SENATE, No. 2737

Report of the Senate committee on Post Audit and Oversight (under the provisions of Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by Chapter 557 of the Acts of 1986) entitled "Are We Really Prepared? A Comprehensive Study of Homeland Security in Massachusetts." (Senate, No. 2737).

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In the Year Two Thousand and Six.

Are We Really Prepared?

A Comprehensive Study of Homeland Security in Massachusetts

A Report of the
Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight

October 2006

Massachusetts Senate
The Honorable Robert E. Travaglini
Senate President

Senator Marc R. Pacheco, Chair
Senator Susan C. Fargo, Vice Chair
Senator Robert A. Havern III
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Senator Richard T. Moore
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Senator Robert L. Hedlund

It shall be the duty of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (established under Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws) to oversee the development and implementation of legislative auditing programs conducted by the Legislative Post Audit and Oversight Bureau with particular emphasis on performance auditing. The Committee shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony and compel the production of books, papers, documents and other evidence in connection with any authorized examination or review. If the Committee shall deem special studies or investigations to be necessary, they may direct their legislative auditors to undertake such studies or investigations.

Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau

Jesse L. Stanesa
Director

Kristen R. Green
General Counsel and Principal Author

The Committee would like to acknowledge the contributions from Senator Pacheco’s office, including Mary Wasylyk, Chief of Staff; Jessica Nordstrom, Policy Analyst; Meghan Reilly, former Communications Director; and Katharine O’Brien, Legal Intern.

The Committee would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the Massachusetts police departments and fire departments, the Massachusetts police chiefs and fire chiefs, Executive Office of Public Safety, Massachusetts National Guard, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency; Massachusetts Port Authority; Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; Massachusetts Water Resources Authority; Department of Telecommunications and Energy; Massachusetts Turnpike Authority; Massachusetts Highway Department; Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission; Executive Office of Transportation; Department of Public Health; Massachusetts State Police; Office of United State Attorney, District of Massachusetts; Massachusetts Law Enforcement Councils; Massachusetts Hospital Association, Massachusetts Nurses Association, Massachusetts Medical Society; Boston Public Health Commission; Boston Emergency Medical Services; Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and Scientists; Massachusetts Municipal Association; Thomas G. Ambrosino, Mayor, Revere; Edward M. Lambert, Mayor, Fall River; Stanley J. Usovicz Jr., former Mayor, Salem; Emergency Management Planning Group; Harvard School of Public Health; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; United States Representative Barney Frank, United States Representative Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Association, Institute for Resource and Security Studies; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Distrigas; Progressive Policy Institute; and Pilgrim Watch.

· Executive Summary ·

September 11, 2001 opened the eyes of Americans to the harsh reality of a terrorist attack on our own soil. The lives lost and feelings of fear bestowed upon us that day will never be forgotten. The incident crystallized the necessity of having national and state emergency plans in place to ensure that the country is prepared and can adequately respond in case of a homeland security emergency.

During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, state and federal emergency plans were put to the test and failed miserably. These events reemphasized the need to evaluate how Massachusetts’ plans would fare if put to a similar test.

With these concerns in mind, the Senate Post Audit & Oversight Committee (“Committee”) has concluded a comprehensive investigation into the overall preparedness of the Commonwealth in case of a homeland security emergency. The Committee began its investigation with three days of hearings in September 2003. Since that time, the Committee has continued its investigation into the Commonwealth’s progress through extensive interviews, surveys, hearings, meetings and requests for documents. The Committee’s investigation focused on statewide planning, regional coordination, staffing and equipment levels for public safety personnel, emergency planning by cities, towns and state agencies, the preparedness of the National Guard and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and public health preparedness.

Overall, the Committee has found that, while the state has made progress in homeland security preparedness since 2003, there are many areas that still need significant improvement. The Committee found the following general areas of concern:

The state’s insufficient oversight of homeland security planning by cities, towns and the state’s agencies and authorities;
The state’s failure to provide first responders with the proper means to protect against terrorist activity and natural disasters;
The state’s inadequate communication of the statewide strategy; and
The state’s unsuccessful implementation of its homeland security plan.

The Committee concluded that these deficiencies are the responsibility of the Executive Office of Public Safety, which is the state agency responsible for homeland security.

KEY FINDINGS

The Executive Office of Public Safety (“EOPS”) and the State’s Emergency Management Plan and Funding Strategy

The Executive Office of Public Safety has failed to follow through and adequately oversee the implementation of the State Homeland Security Strategy.

The 2006 State Homeland Security Strategy is incomplete because it does not mention or incorporate homeland security events that have taken place during 2006.

In 2003, EOPS issued a Homeland Security Report Card that gave itself grades, but did not include any criteria that it was relying on in calculating the grades. EOPS has not released an updated Report Card to evidence the progress made and the current grade it gives itself.

The regional approach to homeland security planning and funding, as implemented by EOPS, has not sufficiently included or addressed the critical needs and priorities of cities and towns and has led to projects receiving funding that are inconsistent with the State Homeland Security Strategy.

Despite Republican Administrations on the state and federal level, this year, the Department of Homeland Security decreased homeland security grant funding to Massachusetts by approximately 34%, from $62.4 million to $41.3 million and funds to Boston’s Urban Area Security Initiative were cut by one-third from $26 million to $18.2 million.

The Regional Advisory Councils make recommendations for projects to be funded with homeland security grants in the region. However, the Regional Councils consist of only 15 individuals and are not required to include any individuals from the disability population or representatives from the state infrastructure agencies and authorities.

Restrictions imposed by EOPS on homeland security grants have caused problems for municipalities.

Increasing private sector partnerships with the state could augment funding for homeland security and would not be subject to the arduous federal restrictions.

Municipal Preparedness

Public safety providers in the Commonwealth are without the proper means to protect against homeland security emergencies and natural disasters, as well as unable to meet the basic public safety needs of their communities.

The Executive Office of Public Safety failed to implement the majority of recommendations set forth by the Committee in its May 2004 report, Homeland Security Interim Report: Survey of Massachusetts Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs on Homeland Security Preparedness.

Since September 11, 2001, police and fire departments throughout the Commonwealth have lost 1,124 personnel.

Since September 11, 2001, 88% of police departments and 82% of fire departments have had to decrease staff or remain the same.

Only 9% of police departments and 18% of fire departments have communications equipment that is interoperable with federal agencies, state agencies and municipalities.

If a homeland security emergency or natural disaster occurred in over 90% of the municipalities in the state, the police would have inadequate equipment to respond and insufficient interoperable communications capabilities.

83% of police departments and 84% of fire departments believe they are not prepared for a homeland security emergency.

91% of police departments and 92% of fire departments reported that they are not prepared for a bio-terrorism attack.

80% of police departments and 87% of fire departments are not prepared for an attack on their community’s infrastructure, including roads and bridges.

In responding to a State of Emergency in Taunton, Massachusetts, police from neighboring communities were forced to communicate with Nextel phones because they did not have interoperable communications equipment.

Reportedly, there is a considerable amount of “dark” and underused fiber optic cable on public rights-of-way in the Commonwealth that could be used to build a high-speed network for police, fire and emergency response entities.

Cities and towns are not prepared for a homeland security emergency and are not receiving nearly enough funding to increase the level of preparedness.

EOPS has failed to communicate the State Homeland Security Strategy and Emergency Management Plan to the top government officials in cities and towns.

Homeland Security Planning by the State Infrastructure Agencies and Authorities

There is no formalized state oversight of emergency planning by the infrastructure agencies and authorities.

EOPS has failed to adequately integrate all of the state’s agencies and authorities into the state homeland security planning strategy or include them in the application process for funding from DHS. Including the agencies would strengthen the proposals sent to DHS, strengthen regional collaboration, and would incorporate more homeland security risks.

EOPS is not effectively communicating to all agencies and authorities the criteria it uses in awarding homeland security grants.

EOPS has refused to include the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority in the State Homeland Security Strategy, the Homeland Security Executive Committee, or the Boston Urban Area Working Group.

Despite the critical infrastructure components under the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority’s jurisdiction, EOPS has not attempted to review its plans and response capabilities.

The Department of Telecommunications and Energy is responsible for monitoring the safety and security at liquefied natural gas storage facilities. However, according to the information received from the Department of Telecommunications and Energy, it does not have an emergency management plan that sets forth security measures to be taken in case of a terrorist attack on any areas within its jurisdiction.

EOPS has not overseen the Massachusetts Port Authority’s emergency planning process.

EOPS did not request the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s emergency management plans until August 31, 2005, which is almost four years after September 11^th and after the transit attacks in London.

Massachusetts National Guard Preparedness

During Federal Fiscal Year 2006, the Massachusetts Army National Guard was deficient in meeting its goal strength by 2,283 soldiers.

Presently, 1,161 Army National Guard soldiers are deployed outside of Massachusetts and unavailable to respond to an emergency in Massachusetts.

There are 521 first responders in the Army National Guard. In the event of a state-wide emergency, these individuals would be available to respond as either first responders or as part of the National Guard, but not both.

The Commonwealth’s system of benefits for National Guard personnel on State Active Duty is inadequate.

The bureaucratic procedure established for the chain of command between the National Guard, the Executive Office of Public Safety, and the Governor creates unnecessary delays in communication.

Public Health

The Department of Public Health has reported that “[w]hile we cannot know when a novel virus will emerge that is capable of effective human-to-human transmission, most experts agree that an influenza pandemic is inevitable.”

Past pandemics have caused between 70,000 deaths (1957) and more than 20 million deaths (1918). An outbreak of a contagious human-to-human influenza or other pandemic is projected to infect as many as 2 million Massachusetts residents, require clinical care for 1 million residents, require 80,000 hospitalizations and result in 20,000 deaths.

While the federal government maintains a stockpile of flu vaccines to supplement state emergency needs, state public health officials have virtually no pandemic flu vaccines.

The Department of Public Health estimates that the state requires 2,000 ventilators and 5,000 additional beds to appropriately respond to a pandemic.

The Department of Public Health can use non-appropriation funding vehicles, such as existing trust funds or emergency-based spending, to obtain the necessary vaccines, hospital beds and ventilators to prepare and respond to a pandemic.

Municipalities and health care providers have expressed concern about the lack of pandemic preparedness training and education.

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Since the original emergency management plans were prepared for Pilgrim, the response capabilities have changed significantly with decreases in public safety personnel.

Recently, the towns within the Emergency Planning Zone submitted a proposal to the Administration and EOPS for $300,000 to conduct a review and assessment of the adequacy of the emergency response and evacuation plan for Pilgrim.
MEMA has refused to expand the Emergency Planning Zone from 10 miles to 20 miles.

Section 127 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 required the President to make potassium iodide tablets available to State and local governments to distribute to populations within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant, but MEMA has refused to expand its potassium iodide distribution plan to 20 miles.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EOPS should be required to routinely and continuously update the State Homeland Security Strategy (“SHSS”) based on constantly evolving real life events.

2. EOPS must be required to oversee the emergency planning efforts by the infrastructure agencies and authorities.

3. EOPS must re-assess and re-formulate the approach it has taken to implement regional coordination. Included in the re-evaluation, EOPS should consider the following:

a. EOPS should have grant analysts work with the regional councils to assist the councils in the grant process and ensure that the projects that are awarded funding are geared toward implementing the SHSS. These specialists should also be available to municipalities and first responders for grant preparation.

b. The Regional Advisory Councils should be required to keep an inventory of all regional homeland security equipment purchased and its location. Each year the Councils should provide a copy of the inventory to the emergency management officials, police chiefs and fire chiefs in each city and town in the Region.

c. EOPS should require the Regional Advisory Councils to include a representative from the disability population.

d. In regions where the state’s infrastructure agencies and authorities are present, EOPS should require that the Regional Advisory Councils include representatives from the agencies or authorities.

e. The Regional Advisory Councils should include more than one representative from government administration.

4. EOPS must re-assess its strategy for implementing interoperable communications equipment and make changes to the system currently in place.

5. Included in its re-assessment, EOPS should consider the unused fiber optic cable throughout the Commonwealth to develop an interoperable communications network.

6. EOPS should retain an experienced independent entity to conduct an extensive, detailed evaluation of the state’s plans and strategies, progress in fulfilling plans and strategies, actual feasibility, and timing for implementation.

7. The Administration should increase lobbying of the federal government to avoid further decreases in homeland security funding to Massachusetts and Boston.

8. If deemed an emergent need by DPH, the agency should use existing resources or emergency-based spending to procure necessary equipment and vaccines to respond to a pandemic or other health care crisis pending approval of the pandemic supplemental budget.

9. DPH should improve regional coordination efforts to ensure that health care providers, municipalities and first responders have sufficient training and education for public health emergency response events.

10. EOPS should be required to integrate state agencies and authorities into the process involved with formulating proposals for grant funding from DHS.

11. The Administration should approve the proposal for $300,000 submitted by the communities in Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station’s Emergency Planning Zone for a review and assessment of the emergency response and evacuation plans.

12. The Administration should work to increase public/private partnerships with private sector entities and formulate a plan to encourage contributions and donations from private entities for homeland security projects.

13. EOPS should communicate with every police and fire chief regarding potential homeland security grants and about their capabilities and needs.

14. EOPS should conduct regional town meetings to inform citizens of the state’s anti-terrorism initiatives and to develop citizen mobilization teams.

15. EOPS must meet with each city and town’s government and inform them of the State’s Homeland Security Strategy and Emergency Management Plan.

16. Beginning for Federal Fiscal Year 2006, EOPS must submit a written detailed explanation to all state agencies and authorities, discussing the exact criteria it is looking for in awarding homeland security grant funding, including the federal restrictions for funding.

17. After EOPS has distributed the homeland security grants for FY 2006 and every year thereafter, EOPS should submit a report to the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security, the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means and the House and Senate Committees on Post Audit and Oversight, discussing the entities that it awarded funding, the amount of funding, the projects that received funding and the criteria and process it used in awarding funding.

18. The Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division should work with the Administration and the National Guard to formulate legislation that remedies the issues associated with medical coverage and claims submitted by National Guard personnel for injuries sustained while on State Active Duty.

19. Filing of legislation that prevents a medical provider from submitting a claim to a collection agency after it was provided with written notification that the patient was on State Active Duty for the Massachusetts National Guard when the related injuries were sustained.

20. Filing of legislation by the Committee that would take the National Guard out of the Executive Office of Public Safety and restore the Adjutant General’s capability to report directly to the Governor.

21. The Executive branch should come up with a plan for expanding the State Guard including an assessment of the necessary steps required and an evaluation of cost and feasibility.

22. Filing of legislation to provide that Massachusetts will match the federal bonus monies awarded to eligible National Guard members who choose to re-enlist.

23. The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (“MEMA”) must be required to routinely update its emergency plans for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, including notification and evacuation strategies.

24. MEMA should be required to re-evaluate and assess the reception centers and their capabilities. Also, MEMA should consider incorporating private businesses into this planning process to determine useful resources they could provide to the reception centers.

25. MEMA must submit a report to the Joint Committee on Public Health, the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security, the House and Senate Committees on Post Audit and Oversight and the House and Senate Committees on Ways and Means, explaining its refusal to expand the Emergency Planning Zone from 10 to 20 miles, including its refusal to expand the potassium iodide distribution plans.

· BACKGROUND ·

On September 11, 2001, 19 men armed with knives, box-cutters, mace and pepper

spray penetrated the defenses of the most powerful nation in the world. They

inflicted unbearable trauma on our people, and turned the international order upside down. . . . But on that September day we were unprepared. We did not grasp the magnitude of a threat that had been gathering over time. . . . Put simply, the

United States is presented with one of the great security challenges in our

history. We have struck blows against the terrorists since 9/11. We have

prevented attacks on the homeland. We believe we are safer today

than we were on 9/11 – but we are not safe.[1]

“At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a nation transformed.”[2] On that day, the meaning of homeland security changed drastically and for the first time, terrorists launched an attack against American civilians on our own soil. Prevention is important, but as September 11^th demonstrated, preparedness will be key in defending against this new kind of attack and enemy. It has been five years since that devastating day, and it is critical to examine precisely how far Massachusetts has come toward preparedness during this time and what still needs to be done to better equip the Commonwealth’s response capabilities.

After September 11th, officials on the state and federal levels were required to develop a homeland security strategy for both emergency preparedness and emergency response. Emergency preparedness is the work done before an emergency to ensure agencies are as prepared as possible to manage protection, response and recovery.[3] Emergency response includes the actual activities conducted by various agencies to rescue survivors of a disaster, provide assistance and reduce damage.[4] To effectuate feasible plans for both emergency preparedness and emergency response, states must work cooperatively with appropriate organizations, agencies and cities and towns.

The Federal Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to prevent attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; and act as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.[5] The Governors of each state are responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people in the state.[6] DHS requires that all states have a homeland security advisor. In Massachusetts, the Governor designated the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety to be the Homeland Security Advisor.[7] Accordingly, the Executive Office of Public Safety (“EOPS”) is required to coordinate statewide efforts to detect, prevent, respond to and manage the consequences of a terrorist attack or other critical incident in an all hazards context.[8]

Additionally, EOPS is the State Administrative Agency (“SAA”) for the State’s homeland security grant funding.[9] Homeland security funding is largely through various federal grant programs.[10] Despite the pervasive need for this funding to adequately prepare municipalities and agencies for homeland security preparedness, funding to the Commonwealth for homeland security measures has been drastically reduced this year.

The 2005 hurricane season and particularly, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita served as a critical reminder that domestic emergencies arise with little or no warning. These emergencies exposed the consequences of unprepared agencies and reiterated the need for communities to have in place feasible, efficient emergency response plans. “Emergency response failures, a porous border, contract mismanagement, and, most recently, the [DHS’s] role in approving a foreign government’s purchase of U.S. port terminals have left many Americans questioning our government’s homeland security efforts.”[11]

The Committee’s assessment of the Commonwealth’s homeland security preparedness focuses on a number of topics. The Committee’s report reviews EOPS’ coordination and management of local communities, agencies and authorities to ensure their preparedness. Also, the committee reviewed the role of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency’s role in ensuring preparedness at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and its neighboring communities. Furthermore, the report examines the preparedness of the Massachusetts National Guard, which is the only military service that has both a state and federal mission to be prepared to respond in the case of a homeland security incident or other domestic emergency. The Committee also analyzed the preparedness of healthcare organizations for the possibility of a homeland security incident, domestic emergency or pandemic.

· the senate committee on post audit & oversight investigation, hearings & methodology ·

Prior to the second anniversary of the tragic events of September 11^th, the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight began its investigation of homeland security preparedness in the Commonwealth with three days of hearings held on September 8, 9, and 10^th, 2003. The goal of the hearings was to learn from federal, state, and local government officials as well as first responders and homeland security experts how far we had come since September 11^th, and how far we had to go in ensuring that our cities and towns are prepared for the possibility of a terrorist attack.

Those who testified in person and/or provided written testimony included:

September 8, 2003

· Barney Frank, U.S. Congressman

· Geoffrey Beckwith, Executive Director, Massachusetts Municipal Association

· Edward M. Lambert, Jr., Mayor, Fall River

· Thomas G. Ambrosino, Mayor, Revere

· Stanley J. Usovicz, Jr., former Mayor, Salem

· Michael Ricciuti, former Massachusetts Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, Chief of Anti-Terrorism Unit, Office of United States Attorney, District of Massachusetts

· Matthew Amorello, former Chairman, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

· Michael Powers, General Counsel, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

· Michael Mucci, Commanding Officer, Troop E Massachusetts State Police

· Michael Swanson, former Chief Operating Officer, Chief Engineer, MTA

· Lorenzo Parra, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Facilitator. Turnpike Task Force on Emergency Response

· Craig P. Coy, former CEO, Massachusetts Port Authority

· Arnold Howitt, Director, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

· Daniel Grabauskas, former Secretary, Executive Office of Transportation and Construction

· Michael Mulhern, former General Manager, Mass Bay Transit Authority

· Joseph Carter, Chief of Police, Mass Bay Transit Authority

· Arthur Allen, Chairman, Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission

· Gordon Rose, Deputy Chief Engineer, MassHighways’ Safety and Security Division

· Richard Grant, President and CEO, Distrigas

September 9, 2003

· John Auerbach, Executive Director, Boston Public Health Commission

· Richard A. Serino, Chief, Boston Emergency Medical Services

· Paul G. Afonso, former Commissioner, Department of Telecommunications and Energy

· Mary J. Richards, former President, Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and Scientists

· Leslie Kirle, Senior Director, Massachusetts Hospital Association, Clinical Policy & Patient Advocacy

· George Thibault, M.D., Vice President, Clinical Affairs, partners Healthcare System, Inc.

· Richard Mangion, President and CEO, Harrington Hospital

· Hank J. Porten, President and CEO, Holyoke Hospital

· Maureen McMahon, Disaster Coordinator, Boston Medical Center

· Bruce Auerbach, M.D., Vice President and Chief, Emergency and Ambulatory Services, Sturdy Memorial Hospital

· Karen Higgins, former President, Massachusetts Nurses Association

· Christine Pontus, Registered Nurse, Massachusetts Nurses Association

· Christine Ferguson, former Commissioner, Department of Public Health

· Suzanne K. Condon, former Director, Center for Emergency Preparedness

· Nancy Ridley, Director, Betsy Lehman Center for Medical Error Reduction

· Anthony Chianca, Vice President, Emergency Management Planning Group, Inc.

· Edward Merrick, Chief, Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association

· Michael Shannon, M.D., Children’s Hospital Chief and Chair, Division of Emergency Medicine

· Jennifer Leaning, M.D., Professor of International Health, Harvard School of Public Health; Director, Program on Humanitarian Crises, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights; Director, Scientific Core, Harvard Center for Public Health Preparedness

· Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative, U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security

September 10, 2003

· Charles Cellucci, Deputy Superintendent, Boston Police Department

· James V. DiPaola, Sheriff, President, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Association

· Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch

· Dr. Gordon Thompson, Institute for Resource and Security Studies

· Jack Alexander, Government Affairs, Entergy/Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

· Dave Tarantino, Communications, Entergy/Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

· Reg Rose, Manager, Security, Entergy/Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

· Robert Atkinson, Progressive Policy Institute

· Robert DiPoli, Chief, former President, Fire Chief’s Association of Massachusetts

· Kenneth Galligan, Chief, Fire Chiefs’ Association of Massachusetts

· Robert McCarthy, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts

· Robert Kilduff Coleman, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts

· Frank Raffa, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts

· Kenneth Donnelly, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts

· Raymond McGrath, International Brotherhood of Police Officers

· Rick Cipro, International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers

· Edward Flynn, former Secretary, Executive Office of Public Safety

· George Keefe, former Adjutant General, National Guard

· Christine McCombs, Director, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency

· Blair Sutherland, Massachusetts State Police

· Bradley Hibbard, Lieutenant Colonel, Massachusetts State Police

· Michael McCormack, Sheriff, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Association

· Joseph McDonough, former Sheriff, Massachusetts Sheriff’s Association

· Wayne Sampson, Chief, Central Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council

· Patrick Foley, Chief, Central Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council

· James Pervier, Chief, Central Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council

The three days of hearings painted a stark picture of preparedness in the Commonwealth. While agencies like the Massachusetts Port Authority, which oversees Logan Airport, and Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority had made significant progress, firefighters, police, and health professionals all voiced the same concern-- two years had passed since September 11^th and we were still not prepared for the possibility of a terrorist attack. Testimony from public safety officials and personnel all pointed to layoffs, lack of training and proper equipment, a confusing federal grant process, and a general lack of coordination in planning and communication among state agencies as the main factors contributing to a lack of preparedness.

Shortly before the hearings, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety at that time, Edward A. Flynn, released the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Homeland Security Report Card: Assessment of State Programs, as requested by Governor Romney. While the Report Card served as a valuable self-assessment tool for the Executive Office of Public Safety, no comprehensive study had yet been done on homeland security preparedness in the Commonwealth and all of its agencies. The report card provided both current grades and goal grades for the state. However, since 2003, EOPS has failed to provide an updated report card, detailing whether it has met the goal grades and what criteria it bases the grades on.

In addition to the hearings, the Committee issued a survey of the Commonwealth’s public safety officials both in 2003 and again in late 2005/early 2006. The survey included responses from 333 of 339 (98%) Massachusetts Police Chiefs in 2003 and 317 of 339 in 2005-2006 (94%), and 351 of 366 (96%) Fire Chiefs in 2003 and 339 of 366 in 2005-2006 (93%). The results of the Committee’s 2003 survey were incorporated in an interim report issued in May 2004, Homeland Security Interim Report: Survey of Massachusetts Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs on Homeland Security Preparedness. In the interim report, the Committee articulated its findings from the survey results and made various recommendations.[12]

In late 2005/early 2006, the Committee repeated its survey on the preparedness of the Commonwealth’s fire and police departments. Also, in 2006, the Committee sent a survey and request for information about emergency management plans to the state agencies and authorities that make up the Commonwealth’s infrastructure. Additionally, the Committee sent requests for updated testimony to organizations in health related fields specifically requesting information on preparedness for a pandemic. The information and documents provided indicate that the state is more prepared than it was in 2003, but there are still improvements that can be made.

Furthermore, in response to the events of September 11^th, the National Guard’s responsibility to the federal government has dominated its missions and a record number of Guard personnel have been deployed outside the United States for extended periods of time. This caused the Committee to inquire into the preparedness and capabilities of the Commonwealth’s National Guard in the case of a domestic security incident here in Massachusetts. On June 15, 2006, a hearing was held on this issue at the State House. At the hearing, Adjutant General Oliver J. Mason testified along with the assistance of other officers in the Guard. Additionally, through meetings and document requests, the Committee received information and data from the National Guard relevant to preparedness issues.

This final report documents an ongoing investigation into the Commonwealth’s preparedness, beginning in 2003 and continuing through the present. Also, to avoid duplication of efforts, the Committee has reviewed the reports by the State Auditor’s Office. The State Auditor produced several reports including a review of homeland security and bioterrorism funding, and the emergency management programs at various state agencies and authorities.

Throughout this time frame, the Committee has continued its research and investigation into homeland security preparedness issues and focused on areas where it would not duplicate efforts by other offices. The Committee has identified the following areas of concern as the focus of its efforts of assessing preparedness in the Commonwealth:

Ø Proper levels of staffing, training, and equipment for public safety personnel

Ø Statewide planning and regional coordination

Ø State agency planning and coordination

Ø Interoperability/Communications abilities of public safety departments

Ø Public Health preparedness

Ø Massachusetts National Guard

Ø Preparedness at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

· overview of the role of the executive office of public safety and the state’s emergency management

plans and strategy ·

The Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety (“EOPS”) is the State’s Homeland Security Advisor and is responsible for overseeing the Commonwealth’s preparedness to respond to a terrorist attack or other homeland security incident. Furthermore, EOPS is responsible to the citizens of Massachusetts to ensure that municipalities and agencies are prepared for a homeland security incident. In its assessment of the state’s homeland security preparedness, the Committee reviewed EOPS’ strategies, infrastructure, compliance, planning and progress. The Committee learned that EOPS prepared a strategy for homeland security that if implemented, appears to fulfill some of its responsibilities. However, through its investigation, the Committee learned that EOPS has failed to fully implement its strategy.

A. The Executive Office of Public Safety

Beginning in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) required every state to submit a homeland security strategy prior to being eligible for any federal homeland security grant funds. As the Commonwealth’s Homeland Security Adviser, EOPS prepared the State Homeland Security Strategy (“SHSS”) and it was approved by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (“ODP”) on February 17, 2004.[13] The SHSS serves as the guide for the Commonwealth’s homeland security planning and activities, and funding received must be used for purposes outlined in the SHSS.[14] The SHSS sets out the following goals: (1) The Commonwealth will enhance its ability to assess risk and prevent future terrorist attacks or critical incidents; (2) The Commonwealth will improve its ability to collect, analyze, disseminate and manage key information; (3) The Commonwealth will improve preparedness by enhancing regional coordination; (4) The Commonwealth will improve the ability of first responders to communicate at the scene of a terrorist attack or other critical incident; and (5) The Commonwealth will improve its ability to recover from a terrorist attack or other critical incident.[15]

In 2005, DHS mandated that states update their strategies to remain consistent with the National Preparedness Goal and National Priorities.[16] According to DHS and its March 31, 2005 Interim National Preparedness Goal, States and Urban Areas were required to update their existing strategies and submit new State Homeland Security Strategies to ODP by September 30, 2005.[17] It is unclear when and if EOPS complied with this mandate.[18] At some point during 2005, EOPS made important additions and revisions to the SHSS, but it is unclear whether and when it was submitted to DHS.[19] The 2005 SHSS incorporated inventories of homeland security activities and threat vulnerability and risk assessments.[20] An important component introduced in the 2005 revision, was the inclusion of practical benchmarks and activities being undertaken in efforts to attain each goal.[21] This section also lists a time frame to meet the benchmarks and lists the agencies responsible for each objective.[22] However, in a conversation with EOPS, the Committee was informed that the 2005 SHSS was merely an update of the 2004 SHSS and there were not any major substantive changes made to the SHSS.[23] The specific date in 2005 when the SHSS was updated is unclear because according to a conversation with EOPS, it was not required by DHS to submit a revised strategy, so there was no filing letter.[24] Furthermore, according to EOPS, the 2005 revised document was posted on its website, but it is unclear on what date it was first posted.[25] Based on the information provided to the Committee, it is unclear whether the 2005 SHSS was submitted to DHS in 2005, or if in fact, EOPS missed DHS’ deadline by submitting the revised SHSS to DHS in 2006.

Nevertheless, the 2006 version of the SHSS is an exact replica of the 2005 version provided to the Committee by EOPS.[26] As a result, the 2006 SHSS is incomplete because it does not mention or incorporate homeland security events and emergencies that have taken place during 2006.[27] The SHSS should routinely and continuously be reviewed and updated based on constantly evolving real life events and discoveries. Furthermore, the DHS’ National Response Plan was recently updated on May 25, 2006, and it contains best practices and procedures.[28] Accordingly, this information could not have been incorporated into EOPS’ 2005 SHSS, which is also its 2006 version. Also, as of 2006, DHS allows State Homeland Security funding to be used to address issues relating to a pandemic influenza and hurricanes.[29] Activities are allowable if they support terrorism preparedness or “build or enhance capabilities that relate to terrorism . . .even if the capabilities themselves do not focus exclusively on terrorism.”[30]

Also, pursuant to Mass. G.L. c. 6A § 18½, EOPS shall have four Undersecretaries, consisting of an Undersecretary of Law Enforcement and Administration, an Undersecretary of Criminal Justice, an Undersecretary of Homeland Security, and an Undersecretary of Forensic Sciences.[31] The Undersecretary of Homeland Security is responsible for overseeing the functions of the emergency management agency, military and nuclear safety department of the emergency management agency, military and nuclear safety department.[32] However, at this time, EOPS does not have an Undersecretary of Homeland Security.[33] It appears that the responsibilities of the Undersecretary of Homeland Security have been placed under the responsibilities listed for the Undersecretary of Law Enforcement.[34] Homeland Security preparedness is critical to the Commonwealth and the Committee strongly urges the Secretary of Public Safety to assign a separate and distinct Undersecretary of Homeland Security.

In 2003, EOPS issued a Homeland Security Report Card, Assessment of State Progress, wherein EOPS gave itself grades on various homeland security responsibilities for 2001 and 2003 and provided a track grade.[35] For example, under prevention and preparedness, EOPS gave itself a C- in 2003 for information and intelligence, a B for basic first responder capabilities, a C+ for infrastructure protection, and a C for citizen involvement.[36] Under the section on Response and Recovery, EOPS gave itself a B- for first response, and a C+ for secondary response. Further, under Organization and Management of Homeland Security, EOPS gave itself a B- for responsibility, and a C+ for collaboration.[37] EOPS did not give itself anything lower than a C- for its 2003 grades.[38] The Report Card was a three page document and failed to put forth any supporting information utilized in the assessment. Also, since 2003, EOPS has never produced an updated report card, so it is unclear what progress it has made toward these goals since that time.

EOPS may argue that it is in compliance with all of DHS’ directives, but the efficiency of the DHS itself has been continuously criticized and questioned. In the 2006 Annual Report Card on DHS, a minority report of the Congressional Committee on Homeland Security, the DHS received many Cs, C-s, and Ds.[39] EOPS must have a strategy in place that truly takes into consideration all hazards and can be feasibly implemented when necessary. When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, the affected states, as well as DHS and FEMA had emergency plans in place. However, emergency response plans at all levels, including the National Response Plan, failed the nation.[40] The response by FEMA and DHS to Hurricane Katrina has been described as “a complete failure, showcasing how ineffective management, poor communications, and failing to take a true all-hazards approach to response have affected both preparedness and response capabilities.”[41] EOPS must show that its strategy would not be similarly deficient if it became necessary to implement it.

For these reasons, an independent, extensive, detailed evaluation of all of the state’s plans and strategies, progress toward implementation, and actual feasibility would be truly beneficial to the Commonwealth in preparation and in the case of a disaster. This would allow for an objective assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Also submission of quarterly reports to the legislature would require EOPS to continually update its strategy. The legislature makes decisions about state funding, and EOPS has information that could be quite helpful to this process, including components of the state’s plan that need more funding to be implemented. While the Committee understands that some of the recommendations impose additional work on an agency that already has a great deal of responsibilities, it is the Committee’s position that the best preparation strategy for homeland security in Massachusetts should include the collaboration and resources of the legislature.

B. The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (“MEMA”)

MEMA is under the jurisdiction of EOPS and is the agency responsible for coordinating federal, state, local, voluntary and private resources during emergencies and disasters.[42] MEMA administers the state’s fusion center, which serves as the statewide information sharing source. MEMA facilitates the “collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence relevant to terrorism and public safety.”[43]

MEMA is responsible for preparing and updating the state’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (“CEMP”). Also, MEMA’s planning department assists communities in developing their own CEMPs, which address mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery from natural and technological emergencies.[44] The state’s CEMP serves as a “playbook” for coordinating local, state and federal resources during a disaster.[45]

The state’s CEMP establishes a framework for integration and coordination of emergency response and recovery actions of all levels of government.[46] According to the CEMP provided on MEMA’s website, the last updates to the CEMP were performed in 2005 and do not incorporate homeland security events from 2006. As discussed above with the SHSS, these plans must be updated continuously using the lessons learned from real-life events, such as Hurricane Katrina, the London subway attacks, and intelligence gained from other attempted attacks. MEMA has indicated that the CEMP is updated annually and will be updated during September 2006, but if this is accurate, it is not the version of the CEMP available to the public on-line and should be posted.[47]

Updating these plans should not be optional and the state should be required to do so periodically. Additionally, the State’s CEMP was first published in 1999, which was two years prior to the approval of the SHSS, and many components of the CEMP do not include theories and goals set forth in the SHSS. The State’s CEMP should certainly be reviewed and updated to include newly obtained information, as well as, recommendations from the most current SHSS and, to reconcile any inconsistencies between the two documents. This entire document and not just the annexes should be updated on a routine basis.

C. Regional Coordination in Massachusetts

Goal No. 3 of the SHSS provides that “[t]he Commonwealth will improve preparedness by enhancing regional coordination.”[48] Regional collaboration is one of the seven National Priorities set forth by DHS.[49] To effectuate preparedness on the municipal level, EOPS implemented a regional approach with regional councils, representing and advocating for regional areas and needs.[50] In May 2004, EOPS organized the state into the following five regional homeland security regions: Metro Boston, Southeast, Northeast, Central and West.[51] Each region has a Regional Advisory Council that is responsible for developing and implementing its homeland security plan.[52] MEMA, rather than EOPS, works most directly with the Regional Councils and five MEMA staff people were hired specifically for this purpose and are assigned to each council.[53] Homeland security funding is distributed by EOPS through MEMA to the Regional Councils.[54] However, once the regional councils receive grant funding, there is not much oversight by EOPS to ensure that the projects receiving funding are truly implementing regional coordination.

EOPS directs the regions to have the following 15 representatives on the Regional Advisory Councils: 3 representatives from law enforcement, 3 representatives from fire services, a representative from public health, a representative from correctional services, a representative from regional transportation authorities, a representative from hospitals, a representative from public works, a representative from emergency management, a representative from emergency medical services, a representative from public safety communications, and a representative from government administration.[55] Additionally, each regional council has one MEMA employee that advises the council.[56]

The regional councils are expected to do the following:

(1) Assess and implement sustainable Homeland Security training and critical incident response planning activities; (2) Identify and establish relationships between all responder agencies/groups within that region; (3) Update emergency response and recovery plans – and provide training to all relevant personnel – to ensure consistency in protocols as defined by the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System recently released by the Department of Homeland Security; (4) Develop strategies to mitigate the redundancy of facilities and communications functions; (5) Conduct an inventory of all emergency response-related CBRNE equipment to identify critical gaps; (6) Continue to provide necessary training to regional HAZMAT response teams; (7) Continue to enhance strategies initiated by the Department of Public Health (through its CDC and HRSA cooperative agreements) to strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis capabilities; (8) Continue to implement the Strategic National Stockpile program, which would provide life-saving pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to the Commonwealth in a WMD event; (9) Continue to utilize available homeland security funds to support multi-disciplinary exercise programs; (10) Conduct regional exercise programs between local, state and federal first responders to identify improvement areas for strategic planning purposes; (11) Ensure that regional efforts are coordinated with the three Metropolitan Medical Response Systems (MMRS) jurisdictions – Boston, Worcester, and Springfield – which have been working since 1996 to develop plans for managing the health consequences of a WMD event; (12) Develop strategies to strategically allocate CBRNE equipment to mitigate potential WMD incidents throughout each Homeland Security Region; and (13) Provide comprehensive homeland security community outreach initiatives and programs.[57]

After the formation of the five regions in 2004, EOPS required each advisory council to develop its own homeland security plan. The initial plans were submitted by the regions in 2004 and set forth their goals and the proposed use of FY 2004 funding.[58] In 2005, EOPS required the Regional Councils to submit updated plans, adding new information and outlining the Council’s proposed use of FY 2005 funds.[59] However, according to the information provided by EOPS, it has not yet required the submission of updated FY 2006 plans. The FY 2005 updates were due to EOPS in April 2005 and it is unclear to the Committee why the 2006 plans have not been submitted to EOPS as of September of 2006. These plans must be updated on a routine basis and if they have not already done so, the regions should be required to submit updated 2006 homeland security strategies and budget overviews to EOPS as soon as possible.

The Regional Councils oversee and make recommendations for grant program expenditures in the region. According to EOPS, the projects that receive funding are supposed to support regional multi-disciplinary exercise programs and equipment.[60] Regional cooperation assists regions where there are small, rural communities that are not capable of responding to a major incident and it can allow cities and towns to maximize funding. Furthermore, as one mayor pointed out, “when it comes to homeland security, borders don’t matter. Terrorists really don’t care where the town line begins or where it ends.”[61] Also, true regional homeland security strategies facilitate equipment sharing and interdisciplinary training.[62]

However, the regional approach as it has been applied and implemented in the Commonwealth needs serious improvement. The SHSS and the Regional Advisory Councils are merely two and a half years old, and there are areas that must be re-evaluated and improved. The regions have expressed a delay in getting projects underway due to the bureaucratic steps required in planning and implementing proposed projects.[63] The Committee was informed that even in MEMA’s fusion center, analysts were without the internet for one full year and public safety officials were requested to send information by facsimile, which clearly slowed down the possibility of information sharing.[64] Furthermore, many of the 2004 projects were just in the beginning phases when the regions submitted the 2005 updates.[65]

Also, there has been frustration among officials who believe that EOPS is not truly incorporating the regional homeland security needs and recommendations towards the projects that are awarded funding.[66] It has been reported that many of the projects that have been awarded funding by the regional councils are not incorporating the regional, inter-disciplinary focus and are more focused on specific disciplines.[67] Also, reportedly, councils have purchased duplicative equipment that is being used by separate disciplines.[68] EOPS must have a role in overseeing the approval of these projects and must remain consistent with its strategy.

Furthermore, the composition of the Regional Advisory Councils presently does not include anyone who has been educated and trained in the grant field.[69] Accordingly, the individuals on the councils who are drafting proposals for grants, making business planning decisions, and decisions about what projects should receive grants have not had extensive training in this field and are most likely not qualified to be making the majority of these decisions. There are many factors involved in grant planning that go outside of the Council’s expertise, including considerations involving procurement, business planning, liability, insurance, ownership, finances, storage, and maintenance. The state should have a more direct role in this process and should hire grant coordinators for each region to work with the various disciplines and focus on putting grants together that fulfill the elements in the SHSS. These grant coordinators could also be available for municipalities to utilize in applying for various municipal and first responder grants.

While the designated individuals on the Advisory Councils provide a variety of perspectives, they do not have representatives from other critical groups, such as the disability community and from the state infrastructure agencies and authorities that are present in the region. People with disabilities constitute 19% of the Massachusetts population and in some regions that percentage is considerably higher.[70] Furthermore, the President issued an Executive Order on July 22, 2004 that encourages the inclusion of persons with disabilities in planning and response of disaster preparedness at the local and state levels as well as the federal level.[71] Also, the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act have been construed to apply during emergency response activities, which require the regions to consider these provisions when planning.[72]

Furthermore, according to the Disability Policy Consortium, most communities are ill prepared to address the needs of individuals within special populations.[73] It would certainly be beneficial to have someone on the council from the disability community and/or special populations to bring light to the particular needs of these groups and to discuss strategies to implement in the event of an emergency.[74] Furthermore, the need to include these populations is recognized by MEMA in its September 25, 2006 report, where MEMA asserts that it is planning a “summit” to address improving the inclusion of special populations in the emergency planning process.[75] Emergency management plans must address issues related to people with disabilities in the case of an emergency or disaster, such as access to treatment, ethics of altered standards of care, locating people who need additional assistance, risk communication and general preparedness communication, and find ways to help in personal preparedness.[76]

Additionally, true regional cooperation must integrate the infrastructure agencies and authorities present within the various regions. Accordingly, EOPS may want to consider tailoring the composition of the advisory councils to coordinate with the infrastructure agencies and authorities in the area. For example, regions that are home to the Commonwealth’s sea and air ports should have individuals from the Massachusetts Port Authority on the council to understand the capabilities and resources it provides. Additionally, for relevant regions, representatives from the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority would certainly provide beneficial information towards regional planning for the area. It appears that some of the regions already include agencies and authorities in their planning process and have participated in drills and training with the agencies.[77] However, it would be advisable for EOPS to require this component for all relevant regions. Requiring the inclusion of these groups would further the all-hazards approach to homeland security planning and preparedness.[78]

A drawback of regional cooperation is that while regional assistance will be needed in the event of a terror attack, it could come with some delay and each municipality must be sufficiently prepared to respond immediately. This necessity is evidenced in the State’s CEMP, which provides that if an emergency occurs or disaster strikes in a community, the local government will be expected to utilize their own response and community-to-community mutual aid agreements first.[79] “Only when the emergency or disaster has depleted or threatens to deplete their own response capabilities would local governments be expected to request assistance from the State.”[80] The regional councils make determinations of whether to approve funding for a particular project and identify the priority needs at a regional level.[81] Many times this results in the denial of equipment proposals submitted by local public safety forces.

Also, the regional approach leaves out certain municipalities and groups who are not on the advisory council.[82] The 5 regions encompass a vast number of cities and towns with different dynamics and needs and there are only 15 individuals on each advisory council. Clearly, some cities and towns will not have any representation on the council. For some regions, such as the Central region, which is comprised of four cities and fifty-six towns, the municipalities are culturally and topographically diverse and present different issues for preparedness.[83] Some communities have more significant areas at risk and will need additional resources.[84] Officials in bigger cities have expressed concerns that their voices are not heard because they are outnumbered by the towns in the region and their proposals are repeatedly denied.[85] When considering population and presence of threat, many of the cities have significantly more needs than other small towns, but these factors are not reflected in voting or distribution of funding.[86] Comparatively, in the Metro Boston Region, it appears that Boston has dominated the preparedness plans and projects for the region.[87]

An additional problem with the present regional councils is that most are not communicating the equipment available and acquired by the region to public safety officials in the cities and towns.[88] The regional councils should be required to keep an inventory of all equipment acquired and list the location of the equipment. This inventory should be provided to the mayors, police chiefs and fire chiefs in each city and town throughout the region.

Some cities and towns, who have been unsuccessful getting funding from the Regional Councils, have instead worked together independently on pilot projects that are very successful, but are running out of funds. A project in Southeastern Massachusetts would allow for intelligence information sharing throughout 87 cities and towns.[89] However, EOPS has refused to award available regional homeland security funds to these projects.[90] This example is just one of many that evidence a breakdown of the process in communicating how the funds should be used for various regions between the localities, Regional Councils, and the state.

D. Federal Grant Funding for Homeland Security Programs

As of May 2005, Massachusetts had been awarded more than $374 million in federal grants and direct allocations through public health and public safety programs.[91] In Fiscal Year 2005, Massachusetts was awarded by the federal government a total of $62,436,056, consisting of $21,863,377 for the State Homeland Security Program, $28,075,000 for the Urban Areas Security Initiative (“UASI”), $7,950,319 for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, $277,556 for Citizens Corps Program, $3,587,028 for the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, and $682,776 for the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program.[92]

However, 2006 homeland security funding for Massachusetts has decreased drastically. This year, Massachusetts will receive $41,246,241 in homeland security grants, which is a decrease of approximately 34% from last year.[93] In its reasoning for the drastic cuts, DHS relies on a new formula utilized this year in which it analyzed the risk of a potential terrorist attack posed to a state and the quality of the proposed spending plans submitted.[94] It is unclear whether the significant cuts to Massachusetts were a result of DHS finding that there is not a high risk of potential terrorist attacks in Massachusetts, or if the spending plans submitted by EOPS were deficient. Nevertheless, this decrease is particularly troubling in light of the insufficient response efforts to Hurricane Katrina. The failure of plans on every level, as well as other recent homeland security events, has made it critical for Massachusetts to re-evaluate the state’s strategy. Also, many first responders still do not have adequate equipment. To decrease funding to these entities at this time could have devastating consequences.

Furthermore, this year, Boston’s Urban Area Security Initiative (“UASI”) grant funds were cut by one-third from $28 million to $18.2 million.[95] UASI funding is appropriated to cities throughout the country and the amounts are determined based on credible threat, presence of critical infrastructure, vulnerability, population density, law enforcement investigative and enforcement activity, and the existence of formal mutual aid agreements.[96] DHS decreased the number of cities eligible for FY 2006 funding from 50 to 35, eliminating Las Vegas, San Diego and Phoenix. However, funding was still decreased for Boston, Washington D.C. and New York City despite the fact that DHS’ existence only came out of the “bravery and sacrifice of thousands of New Yorkers, Bostonians and Washingtonians, many of whom lost their lives on September 11^th.”[97] The cuts to New York and Washington D.C. come also despite the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to “[b]ase federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list.”[98] Also, while New York City and Washington D.C. sustained major cuts in UASI funding this year, Omaha, Charlotte and Louisville had their UASI funding increased.[99] DHS continues to defend the new formulas it utilized to divide the $711 million in 2006 UASI funds despite criticism by numerous federal lawmakers, who categorized the decision making process as “mind-boggling,” “a mystery,” “goofy,” and “one of the greatest displays of incompetence.”[100]

Nevertheless, it has been reported that Boston may not be using all of the UASI funds in the most efficient manner.[101] According to an article in the Boston Herald, as of March 2006, state records showed that Boston had only spent $1.1 million of the $24.75 million in 2004 Homeland Security money and some of these funds would be lost by the city if not used by May 31, 2006, which was the apparent end of the 2004 thirty month period of performance.[102] This money could have been used to “train and equip firefighters and police, improve communications systems and stockpile supplies in case of a terror attack or disaster.”[103] Furthermore, according to Boston Fire Department officials, this money could have gone toward a fire boat to protect the harbor or respond to a potential attack on an LNG tanker, or funding could have been put toward the formation of a hazardous material response team, both of which the city presently does not possess.[104]

Interestingly, in an April 24, 2006 meeting between the Committee’s General Counsel and representatives from EOPS and MEMA, which was prior to DHS’ announcement of the funding awards, EOPS and MEMA expressed great confidence in the DHS’ new formula and the increased possibilities it should bring to the Commonwealth.[105] Also, EOPS and MEMA expressed that this was a positive change and EOPS has been utilizing this same formula for its regional allocations of grants.[106] Despite this representation and the fact that there are Republican administrations on both the federal and state level, DHS decreased funding to Massachusetts by approximately $21.2 million.[107] However, according to the Commonwealth’s Secretary of EOPS, Robert Haas, “the funding cut should not seriously hurt Massachusetts.”[108] Based on the findings in this report, the Committee seriously questions this assertion.

There are many restrictions put on homeland security grant funds by both EOPS and DHS. DHS requires that 80% of the grant funds go to “local units of government, identified urban area jurisdictions or [Metropolitan Medical Response System] subgrantees within 60 days of the grant award date.”[109] The majority of the 80% of funding is distributed by EOPS to the Regional Councils for determination of projects. According to EOPS’ distribution of the funds, all state agencies and authorities, including MEMA, are ineligible for any of the 80% reserved for municipalities. They must compete for the remaining 20% of funding.[110]

All programs within the federal grant program have a thirty month period of performance.[111] EOPS requires the municipalities to spend money first and then seek reimbursement, and only specific types of projects qualify for funding.[112] These requirements have caused concerns with local governments because the state dictates which projects should receive funding without taking into consideration some of the local concerns.[113] Furthermore, the grant process is quite competitive and cities are forced to compete against other needy communities for funding.[114] Additionally, the reimbursement approach presents a problem for municipalities and first responders that cannot afford to pay the initial amounts.[115] Additionally, as discussed in more detail below, EOPS has consistently placed restrictions on interoperability and communications projects, beginning with the near three year delay in awarding funding for any projects.

Moreover, some cities have indicated that the specificity from EOPS in directing how the funds may be used has failed to address their top security priorities.[116] For example, funds may be used to purchase certain equipment, but EOPS refused to allow funds to be used to pay for the technical support services required for the equipment.[117] However, in some cases, the vendor will not even sell the equipment without the support assistance component.[118] The party seeking to purchase the equipment is required to pay for the associated support service costs themselves.[119] Also, the entity purchasing the equipment is responsible to pay out of pocket the associated service costs for the life of the equipment. This restriction places an undue burden on the groups that the funds are supposed to be helping and prevents the areas from getting critical equipment.

Additionally, the limited funding actually available to cities and towns through the Local Preparedness Grants is further restricted because the funds can only be used for planning, training, equipment, and exercises.[120] However, for many years, the top security concerns for cities and towns were not training and equipment. Instead, the concerns were focused on the insufficient number of first responders available to respond to an emergency.[121] Mayor Thomas Ambrosino of Revere, was quoted as saying “[i]t is great to have money to train and equip persons, but if you don’t have the personnel to train and equip, it’s not all that helpful.”[122] One city was reported as having a decontamination unit, but only three firefighters knew how to use it and the city had not trained with the local hospital on what to do with the unit in the event of an emergency.[123] Without funding for manning and training on equipment, having the equipment in an emergency will not do any good.[124] Furthermore, the Committee has learned that this year, EOPS is requiring that cities and towns use the limited funding available to them, which is approximately $12,000 each, solely for National Incident Management System (“NIMS”) Training.[125] Also, many cities and towns cannot afford to hire one individual as the full time emergency management official for the city.[126] Instead, cities and towns have had to assign the emergency management official position to individuals that already have full time positions, such as the chief of police or fire department. [127] This is problematic because it forces the designated officials to find time for the responsibilities accompanying both positions.[128]

Also, while homeland security funding may be used for training, there are unnecessary restrictions placed on the actual classes that recipients may take. The Office for Domestic Preparedness through EOPS only allows funding for courses that it has approved.[129] The guidelines require recipients, such as first responders to only attend classes offered by certain providers.[130] This list of allowable providers includes Texas Engineering Extension Service, Louisiana State University and New Mexico Institute of Mining Technology.[131] Consequently, this requirement mandates that grant recipients attend classes that may not be the best available in the specific area, but are offered by one of the certified providers.[132] Also, it restricts the areas of training that recipients are allowed to receive.[133]

There are also various reporting requirements for the grants on both the state and federal level. EOPS requires the recipients to submit quarterly reports within fifteen days after the end of a quarter.[134] Sub-recipients, such as the cities and towns, are required to submit quarterly reports to MEMA and quarterly Reimbursement and Reporting of Funds reports to receive reimbursement for program related expenditures.[135] MEMA relies on these reports and does not conduct site visits of the localities to confirm and corroborate that the funds were used for the approved purpose.[136] In a report from the State Auditor’s Office on a recently conducted audit of MEMA’s awards, receipts and expenditures of homeland security funds, MEMA was found to be compliant overall with applicable laws and regulations, but there were a few deficiencies found relative to MEMA’s reporting obligations.[137]

In its Emergency Management Policy, the National Governors Association recommends that all levels of Government establish partnerships with the private sector.[138] These partnerships can be used to minimize the economic costs of homeland security materials and training.[139] Also, the Governors recommend that any industry that creates a threat to public safety should bear a reasonable share of associated costs taken by the government to mitigate the threat.[140] Massachusetts should implement these recommendations and EOPS should increase relationships with private sector entities. While EOPS currently has a business network, these relationships should be increased and private entities should be included as part of the Regional Councils. Additionally, EOPS should work to encourage contributions and donations from private sector entities to help compensate for the decrease in federal funding and because any funding received from private entities would not be subject to the arduous restrictions of the federal homeland security grants.

EOPS Findings

1. The Executive Office of Public Safety has failed to follow through and adequately oversee the implementation of the State Homeland Security Strategy (“SHSS”).

2. The procedures currently in place for approval of proposals and funding are inefficient and have created unnecessary bureaucracy and delay in getting the state prepared for a homeland security emergency.

3. In 2003, EOPS issued a Homeland Security Report Card that gave itself grades, but did not include any criteria that it was relying on in calculating the grades. EOPS has not released an updated Report Card to evidence the progress made and the current grade it gives itself.

4. The 2006 State Homeland Security Strategy is incomplete because it does not mention or incorporate homeland security events that have taken place in 2006.

5. The regional approach to planning and funding as implemented by EOPS needs improvement. In particular, officials in bigger cities have expressed concerns that their voices are not heard because they are outnumbered by the towns in the region and their proposals are repeatedly denied.

6. The regional councils are not providing each city and town with an inventory of all equipment they are purchasing.

7. Despite Republican Administrations on both the state and federal level, DHS decreased homeland security grant funding to Massachusetts this year by approximately 34% from $62.4 million to $41.3 million and funds to Boston’s Urban Area Security Initiative were cut by one-third from $26 million to $18.2 million.

8. It is unclear whether the significant cuts to Massachusetts were a result of DHS finding that there is not a high risk of potential terrorist attacks in Massachusetts, or if the spending plans submitted by EOPS were deficient.

9. Based on the information provided by EOPS, it appears that EOPS may not have complied with DHS’ requirements relative to updating the SHSS to remain consistent with the National Preparedness Goal and National Priorities on time by failing to submit the updated SHSS to the Office for Domestic Preparedness by September 30, 2005.

10. The State’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan has not been updated since 2005.

11. There are inconsistencies contained within the Massachusetts SHSS and the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

12. The Committee learned that the regions have not been required to update their homeland security plans since April 2005.

13. The restrictions imposed by EOPS on homeland security funding have caused problems for municipalities.

14. Regional Councils consist of only 15 individuals and are not required to include any individuals from the disability population or representatives from the state infrastructure agencies and authorities.

15. EOPS does not provide the Regional Advisory Councils with assistance from individuals who are trained specifically in the grant field.

16. Most communities are ill prepared to address the needs of individuals with disabilities and within special populations in the event of an emergency.

17. Private sector partnerships with the state could increase funding for materials and training and would not be subject to the arduous federal restrictions.

Recommendations

1. EOPS should be required to routinely and continuously update the State Homeland Security Strategy based on constantly evolving real life events. This should be done throughout the year and not solely for specific deadlines.

2. EOPS must re-assess and re-formulate the approach it has taken to implement regional coordination. Included in the re-evaluation, EOPS should consider the following recommendations:

a. The Regional Advisory Councils should include more than one representative from government administration.

b. EOPS should have grant analysts work with the regional councils to assist the councils in the grant process and ensure that the projects that are awarded funding are geared toward implementing the SHSS. These specialists should also be available to municipalities and first responders for grant preparation.

c. EOPS should require the Regional Advisory Councils to include a representative from the disability population.

e. The Regional Advisory Councils should be required to keep an inventory of all regional homeland security equipment purchased and its location. Each year the Council should provide a copy of the inventory to the emergency management officials, police chiefs and fire chiefs in each city and town in the Region.

3. EOPS should release an updated report card, documenting its grades for 2006 and include concrete information on the factors utilized in calculating its grades.

4. EOPS should retain an experienced independent entity to conduct an extensive, detailed evaluation of the state’s plans and strategies, progress in fulfilling plans and strategies, actual feasibility, and timing for implementation.

5. EOPS should comply with all DHS deadlines and incorporate the most recent DHS best practices into the state’s plan and funding strategy.

6. Pursuant to Mass. G.L. c. 6A § 18½, the Committee urges the Secretary of Public Safety to appoint a separate and distinct position for Undersecretary of Homeland Security.

7. The Administration should implement procedures for the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, as a whole, to be routinely updated to incorporate lessons learned from real-life events and to remedy the inconsistencies within the State Homeland Security Strategy.

8. EOPS should require that the regions submit updated plans and budgets each year to track the progress of projects and fulfillment of goals. If not already done so, EOPS should require the submittal of updated 2006 plans as soon as possible.

9. EOPS must work to include the individual cities and towns in homeland security planning and funding to assure an adequate level of preparedness and response capabilities.

10. EOPS should evaluate the possibility of implementing a citizen service initiative that would consist of a training program for citizens that would teach them their responsibilities in the event of a natural disaster, epidemic, or terrorist attack.

11. The Executive Branch should work to increase public/private partnerships with private sector entities and formulate a plan to encourage contributions and donations from private entities for homeland security projects.

12. The Administration should come up with a plan to require that industries in the Commonwealth that create a threat to public safety be required to contribute a reasonable share of the costs necessary to mitigate the threat.

13. EOPS should have more flexibility with cities and towns in its reimbursement requirement for grant funding.

14. The Administration should increase lobbying of the federal government to avoid further decreases in homeland security funding to Massachusetts and Boston.

· municipal preparedness ·

A. First Responders

I. Survey Results from Police and Fire Departments throughout the Commonwealth

In both 2003 and late 2005/early 2006, the Committee conducted a survey on the preparedness of the Commonwealth’s public safety officials. The survey requested information from Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs throughout Massachusetts. In May 2004, the Committee issued its interim report, summarizing the 2003 survey results and describing the inadequate level of preparedness for the police and fire departments.[141] The report made key findings and recommendations, but the Administration has failed to implement the majority of the recommendations. The 2005-2006 survey results attest that this lack of administrative action has left the public safety providers of the Commonwealth without proper means to protect against terrorist activity and natural disasters, as well as unable to meet basic public safety needs of their communities. The Committee received the results to the 2005-2006 survey in early 2006, and it seems unlikely that very much has changed with the data received during the months since the Committee received the updated survey information.

The findings in the 2004 interim report were as follows:

· From the September 11^th attacks through 2003, the Commonwealth had lost 945 police officers and 798 firefighters through layoffs or attrition.

· From the September 11^th attacks through 2003, 93% of police departments and 87% of fire departments had either decreased staff or remained the same.

· 83% of police departments and 92% of fire departments were not prepared for a homeland security attack.

· 91% of police departments and 93% of fire departments were not prepared for a bio-terrorism attack.

· 82% of police departments and 87% of fire departments were not prepared for an attack on their community’s infrastructure, including roads and bridges.

· 65% of police departments and 38% of fire departments had to increase over-time costs and/or remove personnel from daily public safety responsibilities to provide homeland security training.

· Only 14% of police departments and 6% of fire departments had communications equipment that was interoperable with all federal agencies, state agencies and municipalities.

· Only 10% of police departments and 8% of fire departments had adequate equipment for the homeland security needs of their community.[142]

Additionally, the interim report made the following recommendations:

1) The Administration should immediately convene a bi-partisan task force to address and resolve the Committee’s concerns about the Commonwealth’s inadequate preparation for homeland security.

2) The Administration should not implement any policies that will result in further cuts to municipalities or the loss of additional public safety personnel.

3) The Executive Office of Public Safety should take immediate steps to ensure that communities have communications equipment that is interoperable with appropriate federal, state and municipal agencies and stop any practice that may be inconsistent with this recommendation.

4) The Undersecretary of Homeland Security should report quarterly to appropriate members of the Legislature about the status of homeland security preparedness including staffing, equipment, training, and communications planning. These reports should go to the House and Senate Committees on Ways & Means, the House and Senate Committees on Post Audit & Oversight, the Joint Committee on Public Safety, and the House Committee on Homeland Security.[143]

According to the data collected from the Committee’s 2005-2006 survey, it appears that municipalities have not lost additional public safety personnel.[144] However, it is unclear whether this was a result of any acts by the Administration. In any event, this is the only recommendation that could arguably have been implemented.

It has been over two years since these recommendations were made and the Administration has failed to implement those remaining. In particular, there has not been a bi-partisan task force convened to resolve concerns about inadequate preparation for homeland security. As discussed in more detail below, the 2005-2006 survey results demonstrate that the majority of communities in the Commonwealth still do not possess communications equipment that is interoperable with federal, state and municipal agencies.[145] Additionally, the Committee has not received any quarterly reports from the Undersecretary of Homeland Security regarding the status of homeland security preparedness, including staffing, equipment, training, and communications planning.

The Committee’s 2003 survey results are based on responses from 333 of 339 (98%) Massachusetts Police Chiefs and 351 of 366 (96%) of Fire Chiefs.[146] The 2005-2006 survey results are based on 317 of 339 (94%) Massachusetts Police Chiefs and 339 of 366 (93%) Fire Chiefs.[147] The survey results demonstrated that the Commonwealth’s cities and towns have lost more than 1,100 public safety personnel since September 11, 2001, two-thirds of which were lost in 2003.[148] While this figure has gone down from the 1700 reported in 2003, it still leaves the Commonwealth with 1,124 fewer officials to respond to public safety emergencies. Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs are the front-line officials directly responsible for meeting the public safety needs of their residents. Police and Fire Chiefs have the closest familiarity with municipal preparedness and the steps required to create a safe environment for their residents. In 2003, Mayor Thomas Ambrosino of Revere confirmed that the loss of public safety personnel caused the city to be less prepared for a terrorist attack instead of more prepared since September 11^th.[149] Recently, in Gloucester, Massachusetts, it took firefighters 11 minutes and 27 seconds to respond to a fire where a woman died because budget restraints have caused the city to close two fire stations, one of which was 1.2 miles from the scene.[150] The information presented to the Committee evidences inadequate preparedness for first responders throughout the Commonwealth because of the lack of sufficient public safety personnel, coordinated statewide response planning, equipment and funding.

Since the September 11^th attacks, 88% of police departments and 82% of fire departments have either had to decrease staff or remain the same.[151] Moreover, 72% of police departments and 50% of fire departments reported that they had to increase over-time costs and/or remove personnel from daily public safety responsibilities to provide homeland security training.[152] This represents a significant increase from the results in 2003, when 65% of police and 38% of fire departments were increasing overtime costs and removing personnel for training.[153] These figures are extremely troubling considering the increased responsibilities and dangers that public safety officials are faced with since 9/11. Increased mandates by the federal and state governments require public safety agencies to, in addition to their day to day responsibilities, protect terrorist targets, train for bio-terrorism attacks, and work with state and federal agents to identify terrorist activity.

Since September 11^th, 2001, has your staffing level (please indicate those lost to layoffs, early retirement, or other types of attrition):

( ) Increased

( ) Decreased

( ) Stayed the same

Furthermore, 83% of the police departments and 84% of fire departments believe they are not prepared for a homeland security incident.[154] The 2005-2006 survey figure for fire reflects an improvement of 8%, but the police level remains unchanged.[155] Additionally, 91% of the police and 92% of the fire departments reported that they are not prepared for a bio-terrorism attack.[156] Boston’s own fire department does not have a dedicated hazardous materials unit that would deal exclusively with materials such as anthrax and dirty bombs.[157] According to Boston fire officials, a haz-mat team would make the city much better prepared.[158] Also, the 2005-2006 survey responses indicated that 80% of police departments and 87% of fire departments are not prepared for an attack on their community’s infrastructure, including roads and bridges.[159]

Is your department prepared for a Overall is your department prepared for a

bio-terrorism attack? homeland security attack? Y or N?

Additionally, five years after September 11^th, the majority of the Commonwealth’s police and fire departments have not been provided with communications equipment from EOPS, and of those that have received equipment from EOPS, only 33% of Police and 30% of Fire Chiefs reported that the equipment was interoperable with necessary federal and state agencies.[160] Overall, only 9% of police departments, down from 14% in 2003, and 18% of fire departments, up from 6% in 2003, reportedly have communications equipment that is currently interoperable with all federal agencies, state agencies and municipalities.[161] Moreover, only 8% of police and 11% of the fire departments responded that they have adequate equipment for the homeland security needs of their community.[162] Accordingly, if a homeland security emergency or natural disaster occurred in over 90% of municipalities, the police would have inadequate equipment and insufficient interoperable communication capabilities.

Do you have adequate equipment for the homeland security needs of your community?

Cities and towns rely almost exclusively on federal grants, state grants and state funding to meet public safety and homeland security obligations. As discussed previously, very limited federal grant funding reaches the individual municipalities and an even smaller amount reaches the public safety agencies within the municipality. Additionally, there are no state funds that are specifically earmarked to be used for homeland security.

The Committee has learned of additional federal homeland security grants that are available to first responders in communities that are not eligible for funding through the UASI grant program.[163] The regional requirements to funding would not apply to these funds. EOPS, as the SAA, should increase its communication efforts to notify public safety agencies of their eligibility for these grants.

II. Interoperable Communications for First Responders and the Role of the Executive Office of Public Safety

In the SHSS prepared by EOPS, Goal No. 4 reads that “[t]he Commonwealth will improve the ability of first responders to communicate at the scene of a terrorist attack or other critical incident.”[164] During emergencies and even day to day operations, it is imperative that first responders from different agencies and different localities are able to communicate with one another. Despite this abundant need for interoperable communications equipment, five years after September 11^th, 91% of the police departments and 82% of the fire departments in the Commonwealth are forced to perform without the necessary equipment.[165]

The possession of interoperable communications in the case of an emergency can make the difference between life and death. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’ (9/11 Commission) Report confirms this necessity in finding that the lack of interoperable communication on September 11, 2001 resulted in loss of life.[166] The 9/11 Commission found that firefighters never received the police warning to evacuate the North Tower after the South Tower’s collapse because their systems were not interoperable. Also, the lack of interoperable communications impeded the relay of the message that an open stairwell in the South Tower was free of debris and could have been used for evacuation.[167] The consequences of such a deficiency were further highlighted during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. “The damage to the communications infrastructure in the four Parishes surrounding and including New Orleans led to the operational failure of the interoperable communications network.”[168]

The Commonwealth has recognized that communications interoperability is vital to emergency response and a priority. To further its presence in the SHSS, EOPS created an Interoperability Working Group to assist in the formulation and implementation of interoperability solutions.[169] The necessity for interoperability was also addressed in EOPS’ report entitled “State of Readiness: Public Safety Interoperability in Massachusetts,” dated May 18, 2004. According to the May 18, 2004 report, the best way for the Commonwealth to address interoperability is by using existing equipment, where possible, improving existing networks and replacing elements that may contribute to failure.[170]

Despite EOPS’ recognition of this critical issue and recommendations in their 2004 report, over two years later, the majority of first responders still do not have interoperable communications equipment. As of early 2006, EOPS had failed to provide communications equipment to over 60% of police departments and 62% of fire departments in the Commonwealth.[171] Furthermore, the regional plans from 2005 indicated that the Regional Advisory Councils had not implemented interoperability plans and were still in the process of conducting studies on the interoperability equipment needs.[172]

As mentioned previously, the 2005-2006 survey results demonstrate that only 9% of police and 18% of fire departments have communications equipment that is interoperable with federal and state agencies and municipalities. The lack of interoperable communications equipment was further exposed during a State of Emergency last fall, where severe rainfalls caused flooding and threatened the breach of a dam in Southeastern Massachusetts.[173] In responding to the crisis in Taunton, Massachusetts, police from neighboring communities were forced to communicate with Nextel phones because they did not have interoperable communications equipment.[174]

Also, as reported in the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security’s recent report, Critically Vulnerable, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s police department does not possess interoperable equipment to allow the officers to communicate with police and fire in the locality where the MBTA services are located.[175] The failure by EOPS to provide public safety first responders with the appropriate equipment five years after September 11^th is unacceptable. The burden falls on the Homeland Security Advisor in the state, EOPS, to make this happen.

There has been both state and federal funding allocated to address this issue, and in 2004, $2 million was allocated to each region to be used specifically towards interoperability communications equipment.[176] Despite this funding, most municipal first responders do not have adequate interoperable communications equipment.[177] Moreover, even where interoperable equipment has been purchased on the regional level, the first responders in each municipality must have this equipment as well because they are first on the scene and are expected to respond immediately.

Furthermore, interoperable communications equipment is crucial for first responders every day and should not be stored away to be used only if there is a homeland security emergency. Utilizing this equipment during day to day operations would allow first responders to be trained and accustomed to using the equipment if and when a homeland security emergency occurred.

In addition, it has been reported that there is a considerable amount of “dark” and underused fiber optic cable on public rights-of-way in the Commonwealth that could be used to build a high-speed network for police, fire, and emergency response entities.[178] On November 4, 2005, Congressmen Markey, Frank, Neal, Olver, Meehan, Delahunt, McGovern, Tierney, Capuano and Lynch submitted a letter to the Chairman of the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy, requesting an inventory and map from Verizon and other telecommunications companies detailing the under-utilized fiber optic cable deployments throughout the state that could be used for public safety and homeland security.[179] If implemented, this network could be used during day to day operations as well as emergencies.[180] It is the Committee’s understanding that DTE has failed to provide such a map. However, the Committee strongly encourages EOPS to look into this possibility for an interoperable communications network.

Some of the delay in first responders accessing interoperable equipment may be a result of EOPS’ policy where it refused to award any funding for interoperability projects until after the SHSS was approved, which was almost three years after the September 11^th attacks.[181] Accordingly, first responders were not able to place orders or inquiries about equipment for at least three years.[182] Presently, to be eligible for funding, an applicant must certify that the interoperability or communications projects are consistent with the SHSS.[183] The policy implemented in this respect created unnecessary delay and bureaucracy to projects that should have begun immediately. Interoperability equipment is not only a necessity in the case of a homeland security incident, but it is also a fundamental necessity for first responders to communicate during day to day operations and emergencies.

B. Emergency Management Planning by Cities and Towns

Mayor Thomas Menino was quoted as saying “cities are the first line of homeland defense.”[184] At the Committee’s hearings in 2003, it became apparent that cities and towns across the Commonwealth were ill prepared to handle a terrorist incident. At the hearings, mayors expressed grave concerns about the state of preparedness in the event of an incident.[185] Also, municipal officials testified that due to budget cuts and lack of resources, cities and towns had to eliminate thousands of positions in local governments, including positions in police and fire departments.[186] Unfortunately, the situation in cities and towns has not improved drastically over the past three years. In 2006, when interviewing mayors and emergency management officials, it became apparent that although municipalities are in a better position when it comes to the number of personnel in police and fire departments, there is still a feeling of lack of confidence when it comes to homeland security preparedness.[187] “[I]n the aftermath of 9/11, as opposed to ramping up, we have had difficulty treading water in terms of providing the kinds of homeland security needs that our population expects us to receive.”[188]

According to MEMA, “[e]mergency or disaster response is the province of local government until such time as the situation overwhelms the local government’s capabilities and resources.”[189] Also, pursuant to the DHS’ National Response Plan (“NRP”), “a mayor or city or county manager, as a jurisdiction’s chief executive, is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of the jurisdiction.”[190] Further, the NRP provides that a mayor is responsible for coordinating local resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from a terrorist incident.[191] However, MEMA and EOPS have failed to communicate the state’s homeland security strategy and emergency management plan to city and town elected officials.[192] In response to a question from the Committee in 2006, about whether at any time representatives from EOPS have reached out to mayors to explain the state’s homeland security strategy, one mayor responded “no” and that there has never been any contact in that regard.[193] Also, in response to the Committee’s 2005-2006 Survey, 61% of Police Chiefs and 69% of Fire Chiefs indicated that the state had not provided them with a coordinated, statewide homeland security strategic plan.[194] Even if EOPS communicates with the emergency management official in the city or town, that is not sufficient. It is incomprehensible how the state can expect cities and towns to know how to respond to a state-wide homeland security emergency when the strategy has never been communicated to the chief official in the city. The Regional Advisory Council had never contacted the Mayor either.[195] Additionally, the Committee was informed that the state had not communicated the state’s evacuation plan to city officials, which would direct the city in the case of an emergency that required the mass evacuation of cities or towns.[196]

Moreover, the information that has been provided to local officials when a threat level is raised has been too overly general to be helpful.[197] The local officials are expected to increase readiness to respond to an incident, but they are not provided with any specific information that would allow them to prepare.[198] Also, it has been estimated that every time the Federal Government issues an orange alert, it costs cities and towns $70 million per week.[199] However, it does not appear that cities and towns are being reimbursed for these costs.[200]

Furthermore, emergency management officials have indicated that the federal homeland security funding restrictions have caused cities and towns to be ill prepared in response capabilities.[201] According to a Fire Chief in the Metro Boston Region, the city’s priorities and needs are related to response, and in particular, immediate rescue capabilities, but the city is continually denied funding for these needs.[202] Additionally, Boston Fire representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the distribution of UASI funding and its lack of involvement with the regional council.[203] This frustration is not unique to Massachusetts and homeland security directors throughout the country have reported that the DHS grant program is underemphasizing disaster recovery.[204]

Additionally, according to a survey done in 2003 by Congressman Tierney, to obtain the requisite level of preparedness, a community like Salem would require $100,000 per year for at least five years.[205] However, the total amount that each city or town is eligible to receive is only approximately $12,000. Five years after September 11^th, cities and towns still express frustration that their homeland security needs are not being met and they are unable to get funding.[206]

In 2003, despite its population of 92,000 citizens, sea port, and other critical infrastructure, the city of Fall River was completely denied funding by EOPS. EOPS encouraged cities to apply regionally and Fall River did so, but was still denied.[207] The procedure requires cities and towns to apply for funds on a competitive basis and this does not seem to achieve the best result. There “can’t be winners and losers when it comes to homeland security funds. The losers have too much at risk.”[208] Thankfully over the past three years economic conditions have allowed municipalities to hire additional police and fire personnel, but homeland security funding has not been available to address these needs.

Municipal preparedness is key to adequate homeland security planning for a state and five years after September 11^th, this element is clearly lacking in Massachusetts.

Municipal Preparedness Findings

1. EOPS failed to implement the majority of recommendations set forth by the Committee in its May 2004 report, Homeland Security Interim Report: Survey of Massachusetts Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs on Homeland Security Preparedness.

2. The 2005-2006 survey results demonstrate that the situation faced by the public safety providers in the Commonwealth has not changed dramatically. Public safety providers in Massachusetts are without the proper means to protect against terrorist activity and natural disasters, as well as unable to meet basic public safety needs of their communities.

3. Since September 11, 2001, police and fire departments throughout the Commonwealth have lost 1,124 personnel, two-third of which were lost in 2003.

4. Since September 11, 2001, 88% of police departments and 82% of fire departments have had to decrease staff or remain the same.

5. The lack of sufficient public safety personnel has caused 72% of police departments and 50% of fire departments to increase over-time costs and/or remove personnel from daily public safety responsibilities to provide homeland security training.

6. Presently, only 9% of police departments and 18% of fire departments have communications equipment that is interoperable with federal agencies, state agencies and municipalities.

7. If a homeland security emergency or natural disaster occurred in over 90% of the municipalities in the state, the police would have inadequate equipment to respond and insufficient interoperable communications capabilities.

8. 83% of police departments and 84% of fire departments believe they are not prepared for a homeland security incident.

9. 91% of police departments and 92% of fire departments reported that they are not prepared for a bio-terrorism attack.

10. 80% of police departments and 87% of fire departments are not prepared for an attack on their community’s infrastructure, including roads and bridges.

11. In responding to the State of Emergency in Taunton, Massachusetts, police from neighboring communities were forced to communicate with Nextel phones because they did not have interoperable communications equipment.

12. Cities and towns are not prepared for a homeland security incident and are not receiving enough funding to increase the level of preparedness.

13. Reportedly, there is a considerable amount of “dark” and underused fiber optic cable on public rights-of-way in the Commonwealth that could be used to build a high-speed network for police, fire and emergency response entities.

14. EOPS refused to award funding to any interoperability projects until after the 2004 State Homeland Security Strategy was approved, which was almost three years after the September 11^th attacks. This policy created unnecessary delay and bureaucracy to projects which should have begun immediately.

15. EOPS has failed to communicate the State Homeland Security Strategy and Emergency Management Plan to the top government officials in cities and towns in the Commonwealth.

16. EOPS has failed to sufficiently reach out to local officials in coordinating homeland security preparedness and response efforts.

Recommendations

1. The Committee repeats the following recommendations made initially in 2004:

1) The Administration should immediately convene a bi-partisan task force to address and resolve the Committee’s concerns about the Commonwealth’s inadequate preparation for homeland security.

2) The Administration should not implement any policies that will result in further cuts to municipalities or the loss of additional public safety personnel.

2. It has been over two years since EOPS set forth its plan for interoperable communications and it has yet to meet this objective. EOPS must re-assess its strategy for implementing interoperability communications equipment and make changes to the system currently in place.

3. Included in its re-assessment, EOPS should consider the unused fiber optic cable throughout the Commonwealth to develop an interoperable communications network.

4. EOPS should communicate with every police and fire chief regarding potential homeland security grants and about their capabilities and needs.

5. EOPS should conduct regional town meetings to inform citizens of the state’s anti-terrorism initiatives and to develop citizen mobilization teams.

6. EOPS should meet with each city and town’s government and inform them of the State’s Homeland Security Strategy and Emergency Management Plan. Furthermore, EOPS must notify the officials of what the municipal obligations are in the event of a homeland security emergency.

7. EOPS should evaluate the possibility of implementing a citizen service initiative that would consist of a training program for citizens that would teach them their responsibilities in the event of a natural disaster, epidemic, or terrorist attack.

· homeland security planning by the state infrastructure agencies and authorities ·

State Agencies and Authorities such as the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (“MWRA”), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (“MBTA”), the Massachusetts Port Authority (“Massport”), the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (“MTA”), the Department of Public Health (“DPH”) and the Department of Telecommunications and Energy (“DTE”) are responsible to the public for the safe keeping of our water systems, roads, bridges, tunnels, and ports. Included in the areas that the agencies and authorities oversee are many potential terrorist targets and in the event of a terrorist incident, the preparedness and response capabilities of these agencies are crucial. “If our food is tainted, our water poisoned, or our subways attacked, we as Americans will suffer unimaginable costs.”[209] The National Response Plan requires that infrastructure protection efforts must be included in state strategies.[210] However, in Massachusetts, there is no formalized state oversight of emergency management plans for the infrastructure agencies and authorities.[211] EOPS does not check the quality of the plan or that the plan is being implemented. Also, there is no requirement that all of these public agencies work collaboratively on a state-wide homeland security strategy. Furthermore, the agencies are not voting members on any of the Regional Advisory Councils and EOPS does not include all of them in the funding application process to the federal government.[212]

In the 2006 Annual Report Card on DHS, a minority report of the Congressional Committee on Homeland Security, critical physical infrastructure protection was given a grade of a D-.[213] Also, it reported that as of early 2006, the President had failed to complete the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which was originally set to be completed by December 2004.[214]

In Massachusetts, EOPS, as the State’s Homeland Security Advisor, has a responsibility to effectuate the state-wide strategy and should oversee the quality of emergency planning. EOPS formed a Homeland Security Executive Committee that includes representatives from various state agencies and authorities, but other than this Committee, there is very little direct oversight by EOPS over the agencies and their coordination with one another.[215] Also, there are some agencies that are not members of the Executive Committee and the task is upon them to work collectively with other agencies. Furthermore, in many cases, the state does not check whether there are emergency management or response plans in place or make any assessment of the quality of these plans. EOPS appears to be operating under the premise that the agencies are preparing sufficient emergency management plans without diligently following up to be certain that these plans are in place and are feasible.

Also, as discussed under the homeland security grant section above, the funding available for the agencies and authorities has been quite limited. They have a responsibility to achieve a level of homeland security preparedness, but must do so using their own funds. There is a mere 20% available from the state homeland security grant program that all of the agencies compete for, and this competition includes MEMA.[216] Typically, after the amount of available funding is determined, EOPS invites proposals from state agencies involved in homeland security efforts.[217] After receipt, proposals are supposedly evaluated competitively by a review panel.[218] However, EOPS has been unclear in describing the criteria it uses in awarding these grants and has provided inadequate assistance to the agencies in their quest to prepare applications for funding that actually gets approved.[219] According to EOPS, if an agency is not awarded funding it could be because its application was deficient, a proposed project is not covered under the grant, or just because of competition.[220] However, some agencies have found the explanations to be unhelpful.

The grant distribution system implemented by EOPS to the various agencies has been inconsistent with some agencies receiving several rounds of funding and others receiving no funding from homeland security funds at all. Hopefully this will change with the announcement of additional homeland security funds coming to Boston for protection of critical infrastructure. Apparently, $11 million will be distributed to the MBTA for various security upgrades and a remaining $2.1 million will be available for securing the Commonwealth’s infrastructure such as bridges and roadways.[221]

Pursuant to DHS Headquarters Continuity of Operation Guidance Document, dated April 2004, Presidential Decision Directive – 67, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Order No. 144, each Massachusetts agency must prepare for emergencies and disasters and provide emergency liaisons to MEMA for coordinating resources, training, and operations.[222] EOPS required each state agency and authority to submit a Continuity of Operations/ Continuity of Government Plan (“COOP”) by January 31, 2006.[223] MEMA worked with the agencies in preparing sufficient plans and all were due to EOPS by early 2006. It appears that all of the agencies surveyed have submitted COOP Plans, but the state does not have any oversight of whether the agencies and authorities actually implement these COOP plans.[224] According to MEMA, state agencies recently participated in a tabletop exercise, requiring each agency to implement their COOP plan and identify best practices and necessary improvements.

The Committee sent out a survey to state infrastructure agencies and authorities, requesting information about whether each had an emergency management plan, when the plan was first prepared, any modifications to the plan, whether the plan was submitted to EOPS, any contact or monitoring by EOPS of the plan’s creation and implementation, and information about any grants awarded to the agency from EOPS for implementing its emergency management plan. The Committee received responses from the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the Department of Public Health, the Department of Telecommunications and Energy, the Massachusetts Port Authority, and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. It appears that all but one of the agencies and authorities have emergency management plans in place, and all have COOP Plans.

This section does not go into detail about the emergency management and preparedness plans or other homeland security planning done by the agencies. Furthermore, the Committee is not making an assessment of the quality of the plans. Instead, this section reviews the information provided by the agencies and compares set variables within each agency relative to homeland security planning and funding.

A. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (“MTA”) was created by the Legislature in 1952.[225] The MTA operates on toll revenue, supplemented with revenue from leasing, development of land and air rights, and advertising.[226] The Massachusetts Turnpike is 138 miles and spans Massachusetts from West Stockbridge to Logan Airport. It consists of two highway systems, the original MassPike, which runs for 123 miles, and the Metropolitan Highway System (MHS), which runs from Route 128 to Logan Airport, including the Ted Williams Tunnel and I-90 Connector.[227] Also, all of the roadways that are part of the Central Artery/Ted Williams (CA/T) Project are within the jurisdiction of the MTA.[228] The MTA is responsible for a critical part of the state’s infrastructure, which includes roads, bridges and tunnels across the Commonwealth. Many of these areas have been cited as possible terrorist targets and the use of the 138 miles of the Massachusetts Turnpike would be imperative to evacuate the public from an emergency. Having quality response plans, addressing these security issues is critical for the Commonwealth.

Troop E of the Massachusetts State Police is exclusively assigned to provide security coverage for all operating areas of the MTA, including the Central Artery/Ted Williams Tunnel.[229] Troop E is entirely funded by the MTA and is composed of 163 officers at five locations throughout the MTA.[230]

After September 11^th, the MTA implemented an Emergency Management Program that includes Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, the Emergency Management Plan, Standard Emergency Operating Procedures, Training, and Drills and Exercises.[231] In 2005, the State Auditor’s Office issued a report, summarizing the results of an audit into the MTA’s efforts to identify and mitigate security risks to roadways, bridges, and tunnels, so as to protect the MTA’s considerable assets and the people who use them.[232] The Auditor’s review found that the MTA’s accomplishments had been significant, but the MTA’s plans to enhance and update the Emergency Management Program were pending and there were improvements that could be made.[233]

In responding to the Committee’s survey, the MTA discussed its emergency management plan and asserted that it “details the actions taken by the Authority to ensure it can effectively respond to any hazard that threatens its jurisdiction, integrating mitigation into its response and recovery activities, and facilitating if necessary, coordination with other local, state, and federal entities during emergency incidents or situations.”[234] Furthermore, the MTA’s plan sets forth procedures for all emergency responders to utilize and identifies the roles and responsibilities for each division in responding to threats, hazards or incidents, before, during, and after an emergency.[235]

The MTA first completed its emergency management plan in December 2002. In 2003, the plan was reviewed using the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Capability Assessment for Readiness evaluation standard and was revised in October 2003 to integrate the findings from the review. The MTA’s plan was revised again in September 2005 to ensure compliance with the National Incident Management System and according to the MTA, it is planning another revision of the plan for 2006.[236] Also, the MTA has participated in various interagency drills and exercises and has developed its own drills and exercise program.[237]

The MTA is a member of the MEMA Massachusetts Emergency Management Team and attends monthly meetings, where various issues are discussed.[238] Otherwise, EOPS has had very little contact with the MTA relative to its emergency planning. However, there has been significant correspondence between the MTA and EOPS specifically relating to grant funding issues.

Many agencies are included in the State’s CEMP and have submitted plans that serve as annexes to the CEMP. The MTA, however, is not included in the CEMP, but is referenced as playing a support role to the Massachusetts Highway Department.[239] Also, despite raising concerns to EOPS, the MTA is not included in the SHSS, is not a member of the Boston Urban Area Working Group, and is not a member on the state’s Homeland Security Executive Committee. In its survey response, the MTA discussed that despite raising these issues to EOPS, EOPS has failed to revise the SHSS to include the MTA or include it on the Working Group or Executive Committee.[240] This is particularly troubling considering the roadways and tunnels that are part of the CA/T Project that are integral to the City of Boston.

Furthermore, EOPS has never contacted the MTA regarding the existence of its emergency management plan nor has it ever requested a copy of the MTA’s plan.[241] The only contact MEMA has had with the MTA regarding homeland security planning was in developing the MTA’s COOP plan. The COOP plan was submitted to EOPS in January 2006 and in March 2006, the MTA submitted a Continuity of Government (“COG”) annex.[242] Consequently, the State’s Homeland Security Advisor has not had any oversight of emergency planning and response capabilities relative to the numerous projected terrorist targets under MTA’s jurisdiction. Additionally, EOPS has not requested information about the MTA’s plan to respond to an emergency that requires the mass evacuation from areas in the Commonwealth that would require the use of its roadways. Furthermore, since EOPS has never seen these plans or asked for them, EOPS is unaware of what the plans are and the quality of the plans.

Since September 11, 2001, the MTA has spent over 13 million of its own resources on its Emergency Management Program.[243] The MTA applied to EOPS for DHS grant funding in 2003, 2004, and 2005, but in all three years, EOPS denied funding for its proposals.[244] The DHS has indicated to the MTA that it is eligible for homeland security funding, so it is unclear why the MTA was never awarded any DHS funding by EOPS.[245]

Nonetheless, the MTA asserts that it has implemented all elements of its program and is prepared for a disaster or homeland security incident. However, the MTA asserts that it is unreasonable to expect that the MTA can continue to maintain its program with its own resources.[246]

B. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority

The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (“MWRA”) is a public authority established by the Legislature in 1984 to “provide wholesale water and sewer service to 2.5 million people and more than 5,500 large industrial users in 61 metropolitan Boston communities.”[247] The MWRA funds its operations primarily through user assessments and charges and does not receive funding in the State Budget.[248]

A recent incident in Blackstone, Massachusetts, where teenagers broke into a water facility, served as a critical reminder of the potential for an attack on a water facility, big or small.[249] Furthermore, the incident exposed the vulnerabilities of water supplies and the abilities and inabilities to protect against an attack.[250] In the Blackstone case, test results concluded that there were not any chemical contaminants in the water. However, at that point, considerable damage had been done, causing quite a scare among the public. Also, the incident necessitated the close of schools and businesses, the use of water was banned, and thousands of dollars were spent on tests and repairs.[251]

Public Law 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which was signed by President Bush on June 12, 2002, amended the Safe Drinking Water Act and required that the MWRA, as a community water system, conduct a vulnerability assessment (“VA”), certify to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that the VAs were conducted and submit a copy of the VAs to the EPA.[252] The MWRA was required to submit its VA of the waterworks system by March 31, 2003 and it complied with this deadline.[253]

On June 8, 2005, the Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor released a report on “Certain Activities of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority’s Emergency Management Plan, June 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004.” The audit reviewed the MWRA’s efforts to identify and mitigate drinking water and wastewater security risks.[254] The Auditor’s Office found that the MWRA had made significant security improvements and that additional planned enhancements would be beneficial to the MWRA’s effort to protect its drinking water and sewage assets.[255] The audit recommended that the MWRA continue to implement additional enhancements to protect its drinking water and wastewater facilities, improve communications with DCR and the State Police and update its emergency management plan. The MWRA agreed with the recommendations.[256]

According to the MWRA’s survey response, much of its Emergency Response Plan was written in response to the Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002. The MWRA describes its plan as “a comprehensive document that addresses general response actions for a number of contingencies, including intentional or accidental destruction, contamination or failure of system components.”[257] The MWRA identifies vulnerabilities and points of failure for critical MWRA infrastructure components.[258] It does not appear that the Emergency Management Plan has been updated since 2003, but according to the MWRA, its companion plans are written and revised regularly and complement the core plan.[259]

In addition to the general Emergency Response Plan, the MWRA has developed specific plans for emergency actions and responsibilities for various facilities and for different scenarios.[260] Also, in response to the mandate from the Governor and EOPS, in 2005, the MWRA prepared its Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government (COOP) Plan. The MWRA’s COOP Plan ensures that personnel will be able to continue the agency’s core functions in the event that the MWRA’s management is unable to direct operation or some facilities are inaccessible. The COOP Plan identifies individuals who will replace senior managers if they are unavailable and provides a relocation plan for MWRA operations personnel and equipment.[261] According to the MWRA, MEMA worked with it on its COOP Plan.[262]

According to agendas provided by the MWRA, the MWRA personnel meet regularly as a Security and Emergency Planning Task Force to address various security issues. Also, according to the MWRA, the State Police meet regularly with MWRA personnel to go over its emergency plans and there appears to be fairly consistent communication between the State Police and the MWRA. Further, the MWRA asserts that they attend meetings for a regional task force, but it is unclear for which region.[263]

In responding to the Committee’s questions about EOPS’ oversight of emergency management planning, the MWRA reported that the State Police and MEMA monitor the implementation of its plans and that it has met with the State Police Fusion Center to go over the plans.[264] While it is certainly important for the MWRA to meet with the State Police and fusion center relative to the plans in place and vulnerabilities, it is also advisable for EOPS to have a defined role in the process. According to EOPS’ own contention, neither it nor MEMA have oversight or monitoring responsibilities for the implementation of these plans or for assessing the quality or feasibility of the plans.[265] Accordingly, it appears that the collaboration between agencies at this point is voluntary and not mandatory.

The majority of funding for the MWRA’s homeland security measures has been through its own budget. However, the MWRA has received a total of $450,000 in homeland security grants over the past five years. In April 2005, the MWRA was awarded $250,000 from EOPS and it used these funds to create an Emergency Service Unit (ESU), which consists of MWRA personnel that are trained and capable of responding to suspected incidents of intentional or accidental contamination of the drinking water supply. In January 2006, the MWRA was awarded $200,000 and the MWRA intends to use these funds to purchase an Emergency Reservoir Contamination Response Unit, implement a Reverse 911 system and purchase a rapid field biological contamination screening device for the ESU.[266]

Additionally, the MWRA received $250,000 from the EPA to develop the Vulnerability Assessment Plan.[267] However, the MWRA has not received any additional funding and has had to increase its budget by other means including increasing the amount paid by ratepayers.[268] The funding it has received thus far has been insufficient to address all of the MWRA’s homeland security needs.[269]

It seems that the MWRA has taken substantial steps in increasing its preparedness for a homeland security incident or disaster. However, the MWRA did not respond to the survey questions directly asking whether it was prepared for such an event.

C. Department of Telecommunications and Energy

The Department of Telecommunications and Energy (“DTE”) is comprised of eleven different divisions and “is responsible for the structure and control of monopoly Telecommunications and Energy in the Commonwealth; developing alternatives to traditional regulation and traditional monopoly arrangements; controlling prices and profits; monitoring service quality; regulating safety in the transportation and gas pipeline areas; and for the siting of energy facilities.”[270] The Pipeline Safety and Engineering Division (“Division”) within the DTE is responsible for the technical and safety oversight of nine natural gas companies, four municipal gas departments and the distribution systems of privately owned water companies.[271] A key component of this division’s responsibilities includes the monitoring of safety and security at liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage facilities.[272] The Division serves as the enforcement arm of the DTE to ensure compliance by operators of natural gas distribution companies, municipal gas departments and other intrastate operators with all state and federal regulations.[273] LNG facilities have repeatedly been recognized by officials as potential terrorist targets and the necessity of having proper security and emergency planning is crucial.

On June 23, 2005, the Office of the State Auditor issued a report on its audit of the Division of Pipeline Safety and Engineering’s monitoring of safety and security at LNG storage facilities. The findings of the Auditor’s report indicated that DTE needed to improve its monitoring of the safety and security plans for the LNG facilities, and it needed to conduct inspections more regularly.[274]

Pursuant to 220 CMR 112, DTE is required to obtain and review copies of plans for each LNG facility and operators of the LNG facilities must submit all changes to DTE.[275] Operators must submit an Annual Training Program Report that includes information about training on controls, piping, and fire equipment, procedures and emergency drills.[276] Also, operators are supposed to submit a Fire Study and Prevention Plan for each LNG facility and an Evacuation Plan to DTE.[277] DTE was unable to provide the Auditor’s office with any of the required plans and it agreed that it was not in compliance with the regulatory requirements.[278] The Auditor’s report found that DTE did not provide adequate oversight of the operators of the LNG facilities.[279] According to DTE, it has since requested and received all the plans from the operators of the LNG facilities.[280] However, DTE must remain consistent with its efforts in monitoring these facilities.

Also, the audit found that 18 of the 20 LNG facilities had not been inspected once every 24 months, as required by DTE’s own General Inspection Procedures Manual.[281] Also, the Auditor’s office found that the documentation of LNG facility inspections needed improvement.[282] Although the responsibility of monitoring security and inspecting LNG facilities falls on DTE, EOPS, as the State’s Homeland Security Advisor, must be more involved in the oversight of homeland security planning for LNG facilities.

DTE submitted its response to the Committee’s survey and by its answers, indicated that it does not have its own emergency management plan.[283] Based on DTE’s representation that public safety is its top priority, the Committee would expect that it should have an emergency management plan in place for preparation and response in the case of a terrorist incident on areas within its jurisdiction.[284] The Committee understands that it is the responsibility of each operator of the LNG facilities to have emergency plans, but as demonstrated by the Auditor’s report, operators do not necessarily have plans in place. If DTE is going to rely on the operators having high quality, feasible plans in the case of an emergency, it must review them and assess there quality. Pursuant 220 CMR 112.11, DTE has the right to require an operator to amend its plans and procedures to provide a reasonable level of safety. [285] DTE should exercise its rights in this regard. Regardless of the plans prepared by the operators of the facilities, the Committee believes it is advisable for DTE to formulate emergency management plans for LNG facilities, as well as for the other areas within DTE’s jurisdiction, such as transportation and energy facilities.

DTE prepared a COOP Plan, which was submitted to EOPS on January 31, 2006 that “establishes operational procedures to sustain essential functions, and guides the restoration of full functions if normal operations in one or more of the Agency’s locations are not feasible”[286] Also, DTE prepared a Business Continuity Plan on July 21, 2003 and a contingency plan for Y2K submitted on October 1, 1999.[287] According to DTE, MEMA representatives worked with it in revising its original COOP Plan and provided other technical assistance while it worked on the COOP Plan.[288] However, neither EOPS nor MEMA has monitored the implementation of DTE’s COOP Plan.

DTE has not received any homeland security grant funding from EOPS or any other entity.[289] However, with respect to the COOP Plan, DTE represents that it does not need funding presently because the COOP Plan will only be implemented in the event of an emergency.

Despite its role in public safety, DTE responded that it has not conducted any homeland security exercises or drills from September 2003 through present for its personnel.[290] However, DTE asserts that it is adequately prepared for a homeland security incident.[291] Based on the information provided to the Committee and the information in the Auditor’s report, the Committee questions this assertion.

EOPS must increase its role in the oversight of security at these facilities. It was only after the security breach that occurred on August 21, 2006, at a KeySpan Energy Delivery liquefied natural gas storage facility in Lynn, that the Governor requested state inspections of LNG facilities.[292] The investigation was conducted by DTE, which is the agency charged with overseeing the security on the facilities, and the Fusion Center Critical Infrastructure Assessment Unit.[293] The security review found the LNG facilities to be in substantial compliance with state and federal regulations and identified minor issues that should be addressed.[294]

The Governor recommended that DTE hold surprise random security inspections of the facilities and the Governor plans to establish a task force to suggest improvements on the LNG securing regulations.[295] It does not appear that the Governor’s review made any assessment on DTE’s responsibilities for monitoring the facilities because DTE itself was the reviewing authority. The Committee suggests that any task force that is formed by the Governor also look into DTE’s progress in meeting the 2005 recommendations from the Auditor’s report and look at what more DTE could be doing in securing the safety of these facilities.

D. The Massachusetts Port Authority

The Massachusetts Port Authority (“Massport”) is the public authority that oversees and manages the Commonwealth’s airports, seaport and transportation infrastructure.[296] Massport’s jurisdiction includes Logan International Airport, L.G. Hanscom Field, Worcester Regional Airport, the Tobin Memorial Bridge, and the Port of Boston, all of which have been recognized as potential terrorist targets.[297] Massport is self-sustaining and does not receive state funding.[298] After 9/11, Massport brought in national and international security experts, including some from Israel, to develop a program for security.[299] “Massport has worked tirelessly to implement strategies, policies, and programs suggested by [their] experts.”[300]

According to the information provided by Massport in response to the Committee’s survey, after 9/11, it reorganized its security efforts and developed a Strategic Security Plan that brings together the budget, management, policy and procedures necessary for effective response to natural or man-made disasters.[301] Additionally, Massport holds security meetings seven days per week, where homeland security issues are discussed between Logan Airport officials, Massport officials, TSA, Federal Air Marshals, Customs and Border Protection, FBI, the airlines, airport tenants, and official guests from these agencies. Homeland security preparedness is also discussed at various weekly homeland security meetings to manage security projects, bi-weekly meetings, senior staff meetings, quarterly meetings with the Massport Security Advisory Council, the security grant committee, public meetings, and the Security Center of Excellence.[302]

Additionally, Massport has participated in and developed various homeland security drills and exercises. These exercises have afforded Massport the opportunity to work with different agencies and test command and control and communications interoperability. Also, Operation Atlas allowed Massport to work with the Metro-Boston Homeland Security Region, the federal government, as well as 34 public and private agencies focusing on a variety of areas involved with the simulated hijacking of an airplane.[303]

Similar to other state agencies and authorities, Massport has a COOP Plan and the final version was submitted to EOPS in January 2006. According to Massport, MEMA provided useful feedback to Massport on its COOP Plan’s organization and emergency provisions.[304]

However, Massport informed the Committee that EOPS has not overseen its emergency planning process and that it would make sense to have the state involved in the oversight of emergency planning by state infrastructure agencies and authorities.[305] Nevertheless, Massport incorporated the state’s strategy into its homeland security planning, but it learned of the strategy on its own and not through outreach efforts by EOPS.[306] Massport also highlighted the issue that the agency is not an active participant in the state’s homeland security planning, is not a voting member on any of the regional councils, and is not considered part of the UASI region.[307] Furthermore, Massport has not been integrated into the state’s process of formulating proposals that are sent to the DHS for grants each year.[308] Having Massport, as well as all other state agencies, included in the brainstorming stage, as well as in the submittal of proposals for funding would only strengthen the proposals sent to DHS, strengthen regional collaboration, and would incorporate more homeland security risks in the Commonwealth. Also, this collaboration would allow the state to have an understanding of the homeland security projects that are necessary for Massport and other agencies. It is unclear why EOPS has chosen to exclude these agencies when they are willing participants.

In its response to the survey, Massport asserted that it is prepared to respond to a homeland security incident.[309] While the Committee does not question Massport’s assertion, it does recognize that there are still many security vulnerabilities that threaten aviation security, and planning must be ongoing.[310] For example, just three years ago and after new federal screeners were hired, DHS agents carried weapons through the security checkpoints at Logan Airport without being detected.[311] Also, during a recent antiterrorism drill in September 2006, the State Police lost a powerful Semtex plastic explosive device at Logan Airport.[312] These incidents further evidence the need to remain vigilant in homeland security preparation and for planning to be constantly evolving.

Additionally, improving security for the Port of Boston must be an ongoing process and there are certainly areas for improvement. Gaps in port security have led to experts describing the security regime as a “’house of cards,’ in which high-risk containers are un-inspected and the government remains unaware of security arrangements at foreign ports and vessels shipping goods to the U.S.”[313] Boston is the country’s 11^th largest container port and has regular shipments of liquefied natural gas passing through to Everett.[314] In its attempts to increase security, Massport recently applied to DHS for funding for a camera surveillance system to inspect incoming shipments at Conley Container Terminal and Black Falcon Cruise Terminal.[315] Unfortunately, Massport was denied funding by DHS for this project without any explanation as to why.[316]

Since September 11, 2001, Massport has increased its annual security operating budget by $17,907,434, to a total of $38,680,145 for direct operational security costs.[317] Additionally, due to the complexity of the grants Massport was eligible for, it hired a consultant to specifically handle this process.[318] Even with a specialized consultant preparing the proposals, Massport’s grant application to EOPS for FY 2005 State Homeland Security Program funds was still denied. Also, DHS denied Massport’s FY 2005 and FY 2006 proposals for Port Security grant funds.[319] Reportedly, this year the Port of Boston will receive a mere $147,750 from the federal government, compared to the $8.3 million it received over the previous four years.[320]

After receiving the denial from EOPS, Massport requested a meeting with the EOPS’ grant coordinator to explain the criteria utilized by EOPS in awarding grants and to provide advice on how to complete a proposal that would get approved.[321] Unfortunately, the information provided by EOPS did not provide Massport with a better understanding of the actual criteria used for awarding grants or any assistance in how to get its proposals approved the next year.[322] EOPS is not effectively communicating what criteria it is using and how it is awarding these grants.

Apparently, the Port Security grants are quite complex and require applicants to incorporate regional cooperation into their proposals. However, for agencies like Massport, this can create problems because it requires a great deal of work in anticipation of a grant that they may not receive.[323] Massport would have to take the time and money to find other agencies with ports in their jurisdiction and attempt to come to agreements about ownership, maintenance, business planning, MOUs, procurement, liability, insurance, among many other factors, all without being awarded any grant funding and without the assistance of the state.[324] Massport is responsible for critical sea ports, airports, and bridges and some of the homeland security projects that it needs are specifically related to Massport. Additionally, the lack of funding to the Port of Boston this year may be a result of DHS assigning Boston the lowest possible risk ranking.[325]

The regional approach to funding makes sense in many instances, but it cannot work in every single situation. The grant program requirements must not be so rigid that they exclude the agencies and projects that they were designed to help.

E. Department of Public Health

The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (“DPH”) outlines its mission as follows: “We believe in the power of prevention. We work to help all people reach their full potential for health. We ensure that the people of the Commonwealth receive quality health care and live in a safe and healthy environment. We build partnerships to maximize access to affordable, high quality health care. We are especially dedicated to the health concerns of those most in need. We empower our communities to help themselves. We protect, preserve and improve the health of all the Commonwealth’s residents.”[326]

According to DPH, in the case of an emergency, it is responsible for the state’s Health and Medical Services Plan and would have to send staff to the State Emergency Operations Center, which is coordinated by MEMA.[327] DPH informed the Committee that it first prepared its emergency management plan in 1967 and it was submitted to EOPS at that time. DPH indicated there have been numerous updates to the plan over the years, but did not say whether the updates have been submitted to EOPS.[328]

Also, DPH indicated that it has numerous preparedness plans, but did not give a specific number or provide any information about the emergencies that are covered in the plans. One plan that the Committee located is DPH’s Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan. DPH further represented that all of its plans are annexes to the Commonwealth’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (“CEMP”).[329]

DPH is a state agency, so it receives funding through the Commonwealth’s budget process. Additionally, DPH put forth that “the agency’s close collaboration with EOPS has resulted in a variety of preparedness enhancements aimed at protecting public health via use of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funds.”[330] DPH has used these funds for several public safety projects. For example, in 2003, 91 Mass Decontamination Units were purchased, some of which are located at hospitals across the state and others at local fire departments. Also, 14 portable isolation units have been purchased with DHS funds for hospitals in Southeastern Massachusetts. Furthermore, DHS funds were used toward the initial statewide pandemic awareness/preparedness summit.[331]

In response to the Committee’s survey, DPH indicated that it has participated in numerous homeland security exercises and drills, including tests of nuclear power plant accident response plans, risk communication exercises for chemical and radiological emergencies, plague, smallpox, and other biological releases by terrorists, explosive devise plans, and scenarios that activate mass decontamination units.[332]

DPH has only formally applied for one grant through the EOPS grant program and according to DPH, it was denied funding for this project because it did not meet the criteria for funding.[333] However, DPH represented that it receives funding from the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”). These funds increase DPH’s operating budget and are used in many different ways to increase emergency preparedness and bioterrorism planning.[334] Grants have been utilized in developing the Health Alert Network, to enhance communicable disease surveillance, enhance hospital surge capacity and develop and credential medical volunteers.[335] The information provided by DPH indicates that the HRSA funding was decreased from FY 2004 to FY 2005. Nevertheless, DPH asserts that the funding it has received has been sufficient to implement its plans and it is prepared for a disaster or homeland security incident.[336]

As for future planning efforts, DPH plans to enhance collaboration on mutual aid, regional response planning, pandemic preparedness, communications technology, and related areas of preparedness. In addition, the agency plans to focus on involving public safety partners in cities and towns with local public health planning and preparedness efforts.[337]

F. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

Massachusetts is home to the nation’s oldest and fourth largest transportation system.[338] It now consists of 5 subway lines, 13 commuter rail lines, 4 passenger ferry routes, 181 bus routes, and the para-transit program, The Ride.[339] The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (“MBTA”) covers nearly 3,244 square miles and operates over 2,200 vehicles daily.[340] The attacks on the transit systems in London and Spain have highlighted the vulnerability of the transit system in Massachusetts as a possible terrorist target and the need for emergency planning in this regard.

The MBTA Transit Police Department polices the MBTA system and is charged with securing the entire transit system.[341] According to the MBTA’s response to the Committee’s survey, the Transit Police and Operation Departments of the MBTA have numerous emergency preparedness plans, dating back to the 1980s.[342] There are policies and procedures for dealing with fire, medical emergencies, bomb threats or detonation of an explosive device, procedures for responding to a chemical/biological attack, procedures for dealing with unknown substances in a MBTA facility, evacuating passengers from trains, and procedures for the homeland security early warning system, among others.[343] According to the MBTA, the Transit Police review the emergency preparedness plans on an annual basis or at a minimum of every three years.[344]

Additionally, the MBTA prepared a COOP Plan and it was finalized on March 8, 2006. The MBTA’s COOP Plan documents how the MBTA will operate during a catastrophic incident.[345]

The MBTA informed the Committee that it is a member of the Regional Transit Security Working Group, which is developing the Regional Transit Security Strategy. Apparently, EOPS is the chair of the Working Group.[346] It appears from the information provided, that the first meeting for this Working Group was April 26, 2005, which was almost four years after September 11^th.[347] Also, according to the MBTA, EOPS has worked with the MBTA to ensure that there is no duplication of effort within the region and EOPS has monitored the implementation of its emergency management plans.[348]

However, the MBTA informed the Committee that its emergency management plans were not submitted to EOPS until August 31, 2005.[349] The Committee finds it troubling that EOPS did not request the MBTA’s emergency management plans until almost four years after September 11^th and only after the transit attacks in London. Considering the critical nature of the transit infrastructure and the clear security threats, it would seem that EOPS would have more oversight of the procedures and policies in these plans.

Over the past four years, the MBTA has been awarded grants to implement its emergency management plans. On October 19, 2004, the Transit Police were awarded $184,000 from EOPS to purchase bomb detection equipment. On May 12, 2005, the MBTA was awarded $2.9 million for the Secured Stations Initiative and on February 17, 2006, the MBTA was awarded $10 million to continue with the Secured Stations Initiative, Wide Area Network Expansion, and T Police Equipment. Also, on June 10, 2002, the MBTA was awarded $50,000 in Federal Transit Administration funds for drills and exercises.[350]

Additionally, this year Boston will be receiving $11 million from DHS for transit security.[351] Reportedly, $9 million will be used to build a second subway control center for the MBTA to keep the T network operating if the main control center was damaged or destroyed.[352]

According to the MBTA, the funding received by the agency has been sufficient to implement its plans and it is prepared for a homeland security incident.[353] However, according to a recent report issued by the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security and other news reports, the Transit Police do not possess interoperable communications equipment and are understaffed.[354] Also, it was reported that during the Orange Alert on public transit after the London attack, State Police were needed to assist the Transit Police.[355] If there was a state-wide Orange Alert, these forces would not be available to support the Transit Police in their time of need. Accordingly, the Committee questions how the MBTA can be prepared for a homeland security incident without the necessary staff and equipment. Also, it is questionable that the MBTA responded that it was prepared for a homeland security incident and its funding had been sufficient, but yet it was just awarded $11 million for necessary homeland security projects.

Infrastructure Agencies and Authorities Findings

1. There is no formalized state oversight of emergency planning by the infrastructure agencies and authorities.

2. EOPS is not effectively communicating to all agencies and authorities the criteria it uses for awarding projects homeland security grants.

3. EOPS has refused to integrate all of the state’s infrastructure agencies and authorities into the homeland security planning strategy or included them in the application process for funding from DHS. Including the agencies would strengthen the proposals sent to DHS, strengthen regional collaboration, and would incorporate more homeland security risks in the Commonwealth. It would also allow EOPS to learn of the necessary homeland security projects at the agencies and authorities.

4. According to EOPS, if an agency is not awarded homeland security funds it could be because its application was not good, a proposed project is not covered under the grant, or because of competition.

5. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (“MTA”) has an emergency management plan and program in place and has spent over $13 million of its own funding to implement the plan.

6. Included within the jurisdiction of the MTA are many roadways, tunnels and bridges that have been cited as potential terror targets. Also, the 138 miles that encompass the Mass Turnpike would be critical in the event of a mass evacuation in the Commonwealth.

7. EOPS has refused to include the MTA in the State Homeland Security Strategy, the Homeland Security Executive Committee, or the Boston Urban Area Working Group.

8. Despite the critical infrastructure components under the MTA’s jurisdiction, EOPS has not attempted to review and assess the MTA’s plans and response capabilities.

9. The MTA has not received any homeland security grant funding from EOPS despite its submission of proposals in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

10. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (“MWRA”) has an emergency management plan, as well as specific plans for emergency actions and responsibilities for various facilities and for different scenarios.

11. The MWRA has worked with MEMA and the State Police relative to its plans and vulnerabilities.

12. The MWRA has received $450,000 from EOPS in homeland security funding.

13. The funding received by the MWRA has not been sufficient to implement all aspects of its emergency management plans and it would like to minimize costs to ratepayers.

14. The Department of Telecommunications and Energy (“DTE”) is responsible for the monitoring of safety and security at liquefied natural gas storage facilities.

15. According to the information provided by DTE, it does not have an emergency management plan, setting forth security measures, and planning and response procedures in case of a homeland security emergency at any areas within its jurisdiction.

16. Neither EOPS nor MEMA have monitored the implementation of DTE’s COOP Plan.

17. DTE has not received any homeland security grant funding from EOPS or any other entity.

18. The Governor only called for an investigation of the security at LNG storage facilities after the security breach at a Keyspan facility in Lynn, Massachusetts.

19. The investigation called for by the Governor was conducted by DTE, which is the agency charged with overseeing security at LNG storage facilities.

20. The Massachusetts Port Authority (“Massport”) developed a Strategic Security Plan and believes it is prepared to respond to a homeland security incident.

21. EOPS has not overseen Massport’s emergency planning process and Massport recognizes that it would make sense for the state to oversee emergency planning by state infrastructure agencies and authorities.

22. EOPS has been inconsistent in its approach to oversight and supervision of the state’s infrastructure agencies and authorities.

23. The Department of Public Health (“DPH”) has an emergency management plan and a number of emergency preparedness plans.

24. DPH has worked in close collaboration with EOPS, using Department of Homeland Security funds to enhance preparedness for public health emergencies.

25. DPH formally applied for one grant through EOPS, but was denied. However, DPH receives funding from the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration.

26. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (“MBTA”) has several emergency preparedness plans in place and has participated in various homeland security drills and exercises.

27. The MBTA has worked with EOPS as part of the Regional Transit Security Working Group.

28. EOPS did not request the MBTA’s emergency management plans until August 31, 2005, which is almost four years after September 11^th and only after the transit attacks in London.

29. The MBTA has received over $14 million in homeland security grant funding to implement its emergency preparedness plans.

30. Despite the MBTA’s assertion in April 2006 that the funding it has received was sufficient and it is prepared for a terrorist attack, it has been reported that the Transit Police do not possess interoperable communications equipment and it is receiving $11 million in federal grants to be utilized for necessary homeland security projects.

Recommendations

1. EOPS must be required to oversee the emergency planning efforts by state agencies and authorities that are responsible to the public for the infrastructure of the Commonwealth.

2. EOPS should include the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority as a standing member of the Homeland Security Executive Committee.

3. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority should be included as a standing member of the Boston Urban Area Working Group.

4. Beginning for Federal Fiscal Year 2006, EOPS must submit a written detailed explanation to all state agencies and authorities, discussing the exact criteria it is looking for in awarding homeland security grant funding, including the federal restrictions for funding.

5. Beginning for FY 2006, after homeland security grants are issued, EOPS should submit a report to the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security, the House and Senate Committees on Ways and Means and the House and Senate Committees on Post Audit and Oversight, discussing the entities that it awarded funding, the amount of funding, the projects that received funding and the criteria and process it used in awarding the funds.

6. The Administration should work to increase public/private partnerships to help financing for protection of the state’s critical infrastructure. In particular, the Administration should require companies in the Commonwealth that pose a threat to public safety to contribute a reasonable share of the costs necessary to mitigate the threat.

7. State agencies and authorities should routinely update emergency management and response plans to address current homeland security events.

8. DTE should prepare an emergency management plan to prepare for a possible terrorist attack or other security incident at an LNG facility or any other area within its jurisdiction.

9. Any task force established by the Governor to look into improving the security at LNG facilities should also include an assessment of whether DTE has made progress toward the recommendations in the Auditor’s 2005 report and what more DTE could do in ensuring the safety of these facilities.

10. EOPS should be required to integrate state agencies and authorities into the process involved with formulating proposals for grant funding from the DHS.

· massachusetts national guard preparedness ·

The National Guard is the sole armed force that has both a state and federal mission. Since September 11^th, the National Guard’s federal mission has increasingly dominated the missions performed by Guard personnel. The deployment numbers for the Massachusetts National Guard have remained consistently high since September 11^th, but, during this time, the number of enlisted National Guard soldiers has decreased. Recruitment and re-enlistment figures for the National Guard have also decreased. In light of these factors, the Committee became concerned with the National Guard’s preparedness to respond to a domestic emergency if one was to occur in Massachusetts.

A. History and Mission of the National Guard

The Army National Guard is the oldest component of the armed forces and one of the nation’s longest enduring institutions.[356] It originated 369 years ago with four Massachusetts militia units.[357] Each state is guaranteed by the Constitution to have its own National Guard.[358]

The Army National Guard (“ARNG”) was founded upon the concept of having “able-bodied citizens bear arms for the common defense of the nation and come to the aid of their neighbors in times of need.”[359] Today, the National Guard consists of both the Army National Guard and Air National Guard.[360] Unlike other military forces, the National Guard has a dual mission to the state and federal authorities.

SENATE, No. 2737

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In the Year Two Thousand and Six.

Are We Really Prepared?

A Comprehensive Study of Homeland Security in Massachusetts

A Report of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight

Massachusetts Senate The Honorable Robert E. Travaglini Senate President

Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau

A Report of the
Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight

Massachusetts Senate
The Honorable Robert E. Travaglini
Senate President