### CITY OF SPRINGFIELD AND LOCAL 648, IAFF, MUP-2553 (7/18/77)

- (50 Duty To Bargain)
  53.2 conflicting ordinances and by-laws
  54.520 residency requirements
- (60 Prohibited Practice By Employer)
  67.2 failure to support contract
  67.8 unilateral change by employer

learing Officer: Stuart A. Kaufman, Esq.

#### opearances:

John J. Brogan, Jr., Esq.

- Representing the City of Springfield
- James B. Krumsiek, Esq.
- Representing Local 648, International Association of Firefighters

#### HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION

### Statement of the Case

On July 28, 1976, Local 648, International Association of Firefighters the Association) filed a Complaint of Prohibited Practice with the Labor Relations Commission (the Commission) alleging that the City of Springfield (the ity) had engaged in prohibited practices within the meaning of Sections 10(a) 1), (3) and (5) of General Laws Chapter 150E (the Law). Pursuant to its authrity under Section II of the Law, the Commission conducted an investigation in he above-entitled matter and issued its own Complaint of Prohibited Practice n March 16, 1977 alleging violations by the City of Sections 10(a)(5) and (!) f the Law.

An Expedited Hearing was held at the offices of the Commission in Boston n May 4, 1977 before Stuart A. Kaufman, Esq., a duly designated Commission earing Officer. All parties were afforded full and fair opportunity to be eard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence and to sub-it statements of position. On the basis of the record, including the stipulation of the parties, I hereby make the following findings:

## Jurisdictional Findings

The City is a municipal corporation situated in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is a public employer within the meaning of Section 1 of the Law.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The Commission had postponed the issuance of a Complaint during its conideration of similar residency cases involving the Boston School Committee. se Case Nos. MUP-2503, MUP-2528 and MUP-2541, filed in May and June, 1976.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The City, by way of a late-filed Answer, admits each of the factual alleations contained in the Complaint but denies the conclusions of law.

The Mayor of the City is the chief executive officer of the City within the meaning of Section I of the Law.

The Springfield City Council is a Legislative Body within the meaning of Section 1 of the Law.

The Association is an employee organization within the meaning of Section 1 of the Law and is the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of certain employees of the City, including all uniformed members of the Fire Department of the City below the rank of district chief.

# Findings of Fact

In February, 1974, the City and Association executed a collective bargaingreement which was due to expire on June 30, 1976. Because of the automarenewal conditions in the agreement, the agreement was renewed for one year
id the June 30, 1976 termination date. Article 10 of the agreement provides
allows:

#### Residency Requirements

Any Employee having more than five (5) years of service with the Departmay reside within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts but outside of the of Springfield; provided, however, that no such Employee may reside more ten (10) miles from the City limits of said Springfield. To the extentited by law, the Union shall encourage its members to reside in Springfield.

On June 16, 1976 the Mayor filed an ordinance with the Clerk of the City :il significantly amending the residency ordinances for all City employees uding employees represented by the Association. During the preceding weeks nedia had carried reports of a proposed residency ordinance, although the 16 filing by the Mayor was his first official act in this regard.

The ordinance was inserted as part of the agenda for the June 21, 1976 ing of the City Council. Notice of the filing of the ordinance was pubed in legal notices and was distributed to the public on Thursday, June

Upon receipt of the agenda, the Association President notified the Associa-Counsel. Thereafter, the Counsel prepared a letter addressed to the Presiof the City Council. The letter was delivered to the Council President's ce during the afternoon of June 21 and copies were simultaneously delivered he offices of the Mayor and Associate City Solicitor. The thrust of the er was that the proposed ordinance would conflict with the existing agree-between the Association and City. The letter also indicated that the ciation was prepared to negotiate with the City over residency and requested City Council to defer action on the ordinance until the Association and had an opportunity to negotiate over residency.

The ordinance was officially introduced before the City Council at a well-nded public session on Monday, June 21, 1976. The Council immediately voted



to suspend internal hearing rules and went into recess to allow the Mayor to address the Council. The Mayor spoke in favor of his recently-filed ordinance. The Associate City Solicitor also appeared and answered certain legal questions posed by the Council.3

The Council returned from its recess shortly thereafter and commenced its deliberations on the ordinance. After consideration of several comparatively minor amendments, the Council gave initial approval to an amended ordinance and referred the matter to the Council's Committee on Internal Affairs for proper drafting.

The Clerk inserted a copy of the proposed ordinance in the legal notices for the news media on June 28 and scheduled final Council Consideration of the matter for the next scheduled Council meeting on July 19, 1976.

The ordinance was passed to be ordained by the Council on July 19, 1976 and was approved by the Mayor on the following day. The ordinance purportedly took effect 20 days later on August 10, 1977.4

The text of the ordinance is as follows:

Section 2-17. Subsequent to May 28, 1976, all personnel employed initially, reappointed by the City of Springfield, and/or accepting promotion to a position exceeding that compensation provided for at Step 4 of Range 6 Schedule D of the municipal pay plan, and any amendments thereto, and each person appointed by the Mayor, except those persons appointed by the Mayor under the provisions of Section 2-20, Paragraph 2, as a term and condition of said employment shall be or within the two years next following the date of his or her acceptance of employment, promotion or reappointment become a resident of the City of Springfield, and each such employee shall continue to maintain residency in the City of Springfield during his or her term of employment; provided further that if any such employee shall during his or her term of employment remove from the City of Springfield, such employee shall be deemed to have become disqualified from holding employment with the City of Springfield as of the date of cessation of residency, said employee's name shall be stricken from the payroll, and no further payments of salary or other compensation shall be made thereto. Those employees who are non-tenured employees in their particular grade shall be treated the same as those employees who are tenured prior to May 28. 1976.

Section 2-18. Each employee affected by Section 2-17 shall upon acceptance of employment, promotion and/or reappointment, or within two years next following thereupon, in writing and under the penalties of perjury,



 $<sup>^3</sup>$ There may have been one or two other speakers who addressed the Council Juring the recess, although the record is not clear on this point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The Complaint was filed by the Association subsequent to the Mayor's approval but prior to the effective date of the ordinance.

ertify to the Personnel Director that he or she is a resident of the City of Springfield. If upon the expiration of the two years next following cceptance of employment, promotion and/or re-appointment and such employee hall not have so certified to the Personnel Director that he or she is a resident of the City of Springfield; said employee shall be deemed disqualified from holding employment with said City, and the Personnel Director shall forthwith so notify the Mayor, the Auditor shall strike from the anyroll the name of any such employee and shall cause no further payments of salary or other compensation to be made thereto. No person deemed disqualified hereunder shall be re-employed or reappointed for a period of the year next after the date he or she becomes disqualified unless he or the shall before the date of employment, promotion and/or reappointment become a resident of the City of Springfield.

section 2-19. Applicants at the time of filing an application for employment by the City of Springfield, shall not as a condition of filing said application be required to be a resident of the City of Springfield, provided further however, that, if said applicant is subsequently employed, said applicant-employee shall as a term and condition of employment within the two years next following the date of acceptance of employment become a resident of the City of Springfield, and each such employee shall continue to maintain residency in the City of Springfield during his or her term of employment.

Section 2-20. All persons appointed to membership on boards and commissions of the City of Springfield shall be residents of the City of Springfield during the terms for which they are appointed.

This section shall not apply to persons appointed to advisory committees or to committees established under Federal or State Grant-In-Aid programs except where otherwise specified.

Section 2-21. All personnel currently employed and maintaining residency within the City of Springfield on the date of the adoption of this ordinance shall continue to maintain residency in said City; provided further that if any such employee shall during his or her term of employment remove from the City of Springfield such employee shall be deemed to have become disqualified from holding employment with the City of Springfield as of the date of cessation of residency, and said employee's name shall be stricken from the payroll, and no further payments of salary or other compensation shall be made thereto.

Section 2-22. All employees residing without the City of Springfield on the date of adoption of this ordinance shall within sixty (60) days thereafter adoption certify to the Personnel Director under the penalties of perjury the employee's residency on the date of passage of said ordinance, and shall thereafter certify annually as to their residency.

Subsequent to May 28, 1976, an employee residing without the City, regardless of incidence of title, shall as a term and condition of employment upon voluntarily relocating his or her residency as certified above, remove

to the City of Springfield, and thereupon certify to the Personnel Director under penalties of perjury that he or she has become a resident of the City.

Section 2-23. This Ordinance shall not apply to such municipal employees of the Water Department as are engaged and rendering official services at the following installations and/or locations: Broden Brook Reservoir, Massachusetts; West Parish Filers, Westfield, Massachusetts; Provin Mountain Reservoir, Agawam, Massachusetts and Ludlow Reservoir, Ludlow, Massachusetts.

Section 2-24. The provisions of this ordinance are severable, and if any of its provisions shall be held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, the decision of such court shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions.

Section 2-25. In the event that any collective bargaining contract is executed subsequent to the date of adoption of this ordinance, and such collective bargaining contract permits any of its members to reside outside of the City, then this entire ordinance shall be null and void.

In accordance with the terms of the ordinance, each non-resident member f the unit represented by the Association was required to sign a statement by ctober 10, 1976 indicating, under penalties of perjury, his or her residence nd indicating that he or she had read and understood the conditions of the new esidency ordinance. The signed statements were accompanied by individual leters of protest. To date, no member of the unit represented by the Association as been discharged for failure to comply with the terms of the residency ordinance.

#### Opinion

With the enactment of Section 7 of the Law in 1973, the General Court liminated a major barrier to the implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Prior law provided that conflicts between municipal personnel ordinances nd negotiated agreements would be resolved in favor of the ordinance; Section of the Law prescribes a contrary result:

If a collective bargaining agreement reached by an employer and the exclusive representative contains a conflict between matters which are within the scope of negotiations pursuant to Section 6 of this chapter and any municipal personnel ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation... the terms of the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail.

While conceptually delegating a legislative function to non-legislative ody members, the language reflects the General Court's clear intent to prevent he frustration of negotiated agreements by the presence of conflicting and often ntiquated personnel ordinances.

Applying the principles and language of Section 7 to the text of the resiency ordinance passed by the City in 1976, 1 find that Chapter 2, Sections -19, 2-21 and 2-22 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Springfield, 1963,



mended, are in conflict with Article 10 of the collective bargaining agreebetween the City and Association and are therefore of no force or effect oplied to employees represented by the Association.

Article 10 residency provision clearly permits employees with more than years of service in the Fire Department three options:

- (1) to reside within the City;
- to reside outside of the City but within ten miles thereof, or
- (3) to reside within a ten-mile limit of the City and to relocate freely in any location within ten miles of the City limits.

An examination of each of the aforementioned ordinance sections reveals a r conflict with the options embodied in Article 10 of the collective baring agreement between the City and Association:

- (a) Section 2-19 requires the maintenance of residency within the City ng the entire term of employment irrespective of whether an employee has ad for five years and conflicts with options (2) and (3).
- (b) Section 2-21 prohibits any employee presently residing within the from moving outside of the City and requires continued residence in the as a condition of continued employment. This section conflicts with ops (2) and (3).
- (c) Section 2-22 provides that any employee residing outside of the City the effective date) who chooses to change his or her residence must move the City as a condition of continued employment. This Section also conts with Options (2) and (3).

Application of the language of Section 7 of the Law requires that the cont between the ordinance and contract arise out of a matter within the scope agotiations prusuant to Section 6 of the Law. In this regard, I find that aforementioned ordinances establish conditions of continued employment and therefore within the Section 6 scope of negotiations. This finding is conent, moreover, with the Commission's recent determinations in Boston School ittee. Case Nos. MUP-2503, MUP-2528, and MUP-2541, 3 MLC 1603 (1977).

Since the provisions of Chapter 2, Sections 2-19, 2-21 and 2-22 of the Red Ordinances of the City of Springfield, 1963, as amended were in conflict the collective bargaining agreement between the City and Association and superceded by said agreement, they never took effect.

There are, however, provisions in the aforementioned residency ordinances h do not conflict with the existing collective bargaining agreement but h instead supplement the agreement. These provisions are contained in Sec-2-17 of the residency ordinances and require residency within the City as

<sup>5 (</sup>see page 1140)

condition of promotion or reappointment. Inasmuch as the Commission has ilready concluded in <u>Boston School' Committee</u>, <u>supra</u>, that residency as a conlition of promotion from one job to another within the same unit or in a different unit pursuant to an established career ladder is a mandatory subject if bargaining, I am constrained to conclude that the implementation by the lity of Section 2-17 constitutes a unilateral change in a term and condition of employment. See also <u>Town of Wayland</u>, MUP-2294, 3 MLC \_\_\_\_, (1977), <u>Lynn ichool Committee</u>, MUP-2585, 3 MLC \_\_\_\_ (7/5/77).

I am not persuaded by the School Committee's contention that the Association waived its right to negotiate over the issue of residency. The record ndicates a timely protest by the Association when it received notice of the proposed ordinance changes prior to the June 21, 1976 City Council Meeting. See Bonded Draying Service, 220 NLRB No. 136, 90 LRRM 1556 (1975).

Alternatively, even if I were to discredit the Association's position that it delivered a copy of the protest to the Mayor and Associate City Soli-litor, subsequent events negate any inference leading to waiver. I find that the filing of charges with the Commission on July 28, 1976 -- one week after the Mayor had signed the residency ordinance into Law -- constituted sufficient protest.

Indeed, it would have been futile for the Association to have demanded regotiation over the terms of residency changes which the Mayor had previously supported and signed. City of Everett, MUP-2126, 2 MLC 1471, 1476 (1976). It is clear from the record that at no time prior to the approval of the residency ordinance changes did the City offer to negotiate over such changes with the Association.

Additionally I find that the conduct of the City constitutes separate riolations of Sections 10(a)(1) and (5) of the Law. A chronological review of the conduct of the Mayor reveals the following:

 The signing of a collective bargaining agreement specifying the limits of residency requirements for members of the Fire Department;

 $^{5}$ Section 6 of the Law establishes the following scope of negotiations:

The employer and the exclusive representative shall meet at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the employer's budget-making process and shall negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment, but such obligation shall not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a concession.



- (2) The filing of significant changes to the residency ordinances in conflict with or in addition to the existing residency limitations for members of the Fire Department represented by the Association without negotiating with the Association;
- (3) the support of such changes before the City Council;
- (4) the signing of such changes into law, and
- (5) implementing such changes and requiring compliance.

These actions, taken by the signatory to an agreement, are destructive to purposes of collective bargaining. To legitimize these actions would a parties to any collective bargaining agreement in uncertainty as to furnation of any of the terms of the agreement and would undermine the all trust necessary to administer an agreement. Such conduct would be no coercive if an employee organization, rather than an employer, sought return through the legislative process conditions it had previously agreed th the employer.

Finally, the actions by the Mayor in proposing, supporting, signing and ementing unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment are viove of Section 10(a)(5) of the Law. The conclusion that most of the ordinamendments could not have taken effect because of the operation of Sectof the Law in no way diminishes the fact that each of the residency nance amendments constitutes a matter within the mandatory scope of negonos which must be bargained for in advance of any change. See Boston of Committee, supra.

# Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that the City has engaged in ibited practices within the meaning of Section 10(a)(5) and (1) of the Furthermore, I conclude that Chapter 2, Sections 2-19, 2-21, and 2-22 he Revised Ordinances of the City of Springfield, 1963, as amended, are in lict with Article 10 of the collective bargaining agreement between the and Association and are therefore of no force or effect as applied to embes represented by the Association.

#### ORDER

Wherefore, on the basis of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the City of agfield shall:

Cease and desist from:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The Employer ably refutes an early Association contention that the over had violated Section 10(a)(3) of the Law. However, since the Comion chose not to issue a Complaint regarding Section 10(a)(3), the issue never properly before me.



- (a) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the Law.
- (b) Failing to and refusing to bargain in good faith with Local 648, International Association of Firefighters.
- (c) Imposing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to any provision of Chapter 2, Sections 2-17 to 2-25, inclusive of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Springfield, 1963, as amended, upon any member of the unit represented by Local 648, International Association of Firefighters.
- Take the following affirmative steps which will effectuate the purposes and policies of the Law;
  - (a) Introduce and support before the Springfield City Council the passage of the following amendment to Chapter 2:
    - Section 2-26.

      Nothing in this ordinance shall be construed to apply in any way to any member of the fire department.
  - (b) Upon request, immediately negotiate with the Association over the subject of amendments to residency ordinances affecting members of the Association.
  - (c) Post in a conspicuous place where employees of the Springfield Fire Department regularly congregate or where notices are usually posted, a copy of the accompanying notice and allow the same to remain posted for a period of thirty (30) days.
  - (d) Notify the Commission in writing within ten (10) days of service of this Decision of steps taken to comply with this Order.

Stuart A. Kaufman, Esq. Hearing Officer

