COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH

FAR-27605 2018-P-1440

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Appellee

V.

JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant

COMMONWEALTH'S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

SUFFOLK COUNTY

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REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

The Commonwealth respectfully requests leave from this Court to obtain further appellate review of the Appeals Court decision in *Commonwealth v. Chin-Clarke*, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 604 (2020). The Appeals Court reversed the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence because they concluded that Officer McHugh did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the initial seizure of the defendant. *Chin-Clarke*, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 611.

Further appellate review is appropriate because the Appeals Court majority (1) ignored a critical factual finding of the judge that gave context to Officer McHugh's observations, (2) improperly parsed the facts found by the motion judge rather than viewing them in totality and in light of the officer's experience, and (3) imposed a greater quantum for reasonable suspicion than required under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

STATEMENT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On May 2, 2017, the defendant, Jamal Chin-Clarke, was arraigned in Suffolk Superior Court, Indictment Number 1784CR0243, for the following charges: carrying a firearm without a license, in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10(a); carrying a loaded firearm without a license, in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10(n); posses-

sion with intent to distribute a class B substance, in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(b); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(d); and possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, in violation of G.L. c. 265, § 18B. (C.A.4-5).

On December 11, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence (C.A.8). The Commonwealth filed an opposition to that motion on June 7, 2018 (C.A.9). On June 7, 2018, the Honorable Diane Freniere held an evidentiary hearing and denied the defendant's motion to suppress on June 28, 2018 (C.A.9).

The defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 25, 2018, and an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County on July 26, 2018 (C.A.10, 14). On August 3, 2018, the Single Justice, Lowy, J., allowed the defendant's application and ordered the case be transmitted to the Appeals Court (C.A.14). This case was entered in the Appeals Court on October 16, 2018 (C.A.15).

After briefing and oral argument, on June 9, 2020, the Appeals Court (Shin, Singh, JJ. with Meade, J. dissenting) reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. See Chin-Clarke, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 611.

¹ (C.A.[page]) herein refers to the record appendix attached to this application; and (Tr.[page]) refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing which is included at the end of the Commonwealth's appendix.

Neither party sought reconsideration or a rehearing in the Appeals Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

A. Motion Judge's Findings of Fact.

At the evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer Michael McHugh, whom the motion judge found credible (Tr.3-51; C.A.18). The defendant did not present any evidence. After the evidentiary hearing, the motion judge issued written findings of fact and rulings of law on June 28, 2018 (C.A.17-24). The judge made the following factual findings:

I credit and accept the testimony of Officer McHugh regarding the events he observed and participated in the morning of January 27, 2017 (Tr.3-51). I find that Officer McHugh is an experienced member of the Boston Police Department, serving as an officer in varied capacities for 10 years (Tr.4-6). In addition to his academy training and yearly in-service training, Officer McHugh has participated in specialized training in surveillance tactics, active shooter training and trademarks and identification of armed subjects (Tr.5).

For the last four years, Officer McHugh has been assigned to a plain-clothes, walking beat in the downtown Boston area, covering in relevant part the portion of Boylston Street between Washington and Tremont Streets. (Tr.5-6). The area is dominated by commercial properties and has heavy pedestrian foot traffic (Tr.5-7). It is a high crime area with frequent arrests for buy-

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² The Commonwealth has included citations to the motion hearing transcript in parenthesis where there is support in the record for the judge's findings.

ing/selling narcotics, larceny, robbery, assault, trespassing and shoplifting (Tr.5-12). As for shoplifting, Officer McHugh has made numerous arrests for shoplifting and has made observations of individuals selling or trading stolen property on the street (Tr.5-12). Additionally, Officer McHugh has made numerous shoplifting arrests and has observed individuals selling and/or trading their stolen property outside on the street, often to feed drug addiction (Tr.5-12). Officer McHugh has made arrests for shoplifting crimes based on his observation of people engaged in commerce on the street with items with tags still on them and/or items in bags not consistent with the contained items (Tr.10).

Saint Frances House ("SFH"), a daytime homeless shelter located at 39 Boylston Street, is within Officer McHugh's walking beat and he spends much of his time patrolling in and around SFH (Tr.10-12). SFH provides daytime meals, social services and clothing to the homeless (Tr.10-12). SFH has security comprising a half-dozen blue-uniformed staff equipped with metal detectors to uncover weapons (Tr. 10-12). There are frequent altercations both inside and outside SFH and Officer McHugh has made hundreds of arrests [SFH] for crimes ranging from drug dealing/possession, stabbings, warrant rests, trespassing and malicious destruction of property (Tr.10-12).

On January 27, 2017 at approximately 9:20 A.M., Officer McHugh was in plain clothes working alone on Boylston Street in the vicinity of SFH (Tr.12-13). Officer McHugh carried an iPad tablet which he routinely used to access the Criminal Justice Information System ("CJIS"), including booking photos, license photos, warrants and BOP records (Tr.13). As he walked past the front door of SFH, Officer McHugh observed three males looking in a plastic shopping bag and talking to each other (Tr.14). Officer McHugh was alerted to the three males,

who he did not know, when he noticed that the bag contained clothing and some of the clothing was outside of the bag with tags still attached and visible (Tr.14-15). Based on this observation, his training and experience, Officer McHugh suspected that the men were involved in a street sale transaction of stolen clothing and he decided to conduct a threshold inquiry (Tr.14-15).

As Officer McHugh approached the males, he overheard one male ask "how much is this?" as another male held up some merchandise (Tr.15-16). Officer McHugh then engaged the trio directly asking "what's up guys? that stuff stolen?" (Tr.15-16). Startled, the male holding up the merchandise (later identified as Milton Noj) responded "Woah" Officer McHugh identified himself (Tr.16). as a Boston Police officer and asked the men for their identifications (Tr.16-17). Officer McHugh spoke with Noj, Chin-Clarke had his hands in his front pockets and was looking up and down Boylston Street (Tr.20-For safety purposes, Officer McHugh asked the Chin-Clarke to stand next to the exterior of the SFH building while he spoke with Noj (Tr.34). Noj initially told Officer McHugh that he purchased the items in the plastic bag at the Natick Mall (Tr.17). When asked for receipts, Noj then told Officer McHugh that his mother gave the items to him and he did not have any receipts (Tr.17-18).This change in story further heightened Officer McHugh's belief that the items were stolen (Tr.18). Noj was nervous but provided his identifying information, to include his full name and date of birth, without hesitation (Tr.18). Officer McHugh accessed CJIS images on his iPad to confirm Noj's identity (Tr.19-20).

Officer McHugh's interaction with Noj to confirm his identity lasted 38 seconds (Exhibit 1). Officer McHugh then turned his attention to Chin-Clarke (Tr.21). While waiting, Chin-Clarke was fidgety, nervous and looking up and down Boylston Street,

again heightening Officer McHugh's suspicion that a crime was afoot (Tr.20-22). Chin-Clarke had his hands in his pockets and Officer McHugh instructed him to remove his hands from his pockets (Tr.21). Although he initially complied, within a minute or two Chin-Clarke put his hands back inside his clothing (Tr.21). Based on his observations of Chin-Clarke, Officer McHugh was concerned that the he might be armed and dangerous Officer McHugh asked the Chin-(Tr.21-22). for Clarke his identifying information (Tr.22). In response, Chin-Clarke noticeably hesitated before replying "Dana Clarke," and hesitated again before giving a date of birth of April 10, 1982 (Tr.22). Using that information, Officer McHugh accessed CJIS system and obtained a RMV license image for Dana Clarke (Tr.22-23). Although the image was similar to, it did not match, the individual standing before him (Tr.23). In an attempt to learn his true identify, Officer McHugh asked the Chin-Clarke for his social security number (Tr.23). Chin-Clarke could not remember either the last four or the first three digits of his social security number (Tr.23). Officer McHugh called for backup (Tr.24). In order to compare the RMV image to Chin-Clarke, Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke to take off his glasses and he complied (Tr.40). Concerned about his own safety, Officer McHugh then asked Noj and the Chin-Clarke to take a seat on the ground as he awaited backup (Tr.35). One minute thirty seconds later, Officer Fabian Belgrave, also in plain clothes, arrived on scene to assist Officer McHugh (Exhibit 1). Officer Belgrave agreed that the Chin-Clarke did not match the RMV image for As Officer Belgrave Dana Clarke (Tr.25). searched other images on CJIS, he asked Chin-Clarke to stand to get a better look at his face and it became increasingly clear to both officers that the person in front of them was not Dana Clarke (Tr.25-26).

Chin-Clarke stood directly in front of the two officers, smoking a cigarette as they

compared the CJIS images to him. 3 Given the totality of the circumstances, including Officer McHugh's initial observations of the suspicious street commerce and Chin-Clarke's nervous behavior, providing a false identification and inability to answer basic questions, Officer McHugh decided to handcuff the Chin-Clarke (Tr.26-27). In total, six minutes had passed from the time Officer McHugh began speaking to Chin-Clarke and his decision to handcuff him (Exhibit 1). Officer McHugh attempted to handcuff him, Chin-Clarke spun around striking Office Belgrave in the chest and the three men ended up wrestling to the ground as SFH security attempted to assist (Tr.26-27). Shortly, two other uniformed Boston Police Officers arrived on scene and placed Chin-Clarke into handcuffs (Tr.27). One of those officers, Officer Lopez, pat-frisked Chin-Clarke and located a firearm in a fanny pack in his front pant area, announcing "gun" to his fellow officers as he did so (Tr.27-28). Officers unzipped the fanny pack and recovered a loaded Beretta firearm, 9 bags of heroin and 23 bags of crack cocaine (Tr.28-Chin-Clarke was arrested and transported to District A-1 for booking (Tr.29). \$100 in currency and a cell At booking, phone were retrieved (Tr.29-30).

(C.A.18-21) (internal footnotes omitted).

B. Motion Judge's Rulings of Law.

1. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The motion judge reasoned that Officer McHugh's observations of what appeared to be the selling or trading of stolen goods in a high crime area particularly known for shoplifting and the selling or trading

³ This appears to be an erroneous finding in that there is no testimony that the defendant was smoking a cigarette, however, there is testimony to support that the defendant was standing directly in front of the two officers (Tr.23).

of stolen goods for drugs provided a reasonable suspicion that warranted further inquiry (C.A.23). The motion judge then reasoned that Officer McHugh was justified in making a threshold inquiry of Mr. Noj and the defendant because of the officer's observations and reasonable suspicion that the men were about to commit a crime, the sale of stolen property (C.A.24).

The judge also reasoned that asking Mr. Noj (the individual displaying the clothing) and the defendant for identifying information, in sequence, was a permissible and reasonable way to approach this field investigation and did not constitute a seizure of the (C.A.23).She concluded defendant that McHugh's initial instruction to the defendant to stand by the wall was a safety-based police tactic to separate the two suspects, which was particularly appropriate because Officer McHugh was outnumbered (C.A.23).4

2. Reasonable belief the defendant was armed and dangerous.

While concluding that the defendant was not seized until Officer McHugh asked him to turn around

⁴ While the Commonwealth conceded in the Appeals Court, as it does here, that the defendant was seized when Officer McHugh asked the defendant to stand by the wall while he first questioned Mr. Noj, and the motion judge concluded that the seizure did not occur until later, when the defendant was handcuffed, the difference is immaterial as reasonable suspicion existed at both points.

so that he could handcuff him (C.A.23-24), 5 the motion judge also ruled that at that point, the officers not only had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, but also that he was armed and dangerous (C.A.23-24). The evasive and conflicting responses from Mr. Noj and the defendant's hesitation, evasiveness and inability to provide valid identifying information enhanced that suspicion, and the defendant's nervousness, and repeated insertion of his hands in his pockets gave rise to the reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous (C.A.24). Accordingly, the judge denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized (C.A.24).

C. Appeals Court Ruling.

The Appeals Court majority concluded that Officer McHugh did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop and reversed the motion judge's ruling. The Court concluded that the defendant was seized no later than the point at which he was asked to stand against the wall. See Chin-Clarke, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 608. The majority focused on the facts Officer McHugh knew when he was asked to stand by the wall: "(1) Mr. Noj had a bag of clothes with

⁵ As discussed *supra* n.4 the judge's determination that the seizure did not occur until this point is immaterial as the judge also ruled that the police had reasonable suspicion at the time Officer McHugh asked the defendant to stand against the wall.

tags on them; (2) the three men were looking in the bag; (3) one of the mend said '[H]ow much is this?'; (4) Mr. Noj held up an item of merchandise; (5) Mr. Noj gave arguably conflicting answers about the origin of the clothes; and (6) the defendant appeared to be nervous, had his hands in his pockets (at times), and was looking up and down the street." Chin-Clarke, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 608-609.

The majority reasoned that that these facts did not give rise to reasonable suspicion and that the Officer observed nothing specific to suggest the defendant received or was about to receive any of the items knowing them to be stolen. See Chin-Clarke, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 609. Conspicuously absent from the majority's analysis is an important fact expressly found by the motion judge that provided critical context to Officer McHugh's observations: Officer McHugh made his observations in a specific locale -- a high crime area particularly known for shoplifting, where he had previously made numerous arrests for shoplifting and had observed individuals selling or trading stolen property on the street, often to feed drug addiction (Tr.5-12; C.A.18).

POINTS ON WHICH FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW IS SOUGHT

The Commonwealth seeks further appellate review of the motion judge's determination that based upon all the facts found by the motion judge Officer McHugh

had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity so as to warrant a further inquiry to confirm or dispel that suspicion and to ask the defendant to stand against the wall while inquiry was made of Mr. Noj. 6

REASONS WHY FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW IS APPROPRIATE

THE MAJORITY ERRED IN IGNORING A CRITICAL I. FACT FOUND BY THE MOTION JUDGE, IN PARSING THE FACTS FOUND RATHER THAN VIEWING THEM IN TOTALITY, AND BY REQUIRING MORE THAN THE REASONABLE SUSPICION **STANDARD** REQUIRES. BASED UPON THE FACTS FOUND BY THE MOTION JUDGE, OFFICER MCHUGH HAD A REASONABLE SUS-PICION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ENGAGED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SUFFICIENT TO THRESHOLD INQUIRY WHEN HE ASKED THE DEFEND-ANT TO STAND AGAINST THE WALL WHILE HE IN-QUIRED FIRST OF MR. NOJ.

A person is seized in the constitutional sense when "an officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce that person to stay." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 (2019). It is the defendant's burden to show that an encounter with the police rises to the level of a seizure in the constitutional sense. See Commonwealth v. Thinh Vao Cao,

 $^{^6}$ Between the time of briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Judicial Court released its opinion in Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357 (2019), clarifying when a defendant is seized in Massachusetts. As such, at oral argument the Commonwealth conceded, as it does here, the defendant was seized when Officer McHugh first asked the defendant to stand against the wall, for officer safety, while Officer McHugh spoke with Mr. Noj.

419 Mass. 383, 388 (1995). Here, the Commonwealth agrees that defendant was seized when Officer McHugh initially asked him to stand by the wall while Officer McHugh first inquired of Mr. Noj (Tr.35). See Matta, 483 Mass. at 362. (defendant seized because officer objectively communicated he would use power to coerce defendant to stay). As correctly found by the motion judge and overlooked by the Appeals Court majority, in the facts and circumstances known to Officer McHugh, he reasonably believed that the defendant and Mr. Noj were engaged in criminal behavior, the purchase and sale of stolen property when he asked the defendant to stand against the wall while he first questioned Mr. Officer McHugh's reasonable belief was grounded Noj. in specific and articulable facts observed in a particular context. He had worked in this part of downtown Boston for the last four years (Tr.5). In his experience, the locale was a high crime area where he had previously made numerous arrests for shoplifting and had observed individuals selling or trading stolen property on the street, often to feed drug addiction (Tr.5-12; C.A.18).

There, Officer McHugh observed the defendant, Mr. Noj, and another individual huddled in a doorway with Mr. Noj holding a plastic bag of clothing and the others looking at the clothing; the clothing had store tags attached to them; and one man asked "How much is

this?" when an item was held up from the bag on display Mr. Noj was startled when Officer McHugh engaged the trio directly asking "what's up guys? Is that stuff stolen?" (Tr.15-16). Mr. Noj replied "Woah." After immediately handing back the item of clothing to Mr. Noj, the defendant appeared to be nervous while constantly surveying Boylston Street and keeping his hands in his pockets (Tr.34).

"Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the touchstone of our analysis of police conduct that results in a search or seizure is whether that conduct was reasonable." Commonwealth v. Watts, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 517 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 406, Mass. 343, 346 (1989). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures" [citations omit-An investigatory stop, or "seizure" in the ted]). constitutional sense, is justified under art. 14 if the police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the stop. See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 363 (2017). "Reasonable suspi-

⁷ Article 14 does not impose a higher standard than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418

cion exists when an officer, based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's experience, has reasonable grounds to suspect a person is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 363-364 (2017). See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 820 (2010). Importantly, "reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause," Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 492 (1998), and it is measured objectively. See Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235 (2017).

Here, the Appeals Court majority erred both in ignoring the motion judge's factual finding as to the context in which Officer McHugh made his observations (a high crime area where he had made numerous arrests for shoplifting and encountered the trading of shoplifted merchandise for drugs) and in applying the reasonable suspicion standard by requiring more than a reasonable suspicion. The facts that form the basis for reasonable suspicion must be viewed collectively, in context, and in light of a police officer's experience, not parsed individually. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 476 Mass. 341, 346-347 (2017). A police officer may stop a person to conduct a threshold inquiry

^{(1981);} see also *Terry* v. *Ohio*, 392 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1968).

if the police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 394 (2004); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. "The standard is objective: 'would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?'" Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. An officer's suspicions may be derived from the application of his experience to his detailed observations of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 784 (2004). Seemingly innocent activities taken together can give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a threshold inquiry." Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 139 (2001). Analysis of the order in which events occur is critical in determining whether a threshold inquiry (or full-blown search and seizure) is proper. wealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 163 n.8 (1997).

The Appeals Court majority improperly parsed the motion judge's factual findings regarding Officer McHugh's observations and divorced them from the context and experience in which McHugh made his observations thereby diminishing their collective import. Based on this parsing, and requiring demonstrably more

than what reasonable suspicion requires, the Appeals Court majority incorrectly ruled that reasonable suspicion was lacking. The Commonwealth seeks further appellate review to correct the majority's error in this case and to reinforce the well-established, but sometimes misapplied canon of reasonable suspicion. Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights:

[T]he level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than probable cause." . . . Because it is a "less demanding" standard, "reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause." . . . The standard "depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.

Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1187-1188 (2020) (internal citations omitted). Here, Officer McHugh's observations, coupled with his significant experience in this particularized area of Boston, provided a lens through which his observations provided a reasonable suspicion that the defendant and Mr. Noj were engaged in criminal activity, specifically illegal street commerce. See Mercado, 422 Mass. at 369.

As noted in Justice Meade's dissent, this case is directly comparable to the seminal case, Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officer McHugh's actions were well within the guidelines set forth within the Fourth Amendment, and art. 14 does not require a higher standard than the Fourth Amendment. See Cortez, 449 U. S. at 417-418; Pinto, 476 Mass. at 363. Just as in Terry, Officer McHugh was familiar with this area of Downtown Boston because of his four years patrolling the area (Tr.6-11). With this experience in mind, Officer McHugh's observations of the defendant and Mr. Noj piqued his interest and he decided to approach the men (Tr.14-15). Upon approaching the men, Officer McHugh had noticed (1) the clothing pulled from the plastic bag with store tags still attached; (2) one man asking "How much is this?" when an item of clothing was being held outside of the bag; (3) Mr. Noj's startled demeanor when approached by Officer McHugh; (4) the defendant appearing nervous while continuously surveying Boylston street; and (5) the defendant's hands remaining inside his clothing (Tr.14-21). furthered Officer McHugh's suspicion that criminal activity was afoot which was why he decided to speak with the men further (Tr.15-16). Based on these specific and articulable facts, in conjunction with Officer McHugh's significant experience, there was reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was involved in criminal activity. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth respectfully requests that this Honorable Court allow the application for further appellate review and, ultimately, affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

Respectfully submitted FOR THE COMMONWEALTH,

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ADDENDUM

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonablesearches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contraryto this right, if the cause or foundation of them be notpreviously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the orderin the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspectedplaces, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seizetheir property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and nowarrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with theformalities prescribed by the laws.

G.L. c. 265, § 18B. Use of firearms while committing a felony; second or subsequent offenses; punishment.

Whoever, while in the commission of or the attempted commission of an offense which may be punished by the state prison, imprisonment in has in possession or under his control a firearm, rifle or shotgun shall, in addition to the penalty for such offense, be punished by imprisonment in the state provided, prison for not less than five years; however, that if such firearm, rifle or shotgun is a large capacity weapon, as defined in section 121 of if chapter 140, or such person, while in commission or attempted commission of such offense, has in his possession or under his control a machine gun, as defined in said section 121, such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than ten years. Whoever has committed an offense which may be punished by imprisonment in the

state prison and had in his possession or under his control a firearm, rifle or shotgun including, but not limited to, a large capacity weapon or machine gun and thereafter, while in the commission or attempted commission of a second or subsequent offense which may be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, has in his possession or under his control a firearm, rifle or shotgun shall, in addition to the penalty for such offense, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 20 years; provided, however, that if such firearm, rifle or shotgun is a large capacity semiautomatic weapon or if such person, while in the commission or attempted commission of such offense, has in his possession or under his control a machine gun, such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than 25 years.

A sentence imposed under this section for a second or subsequent offense shall not be reduced nor suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this section be eligible for probation, parole, furlough release or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served the minimum term of such additional sentence; provided, however, the commissioner of correction may, recommendation of the warden, superintendent or other person in charge of a correctional institution or the administrator of a county correctional institution, grant to such offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: (i) to attend the funeral of a spouse or next of kin; (ii) to visit a critically spouse; or (iii) ill close relative or to obtain medical services unavailable emergency at institution. Prosecutions commenced under this section shall neither be continued without a finding nor placed on file. The provisions of section chapter 276 relative to the power of the court to place certain offenders on probation shall not apply to any person 18 years of age or over charged with a violation of this section.

G.L. c. 94C, § 32A. Class B controlled substances; unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to manufacture, etc.

. . .

(b) Any person convicted of violating this section after 1 or more prior convictions of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with the intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled substance as defined by section 31 under this or any other prior law of this jurisdiction or of any offense any other jurisdiction, federal, state which is the territorial, same as or necessarily includes elements of said offense shall the punished by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years, by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 years and by a fine of not less than \$2,500 and not more than \$25,000, or by a fine of not more than \$25,000.

. . .

- (d) Any person convicted of violating the provisions of subsection (c) after 1 or more prior convictions of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance, as defined in section 31 or of any offense of any other jurisdiction, either federal, state or territorial, which is the same as or necessarily includes, the elements of said offense, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 15 years, a term of imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 15 years and a fine of not less than \$2,500 nor more than \$25,000 or a fine of not more than \$25,000.
- G.L. c. 269, § 10. Carrying dangerous weapons; possession of machine gun or sawed-off shotguns; possession of large capacity weapon or large capacity feeding device; punishment.
- (a) Whoever, except as provided or exempted by statute, knowingly has in his possession; or knowingly has under his control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section one hundred and

twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty without either:

- (1) being present in or on his residence or place of business; or
- (2) having in effect a license to carry firearms issued under section one hundred and thirty-one of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (3) having in effect a license to carry firearms issued under section one hundred and thirty-one F of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (4) having complied with the provisions of sections one hundred and twenty-nine C and one hundred and thirty-one G of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (5) having complied as to possession of an air rifle or BB gun with the requirements imposed by section twelve B; and whoever knowingly has in his possession; or knowingly has under control in a vehicle; a rifle or shotgun, loaded or unloaded, without either:
- (1) being present in or on his residence or place of business; or
- (2) having in effect a license to carry firearms issued under section one hundred and thirty-one of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (3) having in effect a license to carry firearms issued under section one hundred and thirty-one F of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (4) having in effect a firearms identification card issued under section one hundred and twenty-nine B of chapter one hundred and forty; or
- (5) having complied with the requirements imposed by section one hundred and twenty-nine C of chapter one hundred and forty upon ownership or possession of rifles and shotguns; or
- (6) having complied as to possession of an air rifle or BB gun with the requirements imposed by section

twelve B; shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two and one-half years nor more than five years, or for not less than 18 months nor more than two and one-half years in a jail or house of correction. The sentence imposed on such person shall not be reduced to less than 18 months, nor suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this subsection be eligible for probation, work release, or furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served 18 months of such sentence; provided, however, the commissioner of correction may recommendation of the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, grant an offender committed under this subsection a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: to attend the funeral of a relative; to visit a critically ill relative; or to obtain emergency medical psychiatric service unavailable at said institution. Prosecutions commenced under this subsection neither be continued without a finding nor placed on file.

No person having in effect a license to carry firearms for any purpose, issued under section one hundred and thirty-one or section one hundred and thirty-one F of chapter one hundred and forty shall be deemed to be in violation of this section.

The provisions of section eighty-seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six shall not apply to any person 18 years of age or older, charged with a violation of this subsection, or to any child between ages fourteen and 18 so charged, if the court is of the opinion that the interests of the public require that he should be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being dealt with as a child.

The provisions of this subsection shall not affect the licensing requirements of section one hundred and twenty-nine C of chapter one hundred and forty which require every person not otherwise duly licensed or exempted to have been issued a firearms identification card in order to possess a firearm, rifle or shotgun in his residence or place of business.

. . .

(n) Whoever violates paragraph (a) or paragraph (c), by means of a loaded firearm, loaded sawed off shotgun or loaded machine gun shall be further punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 21/2 years, which sentence shall begin from and after the expiration of the sentence for the violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c).

. . . .

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, this brief complies with the rules of court that pertain to the filing of petitions for further appellate review, including those rules specified in Mass. R. App. P. 27.1(b), 16(k) and 20(a). The brief is in 12-point Courier New with 10 CPI and has an argument length of 7 pages.

/s/Houston Armstrong HOUSTON ARMSTRONG Assistant District Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under the pains and penalties of perjury that I have today made service on counsel for the defendant by directing that a copy of the attached brief and motion be sent via the e-file and email to:

Alyssa Hackett Committee For Public Counsel Services Public Defender Division 144 Main Street Brockton, MA 02301 ahackett@publiccounsel.net

Respectfully submitted FOR THE COMMONWEALTH,

RACHAEL ROLLINS
District Attorney
For the Suffolk District

/s/Houston Armstrong
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July 15, 2020

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

FAR-27605 2018-P-1440

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Appellee

V.

JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant

COMMONWEALTH'S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

SUFFOLK COUNTY

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

FAR-27605 2018-P-1613

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
Appellee
V.

JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant

APPENDIX FOR THE COMMONWEALTH'S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

SUFFOLK COUNTY

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JULY 15, 2020


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Superior Court Docket Sheet, 1784CR00243 C.A. 3-13
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Appeals Court Docket Sheet, 2018-P-1440 C.A. 15-16
Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Transcript from Evidentiary Hearing C.A. 25-77
Commonwealth v. Chin-Clarke, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 604 (2020)

Skip to main content C.A. 3

1784CR00243 Commonwealth vs. Chin-Clarke, Jamal D

Case Type
Indictment
Case Status
Open
File Date
04/12/2017
DCM Track:
B - Complex
Initiating Action:
FIREARM, CARRY WITHOUT LICENSE, 2ND OFF. c269 §10(a) & (d)
Status Date:
05/02/2017
Case Judge:
Next Event:
09/11/2020



	• (617)482-6212	CA. 4
		More Party Information
Stanton ,Clerk, Joseph - Other interested party		
Alias	Party Attorney	
		More Party Information

	More Larty mormation
	Party Charge Information
	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 1: 269/10/K-0 - Felony FIREARM, CARRY WITHOUT LICENSE, 2ND OFF. c269 §10(a) & (d)
,	Original Charge 269/10/K-0 FIREARM, CARRY WITHOUT LICENSE, 2ND OFF. c269 §10(a) & (d) (Felony) Indicted Charge Amended Charge
•	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 2: 94C/32A/D-0 - Felony COCAINE, POSSESS TO DISTRIBUTE, SUBSQ. c94C §32A(d)
o o	Original Charge 94C/32A/D-0 COCAINE, POSSESS TO DISTRIBUTE, SUBSQ. c94C §32A(d) (Felony) Indicted Charge Amended Charge
•	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 3: 94C/32A/H-0 - Felony DRUG, POSSESS TO DISTRIB CLASS B, SUBSQ. c94C §32A(b)
0	Original Charge 94C/32A/H-0 DRUG, POSSESS TO DISTRIB CLASS B, SUBSQ. c94C §32A(b) (Felony) Indicted Charge Amended Charge
•	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 4: 265/18B/A-3 - Felony FIREARM IN FELONY, POSSESS c265 §18B
0	Original Charge 265/18B/A-3 FIREARM IN FELONY, POSSESS c265 §18B (Felony) Indicted Charge Amended Charge
•	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 5: 269/10/EE-0 - Felony FIREARM, CARRY WITHOUT LICENSE LOADED c269 s.10(n)
0	Original Charge 269/10/EE-0 FIREARM, CARRY WITHOUT LICENSE LOADED c269 s.10(n) (Felony) Indicted Charge Amended Charge
•	Chin-Clarke, Jamal D - Defendant Charge # 6: 269/10/TT - Misdemeanor - more than 100 days incarceration AMMUNITION WITHOUT FID CARD, POSSESS c269 §10(h)(1)
	Original Charge 269/10/TT AMMUNITION WITHOUT FID CARD, POSSESS c269 §10(h)(1) (Misdemeanor - more than 100 days incarceration)

• Indicted Charge

Amended Charge

ate	<u>Session</u>	Location	<u>Type</u>	Event Judge	Result
5/02/2017 9:00 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Arraignment	Curley, Edward J	Held as Scheduled
6/08/2017 9:30 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Pre-Trial Conference	Curley, Edward J	Held as Scheduled
6/28/2017 9:30 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Pre-Trial Conference	Curley, Edward J	Held as Scheduled
7/26/2017 9:30 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Pre-Trial Conference	Medeiros, Lisa B	Held as Scheduled
8/31/2017 9:30 AM	Criminal 1	BOS-7th FL, CR 704 (SC)	Filing of Motions	Sullivan, Hon. William F	Held as Scheduled
0/31/2017 9:30 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Pre-Trial Hearing		Not Held
1/09/2017 9:30 AM	Criminal 1	BOS-7th FL, CR 704 (SC)	Motion Hearing		Held as Scheduled
2/11/2017 9:30 AM	Magistrate's Session	BOS-7th FL, CR 705 (SC)	Filing of Motions	Medeiros, Lisa B	Held as Scheduled
1/29/2018 9:30 AM	Criminal 9	BOS-7th FL, CR 713 (SC)	Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression	Donatelle, Hon. Sharon	Rescheduled
1/29/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 2		Final Pre-Trial Conference		Rescheduled
2/06/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 2		Jury Trial		Rescheduled
2/15/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 1		Bail Review via Video Conference	Tochka, Hon. Robert N	Not Held
3/26/2018 9:30 AM	Criminal 9	BOS-7th FL, CR 713 (SC)	Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression	Donatelle, Hon. Sharon	Not Held
4/19/2018 9:30 AM	Criminal 1	BOS-7th FL, CR 704 (SC)	Hearing for Appearance / Appointment of Counsel	Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	Held as Scheduled
5/14/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 2	BOS-8th FL, CR 806 (SC)	Final Pre-Trial Conference		Canceled
5/29/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 2	BOS-8th FL, CR 806 (SC)	Jury Trial		Canceled
5/29/2018 9:30 AM	Criminal 9	BOS-7th FL, CR 713 (SC)	Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression	Freniere, Hon Diane	Rescheduled
6/07/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 9	BOS-7th FL, CR 713 (SC)	Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression	Freniere, Hon Diane	Held as Scheduled
7/23/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Final Pre-Trial Conference	Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	Not Held
7/30/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Final Pre-Trial Conference		Rescheduled
8/06/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Jury Trial		Rescheduled
8/29/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Conference to Review Status	Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	Held as Scheduled
9/10/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Jury Trial	Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	Rescheduled
9/10/2018 9:00 AM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Bail Hearing	Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	Not Held
0/15/2018 2:00 PM	Criminal 5	BOS-8th FL, CR 817 (SC)	Conference to Review Status		Held as Scheduled

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none- Defendant 019)
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Ticklers				
<u>Tickler</u>	Start Date	<u>Due Date</u>	<u>Days Due</u>	Completed Date
Pre-Trial Hearing	05/02/2017	09/14/2017	135	
Final Pre-Trial Conference	05/03/2017	01/12/2018	254	04/12/2018
Case Disposition	05/02/2017	01/26/2018	269	

Docket In	Docket Information				
Docket Date	Docket Text	File Ref Nbr.			
04/12/2017	Indictment(s) returned	1			
04/12/2017	Commonwealth 's Motion for an arrest warrant filed	2			
04/12/2017	Endorsement on Motion for an arrest warrant , (#2.0): ALLOWED				
04/12/2017	Issued: Straight Warrant issued on 04/12/2017 for Chin-Clarke, Jamal D				
05/02/2017	Recalled: Straight Warrant cancelled on 05/02/2017 for Chin-Clarke, Jamal D				
05/02/2017	Bail set at \$1,000,000.00 Surety, \$100,000.00 Cash. GPS Prior to Release w/o/p BWR COB: Stay Away from Saint Francis House				
05/02/2017	Issued on this date: Mittimus in Lieu of Bail Sent On: 05/02/2017 12:14:10				
05/02/2017	Defendant Brought Into Court The following event: Arraignment scheduled for 05/02/2017 09:00 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Held as Scheduled Case Put on Track B PTC - 6/8/17 (MAG JAIL LIST) PTH - 10/31/17 (1st Session) FPTH- 1/29/18 2nd Session, 2PM JT - 2/6/18 2nd Session A.KAczmarek, MAG - A.Cascione, ADA - Y.Luvish, Atty - FTR				

Docket Date	Docket Text	File Ref Nbr.
05/02/2017	Defendant arraigned before Court.	
05/02/2017	Defendant waives reading of indictment	
05/02/2017	Plea of not guilty entered on all charges.	
05/02/2017	Bail warnings read	
	Court inquires of Commonwealth if abuse, as defined by G.L. c. 209A, § 1, is alleged to have occurred immediately prior to or in connection with the charged offense(s).	
05/02/2017	Court finds NO abuse is alleged in connection with the charged offense. G.L. c. 276, § 56A.	
05/02/2017	Defendant informed of right to request a drug exam. G.L. c. 111E, § 10	
05/02/2017	Attorney appearance On this date Yefim Luvish, Esq. added as Appointed - Indigent Defendant for Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke Appointment made for the purpose of Case in Chief by Judge Anne Kaczmarek.	
05/02/2017	Commonwealth files the statement of the case.	3
05/02/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Discovery (First) Filed	4
05/02/2017	Endorsement on Motion for the Defendants Out of State Records, (#5.0): ALLOWED See Endorsement	
05/03/2017	Case assigned to: DCM Track B - Complex was added on 05/03/2017	
05/03/2017	Defendant 's Motion for The Defendants Out of State Records Filed	5
06/08/2017	Event Result: Deft not in Court Continued to 6-28-17 for hearing Re: PTC in Rm 705 The following event: Pre-Trial Conference scheduled for 06/08/2017 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Held as Scheduled Appeared: Attorney Luvish, Esq., Yefim Kacz, MAG - FTR	
06/08/2017	Defendant 's Motion for Criminal Records of witnesses filed and allowed Applies To: Luvish, Esq., Yefim (Attorney) on behalf of Chin-Clarke, Jamal D (Defendant); Cascione, Esq., Amanda	6
	Read (Attorney) on behalf of Suffolk County District Attorney (Prosecutor)	
06/08/2017	Defendant 's Motion for funds for Investigator filed and allowed as endorsed Applies To: Luvish, Esq., Yefim (Attorney) on behalf of Chin-Clarke, Jamal D (Defendant); Cascione, Esq., Amanda	7
	Read (Attorney) on behalf of Suffolk County District Attorney (Prosecutor)	
06/28/2017	Event Result: Deft brought into Court Continued to 7-26-17 for hearing Re: PTCi n Rm 705 The following event: Pre-Trial Conference scheduled for 06/28/2017 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Held as Scheduled Appeared: Defendant Chin-Clarke, Jamal D Attorney Cascione, Esq., Amanda Read Medeiros, MAG - FTR	
07/26/2017	Event Result: Deft. brought into court. Case continued by agreement to 8/31/17 Hrg Re; Motions Filing (J. Session) JAIL LIST E. Curley, MAG	
	A. Cascione, ADA Y. Luvish, Atty FTR	
07/26/2017	Pre-trial conference report filed	8
07/26/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of second discovery, filed.	9
08/31/2017	Deft Brought into Court Continued by agreement to 11/9/17 for Hearing re: Motion to Dismiss in 1st, JAIL LIST	
	Sullivan, J A Cascione, ADA Y Luvish, ATTY FTR	

020	Case Details - Massachusetts Thai Court 2	
Docket Date	Docket Text	File Ref Nbr.
08/31/2017	Defendant 's Motion to dismiss filed	10
08/31/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Discovery III filed	11
08/31/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Chemist as Expert Witness filed	12
08/31/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Intention to Call a Latent Print Examiner as an Expert Witness filed	13
08/31/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Intention to Call a Ballistician as an Expert Witness filed	14
08/31/2017	Commonwealth 's Notice of Expert Witness filed	15
10/31/2017	Event Result: Judge: Curley, Edward J The following event: Pre-Trial Hearing scheduled for 10/31/2017 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Not Held Reason: Transferred to another session	
10/31/2017	Event Result: Judge: Miller, Hon. Rosalind H The following event: Motion Hearing scheduled for 11/09/2017 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Not Held Reason: Joint request of parties	
11/09/2017	Event Result: Deft. brought into court -Hrg Re; Motion to dismiss (#10), after hearing, taken under advisement.	
	Case continued by agreement to 12/11/17 Hrg Re: Filing of motions to suppress and to schedule hearing thereon (CM Session) -Deft will not be brought in 12/11/17	
	Miller, J A. Cascione, ADA Y. Luvish, Atty FTR	
	Judge: Miller, Hon. Rosalind H	
11/09/2017	Opposition to paper #10.0 Opposition to motion to dismiss. filed by Suffolk County District Attorney	16
	Judge: Miller, Hon. Rosalind H	
12/04/2017	ORDER: Memorandum of decision and order on deft's motion to dismiss(P#10) P#10 denied ADA Cascione and Atty Luvish notified with copy	17
	Judge: Miller, Hon. Rosalind H	
12/11/2017	Event Result: Deft not in Court Continued to 1-29-18 for Motion to Suppress in RM 713 Judge: Medeiros, Lisa B The following event: Filing of Motions scheduled for 12/11/2017 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Held as Scheduled Appeared: Attorney Luvish, Esq., Yefim Attorney Cascione, Esq., Amanda Read Medeiros, MAG - FTR	
10/11/25:-	Judge: Medeiros, Lisa B	
12/11/2017	Defendant 's Motion to suppress Evidence and Affidavit filed	18
	Judge: Medeiros, Lisa B Applies To: Luvish, Esq., Yefim (Attorney) on behalf of Chin-Clarke, Jamal D (Defendant); Cascione, Esq., Amanda Read (Attorney) on behalf of Suffolk County District Attorney (Prosecutor)	a
01/29/2018	Event Result: Judge: Donatelle, Hon. Sharon The following event: Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression scheduled for 01/29/2018 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Rescheduled Reason: Joint request of parties	S
01/29/2018	Event Result: Judge: Donatelle, Hon. Sharon The following event: Final Pre-Trial Conference scheduled for 01/29/2018 02:00 PM has been resulted as follows: Result: Rescheduled	

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Docket Date	Docket Text	<u>File</u> <u>Ref</u> Nbr.
01/29/2018	Deft not in court Continued at request of deft to 2-15-18 hearing re video bail(J).Jail list, 2pm Y Luvish, Atty FTR	
	Judge: Tochka, Hon. Robert N	
01/29/2018	Commonwealth 's Joint Motion to Continue filed & allowed	19
02/15/2018	Deft refused transportation to the jail for video bail Case off the list	
	Judge: Tochka, Hon. Robert N	
03/26/2018	Event Result: Judge: Donatelle, Hon. Sharon The following event: Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression scheduled for 03/26/2018 09:30 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Not Held Reason: Court Order	
04/12/2018	Event Result: Judge: Donatelle, Hon. Sharon The following event: Jury Trial scheduled for 05/29/2018 09:00 AM has been resulted as follows: Result: Canceled Reason: Joint request of parties	
04/13/2018	Pro Se Defendant 's Motion to remove counsel and for appointment of new counsel with affidavit in support thereof. Filed (Copy of motion sent to Y. Luvish Atty, A. Cascione ADA)	20
04/19/2018	Deft brought into court Continued by agreement to 6-7-18 re motion to suppress(713, needs jail list), to 7-30-18 re FPTH(817) and to 8-6-18 re trial(817) A Cascione, ADA A Hackett, Atty FTR	
	Judge: Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	
04/19/2018	Endorsement on , (#20.0): ALLOWED Atty Luvish allowed to withdraw	
	Judge: Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	
04/19/2018	Attorney appearance On this date Yefim Luvish, Esq. dismissed/withdrawn as Appointed - Indigent Defendant for Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke	
04/19/2018	Attorney appearance On this date . CPCS Boston Office added as Appointed - Indigent Defendant for Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke	
04/19/2018	Attorney appearance On this date Alyssa Thrasher Hackett, Esq. added as Appointed - Indigent Defendant for Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke Appointment made for the purpose of Case in Chief by Judge Hon. Beverly J Cannone.	
05/03/2018	Alyssa Thrasher Hackett, Esg.'s Notice of Appearance for the Defendant	21
	Event Result:: Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression scheduled on: 06/07/2018 09:00 AM Has been: Held as Scheduled Hon Diane Freniere, Presiding Appeared: Staff: Rourke Donnelly, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
06/07/2018	Commonwealth 's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed	22
06/07/2018	Defendant 's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed	22.1
06/28/2018	MEMORANDUM & ORDER:	23
	ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE	
	DENIED	
	Judge: Freniere, Hon Diane	
06/29/2018	The following form was generated: A Clerk's Notice was generated and sent to: Attorney: Alyssa Thrasher Hackett, Esq. Attorney: Amanda Read Cascione, Esq.	

<u>Docket</u> <u>Date</u>	Docket Text C.A.	File Ref Nbr.
07/10/2018	Event Result:: Final Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on: 07/30/2018 02:00 PM Has been: Rescheduled For the following reason: By Court prior to date Hon. Beverly J Cannone, Presiding Appeared: Staff:	
	Anne Kaczmarek, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
07/23/2018	Defendant not present. Final PTH not held due to appeal on MTS. Cancel 8/6/18 JT. Case continued by agreement to 8/29/18 at 2pm for status re: appeal and FPTH and 9/10/18 for JT in 817. Jail list ADA Caschione Atty Hackett FTR 817	
	Judge: Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	
07/24/2018	Event Result:: Jury Trial scheduled on: 08/06/2018 09:00 AM Has been: Rescheduled For the following reason: By Court prior to date Hon. Beverly J Cannone, Presiding Appeared: Staff: Anne Kaczmarek, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
07/25/2018	Notice of appeal filed by defendant regarding the denial of the motion to suppress evidence in this case	24
08/06/2018	Notice to the Supreme Judicial Court of Interlocutory Appeal Order: Interlocutory appeal allowed; to appeals court. Lowy, J Applies To: Chin-Clarke, Jamal D (Defendant)	25
08/13/2018	OTS is hereby notified to provide the JAVS transcript of the proceedings of 06/07/2018 09:00 AM Evidentiary Hearing on Suppression. (Per Atty A.Hackett)	
08/15/2018	Attorney appearance On this date David Rassoul Rangaviz, Esq. added as Appointed - Indigent Defendant for Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke Appointment made for the purpose of Appellate action by Judge Unassigned.	
08/15/2018	David Rassoul Rangaviz, Esq.'s Notice of appearance. Filed.	26
	defendant not present. Status conference held before Cannone, J. Case continued by agreement to 9/10/18 for bail hearing in 817- cancel 9/10/18 JT due to interlocutory appeal.	20
	ADA Caschione Atty Hackett FTR 817	
	Judge: Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	
08/31/2018	Event Result:: Jury Trial scheduled on: 09/10/2018 09:00 AM Has been: Rescheduled For the following reason: By Court prior to date Hon. Beverly J Cannone, Presiding Appeared: Staff: Anne Kaczmarek, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
09/10/2018	Defendant not present. Bail hearing not held at request of the defendant. Case continued by agreement to 10/15/18	
	at 2pm for status re: appeal in 817. ADA Cascione Atty Hackett FTR 817	
	Judge: Cannone, Hon. Beverly J	
10/12/2018	Appeal: FTR DVD/CD Received from OTS; re: 6/7/18 (Copy e-mailed to Atty A.Hacket, Atty D.Rangaviz and ADA J.Zanini)	

<u>Docket</u> <u>Date</u>	Docket Text	A. 11 File Ref Nbr.
10/15/2018	Defendant not present. Status re: appeal held before Ullmann, J. Case continued by agreement to 1/9/18 at 2pm in 817 for status re: appeal.	
	ADA Caschione Atty Hackett FTR 817	
	Judge: Ullmann, Hon. Robert L	
10/16/2018	Attorney appearance On this date John P Zanini, Esq. added as Attorney for the Commonwealth for Prosecutor Suffolk County Distr Attorney	ict
10/16/2018	Appeal: notice of assembly of record sent to Counsel Atty D.Rangaviz, ADA J.Zanini and Clerk J.Stanton	
10/16/2018	Appeal: Statement of the Case on Appeal (Cover Sheet).	27
10/22/2018	Notice of Entry of appeal received from the Appeals Court Case was entered in this court on October 16, 2018	28
01/09/2019	Event Result::	
	Defendant brought into Court, but not brought to the courtroom, presence waived in courtroom. Defense Court present.	sel not
	Continued to 4-29-19 for Status or trial assignment conference in Rm 817 at 2pm.	
	Conference to Review Status scheduled on:	
	01/09/2019 02:00 PM	
	Has been: Not Held For the following reason: Defense Attorney failed to appear Hon. Jeffrey A Locke, Presiding	
	Appeared: FTR	
	Prosecutor Amanda Read Cascione, Esq., Defendant Jamal D Chin-Clarke	
	Staff: Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate Michelle Pierce, Assistant Clerk	
04/29/2019	Defendant brought into Court. Presence in Courtroom waived by Court.	
	Continued by Agreement to 8/14/19 for Hearing Re: Status of Appeal at 2:00PM in Courtroom 817. - Jail List	
	Hon. Robert N Tochka, Presiding Appeared: K. McCarthy for A. Casione, ADA - J. Garland for A. Hackett, Atty FTR Staff:	
	Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate Michelle Pierce, Assistant Clerk	
08/14/2019	Defendant not in Court. Defendant is in custody.	
	Conference to Review Status Re: Appeal held before Campo, J.	
	Continued by Agreement to 11/4/19 for Conference to Review Status at 2:00PM in Courtroom 817. - Defendant's presence waived for next date.	
	Hon. Anthony M. Campo, Presiding Appeared: A. Cascione, ADA - A. Hackett, Atty FTR Staff:	
	Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	

<u>Docket</u> <u>Date</u>	Docket Text C.A.	File Ref Nbr.
11/04/2019	Defendant not in Court. Defendant is in custody and his presence was previously waived. Defense Counsel unavailable for today's hearing due to ongoing trial in the Fourth Criminal Session, Courtroom 815.	
	Continued by Agreement to 2/5/20 for Conference to Review Status of Appeal at 2:00PM in Courtroom 817.	
	Hon. Helene Kazanjian, Presiding Appeared: A. Boulanger, ADA for A. Cascione, ADA - XXX, Atty FTR (2:25PM) Staff: Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate David Sheehan, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
02/05/2020	Defendant not in court. Defendant's presence was previously waived for today's hearing.	
	Conference to Review Status of Commonwealth's Appeal held before Locke, J.	
	Continued by Agreement to 4/13/2020 for Trial Assignment Conference at 2:00PM in Courtroom 817 Defendant's presence waived.	
	Hon. Jeffrey A Locke, Presiding Appeared: K. Tolbert, ADA - A. Hackett, Atty FTR (2:00PM) Staff:	
	Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
05/04/2020	Event Result:: Trial Assignment Conference scheduled on: 04/13/2020 02:00 PM Has been: Canceled For the following reason: By Court due to Covid-19 Staff:	
	Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate Michelle Pierce, Assistant Clerk	
06/03/2020	Motion for Release without Rebuttable Presumption (COVID19)	29
	(Defendants Motion for release based on SJC 1926: Non-Presumptive release, filed)	
06/11/2020	Defendant oral motion for reduction of bail is ALLOWED. All prior orders of bail are REVOKED.	
	Judge: Tochka, Hon. Robert N	
06/11/2020	Bail warnings read	
	Released on Personal Recognizance NO conditions.	
	Judge: Tochka, Hon. Robert N	
06/11/2020	The following form was generated:	30
	Release from Custody Order Sent On: 06/11/2020 10:55:45	
06/11/2020	Defendant on video at Nashua St. Jail Hearing for Review of Other Detainee (COVID19): Held via Zoom Call- Defendant Released (COVID19) All prior orders of bail are REVOKED Defendant released on personal recognizance with no conditions Case continued by agreement to 9/11/2020 at 9:30am, re: Conference to Review Status, 1st Criminal Session, Courtroom 704 (non-custody)	
	R. Tochka, Presiding J. Pardi, ACM A. Cascione, ADA A. Hackett, Atty FTR 10:26 AM	
06/15/2020	Attorney appearance On this date John P Zanini, Esq. dismissed/withdrawn as Attorney for the Commonwealth for Prosecutor Suffolk County District Attorney	

Docket Date	Docket Text	File Ref Nbr.
06/17/2020	Defendant is not in court. Defendant's presence is waived with no objection.	
	Conference to Review Status held before Ricciuti, J.	
	Continued by Agreement to September 11, 2020 for Conference to Review Status of Commonwealth's Appeal at 9:30AM in Courtroom 817.	
	Hon. Michael D Ricciuti, Presiding Appeared: A. Cascione, ADA (via Zoom) - A. Hackett, Atty. (via Zoom) - FTR (11:00AM) Staff: Rebeca Figueroa, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
06/17/2020	Event Result:: Conference to Review Status scheduled on: 09/11/2020 09:30 AM Has been: Canceled For the following reason: Transferred to another session Hon. Michael D Ricciuti, Presiding Staff: Carol Mullen-Maguire, Assistant Clerk Magistrate James Pardi, Assistant Clerk Magistrate	
06/17/2020	ORDER: SCHEDULING ORDER	31

Case Disposition			
<u>Disposition</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Case Judge</u>	
Active	05/03/2017		

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT for Suffolk County Case Docket

COMMONWEALTH v. JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE SJ-2018-0333

CASE HEADER			
Case Status	Interlocutory appeal allowed	Status Date	08/03/2018
Nature	Lv for interloc appeal	Entry Date	07/26/2018
Sub-Nature	Mot to Suppress	Single Justice	Lowy, J.
TC Ruling	Motion denied	TC Ruling Date	06/28/2018
SJ Ruling		TC Number	
Pet Role Below	Defendant in lower court	Full Ct Number	
Lower Court	Suffolk Superior Court	Lower Ct Judge	Diane C. Freniere, J.

INVOLVED PARTY	ATTORNEY APPEARANCE
Jamal Chin-Clarke Defendant/Petitioner	Alyssa Hackett, Esquire
Commonwealth Plaintiff/Respondent	Amanda Read Cascione, Assistant District Attorney

DOCKET ENTRIES		
Entry Date	Paper	Entry Text
07/26/2018		Case entered.
07/26/2018	#1	Defendant's Request To Waive Filing Fee with Affidavit filed by Atty. Alyssa Hackett.
07/26/2018	#2	Defendant's Application For Interlocutory Appeal with Certificate of Service filed by Atty. Alyssa Hackett.
07/26/2018	#3	Memorandum Of Law In Support Of The Defendant's Application For Interlocutory Appeal with attachments filed by Atty. Alyssa Hackett.
07/26/2018		Fee Waiver ALLOWED by Judge. (Lowy, J.)
07/31/2018	#4	Commonwealth's Opposition To The Defendant's Application For Leave To Take An Interlocutory Appeal with Certificate of Service filed by ADA Amanda Cascione.
08/02/2018		Under advisement. (Lowy, J.).
08/03/2018	#5	ORDER: Interlocutory appeal allowed; to Appeals Court. (Lowy, J.)
08/03/2018	#6	Notice to counsel/parties, regarding paper #5 filed.

As of 11/04/2019 8:00pm

APPEALS COURT Full Court Panel Case Case Docket

COMMONWEALTH vs. JAMAL D. CHIN-CLARKE 2018-P-1440

CASE HEADER

Case StatusFAR pendingStatus Date06/29/2020NatureCrime: Possession of GunEntry Date10/16/2018

Sub-Nature Denial of the Motion to Suppress SJ Number

Evidence

Appellant Defendant Case Type Criminal

Brief Status Brief Due

 Panel
 Meade, Shin, Singh, JJ.
 Argued/Submitted
 12/12/2019

 Citation
 97 Mass. App. Ct. 604
 Decision Date
 06/09/2020

Lower Court Suffolk Superior Court **TC Number**

Lower Ct Judge Diane C. Freniere, J. TC Entry Date 04/12/2017

FAR Number FAR-27605 SJC Number

INVOLVED PARTY ATTORNEY APPEARANCE

CommonwealthJohn P. Zanini, A.D.A. - WithdrawnPlaintiff/AppelleeAmanda Read Cascione, A.D.A.

Red brief & appendix filed

3 Enls, 112 Days

Jamal D. Chin-Clarke <u>David Rassoul Rangaviz, Esquire</u>

Defendant/Appellant

Alyssa Hackett, Esquire
Blue br, app & reply br filed

Patrick Levin, Esquire

2 Enls, 94 Days

DOCUMENTS

Appellant Brief Appellee Brief

ORAL ARGUMENTS

DOCKET ENTRIES

Entry Date Paper Entry Text

10/18/2018 Transcript Volume: 06/07/2018 - Evidentiary hearing .

10/16/2018 #1 Lower Court Assembly of the Record Package

10/16/2018 #2 Notice of entry sent.

11/15/2018 #3 Motion of Appellant to extend date for filing brief and appendix filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa

Hackett.

11/16/2018 RE#3: No action taken pending receipt of the docketing statement, now due on or before 11/23/2018. *Notice

sen

11/16/2018 #4 Docketing Statement filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.

11/16/2018 RE#3: Allowed to 02/12/2019. Notice sent.

11/30/2018 #5 Notice of appearance filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.

02/06/2019	#6	Motion of Appellant to extend date for filing brief and appendix filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
02/07/2019		RE#6: Allowed to 02/28/2019. Notice sent.
02/25/2019	#7	Appellant brief filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
02/25/2019	#8	Appendix filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
02/25/2019	#9	Rule 18(e) notice of filing of reproduction of video exhibit by Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
02/27/2019	#10	MOTION of Appellee to extend brief due date filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.
02/28/2019		RE#10: Allowed to 5/28/19. Parties to note that amendments to the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure that include revisions to the Rules' brief and appendix content, formatting, certification and filing requirements take effect 3/1/19 and govern appeals then pending. *Notice
03/01/2019	#11	Copy of Exhibit 1 (surveillance video) received from Alyssa Hackett, Esq
05/21/2019	#12	Notice of appearance filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Patrick Levin.
05/21/2019	#13	MOTION of Appellee to extend brief due date filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.
05/21/2019		RE#13: Allowed to 06/25/2019. Notice sent.
06/18/2019	#14	MOTION of Appellee to extend brief due date filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.
06/19/2019		RE#14: Allowed to 07/17/2019. Notice sent.
07/17/2019	#15	Appellee brief filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.
07/17/2019	#16	Appendix filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Amanda Read Cascione.
10/09/2019		Notice sent seeking information on unavailability for oral argument in December 2019
10/21/2019		Response from Amanda Read Cascione, A.D.A. re: available all dates for oral argument
10/30/2019	#17	Notice of 12/12/2019, 9:30 AM argument at John Adams Courthouse, Courtroom 4 (a4) sent.
10/31/2019		Response from Amanda Read Cascione, A.D.A. re: will appear and argue on 12/12/2019.
11/08/2019		Response from Alyssa Hackett, Esquire re: will appear and argue on 12/12/2019.
11/08/2019	#18	Motion of Appellant to extend date for filing Reply Brief filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
11/08/2019	#19	Reply brief filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
11/14/2019		RE#18: Allowed. (Meade, Shin, Singh, JJ.) *Notice.
12/12/2019		Oral argument held. (Meade, J., Shin, J., Singh, J.).
12/12/2019	#20	Letter under MRAP 22(c) filed for Jamal D. Chin-Clarke by Attorney Alyssa Hackett.
04/28/2020		ORDER: The one hundred and thirty day guideline for the above entitled case is waived by order of the Court. (Meade, Shin & Singh, JJ.) *Notice.
06/09/2020	#21	Decision: Full Opinion (Shin, J.). Order denying motion to suppress reversed. *Notice.
06/29/2020		FAR-27605 opened on MOTION to file FAR application late filed for Commonwealth by Attorney Houston Armstrong.

As of 07/08/2020 2:15pm

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL ACTION NO.: 2017-00243

COMMONWEALTH

<u>vs</u>.

JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

The defendant, Jamal Chin-Clarke ("Chin-Clarke"), is charged with various firearm offenses. Chin-Clarke now moves to suppress the firearm, ammunition, narcotics, cell phone and cash that police recovered from his body on January 27, 2017. As grounds for his motion, Chin-Clarke argues the Boston Police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and that he was improperly seized thereafter.

The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 7, 2018 and received testimony from one witness, Boston Police Officer Michael McHugh ("Officer McHugh"). One exhibit was admitted as evidence, a DVD containing video surveillance clips taken from a camera in the area where the defendant was questioned, seized and arrested. On the basis of the evidence as determined to be credible by this Court, and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, Chin-Clarke's motion to suppress is **DENIED**. I make the following findings of fact and rulings of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I credit and accept the testimony of Officer McHugh regarding the events he observed and participated in the morning of January 27, 2017. I find that Officer McHugh is an experienced member of the Boston Police Department, serving as an officer in varied capacities for 10 years. In addition to his academy training and yearly in-service training, Officer McHugh has participated in specialized training in surveillance tactics, active shooter training, and trademarks and identification of armed subjects.

For the last four years, Officer McHugh has been assigned to a plain-clothes, walking beat in the downtown Boston area, covering in relevant part the portion of Boylston Street between Washington and Tremont Streets. The area is dominated by commercial properties and has heavy pedestrian foot traffic. It is a high crime area with frequent arrests for buying/selling narcotics, larceny, robbery, assault, trespassing and shoplifting. As for shoplifting, Officer McHugh has made numerous shoplifting arrests and has observed individuals selling and/or trading their stolen property outside on the street, often to feed a drug addiction. Officer McHugh has made arrests for shoplifting crimes based on his observation of people engaged in commerce on the street with items with tags still on them and/or items in bags not consistent with the contained items.

Saint Frances House ("SFH"), a daytime homeless shelter located at 39 Boylston Street, is within Officer McHugh's walking beat and he spends much of his time patrolling in and around SFH. SFH provides daytime meals, social services and clothing to the homeless. SFH has security comprising a half-dozen blue-uniformed staff equipped with metal detectors to uncover weapons. There are frequent altercations both inside and outside SFH and Officer

McHugh has made hundreds of arrests near SVH for crimes ranging from drug dealing/possession, stabbings, warrant arrests, trespassing and malicious destruction of property.

On January 27, 2017 at approximately 9:20 A.M., Officer McHugh was in plain clothes' working alone on Boylston Street in the vicinity of the SFH. Officer McHugh carried an IPad tablet which he routinely used to access the Criminal Justice Information System ("CJIS"), including booking photos, license photos, warrants and BOP records. As he walked past the front door of SFH, Officer McHugh observed three males looking in a plastic shopping bag and talking to each other. Officer McHugh was alerted to the three males, who he did not know, when he noticed a bag contained clothing and that some of the clothing was outside of the bag with tags still attached and visible. Based on this observation, his training and experience, Officer McHugh suspected that the men were involved in a street sale transaction of stolen clothing and he decided to conduct a threshold inquiry.

As Officer McHugh approached the three males, he overheard one male ask "how much is this?" as another male held up some merchandise. Officer McHugh then engaged the trio directly asking "what's up guys. Is that stuff stolen?" Startled, the male holding up the merchandise (later identified at Milton Noj) responded "Whoa." Officer McHugh identified himself as a Boston Police officer and asked the men for their identifications. As Officer McHugh spoke with Noj, Chin-Clarke had his hands in his front pockets and was looking up and down Boylston Street. For officer safety purposes, Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke to stand next to the exterior of the SFH building while he spoke with Noj. Noj initially told Officer McHugh that he purchased the items in the plastic bag at the Natick Mall. When asked for receipts, Noj then told Officer McHugh that his mother gave the items to him and he did not

¹ Specifically, Officer McHugh was wearing a black puffy vest, green sweatshirt, camouflage cap and long pants.
² The third male, an onlooker who was present but does not appear to be an active participant in the sale, exited promptly.

have any receipts. This change in story further heightened Officer McHugh's belief that the items were stolen property. Noj was nervous but provided his identifying information, to include his full name and date of birth, without hesitation. Officer McHugh accessed CJIS images on his IPad to confirm Noj's identity.³

Officer McHugh's interaction with Noj to confirm his identity lasted 38 seconds. Officer McHugh then turned his attention to Chin-Clarke. While waiting, Chin-Clarke was fidgety, nervous and looking up and down Boylston Street, again heightening Officer McHugh's suspicion that a crime was afoot. Chin-Clarke had his hands in his pockets and Officer McHugh instructed him to remove his hands from his pockets. Although he initially complied, within a minute or two Chin-Clarke put his hands back inside his clothing. Based on his observations of Chin-Clarke, Officer McHugh was concerned that he might be armed and dangerous. Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke for his identifying information. In response, Chin-Clarke noticeably hesitated before replying "Dana Clarke," and hesitated again before giving a date of birth of April 10, 1982. Using that information, Officer McHugh accessed the CJIS system and obtained an RMV license image for Dana Clarke. Although the image was similar to, it did not match, the individual standing before him. In an attempt to learn his true identity, Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke for his social security number. Chin-Clarke could not remember either the last four or the first three digits of his social security number. Officer McHugh then called for backup. In order to compare the RMV image to Chin-Clarke, Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke to take off his glasses and he complied. Concerned about his own safety, Officer McHugh then asked Noi and Chin-Clarke to take a seat on the ground as he awaited backup. One minute thirty seconds later, Officer Fabian Belgrave, also in plain clothes, arrived on scene to assist Officer

³ Officer McHugh has made hundreds of arrest on outstanding warrants in this area. He regularly asks for identifying information to run through CHS during threshold inquiries.

McHugh. Officer Belgrave agreed that Chin-Clarke did not match the RMV image for Dana Clarke. As Officer Belgrave searched other images on CJIS, he asked Chin-Clarke to stand to get a better look at his face and it became increasingly clear to both officers that the person in front of them was not Dana Clarke.⁴

Chin-Clarke stood directly in front of the two officers, smoking a cigarette as they compared the CJIS images to him. Given the totality of the circumstances, including Officer McHugh's initial observation of the suspicious street commerce and Chin-Clarke's nervous behavior, providing a false identification and inability to answer basic questions, Officer McHugh decided to handcuff Chin-Clarke. In total, six minutes had passed from the time Officer McHugh began speaking to Chin-Clarke and his decision to handcuff him. When Officer McHugh attempted to handcuff him, Chin-Clarke spun around striking Officer Belgrave in the chest and the three men ended up wrestling to the ground as SFH security attempted to assist. Shortly, two other uniformed Boston Police officers arrived on scene and placed Chin-Clarke into handcuffs. One of those officers, Officer Lopez, pat-frisked Chin-Clarke and located a firearm in a fanny pack in his front pant area, announcing "gun" to his fellow officers as he did so. Officers unzipped the fanny pack and recovered a loaded Beretta firearm, 9 bags of heroin and 23 bags of crack cocaine. Chin-Clarke was arrested and transported to District A-1 for booking. At booking, \$100 in currency and a cell phone were retrieved.

RULINGS OF LAW

"In the absence of seizure there is no need for the police to justify their conduct by showing a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." *Commonwealth* v. *Nester*, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229, rev. denied, 447 Mass. 1112 (2006)(proper threshold inquiry). A person has been

⁴ Among the differences, one male had a facial scar and the other did not.

⁵ While the officers struggle with Chin-Clarke, Noj leaves the scene.

seized by a police officer "if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 791 (1985), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980). "[N]ot every encounter between a law enforcement official and a member of the public constitutes an intrusion of constitutional dimensions requiring justification." Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789 (1996). The police are free to approach individuals on the street and ask threshold questions. Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 406, 408 (2008); see also Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 6-7 (2010); Commonwealth v. Damelio, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35-36 (2012); Commonwealth v. Martin, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 530-32 (2009). "[T]he police do not effect a seizure merely by asking questions unless the circumstances of the encounter are sufficiently intimidating that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to turn his back on his interrogator and walk away." Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass, 541 (1991). "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Commonwealth v. Thinh Van Cao, 419 Mass. 383, 388 n. 7, cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1146 (1995), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968).

The defendant argues that he was initially seized when Officer McHugh instructed him to stand by the wall. The defendant argues that the level of the seizure escalated when Officer McHugh instructed him to sit on the ground and, later, to stand up so the officers could get a better look at him. The defendant also notes, the officers' request to remove Chin-Clarke's hood and eyeglasses as further evidence of seizure. The court does not agree that these police actions constituted a seizure given the facts before it.

Here, Officer McHugh was justified in making a threshold inquiry of both Roj and Chin-Clarke given that he had reasonable suspicion to believe that the two men were about to commit a crime in the sale of stolen property. Chin-Clarke was approached on a public street by a single officer in plain clothes who identified himself as an officer seeking to investigate what he believed to be a street sale of stolen property. The video shows Officer McHugh working at pace to identify the two individuals involved in the suspected activity on his tablet. He is not hostile or aggressive with the defendant. Further, asking for each man's identifying information in sequence was a permissible and reasonable way to approach this field investigation and did not constitute a seizure of Chin-Clarke. Officer McHugh's initial instruction to Chin-Clarke to stand by the wall was a safety-based police tactic to separate the two suspects which was particularly appropriate given that he was outnumbered. According to the video footage, it took Officer McHugh only 38 seconds to verify Noj's identity.

Thereafter, once Officer McHugh determined that Chin-Clarke provided him with false identifying information (and he was still outnumbered), his request that the defendant sit down was justified. At that point, Officer McHugh knew that Chin-Clarke was concealing his true identity, warranting a brief further investigation. See *Commonwealth* v. *Torres*, 424 Mass. 153, 162 (1997). After Officer Belgrave arrived, his instruction that Chin-Clarke stand so that he could compare the CJIS images to the defendant's face was also appropriate. *Id.* Finally, the entire time from when Officer McHugh started talking to the defendant to the time he attempts to place him in handcuffs is a relatively short 6 minutes. *Commonwealth* v. *Barros*, 435 Mass. 171, 174 (2001).

The seizure here occurred when Officer McHugh asked Chin-Clarke to turn around so that he could handcuff him, a clear indication that he was then no longer free to leave. At that

point, however, Officers McHugh and Belgrave had reasonable suspicion that Chin-Clarke was

about to commit a criminal offense and was armed and dangerous. Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 9.

The observations made by Officer McHugh of the street sale, in a high crime area particularly

known for shoplifting, and the defendant's hesitation and inability to provide valid identifying

information along with his nervous behavior supported the requisite reasonable suspicion.

Finally, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's (i) nervous, fidgety

behavior, (ii) failure to comply with Officer McHugh's direction to keep his hands out of his

pockets, and (iii) provision of a false identifying information, provided reasonable suspicion that

Chin-Clarke was armed and dangerous.

Once officers attempted to restrain Chin-Clarke, the situation rapidly deteriorates with

Chin-Clarke flailing and tumbling on the ground with the officers. It was not until the two

uniformed Boston Police officers arrive on scene that the police were able to contain and

handcuff the defendant. At that point, the pat-frisk of Chin-Clarke was proper, as was his arrest,

and the evidence retrieved by the officers thereby, including the loaded firearm, narcotics, cell

phone and money, will not be suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512

(2009)

<u>ORDER</u>

For the foregoing reasons, Chin-Clarke's Motion to Suppress is **DENIED**.

Date: June 28, 2018

Diane C. Freniere Justice of the Superior Court

Volume: I Pages: 1-71 Exhibits: 1

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT

*

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

*

v. * DOCKET NO. 1784CR00243

*

JAMAL D. CHIN-CLARKE

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON SUPPRESSION
BEFORE HER HONORABLE JUSTICE DIANE FRENIERE

APPEARANCES:

For the Commonwealth: Suffolk County District Attorney's Office One Bulfinch Place Boston, MA 02114

By: Amanda R. Cascione, Assistant District Attorney

For Defendant:

Committee for Public Counsel Services 1 Congress Street Boston, MA 02114

By: Alyssa Hackett, Esquire

Courtroom 713 Boston, Massachusetts June 7, 2018

Julianne Schultz Approved Transcriber

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WITNESS: DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS

MICHAEL MCHUGH

(By Ms. Cascione)

(By Ms. Hackett) 38

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T-31 (Court called to order.) (Defendant present.) (10:19 a.m.) THE COURT OFFICER: Court, all rise. This Honorable Court's in session. Please be seated. THE CLERK: Good morning, Your Honor. Before the Court is the matter of Commonwealth versus Jamal Chin-Clarke. 8 Docket 2017-00243. If parties could please identify themselves for the record and who they represent. 10 11 MS. CASCIONE: Good morning, Your Honor. Amanda Cascione for the Commonwealth. 12 THE COURT: Good morning. 13 14 MS. HACKETT: Good morning, Your Honor. Alyssa Hackett for Mr. Chin-Clarke. 15 16 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. 17 Good morning, Mr. Chin-Clarke. THE DEFENDANT: Good morning. 18 THE COURT: So we're on for Defense motion to suppress. 19 20 I don't need opening arguments. You can call your first 21 witness. 22 MS. CASCIONE: Sure. Commonwealth would call Officer 23 McHugh, McHugh, please. MS. HACKETT: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt. Is it 24

okay -- I have an intern present, Lindsay Kramer. Is it okay

T-4if she sits with us and takes notes? THE COURT: She may. MS. HACKETT: Thanks. MICHAEL MCHUGH, Sworn THE WITNESS: T do. THE CLERK: Officer, take a seat here, sir. THE COURT: And counsel, just give me one second. 8 bringing my computer up. It's slow. A little slow. THE CLERK: Please try to keep your voice up. THE WITNESS: Sure. 10 11 THE COURT: Go right ahead. Thank you, Your Honor. 12 MS. CASCIONE: 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MS. CASCIONE: 15 Good morning, Officer. Could you please introduce yourself to the Court, stating your full name and spelling 16 17 your full name for the record? 18 Good morning. My name is Michael McHugh. My first name 19 is spelled M-i-c-h-a-e-l. My last name is spelled 20 M-c-H-u-q-h. 21 And you work for Boston Police Department? 22 I do. 23 How long have you been with the department?

When you first started with the department, did you

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undergo the initial six month training or academy that the Boston Police Department provides?

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- Q And what are some of the things, topics and things that you covered and learned while that, in that six month academy?
- A Criminal law, constitutional law, tactics, operations, rules and regulations of the Boston Police Department, that nature.
- Q Have you undergone any training subsequent to that initial six month training?
- 12 A I have.
- Q And could you just briefly detail some of the trainings
 that you have gone through subsequent to that initial
 training?
 - A So I've undergone multiple what they call in-service trainings as wells as some out trainings that, active shooter training, trademarks and identification of armed subjects, surveillance, those kind of things.
 - Q And could you, what's your current assignment with the Boston Police Department?
 - A I'm a walking beat in the downtown area, specifically around Boylston Street.
- 24 Q And how long have you been working in that capacity?
- 25 A Almost four years now.

Q Prior to that, could you just describe for the Court the different areas or units that you were assigned to?

- A So, for just under a year I was probationary officer in Brighton, District 14. After that, I went for two years to Roxbury, Area B-2. And for two years after that I was with the Boston Police Fugitive Unit. One year after that in Mattapan. And ever, for the last four now in this current assignment.
- Q And when you, you indicated that you were, that you are working in, as a walking beat patrolman. Can you describe some of your duties and responsibilities working in that particular role?
- A So it's a little bit unique. I work in plain clothes by myself mostly in that specific area, because it's sort of a high crime area. There's a daytime homeless shelter at 39 Boylston Street, called the St. Francis House. And I spend a lot of my time in the street there and the alleys around that area.
- Q And you indicated that you work in the Downtown area of Boston. When you're assigned in this walking beat capacity, where specifically are you assigned to?
- A So the portion of Boylston Street between Washington Street and Tremont as well as some parts of Chinatown, to include Lagrange Street and some of the alleys along Washington Street, Marty's Way, Head Place, that kind of an

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- Q And what shift do you typically work?
- A The day tour, which goes from 7:30 in the morning until four o' clock in the afternoon.
- Q You indicated that you work in a plain clothes capacity. What do you typically wear when you're working this shift?
- A Usually I'm not dressed like this. I wear a t-shirt and, in the summertime, a t-shirt and shorts. In the wintertime, maybe a sweatshirt and pair of jeans. I wear my badge on my belt customarily, like that.
- Q And you indicated moments ago that this area, you're assigned to this particular area because it's a high crime area because there's issues. Can you go into a little more detail in terms of what sort of crime you're dealing with in that walking beat in the first block of Boylston Street?
- A So the area's frequented by a lot of people who sell and buy drugs, people who have drug problems, and that causes other problems. There's larcenies and robberies, shoplifting, assaults, public intoxication, trespassing, shoplifting, that kind of thing.
- Q And have you made arrests for all of these different types of crimes in that specific area?
- A Yes, I have.
- Q Officer McHugh, that first block area of Boylston, I know you mentioned a residency that's there, the St. Francis

House, but what else is on that street?

- A So currently there's a library on the corner and the Chinatown commercial building, I believe it's called.

 There's a convenience store at 40 Boylston Street. There's a nail parlor. There's the employee entrance to the Ritz

 Carlton Hotel on that side, and the Masons Lodge is there.
- Q Is it fair to say that it's a relatively commercial area of the city?
- A Absolutely.

- Q And Officer McHugh, when you're typically working the day tour in that area, can you describe, in terms of walking traffic, how many people are usually out and about?
- A Hundreds and hundreds of people walk through that area each day. It's the way people get from the Boylston subway station to the other side or from the Chinatown T Station to the other side as well as the people that are using the services of the St. Francis House, the daytime homeless shelter there.
- Q And Officer McHugh, I know you mentioned a number of different crimes that you've seen occurring in that downtown area. Could you, focusing specifically on your experience with respect to shoplifting, receiving stolen property and crimes of that nature, can you explain, during your four years working in this specific area, through your training and experience, what you've learned with respect to those

crimes? And -- yeah.

Boston?

A So it's not infrequent that we come across people that are in possession of stolen property. Often times, as I said before, the people are addicted to heroin, crack cocaine, fentanyl, that kind of thing. They don't have any money. So in order to acquire those drugs, what they'll do often times is shoplift and then sell or trade those items in the street.

Q And in your experience, is shoplifting an issue in the stores that are located in that particular area of Downtown

A It's a huge problem. Just previous to the incident that we're talking about today, we had stopped, the My Tan convenience shop -- I guess you want to call it -- it had hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars of shoplifted items that the people were pawning at that shop. And so I think just a month or two previous, we executed a search warrant on the place.

MS. HACKETT: Objection. I don't have any discovery about, I don't know what he's talking about. I wasn't provided with anything before today.

THE COURT: Well, I think it goes to the issues in that particular neighborhood. And for that, I'll consider it.

THE WITNESS: So that store is just located a block away.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q And have you personally been involved in making arrests with respect to shoplifting in the stores in that particular area?
- A I have.

- Q You also mentioned moments ago that there, that you had dealt with and made observations in terms of these crimes.

 What are some of the indicators or things that you look with, look for with respect to shoplifting, receiving stolen property, crimes of that nature?
- A Well, you know, numerous kind of odd items in a bag. Somebody might be in possession with, often with the tags still on them and often with, in a bag that might not be associated with the store that things were purchased from. And then people stand on the street looking in a bag and, you know, looking at new articles of clothing or sunglasses or something of that nature. And you can tell it's, there's some commerce going on there.
- Q And this is something that you had experience dealing with in this particular area?
- A I have.
- Q And have you made arrests as a result of observations and investigations with respect to that type of conduct?
- 23 A I have.
 - Q Just drawing your attention for a moment to the St. Francis House. Are you familiar with that particular

facility?

A Yes.

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- Q And where is that located specifically?
- A 39 Boylston Street.
- Q And just in general, what, what does that facility provide, if you know?
- A So they provide a number of different services, help with drug addiction, social workers that are trying to find beds for people. They provide breakfast in the morning.

 They provide lunch in the afternoon. You can get clothing there on certain days. All kinds of help that homeless people need.
- Q Does St. Francis, does that facility have staff that is employed for security purposes?
- 15 A They do.
 - Q And could you just describe briefly what you know in terms of that particular role for the individuals that work at St. Francis?
 - A So they usually have maybe half a dozen or more people dressed in blue that provide security. They, they have a metal detector as well as a wand to prevent people from coming in with weapons. It's not infrequent that there's altercations and fights inside the place, so they'll help stop those.
 - Q And have you been involved in making arrests both

- outside of St. Francis Street and inside of St. Francis?
- A Yes.

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- Q And just, if you could just describe some of the types of arrests that you've made outside of that particular building.
- A I've made hundreds of arrests around that building for things ranging from stabbings to drug trafficking, drug dealing, drug possession, warrant arrests, mostly warrant arrests. There's, you know, dozens and dozens of warrant arrests there every year. Trespassing, malicious destruction of property, that kind of thing.
- Q Officer, drawing your attention to Friday, January 27th of 2017. Do you recall if you were working on that particular day?
- 15 A I was.
 - Q And were you working in the capacity that you've described as a walking beat patrolman in the Downtown area of Boston?
- 19 A Yes.
- 20 Q Did you work the day tour on that day?
- 21 A I did.
- 22 Q And do you remember what you were wearing?
- A I was wearing a black vest that I often wear. It's a,

 it's a warm kind of puffy winter vest. I think I had a green

 sweatshirt on, a camouflage cap that I often wear, I think

work pants.

- Q And when you work in this walking beat capacity, are you working with anyone or are you working alone?
- A Usually I work alone.
- Q On this day, were you working alone?
- A I was.

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- Q Aside from your typical Boston Police, or the items that you typically carry on your duty belt, is there anything else that you have issued through Boston Police that you use when you're working the walking beat?
- A Yes.
- 12 Q And what's that?
 - A I carry a tablet with me. It's an iPad that I use to access a couple of different applications that are helpful, mostly the Criminal Justice Information System.
 - Q And when you access that Criminal Justice Information System, which is typically referred to as CJIS, what can you, what information can you obtain in that particular program?
 - A So we can access AFIS, which gives us old booking photos. We can access licenses. It would have a license photo. Board of probation records. We can tell if you have a warrant that's current or if you had one in the past. That kind of thing.
 - Q Drawing your attention to the morning, approximately 9:20 on January 27th of 2017. Do you recall being in the

area of the St. Francis House?

A I do.

- Q Can you describe what you recall happening in that vicinity on that morning?
- A So I was walking outbound on the odd numbered side of the street, so that would be heading towards Washington

 Street with the St. Francis House on my left. I always have a heightened sense of awareness when I'm in the area, and I saw a couple of gentlemen as I walked past the door of the St. Francis House. I think three gentlemen looking in a plastic shopping bag and talking to each other.
- Q And that plastic shopping bag that you made observations of, do you have a memory of what type of plastic bag it was, if it came from a store or if it had any sort of insignia of a store on the outside of it?
- 16 A I don't recall.
 - Q And what, what, if anything, sort of caught your attention in terms of the behaviors of these gentlemen at that moment?
 - A So any time I see some guys on the street, you know, looking down at their hands, you know, it catches my attention. So as I approached closer, I noticed that there was some clothing in the bag, and some of it was outside of the bag and it had the tags.
 - Q And is there any significance of the items that they

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- were showing each other having a visible tag on it, based on your training and experience?
- A Yeah, it's often stolen property.
- Q And why do you believe that based on your experience?
- A Because that's what it's looked like in the past when we've come upon that kind of a thing. And then it's odd that it's not in, as I said, in a bag that, that would come from the store with and things of that nature just because that happens there all the time.
- Q And when you first made these observations, you said there was three males?
- 12 A There was.

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- Q Did you know any of those three males?
- 14 A I did not.
- Q And once you made those initial observations, is it fair to say that your awareness was heightened even more so at that point?
- 18 A It was.
- 19 Q What did you do?
- 20 A So I decided to conduct a threshold inquiry.
- 21 Q And did you approach those three gentlemen?
- 22 A I did.
- Q And what, if anything, happened when you approached them?
- 25 A I believe I said hey, what's up guys. Is that stuff

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- And before you made those statements, did you hear any of the gentlemen say anything when you got closer to them?

 Yes, somebody, and I don't recall who, said how much is
- Q And again, based on your training and experience, that question, how much is this, in conjunction with holding items up that still have tags, what is that consistent with?

MS. HACKETT: Objection. Speculation.

THE COURT: I'll allow it.

THE WITNESS: Shoplifting and receiving stolen property.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q And have you seen that type of behavior before?
- A I have.
- Q And had that resulted in arrests before, in your experience in that area?
- A Yes.
 - Q You indicated a moment ago that you decided at that point to conduct a threshold inquiry of these individuals.
- How did you do that?
 - A So I approached and I made that initial statement. The gentleman I identified, a Mr. Noj, later on. He was definitely startled, and he said something like whoa, and he backed up. So I immediately identified myself as a police officer because I am in plain clothes. I had my badge on my

belt, but sometimes it's out of, you know, kind of out of people's immediate vision. So I said I'm a Boston Police officer, and then I asked that they identify themselves.

- Q And the individual you just indicated, Mr. Noj, did he, when you asked him, is the property stolen, did he give you any information about the items that he had in that bag?
- A He did.

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- Q And what did he say?
- A He indicated that he had purchased the items at the Natick Mall.
- 11 Q And once you learned that information, did you inquire 12 further of Mr. Noj?
 - A I did.
- 14 Q And what did you ask him?
- 15 A I said do you have the receipts for these items.
- Q Was Mr. Noj able to provide you receipts at that point?
- 17 A No, he said he did not, and then he indicated that his 18 mother had actually purchased the items.
 - Q And again, based on all of your training and experience, anything about Mr. Noj changing his story with respect to those items that caught your attention?
 - MS. HACKETT: Objection.
- 23 THE COURT: Can I have the question back?
- MS. CASCIONE: Sure.
- 25 BY MS. CASCIONE:

Q Based on your training and -- excuse me. Based on your training and experience, anything about Mr. Noj's responses with respect to the items in the bag that caught your attention?

THE COURT: Overruled.

You can answer the question.

THE WITNESS: Yes, him changing his story so quickly gave me a heightened sense of awareness that something indeed was wrong.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

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- Q And Officer McHugh, were you able to make observations of any receipts in the bag Mr. Noj had?
- A I looked, and there were none.
 - Q You indicated that you asked for the gentlemen to provide you with their names at that point. Starting with the individual, Mr. Noj, did he provide you information?
- A He did.
- Q And can you describe his demeanor while this was happening?
- A He was a bit nervous, but he complied quickly and gave
 me his information.
- Q And fair to say he informed you that his name was Milton Noj, and Noj is spelled is N-o-j?
- 24 A That's correct.
- 25 Q Did you ask for a date of birth?

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- A I did.
- Q And did he provide you with one?
- A I did, he did, but I don't recall what he said.
 - Q Fair to say it was January 15th of 1973?
 - A That sounds right.
- Q Did Mr. Noj hesitate at all when giving you his name and date of birth?
- A He did not.

- 9 Q Did Mr. Noj, if you remember, provide you any other 10 information at that point?
- 11 A No, I don't think so.
- Q You indicated earlier that you carry a tablet. Were you able to utilize that tablet in confirming Mr. Noj's identity?
- 14 A I did.
- Q And is that something that you typically do in these situations?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q And why so?
- A I do it as a rule down there. As I said, I've made
 hundreds of warrant arrests in that area, and sometimes
 they're really violent crimes. So I do that so I know who
 I'm dealing with.
- Q Did you feel comfortable with the identity that Mr. Noj had provided you -- or let me rephrase that.
- Did you believe that that was in fact Milton Noj?

- A Yes, I was able to collect some images from CJIS, and it appeared to be that he was correct.
- Q While you were speaking to Mr. Noj, did you make any observations of the other gentlemen that were present?
- A I did.
- Q One of the other gentlemen that was present, do you see that, one of the men that was there in court here today?
- A I do.
- Q And did you ultimately learn that gentleman's name?
- 10 A Yes.

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- 11 Q Fair to say it's Jamal Chin-Clarke?
- 12 A That's correct.
- Q And do you see that person here in court?
- 14 A I do.
- Q Could you just identify something that he's wearing?
- 16 A He's wearing a blue shirt with a blue tie.
- MS. CASCIONE: May the record reflect, Your Honor, that he's identified the Defendant?
- 19 THE COURT: The record will so reflect.
- BY MS. CASCIONE:
- Q When you were speaking with Mr. Noj, can you describe any observations you made of Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- A So he appeared fidgety and he looked a little nervous, and he was looking up and down the street.
- 25 Q And did that, again, did that heighten your awareness

- even more so at that point?
- A It did.
- Q Once you were done gaining information from Mr. Noj, did you then speak to Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- A Yes.
- Q Did you make any observations with respect to Mr. Chin-Clarke's hands?
 - A Yes.

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- Q Could you describe what you saw and what happened?
- 10 A So the sequence of events, you know, I may have done
 11 this before completely identifying Mr. Noj, but very quickly
 12 I noticed that Mr. Clarke's hands were in his pockets. And
- so I asked him to remove them.
- Q Did he comply at that point?
- 15 A He did.
- Q What happened after that with respect to Mr. Chin-Clarke's hands?
 - A So within a minute or two, he put his hands back inside of his, I think, his pants pockets, but I can't be sure. But they, he put them back inside of clothing.
- Q And based on your training and experience and specifically your training with respect to armed subjects, did you have any concerns with those behaviors of Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- 25 A Yes.

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- Q And can you explain what those concerns were?
- A Well, I would have some concern that somebody might be armed, and then armed themself with something that was inside their clothing and harm me.
 - Q Did you have that concern at that time?
 - A I did.
 - Q Did you ask, did you ask Mr. Chin-Clarke for his name and identifying information?
- A Yes.

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- 10 Q What happened when you asked him for his name?
- 11 A He hesitated noticeable before he gave a reply.
- 12 Q And what name did he provide?
- 13 A I believe he, the name he replied was Dana Clarke.
- 14 Q And did you then ask Mr. Chin-Clarke for a date of
- 15 birth?
- 16 A I did.
- 17 Q And how did he react when you asked that?
- 18 A I believe he hesitated again, but he provided a date of birth.
- 20 Q Fair to say that date of birth he provided was April
- 21 10th of 1982?
- 22 A Yes.
- Q What did you do at that point?
- A So I accessed the CJIS again, and I entered the name that he gave me as well as the date of birth. And I was able

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- to get a license photograph for that person, Dana Clarke. It was indeed, it was somebody of that name in the system with a license and the date of birth that --
- Q Did you make observations of that RMV image for a Dana Clarke?
- A I did.
- Q And did you compare those, that image to Mr. Jamal Chin-Clarke?
- 9 A Yes.

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- 10 Q And what did you believe at that time?
- 11 A The two appeared similar, but I did not think that the
 12 person in the picture was the gentleman that was standing in
 13 front of me.
- Q Did you ask any followup questions of Mr. Chin-Clarke at that point?
- 16 A I did.
- 17 Q And what did you ask him?
- A So I often ask for a social security number to be
 provided to give me a little more to go on to prove that that
 is in fact you.
- Q Did you ask Mr. Chin-Clarke for his social, social security number?
- 23 A I did.
- Q And how did he respond?
- 25 A He said that he didn't know it.

- Q And in your training and experience working for Boston Police Department, has that happened before where someone doesn't know their social security number?
- A Yes.

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Q What is that typically consistent with?

MS. HACKETT: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q Officer McHugh, once Mr. Chin-Clarke was unable to provide his social security number and you had made observations of the RMV photograph and his actual physical presence, what did you do at that point?
- A So it gave me a heightened sense of concern that something might be wrong, so I called for some assistance on the radio on channel two.
- Q Who responded to assist you?
 - A Fabian, Officer Fabian Belgrave came pretty quickly.
- Q And once Officer Belgrave approached, what, if anything, did you do?
 - A So I asked Fabian if he thought that the person in the license photo was the same person that we were talking to.
- Q And how did, did you show Officer Belgrave the photograph of Dana Clarke, the RMV image?
- 24 A Yes.
 - Q And fair to say Officer Belgrave was standing right next

to you, in front of Mr. Chin-Clarke?

A That's correct.

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- Q And what did Officer Belgrave believe at that point?
- A He felt the same way, that it was similar, but he didn't think it was the same person.
- Q What did you do at that point?
- A So Officer Belgrave -- I hadn't thought of it, but he access AFIS, which is a information system that the jails and the prisons use, and they'll have photographs of subjects.
- And so he accessed some of those, and it became increasingly clear to us that Mr. Chin-Clarke was not who he said he was.
 - Q And just so we're clear. When you, when Officer
 Belgrave accessed AFIS, he was looking for photographs of a
 Dana Clarke?
 - A That's correct.
 - Q And what, what were some of the things that made it clear to both you and Officer Belgrave that Dana Clarke and the Defendant were not the same person?
 - A So I kind of remember, I think Dana Clarke may have had a scar here. One of the images, one of the persons did, had a scar, and the other did not. And while it wasn't immediately obvious in the first photographs that we looked it, it became obvious in the second. And I think there was also a freckle that was, was there on one of the images but not on Mr. Chin-Clarke, you know.

- Q And with respect to Mr. Chin-Clarke's socials security number, did you ask him if he was able to give any of the numbers that were part of that social security number?
- A I did.

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- Q And how did he respond?
- A So I asked him if he knew the last four, and he indicated that he did not. I asked him if he knew any of the last four, and he stated that he did not. And I asked him if he just knew the first three, and he said that he did not.
- Q And Officer McHugh, fair to say you ultimately made a determination that this individual was not Dana Clarke?
- A Yes.
 - Q What did you do at that point?
 - A So Mr. Chin-Clarke was clearly very nervous, and that was making me nervous, and the fact that he was giving these sort of bizarre answers to our questions. I thought it would be prudent to put him in handcuffs until we could kind of sort out what was going on there.
 - Q And did you attempt to put Mr. Chin-Clarke in handcuffs?
- A Yes, I did.
- Q What happened at that point?
- 22 A So I believe I said turn around and give me your hands, 23 and I reached to handcuff him. And he spun around, and he 24 was trying to evade us. And I think in doing so, he punched 25 Fabian sort of in the chest. And I think he spun to his

- left, and so we all had to, we all ended up on the ground.
- Q Fair to say a couple of other officers came to assist?
- A Yeah, we were there for a while, trying to get handcuffs on Mr. Chin-Clarke, and then Eddie Lopez and Officer Caulfield showed up to help us out.
- Q During that struggle, were you ultimately able to get handcuffs on Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- A Yes.

Chin-Clarke?

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- Q At that point, are you aware of any of the officers present, including yourself, conducted a pat frisk of Mr.
- A Yes, Officer Lopez did. They had him, I was kind of collecting some of the items that we had dropped. So he was safely in handcuffs, and so Officer Lopez conducted a pat frisk.
 - Q And did, to your knowledge, did Officer Lopez locate anything as a result of that pat frisk?
 - MS. HACKETT: Objection.
- THE COURT: Basis?
- 20 MS. HACKETT: No personal knowledge.
- THE COURT: Overruled.
- THE WITNESS: He did.
- BY MS. CASCIONE:
 - O And what did he locate?
- 25 A Well, he stated gun, which indicated that he had found

something that he believed to be a firearm on Mr. Chin-Clarke's person.

- Q And did Officer Lopez actually recover a gun that you could see?
- A Yes.

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- Q And did you ever see or hold that gun?
- A I did. So what happened then was of course that immediately got my attention, so I went back to where they were going through Mr. Chin-Clarke's items. And he had a, like a fanny pack, I guess, that had been inside of his pants in the, in the front of his pants that I had never seen. And so Eddie had palpated this, and that's when he felt what he believed a trigger guard and I think, you know, the handle of the firearm. So I think Eddie unzipped it. There was a zipper on the top of it. And we all kind of looked in. And I saw the firearm there, and so I withdrew it.
- Q And to your knowledge, was anything else recovered from inside of that fanny pack?
- 19 A Yes.
 - Q And do you recall specifically what was recovered?
- 21 A There was what I believed to be heroin as well as crack 22 cocaine in multiple plastic baggies.
- Q Fair to say there was about 23 bags of what you believed to be crack cocaine?
- 25 A Yes.

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- Q And approximately nine bags of what you believed at that time to be heroin?
- A That's correct.

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- Q And fair to say that the gun that was recovered was determined to be a Beretta?
- A That's correct.
- Q And that gun was loaded with seven rounds of ammunition in the magazine and one in the chamber?
- A That's my understanding.
- Q Officer McHugh, fair to say that Mr. Chin-Clarke was arrested at that, at that time?
- 12 A He was.
- 13 Q And he was transported back to A1 and booked?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q To your knowledge, were any items recovered or seized 16 off of Mr. Chin-Clarke at booking?
- 17 A I don't recall.
- Q Would it refresh your memory to look at the report generated?
- 20 A It would.
- 21 MS. CASCIONE: If I may, Your Honor?
- THE COURT: You may.
- BY MS. CASCIONE:
- Q If you could just take a look at that paragraph right there, and just look up at me when you're done.

- A Yes.
- Q Thank you. And Officer McHugh, does that refresh your memory with respect to what was seized at booking?
- A It does.
- Q And what was that?
- A It was \$100 in U.S. currency and a cellphone.
- Q Fair to say, Officer McHugh, that there was video surveillance that was recovered from the St. Francis House?
- A There was.
- Q You've had an opportunity to view that video surveillance?
- 12 A I have.

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- MS. CASCIONE: I'd move to enter this, Your Honor, this
 CD as the next exhibit at this time.
- MS. HACKETT: No objection.
- THE COURT: It will be admitted as Exhibit 1.
 - MS. CASCIONE: And then with the Court's permission, I'd like to just publish a couple of portions of it unless Your Honor wants me to play the whole thing at this time.
 - THE COURT: How long is the video?
 - MS. CASCIONE: Do you know -- it's probably, in totality, maybe like 10 to 15 minutes. But there's definitely one part that's not relevant, so I can sort of skip that part if --
- 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CASCIONE: -- Your Honor's inclined to --

THE COURT: Is that fine with the Defense?

MS. HACKETT: Yes, I had actually planned to play quite a bit of it for the officer, just to go over a couple of different points. So I don't know if it would be repetitive to play the whole thing, but I'm sure there's points that Commonwealth wants --

THE CLERK: Exhibit 1 so marked.

(Clerk marks CD as Exhibit Number 1.)

MS. CASCIONE: And just for the record, Your Honor, there are three files that are part of this. I'm going to play what's marked Chin-Clarke two at this point.

(Video played.)

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BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q And Officer McHugh, fair to say that this video surveillance is from Boylston Street in Downtown Boston?
- 17 A That's correct.
 - Q If you're looking sort of to this building to the right here, what is that building?
- 20 A That's the building that houses the St. Francis House 21 daytime shelter.
- Q And fair to say that this video surveillance is date and time stamped?
 - A It is.
 - Q And there's a date stamp of January 27th, 2017?

- A That's right.
- Q And there's a timestamp of 8:54 a.m.?
- A Correct.

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MS. CASCIONE: If I may, I'll just skip a little bit to the relevant portion, Your Honor?

BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q Fair to say, Officer McHugh, this is fairly consistent with the traffic in this area on a typical morning?
- A Yes.
- 10 Q That individual walking with the yellow bag, fair to say
 11 that was the individual identified as Mr. Noj?
- 12 A Yes.
- 13 Q And if I can, fair to say -- strike that.
 - If I could just pause this for one moment. Fair to say that this individual speaking to the man with the yellow bag was ultimately identified as Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- 17 A That's correct.
 - Q And Officer McHugh, I know it might be a little bit difficult to see, but do you know where you are at this point?
 - A So I think you can see three persons.
- MS. CASCIONE: If, actually, if the officer may step down?
- THE COURT: You may.
- MS. CASCIONE: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: So about 15 feet away, there are, there would be four people here. And I'm further down the sidewalk, I think, another 50 feet maybe.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

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- Q And are you, can you see yourself in this image?
- A That might be me. It looks like I have the iPad in my left hand.
- Q I'm going to play it for a little bit for a moment.
- A So that's, that's me approaching.
- Q And if you could just point out to the Court.
- A Approaching here.
 - Q You can have a seat. Thank you. This still image here, Officer McHugh, I know you testified moments ago to what you observed. But this, at this time frame right here when you're approaching, can you just let the Court know sort of what part of your testimony this is, is occurring here?
 - A So this is the portion when, this is what initially caught my attention with the people looking into the bag and the new items of clothing. It looked like some commerce was going on.
- Q Fair to say that Mr. Noj is holding an article of clothing in his hand?
- 23 A That's correct.
 - Q And fair to say that Mr. Chin-Clarke also had a sort of nondescript bag in his hand as well?

- A He did.
- Q Did he take any items out of that bag?
- A I can't recall.
- Q And if I could stop for a moment. Fair to say, Officer, that you can see Mr. Chin-Clarke hand back an item to Mr. Noj at that point, is that accurate?
- A That is accurate.
- Q And you can also see Mr. Noj is about to hand over that blue article of clothing to Mr. Chin-Clarke, and when he walked up, he immediately gave it back, is that accurate?
- A Yes.

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- Q And what is that consistent with in your experience?

 MS. HACKETT: Objection.
- 14 THE COURT: Overruled.
 - THE WITNESS: Well, I think he didn't want any part of what was going on at that point.
- 17 BY MS. CASCIONE:
 - Q And I'm going to continue this for a moment. Just in general, what's happening at this point, Officer?
 - A So my, I kept my attention on these two because those, these two gentlemen, Mr. Noj and Mr. Chin-Clarke, were the ones that were engaged in that. The third guy is gone. I think I actually told him to leave because that's too many people to have with me. But I'm asking Mr. Noj for, you know, who he is, where did he get these items, those first

- questions that we spoke about.
- Q At this point, had you identified yourself as a police officer?
 - A Yes, I had.

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- Q Do you have a memory of what you said to Mr. Chin-Clarke at that point when he went against the wall?
- A I had told him to take his hands out of his pockets, and I asked him to stand on the other side of me.
- Q And why did you do that?
- 10 A I didn't want them to split me up, so that they could
 11 approach me from two sides.
- Q Do you remember what you said to Mr. Noj at that point once you confirmed who he was?
- 14 A I asked him to stay standing like he was. It makes it safer for me.
- Q Fair to say you're taking information from Mr. Chin-Clarke at this point?
- 18 A That's correct.
 - Q What's happening in that portion of the video?
 - A So I had looked at the image of Mr. Dana Clarke, and I was concerned that it wasn't matching the person that was in front of me. So I was a little more concerned about what was happening, and so I asked him to sit on the sidewalk for my safety.
 - Q Fair to say they both complied at that point?

A They did.

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- Q This individual here in the blue jacket, Officer McHugh, are you familiar with who that person is?
 - A I think that's, I believe his name is Beau. He's one of the security guards.
 - Q And --
 - A That's Officer Belgrave that just approached.
 - Q In the black sweatshirt, that's Officer Belgrave?
- A That's correct.
- 10 Q And so to your knowledge, this individual works for the
- 11 St. Francis House?
- 12 A Yes.
- Q Fair to say Officer Belgrave's accessing AFIS at this point?
- 15 A That's correct.
- 16 Q And what are you doing right here, Officer McHugh?
- A I wanted to get a better look at what was in there, the items, and make sure there's nothing else that might be dangerous. Neither one of these guys had been frisked.
- Q Do you have a memory of whether the items in the bag appeared to come from the same store or not?
 - A I don't.

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MS. CASCIONE: Just for the record, I'm now playing the portion entitled Chin-Clarke, which is part of Exhibit 1.

BY MS. CASCIONE:

- Q What's happening at this point?
- A Mr. Clarke is trying to get away from us.
- Q Was that the moment when you went for his arm, that you were attempting to place handcuffs on Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- A That's correct.
- Q Did you say anything at that moment?
- A I believe I said give me your hands.
- Q There's a number of people, Officer, in blue jackets.
- To the best of your knowledge, did they all work for St.
- 10 Francis as well?
- 11 A They did.

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- 12 Q Is it fairly normal for them to assist in things that
- occur outside of St. Francis House?
- 14 A They will sometimes.
- 15 Q Those two officers that just approached, are those
- 16 Officers Caulfield and Lopez?
- 17 A Yes.
- Q Do you know what happened to Mr. Noj?
- 19 A He departed. That lady told him to move. I wanted him
- to be away from us as well. And I, I might've said, like,
- get away, move down there. I didn't think he was going to be
- a problem at the point.
- 23 Q And is that when the, the item, what's the item that's
- in your right hand?
- 25 A It's the firearm.

MS. CASCIONE: Can I just have one moment, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MS. CASCIONE: I don't have anything further.

THE COURT: Cross-exam.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. HACKETT:

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- Q Good morning, Officer.
- A Good morning.
- Q When you first approached Mr. Noj and Mr. Chin-Clarke, did you say anything specifically to Mr. Chin-Clarke?
- 11 A I think I addressed both of them. I think I said is 12 this stuff stolen. Something along those lines.
- 13 Q And what did you tell Mr. Chin-Clarke to do?
- 14 A I don't think I told him to do anything right then.
- Q So you said is this stuff stolen, and Mr. Noj said whoa, right?
- 17 A That's correct.
- 18 Q And did Mr. Chin-Clarke say anything?
- 19 A I don't think so. I don't recall.
- Q Did you tell him to stand in a particular area or do anything particular?
- 22 A Not immediately.
- Q When did you first tell him to do something?
- 24 A After I had spoken to Mr. Noj.
- Q And what did you say to him?

- A I said stand over there.
- Q And was that after you had ascertained Mr. Noj's identity?
 - A I'm not sure.

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- Q When you told him to stand over there, is that before or after you had a conversation with Mr. Noj about where the clothing came from?
- A It was after. It was after the initial inquiry.
- Q You just reviewed much of the video in this case, is that right?
- 11 A That's correct.
- Q Yeah. And you saw that at one point you instructed or you did something to have Mr. Chin-Clarke stand against the wall, right?
- 15 A Yes.
- Q And then you also had Mr. Noj stand with his face facing the wall?
- 18 A Yes.
- Q And then he also, both people were told to sit on the ground, right?
- 21 A Yes.
- Q On the sidewalk?
- 23 A That's correct.
- Q And after they were sitting on the sidewalk for a period of time, they, Mr. Chin-Clarke was told to stand up, right?

Α Yes.

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- And is that so you could get a better view of his face?
- That's correct.
 - And you touched the brim of his hat, is that right?
 - I think so. I know I asked him to take his hood off at Α one point, and he complied. He may have put it back on.
 - Yeah, that, that could be accurate.
 - Okay. And then, but whatever is captured in the video is accurate, right?
- That's correct. 10
- 11 And you also had him take his glasses off?
- Again, I don't recall. Of course what's on the video, 12 yes, that would've been at my behest. 13
- 14 Mr. Noj was never charged with receiving stolen
- 15 property, right?
- 16 No, he was not.

No.

- 17 Prior to this interaction with Mr. Noj and Mr. Chin-18 Clarke, you hadn't had any specific calls for a report of 19 shoplifting, right?
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- 21 And when you looked at the clothes that were in the bag, 22 you didn't see any security, like, ink security devices 23 attached to them? You're familiar with an ink security --
- Yeah. 24 Α
- 25 -- device, right?

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- A No, not that I recall.
- Q And you know that an ink security device is something that would be taken out, taken off at the point of purchase, right?
- A Yes.

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- Q Where were the, you said that there were tags on the clothes, right?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q Where were the tags, what was the store that the tags 10 came from?
- 11 A I don't recall.
- Q And what was the brand labeled on the yellow plastic bag that Mr. Noj was holding?
- 14 A I don't recall.
- Q And you didn't know any of these people before that day, right?
- 17 A That's correct.
- Q You said you had a conversation with Mr. Noj about where the clothes came from, right?
- 20 A Yes.
- 21 Q And he said they came from the Natick Mall?
- 22 A He stated that he had bought them at the Natick Mall.
- Q And then he also told you later that his mother actually purchased them?
- 25 A Yeah, he said his mother gave them to him. It was, so

- he did not state my mother purchased them. He said my mother gave them to me. That's what he said.
 - Q And did you ask additional questions about where his mother got them?
 - A I don't recall.
 - Q And did you ask additional questions about whether he was with his mother when she purchased them?
- A No.

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- 9 Q You said that you're familiar with a lot of the stores
 10 in the Downtown Crossing area where the homeless shelter is,
 11 right?
- 12 A Yes.
- Q And most of those stores in that area open around nine or ten o'clock in the morning, right?
- 15 A Yes.
- Q And this incident occurred shortly after nine o'clock in the morning?
- 18 A Yes.
- 19 Q You said that you can get donated clothing or I think
 20 you said you can get clothing, as a homeless person, you can
 21 get it from St. Francis, right?
- 22 A That's correct.
- 23 Q And do you know where some of that clothing comes from?
- 24 A I do not.
- 25 Q And do you know whether or not some of that clothing is

donated?

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- A I believe it's all donated.
- Q Do you know if some of it might have tags on it and some of it might not?
- A I don't know.
- MS. HACKETT: Just one moment if I may. Nothing further. Thank you.
- THE COURT: Any redirect?
 - MS. CASCIONE: No, Your Honor.
 - THE COURT: The witness may step down.
- THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 12 (Witness excused.)
- MS. CASCIONE: I'm just going to grab that exhibit so I don't forget it.
 - THE COURT: Does the Commonwealth have any other witnesses?
 - MS. CASCIONE: No, the Commonwealth would rest.
- THE COURT: Does the Defense have any witnesses?
- MS. HACKETT: Nothing from the Defense. Thank you.
- 20 THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear closing arguments.
 - MS. HACKETT: Defendant is asking that the evidence that was taken from Mr. Chin-Clarke's person at the time of arrest and also the items taken at booking be suppressed. And the basis of that is that essentially the stop of Mr. Chin-Clarke was a stop that did not have reasonable suspicion based on

specific articulable facts. That moment of the seizure is important in this case as the facts that you heard today and the video surveillance show sort of an escalating encounter with the police.

The first couple seconds or first few seconds of this encounter probably can be characterized as a casual encounter between a police officer and a citizen. They're allowed to have some conversation, ask certain questions, ask a person's identity. That is permissible and does not rise to the level of a constitutional seizure. However, at the point where, at the point where the officer starts telling the individuals what they're required to do, at that point a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would've believed that they were not free to leave.

At one point Mr. Chin-Clarke is told to stand over there. He's, and also the, and I think at the point of, that he's told to stand over there, that is a seizure in a constitutional sense because he is being instructed, he, they are using the police authority to, to limit his ability to move in a, in a constructive manner. The seizure increases, and the level of the seizure increases as the encounter goes on. The encounter lasts for several minutes. You'll see on the surveillance video that it lasts for somewhere around eight minutes, where he is not only told to stand over in a particular area. They call in for a second officer.

They are accusing of having the property be stolen. So the awareness of the Defendant in that situation would know that they're being accused of a crime. They would know that they were being told to do something. They were then told to sit on the ground. And so being told to sit on the ground on a public sidewalk is something that a person would do if they were under the authority of a police officer, and that they were, at that point certainly would've understood that they were not free to leave.

In addition to that, the level of the seizure goes on where Mr. Chin-Clarke is told to stand up. He's required to take off certain items of clothing. The police officer actually touches his clothing at a certain point and touches Mr. Chin-Clarke. Prior to, prior to their attempt to place him into handcuffs, there was no specific and articulable facts that Mr. Chin-Clarke was committing or receiving stolen property. What we have is items of clothing with tags on them. They really had no information that those items of clothing were stolen. Simply because they have tags on them doesn't mean that they were stolen. Any person can walk around with tags on clothes. It doesn't mean that those items are stolen.

And the fact that they're standing outside of a homeless shelter cannot be the fact that differentiates this case from all other cases where people have tags on clothing. The fact

that a person's homeless does not mean that they can't purchase clothing. It doesn't mean they can't be donated clothing from the St. Francis House that has tags on it. It doesn't mean that they can't receive clothing from their mother that has tags on it. A person who's homeless can have new items of clothing without having stolen them.

The cases that I put in the memo aren't exactly on point because I don't think there are cases directly on point about a person standing outside of a homeless shelter with tags on the clothing. However, the cases often have, as an aspect of them, a radio call for some kind of theft crime that happened relatively recently in the area. That is absent in this case. So without more factors to fill in the specific and articulable facts that we need for reasonable suspicion, the officer is not permitted to hold Mr. Chin-Clarke and keep him in the place that he kept him for the period of time that he kept him, and limit his freedom of movement in the way that he was permitted to do so.

Then he then, it's a full arrest. Our argument is that it's a full arrest when they attempt to place him in handcuffs. And at that point they really don't have significant additional information that would have increased the level of suspicion to the level of probable cause. It is not relevant that Mr. Chin-Clarke is under suspicion for providing a false name. There is no law requiring that a

person, a citizen standing on the street provide an accurate name to police officers until the moment they are arrested.

If Mr. Chin-Clarke had provided a false name after arrest, that would've been a crime that he could've been, you know, that he, there could be separate probable cause for. But during this period of time leading up to the point where they are attempting to place him under arrest, he wasn't under arrest at that point. And therefore there is no basis to arrest him based on suspicion that he's providing false information.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. CASCIONE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd ask you to deny the motion to suppress. I'm just going to highlight a couple of things that my sister didn't argue that I don't think I touched upon in my memo. I didn't get my sister's memo until late yesterday. She is subsequent counsel, and the initial attorney didn't file a memorandum. So just a couple of things that I didn't touch upon in my memorandum.

Essentially, the Commonwealth's argument is that the moment of seizure is the moment that Officer McHugh grabs Mr. Chin-Clarke's arm and attempts to place him in handcuffs. And the Commonwealth would suggest that nothing prior to that was outside the realm of an appropriate and allowable threshold inquiry.

I think that I did say some of this in my memorandum.

But essentially, I think the case law is clear that officers are permitted to go up and inquire in a particular situation. I don't think that the individuals were detained for an overly long amount of time in order for the officers to confirm or dispel the suspicions that they had with respect to their observations. I think the *Barros* case, 425 Mass. 572, I think, in that case, it was a 15 minute detention that was rule permissible. I think, in this case, frankly, having the video is great because it shows exactly how long this happened, and I think that it was not an unreasonable amount of time for the officers to investigate what they believed to be suspicious conduct.

Additionally, I don't think moving the individuals against the wall and/or asking them to sit down is outside of the realm of a threshold inquiry. *Commonwealth v. Ferrara*, 376 Mass. 502, stands for the proposition that moving an individual during a stop is permissible. Most of the cases in that area focus on moving, removing people --

THE COURT: Car.

MS. CASCIONE: -- from cars. But I do think that the safety concern is present here when, as Officer McHugh testified, he didn't want to be split by these individuals. He's making observations of Mr. Chin-Clarke going in and out of his pockets along with nervousness and both individuals looking up and down the street, which I apologize and I

didn't pause on that. But there in the video, you can see Mr. Chin-Clarke scanning up and down the street, looking to his right.

And all that taken together, I think, more than justifies asking the individuals to be in a place that's more safe for the officer who is alone and outnumbered by these two gentlemen, and also on a street where there's tons of civilians around. So I don't think it's unreasonable to make that move and/or to ask them to sit down to protect the officers' safety. And frankly, they could've said no, I'm not going to sit down, and we may not be here today.

One thing I didn't touch upon in my motion. I would suggest that the officer had probable cause to arrest both of these individuals. This isn't a beyond, proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in terms of probable cause for arrest. But I think that all of the actions of Mr. Noj and Mr. Chin-Clarke are consistent with receiving stolen property or attempt. I think that it's clear, at nine o'clock in the morning when these individuals have a bag of clothing with tags — they didn't just purchase them. The stores are not open at that time. They aren't returning them because they don't have receipts.

And I think, if you look at the actual conduct, Mr. Noj is showing items, handing them to Mr. Chin-Clarke. He holds a black item. He's looking at it. And as Officer McHugh

approaches, he's almost holding that blue object, about to look at it, and then his action of giving it back immediately, of course, would raise the level of suspicion. And I would suggest that the officer indicated he made arrests for that. And just because he didn't arrest him at that time and made a choice to continue investigating, I don't think that that means there's not probable cause.

But even so, I think that there is more than enough to establish reasonable suspicion based on all of those observations, based on this particular area and the heightened issues in terms of shoplifting and drug use. And I don't think that the information about St. Francis House was provided to the Court to say that just because this happened outside of it, it should be treated differently. But I would ask the Court to take into consideration that there is a lot of crime that's occurring in this particular street to the point where an officer's assigned a walking beat. And whether that is a direct correlation with St. Francis House or not, that fact alone isn't something that's rising, raising the level of reasonable suspicion.

I think it's more so just the conduct that happens to be happening on that block and the arrests that are being made. I think the initial observations coupled with Mr. Chin-Clarke being evasive when asked questions, providing information that was believed to be incorrect by the officers -- and I

think you can see from the video, they take time. They don't just jump the gun and say this isn't him. They look at pictures in different databases.

And that taken in conjunction with not knowing any portion of his social security number, again, all goes into the reasonable suspicion calculus, putting his hands in and out of his waistband, consistent with potentially carrying a weapon, as Officer McHugh testified based on his training and experience, all that taken together would certainly rise to the level of reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot. And so I think that my first argument would be that they had probable cause. My second argument would be that they had reasonable suspicion. And all this would be at the time of what I would suggest is the seizure when Officer McHugh puts his hand on Mr. Chin-Clarke's arm.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. I'm going to take it under advisement.

THE CLERK: This case has a July 30 final pretrial in courtroom 817 and a August 6th trial date.

THE COURT: 7/30, did you say?

THE CLERK: 7/30 is the next date, yes.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MS. HACKETT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Clerk.

(Court adjourned at 11:25 a.m.)



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Commonwealth v. Chin-Clarke

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

December 12, 2019, Argued; June 9, 2020, Decided

No. 18-P-1440.

Reporter

97 Mass. App. Ct. 604 *; 2020 Mass. App. LEXIS 69 **

COMMONWEALTH VS. JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE.

Prior History: [**1] Suffolk. INDICTMENTS found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 12, 2017.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Diane C. Freniere. J.

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by *David A. Lowy*, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court.

Core Terms

suspicion, bag, clothes, stolen, Street, seizure, pockets, shoplifting, tags, identification, seized, suppress, arrests, nervous, frisk, merchandise, handcuff, training, armed, articulable, minutes, walking, gun

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-A stop was unlawful, and the evidence obtained during the subsequent patfrisk and at booking should have been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree because a police officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop; [2]-Defendant was seized when the officer directed him to stand by a wall and asked for identification because the officer was communicating what a reasonable person would understand as a command that would be

enforced by the police power; [3]-There were no facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion because the officer did not know defendant and was aware of no reports of shoplifting in the area that day. Defendant's nervous demeanor, and the officer's general sense of concern that something was wrong did not justify the stop.

Outcome

Order denying motion to suppress reversed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review > De Novo Review > Motions to Suppress

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review > Search & Seizure

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Stop & Frisk

HN1 De Novo Review, Motions to Suppress

Absent clear error, the appeals court accepts and adopts the findings of the motion judge, but it independently determines the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. It is the Commonwealth's burden to show that the seizure and frisk of the defendant were within constitutional limits.

Headnotes/Summary

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection

Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Seizure of Persons

HN2[♣] Search & Seizure, Scope of Protection

A person is seized in the constitutional sense when an officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce that person to stay.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches > Stop & Frisk > Reasonable Suspicion

HN3[♣] Stop & Frisk, Reasonable Suspicion

The question then is whether, at the time of the seizure, an officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime. Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. A hunch will not suffice.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Stolen
Property > Receiving Stolen Property > Elements

HN4[♣] Receiving Stolen Property, Elements

The crime of receiving stolen property requires knowledge that property was stolen and knowing possession.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless Searches > Stop & Frisk > Reasonable Suspicion

HN5 ≥ Stop & Frisk, Reasonable Suspicion

It is common, and not necessarily indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a mundane encounter with police.

Headnotes

MASSACHUSETTS OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES

Receiving Stolen Goods > Constitutional Law > Search and seizure > Reasonable suspicion > Investigatory stop > Search and Seizure > Reasonable suspicion > Threshold police inquiry > Threshold Police Inquiry > Practice, Criminal > Motion to suppress

A Superior Court judge erred in denying the criminal defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence discovered after a police officer stopped and frisked the defendant, where, at the time that the defendant was seized by the officer, the officer's training and experience with identifying incidents of shoplifting combined with his observations — i.e., the defendant and two other men looking at a bag of new clothing and discussing the price of items, the man holding the bag giving conflicting explanations of the clothing's origins, and the defendant's nervous appearance — did not amount to reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime. [607-611] MEADE, J., dissenting.

Counsel: Alyssa Hackett, Committee for Public Counsel Services (*Patrick Levin*, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the defendant.

Amanda Cascione, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Judges: Present: MEADE, SHIN, & SINGH, JJ.

Opinion by: SHIN

Opinion

SHIN, J. The defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a stop and frisk of his person. The stop occurred after Boston Police Officer Michael McHugh observed the defendant on a city sidewalk with **[*605]** a man holding a bag of what looked like new clothes, which McHugh suspected were stolen. Because we conclude that McHugh did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop, we reverse.

Background [**2]. The motion judge's factual findings are unchallenged on appeal. We supplement those findings with facts drawn from McHugh's testimony, which the judge expressly credited, see <u>Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell</u>, 472 Mass. 429, 431, 35 N.E.3d 357 (2015), and from our independent observations of the surveillance video entered as an exhibit at the hearing, see <u>Commonwealth v. Tremblay</u>, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655, 107 N.E.3d 1121 (2018).

On the morning of January 27, 2017, McHugh was on a "plain-clothes, walking beat" in the area of Boylston Street between Washington and Tremont Streets in downtown Boston. This area "is dominated by commercial properties and has heavy pedestrian foot traffic" and, by McHugh's description, is high in crime in that it is "frequented by a lot of people who sell and buy drugs, people who have drug problems, and that causes other problems. There's larcenies and robberies, shoplifting, assaults, public intoxication, trespassing ... that kind of thing." McHugh had previously seen people selling or trading stolen items on the street and had made several arrests in the area for shoplifting. "[T]hings that [he] ... look[s] for" as indicative of shoplifting are "numerous kind[s] of odd items in a bag," items "with the tags still on them," and "bag[s] that might not be associated with the store that things were [**3] purchased from."

Around 9:20 A.M., McHugh was near St. Francis House, a daytime shelter that provides services to homeless people, including help with drug addiction, social services, meals, and clothing.¹ By the front door were

¹ McHugh had made "hundreds of arrests around [St. Francis House] for things ranging from stabbings to drug trafficking, drug dealing, drug possession, warrant arrests, ...

three men, not known to McHugh, "looking in a plastic shopping bag and talking to each other." As McHugh drew closer, he saw "that there was some clothing in the bag, and some of it was outside of the bag and it had the tags."

McHugh heard one of the men — he could not recall who — say, "[H]ow much is this?" He also saw one man, later identified as Milton Noj, hold up some merchandise, an item of clothing. McHugh saw no security devices attached to any of the items in the bag, and he could not recall what store name was on the tags or on the bag. He was also unaware of any reports of shoplifting [*606] in the area that day.

Nonetheless, suspecting that "some commerce was going on," McHugh walked up to the men and asked, "[W]hat's up guys. Is that stuff stolen?" Noj appeared startled, said, "[W]hoa," and backed up. McHugh identified himself as a police officer and told the third man to leave.² Responding to McHugh, Noj initially stated that he had purchased the items in [**4] the bag at the Natick Mall. When McHugh asked for receipts, Noj stated he did not have any and that his mother gave him the items.

While McHugh was talking to Noj, he noticed that the defendant had his hands in his pockets and was looking up and down the street. McHugh told the defendant to remove his hands from his pockets and to "stand over there" against the exterior wall of St. Francis House. The defendant complied. He also showed McHugh the inside of the bag he was carrying.

Turning his attention back to Noj, McHugh asked for his name and date of birth and entered the information into an "iPad" tablet computer that he carried while working to "access a couple of different applications that are helpful, mostly the Criminal Justice Information System." Upon verifying Noj's identity, McHugh told him to stand facing the wall and "to stay standing like he was." Noj complied, standing a few feet away from the defendant with his face inches from the wall.

[t]respassing, malicious destruction of property, that kind of thing."

² McHugh testified that he did so in part because "that's too many people to have with me."

³ Although McHugh was unsure whether this occurred before or after he told the defendant to stand by the wall, the surveillance video shows that McHugh first had the defendant stand by the wall and then used the iPad to confirm Noj's identity.

As this was occurring, the defendant "appeared fidgety," "looked a little nervous," and "was looking up and down the street." After instructing Noj to stand facing the wall, McHugh asked the defendant for his identification.⁴ The defendant [**5] "hesitated noticeabl[y]" before giving the name "Dana Clarke" and a date of birth. McHugh entered that information into the iPad and was able to find a driver's license photograph for a Dana Clarke, who looked "similar" to the defendant. McHugh was unsure, however, if the defendant was actually the person in the photograph. When McHugh asked the defendant for his Social Security number, the defendant said that he did not know it. Sometime during this con-[*607] versation (it is unclear from the record precisely when), McHugh noticed that the defendant's hands were in his pockets and asked him to remove them. Although the defendant complied, "within a minute or two, he put his hands back inside of his ... clothing."

McHugh's uncertainty about the defendant's identity "gave [him] a heightened sense of concern that something might be wrong," and so he had the defendant and Noj sit on the ground and called for back-up. Less than two minutes later, Officer Fabien Belgrave arrived at the scene and told the defendant to stand up so that he could get a better look at the defendant's face. The officers also had the defendant remove his hood and eyeglasses. Based on other images Belgrave found [**6] using the iPad, the officers ultimately determined that the defendant was not the Dana Clarke depicted in the driver's license photograph.

At this point, given the defendant's nervousness and his "sort of bizarre answers to [the officers'] questions," McHugh "thought it would be prudent to put him in handcuffs until [they] could kind of sort out what was going on there." As McHugh reached out to handcuff the defendant, the defendant spun around, striking Belgrave in the chest and causing all three men to fall to the ground. Two other officers arrived, and together they were able to handcuff the defendant. One officer then

⁴ As discussed *infra*, the Commonwealth concedes, and we agree, that the defendant was seized by this point.

⁵ While the officers struggled with the defendant, Noj left the scene, apparently at the direction of a St. Francis House worker. He was never charged with receiving stolen property.

pat frisked the defendant and found a loaded firearm, nine bags of heroin, and twenty-three bags of "crack cocaine" in "a fanny pack that ... had been inside of [the defendant's] pants." The defendant was arrested and transported to the police station where, at booking, one hundred dollars in cash and a cell phone were inventoried.

[*] HN1[*] Discussion. "Absent clear error, we accept and adopt the findings of the motion judge, but we independently determine the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1, 5, 927 N.E.2d 439 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 369, 868 N.E.2d 90 (2007). It is the [**7] Commonwealth's burden to show that the seizure and frisk of the defendant were within constitutional limits. See Narcisse, supra.

We begin with the question of when the defendant was seized. The Commonwealth argued at the motion hearing, and the judge [*608] concluded, that the encounter did not escalate to an investigatory stop until McHugh tried to place the defendant in handcuffs. On appeal, however, the Commonwealth concedes that the defendant was seized when McHugh directed him to stand by the wall and asked for identification. We agree that the defendant was seized no later than this point.⁷

HN2 1 A person is seized in the constitutional sense when "an officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce that person to stay." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362, 133 N.E.3d 258 (2019). By directing the defendant to stand by the wall, McHugh "was communicating what a reasonable person would understand as a command that would be enforced by the police power." Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 176, 755 N.E.2d 740 (2001). The language McHugh used, "stand over there," would have indicated to a reasonable person that compliance would be compelled. By that point McHugh had already asserted his authority over the situation by telling the third man [**8] to leave. He then further asserted his authority by conducting a records check on Noj and ordering him "to stay standing like he was" with his face inches from the wall. Certainly,

(1983).

⁶ The Commonwealth does not argue that the defendant's struggle with the officers constituted an intervening act permitting the admission of evidence obtained thereafter. Cf. Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233, 245, 449 N.E.2d 1217

⁷ The defendant claims that he was seized at the very outset of the encounter because McHugh immediately accused the men of committing a crime and ordered the third man to leave. We do not decide this issue.

by the time McHugh asked the defendant for his identification, he had objectively communicated that he would use his police power to compel the defendant to stay. See <u>Matta, supra at 365</u> (defendant seized "once the officer ordered him to stop, and then chased him"); <u>Barros, supra</u> (similar); <u>Commonwealth v. Harris, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 61, 96 N.E.3d 729 (2018)</u> (defendant seized when "officers secured identification from each of [his] companions and began calling in that information").

HN3 The question then is whether, at the time of the seizure, McHugh had reasonable suspicion that the defendant "was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime." Matta, 483 Mass. at 365, quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 303, 4 N.E.3d 1236 (2014). Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in "specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. A hunch will not suffice." Commonwealth v. Barreto, 483 Mass. 716, 720 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707, 463 N.E.2d 344 (1984).

When McHugh told the defendant to stand by the wall and asked for identification, he knew the following facts: (1) Noj had [*609] a bag of clothes with tags on them; (2) the three men were looking in the bag; (3) one of the men said, "[H]ow much is this?"; (4) Noj held up an item of [**9] merchandise; (5) Noj gave arguably conflicting answers about the origin of the clothes; and (6) the defendant appeared nervous, had his hands in his pockets (at times), and was looking up and down the street. These facts do not give rise to reasonable suspicion that the defendant committed or was about to commit a crime. As an initial matter, though the Commonwealth contends that McHugh could rely on his training and experience to infer that the clothes were stolen, McHugh saw none of the signs of shoplifting "that [he] ... look[s] for," apart from the unremarkable fact that the clothes had tags. He could not recall any details about the items, what store brand was on the tags or on the bag, or whether there was a discrepancy between the brands. That the clothes appeared to be new could not alone give rise to reasonable suspicion that they were stolen, especially given that it was daytime and the area is one that is heavily commercial. Cf. Barreto, 483 Mass. at 721 (movements consistent with drug transaction "were just as consistent with any number of innocent activities").

Furthermore, even assuming, without deciding, that Noj's explanation about where he got the clothes gave rise to reasonable suspicion [**10] that *Noj* committed a

crime,8 McHugh observed nothing to suggest that the defendant received or was about to receive any of the items knowing them to be stolen. The judge made no finding that McHugh saw the defendant accept any item or give Noj anything in exchange. To the contrary, the judge found only that the defendant was looking on as Noj held up some merchandise. Cf. Barreto, 483 Mass. at 721 (no reasonable suspicion that defendant sold drugs to pedestrian where "officers did not observe an object change hands and did not observe anything in the pedestrian's hands either before or after meeting the defendant"); Commonwealth v. Smith, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 569, 573, 772 N.E.2d 1084 (2002) (no reasonable suspicion where officer "did not observe any actual transaction or furtive activity on the part of the defendant").

Nor did McHugh have any information that the defendant knew the clothes were stolen (assuming that they were). See Commonwealth v. Namey, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 97, 852 N.E.2d 116 (2006) (HN4 T) crime of receiving stolen property requires knowledge that property was stol- [*610] en and knowing possession). There were no security devices on the clothes or any other signs of theft. McHugh asked the defendant not one question relating to the clothes — he did not ask, for instance, whether the defendant knew Noj or what the defendant was doing there. 9 See Harris, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 62 [**11] (although officers were justified in approaching defendant to investigate possible bicycle theft, "importantly, over the next several minutes they learned nothing that could have added to their suspicions"). Cf. Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 242, 74 N.E.3d 1282 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 465, 945 N.E.2d 899 (2011) (traffic stop may not last "longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"). The first question McHugh directed to the defendant was for his identification. As a result, while McHugh may have suspected that "some commerce was going on," he had no specific and articulable facts indicating that it was illegal commerce. Cf. Barros, 435 Mass. at 177 (because carrying gun is not illegal, "anonymous tip that someone is carrying a gun does

⁸ McHugh did not ask Noj whether he was with his mother when she purchased the clothes.

⁹ The surveillance video showed Noj and the third man standing together on the sidewalk when the defendant passed by. They appear to get the defendant's attention. The three men were then together for approximately twenty seconds before McHugh walked up.

not, without more, constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop and frisk"); Commonwealth v. Clark, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 44-45, 836 N.E.2d 512 (2005) (observations of defendant handing item to another person and then appearing to count money did not support reasonable suspicion of drug activity).

There are no other facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion. McHugh did not know either the defendant or Noj. See Barreto, 483 Mass. at 720 (no reasonable suspicion where, among other factors, "neither the defendant nor [the person with whom he engaged in suspected exchange] was known to the officers"); Clark, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 45 (similar); Smith, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 573 (similar). He was aware of no reports of shoplifting in the area that day that might have added to the reasonable suspicion calculus. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 477-478, 426 N.E.2d 172 (1981) (no reasonable suspicion where officer had no "independent information, such as a tip, that a crime was being committed" and "[t]here had been no report of a recent crime"). That the area is high crime did not justify the stop. See Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 13; Clark, supra at 44; Smith, supra at 572. HN5[1] The defendant's nervous demeanor, and McHugh's general "sense of concern that something might be wrong," also did not justify the [*611] stop. See Cruz, 459 Mass. at 468 ("It [**12] is common, and not necessarily indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a mundane encounter with police ..."); Barros, 435 Mass. at 178 ("defendant's suspicious activities, including his breaking eye contact with the officer and his refusing to answer the officer's initial questions ...[,] cannot provide reasonable suspicion for justification of a detention or seizure").

For these reasons we part ways with the dissent's conclusion that the facts in this case are analogous to those in *Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)*. There, the officer observed the petitioner himself, along with another man, "hover about a street corner for an extended period of time," "pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly [twenty-four] times," and confer on the corner after "each completion of this route." *Id. at 23*. In comparison here, McHugh observed the defendant, in a span of a few seconds, do nothing more than look on as Noj showed him what appeared to be new clothes. A reed as thin as this does not support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

We therefore conclude that the stop was unlawful and that the evidence obtained during the subsequent patfrisk and at booking should have been suppressed [**13] as fruits of the poisonous tree. 10 The order denying the motion to suppress is reversed.

So ordered.

Dissent by: MEADE

Dissent

MEADE, J. (dissenting). The majority concludes that the seizure of the defendant occurred without sufficient antecedent reasonable suspicion, and as a result, his motion to suppress the firearm and narcotics found on his person should have been allowed. Because I believe the record evidence, the motion judge's findings, and the controlling case law support a conclusion at odds with that determination, I respectfully dissent.

"Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the touchstone of our analysis of police conduct that results in a search or seizure is whether that conduct was reasonable." Commonwealth v. Watts, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 517, 908 N.E.2d 788 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 406 Mass. 343, 346, 547 N.E.2d 1134 (1989). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) ("what the Constitution for- [*612] bids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures" [citation omitted]). An investigatory stop, or "seizure" in the constitutional sense, is justified under art. 14 if the police have reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop. See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 476 Mass. 361, 363, 67 N.E.3d 713 (2017). "Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer, based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's experience, has reasonable grounds to suspect a person is committing, has committed, [**14] or is about to commit a crime" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 363-364. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 456 Mass. 818, 820, 926 N.E.2d 199 (2010). Importantly, "reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable

¹⁰ Given our ruling, we do not address the defendant's argument that the officers' use of handcuffs was disproportionate to any threat he posed.

cause," <u>Commonwealth v. Smigliano, 427 Mass. 490, 492, 694 N.E.2d 341 (1998)</u>, and it is measured objectively. See <u>Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231, 235, 66 N.E.3d 1019 (2017)</u>.

Moreover, it had been long held that "[p]olice have seized a person in the constitutional sense 'only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 173-174, 755 N.E.2d 740 (2001), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).¹ See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). However, more recently, the Supreme Judicial Court has charted a course away from the "legal fiction" of the Mendenhall-Royer standard, because "civilians rarely feel 'free to leave' a police encounter," and a literal "application of the test would result in nearly every police inquiry being deemed a seizure in the constitutional sense." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 360-361, 133 N.E.3d 258 & n.4 (2019). Instead, after a review of the totality of the circumstances, "the more pertinent question is whether an officer has, through words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer would use his or her police power to coerce that person to stay." Id. at 362. It is the defendant's burden to show that an encounter with the police rises to the level of a seizure in the constitutional sense. [**15] See Commonwealth v. Thinh Van Cao, 419 Mass. 383, 388, 644 N.E.2d 1294, cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1146, 115 S. Ct. 2588, 132 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1995); J.A. Grasso, Jr., & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 4-2[a] (2019).

1. The initial seizure. Here, the totality of the circumstances, as [*613] found by the motion judge, are as follows: Michael McHugh,² a ten-year veteran of the Boston Police Department, was specially trained in surveillance tactics, active shooter training, trademarks and identification of armed subjects. For the last four years prior to the arrest at issue here, he had been working as a plainclothes officer walking a beat in the area of Boylston Street between Washington and Tremont Street, which is a "high crime" area. McHugh

¹ For more than fifty years, it has been recognized that "not every encounter between a law enforcement official and a member of the public constitutes [a seizure]." <u>Commonwealth</u> v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 789, 665 N.E.2d 93 (1996).

had made numerous shoplifting arrests and had observed individuals selling and trading their stolen property outside on the street, often to feed drug addictions. McHugh had made arrests for shoplifting crimes based on his observation of people engaged in commerce on the street with items with tags still on them and items in bags not consistent with the items contained therein.

On the morning of January 27, 2017, McHugh was by himself, in plain clothes, patrolling Boylston Street in the area of St. Francis House, a daytime homeless shelter located at 39 Boylston [**16] Street, which was an area where McHugh had made hundreds of arrests. In that area, he saw three men looking in a plastic shopping bag and talking to each other. McHugh's attention was drawn to the men, whom he did not know, when he noticed that the bag contained clothing, some of which was outside of the bag, with store tags still attached and visible. Based on what he saw, coupled with his training and experience, McHugh suspected that the men were buying or selling stolen clothing, and he decided to conduct a threshold inquiry.

As McHugh approached the three men, he overheard one male ask, "[H]ow much is this," as another male held up some merchandise. McHugh asked the group, "[W]hat's up guys. Is that stuff stolen?" Milton Noj, the man holding up the merchandise, became startled and responded, "Whoa." McHugh identified himself as a Boston Police officer and asked the men for their [*614] identifications.⁴ As McHugh spoke with Noj, the defendant had his hands in his front pockets and was looking up and down Boylston Street. For safety purposes, McHugh asked the defendant to stand next to the exterior wall of St. Francis House while he spoke Noi initially told McHugh that he with Noj. purchased [**17] the items in the plastic bag at the Natick Mall. When Noj could not produce receipts, he

² The motion judge expressly credited McHugh's testimony.

³ The surveillance video recording (video) depicts the defendant holding the merchandise and only returning it to Noj when McHugh confronted the two. In other words, the clothing was handed back to Noj when they were caught. Also, the video belies the majority's assertion that the defendant did not give Noj anything in exchange for the item handed to him. While it is true that McHugh did not see the exchange, the video depicts the defendant putting something in Noj's hand when the defendant arrives, which occurred before Noj displayed the merchandise for the defendant.

⁴ McHugh had sent the third man away for safety reasons because the third man was not engaged in the transaction with the defendant and Noj.

changed his story and told McHugh that his mother gave him the items. This change in story further heightened McHugh's belief that the items were stolen. Noj was nervous, but provided his identifying information, including his full name and date of birth, without hesitation. McHugh accessed the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) images on his "iPad" tablet computer and confirmed Noj's identity in thirty-eight seconds.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant claimed that he was seized at the moment Officer McHugh told him to stand next to the wall of St. Francis House. On appeal, the Commonwealth concedes that this is the point the seizure occurred. Assuming this to be true, i.e., that McHugh, through his words or conduct, objectively communicated that he would use his police power to coerce the defendant to stay, see Matta, 483Mass. at 360-361 & n.4, this initial seizure was justified and appropriate for a threshold inquiry and safety purposes. 6

For four years, Officer McHugh had been working in this high crime area, where he had made hundreds of arrests for narcotics sales, stabbings, larceny, [**18] robbery, assault, receiving stolen goods, trespassing, and shoplifting. See <u>Matta, 483 Mass. at 367</u> (reaffirming that incident occurring in high crime area "may be taken [*615] into account as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis"). In particular, McHugh had made arrests for shoplifting based on his observation of people selling stolen items on the street

with store tags still attached to the items. With that experience, as well as his training and the fact that the location was a high crime area, McHugh saw Noj holding a bag of clothing, with the defendant looking on, and he heard one of the men ask, "[H]ow much is this," as the merchandise was held up. As the motion judge found, when McHugh approached the men, he was neither "hostile" nor "aggressive." McHugh inquired if the goods were indeed stolen, which startled Noj, and he exclaimed, "[W]hoa." As McHugh spoke to Noj, the defendant had his hands in his pockets and was surveilling Boylston Street. These specific, articulated facts, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in total and in light of Officer McHugh's experience, provided him reasonable grounds to suspect that Noj was attempting to sell or the defendant was attempting [**19] to receive stolen goods. See Pinto, 476 Mass. at 363-364. See also Matta, supra at 366 (police may rely on their experience and training as basis for reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Silva, 440 Mass. 772, 784, 802 N.E.2d 535 (2004) (same). Accordingly, McHugh was warranted in stopping these individuals and making a threshold inquiry to either confirm or dispel his suspicions based on their actions and his experience.⁷

The majority labors to isolate McHugh's articulated facts and to diminish their collective import, and instead emphasizes things McHugh did not know. The majority

⁷The defendant posits a variety of possible innocent explanations for the circumstances, including that Noj could have been selling the clothing his mother gave him. However, much like when proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or establishing probable cause, the government is not charged with excluding hypotheses of innocence, see Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533-534, 542 N.E.2d 249 (1989); Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 175, 439 N.E.2d 251 (1982), the same is true — on a much greater scale — for reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 450 Mass. 818, 823, 882 N.E.2d 328 (2008) (police do "not have to exclude all the possible innocent explanations for the facts in order to form a reasonable suspicion"); Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 44, 762 N.E.2d 815 (2002) ("The standard of 'reasonable suspicion' does not require that an officer exclude all possible innocent explanations of the facts and circumstances"); Commonwealth v. Watson, 430 Mass. 725, 729, 723 N.E.2d 501 (2000) ("Seemingly innocent activities taken together can give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a threshold inquiry"); Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 346, 921 N.E.2d 1026 (2010) ("Viewed through the eyes of experienced police officers and as a whole, even seemingly innocent activities may take on a sinister cast and give rise to reasonable suspicion").

⁵ The defendant also claims that he was seized when McHugh accused him of a crime. However, McHugh merely queried whether the items in the bag were stolen. It is well settled that "the police do not effectuate a seizure merely by asking questions unless the circumstances of the encounter are sufficiently intimidating that a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to turn his back on his interrogator and walk away" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 242, 922 N.E.2d 778 (2010). Here, Noj, although startled, claimed that the items were not stolen. In any event, as describe infra, McHugh had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot even at the time he posed the question.

⁶ The motion judge found that the seizure occurred later, when the defendant was handcuffed, but we can affirm her denial of the motion to suppress if the facts found by the motion judge support an alternative theory that justifies her ultimate order. See <u>Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102, 682 N.E.2d 586 (1997)</u>.

correctly notes that the in-[*616] cident occurred in the daytime in a heavy commercial area, and that McHugh did not know whether the clothing items were actually stolen or whether the items retained security tags on them. He was also unaware of any reports of shoplifting in the area that day, and he did not know whether there was a discrepancy between the tags on the items and the bag from which they were retrieved. The majority further notes that McHugh neither knew the defendant nor Noj, that McHugh failed to inquire whether they knew one another, and that McHugh did not know whether the items in the bag were stolen.⁸

An examination of the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), illustrates why the majority's focus is improper. [**20] In Terry, at 2:30 P.M. on an October day, Martin McFadden, a plainclothes police officer, was patrolling downtown Cleveland, Ohio. Id. at 5. He had been assigned to patrol this area for shoplifters and pickpockets for thirty years. Id. McFadden had developed "routine habits of observation over the years and that he would 'stand and watch people or walk and watch people." Id. While engaged in this routine, McFadden's attention was drawn to two men, Terry and Chilton. McFadden "was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them," but these men "didn't look right to [him]." Id. From his vantage point 300 to 400 feet away, McFadden watched the two men repeatedly walking past and peering into a storefront before returning to a corner to converse. Id. at 5-6. At one point, a third man, Katz, approached the two and briefly engaged them in conversation, before the two men resumed their window peering exercise. *Id. at 6*. After this had gone on for ten to twelve minutes, McFadden had "become thoroughly suspicious." He suspected the two men were "casing a job, a stick-up," and feared they may have been armed with a gun. Id. McFadden approached them, identified himself as a police officer,

97, 852 N.E.2d 116 (2006), the majority correctly notes that receiving stolen property requires knowledge that the property is stolen. However, the issue in Namey was whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 99-100. Here, in contrast, the issue is merely reasonable suspicion, a standard even lower than probable cause. Smigliano, 427 Mass. at 492. In other words, McHugh was only required, in light of his experience and the articulated facts, to have reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant was committing, had

committed, or was about to commit a crime. See Pinto, 476

Mass. at 363-364. This he had.

⁸ Relying on Commonwealth v. Namey, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 94,

and asked for their [**21] names. *Id. at 6-7*. When the men mumbled in response, McFadden grabbed Terry, "spun him around," [*617] and pat frisked him. *Id. at 7*. This frisk revealed a gun in Terry's left breast coat pocket. McFadden's patfrisk of Chilton similarly yielded a gun; Katz was not armed. *Id.*

Like McHugh in this case, McFadden did not know Terry or Chilton, and had never seen them before. "[H]e had received no information concerning them from any other source." Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. McFadden was not patrolling with any specific knowledge of criminal activity in the area, but rather McFadden's "knowledge was confined to what he had observed." Id. He did not ask Terry and Chilton if they knew one another, but only requested their names. The Court concluded that Terry was seized when McFadden grabbed him. Id. at 19. Despite the gaps in McFadden's knowledge, and that each of the acts McFadden observed could have themselves be innocent, id. at 22-23, the Court nonetheless concluded that it was reasonable for McFadden — given his experience — to believe that Terry and Chilton were about to commit a crime, and that they were probably armed. Id. at 23, 28, 30. With this comparison to the instant case, which the majority artificially truncates, I respectfully suggest the majority [**22] has misapplied the reasonable suspicion standard.

2. The continuing investigation. After the initial seizure, McHugh's further investigation and action were similarly justified and proper in scope and proportionality. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 116, 661 N.E.2d 617 (1996); J.A. Grasso, Jr. & C.M. McEvoy, Suppression Matters Under Massachusetts Law § 4-4[b]. Given that he was outnumbered, and that the defendant had his hands in his pockets while he looked up and down Boylston Street, McHugh appropriately separated the defendant from Noj for safety purposes by having the defendant stand against the wall.

After separating the two, McHugh learned that Noj did not have receipts for the clothing items, and Noj gave McHugh conflicting explanations as to whether and where he purchased the items, before claiming they were a gift from his mother. As the motion judge found, this change in story further heightened McHugh's belief that the items were stolen. See <u>Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 78, 833 N.E.2d 590 (2005)</u>, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187, 126 S. Ct. 1369, 164 L. Ed. 2d 77 (2006) (defendant's inconsistent explanations for his activity provided proper basis for reasonable suspicion). Also, as the motion judge found, as the

defendant stood against the wall, he "was fidgety, nervous and looking up and down Boylston Street, again heightening Officer McHugh's [**23] suspicion that a crime was afoot." [*618] See Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372, 868 N.E.2d 90 (2007) ("Although nervous or furtive movements do not supply reasonable suspicion when considered in isolation, they are properly considered together with other details to find reasonable suspicion"). The defendant had his hands in his pockets, and McHugh instructed him to remove them from his pockets. Although the defendant initially complied, within a minute or two, he put his hands back inside his clothing. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 Mass. 159, 164, 908 N.E.2d 729 (2009) (officers in high crime area "not required to accept the risk of ... ambiguity" posed by defendant who disregarded command to take his hands out of his pockets); Commonwealth v. McKoy, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 313, 983 N.E.2d 719 (2013) (for reasonable suspicion of defendant being armed analysis, proper for officer to consider that defendant failed to remove hands from pockets after being requested to do so). Based on his observations of the defendant, McHugh was concerned that he might be armed and dangerous. When the defendant was asked for his identification, he lied,⁹ and could not provide a single digit of his Social Security number. McHugh called for back-up, and for safety reasons, asked the defendant and Noj to sit on the ground. Given everything that had transpired, including the defendant providing a [**24] identification, McHugh decided to handcuff the defendant. During this attempt, the defendant spun around, striking another officer, and all three men ended up on the ground. Once subdued, a patfrisk revealed the defendant was in possession of a firearm, heroin, and "crack" cocaine.

In the end, where McHugh, in a high crime area, saw the defendant engage in conduct consistent with the attempted purchase or sale of stolen goods; where the defendant refused to keep his hands out of his pockets and looked up and down Boylston Street; where the defendant gave a false name and date of birth and could not provide his Social Security number; and where the defendant was nervous and fidgety, McHugh was

⁹ The defendant claimed he was "Dana Clarke," and "noticeably hesitated" before he provided a date of birth. McHugh's CJIS search with that information produced a registry of motor vehicles photograph that was similar to the defendant's appearance, but not a match. Another officer, who provided McHugh with back-up, agreed that the defendant did not appeared to be Dana Clarke.

justified in placing the defendant in handcuffs and pat frisking him as a precautionary safety measure. See *Pinto, 476 Mass. at 363*. In my view, McHugh acted reasonably under the circumstances, and the mo-**[*619]** tion to suppress was properly denied.

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

FAR-27605 2018-P-1440

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Appellee

V.

JAMAL CHIN-CLARKE, Defendant-Appellant

APPENDIX FOR THE COMMONWEALTH'S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO OBTAIN FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW

SUFFOLK COUNTY