

# COMMISSION MEETING

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May 21, 2026

 MassGIC

 Group Insurance Commission

 MA Group Insurance Commission

# Agenda

- **I. Minutes (VOTE)**
  - i. February 26, 2026
  - ii. March 5, 2026

Valerie Sullivan, Chair  
Andrew Stern, General Counsel
- **II. Executive Director's Report (INFORM)**

Matthew Veno, Executive Director  
Members of Senior Staff
- **III. Hospital Price Caps: State Updates and Debunking Common Misconceptions (INFORM)**

Michael Bailit, MBA  
President, Bailit Health
- **IV. CFO Report (INFORM)**

Jennifer Hewitt, Chief Financial Officer
- **V. Other Business/Adjournment**


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8:30-8:45

8:45-10:00

10:00 -10:15

10:15-10:30



## Minutes (VOTE)

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Valerie Sullivan, Chair

Andrew Stern, General Counsel

# Motion

**That the Commission hereby approves the minutes of its meeting held on February 26, 2026 as presented**

- Valerie Sullivan, Chair
- Bobbi Kaplan, Vice-Chair
- Anna Freedman (A&F Designee)
- Rebecca Butler (Designee for DOI)
- Martin Curley
- Tamara Davis
- Jane Edmonds
- Gerzino Guirand
- Eileen P. McAnneny
- Kristin Pepin
- Dean Robinson
- Melissa Murphy-Rodrigues
- Jason Silva
- Anna Sinaiko
- Catherine West

# Motion

**That the Commission hereby approves the minutes of its meeting held on March 5, 2026 as presented**

- Valerie Sullivan, Chair
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- Anna Freedman(A&F Designee)
- Rebecca Butler (Designee for DOI)
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- Catherine West



## Executive Director's Report

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Matthew Veno, Executive Director



## Hospital Price Caps: State Updates and Debunking Common Misconceptions

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Michael Bailit, President, Bailit Health

# Hospital Price Caps: State Updates and Debunking Common Misconceptions


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Group Insurance Commission Meeting

May 21, 2026

# About Bailit Health

Working with state agencies and their partners to improve health care system performance for all.



- Founded in 1997
- Based in Needham
- Have worked in 46 states and Washington, DC
- Team of 14 consultants based in 7 states

 Past or current Bailit Health work


# Agenda

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- Hospital Price Caps
  - Introduction
  - State Momentum is Growing
  - Debunking Common Misconceptions
  - Why Now?
- Wrap-Up

# What are hospital price caps?

- Hospital price caps – also referred to as *payment limits, payment caps, and reference-based pricing* – limit the payment amounts for hospital services.
  - Limits are established in reference to an external payment benchmark, usually a percentage of Medicare.
  - They typically apply to inpatient and outpatient hospital services, although the scope of services could vary.



# State Momentum on Hospital Price Caps

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# State interest in capping hospital prices is growing

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- To date, **five states** across the political spectrum have implemented or are preparing to implement caps on hospital prices to prevent hospital payments from being unreasonably high.
  - Oregon implemented hospital price caps beginning in 2019.
  - Since 2021, four additional states have passed legislation to implement a hospital price cap.
- During the 2026 legislative session, we've seen other states pursue legislation to advance price caps.

# Each state's hospital price cap is unique

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- States vary in their hospital price cap design.
- Market application, value of the price cap, and exemptions to the price cap are just a few of the many design options that will impact outcomes.
- Now, I will walk through the hospital price policies of five states.

# Oregon




## At a Glance

<b>Program Status</b>	Active
<b>Key Dates</b>	2019 – present
<b>Mechanism</b>	State purchasing authority with legislative directive
<b>Market Subject to Cap</b>	State and school-based employee health plans
<b>Cap Level</b>	<b>200%</b> of Medicare for in-network and <b>185%</b> for out-of-network
<b>Services Subject to Cap</b>	Hospital inpatient and outpatient services
<b>Exemptions, Alternative Cap Levels</b>	Rural, critical access, and pediatric hospitals are exempted.

## Highlights

- **OON Cap:** Oregon included an out-of-network cap (185%) to disincentivize hospitals from leaving insurer networks.
- **Savings:** Cap was estimated to save \$113M in 2021 (7% of total spending); 9.5% reduction in out-of-pocket spending per outpatient procedure for individuals in high cost-sharing plans.

# New Mexico



## At a Glance

<b>Program Status</b>	Active
<b>Key Dates</b>	July 2025 – present
<b>Mechanism</b>	State purchasing authority with legislative directive
<b>Market Subject to Cap</b>	State and school-based employee health plans
<b>Cap Level</b>	<b>200%</b> of Medicare for in-network and <b>175%</b> for out-of-network
<b>Services Subject to Cap</b>	Hospital inpatient and outpatient services
<b>Exemptions, Alternative Cap Levels</b>	Applies only to urban hospitals.

## Highlights

- **OON Cap:** New Mexico included an out-of-network cap (175%) to disincentivize hospitals from leaving networks.
- **Recent Expansion:** While the initial authorizing legislation was specific to the state benefits program for state/local government employees, the policy was subsequently expanded to apply to public educator health plans (beginning July 2026).
- **Affordability Goals:** Price caps are helping to offset enhanced financial support for state employee coverage.

# Vermont




## At a Glance

<b>Program Status</b>	Pre-implementation
<b>Key Dates</b>	Beginning October 2026
<b>Mechanism</b>	Provider regulation
<b>Market Subject to Cap</b>	Entire commercial market
<b>Cap Level</b>	<b>TBD</b>
<b>Services Subject to Cap</b>	Hospital inpatient and outpatient services (initially)
<b>Exemptions, Alternative Cap Levels</b>	None specified in statute

## Highlights

- **Market:** Vermont's innovative price cap will apply to the entire commercial market (self- and fully insured) via provider-side regulation.
- **Phase-In:** The price cap will begin with inpatient and outpatient services but may include additional services over time.
- **Goal for Consumer Savings:** The State must ensure that savings are passed along to rate payers through lower insurance premiums and to report on this requirement annually.

# Washington



## At a Glance

<b>Program Status</b>	Pre-implementation
<b>Key Dates</b>	Beginning 2027
<b>Mechanism</b>	State purchasing authority with legislative directive
<b>Market Subject to Cap</b>	State and school-based employee health plans
<b>Cap Level</b>	<b>200%</b> of Medicare for in-network and <b>185%</b> for out-of-network
<b>Services Subject to Cap</b>	Hospital inpatient and outpatient services
<b>Exemptions, Alternative Cap Levels</b>	Non-system-owned critical access and sole community hospitals that serve rural areas are exempted. Pediatric hospitals have an alternatively calculated payment limit.

## Highlights

- **OON Cap:** Washington includes an out-of-network cap (185%) to disincentivize hospitals from leaving networks.
- **Price Floors:** The price caps are accompanied by price floors of 150% of Medicare rates for primary care and behavioral health services delivered in community settings.
- **Public option price cap:** Washington has also applied aggregate statewide hospital price caps at 160% of Medicare rates in its public option program since 2021.

# Indiana



## At a Glance

<b>Program Status</b>	Pre-implementation
<b>Key Dates</b>	Beginning 2029
<b>Mechanism</b>	Provider regulation
<b>Market Subject to Cap</b>	Commercial market
<b>Cap Level</b>	<b>Aggregate statewide average</b>
<b>Services Subject to Cap</b>	Hospital inpatient and outpatient services
<b>Exemptions, Alternative Cap Levels</b>	The price cap applies to only to the five largest nonprofit systems in Indiana.

## Highlights

- **Market:** Indiana’s price cap will apply to the entire commercial market (self- and fully insured) via provider-side regulation.
- **Price Cap:** Indiana’s aggregate price cap will be set based on statewide average payment rates for inpatient and outpatient services.
- **Enforcement:** Indiana will leverage a unique lever to enforce the price cap: nonprofit hospitals that fail to meet the cap must forfeit their tax-exempt status until they lower prices below the statewide average.

# Hospital Price Caps: Common Misconceptions

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# Hospital price caps are often misunderstood

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- State efforts to contain excessive hospital prices often unearth common misconceptions.
- States pursuing or preparing to implement price caps may hear myths about hospital price caps, including that they will...
  1. Not address the right problem
  2. Force hospitals to close / impede access to care
  3. Diminish quality of care
  4. Harm the local economy
  5. Lead to cost-shifting
- Together, armed with the evidence base, let's correct each misconception in turn.

# 1. Price caps don't address the right problem.

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Myth: “Hospital spending growth is due to growth in utilization of services, not price growth.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- GIC data show that rising health care prices, rather than utilization, have been the **primary driver** of health care spending growth for over a decade.
- This trend is also seen in hospital spending, where rising prices have over time been a much larger contributor to hospital spending growth than increased utilization.

# 1. Price caps don't address the right problem.

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Myth: “Massachusetts hospital prices are not excessively high, so a price cap is not necessary here.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- Massachusetts Medicare prices are high, so **Medicare *relative price* isn't a good comparator** for state-level rankings of commercial price levels.
- However, RAND produces **standardized prices** enabling a more apples-to-apples comparison. Prices for a standardized inpatient stay at three Massachusetts hospitals - Brigham & Women's, UMass Memorial Medical Center, and Mass General Brigham - are in the **89th and 90th percentiles for all hospitals nationally**.
- In fact, Massachusetts has some **very high-priced hospital outliers**, with prices for inpatient stays at the most expensive facilities more than double prices for the same services at the least expensive facilities, and prices for lab tests and other routine outpatient services varying as much as 5:1 across hospitals.

# 1. Price caps don't address the right problem.

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Myth: “Hospital prices are high because hospitals are limited in their ability to reduce costs given that so much of their spending goes towards fixed expenses like salaries and facility maintenance.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- Hospitals are not powerless in determining their expenses; they decide their management structure, staffing levels (including for non-direct patient care labor), and salary levels.
- Extensive evidence shows that **high hospital prices are driven primarily by market power**, rather than by increases in labor and other input costs.
  - Massachusetts hospital prices also vary extensively across hospitals, reflecting market leverage more than underlying costs.
- Evidence further shows that when faced with financial pressures that limit their ability to raise their rates, such as operating in a competitive market, hospitals **manage their operating costs more efficiently**. In addition, studies show that hospitals with higher commercial payments may make the choice to develop a higher cost structure than is necessary.

## 2. Price caps will force hospitals to close / impede access to care.

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Myth: “Capping hospital prices will force hospitals to cut back on services, or possibly even close.”

### Evidence-Informed Responses:

- Hospital price cap policy can be informed by **rigorous modeling**, including to understand hospital financial health and the financial impact of capped prices on hospitals.
- The five health systems where the highest proportion of GIC members seek care – MGB, BILH, UMass, Children’s and DFCI – are **all financially stable** according to a holistic assessment of financial health. Those systems have sufficient reserves that could help them withstand price constraints, such as a potential GIC price cap.

## 2. Price caps will force hospitals to close / impede access to care.

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- The hospital systems visited most by public servants have solid finances – and some are ultra-wealthy.

Health System	Unrestricted funds*
<b>Mass General Brigham</b>	<b>\$13.0</b> billion
<b>Beth Israel Lahey Health</b>	<b>\$2.7</b> billion
<b>UMass Memorial Health Care</b>	<b>\$1.7</b> billion
<b>Boston Children's Hospital</b>	<b>\$6.3</b> billion
<b>Dana Farber Cancer Institute</b>	<b>\$1.4</b> billion

## 2. Price caps will force hospitals to close / impede access to care.

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Myth: “Capping hospital prices will force hospitals to leave health plan networks.”

### **Evidence-Informed Responses:**

- To date, price cap policies in other states **have not resulted in network disruptions**.
- Any threats to leave the GIC’s network based on a potential price cap would be a scare tactic, rather than a decision based on actual projected impact.
- Complementary policies, such as caps on out-of-network rates, can also help to reduce any potential incentive to leave insurer networks.

# 3. Price caps will diminish quality of care.

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Myth: “Hospital price caps will diminish the quality of care.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- Hospital price constraints are unlikely to compromise quality of care as there is limited, mixed evidence on whether higher hospital prices are correlated with higher quality of care.
- The association between prices and quality is **affected by many factors** such as hospital size and the health of the hospital’s patients.
- Massachusetts has long documented unwarranted price variation, where hospital prices for the same service vary wildly from one location to another — without correlating with quality.

# 4. Price caps will harm the local economy.

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Myth: “Capping hospital prices will force hospitals to further eliminate jobs and harm the local economy.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- High hospital prices, which are reflected in higher health insurance premiums, harm the local economy as small businesses and municipalities are forced to allocate more and more to health care expenses, which **crowds out wages** and **stifles growth and hiring**.
- In addition, we know from hospital case examples and the literature that when faced with financial/revenue pressures, **hospitals can take steps to manage their administrative and clinical costs more efficiently** to reduce overall costs, rather than defaulting to job cuts.

# 5. Price caps will lead to cost-shifting.

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Myth #1: “Hospitals have to maintain higher commercial prices because Medicare and Medicaid don’t pay enough, forcing hospitals to engage in ‘cost-shifting.’”

## **Evidence-Informed Responses:**

- Extensive research shows that hospitals do not raise prices in response to lower Medicare and Medicaid payment levels, but rather to **maximize revenue**.
- In addition, well-resourced hospitals have choices regarding how to spend their money. When large hospital systems are spending money on expansions, the GIC and other commercial plans should not be subsidizing those costs.

# 5. Price caps will lead to cost-shifting.

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Myth #2: “The proposed price cap will result in hospitals increasing prices for services or for health plans not covered by the price cap.”

## Evidence-Informed Responses:

- Since Oregon first implemented a price caps program for their state and school-based employee health plans in 2019, they have **not seen prices for other insurance plans or services go up.**
- While hospitals could use the price cap as justification to try to increase their prices for non-capped services and plans, those with the most GIC revenue are financially healthy. Hospitals can instead take measures to manage their operating costs more efficiently, rather than cost-shifting.

# Why should the GIC consider price caps now?

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- Following the passage of HR 1, it is more important than ever to slow commercial market spending growth. With HR 1 cutting federal funding to the state, there is simply not enough money to pay for excessively high hospital prices.
- We shouldn't be looking to state employees and Massachusetts taxpayers to recoup lost revenue from HR 1, especially with recent double-digit premium increases that will further eat into the state budget and strain household budgets.

# Questions?

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IV

## CFO Report

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Jennifer Hewitt, GIC Chief Financial Officer

# FY2026 Spending Year-to-Date - State Share Premium Accounts

(\$ millions)	July '25	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.'26	Feb.	Mar.	April	Total**
Pharmacy Claims (CVS/SilverScript)	\$144.2*	\$86.8	\$42.3	\$118.8	\$67.2	\$9.4	\$79.4	\$87.0	\$1.0	\$73.1	\$709.1
Health New England Claims	\$10.5	\$9.2	\$10.8	\$8.6	\$9.8	\$10.5	\$8.0	\$10.3	\$15.2	\$9.5	\$102.4
Mass General Brigham Claims	\$15.3	\$10.9	\$10.0	\$13.9	\$12.4	\$13.1	\$10.6	\$11.5	\$13.5	\$16.5	\$127.7
Point32 Claims	\$115.0*	\$67.5	\$85.1	\$71.6	\$67.6	\$74.1	\$64.0	\$71.6	\$89.6	\$79.5	\$785.7
Wellpoint Claims	\$122.5*	\$65.4	\$70.9	\$72.0	\$68.2	\$85.9	\$96.4	\$83.7	\$79.2	\$95.6	\$840.0
<b>Claims Subtotal**</b>	<b>\$407.5*</b>	<b>\$239.9</b>	<b>\$219.2</b>	<b>\$284.9</b>	<b>\$225.1</b>	<b>\$193.1</b>	<b>\$258.4</b>	<b>\$264.1</b>	<b>\$198.4</b>	<b>\$274.1</b>	<b>\$2,564.9</b>
Basic/RMT Life Ins. Premiums	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$1.7	\$17.1
Tufts Medicare Preferred	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$0.6	\$0.7	\$0.7	\$6.7
UBH Optum EAP	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.1	\$0.8
ASO Administrative Fees	\$10.2	\$8.8	\$8.8	\$8.7	\$8.7	\$8.9	\$8.7	\$8.7	\$8.7	\$8.8	\$88.8
Other Costs	\$0.2	\$1.4	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.4	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.3	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$3.9
Dental/Vision Expenses	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.0	\$1.1	\$10.2
<b>Other Expenses Subtotal**</b>	<b>\$13.9</b>	<b>\$13.7</b>	<b>\$12.6</b>	<b>\$12.5</b>	<b>\$12.5</b>	<b>\$12.6</b>	<b>\$12.3</b>	<b>\$12.4</b>	<b>\$12.4</b>	<b>\$12.5</b>	<b>\$127.5</b>
<b>Combined Total**</b>	<b>\$421.4*</b>	<b>\$253.6</b>	<b>\$231.7</b>	<b>\$297.5</b>	<b>\$237.7</b>	<b>\$205.7</b>	<b>\$270.7</b>	<b>\$276.5</b>	<b>\$210.8</b>	<b>\$286.7</b>	<b>\$2,692.4</b>

\*Restated some July 2025 values to capture corrected allocation between State and Enrollee accounts.

\*\*Totals may not add due to rounding.


# FY2026 Spending Year-to-Date - Enrollee Share Premium Accounts

(\$ millions)	July '25	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.'26	Feb.	Mar.	April	Total**
Pharmacy Claims (CVS/SilverScript)	\$11.7*	\$23.3	\$11.0	\$32.5	\$19.1	\$3.0	\$23.3	\$24.1	\$0.2	\$21.0	\$169.2
Health New England Claims	\$3.2	\$2.8	\$2.6	\$3.4	\$3.6	\$2.5	\$1.8	\$3.7	\$4.6	\$2.2	\$30.5
Mass General Brigham Claims	\$4.8	\$3.4	\$3.1	\$4.3	\$3.9	\$4.1	\$3.3	\$4.4	\$5.3	\$4.0	\$40.5
Point32 Claims	\$8.4*	\$19.5	\$24.7	\$20.8	\$19.6	\$21.5	\$18.6	\$28.5	\$25.9	\$23.1	\$210.6
Wellpoint Claims	\$8.0*	\$18.4	\$20.0	\$20.2	\$19.1	\$24.3	\$27.2	\$23.4	\$22.3	\$27.1	\$210.1
<b>Claims Subtotal**</b>	<b>\$36.0*</b>	<b>\$67.5</b>	<b>\$61.4</b>	<b>\$81.1</b>	<b>\$65.4</b>	<b>\$55.4</b>	<b>\$74.2</b>	<b>\$84.1</b>	<b>\$58.4</b>	<b>\$77.3</b>	<b>\$660.9</b>
Basic/Voluntary Life Ins. Premiums	\$5.1	\$5.1	\$5.2	\$5.2	\$5.2	\$5.2	\$5.2	\$5.2	\$5.3	\$5.1	\$51.9
Long-Term Disability Ins. Premiums	\$1.3	\$1.3	\$1.3	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$1.4	\$13.6
Tufts Medicare Preferred	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.1	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$1.6
UBH Optum EAP	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.2
ASO Administrative Fees	\$2.1	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.3	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.5	\$23.8
Dental/Vision Expenses	\$2.4	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$2.5	\$24.8
<b>Other Expenses Subtotal**</b>	<b>\$11.2</b>	<b>\$11.5</b>	<b>\$11.6</b>	<b>\$11.6</b>	<b>\$11.7</b>	<b>\$11.5</b>	<b>\$11.7</b>	<b>\$11.7</b>	<b>\$11.8</b>	<b>\$11.6</b>	<b>\$115.8</b>
<b>Combined Total**</b>	<b>\$47.2*</b>	<b>\$79.0</b>	<b>\$73.1</b>	<b>\$92.8</b>	<b>\$77.0</b>	<b>\$66.9</b>	<b>\$85.9</b>	<b>\$95.7</b>	<b>\$70.1</b>	<b>\$88.9</b>	<b>\$776.7</b>


\*Restated some July 2025 values to capture corrected allocation between State and Enrollee accounts.

\*\*Totals may not add due to rounding.

# GIC State Appropriation for Health Premium Account FY2026 Available Funds vs. Actual Spending as of April 30, 2026



# GIC State Appropriation for Health Premium Account FY2026 Available Funds vs. Actual Spending - Cumulative



# FY2026 GIC Summary Budget

<b>Health Benefits</b>	<b>GAA</b>	<b>Supplemental</b>	<b>Total Available</b>	<b>Spent thru 4/30</b>
1108-5200 - Actives	\$2,372,061,737	\$300,000,000	\$2,672,061,737	\$2,232,194,828
1599-6152 - Retirees*	\$450,000,000	\$ -	\$450,000,000	\$450,000,000
<b>Total Health Budget</b>	<b>\$2,822,061,737</b>	<b>\$300,000,000</b>	<b>\$3,122,061,737</b>	<b>\$2,682,194,828</b>

Dental/Vision Benefits	\$12,634,259	\$ -	\$12,634,259	\$ 10,244,955
<b>Combined Benefits</b>	<b>\$2,834,695,996</b>	<b>\$300,000,000</b>	<b>\$3,134,695,996</b>	<b>\$2,692,439,783</b>


\*\$100M of the \$300M supplemental was due to a reduction in available funding to the State Retiree Benefit Trust Fund (SRBTF) for retiree health costs. The SRBTF had been traditionally funded at \$550M.

# FY2027 GIC Summary Budget

<b>Health Benefits</b>	<b>H.2, House/Senate</b>	<b>Projected Spending Need</b>	<b>Projected Shortfall</b>
1108-5200 - Actives	\$2,765,209,719	\$2,815,709,719	\$52,500,000
1599-6152 - Retirees*	\$400,000,000	\$550,000,000	\$150,000,000
<b>Total Health Budget</b>	<b>\$3,165,209,719</b>	<b>\$3,367,709,719</b>	<b>\$202,500,000</b>

Dental/Vision Benefits	\$12,634,259	\$12,634,259	\$ -
<b>Combined Benefits</b>	<b>\$3,177,843,978</b>	<b>\$3,380,343,978</b>	<b>\$202,500,000</b>

\*Health spending for Retirees was broken into an Operating Transfer to the State Retiree Benefit Trust Fund (SRBTF) in the late 2000s. The pending FY2027 budgets anticipate dedicating up to \$150M in Excess Capital Gains in FY2027 to the SRBTF, in lieu of direct funding via the budget. Those amounts are not known nor available until May or June, which makes it difficult to pay health claims and creates a shortfall.



## Other Business and Adjournment

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Valerie Sullivan, Chair

Matthew Veno, Executive Director

# Appendix: Sources

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# Sources #1

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# Appendix: Hospital Financials

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# Financial Health of Five Systems Serving Highest Numbers of GIC Members

<p><b>Mass General Brigham (MGB)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• One of the wealthiest health systems in the state.</li><li>• Moderate margins but very strong cash position to help it through tough times.</li><li>• Can easily cover its debt.</li></ul>	<p><b>\$13.0</b> billion in unrestricted funds in 2024*</p>
<p><b>Beth Israel Lahey Health (BILH)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Solid finances overall.</li><li>• Despite lower-than-usual margin, has healthy cash on hand.</li><li>• High credit rating and manageable debt load.</li></ul>	<p><b>\$2.7</b> billion in unrestricted funds in 2024*</p>
<p><b>UMass Memorial Health Care (UMMHC)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Stable finances.</li><li>• Losses in FY19-23 but a strong year in FY24.</li><li>• Sufficient cash and ability to cover its debt.</li><li>• Investing in facility and equipment improvements.</li><li>• Could be vulnerable if it experiences major future losses.</li></ul>	<p><b>\$1.7</b> billion in unrestricted funds in 2024*</p>
<p><b>Boston Children’s Hospital (BCH)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Very wealthy and resilient health system.</li><li>• Very profitable when investment income is included.</li><li>• Manageable debt and high credit ratings.</li><li>• Could operate for two years without additional income.</li></ul>	<p><b>\$6.3</b> billion in unrestricted funds in 2024*</p>
<p><b>Dana Farber Cancer Institute (DFCI)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strong financial position.</li><li>• Consistently profitable, supported by earnings from patient care and high donations.</li><li>• Sufficient cash, manageable debt.</li><li>• Unrestricted reserves have doubled since 2019 – and it has another \$1.8 billion in restricted funds.</li></ul>	<p><b>\$1.4</b> billion in unrestricted funds in 2024*</p>

# 2026 Group Insurance Commission Meetings & Schedule

January <b>15</b>	February <b>12</b>	February <b>26</b>	March <b>5</b>	May <b>21</b>
June <b>18</b>	September <b>17</b>	October <b>15</b>	November <b>19</b>	December <b>17</b>

Unless otherwise announced in the public notice, all meetings take place from 8:30 am - 10:30 am on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Thursday of the month. Meeting notices and materials including the agenda and presentation are available at [mass.gov/gic](https://mass.gov/gic) under Upcoming Events prior to the meeting and under Recent Events after the meeting.

## Please note:

- Until further notice, Commissioners will attend meetings remotely via a video-conferencing platform provided by GIC.
- Anyone with Internet access can view the livestream via the MA Group Insurance Commission channel on YouTube. The meeting is recorded, so it can be replayed at any time.

Note: Topics and meeting dates are subject to change

# Appendix

**Commission Members**

**GIC Leadership Team**

**GIC Goals**

**GIC Contact Channels**

# Commission Members



**Valerie Sullivan**, Public Member, Chair



**Bobbi Kaplan**, NAGE, Vice-Chair



**Michael Caljouw**, Commissioner of Insurance



**Matthew Gorzkowicz**, Secretary of Administration & Finance



**Martin Curley**, Public Member



**Kristin Pepin**, NAGE



**Tamara P. Davis**, Public Member



**Dean Robinson**, Massachusetts Teachers Association



**Jane Edmonds**, Retiree Member



**Melissa Murphy-Rodrigues**, Mass Municipal Association



**Gerzino Guirand**, Council 93, AFSCME, AFL-CIO



**Jason Silva**, Mass Municipal Association



**Eileen P. McAnneny**, Public Member



**Anna Sinaiko**, Health Economist



**Catherine West**, Public Member

## GIC Leadership Team

**Matthew A. Veno**, Executive Director

**Erika Scibelli**, Deputy Executive Director

**Emily Williams**, Chief of Staff

**Jennifer Hewitt**, Chief Fiscal Officer

**Paul Murphy**, Director of Operations

**Andrew Stern**, General Counsel

**Stephanie Sutliff**, Chief Information Officer

**John Viarella**, Director of Human Resources

## GIC Goals

1

Provide access to high quality, affordable benefit options for employees, retirees and dependents

2

Limit the financial liability to the state and others (of fulfilling benefit obligations) to sustainable growth rates

3

Use the GIC's leverage to innovate and otherwise favorably influence the Massachusetts healthcare market

4

Evolve business and operational environment of the GIC to better meet business demands and security standards

# Contact GIC for Enrollment and Eligibility

- Enrollment
- Retirement
- Premium Payments
- Qualifying Events
- Life Insurance
- Long-Term Disability
- Information Changes
- Marriage Status Changes
- Other Questions

Online Contact	mass.gov/forms/contact-the-gic	Any time. Specify your preferred method of response from GIC (email, phone, mail)
Email	gicpublicinfo@mass.gov	
Telephone	(617) 727-2310, M-F from 8:45 AM to 5:00 PM	
Office location	1 Ashburton Place, Suite 1413, Boston, MA, Not open for walk-in service	
Correspondence & Paper Forms	P.O. Box 556 Randolph, MA 02368	Allow for processing time. Priority given to requests to retain or access benefits

# Contact Your Health Carrier for Product and Coverage Questions

- Finding a Provider
- Accessing tiered doctor and hospital lists
- Determining which programs are available, like telehealth or fitness
- Understanding coverage

Health Insurance Carrier	Telephone	Website
Mass General Brigham Health Plan	(866) 567-9175	<a href="https://massgeneralbrighamhealthplan.com/gic-members">massgeneralbrighamhealthplan.com/gic-members</a>
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care	(844) 442-7324	<a href="https://point32health.org/gic">point32health.org/gic</a>
Health New England	(800) 842-4464	<a href="https://hne.com/gic">hne.com/gic</a>
Tufts Health Plan (Medicare Only)	(855) 852-1016	<a href="https://Tuftshealthplan.com/gic">Tuftshealthplan.com/gic</a>
Wellpoint		
Non-Medicare Plans	(833) 663-4176	<a href="https://wellpoint.com/mass">wellpoint.com/mass</a>
Medicare Plans	(800) 442-9300	