

Tuesday, May 27, 1947.

with Chairman Meins, Commissioners McKeown, Whouley, Flaherty and Gadsby.

is given upon petition of A. W. Perry, Inc., for a little of the Boston Edison Company.

J. Cotter, Esq., for petitioner # M. Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Company

Hay continued to September 9, 1947.

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(D. P. U. 7697)

Re supply of electricity by Boston Edison Co.

(7697)

Sitting: McKeown Gadsby

34765 Sept.9,1947

Tuesday, September 2

Chairman Gadsby, Commissioners McKeown, Whoul Present: and Marr.

electricity by Boston Edison Co.

(7697)

Sitting: Gadsby McKeown Flaherty Whouley Marr

A.W. Perry, Ind A hearing was given upon petition of A. W. Perry, Inc. supply of electricity by the Boston Edison Company.

Richard J. Cotter, Esq., for petitioner Richard J. Walsh, Esq., for petitioner Frederick Manley Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Const. Clarence Roberts, Esq., Counsel, for Boston Real Esta David H. Stuart, Esq., Asst. Atty. General, for Common estates of Massachusetts

Hearing continued to September 10,1947, at 10.30 A.M.

(D. P. U. 760)

Onsirman Gadsby, Commissioners McKeown, Whouley, Flaherty and Gadsby.

Meled hearing was given upon petition of A. W. Perry, Inc. of electricity by the Boston Edison Company.

chard J. Cotter, Esq.) for petitioner chard J. Walsh, Esq.) for petitioner aderick Manley Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Company and H. Stuart, Esq., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commonwealth of Massachusetts

continued to September 11,1947.

(D. P. U. 7697)

A. W.Perry Inc. supply ele tricity by Boston Edi son Co.

(7697)

Sitting: Gadsby McKeown Flaherty Whouley Marr

iliu. It was

Complete appoint provisionally to the position of Gas ter Inspector in the Division of Gas, Electric and Water Inspector on Street, Quincy, at an annual salary of \$2280, to be Cleative September 15, 1947, and subject to all rules and regulations of the Division of Civil Service.

Provision app't.Jar MacDon ald as Gas M€

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Voting: Gadsby, Cl Marr . McKeown

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34767 Sept.11,1947

Thursday, September 11

Present: Chairman Gadsby, Commissioners McKeown, Flahers, and Marr.

A.W.Perry, Inc. supply electricity by Boston Edison Co.

(7697)

Sitting: Gadsby McKeown Flaherty Whouley Marr A continued hearing was given upon petition of A. W. P. for supply of electricity by the Boston Edison Company.

Richard J. Cotter, Esq.) for petitioner
Richard J. Walsh, Esq.)
Frederick Manley Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Company
David H. Stuart, Esq., Asst. Atty. General, for Common of Massachusetts

Hearing continued to October 14, 1947.

(D. P. U. 7697

Metropolitan
Transit
Authority trackless
trolley in
Somerville

(7309)

Upon petition of Metropolitan Transit Authority for certifical preliminary to operation of a trackless trolley line in the configuration was taken:

Examination having been made of the trackless trollar the Metropolitan Transit Authority in the city of lone.

ORDERED, That the Department hereby certify that all law relative to the construction of poles, wires and other structures, including apparatus and equipment for the propose of maintaining and operating trackless trolley in over public ways in the city of Somerville as follows:

SOMERVILLE: Cross street, between Broadway and Moone but Highway

have been complied with and that the line appears to be a safe condition for operation.

The Commissioners participating in decision of h but was we

34861 Oct.14,1947

electricity by Boston Edison Co.

(7697)

Sitting: Gadaby McKeown Whouley Flaherty Marr

Re supply of A continued hearing was given upon petition of for a supply of electricity by the Boston Edison

> Richard J. Cotter, Esq., for petitioner Richard J. Walsh, Esq. " " F. M. Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Com David H. Stuart, Esq., Asst. Atty. Gen., for of Massachusetta

Hearing closed.

n motion, it was ħα tte. tor ler.

VOTED: To appoint Michael J. Horrigan, Holden, CommercialExaminer in Motor Vehicle Examiner in the Commercial Motor Vehicle Division of the Department providionally at an annual salary of \$2280, said appointment to be effective as of November 17, 1947, the foregoing subject to all Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regulations.

App't.Micha J.Horrigen Commercial Motor Vehicle Div.

(7438~0s)

Voting: Gad sby Chim. Fla herty McKeown Whouley Marr

con petition of A. W. Perry, Inc. for a supply of electricity by te Boston Edison Company, the following action was taken:

nd Taxi. sengers

Were:

APPEARANCES: Richard J.Cotter, Esq.) for petitioner Richard J.Walsh, Esq.) F. M. Ives, Esq., for Boston Edison Company Clarence Roberts, Esq., for Boston Real Estate Board

David H. Stuart, Esq., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commonwealth of Massachusetts Supply of electricit by Boston Edison Co. A.W. Perry, Inc.

(7697)

The complainant in this matter, A. W. Perry, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Perry), is a corporation which, with its predecessors in interest, has been in the business of owning and managing real estate properties in the City of Boston since 1887. Very early in its history, it installed electric generators in its buildings, apparently selling surplus current. In this connection, it obtained a limited franchise from the City of Boston for the use of the streets. In 1903, it sold this franchise to the defendant, Boston Edison Company (hereinafter referred to as Edison). It proceeded thereafter to buy power from

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Edison both for its own purposes and to resell that power to its tenants. This practice has continued up to the present time.

In addition to selling this power to its tenants,

Perry (or its predecessors in title) has also for

many years resold substantial amounts of Edison's

power to other consumers who are not tenants of Perry's

buildings, but who are located within the same city

block as one of Perry's buildings. Perry makes a profit

on this resale, due to the fact that it buys in wholesale

blocks at low rates and resells at retail.

In the early stages of the industry, while this practice was developing, all of the current furnished was direct current. In fact the production and distribution plant in downtown Boston, which was one of the first areas to use electricity widely, was originally designed for this type of current exclusively. It thereafter became apparent that this distributing system should be designed to accommodate alternating current. Edison determined to accomplish this change gradually, instead of simultaneously in substantial areas, as was done in some other cities.

In the meantime, Edison had begun to consider the problem of resulte of electricity posed by such middleman activities as those of Perry. It determined upon a policy of refusing to extend this practice and particularly to refuse to furnish alternating current for resale to persons other than tenants of the pur-

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chaser. This policy was carried into effect, at least in part, by tariff effective March 1, 1946, Edison's rate D-1, which was stated to be available "for direct current service for any use, and for alternating current service for any use on the premises specified in the agreement for service." Perry's service is furnished under this rate schedule.

(7697)

In 1945, Perry found itself under a very considerable pressure, due in large measure to the invention and extensive use of fluorescent or luminescent lighting, to install alternating current for the use of its tenants and others to whom it resold current. Pursuant to its policy of which warning had been given to Perry or its grantor in 1930 and again in 1937, and in accordance with its interpretation of its filed tariff, Edison has refused to supply alternating current unless Ferry agrees not to resell except to its tenants. This petition is brought by Perry to compel Edison to furnish alternating current without such restriction. Extended hearings were held developing the facts, and we have been furnished with very able briefs by counsel on both sides. It does not seem to us that the difference between direct and alternating current alone furnishes a sound basis for the refusal of Edison to furnish this service, if both types of current are available. If Perry is entitled to be furnished with any service at all, it is entitled to be furnished with alternating current on the same basis

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that the contractual status of the ultimate consumer should make any difference in our decision. We fail to see why the fact that the consumer rents premises from Parry makes him any less a consumer of electric current or any less entitled to the protection of the law and of this Department. We say this with full realization of the ultimate logical conclusions to which this argument may be carried.

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Edison has a gross yearly revenue of about \$50,000.000 Its income balance transferable to profit and less as of December 31, 1946, was \$6,240,025.70, according to its annual return filed as of that date with this Department. It appears that there are in Boston a total of some 6,000 retail customers who are served through privately-owned meters. Edison estimates that it has some 170 customers doing a business similar to that done by Perry, as to 132 of which it is able to make fairly accurate estimates as to the scope of business. These 132 customers now produce a revenue to Edison, under resale practices, of some \$1,304,000, result ing from the sale of 53,603,400 kilowatt hours in 1946. Upon an analysis of these accounts, making the best possible assumption as to distribution as between types of sub-use, it appears that Edison would receive a gross of somewhere near \$2,332,200 for this current if it sold such current direct to the consumers at the rates applied

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able for each consumer's respective type and amount of use. (7697) Stripped down to their bald framework, these figures mean that 132 middlemen in the city of Boston are dividing up a profit derived from electricity which they do not manufacture or distribute (except for relatively short distances) and which is made possible solely by Edison's rate structure, in the amount of more than \$1,000,000 per year. This figure is only about 2% of Edison's gross income, but it is 15% or more of its net. And the additional expense to Edison in handling the newaccounts would not be unduly large: Perry handles the accounts at present at a cost of about 10 to 15 per cent of his gross. Perry is, it appears, one of Edison's largest wholesale customers. It furnishes current at retail to 700 or more customers, through 1200 submeters. It paid Edison \$212.000 in 1946 for all of its current. Edison would have received \$370.000 for the same service if it had sold direct, or additional gross revenue of \$157,600. This Department would consider a request of Edison for \$1,000,000 additional gross revenue per year as a major item on its calendar. Edison's president frankly stated that if Edison had the income these middlemen are getting, it might help avoid increased rates, if it did not actually result in decreased rates to the general public. In fact, the more deeply and dispassionately the record is studied. the more doubt appears as to the economic or legal justification of this practice.

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Perry charges practically all of his customers at the appropriate Edison rates as filed with this Department. But its president admitted that some cases do exist where the consumer receives current from Perry for less than he would otherwise have to pay. We believe this constitutes discrimination. And what assurance is there that Perry will not charge what it pleases for light and power, regardless of Edison's rates? Another unfortunate result of Perry's relationship to Edison came to light when it developed that in at least one case still another middleman had appeared to participate in the profits derived from this resale of As was pointed out in Sixty-seven South current. Munn v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 106 N.J.L. 45, cert. den., 283 U.S. 828, and as Edison's witnesses testified, there is nothing to prevent an extension of this practice of resale to the point where each business block in the city would be furnished current by its own retailer which might so adversely affect Edison's revenues as to require revision of its rates to the detriment of its ordinary customers. And such retailers would, if the complainant's contention is correct, be subject to no control as to prices, practices or service. We are not prepared to arrive at this conclusion unless we are required to do so as a matter of law.

The jurisdiction of this Department to order service to be supplied is granted by sections 92 and 92A of

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General Laws (Ter.Ed.), chapter 164. Section 92 is intended to protect the individual consumer and section 92A applies to sales in bulk, i.e., to other electric companies. (See section 1 of chapter 164.) Neither section is mandatory, leaving it within the power of the Department to refuse such order upon adequate showing. It is well settled that such an order will not issue where the purchaser is a competitor of the seller (Brand v. Water Commissioner of Billerica, 242 Mass. 223; People ex rel N.Y. Edison Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm., 191 App. Div. 237, aff'd. 230 N.Y. 574), and we find and hold that Perry is competing with Edison in the distribution and sale of electricity within the City of Boston. Moreover, section 92A of the statute specifically provides that "such order shall not be made where it appears that compliance therewith would result in permanent financial loss to the corporation." We believe, and so find, that the issuance of such order in this case would result in permanent financial loss to Edison. Furthermore, in section 1 of chapter 164 of the General Laws (Ter.Ed.) an "electric company" is defined as "a corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth for the purpose of making by means of water power, steam power or otherwise and selling, or distributing and selling, electricity ******." By section 76 of the same chapter, this Department is given the broadest sort of supervisory power over all electric companies. Mr. Perry, president of the company, was asked: "And is it fair to say (7697)

that you're in the business of selling and distributing electricity?" His answer, which was currect and inescapable, was: "Yes, sir, I should say it was." We find and hold that complainant is acting as an electric company under the laws of this Commonwealth in reselling the current supplied to it by Edison and is therefore subject to all of the provisions of chapter 164 and of the other applicable statutes.

In our opinion, it makes little difference in arriving at this conclusion whether or not Perry uses the highways in his distribution of current. Public utility businesses are: "Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public." Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, at 535. Among these privileges is the right to use the highways. But there are other privileges as well, one of which is the privilege of carrying on business without competition. And while it is doubtless true, as pointedout in the Wolff Packing Co. case, supra, that the legislative characterization of a given business as a public utility is not necessarily final, still, where the legislaturehas included Perry within the clear terms of the statute, we feel impelled to follow these terms until we are otherwise instructed by the courts. Perry has complied with none of the calls of the statutes

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relating to electric companies. It files no tariffs nor annual reports with this Department. Its security issues have not been submitted for approval nor does it hold any franchise rights. Its counsel contended at the instant hearing that it is not subject to our jurisdiction. To compel Edison to furnish current to Perry for purposes of resale would, in our opinion, be equivalent to a condonation, if not approval, of the type of business which Perry is carrying on. This we decline to do.

We do not feel that we are, by this decision, jeopardizing Edison's revenues through encouraging the installation of private plants to serve Perry's customers. If our reasoning is accurate on the facts before us, Perry has no more right to establish a private plant and sell to its customers without subjecting itself to our jurisdiction and obtaining the necessary authority than it has to buy current for the same purpose. There is no law against Perry's installing a plant to supply current for its own use. In our opinion, there is a law against Perry's manufacturing such current for sale to others.

There may possibly be little essential difference between a tariff provision duly filed with the Department and a reasonable regulation adopted by the company without formal filing. However, since the adoption of a policy such as appears in the instant case results in refusal by the utility to furnish service to applicants of a certain description, we suggest that Edison amend its filed tariffs in this respect rather than to rely upon unpublished rules.

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Our conclusion in this matter agrees with that of the New York commission which was faced in 1939 with an almost identical situation. See Re Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, 30 P.U.R. (N.S.) 257. It agrees also with the determination of various regulatory bodies involving resale of telephone service. See 1015 Chestnut St.Corp. v. Bell Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1931A, 19; Gelsam Realty Co. v. New York Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1929A, 224; Williams & Colmer, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 70 P.U.R. (N.S.) 35. It has very substantial. support in other jurisdictions in many cases where administrative bodies and the courts have upheld the reasonableness of rules and regulations of utilities forbidding the resale of electricity. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Florida, 108 Fla. 657, P.U.R. 1938 E, 157; Sixty-seven South Munn v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 106 N.J.L. 45, P.U.R. 1929 E, 616, cert. den. 283 U.S. 828; Re Potomac Electric Power Co. (D.C.) P.U.R. 1929B, 600; Karrick v. Potomac Electric Power Co.P.U.R. 1932 C, 40; Lewis v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 64 F (2) 701, P.U.R. 1933 C, 155; Re Rates and Rate Structures of Corporations, (N.Y.) P.U.R. 1931 C, 337; Holmes Electric Company, Inc. v. Carolina Power and Light Company, 197 N.C., 766; Re Beloit Water, Gas & Electric Company (Wis.) P.U.R. 1922 E, 133. And we find it very difficult to avoid the application

to the facts before us of the language of the Supreme

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Judicial Court in Brand v. Water Commissioners of Billerica, 242 Mass. 222, at page 228, where the Court said:

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"An even more conclusive answer to the petitioner's claim is that the respondents were under no legal obligation to supply the land company, apart from the existing contract voluntarily made by the parties. By the general character of their customary undertaking, the duty of service, and accordingly the duty of equal service, if any, is owed by the respondents only to the occupiers of premises."

Both Edison and Perry have filed requests for rulings and have waived by stipulation the limitations of section 5 or chapter 25 of the General Laws (Ter.Ed.). Perry's requests Nos. 1 and 4 are granted, and its requests Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are denied. Edison's requests Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are granted, and its requests Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are denied.

After due notice and a public hearing and due consideration being had, it is hereby

ORDERED: That the petition of A. W. Perry, Inc. as amended be and the same hereby is denied.

The Commissioners participating in decision of D.P.U. 7697 were: Gadsby, Chm., Flaherty, McKeown, Whouley

Marr, Commissioner, concurring:

Although I concur in the result of the order of the Department that the Perry Company petition be dismissed, I do not subscribe to all of the findings and rulings of my associates on the Commission and believe that in fairness to all concerned I should state wherein I am not in accord. The Edison Company in its refusal to furnish Perry Company with alternating current for resale to persons other

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than its tenants has, in my opinion, used sound business judgment in its best interests of the public. I believe that this is sufficient ground for its action. That Edison as an electric company benefits or will benefit more is undoubtedly to the public's advantage as clearly presented in the Department's order. The company's stand has been taken with due consideration of such factors as financial, engineering and construction problems peculiar to this electric business. The resale field is one in which the petitioner especially and others have operated profitably for many years, the petitioner supplying his tenants primarily and also certai: other buildings in the same blocks. Perry's activities have been principally the ownership and management of business properties accommodating many tenants. Electric current both for lighting and manufacturing has been in the main supplied incidental to rental, the sums derived from resales of electric current being a small part of total income from realty operations. Our statutes do not expressly cover this situation. Perry Company admittedly was not organized to manufacture and distribute electricity. The Edison Company is so organized. Express provisions are found in the statutes for certain sales in bulk, G.L. (Ter.Ed.), c. 164, s. 92A. Even though petitioner does not come within the terms of this section (s.92A), it cannot, of course, do business with or in competition with Edison in a way to

cause that public service corporation permanent financial (7697) loss. Section 92 of said chapter 164 is sufficiently broad to cover the present situation.

I do not wholly concur in the rulings of the majority of the Commissioners upon the "Petitioner's Requests for Rulings." I am of the opinion that Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which were denied, should as framed be allowed because the words "may find" connote "would be warranted in finding." I would, however, as a matter of fact, find in the negative, i.e., not so find upon each of these Requests except No. 6 as to giving Edison permission "to withdraw from rendering that service (resale) by refusal to supply alternating current at the locations described in the evidence", and except as to No.7, for I find that "the interest of the public" may be served by such permission from the Department as specified in both Requests Nos. 6 and 7. As to No.8, I find that the Department has the power to require the Respondent to supply the Petitioner with alternating current or to refuse such service, and so I would allow Request No.8.

The Petitioner's resale business may be termed ancillary to its real estate operations. This reselling of electrical current is a unique service long carried on openly and apparently without any serious question as to its propriety. The finding of the Department (page 6 of the order) that the Perry Company is an electrical company (de facto), having in mind the definition under section 1 of chapter 164, with the implications drawn from that ruling, puts

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the matter in a new light. A new status is created or established for the resellers of electric current described in this case by this legal construction.

Without going so far as the Order in my own conclusions, I nevertheless have reached the same main conclusion to deny relief and have based it upon the Respondent's right and duty to operate its business wisely in the public interest rather than upon conclusions as to the legal aspects of resale of electric current. Their determination has not seemed to be absolutely essential to a proper disposition of the petition.

New England Upon application of New England Transportation Company, the temporary following action was taken:

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After consideration and in order to provide for unusual, sudden and unforeseen transportation needs between Woods Hole and Boston, it appearing that public convenience and necessity so require, it is

ORDERED: That under the provisions of section 5 of chapter 159A of the General Laws (Tercentenary Edition), the Department hereby grants to the New England Transportation Company a temporary license for sixty (60) days beginning October 31, 1947, and ending December 29, 1947, for the operation of motor vehicles for the carriage of passengers for hire over the following route between Boston and Raynham so as to connect with its existing