Report of the Senate committee on Post Audit and Oversight (under the provisions of Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by Chapter 557 of the Acts of 1986) entitled "Decades of Neglect: Recommendations to Improve Dam Safety and Maintenance in Massachusetts" (Senate, No. 2549). |
A Report
of the
Senate Committee on Post
Audit and Oversight
May 2006
Senator Marc R. Pacheco, Chair
Senator Susan C. Fargo, Vice Chair
Senator Robert A. Havern III
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Senator Richard T. Moore
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
It shall be the duty of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (established under Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws) to oversee the development and implementation of legislative auditing programs conducted by the Legislative Post Audit and Oversight Bureau with particular emphasis on performance auditing. The Committee shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony and compel the production of books, papers, documents and other evidence in connection with any authorized examination or review. If the Committee shall deem special studies or investigations to be necessary, they may direct their legislative auditors to undertake such studies or investigations.
Jesse L. Stanesa
Director
Jessica Nordstrom
Author
The Committee would like to acknowledge the contributions from Senator Pacheco’s office, including Mary Wasylyk, Chief of Staff, Kristen Green, General Counsel, and Meghan Reilly, Communications Director.
The Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight would also like to acknowledge contributions from The Nature Conservancy, the Environmental League of Massachusetts, the Joint Committee on the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture, American Riverways, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of Conservation and Recreation, Department of Fish and Game Riverways Program, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and Taunton elected and emergency management officials.
· Executive Summary ·
Nearly 3,000 dams exist throughout the Commonwealth. Many of
these dams were built at the turn of the century and still serve important agricultural,
recreational, environmental and public safety purposes today. They provide
irrigation for farmlands, offer people a place to swim and supply renewable
energy through hydroelectric power. Dams also pose inherent public safety
risks. Unsafe dams can damage private property, decimate public infrastructure
and pollute local ponds with contaminated sediments. A dam failure can cost a
community tens of millions of dollars in emergency repairs, cripple businesses
and even result in the loss of life. Given the potential impact on communities,
dam safety and maintenance should be a top priority for the state.
The Office of Dam Safety (ODS), under the Department of
Conservation and Recreation (DCR), is in charge of overseeing and regulating all
dams in the Commonwealth. The agency is responsible for keeping records and overseeing
the maintenance, inspections and repairs of all dams to ensure that they are in
safe condition. For nearly three decades, however, public officials and academic
leaders have questioned whether the
These concerns recently resurfaced during the week of
The residents of
Key Findings
·
Nearly three decades after the
·
DCR, under the Romney Administration, did not adopt
dam safety regulations until three years after they were required by a 2002
state statute.
·
Nearly 49% of dams have not been assessed for any
type of structural condition, while at least 5% of dams have no known hazard
potential classification.
·
In 2001, only 14% of high-hazard dams had Emergency
Action Plans (EAPs). In 2002, the number decreased to 8%, well below the
national average of 36%.
·
Enforcement provisions in other environmental
state laws are significantly higher than the penalties in the Commonwealth’s
dam safety statute.
·
The state employs only seven
·
Over the last ten years, ODS has received
inconsistent and inadequate state funding, which has impaired its ability to
manage an effective dam safety program.
·
In October, ODS requested $1.045 million dollars
to implement the new dam safety regulatory program. In the FY07 budget,
Governor Romney provided only $512,476.
Key Recommendations
·
Overview of Dams ·
Any artificial barrier that blocks or diverts the flow of
water in a stream or river can be considered a dam. The Massachusetts
Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) defines a dam as a structure
that is at least 25 feet in height or has the capacity to store at least 50
acre-feet of water.[i] Over the last century, dams have
been built on almost every major river in the country and thousands have been
constructed across the state. ODS estimates there are 2,950 dams in
Figure 1: Dam Ownership in
|
Owner |
Number of Dams |
Percentage |
|
DCR |
338 |
11% |
|
|
12 |
Less than 1% |
|
Other State |
13 |
Less than 1% |
|
Municipal |
836 |
28% |
|
Private |
1,669 |
56% |
|
Utilities |
50 |
2% |
|
ACOE |
16 |
Less than 1% |
|
Other |
16 |
Less than 1% |
|
Total Estimates* |
2,950 |
100% |
Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs *estimates based on inaccurate inventory
Many of these dams serve important agricultural,
recreational, environmental and public safety needs. Dams provide irrigation
for farmlands, offer a place for people to swim, help control floods, create a
source of drinking water and supply renewable energy through hydropower.
By their very nature, dams also pose inherent public safety risks.
The millions of gallons of water released when a large dam breaks can cause damage
to private properties, decimate public infrastructure and pollute local ponds
with contaminated sediments. Unsafe dams pose an even greater threat to the
environment, people and property downstream.
A breached dam can cost a community tens of millions of
dollars in emergency repairs, close businesses and even result in the loss of
life. One of the worst dam failures in the country took place in
Dam failure can be caused by structural deficiencies (e.g. poor
design, lack of maintenance), natural disasters (e.g. floods, earthquakes) or
human interaction with dams (e.g. vandalism, poor operation, terrorism).[6] According
to a report prepared for Congress, “with the exception of seismic or weather
events, age is the leading indicator of dam failure.”[7] In
There are several management tools state agencies can employ
to help mitigate risks, including hazard classifications, inspections, repair
or removal, and emergency action plans. A hazard classification system was
developed by the federal government in 1979 to categorize dams by their
“potential consequences of failure.”[8] A dam
classified as “high-hazard” is a structure that would cause considerable damage
to public property or life if it failed. “Significant-hazard” dams are those
likely to pose a threat, while “low-hazard” dams have little chance of damaging
property or injuring people.[9] Hazard
classifications do not specify whether or not a dam is unsafe, they simply
indicate the amount of damage that would be caused if a dam was to break. Dams can
also be assessed by their structural condition and rated as unsafe, poor, fair
or good.
Regular inspections by civil engineers are critical to
identifying deficiencies that could lead to dam failures. Inspection frequency
should be based on a dam’s hazard potential, as well as structural condition.
The Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) recommends high-hazard
dams be inspected annually, significant-hazard dams every two years and all other
dams every five years.[10]
In order to carry out these responsibilities, the ASDSO recommends that states
employ ten regulators for every 250 dams under its jurisdiction.[11]
Once problems are identified, it is necessary that dam
owners take corrective action, such as repair or removal, to bring the dam into
safe condition. According to ASDSO, “for large and moderate sized dams, repairs
can cost in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.”[12]
Contaminated sediments can significantly increase the cost of a project,
especially in a state such as
Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are formal plans developed by dam owners to help communities plan for potential dam failures and to mitigate the associated risks. An EAP outlines “procedures and information to assist the dam owner in issuing early warning and notification messages to responsible downstream emergency management authorities of the emergency situation.”[13] Federal guidelines recommend EAPs be developed for every high-hazard dam.[14] While dam owners are responsible for preparing EAPs, state officials are in charge of notifying and protecting the public from potential dam failures.
According to Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety, an EAP
should contain six elements:
· Overview
of
Unregulated dams have a greater risk of failure and can
cause property damage or even loss of life. The government’s role is to
minimize the risks through dam safety inspections, maintenance, oversight and
enforcement. Chapter 253 of the Massachusetts General Laws is the state statute
governing the construction, maintenance and operation of dams in the
Commonwealth. Passed in 1921, Chapter 253 has been significantly modified over
the years. In 1970, dam oversight was transferred from the county commissioners
to the Department of Public Works (
In 2002, Chapter 253 was amended in an effort to shift responsibility
of private and municipal dams from the state to individual owners. The new law
signed by Governor Mitt Romney, Chapter 330 of the Acts of 2002, made owners
financially and legally liable for the maintenance, repairs and, if necessary, removal
of their dams. The new law required owners to register with the state and
established fines up to $500 per violation. Fines were to be deposited in the Dam
Safety Trust and used for future dam safety needs. To implement the changes to
the dam safety program, the commissioner was required to develop the first dam
safety regulations in ten years. Once again, more than three years passed
before regulations were implemented.
Currently, the Office of Dam Safety (ODS) resides in the
Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR), which contains the former DEM.
ODS is responsible for promulgating regulations for all public and private
dams, including the 338 dams owned by DCR. Maintaining state owned dams is the
responsibility of DCR. The dam safety regulations, which were eventually adopted
on
·
Decades of Neglect ·
For nearly three decades, public and academic leaders have
raised concerns about the state’s ability to fulfill its dam safety mission. A
1979 report released by the
The report concluded that the “Massachusetts dam safety
program in [sic] a classic case of uncoordinated governmental programs
requiring clearer definition of intergovernmental responsibilities, better intergovernmental
communication, and greater financial support.”[31]
Six years later, the House Post Audit and Oversight (HPAO)
Committee also investigated the state’s dam safety program and issued a report.
The committee found the program was deficient in three major areas: staff,
funding and commitment to dam safety. According to the report, these
inefficiencies continued to result in inaccurate data, unfunded mandates and
weak dam safety and management procedures. Specifically, the report found:
The 1979
The HPAO report made specific recommendations to improve dam
safety in the state. It recommended that the state dam safety program:
Both reports challenged whether the agency could carry out
an effective program with existing resources. According to a memo obtained by
the Boston Globe, former DCR commissioner Kathy Abbott warned that “cuts to the
department would jeopardize some of its core functions, which included dam… inspections.”[47]
Recent events demonstrate that dam safety concerns raised nearly three decades
ago remain just as valid today.
·
October Floods ·
According to state water condition reports, the average
amount of rain that accumulates in
Due to the October floods, a state of emergency was declared
in more than 43 communities across the state. Officials were diligently
monitoring high-hazard dams that posed an immediate threat to life or property
in six communities:
While local, state and federal officials worked effectively
in
As the floods continued throughout the week, it was apparent
that the Whittenton Pond Dam was not the only unstable dam in the state. The Governor
ordered the inspection of 186 high and significant-hazard dams in unsafe, poor
and fair condition. Twenty-four teams (consisting of eight state inspectors,
consulting firms and retired experts) conducted inspections of the privately
and publicly owned dams. As a result, state-funded repairs were made to eight additional
dams: Monument Dam (
While federal standards recommend that high-hazard dams be
inspected at least every two years, DCR Commissioner Stephen H. Burrington recently
stated that “
One dam not included in the governor’s emergency inspection
list was the Morey’s Bridge Dam, a significant-hazard dam in
Morey’s Bridge Dam is currently listed in poor condition.[58] A
2005 DCR inspection notice for the Morey’s Bridge Dam stated that the “dam
continues to worsen as compared to previous inspection records... [I]f the lake
re-impounded under storm conditions with the gates in poor condition, the gates
may not be capable of safely impounding water.”[59] If the Morey’s Bridge Dam failed, then the
structural condition of the Whittenton Pond Dam would be subject to additional
stress.
The conditions of both dams are important because they are
located upstream from heavily populated areas. The Committee remains concerned
that the Morey’s Bridge Dam was not inspected under Governor Romney’s emergency
order because the state does not have an accurate inventory of dams. The
Morey’s Bridge Dam may be just one of the several examples of dams in need of
inspection or repair. Other dams may need to be removed, which would ultimately
eliminate threats to public safety.
The state is still calculating the total cost of the storm,
though initial estimates from Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
officials indicate that it cost the state between $9-15 million. MEMA reports
show that the storm caused $20.6 million worth of damage to individual property
and $6.3 million worth of damage to public infrastructure.[60] The
city of
A federal declaration was awarded to
·
Oversight Hearing ·
The flood elevated public awareness and concern for dam
safety. While a tragedy was averted in
The Committee invited local and state officials, as well as
an expert from the environmental community, to testify at the hearing. The
panelists were questioned about the flood, ODS regulations, staff, funding and
the state’s commitment to dam safety.
The Committee solicited testimony from a panel of local
officials and state legislators, including Taunton Mayor Robert G. Nunes,
Representative James H. Fagan, Representative Patricia A. Haddad and Taunton
MEMA director Richard E. Ferreira. Their testimony included background, a
status update of the emergency situation in
The state officials’ panel consisted of Stephen R.
Pritchard, Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA),
Stephen H. Burrington, Commissioner of DCR and Christine McCombs, Director of
MEMA.
Secretary Pritchard, who was appointed EOEA secretary in
July 2005, provided a brief overview of DCR, stating that the department is
better known for parks and recreation than for dam safety. When questioned by
the Committee about staffing levels, he testified that DCR currently employs
eight dam safety personnel, which he believed met the state’s dam safety and
maintenance needs.
Commissioner Stephen Burrington, who was appointed DCR commissioner
in September 2005, gave a brief overview of ODS, the emergency inspections and
a summary of the draft regulations. He stated that there are 2,950 dams in the
state, varying in size, ownership, hazard classification and structural
condition. He said that ODS has both regulatory, as well as maintenance
functions. The Committee questioned whether ODS should promulgate regulations
for the oversight and maintenance of all dams in the state, including the 338
dams owned by DCR, its parent agency. While the commissioner recognized that the
functions might need to be separated, the Committee encouraged the agency to
develop a strategy with clear deadlines to address whether DCR was the
appropriate agency to house the ODS.
An overview of the 186 high-hazard dams that had been
inspected by the agency was presented by the commissioner. Over three days, 24
teams had gone into the field to inspect the dams. As a result, eight dams (including
the one in
Commissioner Burrington outlined a draft of the new dam safety
regulations and told the Committee that DCR anticipated adopting them on
MEMA Director Christine McCombs discussed the agency’s role
as first responders in the emergency crisis. She said the agency had applied
for federal disaster relief and was confident that the state would receive the
funding. The agency had set up temporary “disaster emergency centers” throughout
the state to help residents affected by the storm.
Jim Gomes, President of the Environmental League of
Massachusetts (ELM), urged the state to focus on dam removal as a solution,
over dam repair, whenever appropriate. He also testified that the overall
message of the oversight hearing was the same as previous environmental
hearings: EOEA just does not have the proper resources to fulfill its public mission.
The Committee stated its hope that the hearing would bring
about a more effective and coordinated strategy to address the management of
dam safety within the Commonwealth. To accomplish this, the Committee made the
following recommendations to ODS:
·
research ·
Through the Committee’s investigation
it has become clear that ODS has in fact inherited several decades of neglect. Many of the concerns raised at the
hearing were similar to those raised nearly three decades ago. Through
subsequent research, interviews with dam safety officials and experts, and
review of dam safety policies and practices, the Committee discovered the
following deficiencies with the
Inventory
According to the 1979 UMass and 1985 HPAO reports,
A draft inventory was prepared for the Committee in December
2005, but DCR admitted that the inventory was flawed.[62]
According the Department of Fish and Game’s Riverways Program, “the office of
dam safety advises that as much as 10% of the ownership data may be erroneous
or out of date.”[63] The
Committee remains concerned that the state still does not have an accurate
inventory of dams. However, the Committee understands this is a problem current
DCR leaders have inherited and recognizes steps have been taken recently to develop
an inventory.
During the first week of January 2006, DCR mailed 1,975 dam
registration forms to dam owners (inquiring about approximately 2,530 dams).[64] A
variety of responses came back, indicating the dam owner in question was
deceased, the property had been sold, or the dam had been breached. Of all the
notices sent, only 125 forms were returned completed and without errors.[65] In
response to the Committee’s investigation, DCR has stated it would have a basic
inventory of dams (including total number of dams, owners, location, structural
condition and hazard classification) by
Inspections
Federal standards recommend that all dams be inspected at
least every five years. Of the 186 dams inspected under emergency order, 35
dams had not been inspected since the 1990s, two had not been inspected since
the 1980s and three had not been inspected since the 1970s. The Wachusett
Reservoir dam in
In a recent Boston Globe article, Governor Romney’s Communications
Director argued that eight staff members could easily conduct 4,000 inspections
a year if they each visited two dams per day. The Committee believes this is an
unrealistic workload projection for ODS. Under this proposed schedule,
engineers would not have enough time to conduct proper inspections or file
necessary paperwork. It would also leave ODS without someone to administer the
office itself. [68]
According to the Association of State Dam Safety Officials,
the “average time for inspection of permitted/approved dams including travel
time, on-site inspection time, and report writing may be as much as four (4)
man days for high-hazard potential dams, three (3) man days for significant-hazard
potential dams, and two (2) man days for low-hazard potential dams. A detailed
inspection, analysis and evaluation of a dam… may take as much as two-man
months.”[69]
As inspections are conducted, any shift of dams to high and significant-hazard
classifications will require additional staff to maintain them.
Emergency Action Plans
Federal dam safety standards recommend that states maintain
an EAP for each high and significantly-hazard dam. According to national
reports,
Hazard Classification
It is estimated there are at least 10,000 high-hazard dams in
the country[72] and
approximately 325[73]
to 350[74] in
Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
Many high-hazard dams are built within one mile of downtown
areas.[75] Therefore,
hazard classifications should be re-evaluated and reclassified periodically as
new housing units, shopping complexes and schools are built downstream from
existing dams.
Environmental Hazards
In addition to traditional public safety risks, dams can
also pose considerable environmental risks. Sediments, which build up behind
dams, can be contaminated with heavy metals, chemicals and other toxins. When a
dam breaks, the contaminated sediments can be released and flow downstream,
polluting swimming ponds, drinking water and wildlife habitat. While dams in
Structural Condition
Dam safety officials also measure the structural condition
of dams and rate them in unsafe, poor, fair or good condition. According to the
DCR inventory, 49% have not been assessed for any type of structural condition.[77]
This is problematic because hundreds of dams could be in either unsafe or poor
condition, without local or state officials being aware of their unstable
situation. Of those dams that are classified in either poor or unsafe
condition, 43% are privately owned, 40% are owned by municipalities and 16% are
owned by the state.[78]
Source: Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
The structural condition of dams tends to worsen as they
age. Therefore, older dams should be made a priority during inspections.
Removal
Dam removal can provide valuable environmental, public
safety and economic benefits. Since dams block the normal flow of a river or
stream, their removal can restore rivers, fish runs and wildlife habitat to
their natural condition. According to American Rivers, removing a dam is often
more cost effective than repairing it, especially since removal is a permanent
solution.[79] In
According to Mark Cullinhan, former director of the state’s
dam safety program, 80% of the state’s high-hazard dams should be removed
because they no longer serve a purpose.[81]
Despite the benefits and need for dam removal, only three dams have been
removed in
Before a dam can be removed, local, state and federal
permits are required. Compared to many other states,
Hydroelectricity
As energy prices continue to soar, alternative sources of
energy are being explored by scientists, environmentalists and public
officials. One alternative is hydroelectricity, which converts water from a dam
into a renewable source of energy. Hydroelectricity
is viewed as clean energy because it does not “contribute to global warming,
air pollution, acid rain, or ozone depletion.” [84]
In addition to being a renewable resource, hydroelectricity is cost effective.
According to the 1979 UMass report, “On any realistic life-cycle cost basis, hydroelectric
power is the cheapest possible way to obtain power. It is fuel free. Its
operating costs are minimal. Its maintenance costs are modest. Its construction
costs can be amortized over an indefinite period of time.”[85]
In 2002, hydroelectric dams met more than 15% of the Commonwealth’s power
needs, generating significantly more electricity than other renewable sources
such as wind.[86] While
hydroelectricity is not the only answer, building more fish-friendly,
hydroelectric dams, retrofitting existing dams or rehabilitating antiquated
hydroelectric dams so they can run at full capacity could reduce the
Commonwealth’s dependency on non-renewable energy.
Enforcement
DCR has the ability to issue fines, $500 per offense, to dam
owners who violate the state’s dam safety regulations. Fines are supposed to be
placed in the statutorily created Dam Safety Trust, so the money can be used
for future dam safety needs.[87]
However, DCR never established the Trust or enforced a single dam safety
violation.[88] Money
collected from fines should have been used for additional inspections, repairs,
removal or other costs associated with dam safety.
Fines established in other environmental state laws, such as
the Massachusetts Clean Water Act and the Hazardous Waste Management Act, are
significantly higher than those found in the Commonwealth’s dam safety statute.
For example, violators of the Clean Water Act are subject to fines of up to
$25,000 per day.[89] The
Hazardous Management Waste Act has even stronger enforcement provisions. In
addition to fines up to $100,000, violators of the law could be subject to 20
years in prison.[90] Given
the severe environmental and public safety risks associated with potential dam
failures, stronger enforcement provisions would help elevate the importance of
dam safety.
Staff
According to the 1985 HPAO report, the
While the number of ODS staff has increased, the agency has
not come close to meeting HPAO recommendations. Secretary Pritchard testified
at the oversight hearing that DCR employs eight dam safety staff to oversee and
maintain the estimated 2,950 dams throughout the state. However, according to
DCR’s human resources department,
Environmental experts claim ODS needs at least an additional
five employees to implement and run the new regulatory program.[95] After
the hearing, DCR reassessed their needs for additional staff and requested another
8.5 ODS and 3 DCR staff. The request for additional personnel was recently
denied in the FY07 budget by the Romney Administration, which has continued to
defend the dam safety program and has maintained the needs of the Commonwealth
are being met. [96]
Governance
At the Oversight Hearing, the Committee questioned whether it
is appropriate for ODS to regulate and oversee all the dams in the state, including
the 338 dams owned by DCR, its parent agency. The Committee is concerned that the
oversight of state owned dams will be compromised and questions whether DCR is
the proper agency to house ODS. It must be noted that the 1985 HPAO report
found that transferring the dam safety program between different agencies had weakened
the program in terms of staffing and funding.
Funding
ODS receives two types of state funding: annual funding from DCR’s budget and capital funding from the administration. ODS did not have its own line-item in the state operating budget and was subject to DCR’s internal funding prioritization.
Over the last ten years, funding for ODS has fluctuated
drastically. In 2000, total state funding for ODS was cute by 76%. While some
funding was restored during subsequent years, ODS funding was again cut by 73%
in 2003.[97] Inconsistent
funding has prevented ODS from committing to adequate staffing levels,
providing effective oversight and management, and developing dam safety regulations.

In response to the oversight hearing, DCR requested an
operational budget of $3.8 million over three years for ODS to implement the
new dam safety regulation program.[98]
While the governor’s FY07 budget created a separate line-item (2800-0700) for ODS,
it appropriated only $512,476 for the office.[99]
A 2004 capital deficiency report cited that $32 million is needed to repair the 338 dams owned by the state.[100] The Romney Administration suggested a plan that commits one third of that amount ($10.3 million) to fund the repair of state owned dams.[101]
It is difficult to pinpoint the average cost of dam repair
or removal, since each project varies in size and scope, but the cost can be
exorbitant. According to the ASDSO, “for large and moderate sized dams, repairs
can cost in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.”[102] Dam
removal can cost $100,000 to $1.5 million, according to American Rivers, a
non-profit organization that specializes in river restoration.[103]
Other states fund dam repair and removal in a variety of
ways. For example,
·
Findings·
Dam Safety Data and Information
·
·
ODS was required by a 2002 state statute to
obtain basic information from dam owners by
·
Dam safety regulations were adopted on
·
In October 2005, 186 high and significant-hazard
dams were inspected under the governor’s emergency order. Of those dams, 35 had
not been inspected since the 1990s, two had not been inspected since the 1980s
and three had not been inspected since the 1970s. The Wachusett Reservoir Dam
in
·
The Morey’s Bridge Dam, a significant-hazard dam
in
·
Based on existing data, at least 5% of dams have
no known hazard potential classification.
·
In 1985, 56 dams were recorded in unsafe
structural condition.[106]
By 2005, the number of unsafe dams had been reduced to 19, although nearly 49%
of dams have not been assessed for any type of structural condition.
·
ODS classifies dams by potential hazard to
property or life, but does not assess dams for possible environmental hazards.
·
According to national reports,
·
Fines are supposed to be deposited in the
statutorily created Dam Safety Trust. The Trust was never established, nor has
a single dam safety violation been enforced.
·
Enforcement provisions in environmental state
laws, such as the Massachusetts Clean Water Act and the Hazardous Waste Management
Act, are significantly higher than those found in the Commonwealth’s dam safety
statute.
·
Only three dams have been removed in
·
In 2002, hydroelectric dams met more than 15% of
the state’s power needs, generating significantly more electricity than other
renewable sources such as wind.
Dam Safety Program
·
There are only seven full-time equivalent (
·
The administration claim eight full-time staff
could conduct 4,000 inspections per year. This inspection schedule is not a
realistic projection. Under this proposed schedule, engineers would not have
enough time to conduct proper inspections or file necessary paperwork. It would
also leave ODS without someone to administer the office itself.
·
Federal dam safety standards recommend at least
10 dam safety employees for every 250 dams under state regulations. By these
standards,
Funding
·
To facilitate dam repair and removal projects,
·
·
ODS has received inconsistent and inadequate
state funding, which has impaired its ability to manage an effective dam safety
program.
·
In FY07, ODS requested $1.045 million to
implement the new dam safety regulation program. Governor’s Romney’s budget for
FY07 appropriated only $512,476 for the office.
·
A 2004 capital deficiency report cited $32
million is needed to repair the 338 dams owned by the state.
Commitment
·
The 1979 UMass and 1985 HPAO reports cite that
the administration’s lack of commitment to dam safety resulted in inadequate
funding and staffing, as well as an increase in public safety concerns. Nearly
three decades later, the Committee has not discovered any ascertainable
increase in the commitment to dam safety.
·
Recommendations ·
Essential Dam Safety Information
Funding
[i] An “‘acre-foot’ is a unit of volumetric measure that
would cover one acre to a depth of one foot….1 million
[1] Senate Post Audit and Oversight, “Dam Safety Meeting”,
State House,
[2] EOEA,
“Ownership: Dams in the Commonwealth”, e-mail to author,
[3] “Frequently Asked Questions”, Association of State Dam Safety Officials, <http://www.damsafety.org/faq/faq.aspx?groupId=14&categoryId=7>, Path: “What Were the Worst Dams in U.S. History?”.
[4]
[5] “Dams in
[6] “Dam
Failures”, US Army Corps of Engineers, (Sept. 2002), 1, <http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/publicmenu/DOCUMENTS/HHD/Dams_Interesting_facts.pdf
>.
[7] Powers,
K.,
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Powers,
K.,
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] “Office of Dam Safety”, The Department of Conservation and Recreation, <http://www.mass.gov/dcr/pe/damSafety/index.htm>.
[24] Edward R. Kaynor, Dam Policy in Massachusetts, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, 1979), 1: footnote.
[25] Ibid, 69.
[26] Ibid, 58.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid, 44.
[29] Ibid, 3.
[30] Ibid, 1.
[31] Ibid, B-12.
[32]
[33] Ibid, 2.
[34] Ibid, 6.
[35] Ibid, 5.
[37] Ibid, 3.
[38] Ibid, 7.
[39] Ibid,
4.
[40] Ibid, 5.
[41] Ibid, 1.
[42] Edward
R. Kaynor, Dam Policy in
[43]
[44] Ibid, 37.
[45] Ibid, 46.
[46] Ibid, 48.
[47] Helman,
Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,”
[48]
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ken McBride, telephone interview,
[51] Ibid.
[52]
Burrington, Stephen, EOEA Press Conference, State House, (
[53]
[54] Helman,
Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,”
[55]
[56] Ibid.
[57]
[58] EOEA,
“Re: Morey’s Bridge Dam, Taunton-Pacheco Inquiry”, e-mail to the author,
[59] Salomaa,
William, Letter to
[60] Ken
McBride, “”Follow Up Questions”, e-mail to the author,
[61] Ibid.
[62] Senate Post Audit and Oversight, “Dam Safety Meeting”,
State House,
[63] Fuss & O’Neill, Inc. Watershed Scale Assessment of
Environmental Impacts and Hazards of Dams: Opportunities to Integrate the
Environmental Hazards of Sediment Impounded Behind Dams into Natural Resource
Decision Making, (2004), 5.
[64] EOEA,
“Re: Dam registration status”, e-mail to the author,
[65] Ibid.
[66] EOEA,
“Re: Pacheco Follow Up: Dam Safety Legislation”, e-mail to the author,
[67]
[68] Committee
Calculations: 262 state business days/year x 2 inspections/ day x 8 employees =
4,192 inspection annually
[69]
[70] “NDSP Activities:
State Accomplishments”, FEMA: National Dam Safety Program, (
[71]
[72] “Dam
Safety 101”, Dam Safety Coalition, (
[73]
[74] “Massachusetts
River Restore Program”, Riverways Program, <http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/river/pdf/riverrestore_factsheet.pdf>.
[75] Coleman, K.,
“U.S. Dams: Is Security Seeping
Through the Cracks”, Government Security,
[76]Fuss & O’Neill, Inc., Watershed Scale Assessment of Environmental Impacts and Hazards of Dams: Opportunities to Integrate the Environmental Hazards of Sediment Impounded Behind Dams into Natural Resource Decision Making, (2004), 1.
[77]
[78] Ibid.
[79] Laura Wilder, phone interview with author,
[80] Graf,
William, ed. Dam Removal Research: Status and Prospects, (
[81] Helman,
Scott, and Mishra, Raja. “State Oversight of Dams Questioned,”
[82] EOEA,
“Re: Riverways Program Information”, e-mail to the author,
[83]
[84] “Benefits
of Dams”, FEMA, <http://www.fema.gov/hazard/damfailure/benefits.shtm>
[85] Neither
Edward R. Kay nor, Dam Policy in
[86]
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/massachusetts.pdf
>
[87]
Massachusetts General Laws,
[88] EOEA, e-mail to author, 14 Nov.2005.
[89]
Massachusetts General Laws,
[90]
Massachusetts General Laws,
[91]
[92]
[93]
“State-By-State Statistics on Dams and State Safety Regulation-2004”, Association
of Dam Safety Officials. (2004), <http://www.damsafety.org/>,
Path: “State Dam Safety Program Statistics”.
[94] Powers,
K.,
[95] “Green
Budget Fiscal Year 2007: Reclaiming Our Environmental Rights”, Environmental
League of
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
[101]
[102]
[103] Laura Wilder, phone interview with author,
[104] Powers,
K.,
[105] Ibid, 14.
[106]