| Report of the Senate committee on Post Audit and Oversight (under the provisions of Section 63 of Chapter 3 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by Chapter 557 of the Acts of 1986) entitled "Long-Term Care -- Buyer Beware" (Senate, No. 2305). |
A Report
of the
Senate Committee on Post
Audit and Oversight
April 2002
Massachusetts Senate
The Honorable Thomas F.
Birmingham
Senate
President
Senator Cheryl A. Jacques, Chair
Senator
Robert A. Havern III, Vice Chair
Senator
Robert L. Hedlund
Senator
Richard T. Moore
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Senator
Steven C. Panagiotakos
Senator
Charles E. Shannon, Jr.
Senator Cheryl A. Jacques, Chair
The Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight works to ensure that state government is accountable to the citizens of the Commonwealth. The Committee’s charge is to monitor compliance with state laws, to act as a watchdog to protect taxpayers from waste and fraud, to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of state agencies and programs, and to recommend corrective actions through legislation, regulation, or administrative initiatives.
Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau
Amy Friedman Rosenthal
Principal Author and Policy
Analyst
Karin Blake
Writer and Principal Researcher
Joel Andrés Barrera
Director
Tobi Quinto
Deputy Director
Angus G. McQuilken
Chief of Staff, Senator Cheryl A. Jacques
The Bureau acknowledges the contributions of: Amy Frisella, Stephen Habbe, Katrina Johnson, Rita Noonan, Amy Panek, Laura Semerjian, Judy Brubaker, James Chilaka, Jennifer Dunn, Jessie Faige Maria Rangel, Jamie Tresselt, and Katie Vatulas.
The Bureau would also like to acknowledge the assistance of: Kevin Beagan, Director of Health Unit, State Rating Bureau, Massachusetts Division of Insurance; Al Norman, Executive Director, Mass Home Care Association; Nancy Turnbull, Director of Education Programs, Health Policy Management, Harvard School of Public Health; Catherine Cushman, President, Senior Insurance Solutions; Bonnie Burns, Director, Consumer Education, California Health Advocates; California State Senator Joseph Dunn; Wendy Pellow, Legislative and Regulatory Counsel, National Association of Insurance Commissioners; Laura Marlin, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Jenny Erickson, Vice President, Legislative & Regulatory Affairs, Life Insurance Association of Massachusetts; Andrew Calamare, President & CEO, Life Insurance Association of Massachusetts; Marie Roche, Director, Long-term Care Contracts and Legislative Services, John Hancock; David Brenerman, Assistant Vice President of Government and Public Affairs, UnumProvident; Allan Kanner, Attorney Allan Kanner & Associates, P.C.; Tonya Music, Allan Kanner & Associates, P.C.; Joan Reardon; and George Brown.
I. Executive Summary
The Market for Long-Term Care Servicesll. Background
A Middle-Class Problem
Long-Term Care Insurance
Increasing Sales of Long-Term Care Insurance Policies
Historic
Pricing Problems with Long-Term Care Insurance
III. Strategies for Protecting Consumers
NAIC Model Standards
Using the NAIC Act and Regulations
at the State Level
Consumer Protections in Other States
IV. Regulation and Legislation in Massachusetts
Regulations
Legislative Efforts
V. Problems in Massachusetts
Lack of Standards
Lack of Safeguards Against Deceptive Marketing
Practices
Lack of Information for Consumers
VI. Findings and Recommendations
VII. Glossary
Executive Summary
Massachusetts is one of only four states in the country that has failed to pass a law mandating minimum standards for long-term care insurance policies. As a consequence, Massachusetts consumers who purchase long-term care insurance policies are not adequately protected.
In the absence of a law, the Division of Insurance (DOI) has been left to oversee long-term care insurance policies through regulations. Long-term care insurance policies may be sold as individual or group policies. DOI regulates individual policies sold in the Commonwealth. In January 2000, DOI relaxed the state’s long-term care insurance regulations for individual policies. During this revision process, DOI missed an opportunity to strengthen consumer protections while ensuring a better quality product.
Group long-term care insurance policies are not required to meet minimum standards in Massachusetts, and insurers are not required to submit any paperwork to regulators regarding these policies. DOI does not even know what companies are selling group policies in the Commonwealth. The most current data show that these largely unregulated group policies account for more than half of all policies sold in the state.
Long-term
care insurance policies provide critical coverage for policyholders such as medical
resources, personal care and support services when some physical or mental capacity
for self-care is lost due to a chronic illness or condition. The demand for long-term care services – whether
in someone’s home, an assisted living facility or a nursing home – will inevitably
increase as the number of older people in Massachusetts grows.
Experiences
in Massachusetts and other states have demonstrated that consumers can suffer
greatly from poorly regulated long-term care products. For example:
·
premiums can increase
dramatically, leading many consumers to let their policies lapse;
·
claims can be denied,
leaving policyholders with no ability to officially appeal their insurance companies’
decisions to a third party; and
·
policies can lack important
home care features, leaving policyholders without the ability to access the kinds
of services they are most likely to need.
Pricing People Out of Policies
Many individuals purchase long-term care insurance policies with “level
premiums,” leading individuals to believe that their premiums will not increase
over the course of their policy. However,
so-called “level premiums” can, in fact, be increased as long as the increase
is applied to a class or category of policyholders rather than just one policyholder.
Ninety-four-year-old Harold Hanson from North Dakota bought his "level premium" policy in 1987 for $1,094 a year. He later had his premium hiked to $3,603 per year by his insurer, Accelleration Life. He had to drop his policy because he could no longer afford the premium. Harold paid out thousands of dollars but ultimately ended up with no coverage.
Eighty-three-year-old North Dakotan Nellie McIlroy's "level premium", originally $830 per
year in 1987, shot up to $6,638 per year in 1999.
Massachusetts
policyholders are at risk because the Commonwealth lacks some valuable consumer
protections that other states apply to long-term care insurance policies. For example, consumers are unable to access
important information that allows them to compare companies’ histories for providing
quality long-term care coverage. In addition,
there is no third-party appeal process for consumers who have problems with their
long-term care insurance policies, and group policies sold in Massachusetts are
not required to meet minimum standards.
Individuals
who purchase long-term care insurance are acting responsibly by preparing for
their future long-term care needs and avoiding dependency on the state Medicaid
program, MassHealth. In 1996, the average annual premium costs for
individual and group policies sold in the Commonwealth were $1,784 and $807, respectively.
People who purchase these long-term care insurance policies should be guaranteed
that the products they buy meet important minimum standards.
The Commonwealth must play a more proactive role in ensuring that consumers
are protected.
Long-term
care will become more of a priority for the United States and Massachusetts as
the elder population continues to grow. People
age 85 and older, those most likely to need long-term care, constitute the fastest
growing portion of the population in the United States and are expected to increase
from 4 million in 2000 to 19 million by 2050. Massachusetts has a larger proportion of older
residents than the nation as a whole, with the fastest growing segment of our
state’s population being made up of people over the age of 85. Currently, there are more than 850,000 individuals
over the age of 65 in Massachusetts, representing 13 percent of the population.
Within 25 years, this population is expected to grow to more than 1.25
million people in Massachusetts.
Paying
for long-term care is largely a middle-class problem.
Some individuals are wealthy enough to pay for long-term care costs out-of-pocket.
Our country’s poorest seniors now rely on Medicaid, the government healthcare
safety net for low-income Americans, to pay for long-term care costs. However, most Massachusetts residents cannot
afford to pay for years of long-term care out-of-pocket or do not qualify for
Medicaid coverage. Middle-class individuals
often are unable to cover their expensive long-term care costs. These individuals may be unaware that their
current healthcare policies, Medicare (the government’s health insurance program
for elders) or supplemental Medicare policies that individuals purchase on their
own will not cover long-term care costs.
When
faced with the dilemma of paying for long-term care needs, too often elderly,
middle-income individuals are unable to afford or did not properly plan for these
costs. They are then left with no other option than
to “spend down” their assets to become eligible for Medicaid. When residents make this choice, limited government
resources are further stretched.
The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a non-profit organization of
insurance regulators, issued and continues to revise model long-term care insurance
acts and regulations. These models serve
as a good foundation from which to base legislation and regulations, yet Massachusetts
has no law and only partially embraces the model regulations.
Consequently, Massachusetts consumers of long-term care insurance policies
are put at risk.
Findings and Recommendations
a.
Massachusetts does not have any legislation or regulation
imposing minimum standards on group long-term care insurance policies.
In addition, DOI does not have the statutory authority to review and approve
initial premium rates and rate increases by insurers offering group policies in
the Commonwealth. In a 1996 DOI survey, more than half of all
policies sold in Massachusetts were group policies.
b.
Insurers are now selling long-term care policies to
some consumers in Massachusetts that are “nursing home only” policies, even though
most policyholders will never need extended nursing home care. These policies do not provide any coverage
for in-home long-term care needs – care most seniors are far more likely to need.
c.
Typically, consumers are forced to make permanent decisions
on the features of their policy at the time of purchase. Insurers are not required to send a yearly
statement reminding policyholders what coverage they have nor are they required
to let them reassess their coverage options each year.
d.
Policyholders lack an appropriate forum for acknowledging
and officially appealing claims denials or other problems with their policies.
DOI and the Attorney General’s office both have a system in place to address
and mediate complaints by consumers regarding their long-term care insurance policies. However, these systems fall short of providing
an independent, third-party appeal process for individuals wishing to challenge
a denied claim or benefit by their long-term care insurance provider.
a.
Group policy minimum
standards and disclosure: Group policies
should be required by law to meet minimum standards. DOI should have statutory authority to mandate
additional standards, review initial premium rates and approve proposed premium
increases for group policies sold in the Commonwealth.
b.
Multiple care settings:
Individuals should have a choice of receiving care at home or in a nursing home. All policies sold in the Commonwealth that
cover nursing home care should have a home care benefit.
c.
Annual review of
policy: Policyholders should receive
a yearly statement clearly outlining their coverage. Policyholders should be allowed to revisit their policies on an
annual basis to make certain changes. At
a minimum, the consumer should be able to:
·
change their elimination
period (i.e., their “deductible”);
·
modify the amount of
coverage;
·
add or remove nonforfeiture
coverage (a benefit that requires insurers to provide some coverage for policyholders
who paid premiums for a set number of years and then let their policies lapse);
and
·
add or remove inflation
protection coverage.
d.
Third-party appeal process: Policyholders should have access to an independent
third-party appeal process as a way to address problems with their long-term care
insurers. This process should ensure that
policyholders’ complaints are reviewed and addressed in a timely and fair manner,
and it should allow for the overturning of unfair decisions by insurers.
a.
The term “level premium” is misleading to consumers
who purchase long-term care insurance policies. While information about possible rate increases is disclosed on
the policy, it is not required to be disclosed in such a way that consumers are
likely to understand it. As a result,
individuals are often told that their policies will have “level premiums” that
will not increase due to age or illness, leaving many with the impression that
their premiums will never increase. However,
insurance companies can and do raise premiums.
b.
There are times when insurance companies make actuarial
mistakes and are forced to increase premiums in order to cover claims.
However, there is no regulation limiting how much the premium can be increased.
c.
Consumers may receive little or inappropriate guidance
in determining whether a policy is appropriate for them. DOI currently offers consumers a policy illustration,
a form that outlines the coverage of a policy. This form falls short of helping consumers
determine whether their income and assets make them suitable purchasers for a
particular policy.
a.
Disclosure of possible rate increases: All policies
sold in the Commonwealth should clearly state in large, bold letters at the top
of the front page of the policy in a clear, non-technical manner that rates can
increase regardless of whether the insurer or agent guarantees a “level premium.”
b.
Establishing guidelines for appropriate premium increases:
Insurers and consumers should have the same expectation regarding how much premiums
may increase. DOI should establish a premium cap that prevents
rates from increasing more than a designated percentage over the life of a policy.
By establishing a premium cap, insurers have the flexibility to increase
premiums up to a certain limit and consumers understand at the time of purchase
the maximum amount their premium could increase.
c.
Suitability standards: Suitability standards are guidelines issued by an insurer
that help consumers determine whether a long-term care insurance policy is appropriate
for them. Insurers should develop suitability
guidelines for all policies sold in the Commonwealth based on a format approved
by DOI.
This
information should be collected on all insurers that sell long-term care insurance
in Massachusetts. Companies should provide
five years worth of national and state-level data, or data since inception, for
every long-term care insurance policy sold in Massachusetts. This information should clearly differentiate
individual policies from group policies and be written in common language with
a standard format that a novice insurance purchaser could understand.
The
data should be included as an insert in DOI’s Your Options for Financing Long-Term
Care: A Massachusetts Guide that is currently provided to every consumer by
insurance agents at their first meeting and should be made available on the DOI
web page. In addition, the suitability
standards developed by insurance companies should be on the DOI web page and provided
to all consumers prior to purchasing a long-term care insurance policy.
By making this information available to consumers, the market will be allowed
to work as it should – consumers can pick a policy with the company they believe
has the best record of service and meets their needs.
Long-term
care refers to the medical resources, personal care and support services needed
by people when they lose their physical and mental capacity for self-care because
of a chronic illness or condition. [1]
The demand for long-term care services – whether
in someone’s home, an assisted living facility or a nursing home – will increase
significantly as the number of older people in Massachusetts grows.
[2]
People
age 85 and older constitute the fastest growing portion of the population in the
United States and are expected to increase from 4 million in the year 2000 to
19 million by 2050.
[3] People over the age of 85 are also the fastest
growing segment of our state’s population. [4]
This group is most likely to need costly long-term
care. Massachusetts has a larger proportion
of older residents than the nation as a whole. Currently, 13.9 percent of the population,
more than 850,000 individuals, is over the age of 65 in Massachusetts.
[5] By 2025, this population is expected to grow
to roughly 18.1 percent of the state’s population, which will be more than 1.25
million people. [6]

Figure 1. Source: www.census.gov/population/projections/state/stpjage.txt
While
only one in three seniors ages 65 and over will require nursing home admission
of three months or longer, many more will need some care at home or in other assisted
settings.
[7] For nursing home patients, the stay for those
with long-term debilitating diseases like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s can be very
long, while the stay for others can be as short as 90 days.
[8] The average length of stay (from admission
to exit interview) is 870 days (approximately 2.4 years). [9]
According to experts, most seniors prefer to
remain in their homes or communities, to “age in place,” rather than being institutionalized. [10]
Long-term
care services are expensive. In the year
2000, the average cost for nursing homes in Massachusetts was $76,000 per year.
[14] In the next 30 years, these costs are expected
to quadruple, bringing Massachusetts’ average nursing home costs to approximately
$304,000 per year. [15]
,
[16] The nursing home population is expected to
double during this same time period. [17]
Massachusetts residents spent $3.5 billion
in 1998 on nursing home care. [18]
The average cost for assisted living facilities
is $36,000 per year in Massachusetts. [19]
By comparison, home care can be less expensive. [20] However, long-term care costs can fluctuate
dramatically based on the needs of the patient, which makes financial planning
for this type of care difficult. [21]
Individuals
who are either wealthy or poor are in a relatively good position to pay for their
long-term care needs. Some individuals
are wealthy enough to pay for their long-term care costs out-of-pocket.
[22] In Massachusetts, individuals pay out-of-pocket
for approximately 32 percent of the costs of long-term care.
[23]
Our
country’s poorest seniors can rely on Medicaid, the government healthcare safety
net for low-income Americans, to pay for long-term care costs.
[24] Medicaid covers about 40 percent of long-term
care costs overall. [25]
However,
most Massachusetts residents cannot afford to pay for years of long-term care
out-of-pocket or qualify for Medicaid coverage.
Middle-class individuals are left with few options for covering expensive
long-term care needs. These individuals
may be unaware that their current healthcare policies, Medicare (the government’s
health insurance program for elders) or supplemental Medicare policies that individuals
purchase on their own will not cover long-term care costs.
[26] ,
[27]
When
faced with the dilemma of paying for long-term care needs, too often elderly middle-income
individuals spend down their assets to become eligible for Medicaid.
[28] When residents make this choice, limited government
resources are further stretched as the number of individuals on Medicaid grows.
Long-term care insurance is one option that
is now available to middle-income individuals who can afford it.
Long-term
care insurance is an insurance plan that typically provides a daily, fixed dollar
amount toward the costs of nursing home, assisted living or home health care costs
for a number of years when policy owners can no longer live at home without assistance. [29] This type of insurance was first offered by
a small number of insurance companies in the mid-1980s.
[30] These policies provide individuals with an
option to plan ahead by purchasing an insurance policy that covers their long-term
care needs. Since the premiums on these
policies can be expensive, it is often middle-income to upper-income individuals
who purchase them. Individuals typically
purchase their policies well before they need them (usually in their mid-50s to
mid-60s) in order to take advantage of a lower, age-based premium. [31]
Long-term
care insurance plans may be sold as individual policies or group policies.
·
Group Policies: In 1996, group
policies accounted for more than half of the policies sold in the Commonwealth. [34] Unlike individual policies, group policies
are not required to meet any minimum standards and insurers do not have to submit
policy information for approval on these plans to the DOI in Massachusetts. [35] Employers (e.g., the federal government), organizations
(e.g., AARP) or specialty associations (e.g., the Massachusetts Medical Society)
may offer group plans to their employees or members. These policies typically
provide quality products because an educated member of the agency or association
is charged with assessing, selecting and monitoring the product on behalf of its
members. [36]
However, not all group policies are sold this
way. Insurers also establish groups for
marketing purposes where a purchaser will nominally join a “group” at the time
the policy is purchased. Some consumer
advocates report that group policies have been sold to individuals who are unaware
that these policies are not required to meet any minimum standards. [37]
The
policy lapse rate reflects the number of individuals who stopped payment on their
policies, switched policies, exhausted their payments, or died before using their
policy.
[38] The lapse rate is a good indicator for determining
whether or not policyholders are able to sustain the coverage they originally
purchased. The most current information
available dates back to 1996 when the policy lapse rates for individual policies
in Massachusetts was 23.3 percent.
[39] The group policy lapse rate for Massachusetts
policies in 1996 was 25.7 percent. [40]
This means that approximately one-fourth of
all individual and group long-term care insurance policyholders let their policies
lapse.
Not all Insurers
are Alike
Massachusetts resident Joan Reardon remembers the dinner conversation with
her uncle, Thomas, when he told her about being approached by an agent from American
Travellers Insurance (now Conseco). He
already had a long-term care insurance policy with John Hancock. However, an American Travellers agent encouraged
him to purchase their policy in addition to his current policy since long-term
care services had become so expensive. In October 1998, Thomas decided to purchase a second long-term care
insurance policy with American Travellers. Both policies had essentially the same benefits and premium.
In July 1999, Thomas had a heart attack. After being in the hospital for several weeks, he moved to a nursing
home and then to an assisted living facility. Joan contacted both John Hancock and American Travellers to place
claims with each company and waited for payment after the 100-day elimination
period expired.
Joan had a very pleasant experience with John Hancock – information was
requested and gathered in a timely manner and payments were disbursed. At the same time, Joan received tremendous
aggravation from American Travellers and was given multiple reasons defending
delays in payment. After months of unrelenting
calls, letters and follow-up, payments were finally disbursed.
[41]
Thomas was lucky to have Joan as his advocate. Not only was she persistent, but she was very thorough in documenting
every call made and letter sent to American Travellers. Joan was astonished to see the difference
in the behavior of the two companies when it came time to collect on the benefits
of what were essentially the same policy. She stated, “[Insurance companies] know that an elderly person won’t
go through all of this – they would just give up. I found it so upsetting.”
[42]
Although Joan was successful in her efforts, she and her uncle were at a disadvantage from the start of this process. Her uncle was unable to compare American Travellers’ record to other insurers. If information on policy lapse rates, claims denial rates, and other information had been accessible to him, he might have made different purchasing decisions. In addition, Joan did not have a formal third-party appeal process under which she could seek resolution of her complaints. Had the issue not been resolved, she would have been left with few alternatives.
Like
all insurance plans, long-term care insurance policies differ greatly in what
they offer the consumer and how much they cost.
Some of the ways in which coverage can differ include:
·
Type of Coverage:
Policies differ in the type of coverage they provide.
Some offer “nursing home only” care, while other plans cover assisted living
facilities and in-home care. As more elders choose to stay at home or enter
assisted living facilities, “nursing home only” coverage becomes significantly
less valuable.
·
Amount of Coverage: The amount of coverage may also differ from policy
to policy. Some plans offer lifetime benefits,
others provide two to five years of coverage and others offer significantly shorter
periods of coverage. Plans also differ
in the amount of daily or monthly benefit allowed by the plan (e.g., some plans
may provide $100 for nursing home care per day, while others may provide $300
per day).
·
Start of Coverage: “Benefit
triggers” are used to determine if and when benefits are payable to the policyholder.
These triggers, called Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), include needing
assistance with eating, dressing, bathing, toileting, moving from bed to table
to bath, etc.
[43] Depending on the terms of the policy, help
with two or more ADLs may be needed before a claim can be filed. [44]
·
Elimination Period: Once a claim is filed, policyholders may not receive
benefits immediately. Policyholders must
wait for the “elimination period” to end before they receive any funds.
The elimination period is similar to a deductible for automobile or homeowners
insurance policies in that the policyholder pays some costs out-of-pocket before
the insurer begins paying. Elimination
periods can vary significantly in length. For
example, some plans have a 90-day elimination period.
This means the insurer will not provide any coverage for long-term care
services for the first 90 days after a policyholder has filed a claim. Other policies have a 365-day elimination period,
which means the policyholder must wait for an entire year before they receive
payments from their insurer. The policyholder
is responsible for any costs incurred during the elimination period.
·
Inflation Coverage: Some plans have a cost-of-living adjustment while others
do not adjust for inflation. Without inflation
coverage, the value of a policy decreases over time.
If a consumer purchased a policy without inflation protection that pays
$125 a day for nursing home care, it would have covered close to 60 percent of
nursing home costs in 2000, yet it will only cover 15 percent of estimated costs
in the year 2030.
[45]
Out-of-Date
Data in Massachusetts
The last time DOI conducted a voluntary comprehensive survey of all long-term
care insurance providers who sell any long-term care insurance policies in the
Commonwealth was 1996. That survey provided
important information that could be used by consumers to make informed choices.
The information included:
·
policy lapse rates,
·
marketing practices,
·
nursing home and home
health coverage, and
·
pricing of policies.
There has been no other DOI survey completed since 1996, and there is no
requirement for the regular collection of such critical consumer data.
[46]
The
pace of sales of long-term care insurance policies has increased significantly
in the last few years. Nationally, the number of long-term care insurance
policies sold has grown at an average rate of about 21 percent annually between
1987 and 1998, with more than 5.8 million policies sold as of June 30, 1998. [47] Massachusetts saw an annual increase of 18
percent in the number of long-term care policies sold from 1994 to 1996, with
18,467 individual and 22,868 group policies sold as of December 1996.
[48]

Figure 2. Source: http://www.ltcg.com/ltcindustry.asp
The
number of policyholders in the nation and in Massachusetts still remains a tiny
fraction of the market despite the increases in the aging population. [49]
Nationally, 2.5 percent of long-term care costs
are financed by long-term care insurance. [50]
In Massachusetts, 4 percent of long-term care
costs are financed with these policies. [51]
As of December 1996, 41,335 people in the Commonwealth
were long-term care policyholders. [52]
This represents a 51 percent increase in the
number of policies held since 1994. [53]
In 1996, the most current information available,
the average annual premium for individual and group policies in the Commonwealth
was $1,785 and $808, respectively. [54]
Long-term
care insurers typically blame lack of market penetration on the cost of their
products, the ignorance of the public and competition with Medicaid.
[55] While it is unclear whether long-term care
insurance will ever play a major role in financing long-term care in the United
States, federal and state officials have recognized the governmental savings that
can result from increasing utilization rates of these policies.
[56] ,
[57]
“Low-balling”
occurs when policies are sold to all applicants, both healthy and unhealthy alike,
at a very low price. These pricing practices
often lead to a significant increase in market share for the insurer. When the unhealthy policyholders start to file
claims, the insurer pleads that it has to pay out more money in claims than its
actuaries initially forecast. To compensate
for this actuarial error, the insurer increases the premiums on a whole policy
class. [58]
A class is determined by any single variable
that is used by the insurance company to group people.
[59]
Premium
increases often force some policy owners to let their policies lapse. Insurers can actually benefit from higher lapse rates because the
number of policyholders filing claims decreases. Consumers who are forced to let their policies lapse usually do
not get back the premium payments that they already contributed to their policy.
Since these individuals do not get their premium payments back and will
not be filing claims, this money then can be used to fund claims submitted by
policyholders who maintained their policies over time.
This situation improves the insurer’s bottom line. [60]
A California couple, Virdon and Camille Strey, bought their long-term care
policies from two different companies in the late 1990s. After the insurers hiked Mr. Strey's premium
41.6 percent and boosted Mrs. Strey's premium 20 percent, the couple immediately
let both policies lapse because they could no longer afford them.
By that time, replacement with a less expensive policy was impossible because
the Streys had become uninsurable by industry standards.
Mr. Strey was hooked up to an oxygen tank, and Mrs. Strey was diagnosed
with severe osteoarthritis. Said Mr. Strey,
82, in The Wall Street Journal, "I'd been suckered.”
[61]
The Streys were victims of two large rival insurance companies, who together
control more than 30 percent of the $4.6 billion long-term care insurance market. [62]
According to a front-page article in The
Wall Street Journal, these companies slashed premiums and marketed policies
aggressively to all comers, the healthy and less healthy alike, particularly in
three states with high elderly populations (California, Florida and Pennsylvania). [63] These companies, Conseco, Inc. and archrival
Penn Treaty American Corp., then repeatedly jacked up premiums on the policies
they sold by 8 to 40 percent when the less healthy started to file claims. As a result, lapse rates soared.
Insurers usually rely on underwriters to determine whether or not to issue
a policy to a consumer and at what price. However, neither company waited for underwriters to do their work.
Rob Brown, an underwriter who worked for each of the companies, told The
Wall Street Journal in an interview that they competed to “get applications
approved quicker… like in three to five days.” [64]
“Officials at Conseco and Penn Treaty say their
long-term care departments used to eagerly snap up customers with diabetes or
a history of strokes, people that other insurers shunned.”
[65]
These companies engaged in low-balling where the insurers purposely under-priced
their policies in order to attract new consumers and then raised the premiums
after the policies had been purchased. Without proper protections, these same tactics could be used to
deceive Massachusetts residents.
Policyholders
can also face problems when it comes time to file a claim.
Most long-term care insurance providers require applicants to provide specific
medical information and authorization to obtain medical and hospital records.
In theory, an underwriter would review this information, which can take
several weeks or more, and the insurer would then either decline to issue the
policy or issue it with an appropriate premium rate that reflects the insurer's
risk. According to some industry employees, underwriters
do not actually review the medical records of many applicants.
[66]
“Post-claims
underwriting” is the technical term for an insurer's failure to do its risk assessment
homework and set a premium that will support the policy before issuing it. More specifically, an insurer accepts insurance
applications without review of the applicants’ health or medical records, issues
the policies and collects the same annual premium from the healthy and unhealthy
applicants alike. Years later, after the
policyholders submit claims, the insurance company finally reviews the consumers’
medical records and denies coverage by finding a disqualifying medical condition.
It is essentially an attempt to rescind policies after claims have been
made, rather than eliminating high-risk applicants in the underwriting process
by refusal or by quoting a premium that reflects the actual risk.
Policyholders
are hurt by this practice because they have paid their premiums for a number of
years, essentially diverting long-term care funds into an unusable policy. Even if the insurance company refunds the premiums,
the consumer has already filed a claim, is in need of long-term care services
and is, in all likelihood, no longer eligible to buy a replacement policy.
The
current DOI long-term care insurance regulations have a section entitled “Prohibition
Against Post Claims Underwriting.” [67]
This section of the regulations requires insurers
to ask clear and unambiguous questions on the application regarding an individual’s
health status and mandates that the consumer answer all questions truthfully.
However, the regulation does not require that this information be reviewed
by the insurer. It is unclear whether this provision prevents
the type of possible abuses that can occur from post-claims underwriting.
Class Action Lawsuits
In the absence of effective consumer regulatory protection, some have resorted
to the courts. In the late 1990s, Attorney
Allan Kanner of New Orleans took the lead in filing a class action suit against
Acceleration Life and Commonwealth Life in North Dakota, Florida and Wyoming to
address problems faced by thousands of consumers due to precipitous premium hikes.
[68]
,
[69] ,
[70] ,
[71]
In this case, an internal company memo stated that no money would be made
on the policies in question and the solution was to "file large rate increases
to encourage higher lapses.” [72]
Kanner reported to the court that it was no
surprise that although 2,000 of these policies were originally sold in North Dakota,
fewer than 130 are still in force. [73]
The parties settled the case nationwide on
the eve of trial for $14.7 million. [74]
The unconscionable conduct exposed in these companies is not unique.
Kanner has also filed a class action suit against Conseco (formerly American
Travellers Life Insurance) on behalf of California policyholders who were forced
to let their policies lapse due to large premium increases and he has filed a
similar action in Texas against National Foundation Life Insurance. [75]
, [76]
,
[77]
Currently,
forty-six states have laws that regulate long-term care insurance. Many of these laws are based on a model developed
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Massachusetts is one of the four states that
has failed to pass such a law. However,
long-term care insurance is not entirely unregulated by the Commonwealth. DOI, the state agency charged with regulating
insurance products, currently regulates individual long-term care insurance policies.
DOI takes the position that it has the authority to regulate individual
long-term care insurance policies as “sickness and accident” insurance under the
broad state law that pertains to individual insurance policies.
[78]
The lack of a specific Massachusetts law that pertains directly to long-term care insurance is troubling for several reasons. It is questionable whether the broad state law for individual insurance policies actually applies to long-term care insurance. DOI’s interpretation of this law has never been challenged and, therefore, has never been decided by the courts. As a result, DOI’s authority, or lack of authority, to regulate long-term care policies remains an open-ended question. In addition, laws that set minimum policy standards and provide consumer protections are much more immune to changes by the administration or political influence. Without such a law, a state agency can elect whether or not to develop, change or enforce regulations. [79] Although this flexibility is useful and necessary in some situations, it can create significant inconsistencies from one administration to the next. Finally, group long-term care insurance policies are not required to meet any minimum standards and are essentially unregulated. [80] DOI takes the position that it does not have the statutory authority to regulate group long-term care insurance policies. [81] This leaves thousands of Massachusetts consumers vulnerable to unregulated group long-term care insurance products.
The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is a non-profit organization
made up of insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and
the four United States territories. [82]
“The mission of the NAIC is to assist state
insurance regulators, individually and collectively, in protecting the public
interest, promoting competitive markets and facilitating the fair and equitable
treatment of insurance consumers.” [83]
NAIC also promotes the “reliability, solvency
and financial solidity of insurance institutions and supports and improves state
regulations on insurance.” [84]
For
fifteen years, NAIC worked in conjunction with regulators, legislators, insurance
industry representatives, and consumers to create a comprehensive uniform model
law (referred to as the NAIC Act) and related regulations for long-term care insurance. [85] The act and regulations, which are continually
updated and amended, do the following:
·
define minimum benefits
for policies offering home health and community health benefits;
·
outline guidelines for
policies with minimum benefit requirements;
·
establish reporting
requirements for insurers detailing lapse rates, number of replacement policies
sold, records on agents, etc.;
·
regulate insurance marketing
practices and advertising guidelines;
·
develop and distributes
suitability standards for all policies sold in each state; and
·
require insurers to
offer at least one plan with built-in inflation coverage.
[86]
The insurance industry has long supported nationwide adoption of the NAIC model act and regulations.