For purposes of this Article, the following definitions are
applicable:
(a)
Writings and Records. “Writings” and “records”
are documents which consist of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent. Writings
and records do not include photographs, composite pictures, tape recordings,
videotapes, or digital images.
(b)
Original. An “original” of a writing or
record is the writing or record itself and any copy intended to have the same
effect by a person executing or issuing it.
(c)
Duplicate. A “duplicate” is a copy of a
writing or record which is not intended to be an original, the copies being no
more than secondary evidence of the original.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived
from Commonwealth v. Duhamel, 391 Mass. 841, 844, 464 N.E.2d 1352, 1355
(1984) (tape recording); Commonwealth v. Weichell,
390 Mass. 62, 77, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032
(1984) (photographs); Commonwealth v. Balukonis,
357 Mass. 721, 725, 260 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1970) (composite pictures); Smith
v. Palmer, 60 Mass. 513, 520–521 (1850) (best evidence); and Commonwealth
v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294, 846
N.E.2d 1195, 1198–1199 (2006) (videotapes or digital images).
This section is not as extensive as Fed. R. Evid. 1001(1) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid.
1001(1), both of which cover recordings and photographs. “The best evidence
rule is applicable to only those situations where the contents of a
writing are sought to be proved” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 170. “[T]his
rule is usually regarded . . . as not applicable to any objects
but writings. . . . So far, then, as concerns objects not writings,
a photographic representation could be used without accounting for the
original.” Id. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 171, quoting Wigmore,
Evidence § 796 (3d ed. 1940).
See also Commonwealth v. McKay, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 402–403, 853
N.E.2d 1098, 1102–1103 (2006).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived
from Quinn v. Standard Oil Co., 249 Mass. 194, 201, 144 N.E. 53, 55
(1924), and Peaks v. Cobb, 192 Mass. 196, 196–197, 77 N.E. 881, 881–882
(1906).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived
from Augur Steel Axle & Gearing Co. v. Whittier, 117 Mass. 451, 455
(1875) (as to letter-press copy of an original letter in possession of adverse
party, “[t]here was sufficient foundation for the admission of secondary
evidence of the contents of the letter”). See also Meehan v. North Adams Sav. Bank, 302 Mass. 357, 363–364, 19 N.E.2d 299, 302–303
(1939) (admissibility of copy of a letter upheld, not to prove its contents,
but to prove the opponent had received the original letter).