COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Suffolk, ss. Division of Administrative Law Appeals
Falmouth Retirement Board,
v. Docket No. CR-08-328
Barnstable County Retirement Board
Appearance for Petitioner:
Nicholas Poser, Esq.
197 Portland Street, 5th Floor
Boston, Massachusetts 02114
Appearance for Respondent:
James H. Quirk, Esq.
P.O. Box 268
Yarmouthport, Massachusetts 02675
Natalie S. Monroe, Esq.
SUMMARY OF RULING
The Barnstable County Retirement Board's motion to dismiss must be denied because the Board did not proffer evidence necessary to support the motion.
RULING ON THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The Falmouth Retirement Board ("Falmouth") filed this appeal to challenge Barnstable County Retirement Board's ("Barnstable") refusal to refund $2,189.30 that Falmouth paid to Barnstable in connection with an individual, Roger Beatty, who made contributions to both retirement systems. Barnstable has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that it does not owe Falmouth a refund as a matter of law. Citing G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(c), Barnstable argues that Falmouth was statutorily required to reimburse Barnstable for the portion of Mr. Beatty's retirement benefits that are attributable to his service in the Falmouth retirement system. Barnstable therefore contends that it is not obligated to refund $2,189.30 that Falmouth previously paid to Barnstable.
Barnstable's motion must be denied because Barnstable has not proffered information and evidence necessary to support its argument. Barnstable's motion does not contain any information about whether Mr. Beatty has retired and, if so, when he retired and the years of creditable service he had at the time of retirement. Nor has Barnstable explained how it calculated the portion of Mr. Beatty's retirement benefits that are attributable to Falmouth. In this regard, Barnstable did not provide any evidence concerning the number of years that Mr. Beatty was a member of the two different retirement systems or the amount of retirement contributions Falmouth received from Mr. Beatty over the years. Indeed, it is not even clear whether the $2,189.30 in dispute is the entire amount that Falmouth paid to Barnstable under G.L. c. 32, or whether it is some portion of Falmouth's payments. Absent these facts and evidence, it is impossible to evaluate the merits of Barnstable's motion to dismiss. Thus, Barnstable has not demonstrated that it is entitled to prevail on its motion.
Barnstable's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPEALS
/s/ Natalie S. Monroe
Dated: March 12, 2009