SJC-07915
IN THE MATTER OF REUBEN S. DAWKINS.
July 17, 2000.
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Reinstatement.
Reuben S. Dawkins appeals from orders of a single justice of this court
(1) denying his second petition for reinstatement to the bar and (2) prohibiting
him from reapplying for reinstatement for an additional ten years. We affirm.
Procedural background. Dawkins was suspended from the practice of
law for six months, effective April 2, 1992, because of his intentional misuse
of client funds. Matter of Dawkins, 412 Mass. 90 (1992). He petitioned
for reinstatement in October, 1992. Bar counsel opposed reinstatement and filed
a new petition for discipline that charged Dawkins with numerous additional
ethical violations, including the further misuse of client funds and serious
neglect of client matters. A hearing panel of the Board of Bar Overseers (board),
after hearing the consolidated matters, recommended that Dawkins's request for
reinstatement be denied and that he be disbarred. The board adopted that recommendation.
However, a single justice of this court imposed an indefinite suspension, retroactive
to April 2, 1992, the date of the earlier six-month suspension.
In September, 1996, bar counsel filed a petition for contempt against Dawkins,
claiming that Dawkins had continued to practice law during his suspension and
continued to hold himself out as an attorney. The single justice declined to
hold Dawkins in contempt at that time, because it was not clear that he had
deliberately disobeyed the order of suspension.
In May, 1997, Dawkins filed his second petition for reinstatement. A hearing
panel recommended denial of that petition and, in light of evidence that surfaced
at the hearing suggesting that Dawkins continued to hold himself out as an attorney,
the panel members also stated that they believed that bar counsel would be justified
in initiating a second contempt proceeding. The board agreed with the panel's
recommendation that reinstatement be denied. When the case proceeded once again
to the county court, bar counsel filed a petition for contempt which was consolidated
with the petition for reinstatement. The single justice, after a hearing, denied
the reinstatement petition. He also ordered that Dawkins not be allowed to reapply
for reinstatement for an additional ten years from the date of the decision.
Order denying reinstatement. It was Dawkins's burden, as a petitioner
for reinstatement, to prove that he satisfied the requirements for reinstatement
set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as amended, 394 Mass. 1106 (1985).
He was thus required to prove that he possessed "the moral qualifications, competency
and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth,
and that his resumption of the practice of law [would] not be detrimental to
the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to
the public interest." Id. See Matter of Pool, 401 Mass. 460, 463
(1988). The hearing panel concluded that Dawkins met none of these requirements.
We agree.
a. Moral qualifications. Dawkins's indefinite suspension in 1994
was conclusive evidence that he was, at the time, morally unfit to practice
law, and it continued to be evidence of his lack of moral character in 1997,
when he petitioned for reinstatement. Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. 298,
304 (1993). Matter of Pool, supra at 464. Matter of Keenan,
313 Mass. 186, 219 (1943). It was incumbent on Dawkins, therefore, to establish
affirmatively that, during his suspension period, he had redeemed himself and
become "a person proper to be held out by the court to the public as trustworthy."
Id., quoting Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169,
183 (1897).
We need not recite the evidence in detail. Suffice it to say this was not
a close case. The hearing panel found, among other things, that Dawkins was
not forthcoming on his reinstatement questionnaire; that he had no real understanding
of the misconduct that led to his indefinite suspension, and no real awareness
of the harm he had caused his clients; that he failed to reimburse the clients'
security board for what it had paid to a former client; that he failed to resolve
outstanding Federal and State tax liabilities; and that he engaged in conduct
during his suspension period that constituted the practice of law or, at least,
gave the appearance of practicing law. Far from affirmatively establishing Dawkins's
rehabilitation, the evidence affirmatively established an absence of rehabilitation.
b. Competency and learning in law. To demonstrate that he possessed
the requisite "competency and learning in law" and that he had stayed abreast
of developments in the law while suspended, Dawkins testified at the reinstatement
hearing that he read Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly when he was able to borrow
a copy of it, that he read the "advance sheets" (although his subscription expired
about a year before the hearing), and that he had been reading an unspecified
book on legal ethics that he borrowed from a friend. These efforts were less
than those deemed insufficient in Matter of Waitz, supra at 306.
c. Effect of resumption of practice. "The act of reinstating a disbarred
[or indefinitely suspended] attorney involves what amounts to a certification
to the public that the person is a person worthy of trust." Matter of Gordon,
385 Mass. 48, 54 (1982). The public interest is paramount in reinstatement cases.
Id. at 55.
Dawkins's failure to prove the moral qualifications, competency, and learning
in law necessary for reinstatement leads us to the inescapable conclusion that
he also has failed to prove that the standing and integrity of the bar, the
administration of justice, and the public interest would not be compromised
if he were to be readmitted.
d. Summary and conclusion. The hearing panel, board, and single
justice were amply warranted in determining that Dawkins had not met his heavy
burden of proving his fitness for reinstatement.
Dawkins was not young or inexperienced when he committed the acts and omissions
that led to his two suspensions. His misconduct was not isolated or minor. He
has had no gainful employment during his suspension; nor has he been involved
in any civic, social, or charitable activities that might be indicative of rehabilitation.
To the contrary, while suspended he has engaged in conduct that constituted
the practice of law or gave the appearance of practicing law, and, in the words
of the single justice, he thus demonstrated "a cavalier attitude toward compliance
with this court's orders." He has not shown present competence in legal skills.
Although he has now been suspended for eight years, the "passage of time alone
is insufficient to warrant reinstatement." Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass.
447, 460 n.19 (1975).
Order prohibiting reapplication for reinstatement for ten years.
Dawkins argues that, because of his age, this "order amounts to a death sentence
insofar as any hope [that he] has for a return to the profession." Dawkins was
sixty-five years old at the time he was suspended and seventy-two years old
when the single justice denied his second petition for reinstatement and issued
this order. The order is justified given the hearing panel's finding that Dawkins
had engaged in legal work (the representation of his wife in a summary process
action) while suspended, and because he continued to hold himself out as an
attorney in other respects (by maintaining a listing as an attorney in a telephone
directory and by accepting $600, which he later returned, from an individual
who engaged him to perform certain legal services in a criminal matter). See
Matter of Waitz, supra at 307. See also S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17
(8), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1321 (1997); S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing
in 425 Mass. 1325 (1997) (rules in effect when the single justice decided this
case and issued this order).
The fact that an attorney engages in misconduct later in life does not
shield him or her from a necessary and appropriate sanction.
Order denying reinstatement affirmed.
Order prohibiting petitioner's reapplication for
reinstatement for ten years affirmed.
Willie J. Davis for the petitioner.
Nancy E. Kaufman, Assistant Bar Counsel.
BBO/OBC Privacy Policy. Please direct all questions to webmaster@massbbo.org.
© 2004. Board of Bar Overseers. Office of Bar Counsel. All rights reserved.
