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### COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, SS. SUCV2006-4617 SUCV2007-1220 SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT

Boston Police Patrolmen's Association ex Plaintiffs

vs.

MA Civil Service, City of Boston et al, Defendants

# HEARING BEFORE BRASSARD, J.

December 18, 2007

NOTICE SENT 01.08.07 S.G.S. H,+D. P.N.B. B.D. J.M.B. MASS. A.G

R.L.Q.

S.C.dM. K.H.H. J.M.S.

R. 4b. J.G.D. Suffolk County Superior Court Three Pemberton Square Boston, Massachusetts 02108

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(TAL)

## APPEARANCES

Patrick N. Bryant, Esq. One State Street Suite 200 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for the plaintiffs

Brýan Decker, Esq. One State Street Suite 200 Boston, MA 02109

Counsel for the plaintiffs

Robert L. Quinlan, Jr., AAG Mass. Atty. General's office One Ashburton Place Room 2019 Boston, MA 02108

Counsel for the Civil Service Commission & HRD

Kay H. Hodge, Esq.
Stoneham, Chandler & Miller
99 High Street
Boston, MA 02110

Counsel for the City of Boston

John M. Simon, Esq. Stoneham, Chandler & Miller 99 High Street Boston, MA 02110

Counsel for the City of Boston

# APPEARANCES, CON'T

Joseph G. Donnellan, Esq. Rogal & Donnellan, P.C. 43 Charles Street Boston, MA 02494

Counsel for the individually named defendants

### DECISION

THE COURT: I am going to affirm all of the decisions of the Civil Service Commission here largely, although not entirely, for the reasons set out in the papers of the so-called State defendants — the Civil Service Commission, the human resource director, and the individual State defendant, I believe, Mr. Dietl — as well as for the reasons set out again largely, but not entirely, in the papers put forward by the so-called City of Boston defendants. With respect to the issue of standing to appeal the Commission's decision permitting the transfer of the 33 officers from the Boston Municipal Police Department to the Boston Police Department, I note the following:

The standing issue before me today is different from the standing issue that was before me about a year ago in connection with the application for preliminary injunction. There I took a look at standing law in general as it has been developed by our appellate courts and by others over the years. I also examined more briefly some of the issues looked at or raised by the statute, Chapter 31,

Section 2B, and related provisions of Chapter 31.

But my decision, both explicitly and clearly, had to be and was grounded in general standing law. What was before me was a declaratory judgment.

The standing issue before me today is significantly more narrow. It relates to the set of persons who may take an appeal to the Commission pursuant to Section 2B. That statute narrows significantly the set of potential plaintiffs who have standing otherwise under general principles of standing. Specifically, 2B requires that an appeal may be taken only by a person aggrieved. Further, the statute expressly states that such a person must specifically allege actual harm to one's employment status. I perceive no concrete allegation of actual harm to anyone's employment status.

I have listened with care to the arguments advanced by the Boston Police Patrolmen's

Association with respect to overtime, with respect to so-called competition for advancement, and also with respect to safety. I do not think that concepts of overtime that might be foregone or competition for advancement with others are within the zone of interest or the statutory intent as to

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harm to one's employment status.

Safety is a more difficult issue in the sense that it may well be within the sweep of the statute's concept of harm to one's employment status. Even if it is, I perceive on this record no indication of a threat to safety toward the plaintiff group here, either the ten taxpayers, or the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, or the body of officers whom that association represents.

Among other reasons, the 33 officers in question have all had significant police experience working for the Boston Municipal Police Department. That experience has been found by a specialized agency of the State government, the Civil Service Commission, to be similar experience to the work done by the Boston Police Department.

Furthermore, each of those 33 officers has been, as has been pointed out here, carefully screened in terms of background, psychological fitness, physical fitness, and the other requirements for becoming a Boston Police officer. Furthermore, each of those 33 officers has attended not only training within the Boston Municipal Police Department, but also Boston Police Academy training.

In every respect, on the record before me, there is no indication whatsoever that any of these 33 officers stands in any different relationship to the membership of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association than does any other newly graduated member of the Boston Police Department, that is to say newly graduated from the Boston Police Academy.

So with respect to the contested issues as to transfer of the 33 officers, I think the decision of the Commission is altogether respectful of our law as to standing, is not in violation of any of those laws, is certainly not arbitrary or capricious, and is certainly not an abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, I will add, although it doesn't bear precisely on standing issues, but it might, that nothing about that decision is inconsistent with the theme of merit principles that are at the heart of Chapter 31 of the General Laws.

The plaintiffs here have asserted there's an independent ground for jurisdiction and there's an independent basis to challenge the transfer decisions, and that this may be done in the form of a ten taxpayer challenge. My conclusion is that it may not be so done. I accept the position of the

City that there is no expenditure of new funds at issue here. Speaking to the ten taxpayer issue, I point out that there is case law that such relief is only available if a town or a municipality is about to raise or expend money, or incur obligations, that the right to sue is not present if the challenged action has already occurred.

Here there may well be, on this record, no indication of any expenditure of funds over and beyond what had already been taking place both at the time of the filing of this lawsuit and today. I point to, among other decisions, Kapinos versus Chicopee, 334 MA 196. Looking at the ten taxpayer cases, I also conclude that trying to fit this set of concerns on the part of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association into that statute and that remedy is simply not a good fit.

The plaintiffs here also urge that their request to seek an investigation was improperly denied. Judgment should enter for the defendants on this issue as well for a number of reasons. First, there has been no final adjudicatory decision within the meaning of Section 44. Second, while the statute certainly does not require that a petition

for investigation need only be made by an aggrieved person, the statute, in my view, can only be fairly read to confer significant discretion upon the Civil Service Commission in terms of what response and to what extent, if at all, an investigation is

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appropriate.

Here, the Commission did look at the matter and did render a decision; one that was grounded largely in its conclusion that it had already considered at length, over a period of time, each of the three issues the plaintiffs sought to be investigated under 2A, namely first, whether the positions of Boston Municipal Police Department officers and Boston Police Department officers are similar, second, whether BMPD employees are police officers and/or permanent employees, and third, whether the transfers were contrary to basic merit principles articulated by the statute. That action, that conclusion satisfied all of the Commission's obligations to these plaintiffs by way of a petition for investigation under Section 2A.

With respect to the decision of the Commission, granting permanent civil-service status to the 23 BMPD officers, I also conclude that the decisions of

the Commission should be affirmed for the following reasons. I think it is a close question as to whether the plaintiffs here have standing to appeal that decision as to the grant of permanent civilservice status. The papers before me, the record before me, appear to indicate that the Commission allowed these plaintiffs to intervene and not merely to act as limited participants. All of these concepts are addressed in the Code of Massachusetts regulations, 801 CMR 1.01.

If the Commission permitted the plaintiffs to intervene, then it seems to me that the plaintiffs have a strong argument that they may act like any other party including taking an appeal from a Commission decision. I note that the Commission specifically used the language of intervention when it concluded early on in these proceedings that the BPPA was indirectly, substantially, and specifically affected by the proceedings. I conclude, however, that even if the plaintiffs had standing to pursue an appeal of that decision, that on the merits, that outcome, that decision on the part of the Commission should be affirmed.

With respect to the 20 officers who received

the benefit of Chapter 282, I conclude, for the 1 reasons expressed by the State defendants, that 2 these officers were provisional civil-service 3 employees by virtue of the various decisions and 4 5 changes in the City of Boston employment situation. They were not temporary civil-service employees, nor obviously were they, at that juncture, permanent. 7 8 They became permanent by the provisions of Chapter 9 I accept entirely the argument of the State 10 defendants that, at this juncture, some many years 11 later, it is simply inconceivable that a challenge 12 may be made to their employment status. It would be inequitable in the extreme for the courts to permit 13 14 such a challenge to occur.

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With respect to the 13 individuals hired after July 1, 1997 and sometime before, approximately, the end of 1999, I do note that all of these individuals had at least five years of police experience. I note further that their rights under Chapter 31 were abridged; they had no direct mechanism to obtain permanency. All 13 of these individuals took and passed the State examination in approximately '00 to '02. I note that the exercise of authority under Chapter 310 is one that our cases have said is

largely committed, if not entirely committed, to the informed discretion of the Civil Service Commission.

I also conclude that the positions were similar for the reasons described in the State defendants' papers. Again, for those same reasons, I conclude that the requirements for appointment were not substantially different. Furthermore, I conclude, for the reasons I have already described, that the public interest called for and supports the highly discretionary decision of the administrator in terms of his conclusion that the public interest warranted the transfers at issue.

For these reasons, once again, I affirm all of the decisions of the Commission. Judgment shall enter on the motions for pleadings filed by all parties as follows: judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiffs, the decisions of the Commission are affirmed.

(Decision concludes)

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## C-E-R-T-I-F-C-A-T-E

I, Caryn Johnson, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, pages 1 through 12, is a true and accurate transcription of Judge Brassard's decision as dictated in open court on December 18, 2007.

Caryn Johnson, OCR