Section 401.    Relevant Evidence

“Relevant evidence” is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 350, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (1990), and is nearly identical to Fed. R. Evid. 401. See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 389 Mass. 308, 310, 450 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1983) (citing with approval Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 401). Massachusetts law accords relevance a liberal definition. See Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83, 546 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1989) (“rational tendency to prove an issue in the case”); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 440, 381 N.E.2d 582, 590 (1978) (“renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence”). The concept of relevancy has two components: (1) the evidence must have some tendency (probative value) to prove or disprove a particular fact, and (2) that particular fact must be material to an issue (of consequence) in the case. Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485, 803 N.E.2d 735, 740 (2004). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 253–254, 892 N.E.2d 299, 312–313 (2008) (inconclusive DNA evidence is admissible on a case-by-case basis provided the evidence “must be probative of an issue of consequence in the case,” such as when defendant questions the integrity or the adequacy of the police investigation; court left open question whether such evidence is admissible in other circumstances), citing Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 871–872, 882 N.E.2d 833, 843–845 (2008); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 412 Mass. 172, 177, 587 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (1992) (“The failure of the police to conduct certain tests is a permissible ground on which to build a defense.”).”

To be admissible, it is not necessary that the evidence be conclusive of the issue. Commonwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 624–625, 694 N.E.2d 862, 866 (1998). It is sufficient if the evidence constitutes a link in the chain of proof. Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144, 810 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (2004). “Evidence must go in by piecemeal, and evidence having a tendency to prove a proposition is not inadmissible simply because it does not wholly prove the proposition. It is enough if in connection with other evidence it helps a little.” Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 467, 76 N.E. 127, 130 (1905). Where the links in the chain are too attenuated, evidence will be excluded as “remote.” DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44, 47 n.3, 533 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 n.3 (1989).

Reliance is placed upon the trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is “substantially outweighed” by risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 831, 840 N.E.2d 939, 948 (2006). Although omitted in a number of cases, a proper explanation of this balancing test includes the term “substantially.” See Note to Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.