SENATE, No. 2549

Report of the Senate committee on Post Audit and Oversight (under the provisions of Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by Chapter 557 of the Acts of 1986) entitled "Decades of Neglect: Recommendations to Improve Dam Safety and Maintenance in Massachusetts" (Senate, No. 2549).


The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Seal of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In the Year Two Thousand and Six.


Decades of Neglect

Recommendations to Improve Dam Safety and Maintenance in Massachusetts

 

A Report of the
Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight

May 2006

Massachusetts Senate
The Honorable Robert E. Travaglini
Senate President

Senator Marc R. Pacheco, Chair
Senator Susan C. Fargo, Vice Chair
Senator Robert A. Havern III
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Senator Richard T. Moore
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Senator Robert L. Hedlund

                               

Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight

Senator Marc R. Pacheco, Chairman

It shall be the duty of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (established under Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws) to oversee the development and implementation of legislative auditing programs conducted by the Legislative Post Audit and Oversight Bureau with particular emphasis on performance auditing. The Committee shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony and compel the production of books, papers, documents and other evidence in connection with any authorized examination or review. If the Committee shall deem special studies or investigations to be necessary, they may direct their legislative auditors to undertake such studies or investigations.

Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau

Jesse L. Stanesa
Director

Jessica Nordstrom
 Author

The Committee would like to acknowledge the contributions from Senator Pacheco’s office, including Mary Wasylyk, Chief of Staff, Kristen Green, General Counsel, and Meghan Reilly, Communications Director.

The Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight would also like to acknowledge contributions from The Nature Conservancy, the Environmental League of Massachusetts, the Joint Committee on the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture, American Riverways, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Department of Fish and Game Riverways Program, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and Taunton elected and emergency management officials.


· Executive Summary ·

 

Nearly 3,000 dams exist throughout the Commonwealth. Many of these dams were built at the turn of the century and still serve important agricultural, recreational, environmental and public safety purposes today. They provide irrigation for farmlands, offer people a place to swim and supply renewable energy through hydroelectric power. Dams also pose inherent public safety risks. Unsafe dams can damage private property, decimate public infrastructure and pollute local ponds with contaminated sediments. A dam failure can cost a community tens of millions of dollars in emergency repairs, cripple businesses and even result in the loss of life. Given the potential impact on communities, dam safety and maintenance should be a top priority for the state.

 

The Office of Dam Safety (ODS), under the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), is in charge of overseeing and regulating all dams in the Commonwealth. The agency is responsible for keeping records and overseeing the maintenance, inspections and repairs of all dams to ensure that they are in safe condition. For nearly three decades, however, public officials and academic leaders have questioned whether the Massachusetts dam safety program has the proper resources to fulfill its mission. Policy reports issued in 1979 and 1985 revealed concerns about staffing, funding, coordination and the state’s commitment to dam safety.

 

These concerns recently resurfaced during the week of October 6, 2005, when historic rainfalls left vast parts of the state submerged in as much as 16 inches of water. A state of emergency was declared in more than 43 communities across the Commonwealth. Officials diligently monitored high-hazard dams that posed an immediate threat to life or property in six communities: Taunton, Southbridge, Concord, Uxbridge, Chicopee and Warren. In Taunton, a private dam located in the heart of the city threatened to buckle under the accumulating rain, forcing local officials to evacuate more than 2,000 people from homes near the dam, close businesses and shutdown the entire downtown area.

 

The residents of Taunton were fortunate. Due to the quick response of local, state and federal officials during the emergency, serious tragedies were averted. It soon became apparent, though, that dam safety regulations mandated by a 2002 state statute had not been promulgated. Without updated regulations, Emergency Action Plans were not issued, inspections were not conducted and violations were not enforced. Fearing statewide deficiencies in the dam safety and maintenance program, the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (Committee) held an oversight hearing on dam safety. Through its investigation of the state’s dam safety policies, oversight and management procedures, the Committee discovered that, despite recent improvements, many of the concerns raised nearly three decades ago are still valid today.

 

Key Findings

·        Nearly three decades after the University of Massachusetts report recognized Massachusetts’ failure to create a complete inventory of dams, an accurate inventory still does not exist.

·        DCR, under the Romney Administration, did not adopt dam safety regulations until three years after they were required by a 2002 state statute.

·        Nearly 49% of dams have not been assessed for any type of structural condition, while at least 5% of dams have no known hazard potential classification.

·        In 2001, only 14% of high-hazard dams had Emergency Action Plans (EAPs). In 2002, the number decreased to 8%, well below the national average of 36%.

·        Enforcement provisions in other environmental state laws are significantly higher than the penalties in the Commonwealth’s dam safety statute.

·        The state employs only seven full-time equivalent (FTE) dam safety staff (3.5 to run the ODS regulatory program and 3.5 to maintain DCR dams) to monitor the state’s 2,950 dams. Requests for increased staffing levels were recently denied by the Romney Administration.

·        Over the last ten years, ODS has received inconsistent and inadequate state funding, which has impaired its ability to manage an effective dam safety program.

·        In October, ODS requested $1.045 million dollars to implement the new dam safety regulatory program. In the FY07 budget, Governor Romney provided only $512,476.

Key Recommendations

  1. ODS must develop a complete and accurate inventory of dams by December 15, 2006.
  2. ODS must inspect all high and significant-hazard dams that were not included in the emergency inspection order, regardless of their condition.
  3. ODS must ensure Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) are developed for all high and significant-hazard dams and available for dam owners and local and state dam safety officials.
  4. Enforcement provisions need to be increased from $500 per day up to $25,000 per violation for high or significant-hazard dams. Fines collected should be dedicated to the Dam Safety Trust and be used for future dam safety needs.
  5. Significantly increase funding for the dam safety program, to meet requests made by ODS. In FY07, provide $1.045 million to ODS for the implementation of the new dam safety regulatory program. Ensure future funding for ODS is maintained.
  6. Provide $10.3 million for capital improvements to DCR owned dams. Priority should be given to high and significant-hazard dams, especially those in unsafe or poor condition. Funding must also be made available for the development of EAPs for state owned dams.
  7. Create a $20 million Dam Safety State Revolving Loan Fund (SRF) to provide low interest loans to assist qualifying private and municipal owners with assessment, repair and removal of dams. Priority should be given to high and significant-hazard dams in unsafe or poor structural condition.
  8. Allow local communities, at their discretion, to use Chapter 90 funds for dam repair, maintenance or removal.

 

  1. Provide additional dam safety and maintenance FTE) staff to ensure public safety is maintained. An additional 8.5 FTE staff are required for ODS to implement the state’s new dam safety regulations. An additional 4.5 FTE staff are needed for DCR to address the current backlog of state owned dams in poor repair.

 

· Overview of Dams ·

 

Any artificial barrier that blocks or diverts the flow of water in a stream or river can be considered a dam. The Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) defines a dam as a structure that is at least 25 feet in height or has the capacity to store at least 50 acre-feet of water.[i] Over the last century, dams have been built on almost every major river in the country and thousands have been constructed across the state. ODS estimates there are 2,950 dams in Massachusetts, but the precise number is unknown because the state does not have an accurate inventory.[1] According to ODS records, more than 50% of the dams in the state are privately owned, 28% are owned by municipalities and 12% are owned by the state.[2] Numerous other man-made structures have been built in the state’s rivers and streams, but do not fall within the DCR definition of a dam.

 

Figure 1: Dam Ownership in Massachusetts

 

Owner

Number of Dams

Percentage

DCR

338

11%

DFG

12

Less than 1%

Other State

13

Less than 1%

Municipal

836

28%

Private

1,669

56%

Utilities

50

2%

ACOE

16

Less than 1%

Other

16

Less than 1%

Total Estimates*

2,950

100%

                      

Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs *estimates based on inaccurate inventory

 

Many of these dams serve important agricultural, recreational, environmental and public safety needs. Dams provide irrigation for farmlands, offer a place for people to swim, help control floods, create a source of drinking water and supply renewable energy through hydropower.

 

By their very nature, dams also pose inherent public safety risks. The millions of gallons of water released when a large dam breaks can cause damage to private properties, decimate public infrastructure and pollute local ponds with contaminated sediments. Unsafe dams pose an even greater threat to the environment, people and property downstream.

 

A breached dam can cost a community tens of millions of dollars in emergency repairs, close businesses and even result in the loss of life. One of the worst dam failures in the country took place in Williamsburg, Massachusetts. In 1874, the Mill River Dam in Williamsburg broke, killing 139 people, damaging factories and destroying 740 homes in four different towns.[3] The last major dam failure in the Commonwealth, which took place in 1968 in Lee, Massachusetts, released 12 million gallons of water, destroyed homes and killed two people.[4] Over the last century, more than 8,000 people worldwide have died as a result of dam failures.[5]

 

Dam failure can be caused by structural deficiencies (e.g. poor design, lack of maintenance), natural disasters (e.g. floods, earthquakes) or human interaction with dams (e.g. vandalism, poor operation, terrorism).[6] According to a report prepared for Congress, “with the exception of seismic or weather events, age is the leading indicator of dam failure.”[7] In Massachusetts, many dams were built during the Industrial Revolution and are either obsolete or in need of serious repair. As the state’s dams continue to age, dam safety and maintenance becomes even more important.

 

There are several management tools state agencies can employ to help mitigate risks, including hazard classifications, inspections, repair or removal, and emergency action plans. A hazard classification system was developed by the federal government in 1979 to categorize dams by their “potential consequences of failure.”[8] A dam classified as “high-hazard” is a structure that would cause considerable damage to public property or life if it failed. “Significant-hazard” dams are those likely to pose a threat, while “low-hazard” dams have little chance of damaging property or injuring people.[9] Hazard classifications do not specify whether or not a dam is unsafe, they simply indicate the amount of damage that would be caused if a dam was to break. Dams can also be assessed by their structural condition and rated as unsafe, poor, fair or good.

 

Regular inspections by civil engineers are critical to identifying deficiencies that could lead to dam failures. Inspection frequency should be based on a dam’s hazard potential, as well as structural condition. The Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) recommends high-hazard dams be inspected annually, significant-hazard dams every two years and all other dams every five years.[10] In order to carry out these responsibilities, the ASDSO recommends that states employ ten regulators for every 250 dams under its jurisdiction.[11]

 

Once problems are identified, it is necessary that dam owners take corrective action, such as repair or removal, to bring the dam into safe condition. According to ASDSO, “for large and moderate sized dams, repairs can cost in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.”[12] Contaminated sediments can significantly increase the cost of a project, especially in a state such as Massachusetts that is required to ship hazardous waste outside its borders.

 

Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are formal plans developed by dam owners to help communities plan for potential dam failures and to mitigate the associated risks. An EAP outlines “procedures and information to assist the dam owner in issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible downstream emergency management authorities of the emergency situation.”[13] Federal guidelines recommend EAPs be developed for every high-hazard dam.[14] While dam owners are responsible for preparing EAPs, state officials are in charge of notifying and protecting the public from potential dam failures.

 

 

According to Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety, an EAP should contain six elements:

  1. Notification Flowchart: outlining key officials to contact during an emergency
  2. Trigger Event: indicating when EAPs should be activated
  3. Defined Responsibilities: for owners, state, and local emergency officials
  4. Preparedness: which includes testing an EAP before an actual failure
  5. Inundation Map: indicating areas that would be flooded during a potential failure
  6. Appendix: containing additional information helpful to the specific site[15]

· Overview of Massachusetts Dam Safety·

 

Unregulated dams have a greater risk of failure and can cause property damage or even loss of life. The government’s role is to minimize the risks through dam safety inspections, maintenance, oversight and enforcement. Chapter 253 of the Massachusetts General Laws is the state statute governing the construction, maintenance and operation of dams in the Commonwealth. Passed in 1921, Chapter 253 has been significantly modified over the years. In 1970, dam oversight was transferred from the county commissioners to the Department of Public Works (DPW) by a special act.[16] Five years later, another special act transferred the authority to approve new dam construction from the DPW to the Department of Environmental Quality and Engineering (Department).[17] At that time, all other oversight functions were transferred as well. A 1979 law required owners to register their dams and for the Department to create an inspection schedule.[18] It also called for the commissioner to develop regulations, which took the Department more than six years to implement.[19] In 1983, the entire dam safety and management program was transferred to the Department of Environmental Management (DEM).[20] Each transfer “served to further weaken the [dam safety] program in terms of staffing, expertise, funding and commitment.”[21]

 

In 2002, Chapter 253 was amended in an effort to shift responsibility of private and municipal dams from the state to individual owners. The new law signed by Governor Mitt Romney, Chapter 330 of the Acts of 2002, made owners financially and legally liable for the maintenance, repairs and, if necessary, removal of their dams. The new law required owners to register with the state and established fines up to $500 per violation. Fines were to be deposited in the Dam Safety Trust and used for future dam safety needs. To implement the changes to the dam safety program, the commissioner was required to develop the first dam safety regulations in ten years. Once again, more than three years passed before regulations were implemented.

 

Currently, the Office of Dam Safety (ODS) resides in the Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), which contains the former DEM. ODS is responsible for promulgating regulations for all public and private dams, including the 338 dams owned by DCR. Maintaining state owned dams is the responsibility of DCR. The dam safety regulations, which were eventually adopted on November 4, 2005, provide guidelines for ODS to create an inventory, hazard classifications, construction or repair requirements, and an inspection schedule.[22] The ODS mission statement says the office “maintains records of dams located throughout the Commonwealth, ensures compliance with acceptable practices pertaining to dam inspections, maintenance, operation and repair of dams.”[23] Since the regulations were just enacted, many of these mandates remain unmet.

· Decades of Neglect ·

 

For nearly three decades, public and academic leaders have raised concerns about the state’s ability to fulfill its dam safety mission. A 1979 report released by the University of Massachusetts discovered the state’s dam safety program suffered from inadequate funding, poor coordination and a lack of public interest. These inefficiencies resulted in inaccurate data, unfunded mandates and weak dam safety and management procedures. Specifically, the report found:

  • “The actual number of dams in the state is not precisely known because of incomplete records.”[24]
  • “Under present dam policy… little is being done about dams subject to state oversight in Massachusetts.”[25]
  • “In no case have legislative mandates been adequately funded, leaving agencies with responsibilities which they can not meet.”[26]
  • “Inconsistent and under-funded dam policy initiatives work to the detriment of dam management across the state.”[27]
  • “Problems stemming from a lack of coordination are a subset of the problems stemming from failure to act.”[28]
  • “Dam policy in Massachusetts suffers from a lack of public and official concern. Except for periodic attention to dam safety (which is aroused only briefly after each dam-break catastrophe)...”[29]
  • “One would expect state dam policy to be well developed and designed to maximize beneficial uses and to minimize the costs associated with those uses. Such a well-developed set of dam policies has been found to be lacking.”[30]

 

The report concluded that the “Massachusetts dam safety program in [sic] a classic case of uncoordinated governmental programs requiring clearer definition of intergovernmental responsibilities, better intergovernmental communication, and greater financial support.”[31]

 

Six years later, the House Post Audit and Oversight (HPAO) Committee also investigated the state’s dam safety program and issued a report. The committee found the program was deficient in three major areas: staff, funding and commitment to dam safety. According to the report, these inefficiencies continued to result in inaccurate data, unfunded mandates and weak dam safety and management procedures. Specifically, the report found:

  • “[Massachusetts] does not have an accurate inventory of dams.”[32]
  • “Dams have not been classified as to their condition and potential for creating the damages and loss of life associated with dam failures.”[33]
  • “Despite the recommendations…that dam safety inspections be made no less than every five years, [the dam safety program] is not, and has not, come close to maintaining such a schedule.”[34]
  • “Although budgeted for four employees, [the dam safety program] currently is operating with only three and, of these, two actually go in the field in order to inspect dams.”[35]
  • “The lack of concern for dam safety in Massachusetts which was noted in the [1979] report… still exists today.”[36]
  • Massachusetts has not come to recognize or accept its [dam safety] responsibility. As a result, the threat to public safety remains large and is not being reduced to any appreciable extent.”[37]
  • “Each succeeding transfer has served to further weaken the [dam safety] program in terms of staffing, expertise, funding and commitment.”[38]
  • “The Massachusetts Dam Safety Inspection Program has never been guided by written regulations.”[39] 
  • The existing program is deficient in at least three major areas: 1) staffing and expertise, 2) funding and 3) commitment.[40]
  • “The purpose of any dam safety program is to prevent the loss of life and property damage associated with dam failures. That goal is not being met in Massachusetts.”[41]

 

The 1979 University of Massachusetts’ report stated that “a well-developed set of dam policies has been found to be lacking.”[42] The HPAO report concluded that nothing had changed in the six years since the report was issued “that would alter that statement today.”[43]

 

The HPAO report made specific recommendations to improve dam safety in the state. It recommended that the state dam safety program:

  • Develop an Inventory of Dams: including location, name of dam, owner, address, date of construction, height, storage and date of last inspection.[44]
  • Increase Staffing Levels: including a multidisciplinary team, that consists of 5 civil engineers, 5 structural engineers, 2 hydraulic engineers, 1 mechanical engineer, 2 geologists, 1 clerical and to contract out for other specialty needs.[45]  
  • Create an Inspection Schedule: with high risk dams being inspected every year.
  • Elevate the Importance of Dam Safety: especially at legislative and executive levels.[46]

 

Both reports challenged whether the agency could carry out an effective program with existing resources. According to a memo obtained by the Boston Globe, former DCR commissioner Kathy Abbott warned that “cuts to the department would jeopardize some of its core functions, which included dam… inspections.”[47] Recent events demonstrate that dam safety concerns raised nearly three decades ago remain just as valid today. 


 

· October Floods ·

 

According to state water condition reports, the average amount of rain that accumulates in Massachusetts throughout the month of October is between three and four inches.[48] During October 2005, however, many parts of the state were submerged in as much as 16 inches of water due to flash floods.[49] According to MEMA, the last time the Commonwealth witnessed a storm of this magnitude was in 1996, when the entire Kenmore MBTA station in Boston was destroyed, costing the state more than $40 million to repair.[50]

 

Due to the October floods, a state of emergency was declared in more than 43 communities across the state. Officials were diligently monitoring high-hazard dams that posed an immediate threat to life or property in six communities: Taunton, Southbridge, Concord, Uxbridge, Chicopee and Warren. As rain continued to accumulate, the 174 year old Whittenton Pond Dam, a high-hazard dam located on the Mill River in the heart of Taunton, was on the brink of collapse. Local, state and federal officials quickly coordinated to evacuate more than 2,000 people from homes near the dam, close businesses and shut down the entire downtown area. Over the following week, water was drained from the surrounding pond and the crumbling sides of the dam were replaced with a new stone wall. The story received widespread attention from local and national media. 

 

While local, state and federal officials worked effectively in Taunton, it soon became clear that without new dam safety regulations they did not have the proper tools to manage the disaster situation. For example, an evacuation plan that should have been made immediately available to local emergency officials was not accessible until the second day of the crisis.[51] When the inundation maps finally arrived, the flood zones and evacuation routes were outdated and inaccurate.

 

As the floods continued throughout the week, it was apparent that the Whittenton Pond Dam was not the only unstable dam in the state. The Governor ordered the inspection of 186 high and significant-hazard dams in unsafe, poor and fair condition. Twenty-four teams (consisting of eight state inspectors, consulting firms and retired experts) conducted inspections of the privately and publicly owned dams. As a result, state-funded repairs were made to eight additional dams: Monument Dam (Freetown), Windsor Reservoir Dam (Dalton), Mountain Lake Dam (Chicopee), Mount Williams Reservoir (North Adams), Houghton Pond Dam (Holliston), Hager Pond Dam (Marlborough), Roberts Meadow Upper Reservoir Dam (Northampton) and Carding Mill Pond Dam (Sudbury).[52] The inspections and repairs cost the state $370,000 in public funds.[53]

 

While federal standards recommend that high-hazard dams be inspected at least every two years, DCR Commissioner Stephen H. Burrington recently stated that “Massachusetts has 3,000 dams and a legacy of a couple of decades of not inspecting them adequately.”[54] Of the 186 dams included in the emergency order, five dams in poor condition had not been inspected in eight years. The Wachusett Reservoir dam in Clinton, a state owned dam listed in fair condition, had not been inspected since 1945.[55]  

 

One dam not included in the governor’s emergency inspection list was the Morey’s Bridge Dam, a significant-hazard dam in Taunton.[56] Located only a mile upstream from the Whittenton Pond dam, the two dams operate in conjunction with one another. The dam is important because the entire flow of Lake Sabbatia on the Mill River “…can be controlled by the gates at the Morey’s Bridge Dam.”[57] 

 

Morey’s Bridge Dam is currently listed in poor condition.[58] A 2005 DCR inspection notice for the Morey’s Bridge Dam stated that the “dam continues to worsen as compared to previous inspection records... [I]f the lake re-impounded under storm conditions with the gates in poor condition, the gates may not be capable of safely impounding water.”[59]  If the Morey’s Bridge Dam failed, then the structural condition of the Whittenton Pond Dam would be subject to additional stress.

 

The conditions of both dams are important because they are located upstream from heavily populated areas. The Committee remains concerned that the Morey’s Bridge Dam was not inspected under Governor Romney’s emergency order because the state does not have an accurate inventory of dams. The Morey’s Bridge Dam may be just one of the several examples of dams in need of inspection or repair. Other dams may need to be removed, which would ultimately eliminate threats to public safety.

 

The state is still calculating the total cost of the storm, though initial estimates from Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) officials indicate that it cost the state between $9-15 million. MEMA reports show that the storm caused $20.6 million worth of damage to individual property and $6.3 million worth of damage to public infrastructure.[60] The city of Taunton, according to MEMA, reported $386,000 in repairs and overtime service.[61] This figure does not include businesses that lost revenue as a result of the storm. Had the Wittenton Pond Dam in Taunton actually failed, the cost to the city and state would have been significantly higher.

 

A federal declaration was awarded to Massachusetts to help municipalities defray costs associated with the flood. The declaration will enable eligible communities to be reimbursed up to 75% of costs incurred from the storm. In addition, the Committee has proposed a statewide flood relief package that would cover the remaining municipal costs.

 


 

· Oversight Hearing ·

 

The flood elevated public awareness and concern for dam safety. While a tragedy was averted in Taunton, the situation exposed deficiencies in the state’s dam safety and maintenance program. In response, the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight conducted a dam safety oversight hearing on October 26, 2005. The hearing presented an opportunity to review current procedures and regulations, as well as to discuss new ways to finance repairs and removal. The goal of the hearing was to take the lessons learned from the local experiences and use them to prevent future tragedies from happening.

 

The Committee invited local and state officials, as well as an expert from the environmental community, to testify at the hearing. The panelists were questioned about the flood, ODS regulations, staff, funding and the state’s commitment to dam safety.

 

The Committee solicited testimony from a panel of local officials and state legislators, including Taunton Mayor Robert G. Nunes, Representative James H. Fagan, Representative Patricia A. Haddad and Taunton MEMA director Richard E. Ferreira. Their testimony included background, a status update of the emergency situation in Taunton and the economic impact of the storm.

 

The state officials’ panel consisted of Stephen R. Pritchard, Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), Stephen H. Burrington, Commissioner of DCR and Christine McCombs, Director of MEMA.

 

Secretary Pritchard, who was appointed EOEA secretary in July 2005, provided a brief overview of DCR, stating that the department is better known for parks and recreation than for dam safety. When questioned by the Committee about staffing levels, he testified that DCR currently employs eight dam safety personnel, which he believed met the state’s dam safety and maintenance needs.

 

Commissioner Stephen Burrington, who was appointed DCR commissioner in September 2005, gave a brief overview of ODS, the emergency inspections and a summary of the draft regulations. He stated that there are 2,950 dams in the state, varying in size, ownership, hazard classification and structural condition. He said that ODS has both regulatory, as well as maintenance functions. The Committee questioned whether ODS should promulgate regulations for the oversight and maintenance of all dams in the state, including the 338 dams owned by DCR, its parent agency. While the commissioner recognized that the functions might need to be separated, the Committee encouraged the agency to develop a strategy with clear deadlines to address whether DCR was the appropriate agency to house the ODS.

 

An overview of the 186 high-hazard dams that had been inspected by the agency was presented by the commissioner. Over three days, 24 teams had gone into the field to inspect the dams. As a result, eight dams (including the one in Taunton) had been repaired and 25 reclassified. When asked why the inspections and repairs were necessary, the commissioner acknowledged that DCR had inherited a “decade of neglect.” The commissioner announced the administration had recently suggested a $10 million capital plan over three years to fix the state’s failing dams.

 

Commissioner Burrington outlined a draft of the new dam safety regulations and told the Committee that DCR anticipated adopting them on November 4, 2005, nearly a month after the storm had begun and three years later than legally required. The regulations instruct DCR to send letters notifying all known dam owners that they were required to comply with the regulations and respond to the department by January 1, 2006. Once identified, dam owners were required to register with the department and provide critical information about their dam (e.g. name, location, etc.). Finally, DCR would issue a certificate of compliance to dam owners who had adhered to the new regulations. Based on years of inaction, the Committee commended DCR for implementing the regulations, but remained skeptical that results would manifest without specific deadlines.

 

MEMA Director Christine McCombs discussed the agency’s role as first responders in the emergency crisis. She said the agency had applied for federal disaster relief and was confident that the state would receive the funding. The agency had set up temporary “disaster emergency centers” throughout the state to help residents affected by the storm.

 

Jim Gomes, President of the Environmental League of Massachusetts (ELM), urged the state to focus on dam removal as a solution, over dam repair, whenever appropriate. He also testified that the overall message of the oversight hearing was the same as previous environmental hearings: EOEA just does not have the proper resources to fulfill its public mission.

 

The Committee stated its hope that the hearing would bring about a more effective and coordinated strategy to address the management of dam safety within the Commonwealth. To accomplish this, the Committee made the following recommendations to ODS:

  • Develop an up to date analysis and inventory of all dams
  • Study all high and significant-hazard dams
  • Determine which dams should be repaired or removed
  • Study which dams could be retrofitted for hydro-electric power
  • Analyze the cost of repair, removal and hydroelectricity
  • Develop a clear dam safety management plan
  • Establish and publicly announce a timeline when goals would be met
  • Look at existing and alternative financing to help municipalities and private owners with dam assessment, repair and/or removal

 

· research ·

 

Through the Committee’s investigation it has become clear that ODS has in fact inherited several decades of neglect. Many of the concerns raised at the hearing were similar to those raised nearly three decades ago. Through subsequent research, interviews with dam safety officials and experts, and review of dam safety policies and practices, the Committee discovered the following deficiencies with the Massachusetts dam safety program:

 

Inventory

 

According to the 1979 UMass and 1985 HPAO reports, Massachusetts did not maintain an accurate inventory of dams. Nearly three decades later, a complete and accurate inventory still does not exist. Dam owners were required by the 2002 state law to provide basic information to ODS, so the office could begin to create an inventory by January 31, 2003. Without regulations, the information was not obtained.

 

A draft inventory was prepared for the Committee in December 2005, but DCR admitted that the inventory was flawed.[62] According the Department of Fish and Game’s Riverways Program, “the office of dam safety advises that as much as 10% of the ownership data may be erroneous or out of date.”[63] The Committee remains concerned that the state still does not have an accurate inventory of dams. However, the Committee understands this is a problem current DCR leaders have inherited and recognizes steps have been taken recently to develop an inventory.

 

During the first week of January 2006, DCR mailed 1,975 dam registration forms to dam owners (inquiring about approximately 2,530 dams).[64] A variety of responses came back, indicating the dam owner in question was deceased, the property had been sold, or the dam had been breached. Of all the notices sent, only 125 forms were returned completed and without errors.[65] In response to the Committee’s investigation, DCR has stated it would have a basic inventory of dams (including total number of dams, owners, location, structural condition and hazard classification) by December 15, 2006.[66]

 

Inspections

 

Federal standards recommend that all dams be inspected at least every five years. Of the 186 dams inspected under emergency order, 35 dams had not been inspected since the 1990s, two had not been inspected since the 1980s and three had not been inspected since the 1970s. The Wachusett Reservoir dam in Clinton, a state owned dam listed in fair condition, had not been inspected since 1945.[67] 

 

In a recent Boston Globe article, Governor Romney’s Communications Director argued that eight staff members could easily conduct 4,000 inspections a year if they each visited two dams per day. The Committee believes this is an unrealistic workload projection for ODS. Under this proposed schedule, engineers would not have enough time to conduct proper inspections or file necessary paperwork. It would also leave ODS without someone to administer the office itself. [68] 

 

According to the Association of State Dam Safety Officials, the “average time for inspection of permitted/approved dams including travel time, on-site inspection time, and report writing may be as much as four (4) man days for high-hazard potential dams, three (3) man days for significant-hazard potential dams, and two (2) man days for low-hazard potential dams. A detailed inspection, analysis and evaluation of a dam… may take as much as two-man months.”[69] As inspections are conducted, any shift of dams to high and significant-hazard classifications will require additional staff to maintain them.

 

Emergency Action Plans

 

Federal dam safety standards recommend that states maintain an EAP for each high and significantly-hazard dam. According to national reports, Massachusetts has a poor reputation for maintaining EAPs. In 2001, only 14% of the state’s high-hazard dams had EAPs. In 2002, the number fell to 8%, well below the national average of 36%.[70] FEMA notes “the absence of an EAP at most state regulated dams is recognized by FEMA as a deficiency in national emergency preparedness.”[71] In the instance of Taunton’s emergency situation, an inundation map was not available until halfway through the crisis. When it arrived, it was outdated and inaccurate.

 

Hazard Classification

 

It is estimated there are at least 10,000 high-hazard dams in the country[72] and approximately 325[73] to 350[74] in Massachusetts. According to the inventory prepared by ODS, the majority (59%) of dams are classified as low-hazard potential. In addition to being concerned that the exact number of high-hazard dams is unknown due to incomplete records, the Committee is troubled to learn that nearly 5% of dams are recorded as having no known hazard potential classification.

 

Hazard classification pie chart

Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs

 

Many high-hazard dams are built within one mile of downtown areas.[75] Therefore, hazard classifications should be re-evaluated and reclassified periodically as new housing units, shopping complexes and schools are built downstream from existing dams.

 

 

Environmental Hazards

 

In addition to traditional public safety risks, dams can also pose considerable environmental risks. Sediments, which build up behind dams, can be contaminated with heavy metals, chemicals and other toxins. When a dam breaks, the contaminated sediments can be released and flow downstream, polluting swimming ponds, drinking water and wildlife habitat. While dams in Massachusetts are classified by potential hazard to property or life, they are not assessed by potential environmental hazards. According to a report prepared for the Massachusetts Riverways Program, “only a fraction of the sediment impounded behind the more than 3,000 dams in Massachusetts has been sampled and analyzed for contaminants.”[76] Since the vast majority of dams are classified as low-hazard, they are inspected less frequently. However, low-hazard dams may present significant environmental risks to communities and require increased monitoring from dam safety officials.

 

Structural Condition

 

Dam safety officials also measure the structural condition of dams and rate them in unsafe, poor, fair or good condition. According to the DCR inventory, 49% have not been assessed for any type of structural condition.[77] This is problematic because hundreds of dams could be in either unsafe or poor condition, without local or state officials being aware of their unstable situation. Of those dams that are classified in either poor or unsafe condition, 43% are privately owned, 40% are owned by municipalities and 16% are owned by the state.[78]

Structural condition pie chart

Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs

                                                                 

The structural condition of dams tends to worsen as they age. Therefore, older dams should be made a priority during inspections.

 

Removal

 

Dam removal can provide valuable environmental, public safety and economic benefits. Since dams block the normal flow of a river or stream, their removal can restore rivers, fish runs and wildlife habitat to their natural condition. According to American Rivers, removing a dam is often more cost effective than repairing it, especially since removal is a permanent solution.[79] In Wisconsin, dam removal costs four to five percent less than repair.[80] The number of dams that need to be inspected and maintained is effectively reduced through dam removal. With fewer dams, the hazard risks associated with potential dam failures are also permanently eliminated.

 

According to Mark Cullinhan, former director of the state’s dam safety program, 80% of the state’s high-hazard dams should be removed because they no longer serve a purpose.[81] Despite the benefits and need for dam removal, only three dams have been removed in Massachusetts (Old Berkshire Mill Dam, Billington Street Dam and the Silk Mill Dam). Currently, the state does not maintain a list of dams that are candidates for removal.[82]

 

Before a dam can be removed, local, state and federal permits are required. Compared to many other states, Massachusetts’ dam removal permitting process is extremely complex and burdensome. At least 15 different permits are typically required, making the process time consuming and expensive. As EOEA stated in a press release, “proactive dam removal is often dramatically delayed by an extensive review process and dam owners are frequently discouraged from proceeding…”[83] In an attempt to streamline the state’s dam removal permitting process, EOEA has convened a working group, consisting of environmental experts, engineers and dam safety officials.

 

Hydroelectricity

 

As energy prices continue to soar, alternative sources of energy are being explored by scientists, environmentalists and public officials. One alternative is hydroelectricity, which converts water from a dam into a renewable source of energy.  Hydroelectricity is viewed as clean energy because it does not “contribute to global warming, air pollution, acid rain, or ozone depletion.” [84] In addition to being a renewable resource, hydroelectricity is cost effective. According to the 1979 UMass report, “On any realistic life-cycle cost basis, hydroelectric power is the cheapest possible way to obtain power. It is fuel free. Its operating costs are minimal. Its maintenance costs are modest. Its construction costs can be amortized over an indefinite period of time.”[85] In 2002, hydroelectric dams met more than 15% of the Commonwealth’s power needs, generating significantly more electricity than other renewable sources such as wind.[86] While hydroelectricity is not the only answer, building more fish-friendly, hydroelectric dams, retrofitting existing dams or rehabilitating antiquated hydroelectric dams so they can run at full capacity could reduce the Commonwealth’s dependency on non-renewable energy.

 

Enforcement

 

DCR has the ability to issue fines, $500 per offense, to dam owners who violate the state’s dam safety regulations. Fines are supposed to be placed in the statutorily created Dam Safety Trust, so the money can be used for future dam safety needs.[87] However, DCR never established the Trust or enforced a single dam safety violation.[88] Money collected from fines should have been used for additional inspections, repairs, removal or other costs associated with dam safety.

 

Fines established in other environmental state laws, such as the Massachusetts Clean Water Act and the Hazardous Waste Management Act, are significantly higher than those found in the Commonwealth’s dam safety statute. For example, violators of the Clean Water Act are subject to fines of up to $25,000 per day.[89] The Hazardous Management Waste Act has even stronger enforcement provisions. In addition to fines up to $100,000, violators of the law could be subject to 20 years in prison.[90] Given the severe environmental and public safety risks associated with potential dam failures, stronger enforcement provisions would help elevate the importance of dam safety.

 

Staff

 

According to the 1985 HPAO report, the Massachusetts dam safety program was operating with only three employees (despite being budgeted for four) and only two were sent into the field to conduct inspections.[91] At the time, the report concluded there was not enough staff to adequately fulfill the program’s regulatory mandates and recommended an increase in personnel.

 

While the number of ODS staff has increased, the agency has not come close to meeting HPAO recommendations. Secretary Pritchard testified at the oversight hearing that DCR employs eight dam safety staff to oversee and maintain the estimated 2,950 dams throughout the state. However, according to DCR’s human resources department, Massachusetts employs only seven full-time equivalent (FTE) dam safety staff: 3.5 for ODS to run the dam safety regulatory program and another 3.5 for DCR to maintain the 338 state owned dams.[92]

 

Pennsylvania’s dam safety program, which is responsible for a comparable number of dams (3,044) as Massachusetts, has a staff of 24 people.[93] Federal dam safety standards recommend at least 10 dam safety employees for every 250 dams under state regulations. By these standards, Massachusetts should have a dam safety staff of 120 people (though independent contract employees could be used to augment this number). Only California, Florida and Puerto Rico have the number of staff suggested by federal standards.[94]

 

Environmental experts claim ODS needs at least an additional five employees to implement and run the new regulatory program.[95] After the hearing, DCR reassessed their needs for additional staff and requested another 8.5 ODS and 3 DCR staff. The request for additional personnel was recently denied in the FY07 budget by the Romney Administration, which has continued to defend the dam safety program and has maintained the needs of the Commonwealth are being met. [96]

 

Governance

 

At the Oversight Hearing, the Committee questioned whether it is appropriate for ODS to regulate and oversee all the dams in the state, including the 338 dams owned by DCR, its parent agency. The Committee is concerned that the oversight of state owned dams will be compromised and questions whether DCR is the proper agency to house ODS. It must be noted that the 1985 HPAO report found that transferring the dam safety program between different agencies had weakened the program in terms of staffing and funding.

Funding

 

ODS receives two types of state funding: annual funding from DCR’s budget and capital funding from the administration. ODS did not have its own line-item in the state operating budget and was subject to DCR’s internal funding prioritization.

 

Over the last ten years, funding for ODS has fluctuated drastically. In 2000, total state funding for ODS was cute by 76%. While some funding was restored during subsequent years, ODS funding was again cut by 73% in 2003.[97] Inconsistent funding has prevented ODS from committing to adequate staffing levels, providing effective oversight and management, and developing dam safety regulations.

  Dam safety funding graph

 
 


In response to the oversight hearing, DCR requested an operational budget of $3.8 million over three years for ODS to implement the new dam safety regulation program.[98] While the governor’s FY07 budget created a separate line-item (2800-0700) for ODS, it appropriated only $512,476 for the office.[99]

 

A 2004 capital deficiency report cited that $32 million is needed to repair the 338 dams owned by the state.[100] The Romney Administration suggested a plan that commits one third of that amount ($10.3 million) to fund the repair of state owned dams.[101]

 

It is difficult to pinpoint the average cost of dam repair or removal, since each project varies in size and scope, but the cost can be exorbitant. According to the ASDSO, “for large and moderate sized dams, repairs can cost in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.”[102] Dam removal can cost $100,000 to $1.5 million, according to American Rivers, a non-profit organization that specializes in river restoration.[103]

 

Other states fund dam repair and removal in a variety of ways. For example, Wisconsin bonded $11 million over 10 years to provide grants to municipalities.[104] Massachusetts previously awarded grants to help local communities alleviate the cost of repair and removal, but no money has been appropriated since 2003.[105] While Chapter 330 of the Acts of 2002 holds municipal and private owners responsible for the cost of repairs or removal, the high costs have caused some dam owners to abandon their dams.


 

· Findings·

 

Dam Safety Data and Information

·        Massachusetts still does not have a complete and accurate inventory of dams, nearly three decades after an UMass report published the same finding.

·        ODS was required by a 2002 state statute to obtain basic information from dam owners by January 31, 2003. Initial notices of inquiry were not sent to dam owners until three years later.  

·        Dam safety regulations were adopted on November 4, 2005, nearly three years after they were required by a 2002 state statute.

·        In October 2005, 186 high and significant-hazard dams were inspected under the governor’s emergency order. Of those dams, 35 had not been inspected since the 1990s, two had not been inspected since the 1980s and three had not been inspected since the 1970s. The Wachusett Reservoir Dam in Clinton had not been inspected since 1945.

·        The Morey’s Bridge Dam, a significant-hazard dam in Taunton, was not included in the governor’s emergency inspection order. This may be just one of several significant-hazard dams in need of inspection or repair, while other dams may even need to be removed.

·        Based on existing data, at least 5% of dams have no known hazard potential classification.

·        In 1985, 56 dams were recorded in unsafe structural condition.[106] By 2005, the number of unsafe dams had been reduced to 19, although nearly 49% of dams have not been assessed for any type of structural condition.

·        ODS classifies dams by potential hazard to property or life, but does not assess dams for possible environmental hazards.

·        According to national reports, Massachusetts has a poor reputation for maintaining Emergency Action Plans. In 2001, only 14% of high hazard dams had EAPs, which in 2002 was reduced to 8%. The national average is 36%.

·        Fines are supposed to be deposited in the statutorily created Dam Safety Trust. The Trust was never established, nor has a single dam safety violation been enforced.

·        Enforcement provisions in environmental state laws, such as the Massachusetts Clean Water Act and the Hazardous Waste Management Act, are significantly higher than those found in the Commonwealth’s dam safety statute.

·        Only three dams have been removed in Massachusetts, despite the documented benefits and cost-effectiveness of dam removal. In addition, the state does not maintain a list of dams that are candidates for removal.

·        In 2002, hydroelectric dams met more than 15% of the state’s power needs, generating significantly more electricity than other renewable sources such as wind.

Dam Safety Program

·        There are only seven full-time equivalent (FTE) dam safety staff (3.5 to run the ODS regulatory program and 3.5 to maintain DCR dams), despite claims from the Romney Administration that the program employs eight dam safety personnel.

·        The administration claim eight full-time staff could conduct 4,000 inspections per year. This inspection schedule is not a realistic projection. Under this proposed schedule, engineers would not have enough time to conduct proper inspections or file necessary paperwork. It would also leave ODS without someone to administer the office itself. 

·        Federal dam safety standards recommend at least 10 dam safety employees for every 250 dams under state regulations. By these standards, Massachusetts should have a dam safety staff of 120 people (though this number could be augmented by contracting independent engineers and inspectors).

  • DCR requested an additional 8.5 staff for the ODS dam safety regulatory program and another three staff to maintain the state owned dams. Requests for additional staff were recently denied by the Romney Administration.
  • In 1985, the HPAO report found the dam safety program had been weakened by transferring the program between different agencies.
  • DCR is required by a 2002 state statute to prepare an annual report on the effectiveness of the dam safety program and submit it to the Joint Committee on the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture, as well as the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees. No report has been filed.

Funding

·        To facilitate dam repair and removal projects, Wisconsin bonded $11 million over 10 years to provide grants to municipalities

·        Massachusetts provided grants to help local communities with repair and removal, but no money has been distributed since 2003.

·        ODS has received inconsistent and inadequate state funding, which has impaired its ability to manage an effective dam safety program.

·        In FY07, ODS requested $1.045 million to implement the new dam safety regulation program. Governor’s Romney’s budget for FY07 appropriated only $512,476 for the office.

·        A 2004 capital deficiency report cited $32 million is needed to repair the 338 dams owned by the state.

 

 

 

Commitment

·        The 1979 UMass and 1985 HPAO reports cite that the administration’s lack of commitment to dam safety resulted in inadequate funding and staffing, as well as an increase in public safety concerns. Nearly three decades later, the Committee has not discovered any ascertainable increase in the commitment to dam safety.


 

· Recommendations ·

 

Essential Dam Safety Information

  1. ODS must inspect all high and significant-hazard dams that were not included in the emergency inspection order, regardless of their condition.

 

  1. ODS must ensure Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) are developed for all high and significant-hazard dams. A template should be developed and available for all dam owners. ODS needs to ensure necessary local and state dam safety officials have immediate access to EAPs in the event of a dam failure.

 

  1. ODS must develop a complete inventory of dams by December 15, 2006. ODS must update the inventory of dams on an annual basis, including the names of owners who have failed to meet regulatory requirements, dams in non-compliance, abandoned dams and the state’s plans for those dams.

 

  1. ODS must develop an inspection schedule, as required by dam safety regulations, to ensure all dams are inspected no less than every five years.

 

  1. ODS must review the hazard classifications of all dams to ensure their accuracy. After the initial review, hazard classifications should be reviewed every five years and as new developments (such as housing complexes or schools) are built near existing dams. 

 

  1. ODS must review opportunities to incorporate environmental hazard ratings with traditional public safety evaluations.

 

  1. EOEA must identify dams that are eligible candidates for removal. EOEA shall consider dam removal, in addition to repairs, as a remedial option where appropriate. The administration needs to streamline the state’s permitting process for dam removal by December 31, 2006. The administration needs to ensure capital funds are available for dam removal, as well as repairs.

 

  1. ODS shall calculate the average costs of dam repair versus dam removal.

 

  1. ODS needs to identify opportunities in new and existing dams (in consultation with the Department of Fish and Game and The Massachusetts Technology Collaborative) that are capable of producing electricity through hydroelectricity. All projects should be assessed for their potential impact on stream flow, the environment, fish passage, and wildlife habitat. Once identified, DCR must undertake efforts to encourage the development of fish-friendly hydro-electric dams in an attempt to reduce the state’s dependence on non-renewable energy sources.

 

  1. DCR shall (in conjunction with the Executive Office of Public Safety and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency) review the Committee’s homeland security concerns relative to dam safety. The Committee will send a memorandum to the Executive Office of Public Safety with its concerns.

Massachusetts Dam Safety Program

  1. Provide additional dam safety and maintenance full-time equivalent (FTE) staff to ensure public safety is maintained. An additional 8.5 FTE staff are required for ODS to implement the state’s new dam safety regulations. An additional 4.5 FTE staff are needed for DCR to address the current backlog of state owned dams in poor repair.

 

  1. ODS shall convene annual meetings on dam safety to improve coordination and communication between local and state dam safety officials at various agencies, such as DCR, ODS and MEMA. These meetings shall include strategies to improve public awareness about dam safety.

 

  1. ODS should consider supplementing ODS engineers to inspect DCR owned dams, to ensure the oversight of state-owned dams is maintained.

 

  1. ODS enforcement provisions need to be increased from $500 per day up to $25,000 per violation for high or significant-hazard dams. Fines collected should be dedicated to the Dam Safety Trust and be used for future dam safety needs.

 

  1. ODS needs to establish an interdisciplinary team to develop a dam management plan. The team should consist of representatives from EOEA, DCR, DEP, EOPS and MEMA. The management plan should include recommendations to: a) manage high and significant-hazard dams, b) enforce dams in non-compliance with regulations, c) repair or remove dams to protect public safety, property, wildlife habitat or improve migratory fish passage, d) educate dam owners about how to implement EAPs. ODS, in consultation with the commission, shall file a written report of its findings and recommendations with the Committee by December 15, 2006.

Funding

  1. Significantly increase FY07 funding for dam safety and maintenance program, in line with requests made by ODS. In FY07, provide $1.045 million to ODS for the implementation of the new dam safety regulatory program. Ensure that future funding for ODS is maintained.

 

  1. Provide $10.3 million for capital improvements to DCR owned dams. Priority should be given to high and significant-hazard dams, especially those in unsafe or poor condition. Funding shall be made available for the development of EAPs for state owned dams.

 

  1. Allow local communities, at their discretion, to use Chapter 90 funds for dam repair, maintenance or removal.

 

  1. Create a $20M Dam Safety State Revolving Loan Fund (SRF) to provide low interest loans to assist qualifying private and municipal owners with assessment, repair and removal of dams. Priority should be given to high and significant-hazard dams in poor or fair structural condition.

 



[i] An “‘acre-foot’ is a unit of volumetric measure that would cover one acre to a depth of one foot….1 million U.S. gallons = 3.068 acre foot.” Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, 302 CMR 10:00-Dam Safety, Sec 10.03: Definitions, (4 Nov 2005).

 

 



[1] Senate Post Audit and Oversight, “Dam Safety Meeting”, State House, 14 Nov. 2005.

[2] EOEA, “Ownership: Dams in the Commonwealth”, e-mail to author, 13 Dec. 2005.

[3] “Frequently Asked Questions”, Association of State Dam Safety Officials, <http://www.damsafety.org/faq/faq.aspx?groupId=14&categoryId=7>, Path: “What Were the Worst Dams in U.S. History?”.

[4] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985) 7.

[5] “Dams in Connecticut: Their History, Use & Regulation”, CT Department of Environmental Protection, (1998-2004), <http://dep.state.ct.us/wtr/dams/damsintro.htm>.

[6] “Dam Failures”, US Army Corps of Engineers, (Sept. 2002), 1, <http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/publicmenu/DOCUMENTS/HHD/Dams_Interesting_facts.pdf >.

[7] Powers, K., CRS Report for Congress, Aging Infrastructure: Dam Safety, (Washington: GPO, 2005), 5.          

[8] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, 302 CMR 10:00-Dam Safety, Sec 10.03: Definitions, (4 Nov 2006).

[9] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, 302 CMR 10:00-Dam Safety, Sec 10.06: Size and Hazard Classification, (4 Nov. 2006).

[10] United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Model State Dam Safety Program, FEMA 316, (Washington: GPO, 1998), 15.

[11] Powers, K., CRS Report for Congress, Aging Infrastructure: Dam Safety, (Washington: GPO, 2005), 10.

[12] United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Model State Dam Safety Program, FEMA 316, (Washington: GPO, 1998), 28.

[13] United States, FEMA, Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Emergency Action Planning for Dam Owners, FEMA 64, (Washington: GPO, 2004), 3.

[14] United States, FEMA, Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety, FEMA 93, (Washington: GPO, 2004), 46.

[15] United States, FEMA, Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Emergency Action Planning for Dam Owners, FEMA 64, (Washington: GPO, 2004), 4-5.

[16] Massachusetts Special Act, Ch. 595 of the Acts of 1970, 28 July 1970.

[17] Massachusetts Special Act, Ch. 706 of the Acts of 1975, 25 Nov. 1975.

[18] Massachusetts Special Act, Ch. 722 of the Acts of 1979, 13 Nov. 1979.

[19] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 6.

[20] Massachusetts Special Act, Ch. 589 of the Acts of 1983, 17. Dec. 1983.

[21] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 7.

[22] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, 302 CMR 10:00-Dam Safety, 4 Nov. 2005.

[23] “Office of Dam Safety”, The Department of Conservation and Recreation, <http://www.mass.gov/dcr/pe/damSafety/index.htm>.

[24] Edward R. Kaynor, Dam Policy in Massachusetts, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1979), 1: footnote.

[25] Ibid, 69.

[26] Ibid, 58.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid, 44.

[29] Ibid, 3.

[30] Ibid, 1.

[31] Ibid, B-12.

[32] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 6.

[33] Ibid, 2.

[34] Ibid, 6.

[35] Ibid, 5.

[37] Ibid, 3.

[38] Ibid, 7.

[39] Ibid, 4.

[40] Ibid, 5.

[41] Ibid, 1.

[42] Edward R. Kaynor, Dam Policy in Massachusetts, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1979) 1.

[43] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 4.

[44] Ibid, 37.

[45] Ibid, 46.

[46] Ibid, 48.

[47] Helman, Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,” Boston Globe, 20 Oct. 2005. 

[48] Massachusetts. Department of Conservation and Recreation, “Massachusetts Monthly Precipitation Composite Estimate”, Oct. 2005, <http://www.mass.gov/dcr/waterSupply/rainfall/reports/1005comp.xls>.  

[49] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Burrington, Stephen, EOEA Press Conference, State House, (Boston: MA) 24 Oct. 2005. 

[53] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Program Implementation Plan, 28 Oct. 2005.

[54] Helman, Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,” Boston Globe, 20 Oct. 2005. 

[55] Massachusetts. Department of Conservation and Recreation, Division of Dam Safety, “Inspection Reports: Unsafe, Poor, Fair Condition Dams,”19 Oct. 2005.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Massachusetts, Department of Environmental Management, Office of Dam Safety, Inspection/Evaluation Report: Mill River Dam, (MA, 1998), MA 00813, 10.

[58] EOEA, “Re: Morey’s Bridge Dam, Taunton-Pacheco Inquiry”, e-mail to the author, 9 May 2006.

[59] Salomaa, William, Letter to Jefferson Development Partners, 15 Aug. 2005, (Boston: MA), DCR.

[60] Ken McBride, “”Follow Up Questions”, e-mail to the author, 27 April 2006.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Senate Post Audit and Oversight, “Dam Safety Meeting”, State House, 14 Nov. 2005.

[63] Fuss & O’Neill, Inc.  Watershed Scale Assessment of Environmental Impacts and Hazards of Dams: Opportunities to Integrate the Environmental Hazards of Sediment Impounded Behind Dams into Natural Resource Decision Making, (2004), 5.

[64] EOEA, “Re: Dam registration status”, e-mail to the author, 26 April 2006.

[65] Ibid.

[66] EOEA, “Re: Pacheco Follow Up: Dam Safety Legislation”, e-mail to the author, 15 Nov. 2005.

[67] Massachusetts. Department of Conservation and Recreation, Division of Dam Safety, “Inspection Reports: Unsafe, Poor, Fair Condition Dams”, 19 Oct. 2005.

[68] Committee Calculations: 262 state business days/year x 2 inspections/ day x 8 employees = 4,192 inspection annually

[69] United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Model State Dam Safety Program, FEMA 316, (Washington: GPO, 1998), 11.

[70] “NDSP Activities: State Accomplishments”, FEMA: National Dam Safety Program, (9 Dec. 2004), <http://www.fema.gov/fima/damsafe/accomplishments.shtm>.

[71] United States, FEMA, Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety: Emergency Action Planning for Dam Owners, FEMA 64, (Washington: GPO, 2004), 3.

[72] “Dam Safety 101”, Dam Safety Coalition, (Washington: D.C.) <http://www.damsafetycoalition.org/about/101.html>.

[73] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Maintenance Program, Inventory of All Dams in the Commonwealth, 13 Dec. 2005.

[74] “Massachusetts River Restore Program”, Riverways Program, <http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/river/pdf/riverrestore_factsheet.pdf>.

[75] Coleman, K., U.S. Dams: Is Security Seeping Through the Cracks”, Government Security, 1 Dec. 2005, <http://govtsecurity.com/mag/us_dams_security/index.html>.

[76]Fuss & O’Neill, Inc., Watershed Scale Assessment of Environmental Impacts and Hazards of Dams: Opportunities to Integrate the Environmental Hazards of Sediment Impounded Behind Dams into Natural Resource Decision Making, (2004), 1.

[77] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Maintenance Program, Inventory of All Dams in the Commonwealth, 13 Dec. 2005.

[78] Ibid.

[79]  Laura Wilder, phone interview with author, 6 March 2006.

[80] Graf, William, ed. Dam Removal Research: Status and Prospects, (Washington: GPO, 2003), 43, <http://www.penobscotriver.org/Dam_Research_FullReport.pdf>.

[81] Helman, Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,” Boston Globe, 20 Oct. 2005. 

[82] EOEA, “Re: Riverways Program Information”, e-mail to the author, 13 Dec. 2005.

[83] Massachusetts, EOEA, Press Release, “Dam Removal Process to be Streamlined”, 27 Jan. 2006.

[85] Neither Edward R. Kay nor, Dam Policy in Massachusetts, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1979), 31.

[86] United States, Department of Energy, “State Electricity Profiles 2002,” Energy Information Administration, EIA-0629 (Washington: GPO, 2004).

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/massachusetts.pdf >

[87] Massachusetts General Laws, Ch. 29, Sec 2FFF.

[88] EOEA, e-mail to author, 14 Nov.2005.

[89] Massachusetts General Laws, Ch. 21, Sec. 34C.

[90] Massachusetts General Laws, Ch. 21C, Sec. 10.

[91] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 5.

[92] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Program Implementation Plan, 28 Oct. 2005.

[93] “State-By-State Statistics on Dams and State Safety Regulation-2004”, Association of Dam Safety Officials. (2004), <http://www.damsafety.org/>, Path: “State Dam Safety Program Statistics”.

[94] Powers, K., CRS Report for Congress, Aging Infrastructure: Dam Safety, (Washington: GPO, 2005) 10.

[95] “Green Budget Fiscal Year 2007: Reclaiming Our Environmental Rights”, Environmental League of Massachusetts, (Boston: MA, 2006), 5.  

[96] Massachusetts Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, “House Bill No. 2”.

[97] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation, Office of Dam Safety: Total Program Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1995-Fiscal Year 2005.

[98] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Program Implementation Plan, 28 Oct. 2005.

[99] Massachusetts Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, “House Bill No. 2”.

[100] Massachusetts, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Preliminary Baseline Assessment Capital Deficiency Estimates, (2004).

[101] Massachusetts, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Dam Program Implementation Plan, 28 Oct. 2005.

[102] United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Model State Dam Safety Program, FEMA 316, (Washington: GPO, 1998), 28.

[104] Powers, K., CRS Report for Congress, Aging Infrastructure: Dam Safety, (Washington: GPO, 2005), 15.

[105] Ibid, 14.

[106] Massachusetts, House of Representatives, House Post Audit and Oversight Committee, Massachusetts Dams…Are They Safe?, (Boston: MA, 1985), 4.