SENATE, No. 2737
Report of the Senate committee on Post Audit and Oversight (under the provisions of Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by Chapter 557 of the Acts of 1986) entitled "Are We Really Prepared? A Comprehensive Study of Homeland Security in Massachusetts." (Senate, No. 2737). |
The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
In the Year Two Thousand and Six.
Are We Really Prepared?
A Comprehensive Study of Homeland Security in Massachusetts
A Report
of the
Senate Committee on Post
Audit and Oversight
October 2006
Massachusetts Senate
The Honorable Robert E. Travaglini
Senate President
Senator Marc R. Pacheco, Chair
Senator Susan C. Fargo, Vice Chair
Senator Robert A. Havern III
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Senator Richard T. Moore
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
It shall be the duty of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (established under Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws) to oversee the development and implementation of legislative auditing programs conducted by the Legislative Post Audit and Oversight Bureau with particular emphasis on performance auditing. The Committee shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony and compel the production of books, papers, documents and other evidence in connection with any authorized examination or review. If the Committee shall deem special studies or investigations to be necessary, they may direct their legislative auditors to undertake such studies or investigations.
Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau
Jesse L. Stanesa
Director
Kristen R. Green
General Counsel and Principal Author
The Committee would like to acknowledge the contributions from Senator Pacheco’s office, including Mary Wasylyk, Chief of Staff; Jessica Nordstrom, Policy Analyst; Meghan Reilly, former Communications Director; and Katharine O’Brien, Legal Intern.
The Committee would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the Massachusetts police departments and fire departments, the Massachusetts police chiefs and fire chiefs, Executive Office of Public Safety, Massachusetts National Guard, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency; Massachusetts Port Authority; Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; Massachusetts Water Resources Authority; Department of Telecommunications and Energy; Massachusetts Turnpike Authority; Massachusetts Highway Department; Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission; Executive Office of Transportation; Department of Public Health; Massachusetts State Police; Office of United State Attorney, District of Massachusetts; Massachusetts Law Enforcement Councils; Massachusetts Hospital Association, Massachusetts Nurses Association, Massachusetts Medical Society; Boston Public Health Commission; Boston Emergency Medical Services; Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and Scientists; Massachusetts Municipal Association; Thomas G. Ambrosino, Mayor, Revere; Edward M. Lambert, Mayor, Fall River; Stanley J. Usovicz Jr., former Mayor, Salem; Emergency Management Planning Group; Harvard School of Public Health; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; United States Representative Barney Frank, United States Representative Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Association, Institute for Resource and Security Studies; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Distrigas; Progressive Policy Institute; and Pilgrim Watch.
·
Executive Summary ·
During Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, state and federal emergency plans were put to the test and failed
miserably. These events reemphasized the
need to evaluate how
With these concerns in mind,
the Senate Post Audit & Oversight Committee (“Committee”) has concluded a
comprehensive investigation into the overall preparedness of the Commonwealth
in case of a homeland security emergency.
The Committee began its investigation with three days of hearings in
September 2003. Since that time, the
Committee has continued its investigation into the Commonwealth’s progress
through extensive interviews, surveys, hearings, meetings and requests for
documents. The Committee’s investigation
focused on statewide planning, regional coordination, staffing and equipment
levels for public safety personnel, emergency planning by cities, towns and
state agencies, the preparedness of the National Guard and Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, and public health preparedness.
Overall, the Committee has
found that, while the state has made progress in homeland security preparedness
since 2003, there are many areas that still need significant improvement. The Committee found the following general
areas of concern:
- The state’s insufficient oversight of homeland
security planning by cities, towns and the state’s agencies and
authorities;
- The state’s failure to provide first responders
with the proper means to protect against terrorist activity and natural
disasters;
- The state’s inadequate communication of the
statewide strategy; and
- The state’s unsuccessful implementation of its
homeland security plan.
The Committee concluded that
these deficiencies are the responsibility of the Executive Office of Public
Safety, which is the state agency responsible for homeland security.
The Executive Office of Public Safety (“EOPS”) and the
State’s Emergency Management Plan and Funding Strategy
- The Executive Office of Public Safety has failed
to follow through and adequately oversee the implementation of the State
Homeland Security Strategy.
- The 2006 State Homeland Security Strategy is
incomplete because it does not mention or incorporate homeland security
events that have taken place during 2006.
- In 2003, EOPS issued a Homeland Security Report
Card that gave itself grades, but did not include any criteria that it was
relying on in calculating the grades.
EOPS has not released an updated Report Card to evidence the
progress made and the current grade it gives itself.
- The regional approach to homeland security
planning and funding, as implemented by EOPS, has not sufficiently
included or addressed the critical needs and priorities of cities and
towns and has led to projects receiving funding that are inconsistent with
the State Homeland Security Strategy.
- Despite Republican Administrations on the state
and federal level, this year, the Department of Homeland Security
decreased homeland security grant funding to
- The Regional Advisory Councils make
recommendations for projects to be funded with homeland security grants in
the region. However, the Regional Councils
consist of only 15 individuals and are not required to include any individuals
from the disability population or representatives from the state
infrastructure agencies and authorities.
- Restrictions imposed by EOPS on homeland security
grants have caused problems for municipalities.
- Increasing private sector partnerships with the
state could augment funding for homeland security and would not be subject
to the arduous federal restrictions.
Municipal Preparedness
- Public safety providers in the Commonwealth are
without the proper means to protect against homeland security emergencies
and natural disasters, as well as unable to meet the basic public safety
needs of their communities.
- The Executive Office of Public Safety failed to
implement the majority of recommendations set forth by the Committee in
its May 2004 report, Homeland
Security Interim Report: Survey of Massachusetts Police Chiefs and Fire
Chiefs on Homeland Security Preparedness.
- Since
- Since
- Only 9% of police departments and 18% of fire
departments have communications equipment that is interoperable with
federal agencies, state agencies and municipalities.
- If a homeland security emergency or natural
disaster occurred in over 90% of the municipalities in the state, the
police would have inadequate equipment to respond and insufficient
interoperable communications capabilities.
- 83% of police departments and 84% of fire
departments believe they are not prepared for a homeland security
emergency.
- 91% of police departments and 92% of fire
departments reported that they are not prepared for a bio-terrorism
attack.
- 80% of police departments and 87% of fire
departments are not prepared for an attack on their community’s
infrastructure, including roads and bridges.
- In responding to a State of
- Reportedly, there is a considerable amount of
“dark” and underused fiber optic cable on public rights-of-way in the
Commonwealth that could be used to build a high-speed network for police,
fire and emergency response entities.
- Cities and towns are not prepared for a homeland
security emergency and are not receiving nearly enough funding to increase
the level of preparedness.
- EOPS has failed to communicate the State Homeland
Security Strategy and Emergency Management Plan to the top government
officials in cities and towns.
Homeland Security Planning by the State Infrastructure
Agencies and Authorities
- There is no formalized state oversight of
emergency planning by the infrastructure agencies and authorities.
- EOPS has failed to adequately integrate all of
the state’s agencies and authorities into the state homeland security
planning strategy or include them in the application process for funding
from DHS. Including the agencies
would strengthen the proposals sent to DHS, strengthen regional
collaboration, and would incorporate more homeland security risks.
- EOPS is not effectively communicating to all agencies
and authorities the criteria it uses in awarding homeland security grants.
- EOPS has refused to include the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority in the State Homeland Security Strategy, the Homeland
Security Executive Committee, or the Boston Urban Area Working Group.
- Despite the critical infrastructure components
under the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority’s jurisdiction, EOPS has not
attempted to review its plans and response capabilities.
- The Department of Telecommunications and Energy
is responsible for monitoring the safety and security at liquefied natural
gas storage facilities. However,
according to the information received from the Department of
Telecommunications and Energy, it does not have an emergency management
plan that sets forth security measures to be taken in case of a terrorist
attack on any areas within its jurisdiction.
- EOPS has not overseen the Massachusetts Port
Authority’s emergency planning process.
- EOPS did not request the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority’s emergency management plans until
- During Federal Fiscal Year 2006, the
Massachusetts Army National Guard was deficient in meeting its goal
strength by 2,283 soldiers.
- Presently, 1,161 Army National Guard soldiers are
deployed outside of
- There are 521 first responders in the Army
National Guard. In the event of a
state-wide emergency, these individuals would be available to respond as
either first responders or as part of the National Guard, but not
both.
- The Commonwealth’s system of benefits for
National Guard personnel on State Active Duty is inadequate.
- The bureaucratic procedure established for the
chain of command between the National Guard, the Executive Office of
Public Safety, and the Governor creates unnecessary delays in
communication.
Public Health
- The Department of
Public Health has reported that “[w]hile we cannot know when a novel virus
will emerge that is capable of effective human-to-human transmission, most
experts agree that an influenza pandemic is inevitable.”
- Past pandemics have caused between 70,000 deaths
(1957) and more than 20 million deaths (1918). An outbreak of a contagious human-to-human
influenza or other pandemic is projected to infect as many as 2 million
- While the federal government maintains a stockpile
of flu vaccines to supplement state emergency needs, state public health
officials have virtually no pandemic flu vaccines.
- The Department of Public Health estimates that the
state requires 2,000 ventilators and 5,000 additional beds to appropriately
respond to a pandemic.
- The Department of Public Health can use
non-appropriation funding vehicles, such as existing trust funds or
emergency-based spending, to obtain the necessary vaccines, hospital beds
and ventilators to prepare and respond to a pandemic.
- Municipalities and health care providers have
expressed concern about the lack of pandemic preparedness training and
education.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
- Since the original emergency management plans
were prepared for Pilgrim, the response capabilities have changed
significantly with decreases in public safety personnel.
- Recently, the towns within the Emergency Planning
Zone submitted a proposal to the Administration and EOPS for $300,000 to
conduct a review and assessment of the adequacy of the emergency response
and evacuation plan for Pilgrim.
- MEMA has refused to expand the Emergency Planning
Zone from 10 miles to 20 miles.
- Section 127 of the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 required the President
to make potassium iodide tablets available to State and local governments
to distribute to populations within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant, but
MEMA has refused to expand its potassium iodide distribution plan to 20
miles.
1. EOPS should be required to routinely and continuously update
the State Homeland Security Strategy (“SHSS”) based on constantly evolving real
life events.
2. EOPS must be required to oversee the emergency planning
efforts by the infrastructure agencies and authorities.
3. EOPS must re-assess and re-formulate the approach it has
taken to implement regional coordination.
Included in the re-evaluation, EOPS should consider the following:
a. EOPS
should have grant analysts work with the regional councils to assist the
councils in the grant process and ensure that the projects that are awarded
funding are geared toward implementing the SHSS. These specialists should also be available to
municipalities and first responders for grant preparation.
b. The
Regional Advisory Councils should be required to keep an inventory of all
regional homeland security equipment purchased and its location. Each year the Councils should provide a copy
of the inventory to the emergency management officials, police chiefs and fire
chiefs in each city and town in the Region.
c. EOPS
should require the Regional Advisory Councils to include a representative from
the disability population.
d. In
regions where the state’s infrastructure agencies and authorities are present,
EOPS should require that the Regional Advisory Councils include representatives
from the agencies or authorities.
e. The
Regional Advisory Councils should include more than one representative from
government administration.
4. EOPS must re-assess its strategy for implementing
interoperable communications equipment and make changes to the system currently
in place.
5. Included in its re-assessment, EOPS should consider the
unused fiber optic cable throughout the Commonwealth to develop an interoperable
communications network.
6. EOPS should retain an experienced independent entity to
conduct an extensive, detailed evaluation of the state’s plans and strategies,
progress in fulfilling plans and strategies, actual feasibility, and timing for
implementation.
7. The Administration should increase lobbying of the federal
government to avoid further decreases in homeland security funding to
8. If deemed an emergent need by
9.
10. EOPS should be required to integrate state agencies and
authorities into the process involved with formulating proposals for grant
funding from DHS.
11. The Administration should approve the proposal for $300,000 submitted
by the communities in Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s Emergency Planning Zone
for a review and assessment of the emergency response and evacuation plans.
12. The Administration should work to increase public/private
partnerships with private sector entities and formulate a plan to encourage
contributions and donations from private entities for homeland security
projects.
13. EOPS should communicate with every police and fire chief
regarding potential homeland security grants and about their capabilities and
needs.
14. EOPS should conduct regional town meetings to inform citizens
of the state’s anti-terrorism initiatives and to develop citizen mobilization teams.
15. EOPS must meet with each city and town’s government and
inform them of the State’s Homeland Security Strategy and Emergency Management
Plan.
16. Beginning for Federal Fiscal Year 2006, EOPS must submit a
written detailed explanation to all state agencies and authorities, discussing
the exact criteria it is looking for in awarding homeland security grant
funding, including the federal restrictions for funding.
17. After EOPS has distributed the homeland security grants for
FY 2006 and every year thereafter, EOPS should submit a report to the Joint
Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security, the House Committee on Ways
and Means, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means and the House and Senate
Committees on Post Audit and Oversight, discussing the entities that it awarded
funding, the amount of funding, the projects that received funding and the
criteria and process it used in awarding funding.
18. The Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division should work with
the Administration and the National Guard to formulate legislation that remedies
the issues associated with medical coverage and claims submitted by National
Guard personnel for injuries sustained while on State Active Duty.
19. Filing of legislation that prevents a medical provider from
submitting a claim to a collection agency after it was provided with written
notification that the patient was on State Active Duty for the Massachusetts
National Guard when the related injuries were sustained.
20. Filing of legislation by the Committee that would take the
National Guard out of the Executive Office of Public Safety and restore the
Adjutant General’s capability to report directly to the Governor.
21. The Executive branch should come up with a plan for expanding
the State Guard including an assessment of the necessary steps required and an
evaluation of cost and feasibility.
22. Filing of legislation to provide that
23. The
24. MEMA should be required to re-evaluate and assess the
reception centers and their capabilities.
Also, MEMA should consider incorporating private businesses into this
planning process to determine useful resources they could provide to the
reception centers.
25. MEMA must submit a report to the Joint Committee on Public
Health, the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security, the House
and Senate Committees on Post Audit and Oversight and the House and Senate
Committees on Ways and Means, explaining its refusal to expand the Emergency
Planning Zone from 10 to 20 miles, including its refusal to expand the
potassium iodide distribution plans.
·
BACKGROUND ·
On
spray penetrated the defenses of
the most powerful nation in the world.
They
inflicted unbearable trauma on
our people, and turned the international order upside down. . . . But on that
September day we were unprepared. We did
not grasp the magnitude of a threat that had been gathering over time. . . .
Put simply, the
history. We have struck blows
against the terrorists since 9/11. We
have
prevented attacks on the homeland.
We believe we are safer today
than we were on 9/11 – but we are not safe.[1]
“At
After September 11th, officials on the state and federal levels were required to develop a homeland security strategy for both emergency preparedness and emergency response. Emergency preparedness is the work done before an emergency to ensure agencies are as prepared as possible to manage protection, response and recovery.[3] Emergency response includes the actual activities conducted by various agencies to rescue survivors of a disaster, provide assistance and reduce damage.[4] To effectuate feasible plans for both emergency preparedness and emergency response, states must work cooperatively with appropriate organizations, agencies and cities and towns.
The Federal Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to prevent attacks within the
Additionally, EOPS is the State Administrative Agency (“
The 2005 hurricane season and particularly, Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita served as a critical reminder that domestic emergencies arise
with little or no warning. These
emergencies exposed the consequences of unprepared agencies and reiterated the
need for communities to have in place feasible, efficient emergency response
plans. “Emergency response failures, a
porous border, contract mismanagement, and, most recently, the [DHS’s] role in
approving a foreign government’s purchase of
The Committee’s assessment of the Commonwealth’s homeland security preparedness focuses on a number of topics. The Committee’s report reviews EOPS’ coordination and management of local communities, agencies and authorities to ensure their preparedness. Also, the committee reviewed the role of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency’s role in ensuring preparedness at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and its neighboring communities. Furthermore, the report examines the preparedness of the Massachusetts National Guard, which is the only military service that has both a state and federal mission to be prepared to respond in the case of a homeland security incident or other domestic emergency. The Committee also analyzed the preparedness of healthcare organizations for the possibility of a homeland security incident, domestic emergency or pandemic.