

1 XAVIER BECERRA  
Attorney General of California  
2 ROBERT W. BYRNE  
SALLY MAGNANI  
3 MICHAEL L. NEWMAN  
Senior Assistant Attorneys General  
4 MICHAEL P. CAYABAN  
CHRISTINE CHUANG  
5 EDWARD H. OCHOA  
Supervising Deputy Attorneys General  
6 HEATHER C. LESLIE  
LEE I. SHERMAN  
7 JANELLE M. SMITH  
JAMES F. ZAHRADKA II (SBN 196822)  
8 Deputy Attorneys General  
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor  
9 Oakland, CA 94612-0550  
Telephone: (510) 879-1247  
10 E-mail: James.Zahradka@doj.ca.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California*  
11

12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
13 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
14 OAKLAND DIVISION  
15

16 **STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF**  
17 **COLORADO; STATE OF**  
18 **CONNECTICUT; STATE OF**  
19 **DELAWARE; STATE OF HAWAII;**  
20 **STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF**  
21 **MAINE; STATE OF MARYLAND;**  
22 **COMMONWEALTH OF**  
23 **MASSACHUSETTS; ATTORNEY**  
24 **GENERAL DANA NESSEL ON BEHALF**  
25 **OF THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN;**  
26 **STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF**  
27 **NEVADA; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;**  
28 **STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF**  
**NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON;**  
**STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF**  
**VERMONT; COMMONWEALTH OF**  
**VIRGINIA; and STATE OF WISCONSIN;**

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 4:19-cv-00872-HSG

**FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR  
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE  
RELIEF**

1 **DONALD J. TRUMP**, in his official capacity  
2 as President of the United States of America;  
3 **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; U.S.**  
4 **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; PATRICK**  
5 **M. SHANAHAN**, in his official capacity as  
6 Acting Secretary of Defense; **MARK T.**  
7 **ESPER**, in his official capacity as Secretary of  
8 the Army; **RICHARD V. SPENCER**, in his  
9 official capacity as Secretary of the Navy;  
10 **HEATHER WILSON**, in her official capacity  
11 as Secretary of the Air Force; **U.S.**  
12 **DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;**  
13 **STEVEN T. MNUCHIN**, in his official  
14 capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; **U.S.**  
15 **DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;**  
16 **DAVID BERNHARDT**, in his official capacity  
17 as Acting Secretary of the Interior; **U.S.**  
18 **DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND**  
19 **SECURITY; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN**, in  
20 her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland  
21 Security;

22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
Defendants.

## INTRODUCTION

1  
2 1. The States of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,  
3 Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode  
4 Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and Attorney  
5 General Dana Nessel on behalf of the People of Michigan (collectively, “Plaintiff States”), bring  
6 this action to protect their residents, natural resources, and economic interests from President  
7 Donald J. Trump’s flagrant disregard of fundamental separation of powers principles engrained in  
8 the United States Constitution. Contrary to the will of Congress, the President has used the  
9 pretext of a manufactured “crisis” of unlawful immigration to declare a national emergency and  
10 redirect federal dollars appropriated for drug interdiction, military construction, military  
11 personnel, and law enforcement initiatives toward building a wall on the United States-Mexico  
12 border. This includes the diversion of funding that each of the Plaintiff States receive.  
13 Defendants must be enjoined from carrying out President Trump’s unconstitutional and unlawful  
14 scheme.

15 2. President Trump has veered the country toward a constitutional crisis of his own  
16 making. For years, President Trump has repeatedly stated his intention to build a wall across the  
17 United States-Mexico border. Congress has repeatedly rebuffed the President’s insistence to fund  
18 a border wall, recently resulting in a record 35-day partial government shutdown over the border  
19 wall dispute.<sup>1</sup> After the government reopened, Congress approved, and the President signed into  
20 law, a \$1.375 billion appropriation for fencing along a specific stretch of the southern border, but  
21 Congress made clear that funding could not be used to build President Trump’s proposed border  
22 wall.

23 3. After an agreement was reached on the spending bill to prevent another  
24 government shutdown, on February 15, 2019, President Trump declared an intention to redirect  
25 federal funds toward the construction of a border wall. On the same day, the Administration

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>1</sup> References to “border wall” in this First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) refer to any  
28 barrier or border-related infrastructure and/or project relating to the construction of a barrier or  
border-related infrastructure along the southern border that President Trump has called for and  
has not been approved by Congress.

1 announced an executive action (“Executive Action”) to make up to \$6.7 billion in additional  
2 funding available for construction of the border wall, including through the declaration of a  
3 national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (“Emergency Declaration,” combined  
4 with the “Executive Action,” the “Executive Actions”).

5 4. Use of those additional federal funds for the construction of a border wall is  
6 contrary to Congress’s intent in violation of the U.S. Constitution, including the Presentment  
7 Clause and Appropriations Clause. This use would divert funding that has been appropriated to  
8 support Plaintiff States’ law enforcement and counter-drug programming efforts, as well as  
9 military construction and other Department of Defense projects in Plaintiff States, for the non-  
10 appropriated purpose of constructing a border wall. Even if the Administration could  
11 constitutionally redirect funds toward the construction of the border wall, the Administration does  
12 not satisfy the criteria in the statutes that it invokes to enable it to do so. In addition, Defendants’  
13 actions to divert funding from state and local law enforcement, military construction, and other  
14 appropriated Department of Defense projects toward a border wall for which funding has not  
15 been appropriated by Congress is arbitrary and capricious and exceeds Defendants’ authority in  
16 violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

17 5. If the Administration were to use the funding sources identified in the Executive  
18 Actions for the purpose of building a border wall, Plaintiff States collectively stand to lose  
19 millions of dollars in federal funding that their national guard units receive for domestic drug  
20 interdiction and counter-drug activities, and millions of dollars received on an annual basis for  
21 law enforcement programs from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, harming the public safety of  
22 Plaintiff States. The redirection of funding from authorized military construction and other  
23 Department of Defense projects located in Plaintiff States will cause damage to their economies.  
24 Plaintiff States will face harm to their proprietary interests by the diversion of funding from  
25 military construction projects or military pay for the States’ national guard units. And the  
26 diversion of any funding toward construction of a wall along California’s and New Mexico’s  
27 southern borders will cause irreparable environmental damage to those States’ natural resources.  
28



1 provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. sections 701-06. This Court also has jurisdiction under 28  
2 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 2201.

3 10. An actual, present, and justiciable controversy exists between the parties within the  
4 meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 2201(a), and this Court has authority to grant declaratory and  
5 injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. sections 2201 and 2202.

6 11. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(e) because  
7 the California Attorney General and the State of California have offices at 455 Golden Gate  
8 Avenue, San Francisco, California and at 1515 Clay Street, Oakland, California, and therefore  
9 reside in this district, and no real property is involved in this action. This is a civil action in  
10 which Defendants are agencies of the United States or officers of such an agency.

11 12. Assignment to the San Francisco Division of this District is proper pursuant to  
12 Civil Local Rule 3-2(c)-(d) and 3-5(b) because Plaintiff State of California and Defendant United  
13 States both maintain offices in the District in San Francisco.

## 14 **PARTIES**

### 15 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

16 13. The State of California, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
17 sovereign state of the United States of America.

18 14. Attorney General Xavier Becerra is the chief law officer of the State of California  
19 and has the authority to file civil actions to protect California's rights and interests, the  
20 environment, and the natural resources of this State. Cal. Const., art. V, § 13; Cal. Gov't Code  
21 §§ 12511, 12600-12. This challenge is brought pursuant to the Attorney General's independent  
22 constitutional, common law, and statutory authority.

23 15. As head of the California Department of Justice, Cal. Gov't Code section 12510,  
24 Attorney General Becerra also has standing to bring this action because funding for law  
25 enforcement throughout the State is at stake. *See Pierce v. Sup. Ct.*, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 761-62 (1934)  
26 (Attorney General "has the power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the  
27 rights and interests of the state . . . and the protection of public rights and interest.").

28

1           16.     Governor Gavin Newsom is the chief executive officer of the State. The Governor  
2 is responsible for overseeing the operations of the State and ensuring that its laws are faithfully  
3 executed. As the leader of the executive branch, the Governor is the chief of California’s  
4 executive branch agencies, including those whose injuries are discussed in this Complaint. Cal.  
5 Const., art. V, § 1. Governor Newsom is the Commander-in-Chief of the California National  
6 Guard. Cal. Const., art. V, § 7; Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 550 et seq.

7           17.     California, as one of several affected states located within President Trump’s  
8 declared “national emergency” southern border area, has an interest in ensuring public safety  
9 within its borders and protecting its economic interests and the rights of its residents. California  
10 shares over 140 miles of its southern border with Mexico.<sup>2</sup> The orderly flow of goods and people  
11 across the border is a critical element in California’s success as the fifth-largest economy in the  
12 world.

13           18.     California is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
14 action because of the injury due to the loss of federal drug interdiction, counter-narcotic, and law-  
15 enforcement funding to the State caused by Defendants’ diversion of funding and resources.

16           19.     The threat of losing funding to conduct drug interdiction and counter-narcotic  
17 activity prevents California from moving forward with critical criminal narcotics programs and  
18 threatens the public safety of all Californians. The diversion of funding from the Treasury  
19 Forfeiture Fund will harm public safety by impacting critically necessary funding for law  
20 enforcement officers and their agencies.

21           20.     California is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
22 action because of the injury to the State and its residents caused by Defendants’ reduction of  
23 federal defense spending in California due to diversion of funding to the border wall.

24           21.     California has an interest in protecting the economic health and well-being of its  
25 residents. *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez*, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).

26  
27  
28           <sup>2</sup> Janice Cheryl Beaver, *U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts*, Cong. Res. Serv. (Nov. 9,  
2006), <https://tinyurl.com/y49jq9vv>.





1 the Attorney General’s authority and responsibility to protect Connecticut’s sovereign, quasi-  
2 sovereign, and proprietary interests.

3 39. Governor Ned Lamont is the chief executive officer of the State. The Governor is  
4 responsible for overseeing the operations of the State and ensuring that its laws are faithfully  
5 executed. As the leader of the executive branch, the Governor is the chief of Connecticut’s  
6 executive branch agencies, including those whose injuries are discussed in this Complaint. Conn.  
7 Const. art IV, § 5.

8 40. On information and belief, Connecticut is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants  
9 and has standing to bring this action because of the injury caused by Defendants’ unlawful and  
10 unconstitutional diversion of funding from military construction projects in Connecticut to  
11 construction of a border wall in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California. Defendants’  
12 actions will hurt Connecticut’s economy and, by damaging the State’s critical security  
13 infrastructure, threaten the safety of Connecticut’s National Guard and of all Connecticut  
14 residents.

15 41. Further, on information and belief, Defendants’ diversion of funding aimed at drug  
16 interdiction and counter-narcotic activity threatens to hurt the State’s law enforcement agencies  
17 and compromise the public safety of all Connecticut residents. Connecticut has received and—  
18 absent the unlawful and unconstitutional actions of Defendants—intends to continue to receive  
19 equitable sharing funding through the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. Defendants’ diversion of that  
20 funding threatens the budgets of Connecticut law enforcement agencies and the public safety of  
21 all Connecticut residents.

22 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF DELAWARE**

23 42. The State of Delaware, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
24 sovereign state of the United States of America.

25 43. Attorney General Kathleen Jennings is the chief legal officer of the State of  
26 Delaware and has the authority to file civil actions to protect Delaware’s rights and the rights of  
27 Delaware citizens. 29 Del. C. § 2504. The Attorney General’s powers and duties include  
28 litigating matters in our nation’s federal courts on matters of public interest. The Attorney

1 General has the authority to file suit to challenge action by the federal government that threatens  
2 the public interest and welfare of Delaware residents as a matter of constitutional, statutory, and  
3 common law authority.

4 44. Governor John Carney is the chief executive officer of the State of Delaware. The  
5 Governor is responsible for overseeing the operations of the State of Delaware and is required to  
6 take care that Delaware's laws be faithfully executed. Del. Const., Art. III, §§ 1, 8.

7 45. Delaware is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
8 action because of the injury due to loss of federal funding to the State caused by Defendants'  
9 unconstitutional and unlawful diversion of funding discussed herein.

10 46. Defendants have and intend to continue to misappropriate equitable sharing funds  
11 gained through forfeiture of assets in the context of Delaware's enforcement of state and federal  
12 law. As such, Delaware will be deprived of such funds that are owed to it to carry on law  
13 enforcement activities.

14 47. Delaware has received money from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in the past, and  
15 expects to receive comparable monies in the future absent diversion to fund the construction of a  
16 wall. According to audits of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, in 2018, Delaware received more than  
17 \$1.3 million in equitable sharing from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund; in 2017, Delaware received  
18 \$349,045; in 2016, Delaware received more than \$1.2 million; in 2015, Delaware received  
19 \$331,134; and in 2014, Delaware received more than \$2.5 million. These resources are used to  
20 supplement and enhance law enforcement agencies' state-appropriated funding.

21 48. With a federally funded budget of over \$1 million, any diversion of annual federal  
22 funding intended for the Delaware National Guard's drug interdiction programs will harm  
23 Delaware given the success of such programs resulting in the annual confiscation of illegal drugs  
24 and by and through the support it provides to state and local law enforcement agencies for this  
25 purpose.

26 49. Defendants' unlawful and unconstitutional diversion of funds away from projects  
27 authorized and appropriated for disbursement and use within the State of Delaware will cause it  
28 injury in fact, which is traceable to Defendants' conduct as set forth herein.

1 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF HAWAII**

2 50. The State of Hawaii, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
3 sovereign state of the United States of America.

4 51. Attorney General Clare E. Connors is the chief legal officer of the State of Hawaii  
5 and has authority to appear, personally or by deputy, for the State of Hawaii in all courts, criminal  
6 or civil, in which the State may be a party or be interested. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 28-1. The  
7 Department of the Attorney General has the authority to represent the State in all civil actions in  
8 which the State is a party. *Id.* § 26-7. This challenge is brought pursuant to the Attorney  
9 General’s constitutional, statutory, and common law authority. *See* Haw. Const. art. V, § 6; Haw.  
10 Rev. Stat. Chapter 28; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 26-7.

11 52. As the chief law enforcement officer of the State of Hawaii, the Attorney General  
12 has ultimate responsibility for enforcing the penal laws of the State, and thus has a strong interest  
13 in protecting public safety. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-2 & 28-2.5; *Amemiya v. Sapienza*, 629 P.2d  
14 1126, 1129 (Haw. 1981).

15 53. Hawaii has an interest in its exercise of sovereign power over individuals and  
16 entities within the State, including the enforcement of its legal code.

17 54. Hawaii is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
18 action because of the injury due to the loss of federal drug interdiction, counter-narcotic, and law  
19 enforcement funding to the State caused by Defendants’ diversion of funds.

20 55. Hawaii participates in federally-funded drug interdiction and counter-narcotic  
21 programs, such as the National Guard Counterdrug Program. Diversion of this funding will  
22 reduce the funds available to Hawaii for accomplishing critical drug interdiction and counter-  
23 narcotic efforts, and will therefore threaten public safety in Hawaii.

24 56. State and local law enforcement agencies in Hawaii have received funds from the  
25 Treasury Forfeiture Fund in the past and anticipate doing so again in the future. Unless diverted,  
26 these funds would be available to Hawaii’s state and local law enforcement agencies. Diversion  
27 of funding therefore will harm public safety by reducing the availability of critical funds for state  
28 and local law enforcement officers and their agencies.



1 State from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. The loss of funding for state and local law enforcement  
2 operational needs threatens the public safety of all Illinois residents.

3 65. On information and belief, Illinois is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and  
4 has standing to bring this action because of the injury due to the loss of federal funding to the  
5 State caused by Defendants' diversion of funding. The loss of funding to conduct drug  
6 interdiction and counter-narcotics activity threatens the public safety of all Illinois residents.

7 66. On information and belief, Illinois is also aggrieved by the actions of Defendants  
8 and has standing to bring this action because of the injury due to the loss of federal funding  
9 resulting from the diversion of military construction projects from Illinois to the construction of a  
10 border wall on the nation's southern border.

11 67. In filing this action, the Attorney General seeks to protect the residents and  
12 agencies of Illinois from harm caused by Defendants' illegal conduct, prevent further harm, and  
13 seek redress for the injuries caused to Illinois by Defendants' actions. Those injuries include  
14 harm to Illinois's sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and proprietary interests.

15 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF MAINE**

16 68. The State of Maine, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
17 sovereign state of United States of America.

18 69. The Attorney General of Maine, Aaron M. Frey, is a constitutional officer with the  
19 authority to represent the State of Maine in all matters, and serves as its chief legal officer with  
20 general charge, supervision, and direction of the State's legal business. Me. Const. art. IX, Sec.  
21 11; 5 M.R.S., §§ 191 et seq. The Attorney General's powers and duties include acting on behalf  
22 of the State and the people of Maine in the federal courts on matters of public interest. The  
23 Attorney General has the authority to file suit to challenge action by the federal government that  
24 threatens the public interest and welfare of Maine residents as a matter of constitutional, statutory,  
25 and common law authority.

26 70. The Governor of Maine, Janet T. Mills, is the chief executive officer of the State.  
27 The Governor is responsible for overseeing the operations of the State and ensuring that its laws  
28 are faithfully executed. As the leader of the executive branch, the Governor is the chief of

1 Maine's executive branch agencies, including those whose injuries are discussed in this  
2 Complaint. Me. Const. art V, § 1. Governor Mills is the Commander-in-Chief of the Maine  
3 National Guard. 37-B M.R.S. §§ 103 et seq.

4 71. Maine is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
5 action because of the injury due to the loss of federal funding to the State caused by Defendants'  
6 diversion of funding.

7 72. Maine is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
8 action because of the injury to the State and its residents caused by Defendants' reduction of  
9 federal defense spending in Maine due to diversion of funding to the border wall.

10 73. Maine has an interest in protecting the health, safety, and well-being of its  
11 residents, including protecting its residents from harms to their economic health.

12 74. Maine has an interest in the State's economic vitality and workforce.

13 75. Maine has an interest in preventing diminution of its tax revenues.

14 76. The diversion of military construction funding from authorized projects in Maine  
15 will harm Maine's economy.

16 77. The State would suffer economic harm from diversion of funding from authorized  
17 military construction projects in Maine.

18 78. Maine participates in the equitable sharing program, pursuant to which eligible  
19 Maine law enforcement agencies are entitled to reimbursement from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund  
20 for law enforcement agency expenditures associated with seizures and forfeitures, 31 U.S.C.  
21 section 9705(a)(1)(B)(iii).

22 79. During the federal fiscal years 2009 through 2018, eligible law enforcement  
23 agencies within the State of Maine were entitled to receive or received approximately \$4.9  
24 million dollars in equitable sharing funds from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund account, or an  
25 average of approximately \$490,000 annually.

26 80. In addition to the state-wide impact that loss of Treasury Forfeiture Funds would  
27 have on all law enforcement agencies within Maine, the State of Maine, Department of Inland  
28

1 Fisheries & Wildlife, Maine Warden Service (“Maine Warden Service”) will be impacted by the  
2 non-payment of an approved pending claim for Treasury Forfeiture Fund equitable sharing.

3 81. By letter dated September 7, 2018, the Maine Warden Service was notified by the  
4 Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service that the Maine Warden Service was entitled to  
5 equitable sharing at the rate of 3 percent of \$238,956.42 (or \$7,168), the net amount available for  
6 equitable sharing related to the liquidation of two parcels of land seized during a joint law  
7 enforcement operation conducted in 2014.

8 82. To date, the Maine Warden Service has not received payment of its equitable  
9 share.

10 83. The diversion of Treasury Forfeiture Funds will harm Maine by depriving Maine  
11 of the proceeds of equitable sharing to which it is entitled and by impacting public safety  
12 generally by reducing critically necessary funding for law enforcement officers and their agencies  
13 within Maine.

14 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF MARYLAND**

15 84. The State of Maryland is a sovereign state of the United States of America.  
16 Maryland is represented by and through its chief legal officer, Attorney General Brian E. Frosh.  
17 Under the Constitution of Maryland, and as directed by the Maryland General Assembly, the  
18 Attorney General has the authority to file suit to challenge action by the federal government that  
19 threatens the public interest and welfare of Maryland residents. Md. Const. art. V, § 3(a)(2); 2017  
20 Md. Laws, J. Res. 1.

21 85. Maryland is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring this  
22 action due to the loss of federal funding to the State caused by Defendants’ diversion of federal  
23 funds. The loss of funding to conduct drug interdiction and counter-narcotic activity would  
24 threaten the public safety of all Marylanders.

25 86. Maryland is also aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and has standing to bring  
26 this action because of the injury due to the diversion of funding for military construction projects.  
27 On information and belief, Maryland stands to lose up to \$513 million in military construction  
28 funding for currently planned projects at Fort Meade and Joint Base Andrews.



1           92.     The Department of Defense allocated \$2.3 million to Massachusetts for drug  
2 interdiction and counterdrug activities in fiscal year (or “FY”) 2019. Of that allocation,  
3 Massachusetts has not yet received more than \$965,000.

4           93.     The Massachusetts National Guard uses these funds to combat drug trafficking  
5 organizations operating in our communities, and to support federal, state, and local law  
6 enforcement agencies in their efforts to decrease illicit drug supply and demand while reducing  
7 opioid overdose deaths.

8           94.     Specifically, the Massachusetts National Guard uses Department of Defense drug  
9 interdiction and counter-narcotic funds to provide investigative case analysis support, linguist  
10 services, transportation support, inter-agency training, and reconnaissance.

11          95.     These funds are particularly important in Massachusetts, where the number of fatal  
12 opioid-related overdoses has increased by over 420 percent from 2000 to 2018. Heroin and  
13 fentanyl trafficking and consumption remain a major threat, due to widespread availability, high  
14 demand, low costs, and high incidence of addiction. Local agencies often have neither the  
15 resources nor the expertise to properly conduct extensive drug investigations, and illegal narcotics  
16 are rarely manufactured, distributed and consumed all within the same municipality. The  
17 Massachusetts National Guard drug interdiction and counter-narcotic programs provide critically  
18 important support for these agencies in pursuing inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional work.

19          96.     Massachusetts will also be harmed due to the loss of federal asset forfeiture funds  
20 to state and local law enforcement agencies in Massachusetts.

21          97.     Massachusetts receives Treasury Forfeiture Funds through equitable sharing when  
22 participating in asset forfeiture activities with certain federal law enforcement agencies.

23          98.     In fiscal year 2018, state and local law enforcement agencies in Massachusetts  
24 received approximately \$307,000 in currency and \$34,000 in property through the Treasury  
25 Forfeiture Fund’s equitable sharing program. These resources are used to supplement and  
26 enhance law enforcement agencies’ state appropriated funding.

27          99.     The Massachusetts State Police and Massachusetts Port Authority received a  
28 combined \$481,822 in fiscal year 2017 and \$35,286 in fiscal year 2018 from the Treasury

1 Forfeiture Fund's equitable sharing program.

2 100. In fiscal year 2019, the Massachusetts State Police has already received \$13,980  
3 through the Treasury Forfeiture Fund's equitable sharing program, and the Massachusetts Office  
4 of the Attorney General has received \$17,313.

5 101. On information and belief, Massachusetts law enforcement agencies have  
6 submitted requests for equitable sharing funds that remain pending with the Treasury Department.

7 102. Massachusetts will be additionally harmed due to the loss of funding for military  
8 construction projects in Massachusetts.

9 103. Funds that could be diverted include, but may not be limited to, \$90 million  
10 appropriated by Congress for a new compound semiconductor facility and microelectronics  
11 integration facility at Hanscom Air Force Base's Lincoln Laboratory, which is affiliated with the  
12 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and \$42.6 million appropriated by Congress for  
13 construction of a new hangar at Westover Air Force Base.

14 104. In addition, the Massachusetts National Guard has been allocated \$9.7 million in  
15 funding for a multi-purpose machine gun range for fiscal year 2020. \$8.9 million of these funds  
16 have not yet been obligated.

17 105. Not only are these military construction projects important to national security,  
18 military readiness, and well-being of our service members, they are important generators of  
19 economic activity for Massachusetts.

20 **PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY GENERAL DANA NESSEL ON BEHALF**

21 **OF THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN**

22 106. The People of Michigan are the sovereign of one of the states of the United States  
23 and are represented by and through the Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel.

24 107. Attorney General Dana Nessel is the chief legal officer of the State of Michigan  
25 and her powers and duties include acting in federal court in matters of concern to the People of  
26 Michigan, to protect Michigan residents. *Fieger v. Cox*, 734 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Mich. Ct. App.  
27 2007); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 14.28, 14.101. This action is brought to protect the interests of the  
28 People of Michigan.



1 quasi-sovereign, and proprietary interests.

2 115. Governor Tim Walz is the chief executive officer of the State of Minnesota,  
3 custodian of state property and federal funds made available to the State, and the Commander-in-  
4 Chief of the state military. Minn. Const., art. V, § 3; Minn. Stat. §§ 4.01 & .07. As the chief  
5 executive officer and Commander-in-Chief of the State of Minnesota, Governor Walz leads  
6 executive branch agencies injured by the actions described in this Complaint.

7 116. The Minnesota National Guard has over 13,000 soldiers and airmen, employs  
8 more than 2,000 people on a full-time basis, and operates over 60 facilities in the state. The  
9 Minnesota National Guard receives more than 96 percent of its funding from the federal  
10 government. It performs missions training and prepares citizen soldiers and airmen to respond to,  
11 among other things, the Governor of Minnesota for state emergency response, military support,  
12 and protection of local communities. Loss of funding negatively impacts this vital service for the  
13 State of Minnesota.

14 117. For example, diverting federal funding for the Minnesota National Guard's  
15 counterdrug programs and domestic drug interdiction activities to construct a wall along the  
16 United States-Mexico border would harm Minnesota's law enforcement agencies and  
17 compromise the health and safety of Minnesota residents.

18 118. In addition, diverting federal funding from necessary military construction projects  
19 in Minnesota, including National Guard projects, to construct a wall along the United States-  
20 Mexico border would also harm Minnesota, its economy, and its residents.

21 119. Law enforcement agencies in Minnesota, and the Minnesotans they protect and  
22 serve, are also harmed by the diversion of funding from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund to construct  
23 a wall along the United States-Mexico border. Law enforcement agencies in Minnesota  
24 participate in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund's strategic mission "to use high-impact asset forfeiture  
25 in investigative cases to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprises."<sup>3</sup> For example, in Fiscal Year

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>3</sup> See Off. of Inspector Gen., Dep't of the Treasury, *Audit of the Department of the*  
28 *Treasury Forfeiture Fund's Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2017* at 2 (Dec. 13,  
2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y6ovg5s3>.

1 2018, a Minnesota-based investigation and prosecution of a nationwide wire fraud scheme  
2 primarily targeting elderly Hmong people resulted in the forfeiture of \$1,612,451.84.<sup>4</sup>

3 120. Law enforcement agencies in Minnesota have pending requests for money from  
4 the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and will likely have additional requests in the future. The delay,  
5 reduction, or denial of payment resulting from the diversion of funding from the Treasury  
6 Forfeiture Fund to construct a wall along the United States-Mexico border harms these law  
7 enforcement agencies and compromises the health and safety of Minnesota residents.

8 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEVADA**

9 121. The State of Nevada, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
10 sovereign state of the United States of America.

11 122. Attorney General Aaron D. Ford is the chief legal officer of the State of Nevada  
12 and has the authority to commence actions in federal court to protect the interests of the State.  
13 Nev. Rev. Stat. 228.170.

14 123. Governor Stephen F. Sisolak is the chief executive officer of the State of Nevada.  
15 The Governor is responsible for overseeing the operations of the State and ensuring that its laws  
16 are faithfully executed. Nev. Const., art. 5, § 1. Governor Sisolak is the Commander-in-Chief of  
17 the Nevada state military forces. Nev. Const., art. 5, § 5.

18 124. On information and belief, Nevada is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and  
19 has standing to bring this action because of the injury to the State and its residents caused by the  
20 reduction of federal funding to the State due to Defendants' diversion of funding to a southern  
21 border wall.

22 125. Any diversion of military construction funding from Nevada will harm the State's  
23 economy. Nevada is home to several military bases, including Nellis Air Force Base, Creech Air  
24 Force Base, Hawthorne Army Depot Base, and Naval Air Station Fallon. These military bases  
25 play a critical role in our nation's defense and to the State's economy. The use of funding for a  
26 southern border wall rather than for necessary expenses at these military bases harms Nevada and  
27 its economy.

28 

---

<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 5.





1 consequences of cross-border activity. Attorney General Balderas has worked with law  
2 enforcement counterparts in Mexico to facilitate international extraditions, implement  
3 technologies to combat human trafficking, and train prosecutors.<sup>6</sup> Trade across New Mexico's  
4 southern border is a crucial component of the State's economy, with Mexico its largest export  
5 partner.<sup>7</sup>

6 139. New Mexico is aggrieved by Defendants' actions and has standing to bring this  
7 lawsuit. Defendants' diversion of federal funding to conduct drug-interdiction and counter-  
8 narcotics efforts threatens the safety and health of all New Mexicans.

9 140. New Mexico will also be harmed by Defendants' diversion of military  
10 construction funding. Some \$85 million of this funding currently is allocated to construct a MQ-  
11 9 Formal Training Unit at Holloman Air Force Base in Otero County, New Mexico.<sup>8</sup> Another  
12 \$40 million is allocated to White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to build an information  
13 systems facility.<sup>9</sup> The loss of these projects would harm New Mexico's economy, particularly in  
14 the communities surrounding these military installations.

15 141. If Defendants use the diverted funding to construct any of their border wall in New  
16 Mexico, it will also impose environmental harm to the State. The environmental damage caused  
17 by a border wall in New Mexico would include the blocking of wildlife migration, flooding, and  
18 habitat loss.<sup>10</sup> Further, this border wall would be constructed on state land, taking the State's

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>6</sup> Ryan Boetel, *Attorney General Announces Pilot Project for Mexico Extraditions*,  
21 Albuquerque J. (July 25, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y2zdbc8h>; PR Newswire, *TrustStamp and the*  
22 *Conference of Western Attorneys General Alliance Partnership Introduce Technology to Ease*  
23 *Data Sharing Among Law Enforcement* (Aug. 30, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y2seu64t>; Carol  
24 Clark, *AG Balderas Trains Mexican Prosecutors, Forensic Scientists, Investigators in Effort to*  
25 *Stop Crime From Crossing Border*, Los Alamos Daily Post (Nov. 3, 2017),  
26 <https://tinyurl.com/y3mcvrms>.

27 <sup>7</sup> Int'l Trade Admin., *New Mexico Exports, Jobs, & Foreign Investment* (Feb. 2018),  
28 <https://tinyurl.com/y25tsost>.

<sup>8</sup> Alamogordo Daily News, *Holloman Getting \$85M for Construction Project* (Feb. 3,  
2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y5u7vx4k>.

<sup>9</sup> Miriam U. Rodriguez, *WSMR to Build State of the Art Information Systems Facility*,  
U.S. Army (Jan. 10, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y3yr24yr>.

<sup>10</sup> See Robert Peters et al., *Nature Divided, Scientists United: US-Mexico Border Wall*  
27 *Threatens Biodiversity and Binational Conservation*, 68 *BioScience* 740, 743 (Oct. 2018),  
28 <https://tinyurl.com/y3t4ymfn>.

1 sovereign property.<sup>11</sup>

2 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEW YORK**

3 142. The State of New York, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
4 sovereign state of the United States of America. The Attorney General is New York State's chief  
5 law enforcement officer and is authorized to pursue this action pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law  
6 section 63.

7 143. Upon information and belief, New York is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants  
8 and has standing to bring this action because of the injury due to the loss of federal funding to the  
9 State caused by Defendants' diversion of federal funds. The loss of funding to conduct drug  
10 interdiction and counter-narcotic activity would injure the State's law enforcement agencies and  
11 threaten the public safety of all New Yorkers.

12 144. New York participates in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund through state law  
13 enforcement agencies, state prosecutorial agencies, and joint federal-state task forces, and  
14 regularly receives equitable sharing payments to state agencies from forfeitures generated by joint  
15 law enforcement operations with federal law enforcement. Defendants' unlawful diversion of  
16 funding from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund will harm the public safety of New York's residents  
17 by impacting critically necessary funding for law enforcement officers and their agencies.

18 145. Upon information and belief, Defendants' unlawful diversion of funding from  
19 military construction projects in New York to construction of a border wall will injure New  
20 York's economy and, by damaging the State's critical security infrastructure, threaten the safety  
21 of New York's National Guard and of all New York residents.

22 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF OREGON**

23 146. Plaintiff State of Oregon, acting through its Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, is  
24 a sovereign state in the United States of America.

25 147. Attorney General Rosenblum is the chief law officer of Oregon and is empowered  
26 to bring this action on behalf of the State of Oregon and the affected state agencies under ORS

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>11</sup> See Deming Headlight, *N.M. Land Commish Aubrey Dunn Rejects Settlement Offer from CBP* (Aug. 17, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y557wpcb>.

1 160.060, ORS 180.210, and ORS 180.220.

2 148. On information and belief, Oregon is aggrieved by the actions of Defendants and  
3 has standing to bring this action because of the injury due to the loss of federal funding to the  
4 State caused by Defendants' diversion of federal funds. The loss of funding to conduct drug  
5 interdiction and counter-narcotic activity, including funding that supports Oregon's work in this  
6 area with other States, would threaten the public safety of all Oregonians.

7 149. On information and belief, the diversion of military construction funds will harm  
8 Oregon. Defendants' diversion of funding from military construction projects in Oregon to  
9 construction of a border wall in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California would impact  
10 Oregon's economy. In particular and without limitation, any diversion of funds from U.S. Army  
11 Corps of Engineers projects in Oregon would harm Oregon's environment and could cause  
12 flooding and other dangers to the health and safety of Oregonians.

13 150. Oregon has received money from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in the past and  
14 expects to receive comparable monies in the future absent diversion to fund the construction of a  
15 wall. According to federal audits of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in 2018, Oregon received more  
16 than \$9 million in equitable sharing from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund over the years 2008-2017.  
17 These resources are used to supplement and enhance law enforcement agencies' state-  
18 appropriated funding.

19 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS**

20 151. The State of Rhode Island, represented by and through its Attorney General, is a  
21 sovereign state of the United States of America.

22 152. Attorney General Peter F. Neronha is the chief law officer of the State of Rhode  
23 Island and has the authority to file civil actions to protect Rhode Island's rights and the rights of  
24 Rhode Island citizens. The Attorney General has the authority to file suit to take legal action  
25 against the federal government for the protection of the public interest and welfare of Rhode  
26 Island citizens as a matter of constitutional, statutory, and common law authority. R.I. Const. art.  
27 IX, sec. 12; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-9-1, et seq.; *see also State v. Lead Industries Ass'n*, 951 A.2d  
28 428 (R.I. 2008).

1           153. The Governor of Rhode Island, Gina M. Raimondo, is the chief executive officer  
2 of the State of Rhode Island. The Governor oversees the operations of the State and is in charge  
3 of the State military, the Rhode Island National Guard, which is comprised of the Rhode Island  
4 Army National Guard, Rhode Island Air National Guard, and the Historic Rhode Island Militia.

5           154. The Rhode Island National Guard is the oldest military branch in the United States  
6 and consists of over 3,300 members (2,178 in the Army National Guard, 1,136 in the Air National  
7 Guard) and operates 14 armories, three air bases, two training sites, 10 support buildings, four  
8 organization maintenance facilities, and one combined support maintenance facility and is  
9 responsible for responding to statewide civil emergencies declared by the Governor, as well as  
10 supporting the defense of the nation and national security interests, including actively  
11 participating in counterdrug efforts.

12           155. The Rhode Island National Guard is financed with approximately 74 percent  
13 federal funds and federal equipment housed and secured at these facilities and is valued in excess  
14 of \$500 million. The estimated annual impact on the State attributed to National Guard programs  
15 exceeds \$238 million.<sup>12</sup>

16           156. The Rhode Island National Guard, Counterdrug Support program (“RING-CD”),  
17 coordinates and provides unique military skills and resources to support state and federal law  
18 enforcement and community-based organizations in their efforts to disrupt and dismantle various  
19 aspects of the illicit markets supporting the drug and narcotic trade.

20           157. RING-CD provides support to state and federal law enforcement agencies with  
21 embedded criminal intelligence analysts, the local offices of the U.S. Drug Enforcement  
22 Administration (“DEA”), the U.S. Postal Inspector Service (“USP”), the Food and Drug  
23 Administration Office of Criminal Investigations (“FDA”), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service  
24 (“IRS”), the U.S. Marshall Service, the Rhode Island State Police Narcotics, High Intensity Drug  
25 Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”), and Financial Crimes Units, and the Providence Police  
26 Department.<sup>13</sup>

27           <sup>12</sup> State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, *Fiscal Year 2019 Budget*, Vol. IV,  
28 103-111 (Jan. 2018), <http://tinyurl.com/y3nucc5s>.

<sup>13</sup> R.I. Nat’l Guard, *Joint Units*, <https://ri.ng.mil/Joint-Units/>.

1           158. RING-CD provides support to Rhode Island State Police and local law  
2 enforcement that is essential to combat illicit drug markets in Rhode Island, as well as ensuring  
3 the health and safety of officers, investigators, and other law enforcement personnel from the  
4 evolving dangers that the drug trade poses.<sup>14</sup>

5           159. For Fiscal Year 2018, the Rhode Island National Guard received approximately  
6 \$852,000 in connection with the U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Counterdrug  
7 program for state drug interdiction and counterdrug activities.

8           160. For Fiscal Year 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense allocated approximately  
9 \$900,000 to be paid in monthly installments to the Rhode Island National Guard in connection  
10 with the U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Counterdrug program for state drug  
11 interdiction and counterdrug activities.

12           161. For Fiscal Year 2019, the Rhode Island National Guard has received  
13 approximately \$450,000 under the National Guard Counterdrug program and approximately  
14 \$450,000 remains outstanding.

15           162. The Rhode Island State Police is a full-service, statewide law enforcement agency  
16 whose mission is to fulfill the law enforcement needs of the people with the highest degree of  
17 fairness, professionalism, and integrity, and protect the inherent rights of the people of Rhode  
18 Island to live in freedom and safety.

19           163. The Rhode Island State Police receives funds from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in  
20 connection with law enforcement activities jointly performed by and between the Rhode  
21 Island State Police and federal law enforcement agencies.

22           164. In 2018, the Rhode Island State Police received approximately \$26,960.10 from  
23 the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in connection with joint law enforcement actions.

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>14</sup> For example, in 2018 RING-CD procured a Liquid Chromatography Mass  
26 Spectrometer. This device supports Rhode Island's efforts to combat the dramatic effects of  
27 opioid abuse. The Rhode Island Department of Health Forensic Toxicology Laboratory  
28 previously identified a significant lag in in confirming the presence of illicit trace evidence to the  
Law Enforcement Community. This device, and RING memorandum of agreement with the  
Department of Health, targets that capability gap. This system began supporting casework in  
Rhode Island during the last fiscal year. R.I. Nat'l Guard, *Annual Report 2018*,  
<http://tinyurl.com/y2qagky6>.



1 enforcement agencies. These Vermont law enforcement agencies regularly receive equitable  
2 sharing payments from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and expect to receive comparable payments  
3 in the future absent diversion to fund the construction of a wall.

4 174. The diversion of funding from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund will harm public  
5 safety by impacting critical funding for these law enforcement agencies and their officers.

6 **PLAINTIFF COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA**

7 175. The Commonwealth of Virginia is a sovereign state of the United States of  
8 America.

9 176. The Commonwealth of Virginia brings this action by and through its Attorney  
10 General, Mark R. Herring. The Attorney General has authority to represent the Commonwealth,  
11 its departments, and its agencies in “all civil litigation in which any of them are interested.” Va.  
12 Code Ann. § 2.2-507(A).

13 177. On information and belief, the Commonwealth of Virginia will be injured by the  
14 diversion of funding from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. The Commonwealth participates as an  
15 equitable sharing partner in the Fund and, from 2013 to 2017, received over \$122 million in  
16 distributions to state and local law enforcement. On information and belief, the announced  
17 diversion of forfeiture funding will diminish the future funding available for the  
18 Commonwealth’s participating law enforcement agencies, thereby decreasing the resources  
19 available for future investigations to the detriment of the safety and welfare of Virginia’s citizens  
20 and law enforcement officers.

21 178. On information and belief, the Commonwealth of Virginia will be injured by the  
22 diversion of funding from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. The Commonwealth participates as an  
23 equitable sharing partner in the Fund and, in the past five years, has received over \$79 million in  
24 distributions to state and local law enforcement. On information and belief, the announced  
25 diversion of forfeiture funding will diminish the funding available for the Commonwealth’s  
26 participating law enforcement agencies.

27 179. On information and belief, the Commonwealth of Virginia would likewise be  
28 aggrieved if Defendants divert federal funding under the National Guard Drug Interdiction and

1 Prevention Program for use on a southern border wall. This loss of funding—to the tune of  
2 approximately \$3 million for Virginia—to implement counter-narcotics and drug interdiction  
3 measures would threaten the public safety of all Virginians.

4 **PLAINTIFF STATE OF WISCONSIN**

5 180. The State of Wisconsin is a sovereign state of the United States of America.

6 181. Governor Tony Evers is the chief executive officer of the State of Wisconsin and  
7 has the duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Wis. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 4. The  
8 Governor is the commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the State, including the  
9 Wisconsin National Guard. Wis. Const. art. V, § 1.

10 182. Attorney General Joshua L. Kaul is the chief legal officer of the State of  
11 Wisconsin and has the authority to file civil actions to protect Wisconsin’s rights and interests.  
12 *See Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m)*. The Attorney General’s powers and duties include appearing for  
13 and representing the State, on the governor’s request, “in any court or before any officer, any  
14 cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state or the people of this state may be interested.”  
15 Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m).

16 183. The State of Wisconsin brings this action by and through its Attorney General,  
17 Joshua L. Kaul.

18 184. In filing this action, the Attorney General seeks to redress and prevent injuries to  
19 the State and its residents caused by Defendants’ illegal diversion of federal funds to build the  
20 border wall. These injuries include harms to Wisconsin’s sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and  
21 proprietary interests.

22 185. Wisconsin has an interest in protecting the State’s economy and security, as well  
23 as the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.

24 186. Wisconsin has an interest in protecting its tax revenues, including those resulting  
25 from economic activity in communities near military bases in Wisconsin.

26 187. On information and belief, Defendants’ diversion of funds for the border wall  
27 includes over \$29 million in military construction funding for projects currently planned in  
28 Wisconsin.



1           196. Defendant Department of Defense (“DOD”) is the federal agency to which  
2 Congress has appropriated the military construction and drug interdiction funding implicated by  
3 the President’s Executive Actions. Defendant DOD is an executive department of the United  
4 States of America pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 101, and a federal agency within the meaning of  
5 28 U.S.C. section 2671. As such, it engages in agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.  
6 section 702, and is named as a defendant in this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

7           197. Defendant Patrick M. Shanahan, acting Secretary of Defense, oversees the DOD  
8 and is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by Plaintiffs in this  
9 action. Defendant Shanahan is sued in his official capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

10          198. Defendant Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the Army, oversees the United States Army  
11 within DOD, and is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by  
12 Plaintiffs in this action. Defendant Esper is sued in his official capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C.  
13 section 702.

14          199. Defendant Richard V. Spencer, Secretary of the Navy, oversees the United States  
15 Navy within DOD, and is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by  
16 Plaintiffs in this action. Defendant Spencer is sued in his official capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C.  
17 section 702.

18          200. Defendant Heather A. Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, oversees the United  
19 States Air Force within DOD, and is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being  
20 challenged by Plaintiffs in this action. Defendant Wilson is sued in her official capacity pursuant  
21 to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

22          201. Defendant Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) is the federal agency  
23 responsible for the Treasury Forfeiture Fund that is implicated by the President’s Executive  
24 Actions. Defendant the Treasury is an executive department of the United States of America  
25 pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 101, and a federal agency within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section  
26 2671. As such, it engages in agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. section 702, and is  
27 named as a defendant in this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

28          202. Defendant Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, oversees the Treasury

1 and is responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by Plaintiffs in this  
2 action. Defendant Mnuchin is sued in his official capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

3 203. Defendant Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is the federal agency  
4 responsible for providing border security along the United States-Mexico border in a manner that  
5 is consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. Defendant DHS is an executive  
6 department of the United States of America pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 101, and a federal  
7 agency within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 2671. As such, it engages in agency action  
8 within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. section 702, and is named as a defendant in this action pursuant to  
9 5 U.S.C. section 702.

10 204. Defendant Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of DHS, oversees DHS and is  
11 responsible for the actions and decisions that are being challenged by Plaintiffs in this action.  
12 Defendant Nielsen is sued in her official capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 702.

13 205. Defendant Department of the Interior (“DOI”) is the federal agency responsible for  
14 managing federal lands.

15 206. Defendant David Bernhardt, acting Secretary of the Interior, oversees the  
16 Department of the Interior, and is responsible for the actions that are being challenged by  
17 Plaintiffs in this action. Defendant Bernhardt is sued in his official capacity.

## 18 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

### 19 **I. PRESIDENT TRUMP HAS LONG CLAIMED THAT A “CRISIS” AT THE BORDER** 20 **REQUIRES BUILDING A BORDER WALL, BUT HAS NOT DECLARED A NATIONAL** 21 **EMERGENCY UNTIL NOW**

22 207. Dating back to at least August 2014, President Trump has advocated for a wall  
23 along the southern border.<sup>15</sup>

24 208. In his speech announcing his candidacy for President in June 2015, President  
25 Trump claimed that a border wall is needed to stop a tide of illegal immigration, and that he  
26 would build it as President and have Mexico pay for the wall.<sup>16</sup> In the same speech, he also

27 <sup>15</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Aug. 5, 2014, 1:34 PM),  
<https://tinyurl.com/ydre3ep>.

28 <sup>16</sup> Time, *Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech* (June 16, 2015),  
<https://tinyurl.com/qzk4wrv>.

1 stated, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . . . They’re bringing drugs.  
2 They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” This claim and his promise to build a wall and have  
3 Mexico pay for it became a consistent theme of his campaign.

4 209. President Trump repeatedly stated that the border wall he planned to build would  
5 help prevent terrorism, crime, and drug smuggling. For example, on October 4, 2014, President  
6 Trump tweeted, “The fight against ISIS starts at our border. ‘At least’ 10 ISIS have been caught  
7 crossing the Mexico border. Build a wall!”<sup>17</sup> More recently, on February 3, 2019, President  
8 Trump tweeted, “If there is no Wall, there is no Security. Human Trafficking, Drugs and  
9 Criminals of all dimensions - KEEP OUT!”<sup>18</sup>

10 210. On July 13, 2016, President Trump tweeted, “We will build the wall and MAKE  
11 AMERICA SAFE AGAIN!”<sup>19</sup>

12 211. On August 27, 2016, President Trump tweeted that “[h]eroin overdoses are taking  
13 over our children and others in the MIDWEST. Coming in from our southern border. We need  
14 strong border & WALL!”<sup>20</sup>

15 212. In a speech shortly before the 2016 presidential election, President Trump stated  
16 that “[o]n day one [of his Administration], we will begin working on an impenetrable, physical,  
17 tall, power [sic], beautiful southern border wall” to “help stop the crisis of illegal crossings” and  
18 “stop the drugs and the crime from pouring into our country.”<sup>21</sup>

19 213. As President, President Trump has continued to repeatedly mention the need for  
20 the border wall and his intention to build it.

21 214. On January 27, 2017, President Trump discussed his proposed border wall with  
22 Mexico’s then-President Enrique Peña Nieto, in which he reportedly pressured Mexico to pay for  
23

---

24 <sup>17</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 8 2014, 2:26 PM),  
25 <https://tinyurl.com/yxntlamo>.

26 <sup>18</sup> *Id.* (Feb. 3, 2019, 2:03 PM), <https://tinyurl.com/yywmw9yx>.

27 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* (Jul. 13, 2016, 2:56 PM), <https://tinyurl.com/gm8yty6>.

28 <sup>20</sup> *Id.* (Aug. 27, 2016, 7:17 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y3f6bp9s>.

<sup>21</sup> N.Y. Times, *Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech* (Sept. 1, 2016),  
<https://tinyurl.com/yalom4hl>.

1 the border wall and stated that he “[has] been talking about it for a two-year period.”<sup>22</sup>

2 215. On February 28, 2017, President Trump delivered an address to a joint session of  
3 Congress in which he stated that in order to “restore integrity and the rule of law at our  
4 borders . . . we will soon begin the construction of a great, great wall along our southern  
5 border.”<sup>23</sup>

6 216. Additional statements by President Trump regarding the border wall include a  
7 campaign rally speech on August 22, 2017 (“[W]e are building a wall on the southern border  
8 which is absolutely necessary.”),<sup>24</sup> and tweets on January 26, 2017 (“badly needed wall”),<sup>25</sup>  
9 February 23, 2018 (“MS-13 gang members are being removed by our Great ICE and Border  
10 Patrol Agents by the thousands, but these killers come back in from El Salvador, and through  
11 Mexico, like water. . . . We need The Wall!”),<sup>26</sup> June 21, 2018 (“We shouldn’t be hiring judges  
12 by the thousands, as our ridiculous immigration laws demand, we should be changing our laws,  
13 building the Wall, hire Border Agents and Ice [sic] and not let people come into our country  
14 based on the legal phrase they are told to say as their password.”),<sup>27</sup> December 19, 2018  
15 (“Because of the tremendous dangers at the Border, including large scale criminal and drug  
16 inflow, the United States Military will build the Wall!”),<sup>28</sup> and December 31, 2018 (“I  
17 campaigned on Border Security, which you cannot have without a strong and powerful Wall. Our  
18 Southern Border has long been an ‘Open Wound,’ where drugs, criminals (including human  
19 traffickers) and illegals would pour into our Country. Dems should get back here an [sic] fix  
20 now!”).<sup>29</sup>

21 <sup>22</sup> Greg Miller, *Trump Urged Mexican President to End His Public Defiance on Border*  
22 *Wall, Transcript Reveals*, Wash. Post (Aug. 3, 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/y3gqdf2m>.

23 <sup>23</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress* (Feb. 28,  
2017), <https://tinyurl.com/y4kvpj7n>.

24 <sup>24</sup> Time, *President Trump Ranted for 77 Minutes in Phoenix. Here’s What He Said* (Aug.  
24 23, 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/ycxt2woc>.

25 <sup>25</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),  
<https://tinyurl.com/zm26eaf>.

26 <sup>26</sup> *Id.* (Feb. 23, 2018, 3:28 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y9xypa55>.

27 <sup>27</sup> *Id.* (June 21, 2018, 5:12 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y3zaqk7d>.

28 <sup>28</sup> *Id.* (Dec. 19, 2018, 5:43 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y95cnd8r>.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* (Dec. 31, 2018, 5:29 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y6stmopr>.

1           217. Indeed, President Trump has made it clear that his plan to build the border wall  
2 would go forward regardless of the actual need for one. During a speech to the National Rifle  
3 Association, President Trump stated in the context of statistics showing a decrease in unauthorized  
4 border crossings that “we will build the wall no matter how low this number gets or how this goes.  
5 Don’t even think about it. Don’t even think about it.”<sup>30</sup>

6           218. The salient facts regarding the ostensible “crisis” that President Trump repeatedly  
7 invoked in these numerous statements have not significantly changed since his inauguration as  
8 President in January 2017.

9           219. President Trump acknowledged this when he stated that the “emergency” at the  
10 border “began a long time [ago],” citing 2014 as the beginning of the ostensible “crisis at the  
11 border.”<sup>31</sup>

12           220. There is no evidence of change to the historic pattern of unauthorized immigrants  
13 committing crimes at substantially lower rates than native-born Americans.<sup>32</sup>

14           221. The federal government’s own data also show that the vast majority of the drugs  
15 smuggled into the country that the President has singled out as dangerous (methamphetamine,  
16 heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl)<sup>33</sup> continue to come through, not between, ports of entry.<sup>34</sup>

17           222. There continues to be a lack of credible evidence that terrorists are using the  
18 southern border as a means of entering the United States, as a State Department report produced  
19 under the Trump Administration makes clear.<sup>35</sup>

20           <sup>30</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump at the National Rifle Association*  
21 *Leadership Forum* (Apr. 28, 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/y5dtnaej>.

22           <sup>31</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure* (Jan. 10,  
2019), <https://tinyurl.com/yycew5dk>.

23           <sup>32</sup> See, e.g., Alex Nowrateh, *The Murder of Mollie Tibbetts and Illegal Immigrant Crime: The Facts*, Cato Institute (Aug. 22, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y5boc9me> (showing that “[t]he  
24 illegal immigrant conviction rate for homicide was 44 percent below that of native-born  
25 Americans in 2016 in Texas”) (emphasis in original).

26           <sup>33</sup> White House, *President Donald J. Trump’s Address to the Nation on the Crisis at the*  
27 *Border* (Jan. 8, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y5uloxyg>.

28           <sup>34</sup> CBP, *CBP Enforcement Statistics FY2018*, <https://tinyurl.com/y9c4c6ft> (showing that  
through August 2018, federal agents seized 88 percent of cocaine, 90 percent of heroin, 87  
percent of methamphetamine, and 80 percent of fentanyl at ports of entry in this fiscal year).

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017*

1           223. In his own public statements, President Trump has made clear that his emergency  
2 declaration was triggered by his inability to secure funding for the border wall from Congress  
3 rather than an actual national emergency at the border.

4           224. When asked by the media about his plans to declare a national emergency relating  
5 to the border wall, President Trump stated his preference for “do[ing] the deal through Congress,”  
6 but that if the deal did not “work out” he would “almost . . . definitely” declare a national  
7 emergency.<sup>36</sup> While he reiterated his claims that the volume of drugs, criminals, and gangs  
8 coming through the border between ports of entry constituted a “crisis,” President Trump  
9 repeatedly cited the ongoing impasse with Congress as his rationale for the emergency  
10 declaration.<sup>37</sup>

11           225. Around the same time, when asked by the media what his threshold was for  
12 declaring a national emergency, President Trump responded, “My threshold will be if I can’t  
13 make a deal with people that are unreasonable.”<sup>38</sup>

14           226. On February 1, 2019, President Trump made clear in an interview that he was  
15 planning to wait until February 15, the deadline for a congressional conference committee to avert  
16 another government shutdown, before issuing an emergency declaration.<sup>39</sup> President Trump  
17 claimed he was already building the border wall, and strongly implied that he needed neither  
18 additional funding nor an emergency declaration to build it.<sup>40</sup>

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 205 (Sept. 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y93n5fes>.

21 <sup>36</sup> *Trump Remarks before Marine One Departure*, *supra* note 31.

22 <sup>37</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>38</sup> George Sargent, *Trump: I Have the ‘Absolute Right’ to Declare a National Emergency*  
24 *if Democrats Defy Me*, Wash. Post (Jan 9, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y4vmtezb>.

25 <sup>39</sup> N.Y. Times, *Excerpt from Trump’s Interview with the New York Times* (Feb. 1, 2019),  
26 <https://tinyurl.com/y9gsosk4>; see also CBS, *Transcript: President Trump on “Face the Nation”*  
27 (Feb. 3, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y8l38g72> (President Trump describing emergency declaration  
28 as an “alternative” to the process that Congress was engaged in to avert another shutdown, which  
was to end on February 15).

<sup>40</sup> *New York Times Interview*, *supra* note 39 (President Trump stating: “I’m building the  
wall right now. . . . it’s been funded . . . . We’ll be up to, by the end of this year, 115 miles . . . .  
At least . . . . And that doesn’t include large amounts of wall that we’ll be starting before the end  
of the year. So we’ll be up to hundreds of miles of wall between new wall and renovation wall in  
a fairly short period of time . . . . And I’ll continue to build the wall, and we’ll get the wall

1           227. During a press conference that same day, when asked whether he would consider  
2 other options besides the emergency declaration, President Trump stated that “we will be looking  
3 at a national emergency, because I don’t think anything is going to happen [in Congress]. I think  
4 the Democrats don’t want border security.”<sup>41</sup> President Trump also repeated his view that the  
5 wall was already being built “with funds that are on hand . . . we’re building a lot of wall right  
6 now, as we speak . . . [a]nd we’re getting ready to hand out some very big contracts with money  
7 that we have on hand and money that comes in.”<sup>42</sup>

8           **II. CONGRESS HAS APPROPRIATED LIMITED FUNDING TOWARD A BORDER BARRIER**  
9           **AND NO FUNDING TOWARD PRESIDENT TRUMP’S PROPOSED BORDER WALL**

10           228. Congress has exercised its Article I powers by appropriating funds for the  
11 construction of border barriers and related infrastructure when Congress deemed it appropriate.  
12 During the period of 2005 through 2011, Congress appropriated funding for the construction of  
13 hundreds of miles of border barriers.<sup>43</sup> Currently, there is a total of 705 miles of primary,  
14 secondary, or tertiary fencing along 654 miles of the southwest border.<sup>44</sup>

15           229. In the 115th Congress, between 2017 and 2018, Congress considered, but  
16 repeatedly declined to adopt, legislation appropriating funding for President Trump’s proposed  
17 border wall.<sup>45</sup>

18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 finished. Now whether or not I declare a national emergency, that you’ll see”); *see also* Donald J.  
20 Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 31, 2019, 9:43 AM), <https://tinyurl.com/y56tevok>  
21 (“Wall is being built!”).

22           <sup>41</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump in Meeting on Human Trafficking on the*  
23 *Southern Border* (Feb. 1, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y5ghp3eh>.

24           <sup>42</sup> *Id.*

25           <sup>43</sup> Gov’t Accountability Office, *Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s*  
26 *Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps*, GAO-17-  
27 331 (Feb. 16, 2017), at 7-10, <https://tinyurl.com/yaqbny6e>; Gov’t Accountability Office, *Secure*  
28 *Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs*, GAO-09-244R (Jan. 29, 2009), at 4-11,  
<https://tinyurl.com/y2kgefp5>.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Border Patrol, *Mileage of Pedestrian and Vehicle Fencing by State* (Aug. 2, 2017),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y6f27h4e>.

<sup>45</sup> *See, e.g.*, The WALL Act of 2018, S. 3713, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed \$25 billion  
appropriation for border wall; no committee action); 50 Votes for the Wall Act, H.R. 7073, 115th  
Cong. (2018) (proposed \$25 billion appropriation for funding for border wall; no committee  
action); Build the Wall, Enforce the Law Act of 2018, H.R. 7059, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed

1           230. Near the end of the 115th Congress, Congress worked on a funding bill before the  
2 December 22, 2018 deadline when federal funding ran out for a number of federal departments.  
3 On December 11, 2018, President Trump held a televised meeting with the Democratic leaders of  
4 Congress (then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck  
5 Schumer) to discuss the funding deadline. At that meeting, President Trump said he wanted \$5  
6 billion to build a portion of the border wall. President Trump said at that meeting, “If we don’t  
7 get what we want one way or the other, whether it’s through you, through a military, through  
8 anything you want to call, I will shut down the government, absolutely.” President Trump  
9 reiterated that he would be “proud to shut down the government for border security.” At the  
10 meeting, Leaders Schumer and Pelosi said they disagreed with the President on providing funding  
11 for the border wall.<sup>46</sup>

12           231. On December 19, 2018, the Senate passed by voice vote a bill to fund the  
13 government through February 8, 2019 that did not include any funding for a border wall.  
14 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. 695, 115th Cong. (2018).

15           232. After the Senate passed the temporary funding bill, on December 20, 2018,  
16 President Trump announced that “I’ve made my position very clear. Any measure that funds the  
17 government must include border security,” which he clarified must include funding for a wall.<sup>47</sup>

18  
19 \$16.6 billion appropriation for border wall; no committee action); Fund and Complete the Border  
20 Wall Act, H.R. 6657, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed authorization of funding for border wall; no  
21 committee action); American Border Act, H.R. 6415, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed \$16.6 billion  
22 appropriation for border wall; no committee action); Border Security and Immigration Reform  
23 Act of 2018, H.R. 6136, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed \$16.6 billion appropriation for border  
24 wall; voted down by House 301 to 121); Securing America’s Future Act of 2018, H.R. 4760,  
25 115th Cong. (2018) (proposed construction of physical barrier, including border wall; voted down  
26 by House 231-193); Border Security and Deferred Action Recipient Relief Act, S. 2199, 115th  
27 Cong. (2017) (proposal to make available \$38.2 million for planning for border wall construction;  
28 no action in Senate); Make America Secure Appropriations Act, H.R. 3219, 115th Cong. (2017)  
(proposed \$38.2 million appropriation for border wall; passed House of Representatives, but no  
action by Senate).

<sup>46</sup> CSPAN, *President Trump Meeting with Democratic Leaders* (Dec. 11, 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/yca1rz3x>.

<sup>47</sup> CNN, *Trump: “I’ve Made My Position Very Clear” on Spending Bill* (Dec. 20, 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/yy9cvzdd>.

1           233. On December 20, 2018, the House of Representatives approved a short-term  
2 funding bill appropriating \$5.7 billion for “U.S. Customs and Border Protection – Procurement,  
3 Construction, and Improvements.” Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R.  
4 695, 115th Cong. (2018). The Senate never passed the House-approved version of the legislation.

5           234. With no agreement between Congress and the President on funding, on December  
6 22, 2018, the federal government partially shut down.

7           235. On January 3, 2019, Nancy Pelosi became Speaker of the House. The day before,  
8 Speaker Pelosi reiterated in a televised interview that the House would be providing “[n]othing  
9 for the wall.”<sup>48</sup> On January 3, the House of Representatives approved a short-term funding bill  
10 without any funding for a border wall. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, H.R. 21, 116th  
11 Cong. (2019). The Senate never passed the House-approved version of the legislation.

12           236. The Office of Management and Budget formally requested \$5.7 billion from  
13 Congress for the border wall on January 6, 2019.<sup>49</sup>

14           237. On January 19, 2019, President Trump addressed the nation regarding the partial  
15 government shutdown and laid out his immigration proposal. In his remarks, he repeated his  
16 unsupported claims of an immigration enforcement crisis at the border in connection with his  
17 continued proposal for \$5.7 billion in funding for a wall, stating that “[a]s a candidate for  
18 president, I promised I would fix this crisis, and I intend to keep that promise one way or the  
19 other.”<sup>50</sup>

20           238. When he announced the congressional agreement that ended the government  
21 shutdown on January 25, 2019, President Trump stated: “If we don’t get a fair deal from  
22 Congress, the government will either shut down on February 15th, again, or I will use the powers  
23 afforded to me under the laws and the Constitution of the United States to address this  
24

---

25           <sup>48</sup> Tal Axelrod, *Pelosi on Negotiations with Trump: “Nothing for the Wall”*, The Hill,  
26 (Jan. 2, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y77o89hp>.

27           <sup>49</sup> Letter from Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, to Sen.  
28 Richard Shelby (Jan. 6, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y224y59q>.

<sup>50</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump on the Humanitarian Crisis on our  
Southern Border and the Shutdown* (Jan. 19, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y7gdj6s8>.

1 emergency.”<sup>51</sup>

2 239. After weeks of negotiation, on February 14, 2019, Congress passed the  
3 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (H.J. Res. 31) (the “2019 Appropriations Act”). The  
4 2019 Appropriations Act provides \$1.375 billion for “construction of primary pedestrian fencing,  
5 including levee pedestrian fencing, in the Rio Grande Valley Sector” of the border. H.J. Res. 31  
6 § 230(a)(1). That is the only funding in the 2019 Appropriations Act that Congress designated for  
7 the construction of a barrier.

8 240. The 2019 Appropriations Act also imposes limitations on how the fencing may be  
9 constructed. The amount designated for fencing in the Rio Grande Valley Sector “shall only be  
10 available for operationally effective designs deployed as of the date of the Consolidated  
11 Appropriations Act, 2017 (Public Law 115-31), such as currently deployed steel bollard designs,  
12 that prioritize agent safety.” *Id.* § 230(b). The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 was  
13 enacted on May 5, 2017. *See* Pub. L. No. 115-31. Thus, the 2019 Appropriations Act authorized  
14 fencing only using designs already “deployed” nearly two years ago. The Consolidated  
15 Appropriations Act of 2017 likewise does not authorize the construction of a concrete or any  
16 other solid wall. *Id.*

17 241. Congress made clear its intent that it was not appropriating any funding toward the  
18 construction of a wall. Senator Patrick Leahy, Vice Chairman of the Senate Appropriations  
19 Committee, who was actively involved in negotiations on the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations  
20 Act, stated, “The agreement does not fund President Trump’s wasteful wall.” 165 Cong. Rec.  
21 S1362 (daily ed. Feb 14, 2019). Senator Schumer, the Senate Minority Leader, noted that, “The  
22 agreement will provide smart border security, increasing support for technologies at our ports of  
23 entry. It will not fund the President’s expensive, ineffective wall.” 165 Cong. Rec. S1363 (daily  
24 ed. Feb. 14, 2019). The congressional record in the House of Representatives is no different.  
25 *See, e.g.*, 165 Cong. Rec. H2019 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2019) (statement of Rep. Price) (“This  
26 agreement denies the President billions of dollars for an unnecessary wall.”); 165 Cong. Rec.

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>51</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump on the Government Shutdown* (Jan. 25,  
2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y4mplplb>.

1 H2020 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2019) (statement of Rep. Aguilar) (“What this bill will not do is . . .  
2 fund the President’s wall from sea to shining sea, a wall that he said Mexico would pay for.”).

3 242. On February 15, 2019, President Trump signed the 2019 Consolidated  
4 Appropriations Act into law.

5 **III. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ACTION AND EMERGENCY DECLARATION**

6 243. That same day, the Trump Administration announced that the President was taking  
7 Executive Action to redirect funding beyond what was appropriated by Congress toward  
8 construction of a border wall. The Administration outlined specific plans for the diversion of an  
9 additional \$6.7 billion “that will be available to build the border wall once a national emergency  
10 is declared and additional funds have been reprogramed.”<sup>52</sup> The Administration identified the  
11 following funding for diversion to “be used sequentially”:

- 12 • \$601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund;
- 13 • Up to \$2.5 billion under the Department of Defense funds transferred for Support for  
14 Counterdrug Activities (10 U.S.C. § 284); and
- 15 • Up to \$3.6 billion reallocated from Department of Defense military construction projects  
16 under the President’s declaration of a national emergency (10 U.S.C. § 2808).<sup>53</sup>

17 244. In conjunction with that announcement, the President also declared a national  
18 emergency under the National Emergencies Act claiming that there is a “border security and  
19 humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national  
20 emergency.” The Emergency Declaration claimed that the border is an entry point for “criminals,  
21 gang members, and illicit narcotics.”<sup>54</sup> The Emergency Declaration continues: “The problem of  
22 large-scale unlawful migration through the southern border is long-standing, and despite the  
23 executive branch’s exercise of existing statutory authorities, the situation has worsened in certain  
24 respects in recent years. In particular, recent years have seen sharp increases in the number of

25 <sup>52</sup> White House, *President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory* (Feb. 15, 2019),  
26 <https://tinyurl.com/y3empmay>.

27 <sup>53</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>54</sup> Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States,  
84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019).

1 family units entering and seeking entry to the United States and an inability to provide detention  
2 space for many of these aliens while their removal proceedings are pending.”<sup>55</sup> The Emergency  
3 Declaration concludes that the difficulty in removing these family units justifies the declaration,  
4 but it does not make any connection to how the entry of these family units into the United States  
5 contributes to the flow of “criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics” into the country.<sup>56</sup>

6 245. The President invoked the National Emergencies Act and declared that the  
7 “emergency requires use of the Armed Forces” and “that the construction authority provided in  
8 section 2808 of title 10, United States Code, is invoked and made available, according to its  
9 terms, to the Secretary of Defense, and at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, to the  
10 Secretaries of the military departments.”

11 246. The Emergency Declaration directs the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of  
12 relevant military departments to “order as many units or members of the Ready Reserve to active  
13 duty as the Secretary concerned, in the Secretary’s discretion, determines to be appropriate to  
14 assist and support the activities of the Secretary of Homeland Security at the southern border.”<sup>57</sup>  
15 The Emergency Declaration acknowledges that DOD had previously “provided support and  
16 resources to the Department of Homeland Security at the southern border” pursuant to President  
17 Trump’s April 4, 2018 memorandum.<sup>58</sup>

18 247. The Emergency Declaration further directs the Secretaries of Defense, Interior,  
19 and Homeland Security to “take all appropriate actions, consistent with applicable law, to use or  
20 support the use of the authorities herein invoked.”<sup>59</sup>

21 248. At a press conference announcing the Executive Actions, President Trump  
22 acknowledged that Congress provided more than enough funding for homeland security, and that  
23 the Administration has “so much money, we don’t know what to do with it.” In explaining his  
24 rationale for the Executive Actions, the President candidly admitted that the emergency

---

25 <sup>55</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>56</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>57</sup> *Id.* § 1.

28 <sup>58</sup> *Id.*

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* § 2.

1 declaration reflected his personal preference to construct the wall more quickly, rather than an  
2 actual urgent need for it to be built immediately: “I could do the wall over a longer period of time.  
3 I didn’t need to do this. But I’d rather do it much faster.”<sup>60</sup>

4 249. Following the announcement of the Executive Actions, Defendants announced  
5 their plans in more specific detail. Based on information and belief, on February 15, 2019, the  
6 Treasury notified Congress that it would be transferring \$242 million from the Treasury  
7 Forfeiture Fund to DHS to support law enforcement border security efforts conducted by CBP to  
8 be available for obligation as of March 2, 2019, with the remaining \$359 million to be transferred  
9 and available for obligation at a later date.

10 250. On February 26, 2019, the White House released a “fact sheet” indicating that in  
11 order to accommodate the Executive Action’s directive to use \$2.5 billion from DOD’s drug  
12 interdiction account toward construction of a border wall, DOD “will augment existing  
13 counterdrug funds” through the Department’s transfer authority provided in section 8005 of the  
14 FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. No. 115-245.<sup>61</sup> Based on information  
15 and belief, DOD has informed Congress that it immediately plans to divert \$1 billion in  
16 “underutilized” funds that were appropriated for military pay and pensions for the construction of  
17 the border wall.<sup>62</sup>

#### 18 **IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND**

##### 19 **A. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651)**

20 251. The National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), Pub. L. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, codified at  
21 50 U.S.C. sections 1601-1651, was enacted by Congress in 1976 to rein in, rather than expand,  
22 the power of the president. The NEA was designed to “insure” that the president’s  
23 “extraordinary” emergency powers would “be utilized only when emergencies actually exist.” S.  
24 Rep. No. 94-1168, at 2 (1976). Senator Frank Church, who was instrumental in the development

---

25 <sup>60</sup> White House, *Remarks by President Trump on the National Security and Humanitarian*  
26 *Crisis on our Southern Border* (Feb. 15, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y3jenqeu>.

27 <sup>61</sup> White House, *The Funds Available to Address the National Emergency at Our Border*  
(Feb. 26, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y3yu3pr8>.

28 <sup>62</sup> Andrew Taylor and Lisa Mascaro, *Pentagon May Tap Military Pay, Pensions for*  
*Border Wall*, ABC News (Mar. 7, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y5pg7wtv>.

1 of the NEA, testified before the Senate Committee of Government Operations “that the President  
2 should not be allowed to invoke emergency authorities or in any way utilize the provisions of this  
3 Act for frivolous or partisan matters, nor for that matter in cases where important but not  
4 ‘essential’ problems are at stake.” *Hearing on H.R. 3884 Before the S. Comm. of Governmental*  
5 *Operations*, 94th Cong. 7 (1976) (statement of Sen. Frank Church). Senator Church continued  
6 that “[t]he Committee intentionally chose language which would make clear that the authority of  
7 the Act was to be reserved for matters that are ‘essential’ to the protection of the Constitution and  
8 the people.” *Id.*

9 252. The NEA allows the president to utilize emergency powers, as authorized by  
10 Congress in other federal statutes, when there is a national emergency, and one has been declared.  
11 50 U.S.C. § 1621.

12 253. Under the NEA, the president must specify the statutory emergency authorities he  
13 intends to invoke upon issuing a national emergency. He must also publish the proclamation of a  
14 national emergency in the Federal Register and transmit it to Congress. 50 U.S.C. § 1631.

15 254. The NEA sets out a procedure whereby Congress may terminate the national  
16 emergency if a resolution is passed by both houses of Congress and becomes law. 50 U.S.C. §  
17 1622. This procedure requires that the joint resolution be signed into law by the President, or if  
18 vetoed by the President, that Congress overrides the veto with a two-thirds vote in both chambers  
19 of Congress.

20 255. On February 26, 2019, the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 46  
21 terminating the Emergency Declaration by a vote of 245 to 182. The Senate has yet to act on the  
22 resolution. President Trump has vowed to veto any resolution by Congress terminating the  
23 Emergency Declaration.<sup>63</sup>

24 **B. Section 2808’s Emergency Military Construction Authority (10 U.S.C.**  
25 **§ 2808)**

26 256. The President seeks to reallocate “[u]p to \$3.6 billion . . . from Department of

27 <sup>63</sup> Phil Helsel, *Trump Says He Will Veto Resolution Terminating National Emergency*,  
28 NBC News (Feb. 28, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y2a53xrz>.

1 Defense military construction projects under the President’s declaration of a national  
2 emergency.”<sup>64</sup>

3 257. Section 2808 states that when the president declares a national emergency “that  
4 requires use of the armed forces,” the Secretary of Defense may “undertake military construction  
5 projects . . . not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed  
6 forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a).

7 258. Section 2808 limits the funds available for emergency military construction to “the  
8 total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction . . . that have not been  
9 obligated.” *Id.*

10 259. “Military construction” under Section 2808 includes “any construction,  
11 development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military  
12 installation,” and “military installation” includes a “base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or  
13 other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department.” 10 U.S.C. § 2801.

14 **C. Section 284’s Authority to Support Counter-Drug Activities (10 U.S.C.  
15 § 284) and Section 8005’s Transfer Authority**

16 260. The President seeks to use “[u]p to \$2.5 billion under the Department of Defense  
17 funds transferred for Support for Counterdrug Activities.”<sup>65</sup> Defendants intend to transfer up to  
18 \$2.5 billion from other DOD accounts into the Department’s account for counterdrug activities in  
19 order to satisfy that directive.<sup>66</sup>

20 261. Section 284 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to assist civilian law enforcement  
21 with drug enforcement activities. 10 U.S.C. § 284. It states that the Secretary of Defense “may  
22 provide support for the counterdrug activities or activities to counter transnational organized  
23 crime” of any law enforcement agency. Such support may include “[c]onstruction of roads and  
24 fences and installation of lighting to block drug smuggling corridors across international  
25

---

26 <sup>64</sup> *President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory*, *supra* note 43 (citing 10 U.S.C. §  
27 2808).

<sup>65</sup> *Id.* (citing 10 U.S.C. § 284).

28 <sup>66</sup> *Funds Available to Address the National Emergency at Our Border*, *supra* note  
61(citing section 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act).

1 boundaries of the United States.” *Id.*

2 262. Use of Section 284 is not dependent on the president declaring a national  
3 emergency.

4 263. Congress has appropriated funding for interdiction and counterdrug activities to  
5 the DOD. For instance, in FY2019, Congress appropriated \$217,178,000 for National Guard  
6 counterdrug programs subject to specific limitations on how the Administration may expend these  
7 funds.<sup>67</sup> That funding is intended to support counterdrug operations at all levels of government,  
8 including on a state-wide basis.<sup>68</sup> According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office  
9 analysis, National Guard Counterdrug Program funding was planned for all fifty states plus  
10 Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.<sup>69</sup>

11 264. Section 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. No.  
12 115-245 provides that “[u]pon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is  
13 necessary in the national interest, he may, with the approval of the Office of Management and  
14 Budget, transfer not to exceed \$4,000,000,000 of working capital funds of the Department of  
15 Defense or funds made available in this Act to the Department of Defense for military functions  
16 (except military construction) between such appropriations or funds or any subdivision thereof, to  
17 be merged with and to be available for the same purposes and for the same time period, as the  
18 appropriation or fund to which transferred.”

19 265. The “funds made available” in the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations  
20 Act includes those funds for the States’ national guards such as over \$8.6 billion appropriated for  
21 Army National Guard personnel, almost \$3.7 billion appropriated for Air Force National Guard  
22 personnel, over \$7.1 billion appropriated for Army National Guard operations and maintenance,  
23 over \$6.4 billion appropriated for Air Force National Guard operations and maintenance, and \$1.3

24 <sup>67</sup> Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education  
25 Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245 (Sept.  
26 28, 2018).

26 <sup>68</sup> Nat’l Guard, National Guard Counterdrug Program, <https://tinyurl.com/yx9whzd8> (last  
27 visited Feb. 17, 2019).

27 <sup>69</sup> Gov’t Accountability Off., *Drug Control, DOD Should Improve Its Oversight of the*  
28 *National Guard Counterdrug Program*, GAO-19-27 (Jan. 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y4e6ocra>.

1 billion for procurement items for the reserve components of the Armed Forces, including the  
2 National Guard.<sup>70</sup>

3 266. Section 8005’s transfer authority is subject to several conditions, including  
4 “prompt” notification to Congress. In addition, the Section 8005 transfer authority “may not be  
5 used unless for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, than those for  
6 which originally appropriated and in no case where the item for which funds are requested has  
7 been denied by Congress.”

8 267. Defendants have not explained how diversion of DOD funds toward construction  
9 of a border wall would “block drug smuggling corridors” as contemplated by 10 U.S.C. section  
10 284. Neither have Defendants explained how transferring funding for a border wall is for a  
11 “higher priority item” nor an “unforeseen military requirement.” Defendants have not provided  
12 an explanation, nor could they, as to how diverting funding toward construction of a border wall  
13 would not be transferring funds for a project for which Congress has already denied funding.

14 **D. Authority to Transfer Funds from Treasury Forfeiture Fund (31 U.S.C. §**  
15 **9705)**

16 268. The President seeks to use “about \$601 million” from the Department of the  
17 Treasury’s Forfeiture Fund.<sup>71</sup>

18 269. Section 9705(g)(4)(B) provides that after reserves and required transfers, the  
19 Treasury Forfeiture Fund’s “unobligated balances . . . shall be available to the Secretary . . . for  
20 obligation or expenditure in connection with the law enforcement activities of any Federal  
21 agency. . . .”

22 270. Defendants have not provided any explanation justifying the diversion of funding  
23 from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund toward construction of the border wall. Specifically,  
24 Defendants have not provided any explanation to warrant using Treasury Forfeiture Funds for the  
25 construction of a border wall as opposed to reimbursing the Plaintiffs States’ outstanding claims  
26 from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund.

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>70</sup> H.R. 6157, 115th Cong. § 4 (2019).

<sup>71</sup> *Border Security Victory*, *supra* note 52.

1           **E. National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)**

2           271. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. section 4321 et seq., is the “basic national charter for protection  
3 of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (a). NEPA contains several action-forcing procedures,  
4 most significantly the mandate to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) on major  
5 federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” *Robertson v.*  
6 *Methow Valley Citizen Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)).

7           272. NEPA requires federal agencies to consider several factors relating to the  
8 “intensity” of the project, including: the “[u]nique characteristics of the geographic area such as  
9 proximity to . . . ecologically critical areas” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(3)); “[t]he degree to which the  
10 action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been  
11 determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(9));  
12 and “[w]hether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law or requirements  
13 imposed for the protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(10).

14           273. “NEPA requires that the evaluation of a project’s environmental consequences  
15 take place at an early stage in the project’s planning process.” *State of California v. Block*, 690  
16 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). A proposal subject to NEPA exists where an  
17 agency has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on the alternatives in  
18 accomplishing that goal, regardless of whether the agency declares that such a proposal exists:  
19 “An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as  
20 possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal.” 40 C.F.R. §  
21 1502.5. A “[p]roposal exists at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject  
22 to the Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative  
23 means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be meaningfully evaluated.” 40 C.F.R. §  
24 1508.23.

25           **V. THERE IS NO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT “CRISIS” OR “INVASION” AT THE**  
26           **SOUTHERN BORDER TO SUPPORT THE DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY**

27           **A. There Is No Evidence That a Massive Influx of Migrants Is Overwhelming**  
28           **Government Resources at the Southern Border**

274. President Trump’s continued claim that an unprecedented flood of migrants is

1 causing an immigration enforcement crisis amounting to a “national emergency” is not supported  
2 by the facts.<sup>72</sup>

3 275. As CBP statistics show, apprehensions at the border in recent months—while they  
4 show increases stemming from an increase in migrant families seeking asylum—are well within  
5 the historic range.<sup>73</sup>

6 276. In recent years, apprehensions at the southwest border have been near historic  
7 lows, with fewer than 400,000 apprehensions in FY2018 compared to over 1.6 million in  
8 FY2000.<sup>74</sup>

9 277. In FY2017, CBP made the fewest apprehensions since FY2000, and the number of  
10 apprehensions in FY2018 was the fifth lowest since FY2000.<sup>75</sup>


---

21 <sup>72</sup> See 165 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2019) (joint declaration of 58 former  
22 United States senior government national security, defense, and diplomatic officials, including  
23 former Cabinet Secretaries Madeline Albright, Chuck Hegel, John Kerry, and Leon Panetta,  
hereafter “Former Gov’t Officials Decl.”) (stating that “there is no evidence of a sudden or  
emergency increase in the number of people seeking to cross the southern border”).

24 <sup>73</sup> CBP, *Southwest Border Migration FY2019*, <https://tinyurl.com/CBP-app-2019> (last  
visited Feb. 17, 2019).

25 <sup>74</sup> CBP, *Nationwide Illegal Alien Apprehensions Fiscal Years 1925-2017*,  
26 <https://tinyurl.com/y2kysbr8> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (also showing over 1 million  
27 apprehensions in each of fiscal years 1954, 1983-87, 1990-99, 2001, 2004-06, as well as over  
800,000 apprehensions in each of fiscal years 1953, 1977-79, 1981-82, 1988-89, 2002, 2003, and  
2007).

28 <sup>75</sup> *Id.* (also the source of data for the graph included herein).



278. During this same time span, there were dramatic increases in the number of Border Patrol agents utilized to patrol the southwest border between the ports of entry. From 2000 to 2017, CBP increased its Border Patrol agent staffing nationwide by 111 percent, from 9,212 to 19,437 agents. CBP increased the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to the southwest border sectors by nearly 94 percent, from 8,580 to 16,605 agents during the 2000-2017 time period.<sup>76</sup>

279. The number of Border Patrol agents have significantly increased over the past two decades, while illegal border crossings have dropped, causing the average annual number of apprehensions made by each Border Patrol agent to drop by almost 91 percent, from 192 in FY2000 to only 18 in FY2017.<sup>77</sup>

280. The Border Patrol’s budget has also significantly increased during this period, with Congress’ appropriations increasing from \$1.055 billion in FY2000 to \$3.805 billion in FY2017, an increase of over 260 percent.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> CBP, *Border Patrol Agent Nationwide Staffing by Fiscal Year*, <https://tinyurl.com/yyazdqm7> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).


<sup>77</sup> *Id.*; CBP, *Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year*, <https://tinyurl.com/y73mzshs> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).

<sup>78</sup> CBP, *Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year*,

1           281. In September 2017, DHS published a report in which it concluded that “the  
2 southwest land border is more difficult to illegally cross today than ever before.”<sup>79</sup>

3           282. This difficulty is borne out in the precipitous drop in undetected unlawful entries,  
4 which, as a 2018 DHS study estimated, “fell from approximately 851,000 to nearly 62,000  
5 [between FY2006 and 2016], a 93 percent decrease.”<sup>80</sup>

6 **Figure 2: Estimated Southwest Border Undetected Unlawful Entries, FY 2006 – FY 2016**



17

18           283. That same DHS report contained data showing that probability of detection  
19 markedly increased during this time period, “from 70 percent in FY2006 (when an estimated 2.0  
20 million unlawful border crossers were detected out of an estimated 2.9 million total unlawful  
21 border crossers) to 91 percent in FY2016 (611,000 detected out of 673,000 total estimated  
22 unlawful border crossers).”<sup>81</sup>

23           284. In general, the undocumented population in the United States has dropped

24

25 <https://tinyurl.com/yxw4bj4b> (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).

26 <sup>79</sup> DHS, Off. of Immigr. Stats., *Efforts by DHS to Estimate Southwest Border Security between Ports of Entry* (Sept. 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/y9gbn5js>.

27 <sup>80</sup> DHS, *Border Security Metrics Report* (May 1, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y2p96d2o>  
(2016 is the most recent year for which this data is available).

28 <sup>81</sup> *Id.*

1 significantly in recent years, falling by about 1 million between 2010 and 2017.<sup>82</sup>

2 285. The overall characteristics of individuals who are apprehended at the southwest  
3 border have changed significantly, from predominantly adult male Mexican nationals entering the  
4 United States alone, to increasing numbers of families from Central America.<sup>83</sup> Many of these  
5 migrant families are requesting asylum upon entry into the United States.<sup>84</sup>

6 286. The Director of National Intelligence’s most recent “Worldwide Threat  
7 Assessment” (“DNI Report”) was produced on January 29, 2019. That report discusses several  
8 topics germane to the Emergency Declaration, including migration, terrorism, and transnational  
9 crime (including human and drug trafficking).<sup>85</sup>

10 287. While the DNI Report notes that “high crime rates and weak job markets will spur  
11 additional United States-bound migrants from the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala,  
12 and Honduras,” the report contains no mention of a security threat at the southwest border.<sup>86</sup> The  
13 report also discusses “transnational organized crime” as a driver of migration,<sup>87</sup> consistent with  
14 research by federal officials indicating that most migrants from the Northern Triangle are “fleeing  
15 violence at home” and seeking to claim asylum in the United States.<sup>88</sup>

16 288. At the January 29, 2019, hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee where the  
17 report was presented, the heads of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),  
18 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency—all appointed by President

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>82</sup> Robert Warren, *U.S. Undocumented Population Continued to Fall from 2016 to 2017, and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive Year*,  
21 Ctr. for Migration Studies (Jan. 16, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y7wa849r>; see also Former Gov’t  
22 Officials Decl., *supra* note 72, at S1412 (“The United States currently hosts what is estimated to  
23 be the smallest number of undocumented immigrants since 2004”).

24 <sup>83</sup> Cong. Res. Serv., *The Trump Administration’s “Zero Tolerance” Immigration*  
25 *Enforcement Policy* (Jul. 20, 2018) <https://tinyurl.com/y6rxgipk>.

26 <sup>84</sup> See, e.g., Nomaan Merchant, *Crush of Desperate Migrant Families Seek Asylum at*  
27 *Border*, Associated Press (Jan. 23, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y4to9ykq>.

28 <sup>85</sup> Daniel R. Coats, *Worldwide Threat Assessment*, Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence  
(Jan. 29, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y9r6kkhu>.

<sup>86</sup> *Id.* at 41.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.* at 19.

<sup>88</sup> Max Ehrenfreund, *The Huge Immigration Problem That Donald Trump’s Wall Won’t*  
Solve, Wash. Post (Dec. 18, 2015), <https://tinyurl.com/yxgwlx2q> (citing research by Federal  
Reserve Bank of Dallas economist).

1 Trump—testified about international threats to the United States. During that hearing, none of  
2 these officials even mentioned issues relating to the southwest border; they also did not testify  
3 that the situation at the United States-Mexico border constituted a threat to the United States’  
4 national security.<sup>89</sup>

5 **B. There Is No Evidence that Terrorists Are Infiltrating the United States via**  
6 **the Southern Border**

7 289. The Trump Administration’s assertions that terrorism concerns justify its actions  
8 here are without factual basis.

9 290. President Trump and other members of his Administration, including DHS  
10 Secretary Nielsen, have repeatedly claimed that terrorists have attempted to infiltrate the United  
11 States via the southern border and that the border wall is needed to stop this from happening.<sup>90</sup>

12 291. However, the federal government’s own reports, as well as credible third-party  
13 analysis, show that these claims are false.

14 292. In fact, while over 2,500 individuals on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s  
15 terrorist watchlist attempted to travel to the United States in FY2017, the vast majority—over  
16 2,100—attempted to do so by air.<sup>91</sup>

17 293. More generally, a 2018 U.S. State Department report finds that there is “no

18 <sup>89</sup> CSPAN, *Global Threats and National Security* (Jan. 29, 2019),  
19 <https://tinyurl.com/ydyaugm5>; see also Former Gov’t Officials Decl., *supra* note 72, at S1413  
20 (“In a briefing before the House Armed Services Committee the next day, Pentagon officials  
acknowledged that the 2018 National Defense Strategy does not identify the southern border as a  
security threat”).

21 <sup>90</sup> See White House, *Remarks by Vice President Mike Pence at an America First Policies*  
22 *Tax Reform Event* (Feb. 17, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y54tmrzo> (claiming that “seven individuals  
a day who are either known or suspected terrorists” are apprehended at one Texas port of entry);  
23 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 22, 2018, 5:37 AM),  
<https://tinyurl.com/mid-easterners-tweet> (asserting that “unknown Middle Easterners” are part of  
24 the Caravan, and that he has “alerted Border Patrol and Military that this is a National Emergency  
[sic.]”); see also Calvin Woodward, *AP FACT CHECK: Trump’s Mythical Terrorist Tide From*  
25 *Mexico*, ABC News (Jan. 7, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/yyhewhrl> (collecting other statements by  
Administration officials asserting that large numbers of individuals with terrorist ties are  
26 apprehended at the Southern Border).

27 <sup>91</sup> DHS and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation From*  
*Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States Initial Section 11 Report 9* (Jan. 2018),  
28 <https://tinyurl.com/yy6bg66j>.

1 credible evidence indicating that international terrorist groups have established bases in Mexico,  
2 worked with Mexican drug cartels, or sent operatives via Mexico into the United States.”<sup>92</sup>

3 294. While noting that “[t]he U.S. southern border remains vulnerable to *potential*  
4 terrorist transit,” the report concluded that “terrorist groups likely seek other means of trying to  
5 enter the United States.”<sup>93</sup>

6 295. A recent comprehensive study by the Cato Institute—using data going back to  
7 1975—found that “there have been zero people murdered or injured in terror attacks committed  
8 by illegal border crossers on U.S. soil.”<sup>94</sup>

9 296. In fact, almost every individual convicted of even planning a terrorist attack on the  
10 United States who entered the country illegally came over the Canadian border or jumped ship in  
11 American ports.<sup>95</sup>

12 297. Only three individuals convicted of a terrorist plot entered illegally through the  
13 Mexican border, and they did so as children in the 1980s, decades before the planned attack was  
14 foiled in 2007.<sup>96</sup>

15 298. Further, the Cato Institute noted that “[n]ot a single terrorist in any visa category  
16 came from Mexico or Central America during the 43-year period.”<sup>97</sup>

17 299. The DNI Report contains a three-page discussion of terrorism. That discussion  
18 does not mention any threat of terrorists infiltrating the United States through the southwest  
19 border.<sup>98</sup> Indeed, terrorism is not discussed at all in the Western Hemisphere section of the  
20

---

21 <sup>92</sup> U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017*  
205 (Sept. 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y93n5fes>.

22 <sup>93</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

23 <sup>94</sup> David Bier & Alex Nowrasteh, *45,000 “Special Interest Aliens” Caught Since 2007,  
But No U.S. Terrorist Attacks from Illegal Border Crossers*, Cato Inst. (Dec. 17, 2018),  
24 <https://tinyurl.com/yddqwes3>.

25 <sup>95</sup> *Id.*; see also Former Gov’t Officials Decl., *supra* note 72, at S1412 (“Between October  
2017 and March 2018, forty-one foreign immigrants on the terrorist watchlist were intercepted at  
the northern border. Only six such immigrants were intercepted at the southern border”).

26 <sup>96</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>97</sup> Alex Nowrasteh, *Does the Migrant Caravan Pose a Serious Terrorism Risk?*, Cato Inst.  
(Oct. 23, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/yap9uc9s>.

28 <sup>98</sup> *DNI Report*, *supra* note 85 at 10–13.

1 report.<sup>99</sup>

2 300. At the January 29, 2019, Senate Intelligence Committee hearing about the report,  
3 none of the national security officials testified to terrorists infiltrating the United States through  
4 the southern border. The DNI's and Central Intelligence Agency Director's testimony focused on  
5 threats in the Middle East, Africa, and the Philippines.<sup>100</sup>

6 301. Thus, while combating terrorism is an important national priority, illegal crossings  
7 at the southern border do not materially contribute to that problem and provide no factual  
8 justification for declaring an emergency requiring the diversion of funds to build a wall.

9 **C. There Is No Evidence that a Border Wall Will Decrease Crime Rates**

10 302. Studies have consistently shown that the connection that President Trump attempts  
11 to draw between unauthorized immigration and increased crime rates is false.

12 303. According to a 2018 Cato Institute study examining 2016 incarceration rates,  
13 unauthorized immigrants were 47 percent less likely to be incarcerated for crimes than native-  
14 born Americans.<sup>101</sup>

15 304. A 2018 Cato Institute report examining 2015 Texas crime statistics found that  
16 undocumented immigrants had a criminal conviction rate 50 percent below that for native-born  
17 Americans.<sup>102</sup>

18 305. A 2018 study published in *Criminology* examining national crime rates from 1990  
19 to 2014 found “that undocumented immigration does not increase violence” and in fact

22 <sup>99</sup> *Id.* at 40–42.

23 <sup>100</sup> Global Threats and National Security, *supra* note 89 (24:12–:21; 32:05–:50; 1:27:15–  
:50; 1:28:40–:29:57).

24 <sup>101</sup> Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, *Incarcerated Immigrants in 2016*, Cato  
25 Inst. Res. and Pol’y Br. No. 7 (Jun. 4, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y2jn4e3x>; *see also* Former Gov’t  
26 Officials Decl., *supra* note 72, at S1412 (stating that “in Texas, undocumented immigrants were  
found to have a first-time conviction rate 32 percent below that of native-born Americans; the  
conviction rates of unauthorized immigrants for violent crimes such as homicide and sex offenses  
were also below those of native-born Americans”).

27 <sup>102</sup> Alex Nowrasteh, *Criminal Immigrants in Texas*, Cato Inst. Res. and Pol’y Br. No. 4  
28 (Feb. 26, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y62qjsa6>.

1 “[i]ncreases in the undocumented immigrant population within states are associated with  
2 significant decreases in the prevalence of violence.”<sup>103</sup>

3 306. A 2017 study in the *Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice* examining  
4 immigration and crime rates nationally over a 40-year period found that in the 10 cities where the  
5 immigrant population increased the most, crime levels in 2016 decreased to lower levels of crime  
6 than in 1980.<sup>104</sup> “The most striking finding from our research is that for murder, robbery,  
7 burglary and larceny, as immigration increased, crime decreased, on average, in American  
8 metropolitan areas.”<sup>105</sup> Large cities with substantial immigrant populations have *lower* crime  
9 rates, on average, than those with minimal immigrant populations.<sup>106</sup>

10 307. A 2010 study showed that native-born American men between ages 18 to 39 with  
11 no high school diploma had triple the incarceration rate of immigrant men from Mexico, El  
12 Salvador, and Guatemala with the same age and education profile.<sup>107</sup>

13 308. The Administration’s repeated claims that building a border barrier in El Paso,  
14 Texas reduced a previously high rate of violent crimes there are also false.<sup>108</sup>

15 309. In fact, when the new border barrier was built in 2009, crime in El Paso had been  
16 dramatically decreasing since the 1990s, just as the violent crime rate decreased substantially  
17 nationwide from the 1990s through the present.<sup>109</sup> “From 2006 to 2011—two years before the

18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 <sup>103</sup> Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, *Does Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent  
Crime?* Criminology (Mar. 25, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/yczsf27>.

20 <sup>104</sup> Robert Adelman et al., *Urban crime rates and the changing face of immigration:  
Evidence across four decades*, *J. of Ethnicity in Crim. Justice*, Vol. 15 (2017),  
21 <https://tinyurl.com/y6czenh7>; see also Anna Flag, *The Myth of the Criminal Immigrant*, N.Y.  
Times (Mar. 30, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y9hcu6kp>.

22 <sup>105</sup> Charis Kubrin et al., *Immigrants Do Not Increase Crime, Research Shows*, *Scientific  
American* (Feb. 7, 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/h8xauk2>.

23 <sup>106</sup> *Id.*

24 <sup>107</sup> Walter Ewing, et al., *The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States*, *Am.  
Immigr. Council Rep.* (Jul. 13, 2015), <https://tinyurl.com/jxcv9aq>.

25 <sup>108</sup> See, e.g., White House, *President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address* (Feb.  
26 5, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y77nquv5> (“The border city of El Paso, Texas, used to have  
27 extremely high rates of violent crime—one of the highest in the entire country, and considered  
one of our nation’s most dangerous cities. Now, immediately upon its building, with a powerful  
barrier in place, El Paso is one of the safest cities in our country.”).

28 <sup>109</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States*,

1 fence was built to two years after—the number of violent crimes recorded in El Paso increased by  
2 17 percent.”<sup>110</sup>

3 310. CBP data show that as the mix of apprehended migrants has shifted to an  
4 increasing proportion of families as discussed above, the numbers of violent crimes committed by  
5 this group has also decreased.<sup>111</sup>

6 **D. There Is No Evidence that a Border Wall Will Impact the Smuggling of**  
7 **Dangerous Drugs into the United States**

8 311. For years, the vast majority of the drugs smuggled into the country that the  
9 President has singled out as dangerous (methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl)<sup>112</sup> have  
10 been smuggled through, not between, ports of entry.<sup>113</sup>

11 312. From 2012-2018, 86 percent of cocaine, 88 percent of heroin, and 84 percent of  
12 methamphetamine came through ports of entry.<sup>114</sup>

13 313. From 2017-2018, 83 percent of fentanyl came through legal border ports of  
14 entry.<sup>115</sup>

15  
16 Table 1 (showing violent crime rate reduction from 567.6 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants  
17 in 1998 to 382.9 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017), <https://tinyurl.com/yyvc6636> (last visited Feb.  
18 17, 2019).

19 <sup>110</sup> Madlin Mekelburg, *State of the Union: Facts Show Trump Wrong to Say El Paso*  
*Dangerous City until Fence*, El Paso Times (Feb. 5, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y9o196az> (citing  
20 crime data from El Paso County Sheriff’s Office and FBI Uniform Crime Reports).

21 <sup>111</sup> Alex Nowrasteh, *There Is No National Emergency on the Border, Mr. President*, Cato  
22 Institute, <https://www.cato.org/blog/there-no-national-emergency-border-mr-president> (citing  
23 CBP data).

24 <sup>112</sup> *Trump Address on Crisis at Border*, *supra* note 33; see also White House, *President*  
*Donald J. Trump Is Committed to Working with Congress to Solve Our Urgent Immigration*  
25 *Crisis* (Feb. 5, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/yyhzvrq9> (“Tens of thousands of Americans are killed  
26 by tons of deadly, illicit drugs trafficked into our country by criminal aliens, gangs, and cartels  
27 exploiting our porous border. The lethal drugs that flood across our border and into our  
28 communities include meth, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl.”).

<sup>113</sup> CBP, *Enforcement Statistics FY2018*, <https://tinyurl.com/y9c4c6ft> (showing that  
through August 2018, out of all the drugs seized by CBP in that fiscal year, 88 percent of cocaine,  
90 percent of heroin, 87 percent of methamphetamine, and 80 percent of fentanyl were seized by  
Field Operations at ports of entry).

<sup>114</sup> *Id.*

<sup>115</sup> *Id.*

1           314. For instance, CBP officers recently made what is being touted (including by  
2 President Trump<sup>116</sup>) as the largest seizure of fentanyl in history. Some 254 pounds of the drug  
3 and 395 pounds of methamphetamine were discovered hidden in a floor compartment of a truck  
4 loaded with cucumbers as the truck tried to enter through the port of entry at Nogales, Arizona.<sup>117</sup>

5           315. The most recent Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) National Drug Threat  
6 Assessment affirms the CBP data showing that the bulk of dangerous illegal drugs flow through,  
7 not between, ports of entry.<sup>118</sup>

8           316. For example, in that report, the DEA states that “[a] small percentage of all heroin  
9 seized by CBP along the land border was between Ports of Entry (POEs).”<sup>119</sup>

10           317. As to fentatyl, the report states that “Mexican [Transnational Criminal  
11 Organizations] most commonly smuggle the multi-kilogram loads of fentanyl concealed in  
12 [privately owned vehicles] before trafficking the drugs through SWB POEs.”<sup>120</sup>

13           318. Finally, the report notes that privately owned vehicles “remain the primary method  
14 used to smuggle cocaine across the SWB. Traffickers hide cocaine amongst legitimate cargo of  
15 commercial trucks or within secret compartments built within passenger vehicles.”<sup>121</sup>

16           319. The DNI Report discusses drug trafficking from Mexico; however, it contains no  
17 mention of smuggling between ports of entry.<sup>122</sup>

18           320. In fact, the DNI Report notes that as to fentanyl—one of the drugs that President  
19 Trump has invoked in support of the border wall<sup>123</sup>—“Chinese synthetic drug suppliers . . .  
20 probably ship the majority of US fentanyl, when adjusted for purity.”<sup>124</sup>

21           <sup>116</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 31, 2019, 4:14 PM),  
22 <https://tinyurl.com/y4c4zxo3>.

23           <sup>117</sup> Pete Williams, *Feds Make Largest Fentanyl Bust in U.S. History*, NBC News (Jan. 31,  
2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y9zgnv7p>.

24           <sup>118</sup> DEA, *2018 National Drug Threat Assessment* (Oct. 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/yaqyh3ld>.

25           <sup>119</sup> *Id.*

26           <sup>120</sup> *Id.*

27           <sup>121</sup> *Id.*

28           <sup>122</sup> *DNI Report, supra* note 85.

<sup>123</sup> *Trump Address on Crisis at Border, supra* note 33.

<sup>124</sup> *DNI Report, supra* note 85 at 18; *see also* Former Gov’t Officials Decl., *supra* note 72,

1           **E.    There Is No Factual Basis to Support the Statutory Criteria for Diverting**  
2           **Funding**

3           321.    Building a border wall does not “require[] use of the armed forces” under 10  
4 U.S.C. section 2808.<sup>125</sup>

5           322.    Construction of border fencing has been carried out by civilian contractors in  
6 recent years.

7           323.    In fact, in 2007, the U.S. military informed DHS that “military personnel would no  
8 longer be available to build fencing.”<sup>126</sup>

9           324.    This, along with the desire to not take CBP agents away from their other duties,  
10 led CBP to decide to use “commercial labor for future infrastructure projects.”<sup>127</sup>

11          325.    This decision has been reflected in recent projects related to the border wall,  
12 including contract awards in California<sup>128</sup> and Arizona<sup>129</sup> in Fall 2018.

13          326.    The construction of a border wall also does not constitute a “military construction”  
14 project, as defined in 10 U.S.C. section 2801. Since at least 2001, 10 U.S.C. section 2808 has  
15 only been invoked to justify military construction directly linked to a military installation.<sup>130</sup>

16          327.    In fact, with one exception, it has only been invoked in relation to construction at  
17

18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 at S1412 (noting that border wall will not “stop drugs from entering via international mail (which  
20 is how high-purity fentanyl, for example, is usually shipped from China directly to the United  
21 States)”).

22 <sup>125</sup> See also Former Gov’t Officials Decl., *supra* note 72, at S1412 (noting that “the  
23 composition of southern border crossings has shifted such that families and unaccompanied  
24 minors now account for the majority of immigrants seeking entry at the southern border; these  
25 individuals do not present a threat that would need to be countered with military force”).

26 <sup>126</sup> Gov’t Accountability Office, *GAO-09-244R Secure Border Initiative Fence*  
27 *Construction Costs* 7 (Jan. 29, 2009), <https://tinyurl.com/y2kgef5>.

28 <sup>127</sup> *Id.*

<sup>128</sup> CBP, *Border Wall Contract Awards in California* (Dec. 21, 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y3px9ubj> (announcing \$287 million contract with SLSCO Ltd. to build border  
barriers).

<sup>129</sup> CBP, *Border Wall Contract Award in Arizona* (Nov. 15, 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y2t5u6pw> (announcing \$172 million contract with Barnard Construction Co.  
to build border barriers).

<sup>130</sup> Michael J. Vassalotti & Brendan W. McGarry, *Military Construction Funding in the*  
*Event of a National Emergency*, Cong. Res. Serv. (Jan. 11, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y23t8xbc>.

1 military installations outside the United States.<sup>131</sup>

2 328. That single instance related to securing domestic sites at which weapons of mass  
3 destruction were sited.<sup>132</sup>

4 329. Furthermore, the diversion of funding and resources for the proposed border wall  
5 does not satisfy the requirements of 10 U.S.C. section 284, the Counterdrugs Activities statute  
6 because the proposed border wall does not “block drug smuggling corridors,” 10 U.S.C. §  
7 284(b)(7), as contemplated by the statute. Defendants also do not satisfy the criteria under  
8 section 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act to transfer other  
9 Department of Defense funds toward construction of the border wall because it is not a “higher  
10 priority item,” is not a “unforeseen military requirement,” and *is* an item for which Congress has  
11 denied funding.

12 330. The diversion of Treasury Forfeiture Funds for construction of a border wall fails  
13 to satisfy the criteria of 31 U.S.C. section 9705 because infrastructure construction is not within  
14 the scope of the activities for which Treasury Forfeiture Funds may be used under that statute.

15 **F. Plaintiff States and their Residents Are Harmed by the Executive Actions**

16 **1. Harm caused by diversion of funding and other resources**

17 331. Plaintiff States and their residents are harmed by the Executive Actions and  
18 Defendants’ unlawful actions undertaken to construct the border wall. *See Parties section supra.*

19 332. California will be harmed by the diversion of funds it receives from the federal  
20 government for drug interdiction program funding, which will impact public safety and the  
21 welfare of its residents.

22 333. California is typically allocated tens of millions of dollars in drug interdiction  
23 funds from the federal government annually (for example, over \$25 million in FY2018-19). If  
24 California loses this funding, there will be negative public safety impacts arising from the  
25 impairment of the State’s criminal and narcotics operations.

---

27 <sup>131</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>132</sup> *Id.*

1           334. Diversion of DOD funding from California’s National Guard will likewise cause  
2 harm to the State. For FY2019-20, California expected to receive \$126.1 million in federal funds  
3 that are at risk due to the Executive Actions.<sup>133</sup> Any diversion of military funding intended for  
4 the California National Guard will also harm the State.

5           335. Diversion of funds from the Treasury’s Forfeiture Fund will deprive the State of  
6 California and its local law enforcement agencies of access to millions of dollars of funds that  
7 would otherwise be available for law enforcement purposes, negatively impacting the public  
8 safety and welfare of California’s residents.

9           336. The law enforcement agencies within the Plaintiff States received over 73 percent  
10 of the equitable shares paid to local and state agencies under the Treasury Forfeiture Fund’s  
11 equitable share program in FY2018. California law enforcement agencies, many of which have  
12 participated in the equitable share program for over a decade, received \$53,304,000 in funding  
13 from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in FY2018, more than any state.<sup>134</sup> Based on information and  
14 belief, California’s state and local agencies, including the California Department of Justice,  
15 California Highway Patrol, and California National Guard, have millions of dollars in outstanding  
16 claims based on their previous participation in law enforcement activities.

17           337. California also will be harmed by diversion of funding for military construction.

18           338. More funds are spent on defense in California than in any other state, with \$48.8  
19 billion in FY2017 alone.<sup>135</sup>

20           339. California also leads the nation in defense contract spending, with \$35.2 billion  
21 that same year.<sup>136</sup> Plaintiff States collectively account for \$142.3 billion in defense contract  
22 spending, which represents 52 percent of all defense contract spending.

23           340. Three of the top ten defense contract spending locations in the nation are in

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>133</sup> State of California, *2019-20 Governor’s Budget, Statewide Financial Information* at 29  
(Jan. 10, 2019) (estimating \$126.1 million in federal funding for the California Military  
Department for FY2019-20), <https://tinyurl.com/y48pjdnL>.

26 <sup>134</sup> *Forfeiture Fund Audit*, *supra* note 3, at 67.

27 <sup>135</sup> DOD, Off. of Econ. Adjustment, *Defense Spending by State Fiscal Year 2017*,  
<https://tinyurl.com/yxcqugzr>.

28 <sup>136</sup> *Id.*

1 California (San Diego with \$9.2 billion, Los Angeles with \$5.3 billion, and Santa Clara County  
2 with \$4.8 billion).<sup>137</sup>

3 341. This defense spending—including construction—in California generates  
4 significant economic activity, employment, and tax revenue.<sup>138</sup>

5 342. In FY2016, this spending generated \$86.9 billion of direct economic activity in  
6 California, \$17.4 billion of economic activity created through the supply chain, and \$52 billion of  
7 “induced” economic activity created because of additional money in the economy.<sup>139</sup>

8 343. This economic activity, in turn, generates employment for Californians. In  
9 FY2016, approximately 358,000 jobs were directly attributable to employment by defense  
10 agencies and their contractors, 84,000 were generated through the supply chain, and 324,000  
11 resulted from economic activity induced by the additional money in the economy.<sup>140</sup>

12 344. The economic activity generated by defense spending also resulted in significant  
13 tax revenues for California at the state and local level, estimated at \$5.8 billion total annually,  
14 including \$1.9 billion in income tax, \$1.7 billion in sales tax and \$1.3 billion in property tax.<sup>141</sup>

15 345. Certain regions of the state particularly rely on defense spending for employment,  
16 including Lassen County (with 18% of jobs reliant on defense spending) and San Diego (16%).<sup>142</sup>

17 346. In a briefing with reporters on February 15, 2019, White House officials (Acting  
18 Chief of Staff John Michael Mulvaney, Defendant Nielsen, and Acting Director of the Office of  
19 Management and Budget Russell Vought) discussed the Administration’s plans to carry out the  
20 Emergency Declaration.<sup>143</sup> In response to a question regarding “which military construction  
21 projects will see the money moved for the border wall,” one Administration official stated during

---

22 <sup>137</sup> *Id.*

23 <sup>138</sup> Devin Lavelle, *California Statewide National Security Economic Impacts*, Cal. Res.  
24 Bureau (Aug. 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/yxqlw43b>.

24 <sup>139</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>140</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>141</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>142</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>143</sup> White House, *Background Press Call on President Trump’s Remarks on the National*  
27 *Security and Humanitarian Crisis on Our Southern Border* (Feb. 15, 2019). This document was  
28 available on the White House website but then taken down that same day.

1 that briefing: “We would be looking at lower priority military construction projects. We would  
2 be looking at ones that are to fix or repair a particular facility that might be able to wait a couple  
3 of months into next year.”<sup>144</sup>

4 347. A number of military construction projects that could fit this description, and for  
5 which funds have been appropriated but are as yet unobligated, are planned in California.<sup>145</sup>  
6 These projects include repairs to existing military infrastructure. If Defendants determine that  
7 these projects can wait, funding for them could be diverted to the border wall, and California  
8 would be deprived of this federal funding and the resulting positive economic, employment, and  
9 tax consequences.

10 348. If these types of projects are delayed due to the diversion of funding for border  
11 wall construction, California stands to suffer economic harm.

12 349. Other Plaintiff States will suffer similar harms due to diversion of military  
13 construction, drug interdiction, and drug forfeiture funding.

## 14 2. Environmental harms to the States of California and New Mexico

15 350. On December 12, 2018, DHS announced that if it received \$5 billion in additional  
16 funding, it would use this funding to construct 330 miles of new barriers along the United States-  
17 Mexico border in areas that the United States Border Patrol identified as “highest priority” in each  
18 of the four border states. DHS specifically identified a five-mile barrier project in the CBP’s San  
19 Diego Sector (California), a nine-mile project in the CBP’s El Centro Sector (California), and a  
20 nine-mile project in the CBP’s El Paso Sector (New Mexico).<sup>146</sup>

21 351. Following Defendant DHS’s December 12, 2018 announcement that it intended to  
22 construct 330 miles of new barriers along the United States-Mexico border, DHS now intends to  
23 construct hundreds more miles of new border barriers. During a March 6, 2019 hearing before  
24 the House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee, Defendant Nielsen testified that

---

25  
26 <sup>144</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>145</sup> *E.g.*, DOD, *Construction Programs (C-1), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year*  
2019 (Feb. 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/yy85dch9>.

28 <sup>146</sup> DHS, *Walls Work* (Dec. 12, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y7ca6byc>.

1 DHS now seeks to construct more than 700 miles of additional barriers along the southern  
2 border.<sup>147</sup>

3 352. CBP’s San Diego Sector is located in San Diego County, California and  
4 shares a 60-mile segment of the border with Mexico, 46 linear miles of which are already lined  
5 with primary fencing.<sup>148</sup> The only portions of the border located within the San Diego Sector that  
6 are not already lined with primary fencing are located in the southeastern portion of the county in  
7 or near the Otay Mountain Wilderness Area.<sup>149</sup> Thus, the only segment of the border within the  
8 San Diego Sector where DHS can construct new primary fencing, as it announced on December  
9 12, 2018, are areas within or near the Otay Wilderness Area.

10 353. CBP’s El Centro Sector is located within Imperial County, California, and shares a  
11 70-mile segment of the border with Mexico, 59 linear miles of which are already lined by primary  
12 fencing.<sup>150</sup> The only portions of the border located within the El Centro Sector that are not  
13 already lined with primary fencing are located in the southwestern portion of Imperial County,  
14 which is comprised of a mountainous landscape and the Jacumba Wilderness Area.<sup>151</sup> Thus, the  
15 only segment of the border within the El Centro Sector where DHS can construct new primary  
16 fencing, as it announced on December 12, 2018, are areas within or near the Jacumba Wilderness  
17 Area.

18 354. The Otay Mountain Wilderness and the Jacumba Wilderness areas are home to  
19 more than 100 sensitive plant and animal species that are listed as “endangered,” “threatened,” or  
20 “rare” under the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., and/or the

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>147</sup> CSPAN, *Immigration and Border Security* (Mar. 6, 2019),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y5fqdmma>.

23 <sup>148</sup> CBP, *San Diego Sector California* (Jan. 26, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y5zgvftf>; Gov’t  
24 Accountability Off., *GAO-17-331, Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to  
25 Better Assess Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying  
26 Capability Gaps* 48, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-331>.

27 <sup>149</sup> CBP, *Border Fencing – California* (June 2011), <https://tinyurl.com/y24zbf4>; CBP,  
28 *FY17 U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions (Deportable) & Fencing* (Dec. 6, 2017),  
<https://tinyurl.com/ydf146zk>.

<sup>150</sup> CBP, *El Centro Sector California* (Apr. 11, 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y5kpbk2e>;  
*Southwest Border Security*, *supra* note 148.

<sup>151</sup> CBP, *Border Fencing 2011 & 2017*, *supra* note 149.

1 California Endangered Species Act, Cal. Fish & Game Code § 2050 et seq. These species include  
2 the following federally and state endangered species: the Mexican flannel bush, Thornmint, the  
3 Quino Checkerspot Butterfly, the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, and the Peninsular Desert  
4 Bighorn sheep.<sup>152</sup> Some of the listed plant species, such as the Tecate Cypress and the Mexican  
5 flannel bush, are so rare they can only be found in these wilderness areas.<sup>153</sup> The federally and  
6 state-endangered Peninsular Desert Bighorn sheep has a range that includes mountainous terrain  
7 in Mexico near the United States-Mexico border and extends north across the border through the  
8 Jacumba Wilderness to California's Anza-Borrego State Park.<sup>154</sup>

9 355. The construction of border barriers within or near the Jacumba Wilderness Area  
10 and the Otay Mountain Wilderness Area will have significant adverse effects on environmental  
11 resources, including direct and indirect impacts to endangered or threatened wildlife. These  
12 injuries to California's public trust resources would not occur but for Defendants' unlawful and  
13 unconstitutional diversion of funds.

14 356. The construction of a border wall in the El Paso Sector along New Mexico's  
15 southern border will have significant adverse effects on the State's environmental resources,  
16 including direct and indirect impacts to endangered or threatened wildlife.

17 357. If Defendants use the diverted funding announced in President Trump's February  
18 15 Executive Actions to construct any of the border wall in New Mexico, it will impose  
19 environmental harm to the State. The environmental damage caused by a border wall in New  
20

---

21  
22 <sup>152</sup> Cal. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, *Threatened and Endangered Species*,  
23 <https://tinyurl.com/7l65784> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019); Wilderness Connect, *Jacumba*  
24 *Wilderness*, <https://tinyurl.com/y5yh23x5> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019); U.S. Bureau of Land  
25 Management, *Jacumba Wilderness* <https://tinyurl.com/y43hv424> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019); U.S.  
26 Bureau of Land Management, *Otay Mountain Wilderness* <https://tinyurl.com/y3zamvsh> (last  
27 visited Feb. 17, 2019); Wilderness Connect, *Otay Mountain Wilderness*,  
28 <https://tinyurl.com/y3ymkazn> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).

<sup>153</sup> Wilderness Connect, *Otay Mountain*, *supra* note 152.

<sup>154</sup> Cal. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, *Peninsular Desert Bighorn Sheep*  
<https://tinyurl.com/yyvu5kwa> (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).

1 Mexico would include the blocking of wildlife migration, flooding, and habitat loss.<sup>155</sup>

2 358. The Chihuahuan desert bisected by the New Mexico-Mexico border is the most  
3 biologically diverse desert in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>156</sup> Species common along the border are a  
4 number of endangered, threatened, and candidate species including the beautiful shiner,  
5 Chiricahua leopard frog, jaguar, lesser long-nosed bat, loach minnow, Mexican long-nosed bat,  
6 Mexican spotted owl, Mexican wolf, narrow-headed gartersnake, New Mexican ridge-nosed rattle  
7 snake, northern aplomado falcon, northern Mexican gartersnake, southwestern willow flycatcher,  
8 spikedace, and yellow billed cuckoo.<sup>157</sup> A barrier built in the Chihuahuan desert is likely to  
9 disrupt or destroy habitat of these migratory animals, nesting birds and reclusive reptiles.

10 359. In particular, New Mexico's border is also home to the endangered Mexican gray  
11 wolf, the rarest subspecies of gray wolf in North America, which was nearly extirpated by the  
12 1970s and only recently reintroduced.<sup>158</sup> A wall impossible to breach may make it impossible for  
13 the wolf to disperse across the border to reestablish recently extirpated populations or bolster  
14 small existing populations. On March 14, 2018, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish  
15 signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife to increase cooperation in  
16 reintroduction of this species to the wild, evidencing the State's commitment to preventing the  
17 extinction of this species.

18 360. The segment of New Mexico's border with Mexico that does not already have  
19 primary fencing is in the State's "bootheel" region.<sup>159</sup> If Defendants' diverted funding resulted in  
20 the construction of a barrier in New Mexico's bootheel, it would cause environmental harm in

21 <sup>155</sup> See Robert Peters et al., *Nature Divided, Scientists United: US–Mexico Border Wall*  
22 *Threatens Biodiversity and Binational Conservation*, BioScience (Oct. 2018),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y3t4ymfn>.

23 <sup>156</sup> Nat'l Park Service, *Chihuahuan Desert Ecoregion* (Sept. 20, 2018),  
<https://www.nps.gov/im/chdn/ecoregion.htm>.

24 <sup>157</sup> U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., *Species By County Report*, <https://tinyurl.com/yxmwz9qm>  
25 (Hidalgo County, NM); <https://tinyurl.com/y4ojwrtq> (Luna County, NM) (last visited Feb. 17,  
2019).

26 <sup>158</sup> U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., *Mexican Wolf*, <https://tinyurl.com/y2hf5ea2> (last visited  
27 Feb. 17, 2019).

28 <sup>159</sup> CBP, *Border Fencing - New Mexico/West Texas* (June 2011),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y24zfb4>.

1 one of the State’s most ecologically pristine and fragile regions. The bootheel is where temperate  
2 and subtropical climates converge, making it another of the most biologically diverse regions in  
3 the world, home to jaguars and wolves that coexist along the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>160</sup> Recognizing  
4 the ecological importance of this region, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has designated large  
5 segments of the bootheel’s border with Mexico as critical habitat for the jaguar.<sup>161</sup>

6 361. Defendant DHS has not engaged in a public review of these adverse effects. By  
7 failing to do so at the earliest possible stage of the project’s planning process, DHS is violating  
8 the requirements of NEPA. *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 348-49  
9 (1989); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.27(b)(9), (10). California and New Mexico have suffered, and will  
10 continue to suffer, injuries to their procedural rights under NEPA and the APA, 5 U.S.C. section  
11 551, and injuries to their concrete, quasi-sovereign interests relating to the preservation of wildlife  
12 resources within their boundaries, including but not limited to wildlife on state properties.  
13 *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497, 519-24 (2007); *Sierra Forest Legacy*, 646 F.3d at 1178.  
14 These injuries to California’s and New Mexico’s procedural rights and quasi-sovereign interests  
15 would not occur but for Defendants’ unlawful and unconstitutional diversion of funds.

### 16 **DECLARATORY/INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

17 362. Plaintiff States will suffer irreparable injury if Defendants take action to build the  
18 border wall by diverting funds and resources in contravention of the United States Constitution  
19 and several federal statutes, and Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

### 20 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### 21 **VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS**

22 363. Plaintiff States incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs by  
23 reference.

24 364. Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution enumerates that “[a]ll  
25 legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in [the] Congress.” Article I, Section 8 of the

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>160</sup> Lauren Villagran, *Land That Time Forgot*, Albuquerque J. (Apr. 30, 2017),  
<https://tinyurl.com/mxqht6r>.

28 <sup>161</sup> U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., *Jaguar (Panthera onca)*, <https://tinyurl.com/y6qpjdjl> (last  
visited Feb. 17, 2019); 79 Fed. Reg. 12571 (Mar. 5, 2014).

1 United States Constitution vests exclusively in Congress the spending power to “provide for  
2 the . . . General Welfare of the United States.”

3 365. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the  
4 Presentment Clause, requires that all bills passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate  
5 be presented to the President for signature. The President then has the choice to sign or veto the  
6 bill. Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that the President “shall take  
7 Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

8 366. The President acts at the lowest ebb of his power if he acts contrary to the  
9 expressed or implied will of Congress. *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579,  
10 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, there is no provision in the United States  
11 Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes, including  
12 appropriations already approved by Congress and signed into law by the President. *Clinton v.*  
13 *City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).

14 367. Defendants have violated the United States Constitution’s separation of powers  
15 doctrine by taking executive action to fund a border wall for which Congress has refused to  
16 appropriate funding. The 2019 Appropriations Act is an explicit denial of the President’s  
17 requested funding for a border wall. Defendants have further violated the separation of powers  
18 doctrine—specifically the Presentment Clause—by unilaterally diverting funding that Congress  
19 already appropriated for other purposes to fund a border wall for which Congress has provided no  
20 appropriations.

21 368. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that  
22 Defendants’ diversion of funding and resources toward the construction of a border wall is  
23 unconstitutional, and the Court should enjoin Defendants’ implementation of the President’s  
24 Executive Actions.

## 25 **SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

### 26 **VIOLATION OF APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE**

27 369. Plaintiff States incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs by  
28 reference.



1 statute does not contemplate the construction of a border wall as proposed by the President.  
2 Moreover, Defendants have acted ultra vires in seeking to transfer funding pursuant to section  
3 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Consolidated Appropriations Act to ultimately use  
4 for the construction of a border wall because it is not being transferred for: (a) a “higher priority  
5 item;” (b) “unforeseen military requirements;” or (c) an item for which Congress has not denied  
6 funding.

7 378. Defendants have acted ultra vires in seeking to divert funding pursuant to 31  
8 U.S.C. section 9705 for failure to meet the criteria required under that statute.

9 379. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that  
10 Defendants’ diversion of funding and resources toward the construction of a border wall is  
11 unlawful, and the Court should enjoin Defendants’ implementation of the President’s Executive  
12 Actions.

#### 13 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### 14 **VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT** 15 **(Constitutional Violation and Excess of Statutory Authority under 10 U.S.C. section 284,** 16 **section 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and 31 U.S.C.** **section 9705)**

17 380. Plaintiff States incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs by  
18 reference.

19 381. Defendants DOD and the Treasury are “agencies” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. section  
20 551(1), and diversions of funding for construction of a border wall constitute “agency action”  
21 under the APA, *id.* section 551(13).

22 382. The diversion of federal funds toward construction of a border wall constitutes an  
23 “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other  
24 adequate remedy in a court.” *Id.* § 704.

25 383. The APA requires that a court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,  
26 findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or  
27 immunity,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory  
28 right.” *Id.* § 706(2)(B)-(C).



1 otherwise not in accordance with law.” *Id.* § 706(2)(A).

2 390. Defendants DOD and the Treasury’s diversion of funding and resources pursuant  
3 to 10 U.S.C. section 284, section 8005 of the FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act,  
4 and 31 U.S.C. section 9705 for construction of a border wall is arbitrary and capricious and an  
5 abuse of discretion because Defendants have relied on factors that Congress did not intend, failed  
6 to consider an important aspect of the problem the agency is addressing, and offered no  
7 explanation for the decision to divert funding and resources toward construction of a border wall  
8 that is consistent with the evidence that is before the agencies. *See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of*  
9 *the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

10 391. For the reasons stated herein, because Defendants DOD and the Treasury acted in  
11 an arbitrary and capricious manner in diverting federal funds and resources toward construction  
12 of a border wall pursuant to the statutes described above, these actions are unlawful and should be  
13 set aside under 5 U.S.C. section 706. Moreover, the Court should enjoin Defendants’  
14 implementation of the Executive Actions.

15 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

16 **VIOLATION OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT**

17 **(For Plaintiff States California and New Mexico)**

18 392. Plaintiff States incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs by  
19 reference.

20 393. Defendant DHS is an “agency” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. section 552(1).

21 394. Defendant DHS has taken final agency action by proposing southern border wall  
22 development projects in “high priority” areas and has identified specific projects along the border  
23 in the El Centro, San Diego, and El Paso Sectors.<sup>162</sup>

24 395. Defendants, through the Executive Actions, have taken steps to divert federal

25  
26 <sup>162</sup> The proposed projects are not located within areas covered by any existing waiver  
27 issued by DHS pursuant to section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  
28 Responsibility Act (8 U.S.C. § 1103 note). 84 Fed. Reg. 2897 (February 8, 2019); 83 Fed. Reg.  
3012 (January 22, 2018); 82 Fed. Reg. 42829 (September 12, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 35984 (August  
2, 2017).

1 funding and other resources for those southern border wall construction projects.

2 396. NEPA compels federal agencies such as Defendant DHS to evaluate and consider  
3 the direct, indirect and cumulative effects that a proposed development project or program will  
4 have on the environment by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS that analyzes a reasonable  
5 range of alternatives and compares each alternative’s environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. §§  
6 1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8, 1508.27(b)(7). The EIS must also include an analysis of the affected  
7 areas and resources and the environmental consequences of the proposed action and the  
8 alternatives. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.10- 1502.19. The agency must commence preparation of the EIS  
9 “as close as possible to the time that the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal” so  
10 that the environmental effects of each alternative can be evaluated in a meaningful way. 40  
11 C.F.R. § 1502.23.

12 397. Defendant DHS is in violation of NEPA and the APA because it failed to prepare  
13 an EIS concerning border wall development projects that will have adverse effects on the  
14 environment, including but not limited to direct, indirect and cumulative impacts on plant and  
15 animal species that are listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act  
16 and/or California Endangered Species Act.

17 398. The imminent nature of this action is shown by the Trump Administration’s  
18 expression of its intent to move quickly with the construction of the border wall, DHS’s  
19 announcement designating priority areas for new border wall construction within the San Diego,  
20 El Centro, and El Paso Sectors, and Defendant Nielsen’s testimony regarding the intent to  
21 construct even more fencing than previously designated.<sup>163</sup> In addition, during his speech  
22 announcing the Emergency Declaration, President Trump spoke of his desire to build the wall  
23 “much faster” that he could otherwise,<sup>164</sup> and recently claimed that “[m]any additional contracts  
24 are close to being signed.”<sup>165</sup>

25  
26 <sup>163</sup> Rachael Bade et al., *‘A Recipe for Disaster’? Trump’s Border Emergency Drags the*  
*GOP into a Risky Fight Ahead of 2020*, Wash. Post (Feb. 15, 2019), <https://tinyurl.com/y413lu99>.

27 <sup>164</sup> White House, *President Trump’s Feb. 15, 2019, Remarks*, *supra* note 60.

28 <sup>165</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 8, 2019, 4:24 AM),  
<https://tinyurl.com/y3tsqmg1>.



1 Dated: March 13, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

XAVIER BECERRA  
Attorney General of California  
ROBERT W. BYRNE  
SALLY MAGNANI  
MICHAEL L. NEWMAN  
Senior Assistant Attorneys General  
MICHAEL P. CAYABAN  
CHRISTINE CHUANG  
EDWARD H. OCHOA  
Supervising Deputy Attorneys General

/s/ James F. Zahradka II  
JAMES F. ZAHRADKA II (SBN 196822)  
HEATHER C. LESLIE  
LEE I. SHERMAN  
JANELLE M. SMITH  
Deputy Attorneys General  
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor  
Oakland, CA 94612-0550  
Telephone: (510) 879-1247  
E-mail: James.Zahradka@doj.ca.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of California*

Philip J. Weiser  
Attorney General of Colorado

WILLIAM TONG  
Attorney General of Connecticut

/s/ Eric R. Olson  
Eric R. Olson (*pro hac vice pending*)  
Solicitor General  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Colorado*

/s/ Margaret Q. Chapple  
MARGARET Q. CHAPPLE (*pro hac vice  
forthcoming*)  
Deputy Attorney General  
55 Elm Street  
Hartford, CT 06106  
Telephone: (860) 808-5316  
Margaret.chapple@ct.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Connecticut*

1 KATHLEEN JENNINGS  
Attorney General of Delaware  
2 AARON R. GOLDSTEIN  
Chief Deputy Attorney General  
3 ILONA KIRSHON  
Deputy State Solicitor  
4  
5 /s/ David J. Lyons  
DAVID J. LYONS  
Deputy Attorney General  
6 *Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Delaware*

9 KWAME RAOUL  
Attorney General  
10 State of Illinois  
11 By: /s/ Caleb Rush  
Caleb Rush  
12 Assistant Attorney General  
David L. Franklin, Solicitor General  
13 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor  
Chicago IL 60601  
14 (312) 814-5376  
crush@atg.state.il.us  
15 *Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Illinois*

17 AARON M. FREY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE  
18 SUSAN P. HERMAN (*pro hac vice pending*)  
Deputy Attorney General  
19 6 State House Station  
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006  
20 Telephone: (207) 626-8814  
Email: susan.herman@maine.gov  
21 *Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Maine*

CLARE E. CONNORS  
Attorney General of Hawaii  
  
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth  
CLYDE J. WADSWORTH  
Solicitor General  
Department of the Attorney General  
425 Queen Street  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813  
Telephone: (808) 586-1360  
E-mail: Clyde.J.Wadsworth@hawaii.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Hawaii*

BRIAN E. FROSH  
Attorney General of Maryland  
  
/s/ Jeffrey P. Dunlap  
Jeffrey P. Dunlap (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
Assistant Attorney General  
200 Saint Paul Place, 20th Floor  
Baltimore, MD 21202  
(410) 576-6300  
jdunlap@oag.state.md.us  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Maryland*

MAURA HEALEY  
Attorney General for Massachusetts  
  
/s/ Abigail B. Taylor  
ABIGAIL B. TAYLOR (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
Director, Child & Youth Protection Unit  
DAVID C. KRAVITZ  
Assistant State Solicitor  
TARA D. DUNN  
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division  
Office of the Attorney General  
One Ashburton Place  
Boston, MA 02108  
Tel: (617) 727-2200  
Abigail.Taylor@mass.gov  
David.Kravitz@mass.gov  
Tara.Dunn@mass.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff Commonwealth of Massachusetts*

1 Dana Nessel  
Michigan Attorney General  
2 P.O. Box 30212  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
3  
4 /s/ B. Eric Restuccia  
Assistant Attorney General B. Eric Restuccia  
(P49550) (*pro hac vice pending*)  
5 Solicitor General Fadwa A. Hammoud  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Michigan*

KEITH ELLISON  
Attorney General of Minnesota  
JOHN KELLER  
Chief Deputy Attorney General  
JAMES W. CANADAY  
Deputy Attorney General  
  
/s/ Jacob Campion  
JACOB CAMPION (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
Assistant Attorney General  
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128  
Telephone: (651) 757-1459  
Email: [jacob.campion@ag.state.mn.us](mailto:jacob.campion@ag.state.mn.us)  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Minnesota*

10 AARON D. FORD  
11 Attorney General of Nevada  
12  
13 /s/ Heidi Parry Stern  
HEIDI PARRY STERN  
Solicitor General  
Office of the Nevada Attorney General  
14 100 North Carson Street  
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717  
15 775-684-1100  
775-684-1108 Fax  
16 *Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Nevada*

GURBIR S. GREWAL  
Attorney General of New Jersey  
  
/s/ Jeremy Feigenbaum  
JEREMY FEIGENBAUM (*pro hac vice*  
*forthcoming*)  
Assistant Attorney General  
New Jersey Attorney General's Office  
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  
25 Market Street  
Trenton, NJ 08625  
(609) 376-3235  
[Jeremy.Feigenbaum@njoag.gov](mailto:Jeremy.Feigenbaum@njoag.gov)  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of New Jersey*

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 HECTOR BALDERAS  
Attorney General of New Mexico  
2  
3 /s/ Tania Maestas  
TANIA MAESTAS (*pro hac vice*  
*forthcoming*)  
4 Chief Deputy Attorney General  
NICHOLAS M. SYDOW  
5 Civil Appellate Chief  
JENNIE LUSK  
6 Assistant Attorney General, Director  
MATTHEW L. GARCIA  
7 Governor's General Counsel  
PO Drawer 1508  
8 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508  
E-mail: [tmaestas@nmag.gov](mailto:tmaestas@nmag.gov)  
9 *Attorneys for Plaintiff State of New Mexico,*  
*by and through Attorney General Hector*  
10 *Balderas*

11 ELLEN ROSENBLUM  
12 Attorney General of Oregon  
Henry Kantor (*pro hac vice pending*)  
13 Special Counsel to Attorney General  
14 /s/ J. Nicole Defever  
J. NICOLE DEFEVER SBN #191525  
15 Senior Assistant Attorney General  
16 *Attorney for the State of Oregon*

LETITIA JAMES  
Attorney General of the State of New York  
  
By: /s/ Matthew Colangelo  
Matthew Colangelo  
*Chief Counsel for Federal Initiatives*  
Steven C. Wu, *Deputy Solicitor General*  
Eric R. Haren, *Special Counsel*  
Gavin McCabe, *Special Assistant Attorney General*  
Amanda Meyer, *Assistant Attorney General*  
Office of the New York State Attorney General  
28 Liberty Street  
New York, NY 10005  
Phone: (212) 416-6057  
[matthew.colangelo@ag.ny.gov](mailto:matthew.colangelo@ag.ny.gov)  
*Attorneys for the State of New York*

PETER F. NERONHA  
Attorney General of Rhode Island  
  
/s/ Justin Sullivan  
JUSTIN J. SULLIVAN (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
Special Assistant Attorney General  
Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General  
150 South Main Street  
Providence, RI 02903  
Tel: (401) 274-4400 | Fax: (401) 453-0410  
[jjullivan@riag.ri.gov](mailto:jjullivan@riag.ri.gov)  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Rhode Island*

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 THOMAS J. DONOVAN  
2 Attorney General of Vermont  
3 /s/ Benjamin D. Battles  
4 BENJAMIN D. BATTLES (*pro hac vice*  
5 *forthcoming*)  
6 Solicitor General  
7 109 State Street  
8 Montpelier, VT 05609  
9 (802) 828-5500  
10 [benjamin.battles@vermont.gov](mailto:benjamin.battles@vermont.gov)  
11 *Attorneys for the State of Vermont*

MARK R. HERRING  
Attorney General  
TOBY J. HEYTENS  
Solicitor General  
Counsel of Record  
MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE  
Principal Deputy  
Solicitor General  
  
/s/ Michelle S. Kallen  
MICHELLE S. KALLEN  
Deputy Solicitor General  
BRITTANY M. JONES (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
Attorney  
Office of the Attorney General  
202 North Ninth Street  
Richmond, Virginia 23219  
(804) 786-7240 – Telephone  
(804) 371-0200 – Facsimile  
[SolicitorGeneral@oag.state.va.us](mailto:SolicitorGeneral@oag.state.va.us)  
*Attorney for Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia*

13 JOSHUA L. KAUL  
14 Wisconsin Attorney General  
15 /s/ Gabe Johnson-Karp  
16 GABE JOHNSON-KARP (*pro hac vice*  
17 *forthcoming*)  
18 Assistant Attorney General  
19 Wisconsin Department of Justice  
20 Post Office Box 7857  
21 Madison, WI 53707  
22 P: (608) 267-8904  
23 F: (608) 267-2223  
24 [johnsonkarp@doj.state.wi.us](mailto:johnsonkarp@doj.state.wi.us)  
25 *Attorney for State of Wisconsin*