On July 12, 1977 the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 93, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a petition with the State Labor Relations Commission (the Commission) seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees of the Fall River Redevelopment Authority. In the course of our investigation of the above-entitled matter, we raised to all interested parties the question of our jurisdiction, if any, over redevelopment authorities and requested statements of position on this issue.[1]

As the result of our investigation we conclude that redevelopment authorities and their employees are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under either General laws Chapter 150E or 150A.

Redevelopment authorities constitute one of several political subdivisions created by the General Court to carry our specific functions. See Chapter 121B. Other authorities include the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (Chapter 161A); housing authorities (Chapter 121B); Massachusetts Port Authority (Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1956) ; Massachusetts Parking Authority (Chapter 606 of the Acts of 1958); and the Wood's Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority (Chapter 701 of the Acts of 1960).

It is well settled that the Commission may not assert its jurisdiction absent specific statutory authorization, Massachusetts Probation Association v. Commissioner of Administration, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1814; Labor Relations Commission v. University Hospital (1971) 254 N.E. 2d 404, 356 Mass. 563; St. Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission (1947) 70 N.E. 2d 10, 320 Mass. 467; Merloni v. Labor Relations Commission (1976), Suffolk Superior Civil Action Number 15308.

Thus. the General Court has extended the jurisdiction of this Commission to authorities only pursuant to specific legislation. For example Chapter 760 of the Acts of 1962 applies the provisions of Sections 4, 4A. 4B, 5, 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 7 and 8 of Chapter 150A to the Massachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Parking Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and the Wood's Hole. Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority and their respective employees.[2]

Our examination of the statutes governing redevelopment authorities reveals no specific reference to either Chapter 150A or 150E. This omission, when contrasted with the aforementioned statutory precedents for other authorities, is significant.

The Union urges us to equate housing and redevelopment authorities for the purposes of jurisdiction. While it is true that housing and redevelopment authorities share certain sections of Chapter 121B, they are not identical. See, i.e. Chapter 121B, Sections 8, 26, 29.[3]

Moreover, the recent extension of the Commission's jurisdiction under Chapter 150E solely to housing authorities pursuant to Chapter 610 of the Acts of 1977 mandates no such jurisdiction over the unreferenced redevelopment authorities. The omission can only be corrected by the General Court. We will not supply it. Boylston Water District v. Tahanto, 227 N.E. 2d 921 (1967). The wisdom of the continued omission of redevelopment authorities from our jurisdiction is the type of matter "regularly and properly resolved in the political and legislative areas." Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E. 2d 914 (1976) .

On the basis of the foregoing, the petition for certification is hereby DISMISSED.

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[1] Timely statements were received from the Fall River Redevelopment Authority and the Union.

[2] Other examples include Chapter 514 of the Acts of 1970 which applies [the] provisions of Section 5 of Chapter 150A to the MBTA and its employees; see also Chapter 610 of the Acts of 1977 which applies the provisions of Sections 4, 10 and 11 of Chapter 150E to housing authorities and their employees (repealing the prior coverage of Section 5 of Chapter 150A).

[3] Our reading of Chapter 121B reveals that housing authorities perform functions distinct from those of redevelopment authorities. Chapter 121B, Sections 1,3 and 4. While housing authorities possess broad powers to implement state policy in the area of Iow-income residential housing (see Sections 25-33), redevelopment authorities carry out broader mandates to redevelop substandard, decadent and blighted open areas involving commercial and industrial locations and are not subject to limitations regulating either residential or Iow-income property. See Chapter 121B, Sections 45-59; see also Chapter 121A.

Our conclusion is supported by an examination of recent legislative history. In both 1975 and 1976 the General Court rejected general legislation which would have permitted communities to combine their housing and redevelopment authorities and eliminate all distinctions between them. See Senate Bill 1645 (1975); Senate Bill 1242 and House Bill 2782 (1976).