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DALA WEBSITE DECISION INDEX BY SUBJECT, WITH KEYWORD AND PHRASE DIGEST

Please note:

This Index and Digest covers DALA general jurisdiction decisions issued beginning in 2016. It will be updated periodically as additional DALA decisions are posted to the website. A separate document at the DALA website shows the organization of the Index and Digest by subject. An alphabetical table of the decisions included in the Index and Digest is also posted at the DALA website.

The Index and Digest is provided solely as a helpful finding aid. It is not intended that the decision summaries in the Index and Digest, or the Index and Digest's organization, be cited as authority.

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Animal Shelter, Rescue and Adoption Operations

Pesticide Program

—Herbicide Application–Right of Way Management

Vegetation Management Plan Approval

Herbicide application to manage right of way - Electric transmission utility - Five year vegetation management plan approved by Department of Agricultural Resources and requiring Department's approval of yearly operating plan - Approval of operating plan for 2016 specifying areas off-limits to herbicide spraying, including Zone I areas with public water supply wells - Appeal of operating plan by Cape Cod municipalities where herbicides would be applied - Asserted interference with municipal obligation to provide drinking water to residents - Dismissal - Lack of standing - Failure to allege specific facts showing aggrievement (actual injury different in kind or magnitude from that suffered by general public) - Claim that leaching herbicides would enter groundwater from which towns may draw water unsupported by factual allegations regarding location of spraying relative to town water sources and likely direction of groundwater flow - Failure to assert detail sufficient to support claim that yearly operational plan was inconsistent with five-year vegetation management plan.

Town of Brewster v. Dep't of Agricultural Resources, Docket Nos. MS-16-393, 394, 395 and 396, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 27, 2017).

WIC Farmers' Market Nutrition Program

—Farmers' Market Coupon Program Violations

Enforcement and Civil Penalties

[no entries]

CERTIFIED NURSE AIDE / HOME HEALTH AIDE DISCIPLINE

Abuse

Certified nurse aide - Appeal from finding by Massachusetts Department of Public Health that allegation of patient abuse against respondent CNA was valid - Long-term care facility with written patient abuse policy - Patient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, anxiety, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, atrial fibrillation and anemia, who was taking Coumadin and was prone to bruise easily, rang call light at 4:00 p.m. on day in question and requested change of clothing following incontinence episode - Respondent, aged 59 and originally from Ghana, was licensed as CNA in 2009 - Respondent, one of two CNAs working 3 p.m.-11 p.m. shift on facility's third floor on March 16, 2016, was providing care to another patient prior to having to cover the residents' 4:00 p.m. smoke break, when patient rang call bell - Respondent told patient he was busy, and repeated this response an hour later when patient rang call light again - When another CNA answered patient's third call bell ring at 6:30 p.m., she noticed his bed was wet, left room to obtain linens, and called respondent to assist her - Patient was loud and antagonistic toward respondent when he entered room, cursed respondent and told him to get out, and respondent answered "you're the father!" and, when the other CNA returned, he told petitioner to turn on his side , grabbed patient in area of his left hip, and started to turn him, and patient complained respondent was hurting him and began lashing out with his arms but did not make contact - Patient reported incident to on-duty nurse and another CNA later that evening - Skin check of patient revealed two purpose quarter-sized bruises between his left hip and bottom of his rib cage - When facility's licensed professional nurse interviewed respondent, he told her the incident had occurred at the end of his shift, at 10:30 p.m., and stated his impression that patient had urinated in his bed intentionally - Written statements prepared by respondent and second CNA in patient's room stated that incident occurred at the end of their shifts, and each denied having heard patient cry out in pain while he was being changed - Facility discharged both CNAs, respondent for patient abuse and second CNA for doing nothing to stop it and for failing to report it - DPH surveyor reported CNA's belief that patient was gay and did not want to receive care from him, that other facility employees reported patient could be "accusatory," and that patient's version of incident was corroborated by his roommate, even though roommate was not able to observe incident because curtain was drawn - Finding of patient abuse based upon a physical element (rough handling) and a verbal element

(combative words) sustained as supported by the credible evidence - Evidence showed that respondent acted impatiently, allowed himself to be drawn into an acrimonious situation with a hostile resident, and handled him roughly while changing him, resulting in bruising - Resident's testimony credited because, notwithstanding his known propensity to be accusatory and "high maintenance," his version of events was consistent with his reports to the facility's staff, and he had two bruises that were consistent with rough handling and with pressure points from a hand - Testimony of respondent and the second CNA was self-serving, as they appeared to be covering for one another, their testimony over-emphasized the patient's shortcomings and short-staffing during their shift, and gave a later time for the event that implied they had left the patient in his own waste for several hours.

Dep't of Public Health v. Ghunney, Docket No. PHNA-16-306, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 9, 2018).

Certified Nurse Aide - Patient abuse charge sustained - Complaint investigation report by Department of Public Health (DPH) reciting finding of patient abuse by respondent CNA against elderly female skilled nursing facility resident with dementia known to be overanxious, easily startled, and physically combative with caregivers on a daily basis - Video posted by respondent CNA on social media site (Facebook), after resident died, showed her elbowing, poking and laughing at resident, and continuing to taunt resident who was asking to be left alone, and was crying and striking out at CNA and a staff nurse - Video deleted by CNA after another staff CNA showed it to other CNAs at facility and it was viewed by facility supervisors - Pending criminal proceeding regarding incident - Physical and mental abuse of resident shown by preponderance of evidence - Credible testimony by witnesses who had viewed the video before it was deleted established that video showed respondent CNA poking, teasing, prodding, taunting and laughing at resident to the point of her crying - CNA's conduct and email comments after the incident displayed coldness and lack of remorse.

Dep't of Public Health v. Wilds, Docket No. PHNA-15-300, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 28, 2017)

Certified Nurse Aide - Nursing home resident - Abuse - Willfulness - Insufficiency of evidence - Clarification of decision - Administrative Magistrate's discretion in assessing witness credibility and weight of testimony - Determination as to violation alleged - Moving nursing home resident without assistance or use of gait belt - Evidence showed neglect (not charged) but not abuse - No entry of nurse aide's name in Nurse Aide Registry.

Dep't of Public Health v. Bernal, Docket No. PHNA-16-314, Ruling on Motion for Clarification – Revised Conclusion and Order (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 21, 2016).

Certified Nurse Aide - Nursing home resident - Abuse - Willfulness - Transfer of resident from bed to walker without required assistance - Bruising to forearm - Insufficient evidence of abuse - Unawareness that resident needed additional assistance due to visual impairment.

Dep't of Public Health v. Bernal, Docket No. PHNA-16-314, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 30, 2016).

Certified Nurse Aide - Nursing home resident - Abuse - Willfulness - Walking frail resident too quickly or with excessive wrist or forearm grip - Thrown pillows - Insufficient evidence - Conflicting witness accounts.

Mbugua v. Dep't of Public Health, Docket No. PHNA-15-398, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 7, 2016)

Neglect

[no entries]

Property Misappropriation

[no entries]

CIVIL SERVICE

Jurisdiction

—Discipline Appeals

Appeal by city fire captain challenging city's decision suspending him for one day without pay - Appeal transferred by Civil Service Commission to DALA for hearing and issuance of recommended decision - Handwritten settlement agreement signed by parties and submitted before hearing testimony concluded provided that city agreed to issue, and fire captain agreed to accept, a written warning in lieu of the one-day suspension - Agreement included no provision making it contingent upon review and approval by DALA Administrative Magistrate - Approval of the settlement agreement or its alternative sanction by DALA was unnecessary to effect the agreement, and all that

remained was for the parties to file a withdrawal of the appeal as the agreement provided - Neither the Civil Service Commission nor the Division of Administrative Law Appeals retained jurisdiction of the appeal, and therefore neither could entertain motion to reopen the appeal and set aside the settlement agreement, as the fire captain requested - DALA would therefore issue decision recommending that Commission dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction based upon appeal's mootness.

Savage v. City of Springfield, Docket No. CS-18-0151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2018).

EDUCATOR LICENSE REVOCATION

Dismissal of Appeal

Notice of probable cause to revoke educator license - Criminal indictment, and failure to report it to Department of Elementary and Secondary Education - Lack of prosecution dismissal - Failure to attend two previously-scheduled mandatory prehearing conferences - Filing response to order to show cause regarding dismissal, following failure to appear at second prehearing conference, that asserted constitutional right not to appear at DALA conference prior to criminal trial, despite warning in order to show cause that continued pendency of criminal charges was not good cause for failing to attend conference.

Dep't of Elementary and Secondary Education v. Andrade, Docket No. MS-16-430, Final Decision-Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 27, 2017).

EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN CERTIFICATION

Revocation and Suspension of EMT Certification

Proposed revocation of respondent's EMT certification and EMT instructor/coordinator and examiner certification upheld by summary decision - Respondent charged with conducting EMT-Basic initial training course at unapproved location (local fire department), and with providing false information to Department of Public Health investigators as to whether course had started and the number of currently-enrolled students - Respondent's history of noncompliance included temporary revocation of his instructor/coordinator and examiner certification and EMT certification - Unopposed motion for summary decision by Department - No genuine or material factual issues as to whether respondent conducted unapproved EMT training course or made omissive or false statements to Department - No evidence offered to show that despite mishandling of training program responsibilities, respondent could still be trusted to act as EMT.

Dep't of Public Health Office of Emergency Medical Services v. Stepien, Docket No. PHET-17-830, Decision on Motion for Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 26, 2018).

EMT Paramedic - Immediate suspension and revocation of EMT certification by Department of Public Health (DPH) - Demonstration of sufficient grounds - Undisputed conviction of criminal offenses related to violence, and guilty plea as to two counts of assault and battery on household member (girlfriend) - Claim by EMT that he presents no danger to public and that police reports misstated events leading to criminal charges not disputable before DALA in view of guilty pleas and conviction - Violation of public trust and endangerment of public health and safety shown sufficiently by conviction of criminal offenses related to domestic violence - Unfitness of individual prone to violence to work with difficult, upset and combative persons encountered during EMT response - Failure to report criminal convictions within five days to DPH Office of Emergency Medical Service (OEMS) as required by agency's regulations - Duty to inform OEMS not discharged by informing fire department supervisor of convictions.

Dep't of Public Health, Office of Emergency Medical Services v. Pessini, Docket No. PHET-16-162, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

EVIDENCE

Briefs and Memoranda

—Citations and References, and their Omission

DALA Administrative Magistrate was not obligated to search for evidence supporting arguments made by a party in its post-hearing brief without citations to the hearing transcript, particularly when the Magistrate ordered that party to submit a post-hearing brief with such citations.

Benoit v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-426, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 5, 2018).

Usefulness and reliability of a party's post-hearing brief was diminished by missing citations to the record, especially uncited factual assertions that were not supported by the evidence, and by overbroad factual assertions and exaggeration that were not supported by citations to the evidence that the party's brief supplied.

Benoit v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-426, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 5, 2018).

Burden of Proof

—Family Child Care Provider License Revocation Appeals

Department of Early Education and Care has burden to prove that it had reasonable cause to revoke a family child care provider's license, and Division of Administrative Law Appeals' role in appeal challenging license revocation is to evaluate whether or not there was substantial evidence to support EEC's decision that there was reasonable cause to revoke the license, bearing in mind that under M.G.L. c. 15D, § 6(a), the legislation delegating family child care licensing authority to EEC, the agency has a wide range of discretion in establishing the parameters of its authority.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Boodakian, Docket No. OC-17-151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 28, 2017).

—Retirement Appeals

Accidental Disability Retirement

Generally - Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), accidental disability retirement applicant bears the burden of proof to establish a causal nexus between an injury and a disability and, as well, to show that the injury was incurred as a result of, and while in the performance of, his employment duties.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Amended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018), *confirming prior Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018).

Willful misconduct defeating accidental disability retirement application - In order to prove willful misconduct on part of accidental disability retirement applicant when he was injured while in performance of employment duties, retirement board would have to establish facts to support its claim that accidental disability retirement applicant acted with deliberate indifference to probable grave injury when he was injured.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Overcoming adverse medical panel certificate - Unanimous negative panel opinion as to work-related causation - In view of unanimous negative medical panel certificate as to whether retired recreation facilities supervisor's permanent disability was the natural and proximate result of a shoulder injury he sustained at work, it was petitioner's burden to prove either that the panel was improperly comprised, employed an erroneous standard in reaching its conclusion, or lacked knowledge of petitioner's job duties - Fact that all three panel members found petitioner to be totally disabled from performing his job duties left no room for argument that panel did not have an accurate description of his job - Rationales of medical panel majority were well-documented and supported by medical records, and were not tantamount to application of erroneous standard, and nor were they an unqualified negative opinion as to causation or erroneous as a matter of law - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-268, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 9, 2018).

Creditable Service - Prior Service Ineligible for Purchase

Petitioner claiming she was employee of state agency rather than contractor paid through Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account has burden of proving employee status, and inability to prove employee status means she cannot prevail in appeal challenging denial of application to purchase prior service as contracted employee as creditable service for retirement purposes.

Harris v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-487, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Credibility

—Generally

DALA Administrative Magistrate is entitled to accept a witness's testimony in whole or in part.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

—Retirement Appeals

Accidental Disability Retirement

Witness credibility - Absence of willful misconduct by applicant - In determining that accidental disability retirement applicant (a municipal highway department heavy equipment operator who was injured when his disabled 18,000 pound dump truck with snow plow collided with front-end loader that was pulling it with a chain en route to the municipal garage for repairs) did not commit willful misconduct by remaining inside the vehicle to steer it and operate the brakes while it was being towed (at the direction of the highway superintendent, who was his supervisor, and consistent with highway department practice), DALA Administrative Magistrate was entitled to reject applicant's assertion that he was only partly inside the dump truck, with one foot on the exterior fuel tank and one arm on the open driver's side door,, when the front-end loader began pulling it, rather than being fully seated and therefore in a position to fasten his seat belt, because the collision that threw him to the dump truck's floor would have had worse consequences than a disabling shoulder injury had he fallen outside the truck, which likely would have occurred had he actually been seated as he described.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Creditable Service - Prior Service Ineligible for Purchase

Contract employee performing full-time service as information technology professional for Massachusetts Commission for the Blind - Source of payment for prior full-time contract service for state agency - Evidence - Admissibility and weight - Testimony by current director of employment services for Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, as keeper of records, that her agency's records showed petitioner was paid as contracted employee through Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account - Keeper of records entitled to testify as to what agency's business records showed as to account from which petitioner was paid, even though she did not hold recordkeeper position when petitioner performed full-time contract service, and there was no one with a contemporaneous memory or contemporary documentation of what account was used to pay petitioner - Petitioner's testimony that she was told at unspecified times by unspecified persons at Commission for the Blind that she was not paid from 03 subsidiary account, and that unspecified person at unspecified time showed her a document or documents showing she was not paid from 03 account was unreliable, and was contradicted by email petitioner sent several years after leaving her position that she was paid from the 03 account for the entire time she worked at the Commission for the Blind - Conclusion of state auditor's report on use of contract employee by certain state agencies that no employee, including contract employee, could be paid through the Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account did not establish that petitioner could not have been so paid - Uncontradicted evidence, including testimony of director of employment services for Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, as keeper of records, showed that she was, in fact, paid through 03 account - Petitioner's argument that legislature did not intend to create "arbitrary" system of granting or rejecting retirement credit for contract employee service based upon mistake or "gamesmanship" on part of agency payroll manager failed for lack of evidence that her payment through 03 account was by mistake, that Commission for the Blind's payroll manager engaged in "gamesmanship," or that Commission did not comply with law or established procedure - Applicable law furnished no support for petitioner's argument that she should be able to purchase prior contract service for retirement credit based upon the account from which she "should have" been paid, where evidence showed that she was paid from Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account - Denial of application to purchase prior service as contract employee paid through 03 account affirmed.

Harris v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-487, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

—Wage and Hours Appeals

Failure to Make Timely Wage Payments

Unresolvable issues of witness and evidence credibility - Appealed civil citation for unintentional failure to make timely wage payments to employee - Citation vacated as erroneously issued - Demand for restitution ($5,100) and civil penalty ($1,100) - Salesperson - Performance of business development and sales work at market research business services company, primarily through via email and telephone contacts - Same pay as business owner ($25 per hour), with owner proposing (but not committing) to phase in employee as partner, with increasing percentage of ownership as business achieved specified net revenue benchmarks and maintained that net revenue level for three consecutive months - Following last two paychecks ($3,000 for 120 hours of work, and $2,000 for 80 hours of work), no pay for two-month period when employee was absent from office, including one month for medical reasons, without notice of absence to owner, who was away at time - Termination of employment upon owner's return for failure to generate business - Complaint filed with Fair Labor Division claimed $12,000 in unpaid wages for 10-week period without disclosing $2,000 payment - Unpaid wage restitution claim reduced by Division to $5,100, following audit of business payroll records, with eight hours of work per day at $25/hour rate credited for any day on which employee sent email from home on her business email account - Dispute as to whether employee could, or actually did, work from home, and whether employee was commission-only salesperson whose hourly pay rate was drawn against commissions earned, and whether employee was entitled to full day's pay credit for any day on which she sent email using business email account - Credibility issues regarding unpaid wage claim and computation not resolved by hearing testimony or exhibits - Emails not in evidence - Email log created by Fair Labor Division inspector not contemporaneous with alleged days of emailing - Employee's inability to recall with specificity what work she performed while away from office during two month period - Absence of telephone logs showing whether employee followed up emails from home with telephone calls to business clients and customers - Insufficient evidence that employee worked on days she was absent from office or, thus, that any particular amount of wages was unpaid and owed to employee, or that citation could be modified to demand different restitution or penalty amounts.

McNeil v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-16-211, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 22, 2017).

Inferences

[no entries]

Presumptions

[no entries]

EXPEDITED PERMITTING - M.G.L. c. 43D

Constructively-Granted Permit

Proposed planned commercial/industrial business development - Industrially-zoned area within designated "priority development site" - Town planning board's failure to take final action on permit application before 180-day review period expired - Expedited permit granted constructively - Scope of constructive permit - Approval confined to work in priority development site that was proposed in permit application - Permit does not include conditions that planning board might have required had it acted within 180-day review period that Chapter 43D prescribes - Permit does not include, or preclude, work that town may require before "paper street" alongside project site was accepted as public way, including full turnaround for fire and emergency equipment and trucks entering and leaving developed site, where the site's private and "paper street" sections meet, or other modifications to meet municipal and state traffic safety requirements and/or to improve traffic circulation.

Corliss Landing Condominium Tr. v. *North Attleborough Planning Bd.,* Docket No. MS-15-661, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2016).

FAMILY CHILD CARE LICENSING

Original Family Child Care Provider License Denied

—Generally

Scope of Review

Discretionary denial of family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) - Broad discretionary authority delegated to EEC by statute (M.G.L. c. 15D, §§ 3, 7 and 8) to determine who is suitable for employment or licensure in child care programs licensed by the agency, in light of concern for safety of children - On appeal, DALA is not to re-evaluate EEC's discretionary decision; rather, it should determine whether or not the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not supported by law.

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Reyes*, Docket No. OC-17-086, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 1, 2017).

Appeal challenging discretionary denial of family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) - Broad discretion of EEC to decide whether applicant has provided clear and convincing evidence of suitability for licensing in light of concern for safety of children - Denial evaluated on appeal to DALA not to second-guess EEC but, instead, to determine whether decision was based upon sufficient facts, was not arbitrary or capricious, or was not otherwise unsupported by law.

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Correa*, Docket No. OC-16-548, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 18, 2017).

Time to Appeal

Per the Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) regulations, person whose family child care license application was denied, whether in EEC's original "Order to Protect Children" or in the agency's subsequently-amended order, had 21 days after receiving the denial to appeal it. *See* 102 C.M.R. § 1.08(2)(a).

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Schofield*, Docket No. OC-18-0455, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 22, 2019).

Deadline for administrative appeal, including appeal challenging the Department of Early Education and Care's denial of family child care license application, is a jurisdictional requirement, and jurisdiction that is absent because the appeal period has expired cannot be conferred by waiver or consent - DALA therefore had jurisdiction to decide appeal challenging EEC's original Order to Protect Children denying applicant's family child care license application filed within 21 days of its receipt by license applicant (and to determine whether grounds for denial recited by the original order were valid), but lacked jurisdiction to decide appeal challenging EEC's subsequent Amended Order to Protect Children (and the additional grounds it asserted for denying license application) that was not filed within 21 days of its receipt - Even if applicant did not receive EEC's amended order dated October 12, 2018, a Friday, on that day despite its additional emailing to her attorney, and received it, instead, on Monday, October 15, 2018, her appeal on November 6, 2018 was still filed 22 days after she received the amended order and, thus, one day after the 21-day appeal period expired.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Schofield, Docket No. OC-18-0455, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 22, 2019).

—Insufficient Grounds for Denying Family Child Care License

Application to Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) for license to operate child care program was properly denied, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 15D, § 6 and 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)6, because applicant had previously operated a child care program and opened a child care facility without a license, and because the applicant made a false and misleading statement on the license application in violation of the EEC regulations, *see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)3 (denying she had previous involvement with EEC regarding unlicensed child care, because EEC had previously issued to her three orders directing her to immediately cease and desist from providing unlicensed childcare to unrelated children at her home) - However, other grounds that EEC asserted for denying the license application were inapplicable or did not have to be reached on appeal—(1) allowing unrelated persons to provide unlicensed child care in her home (because she did not herself operate such child care program and it was unclear that allowing such care to be provided at her home by others was a violation of EEC's regulations on her part); (2) operating a child care "program" at the applicant's home by allowing her brother's girlfriend to care for her son there, as this was the subject of an amended EEC order that the applicant did not timely appeal and that was therefore not before DALA; (3) failing to comply with the first of EEC's cease and desist orders as to the provision of unlicensed child care, because she did not receive the order until after she had allegedly provided child care in violations of it; and (4) failing to comply with standards of care provision capability and the exercise of good judgment required of educators, *see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.09, meaning persons licensed by EEC to provide child care), *see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.02, because the applicant was not licensed to provide child

care.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Schofield, Docket No. OC-18-0455, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 22, 2019).

—Sufficient Grounds for Denying Family Child Care License

History of Child Neglect

Appeal challenging discretionary denial of family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in January 2017 based upon child neglect history - Summary decision affirming license denial - Background check by EEC revealed 2008 "51B report," by Department of Children and Families (DCF), of applicant's alleged child neglect (seven month old child left alone in bathtub, and applicant's own three year old son left alone in play pen while she walked to a bus stop to pick up another child who was being dropped off) - EEC determined that 51B report showed applicant to be unsuitable to receive family child care license in view of the circumstances and seriousness of the prior child neglect incident, including the age of the children involved, and applicant's provision of conflicting stories to investigators about the incident, including claim that an unauthorized care giver (applicant's brother) was watching the two children and, therefore, that at least someone was watching them - Broad discretionary authority delegated to EEC by statute (M.G.L. c. 15D, §§ 3, 7 and 8) to determine who is suitable for employment or licensure in agency-licensed programs, in light of concern for safety of children - On appeal, DALA is not to re-evaluate EEC's discretionary decision, but rather it should evaluate whether or not the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not supported by law - No genuine dispute as to allegations of neglect or their support by a 51B report, or that EEC followed its regulations in considering a discretionary license disapproval based upon a DCF record check, including evaluation of the factors specified by the regulations and affording the applicant an opportunity to submit other relevant information (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 14.13(3)) - Applicant claimed on appeal that while leaving the children unattended was wrong, the incident was not "not so horrible an act" that she should be denied a family child care provider license, and that she was an excellent care giver and could call witnesses to support that assertion at a hearing - Claims did not show that the factual basis for DCF's discretionary license denial was genuinely or materially disputed, and instead sought re-evaluation of DCF's discretionary decision based upon undisputed facts.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Reyes, Docket No. OC-17-086, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 1, 2017).

Discretionary family child care provider license denial by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in late 2016 - Background check by Department of Children and Families showing applicant's neglect of her own children (1999 sexual abuse of applicant's then-five year old son by playmate as a result of lack of supervision; 28 days of school missed by then-six year old son, who had already been held back for one year once before; 2008 neglect based upon admission by applicant that she disciplined her then-fourteen and eleven year old children by open-hand face slapping) - Determination of unsuitability for day care provider licensing - EEC discretion to determine appropriateness of applicant for licensure in light of concern for safety of children - Prior child neglect findings undisputed - Thoughtful and lengthy analysis of background check by EEC and its discretionary decision to deny family child care license application - Applicant given opportunity to respond - Discretionary decision based upon sufficient facts, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not otherwise unsupported by law - Undisputed material facts - Summary decision in favor of Department sustaining license denial.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Correa, Docket No. OC-16-548, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 18, 2017).

Misleading or False Statement on License Application

Family child care license application was properly denied because applicant had previously operated a child care program and opened a child care facility without a license from the Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (EEC), *see* M.G.L. c. 15D, § 6, and 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)6, and because on her application, she made a misleading or false statement in answering "no" to the question "[h]ave you ever had previous involvement with EEC due to unlicensed child care," because EEC had previously issued to her three orders directing her to immediately cease and desist from providing unlicensed childcare to unrelated children at her home. *See* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)3.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Schofield, Docket No. OC-18-0455, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 22, 2019).

Prior Provision of Unlicensed Child Care

Family child care license application was properly denied because applicant operated an unlicensed child care program and opened a child care facility without a license from the Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (EEC), *see* M.G.L. c. 15D, § 6, and 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)6, and because on her application, she made a misleading or false statement in answering "no" to the question "[h]ave you ever had previous involvement with EEC due to unlicensed child care," because EEC had

previously issued to her three orders directing her to immediately cease and desist from providing unlicensed childcare to unrelated children at her home. *See* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)3.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Schofield, Docket No. OC-18-0455, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 22, 2019).

Renewal of Family Child Care Provider License Denied

—Generally

[no entries]

—Grounds

Disqualifying Background of Family Member

Denial of application to renew family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in August 2017 based upon disqualifying background of family member - Father of applicant's children - Domestic violence - Striking applicant with closed fist in front of children in September 2014 - Pattern of domestic violence shown by earlier occurrence (in 2007) of same type of assault by father against his previous wife in front of their children - Conduct constituted neglect of children, was subject of 2007 "51B" report, documented by Criminal Offender Information (CORI) record of earlier assault and battery charge - Family child care provider license issued originally by EEC, as matter of discretion, in 2013 because there was only one "51B" report of neglect against the father, and applicant was not the victim of his domestic abuse - Particularly in context of reoccurrence of same type of domestic violence, conduct of father related directly to applicant's ability to provide safe child care and was evidence of a family member's disqualifying background - No evidence that father would be outside of home during child care hours - No evidence of rehabilitation by father, such as completing anger management classes, and reoccurrence of same type of violence when father was 31, seven years after first occurrence when he was 24 -Department of Early Education and Care discretionary review properly weighed factors relevant to evaluation of risk of harm to child day care children (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 14.14(3)(a)-(g)), particularly the risk of serious harm posed by individual in question who struck two women, under very similar circumstances, in front of their young children - Although applicant testified credibly that father's work shift would place him outside the house during child care hours, that she could provide the security necessary to protect day care children in the home, and that father could stay in his mother's apartment rather than return home during child care hours, EEC did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that father's background bore adversely on applicant's ability to care for children and outweighed other relevant factors - Absent abuse of discretion, DALA Magistrate declined to substitute her judgment for that of the agency.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Carvajal-Rojas, Docket No. OC-17-754, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 29, 2018).

Denial of application to renew family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in late 2016 based upon applicant's unsuitability - Initial license approved in 2006 and renewed in 2012, both when applicant's son was under 15 and not subject to background record check, despite son having been found guilty, at age 12, of assault and battery charge - Massachusetts Criminal Record Information (CORI) check in 2016 revealed delinquency finding as to son regarding anal penetration of friend during sleepover, when both were 13, witnessed by victim's 10 year old brother - Discretionary license renewal denial by EEC based upon potential risk of harm to children based upon son's disqualifying background check, applicant's refusal to ensure that son was out of home during family child care hours, son's downplaying of earlier assault and battery conviction, and no demonstrated rehabilitation by son - EEC discretion to determine appropriateness of applicant for licensure in light of concern for safety of children - Applicant given opportunity to respond - Discretionary decision based upon sufficient facts, not arbitrary or capricious, and not otherwise unsupported by law - Undisputed material facts - Summary decision in favor of Department sustaining denial of family child care provider license renewal.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Hoyt, Docket No. OC-17-034, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2017).

Revocation of Family Child Care Provider License

—Generally

Although in general, administrative agencies have broad discretion over procedural aspects of matters before them, they must not abuse their discretion, meaning that their decisions must be reasonable.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Grounds for revoking a family child care license include the license-holder's failure to comply with an agreement (*see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1)), failure to "exercise

appropriate supervision of the children in [his] care in order to ensure their health and safety at all times (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.10(5)), and failure to "exercise good judgment at all times and demonstrate an ability to handle emergency situations appropriately" (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.09(8).

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha*, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

In determining whether family child care licenseholder violated Department of Early Education and Care's Safe Sleep Regulations (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.11(13)(d) and (e)) by not having a port-a-crib for one of the child care children in his program and having the child sleep in a "bouncy seat," and by placing that child in the same port-a-crib another child had used, issue was whether licenseholder violated the regulations, and not whether he violated EEC's "Safe Sleep for Infants" policy.

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha*, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

In determining whether to revoke a family child care provider license, Department of Early Education and Care must take into account licensee's actions to correct instances of non-compliance with department's regulations. *See* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(d)(2).

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Lentini*, Docket No. OC-15-656, Recommended Final Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 7, 2017).

Per M.G.L. c. 15D, § 10, Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) has authority to revoke a family child care provider license when the licensee "fails to comply with applicable rules and regulations," which the EEC regulations also make a ground for revoking, suspending, refusing to renew, or refusing to issue a family child care provider license, as the regulations also do for the licensee's "failure to comply with a deficiency correction order, notice of sanction, suspension, or agreement or terms of probation." *See* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1).

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Boodakian*, Docket No. OC-17-151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 28, 2017).

Grounds for revoking family child care provider license include violation of Dep't of Early Education and Care regulations requiring that licensed child care program children be appropriately supervised, *see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.10(5), and any form of neglect or abuse of children while in family child care, *see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.11(4)(a), "neglect" being

defined as "the failure, either deliberately or through negligence or inability, to adequately care for, protect, or supervise children." 102 C.M.R. § 1.02.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Boodakian, Docket No. OC-17-151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 28, 2017).

Department of Early Education and Care has burden to prove that it had reasonable cause to revoke a family child care provider's license, and Division of Administrative Law Appeals' role in appeal challenging license revocation is to evaluate whether or not there was substantial evidence to support EEC's decision that there was reasonable cause to revoke the license, bearing in mind that under M.G.L. c. 15D, § 6(a), the legislation delegating family child care licensing authority to EEC, the agency has a wide range of discretion in establishing the parameters of its authority.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Boodakian, Docket No. OC-17-151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 28, 2017).

—Insufficient Basis for Revoking License

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Failure to comply with provision of agreement (*see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1)) resolving Department of Early Education and Care's prior "Order to Protect Children," which required that licenseholder and his wife not commingle their separate day care programs (each operated on a different floor of a residential building, each with a separate address) and run them as a single program - Provision requiring that parents of all children enrolled in licenseholder's program sign written form acknowledging that his program was operated separately and distinctly from his wife's program - Licenseholder had two children enrolled in his program, and had given acknowledgment forms to their parents they had not yet signed and returned, when EEC licenseholder made unannounced visit seven weeks after agreement was signed to determine compliance and found no signed parent acknowledgments in program's records - Over the next two days, parents returned the signed acknowledgments, and EEC licensor viewed them when she returned for a second visit one week after her first visit - Delay in collecting the signed forms from the parents was negligible, and licensor testified that the parents had delayed signing and returning the acknowledgment forms he had given them - Parents had the information EEC wanted them to have about the separation between the two child care programs before EEC licensor conducted her first visit, and EEC was able to confirm that the parents had this information within a week of its licensor's first compliance visit - Revoking family child care license based upon failure to comply with parent acknowledgment provision of agreement would be abuse of EEC's discretion, even if the negligible delay in making signed acknowledgment available for EEC to review was combined, as it was, with other violations alleged against him.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Failure to comply with provision of agreement (*see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1)) resolving Department of Early Education and Care's prior "Order to Protect Children," which required that licenseholder and his wife not commingle their separate day care programs (each operated on a different floor of a residential building, each with a separate address) and run them as a single program - Provision requiring that licenseholder "execute all substantial tasks" of operating his family child care program, either himself or through his assistant or assistants, including supervising children, attending to children's needs, educating children, and diapering children - Purpose of provision was to keep separate the child care programs being operated on each floor of the residential dwelling - Child care assistant from licenseholder's wife's program assisted him in calming two infants in his program for several minutes while he was speaking with EEC licensor who was conducting compliance visit and was unable to calm the infants - Occurrence was insufficient to show licenseholder's failure to "execute all substantial tasks of operating his family child care program," bearing in mind that agreement required that he perform the "substantial" tasks of his program, not the "substantive" tasks, which he did even when he received several minutes of help from the other program's assistant while he spoke with the EEC licensor - EEC did not prove violation of this provision of the agreement by preponderance of the evidence - License revocation on this ground not recommended.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Failure to comply with provision of agreement (*see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1)) resolving Department of Early Education and Care's prior "Order to Protect Children," which required that licenseholder and his wife not commingle their separate day care programs (each operated on a different floor of a residential building, each with a separate address) and run them as a single program - Provision requiring that licenseholder maintain, on the program's premises, separate documentation for the children enrolled in his program - Allegation that during visit by EEC licensor, licenseholder brought documents from the first floor, where his wife operated a separate family day care program, to the second floor, where he operated his own program - Agreement required that licenseholder keep "documentation for the children enrolled" in his program on the second floor, but did not require that all other program documents be kept there as well - EEC licensor did not identify documents licenseholder brought from first floor, and testified that when she requested program documents, he brought them from a bedroom on second floor - Licenseholder testified that he brought mail up from first floor - EEC did not prove

violation of this provision of the agreement by preponderance of the evidence - License revocation on this ground not recommended.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Failure to comply with provision of agreement (*see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.07(4)(a)(1)) resolving Department of Early Education and Care's prior "Order to Protect Children," which required that licenseholder and his wife not commingle their separate day care programs (each operated on a different floor of a residential building, each with a separate address) and run them as a single program - Provision allowing children in licenseholder's program to have limited activities with children enrolled in wife's program, or at least be present on first floor where her program operated, but requiring that licenseholder "document any instance in which his child care programming interacts with [his wife's] programming" - Alleged failure to provide EEC licensor with documentation verifying times when child care children enrolled in his program attended his wife's program - During time in question (May-August 2017) licenseholder wrote, on attendance sheets for children enrolled in his program, general notes such as "Interaction 30 min. everyday AM / 30 min. PM Play," "M-F 30 min AM / 30 min PM," "Interaction time 8-8:30 / 4:30-5:00," and "Interaction 8-8:30 / 12-12:30" - Licenseholder testified that he generally adhered to schedule for interaction time, which was not inherently unbelievable because coordinating interaction between the two day care programs may have required adhering to a schedule - EEC did not clarify whether it was alleging that licenseholder failed to provide any documentation of interaction time, which was clearly not the case, or whether he did not provide adequate documentation - EEC licensor did not testify whether or not she reviewed licenseholder's schedule of interaction time on attendance sheets, but undoubtedly she would have mentioned it if she did not find those documents during her review, and EEC's order would have mentioned their absence if that had been the case - Fact that EEC licensor may have seen licenseholder's child care children present during scheduled interaction time would have shown that scheduled interaction time was stated inaccurately for that date, but that was not what license revocation order alleged - Violation that order alleged (failure to provide EEC with child interaction schedule) not proved by preponderance of the evidence - License revocation on this ground not recommended.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Failure to "exercise appropriate supervision of the children in [his] care in order to ensure their health and safety at all times (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.10(5)), and failure to "exercise good judgment at

all times and demonstrate an ability to handle emergency situations appropriately" (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.09(8) - Leaving infant on second floor of dwelling, where licenseholder operated his family child care program, in order to retrieve second infant in his program from first floor where his spouse operated a separate family child care program, and leaving the second child to retrieve a portable crib when EEC licensor inspecting the program asked him to locate this equipment - Licenseholder testified that it was safer and more prudent for him to carry one child at a time rather than to carry both, and EEC did not present testimony on this point - Unclear how licenseholder could have safely retrieved portable crib while carrying a child, had he elected to proceed this way - Violations not proved by preponderance of evidence - Recommendation that EEC not revoke license on these grounds.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Alleged violation of Department of Early Education and Care's Safe Sleep Regulations (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.11(13)(d) and (e)) by not having a port-a-crib for one of the child care children in his program and having the child sleep in a "bouncy seat," and by placing that child in the same port-a-crib another child had used - Issue to be determined was whether licenseholder violated the regulations, and not whether he violated EEC's "Safe Sleep for Infants" policy - Not having a portable crib for child, who slept instead in a "bouncy seat," violated the regulations - licenseholder's attempt to place child in portable crib that another child care child, which EEC licensor inspecting program stopped as unsanitary, demonstrated his unfamiliarity with the regulations - Shortly after this incident, licenseholder attended a safe sleep training session at EEC after agency ordered him to do so - Revocation of licenseholder's family day care license based upon the incident and unfamiliarity with EEC sleep-related regulations before he completed safe sleep training would be abuse of discretion and was not recommended.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Alleged violation of Department of Early Education and Care regulation requiring that family child care program space be clean, safely maintained, well-ventilated and well-lit, and of sufficient size for the children served (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.07(10)) - Although licenseholder should have covered all electrical outlets, put away a can filled with screws that was left on the living room floor of dwelling's second floor in which his program operated and other items in this space (plastic bags in the kitchen, used paint brushes on a living room side table, and wires left on a bedroom floor), these conditions did not present a risk to the children enrolled in his family child care program as none of them was mobile, and there

was no evidence that children from his wife's separately licensed family day care program on the first floor spent time on the second floor - License revocation on this ground would therefore be unreasonable and, thus, an abuse of discretion, and was not recommended.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Jha, Docket No. OC-17-870, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 22, 2018).

Insufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Death of infant in provider's care three years prior to issuance, and then revocation, of new license - Three month old infant born prematurely - No visible indication that child was ill when brought to provider by father on August 7, 2012 - Provider had one more child in her care than license allowed - Following bottle feeding before 1 p.m., infant placed on back in crib for afternoon nap while provider performed household chores - Provider able to hear infant but not see her - Heard crying at 2:10 p.m. and gave infant pacifier - Upon returning to check infant 10-15 minutes later, in infant noted to have dress pulled up to face and limp arm - Husband called 911 while provider attempted to perform CPR - Infant died after being taken to hospital - During investigation two days later by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) and Department of Children and Families (DCF), provider denied knowing of EEC's safe sleep rule but stated she had left door of room where children slept open, and then surrendered her child care provider license - Middlesex District Attorney's office advised investigators of concern that infant had been placed on belly for nap - Investigation determined that provider had failed to provide direct supervision of infant, and had been neglectful in providing care - Death certificate issued August 13, 2012 listed infant's cause of death as having been from Klebsiella Pneumonia Septicemia - DCF issued finding on August 29, 2012 that provider had neglected infant who died - Provider appealed, and, based upon death certificate, DCF overturned neglect finding on September 17, 2014 - Provider reapplied to EEC for day care license on May 12, 2015, acknowledging she had surrendered license previously due to infant who died in her care, but answering "no" as to whether she ever had dealings with any child protection or child welfare agency such as DCF, including whether there were any findings that she had abused or neglected a child, and "no" as to whether she had previous involvement with EEC due to unlicensed child care - EEC issued new license to provider four months later, but two months afterward, EEC revoked license based upon false information provided in her application as to previous involvement with agency due to unlicensed child care and no involvement with child welfare agency, and also because she had neglected four month old infant by failing to provide direct visual observation of infant for fifteen minutes, during which time the child was found dead, and because her day care program was over-enrolled on that day, which impacted provider's ability to provide appropriate supervision of day care children - Grounds for revocation unsubstantiated - Although EEC suspected provision of unlicensed day care in March 2007 and sent provider letter ordering her to cease doing so, suspicion was never transformed into proof, and provider denied having provided

unlicensed day care because she was only caring for children related to her at the time, and therefore had valid basis for believing she had not provided unlicensed child day care and answering "no" to application question - Provider also had valid basis for answering "no" as to whether there had been any findings she had abused or neglected a child, because DCF had reversed its neglect finding upon appeal and cleared her of any neglect regarding the deceased infant, and although answer was inaccurate as to whether she had involvement with child welfare agency over alleged neglect of child, she admitted on her application that she had surrendered her previous license due to child that died while in her care, which sufficed to alert EEC that the child's death had been investigated - Application was therefore accurate as a whole and not misleading, as EEC's initial granting of license in 2015 following a four- month review suggested - Over-enrollment of children by one day care child on August 7, 2012 was unrelated to infant's death - All other children were napping when infant in question expired, and were therefore not distracting provider from caring for infant - Failure to maintain visualization of infant was violation of EEC's safe sleep rule, but there was no evidence this led to infant's death, or that provider placed infant on stomach, thereby causing death by sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) - Although infant's sudden death suggested initially that infant had died of SIDS, death certificate resolved that infant had died from Klebsiella Pneumonia Septicemia - No evidence regarding epidemiology of this bacterial infection, particularly how it killed infant with no apparent warning - No ground for EEC to revoke license for death of infant in her care, or, even if safe sleep rule had been violated, for agency to depart from its usual rule of requiring a retraining following a one-time violation of this rule, rather than revoking a family day care provider license.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Lentini, Docket No. OC-15-656, Recommended Final Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 7, 2017).

—Sufficient Basis for Revoking License

Evidence sufficient to show reasonable cause to revoke family child care provider license - Violation of 606 C.M.R. § 7.10(5) and 606 C.M.R. § 7.11(4)(a) - Child neglect (failure " through negligence or inability to adequately care for, protect or supervise" a child, *see* 102 C.M.R. § 1.02) - Family child care program child, a 23 month old boy, wandered away from child care provider and traveled approximately 350 feet and was missing at least 15 minutes before being found unhurt, playing on excavating equipment at local park - Provider knew that children new to day care are inclined to wander off, and that child in question had tried to wander off before - Child care provider, who turned her back on child briefly to give a bottle to a baby who was also in her care, took her eyes off the child long enough for him to wander off - Although the lack of a fence all the way around family child care program's outdoor play area did not violate any EEC policy, it was a factor provider should have considered when deciding how to supervise the child in question - Provider's failure to call police when she could not find the child after he wandered off, based upon phone call to child's mother during which mother said she

would call police, violated her emergency plan and made it impossible for EEC to fulfill its obligation to ensure that the family child care program had an appropriate emergency plan in place, and also showed poor judgment (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 7.11(7)(f)), particularly since the only way for the provider to assure that the police would be called was for her to call them herself, and because the police would have arrived sooner if provider had made the call - EEC considered these factors in deciding whether to revoke the family child care provider license - Other factors weighing in favor of license revocation were (1) provider's history of serious non-compliance, including leaving day care children outside unsupervised, that resulted in EEC and the provider entering into agreement placing restrictions on the family day care provider license, (2) risk of catastrophic consequence in view of missing child's distance from child care facility when he was found, and being found playing on excavating equipment, and (3) provider's statement, during hearing, as to not calling the police was that she would not do anything differently - That parents of children enrolled in the child day care program had positive things to say about it, and that provider properly supervised other children, did not change the facts pertaining to the child who wandered off, and was irrelevant to the incident involving that child - It was also irrelevant that provider may not have been purposefully neglectful, since EEC regulations define child neglect as including failure to adequately care for, protect or supervise children through negligence or inability - License revocation recommended upon these grounds - However, fact that allegations of neglect as to the child in question were found to have been supported by a "51B" report prepared by EEC and the Department of Children and Families would not be included among grounds for recommending license revocation because (1) although 51B report was prima facie evidence that there was an emergency endangering the life, health or safety of children in the child care program, there was no such emergency because (1) provider voluntarily ceased providing day care two days after child wandering incident, (2) provider had appealed the 51B Report by requesting a fair hearing, and no decision on that appeal had been issued when the record of the DALA proceeding closed, and basing license revocation upon 51B report would give rise to constitutional issues, and (3) the other evidence presented at DALA hearing supported family child care license revocation sufficiently.

> *Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Boodakian*, Docket No. OC-17-151, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 28, 2017).

Sufficient basis for revoking family child care provider license - Multiple instances of exceeding licensed child care children capacity, noncompliance with required children-to-staff ratios and utilizing unapproved caregivers - Failure to comply with sanction order freezing enrollment and reducing child care children capacity - Following appeal by license holder to DALA, failure to file prehearing memorandum or proposed hearing exhibits, and failure to appear for hearing rescheduled at license holder's request - Recommended dismissal of appeal for lack of prosecution, and finalization of family child care license revocation order.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Barbas, Docket No. OC-15-556, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2017).

Suspension of Family Child Care Provider License

—Generally

Suspension of family child care provider's license for failure to comply with any applicable regulation that results in emergency situation endangering life, safety or health of children or staff present in program or facility must be based upon failure of licensee to comply, not failure of outsider who is not under her professional control to comply, and the suspension must be based upon the child care provider's violation of a specific regulation.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

In an appeal challenging suspension of a family child care provider's license for failure to comply with a particular regulation, the Department was required to prove all of the elements of its case affirmatively, and could not rely upon the provider's failure to contest all of the elements of noncompliance the Department alleged.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

—Insufficient Basis for Suspending License

Insufficient basis for suspending family child care provider license - False statement by provider's niece to Department of Early Education and Care staffpersons during a site visit regarding the parentage of one of the infants observed in the child care space - Insufficient ground for recommending that Department continue to suspend, or revoke, provider's family fay care license on ground that she provided false information to Department licensing staff - License suspension must be based upon the provider's violation of a specific regulation, and not upon violation by someone other than the provider - No evidence that provider herself made a false statement to Department licensing staff, or that her niece did so at her direction.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

No recommendation that Department of Early Education and Care continue to suspend, or revoke, family child care provider's license based upon alleged violation of regulation requiring that family child care program nap infants in individual cribs, portacribs, playpens or bassinets, and interpretive policy stating, per the regulation, that car seats and other sitting devices were not allowed for "routine sleep" - Regulation and policy inapplicable in circumstances - Infant 's mother dropped off unenrolled child in car seat at day care program - Infant, who was crying in crib, was placed by provider's assistant in car seat so she could rock him back to sleep and then place him back in crib - Car seat arrived with child - No evidence that the day care program routinely put infants to sleep in a car seat.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

In determining whether family child care provider violated Department of Early Education and Care regulation because "household members" did not undergo a background check (102 C.M.R. § 1.05(1)), specifically the five residents of the second floor of a two-family house belonging to the provider, the first floor of which was the provider's residence and child-care space, the circumstances in evidence did not show, on balance, that all the residences in the house were in the same household; even though most of the residents were the provider's relatives and the house had a single address, each of the two floors had a kitchen and bathroom; the child care space on the first floor was distinguished from entrances to the second floor residence by signs, doors and locks, and the provider's residence was controlled by a solid door with a strong-looking lock (rather than, for example, an unlocked screen door); and the provider rented the second floor to her brother and allowed him to rent out the rooms on that floor, giving him control of the second floor; in these circumstances, each of the two floors was a separate residence, and the residents of the second floor were not members of the provider's household who were required to undergo a background check, and the fact that a Department staff member observed a second-floor resident enter the licensed day care space and removed an unrelated infant from the day care program showed that the program had questionable security, not that the second-floor residents were household members, absent any evidence that all five second-floor residents had "clear and unfettered access to the day care space," as the Department contended; moreover, the Department did not suspend the day care license under a separate provision of the regulation requiring "any person regularly on the premises when family child care children were present" to undergo a background check," and had acted instead based upon its conclusion that all of the second-floor residents, including the individual in question, was a household member, but even if had done so, the record did not show that the second-floor resident who removed the child had regular access to the day care space.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

—Sufficient Basis for Suspending License

Valid grounds proven for Department of Early Education and Care to continue suspension of a provider's family child care license, or to revoke the license - Provider violated staff-to-children ratio requirements by leaving a single assistant to care for nine children—three more than the maximum the Department regulations allowed a single child care provider to supervise (606 C.M.R. § 7.10(3)(a))—while provider left the premises for at least 45 minutes - Provider allowed day care child to be placed to sleep behind a closed door, in violation of 606 C.M.R. § 7.10(7)(d).

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Santizo, Docket No. OC-17-087, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 10, 2017).

Child neglect - Failure to comply with applicable Department of Early Education and care regulations resulting in emergency situation endangering lives of children in day care program - Violations observed during unannounced Department inspections - Infant asleep in bouncy seat in room that was not part of licensed day care space - Failure to provide separate mat, cot, sofa, portacrib, playpen, bassinet or bed, and blanket for each child - Provision of false and conflicting information about children enrolled in day care program - Uncorrected violations - Prima facie evidence - Occurrence of violations documented in 51B Report - Unnecessary to prove license-holder's knowledge of documented violations.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Sanchez, Docket No. OC-16-485, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 6, 2017).

Unlicensed Child Care Provided to Unrelated Children

—Generally

Department of Early Education and Care has burden of proving that respondent charged with doing so provided unlicensed child care to unrelated children in her home on date in question.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Frechette, Docket No. OC-18-0175, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

—Insufficient Evidence of Violation

Misinterpretation of activity viewed by Department of Early Education and Care

Investigator on January 22, 2018 while observing home of formerly-licensed family child care provider ordered to cease and desist providing unlicensed child care to unrelated children - Conclusion that boy who walked up street, entered respondent's home and then left with another boy who had been at home were child care children was mistaken, as they were actually respondent's son and a friend who left to go to a friend's house - Conclusion that woman who drove up to respondent's house, entered it, and then left with a 3 or 4 year old girl and drove away was a parent who had picked up a child care child was mistaken, as the woman was actually the mother of a pre-school friend of respondent's daughter who was picking up her child after a play date - Investigator also approached home and observed multiple children, and although respondent would not let investigator inside the house, she told him that the group comprised her own children, two nephews and the child of a neighbor who had gotten off a school bus and was staying at respondent's house until his mother returned home - Respondent had five children of her own, all of whom had occasional play dates at her home and at the homes of their friends, and respondent also cared for the child of a family member (a cousin) several days a week for which she received payment - Investigator was unable to determine the names and ages of the children he observed - No basis for agency's conclusion that respondent was providing day care for at least three unrelated children, or for imposing three fines of $250 each on respondent for caring for three unrelated children on January 22, 2018 - Evidence insufficient to find that alleged violation occurred on that date or to sustain fines, but directives in prior cease and desist order remained in effect and EEC was entitled to take further action, including enforcing the cease and desist order and imposing fines, if it found that respondent had re-commenced providing child care and was not licensed to do so.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Frechette, Docket No. OC-18-0175, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

LEAD INSPECTOR LICENSING

Denial of License Renewal

—Dismissal of Appeal

Licensed lead inspector - Appeal of proposed license renewal denial by Department of Public Health - Alleged multiple violations of M.G.L. c. 111, § 197B and DPH lead poisoning prevention and control regulations, 105 C.M.R. § 460.000(H), during residential lead inspections, including failure to follow procedures for initial lead inspection by repeatedly failing to identify or test surfaces in accordance with DPH Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program policies and training materials, using an x-ray fluorescence analyzer that was more than six years old that had not been checked

recently for functionality or re-sourced, failure to test and inspect surface or components at several residences including windows, doors, closets and hallways, stairs and/or entire rooms, and falsification of lead inspection test results for areas not tested or that were later found to have dangerous lead levels on both interior and exterior surfaces despite having been reported as negative for lead - Following prehearing conference session, proposed agreement offered by DPH describing what inspector would need to do to renew his lead inspector license, including six-month license non-renewal period, purchase or lease of new x-ray fluorescence analyzer, and completion of apprenticeship inspection s with a license lead inspector - Inspector's response stating that compliance with agreement's terms would be extremely difficult and financially burdensome and that he was no longer interested in becoming a Massachusetts lead inspector or renewing his license, with qualification that he so stated with "all [his] legal rights reserved" and no statement that he was withdrawing his appeal - Order issued directing inspector to clarify whether he wished to withdraw or pursue his appeal, and warning that failure to respond would result in appeal's dismissal and finalization of DPH's refusal to renew his license - No response to order - Recommended Decision that DPH Commissioner dismiss appeal for lack of prosecution and that agency's proposal to deny lead inspector license renewal be made final.

Dep't of Public Health v. Tilahun, Docket No. PH-17-148, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 13, 2017).

MEDICAL MARIJUANA

Medical Marijuana Certification

—Authority to Issue, and Delegation of Authority

Physician - Summary suspension by Board of Registration in Medicine - Alleged delegation by physician to nurse practitioner of authority to issue medical marijuana certification - Recommendation to not suspend - Insufficient evidence of delegation - Independent authority of nurse practitioners to issue marijuana certification.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nadolny, Docket No. RM-16-238 , Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 23, 2016).

Dispensary Agent Registration

—Temporary Revocation

Medical Use of Marijuana Program - Dispensary Agent - Registration - Temporary revocation - Recommendation to suspend and revoke dispensary agent registration - Submission of misleading, incorrect, false or fraudulent dispensary agent application (omission of information regarding prior conviction for distributing marijuana, positive testing for THC and revocation of probation) - Due to lack of notice, no recommendation of suspension pursuant to Department of Public Health Guidance for Registered Marijuana Dispensaries Regarding Background Checks or agency policy that dispensary agents must be honest.

Dep't of Public Health Medical Use of Marijuana Program v. Willis, Docket No. PH-15-589, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 19, 2016).

PHYSICIAN DISCIPLINE

Conduct Placing Into Question Competence to Practice Medicine

Gross misconduct in practice of medicine and unprofessional behavior during appendectomy, calling into question competence to practice medicine - On-call surgeon and locum tenens physician called into hospital that did not staff surgery department on weekends - Emergency surgery - Appendicitis - Numerous instances of disruptive behavior during single surgical procedure - Failure to call in anesthesiologist, as required by hospital policy, and insistence that nursing supervisor do so - Throwing around surgical tools and instruments in operating room - Failure to complete an appropriate scrub prior to performing surgery, including failure to allow hands to dry and refusal to dry hands with special towel provided by scrub tech - Shortness and rudeness toward operating staff assisting with surgery - Refusal to allow sponge count - Refusal to replace punctured glove as requested by scrub nurse, necessitating its physical removal from his hand - Not speaking clearly during procedure, making it difficult for surgical staff to hear and understand his instructions - Insistence that patient was moving and directing anesthesiologist to give more anesthesia when patient was not moving - Failure to alert surgical team when shifting to open procedure due to inability to locate appendix laparoscopically, leaving team to chance to prepare for the procedure by gathering needed supplies, such as blade and sponges - Violation of sterile operation field during surgery (reaching under gown to pull up falling pants during procedure and resistance to re-gowning and changing gloves, making it necessary for surgical tech to use force to keep him away from patient until he finally re-gowned and re-gloved - Refusal to re-glove when scrub tech pointed out he had torn a hole in sterile gloves, and doing so only when anesthesiologist advised that sterile procedure had been breached - Grabbing instruments without requesting that scrub tech hand him the instruments - Throwing instruments onto scrub tech's tray - Striking scrub tech with needle causing her to bleed, and continuing to stitch patient using same needle, compelling scrub nurse to physically take the contaminated needle to prevent possible contamination of the patient - Failure to conduct sponge count while closing the surgical site, in violation of hospital's general surgical procedure - Recommendation that Board of Registration in Medicine impose appropriate sanctions.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Pomerantz, Docket No. RM-16-483, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 1, 2017).

Inappropriate restraint of, and disruptive behavior toward, psychiatric patient presenting no danger to herself or others - Mitigating factors - Tense circumstances at psychiatric hospital.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Kohn, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 8, 2016).

Conduct Undermining Public Confidence in Integrity of Medical Profession

Practicing medicine in violation of probation agreement with Board of Registration in Medicine and permanent restrictions imposed by Board on medical license following allegations of substandard practice (practice of medicine confined to private offices; no performance of surgical procedures, whether in-patient, out-patient or office-based; practice limited to performance of non-surgical orthopedics and conducting independent medical examinations; expansion of this restricted medical practice prohibited - indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine stayed pending compliance with probation agreement) - subsequent expansion of practice - Treating workers' compensation claimants and providing rehabilitation services and physical medicine (performing examinations and then referring patients for physical therapy treatments by individual whose license to practice medicine had been revoked by Board following criminal convictions on multiple controlled substances violations unsupervised by licensed physician) and ownership interest in this practice - Failure to notify Board of this business relationship or involvement of person with revoked medical license - Failure to disclose, to Board, ownership interest in facility providing physical therapy services - Aiding and abetting unlicensed person to perform activities requiring a license - Performance of activities beyond conducting independent medical examinations, as required by probation agreement, and therefore outside parameters of restricted license to practice medicine - Conduct undermining public confidence in integrity of medical profession, and comprising dishonesty, fraud or deceit related to practice of medicine - Lifting of stay of indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine sustained.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nasif, Docket No. RM-16-163, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Inappropriate restraint of, and disruptive behavior toward, psychiatric patient presenting no danger to herself or others - Mitigating factors - Tense circumstances at psychiatric hospital.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Kohn, Docket No. RM-15-122 (Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 8, 2016).

Failure to Meet Standard of Care

Alleged violation of standard of care by physician - Prescription of opioids to pregnant patient and to other patients without recognizing their drug-seeking behavior - Failure to develop and implement treatment plans and meet minimum requirements for medical record keeping - Physician's death following DALA hearing, filing of closing briefs, and closure of record - Recommended decision that matter be dismissed as moot.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Fraser, Docket No. RM-13-224, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 4, 2017).

Opthamologist/retinal specialist - Insufficient Evidence - Diagnosis of retinal detachment and serous choroidal vitrectomy to reattach retina, possibility of melanoma or lesion noted, and clear treatment plan developed (patient 1) - Diagnosis of visual problems, including "floaters," following cataract procedure by another specialist, and performance of vitrectomy with lensectomy to remove retained lens fragments without subsequent complications (patient 2) - Reasonable choices of care between alternative treatment approaches.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v Hughes, Docket No. RM-14-810, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 30, 2016).

Gross Misconduct in Practice of Medicine

Gross misconduct in practice of medicine and unprofessional behavior during appendectomy, calling into question competence to practice medicine - On-call surgeon and locum tenens physician called into hospital that did not staff surgery department on weekends - Emergency surgery - Appendicitis - Numerous instances of disruptive behavior during single surgical procedure - Failure to call in anesthesiologist, as required by hospital policy, and insistence that nursing supervisor do so - Throwing around surgical tools and instruments in operating room - Failure to complete an appropriate scrub prior to performing surgery, including failure to allow hands to dry and refusal to dry hands with special towel provided by scrub tech - Shortness and rudeness toward operating staff assisting with surgery - Refusal to allow sponge count - Refusal to replace punctured glove as requested by scrub nurse, necessitating its physical removal from his hand - Not speaking clearly during procedure, making it difficult for surgical staff to hear and understand his instructions - Insistence that patient was moving and directing anesthesiologist to give more anesthesia when patient was not moving - Failure to alert surgical team when shifting to open procedure due to inability to locate appendix laparoscopically, leaving team to chance to prepare for the procedure by gathering needed supplies, such as blade and sponges - Violation of sterile operation field during surgery

(reaching under gown to pull up falling pants during procedure and resistance to re-gowning and changing gloves, making it necessary for surgical tech to use force to keep him away from patient until he finally re-gowned and re-gloved - Refusal to re-glove when scrub tech pointed out he had torn a hole in sterile gloves, and doing so only when anesthesiologist advised that sterile procedure had been breached - Grabbing instruments without requesting that scrub tech hand him the instruments - Throwing instruments onto scrub tech's tray - Striking scrub tech with needle causing her to bleed, and continuing to stitch patient using same needle, compelling scrub nurse to physically take the contaminated needle to prevent possible contamination of the patient - Failure to conduct sponge count while closing the surgical site, in violation of hospital's general surgical procedure - Recommendation that Board of Registration in Medicine impose appropriate sanctions.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Pomerantz, Docket No. RM-16-483, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 1, 2017).

Practicing medicine in violation of probation agreement with Board of Registration in Medicine and permanent restrictions imposed by Board on medical license following allegations of substandard practice (practice of medicine confined to private offices; no performance of surgical procedures, whether in-patient, out-patient or office-based; practice limited to performance of non-surgical orthopedics and conducting independent medical examinations; expansion of this restricted medical practice prohibited - indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine stayed pending compliance with probation agreement) - subsequent expansion of practice - Treating workers' compensation claimants and providing rehabilitation services and physical medicine (performing examinations and then referring patients for physical therapy treatments by individual whose license to practice medicine had been revoked by Board following criminal convictions on multiple controlled substances violations unsupervised by licensed physician) and ownership interest in this practice - Failure to notify Board of this business relationship or involvement of person with revoked medical license - Failure to disclose, to Board, ownership interest in facility providing physical therapy services - Aiding and abetting unlicensed person to perform activities requiring a license - Performance of activities beyond conducting independent medical examinations, as required by probation agreement, and therefore outside parameters of restricted license to practice medicine - Conduct undermining public confidence in integrity of medical profession, and comprising dishonesty, fraud or deceit related to practice of medicine - Lifting of stay of indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine sustained.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nasif (Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Malpractice

—Order of Default

Failure to file status reports as ordered - Failure to respond to or communicate with opposing party's counsel.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Provow, Docket No. RM-13-510, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 22, 2016).

Misconduct in Practice of Medicine

—Mitigating Factors

Inappropriate restraint of, and disruptive behavior toward, psychiatric patient presenting no danger to herself or others - Mitigating factors - Tense circumstances at psychiatric hospital including disruptive patients and "Code Green" behavioral management emergency.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Kohn, Docket No. RM-15-122, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 8, 2016).

—Order of Default

Order of Default Recommended Decision issued - Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine issued order to respondent physician to show cause why she should not be disciplined after her license to practice medicine was revoked by another state (Maryland) for failure to provide details of medical records to three of her patients, her failure to respond to Maryland Board of Physicians' three separate requests for response to three patient complaints, and improper billing for care she provided to three of her patients - Following Board's referral of matter to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, DALA's notice of prehearing conference mailed to physician was returned by United States Postal Service as "not deliverable as addressed" - DALA's remailed notice to physician at more recent address supplied by Board was not returned, but physician did not appear for prehearing conference, and also did not file a response to Board's order to show cause, as required by the Standard Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. 1.01(6)(d) - Respondent's conduct implied her lack of intent to defend against Board's action or a furtive attempt to delay adjudication - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of

default decision sustaining Board's allegations against physician, and imposition by Board of appropriate sanctions against her.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nelson, Docket No. RM-18-0550, Order of Default Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 4, 2019).

Order of default - Availability and legal basis - Physician discipline proceeding - Alleged misconduct in practice of medicine - Legal basis for default decision against physician - Failure of physician to file answer to Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine's statement alleging misconduct, including fraudulent prescribing of controlled substances, for which physician's license to practice medicine was revoked by out-of-state medical board (California) - Following Board's referral of its statement of allegations to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, multiple mailings to physician by Board and by DALA to his last known addresses in California and Indiana returned by U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and unforwardable - Physician also failed to update contact information with California Medical Board - Board moved for entry of default order and summary decision, and sent copy of motion to physician's criminal defense attorney in San Francisco - No response by physician to Board's motion - Default decision granted pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA, or with law - "Law" includes M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which allows agency conducting adjudicatory proceedings to make "informal disposition" of proceeding by "default," among other things, and M.G.L. c. 30A, § 9, which requires that adjudicatory proceedings conducted according to standard rules or approved substitute rules of procedure - Neither of the Standard Rules governing dismissal, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(g), and summary decision, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(h), provides for a default order specifically based upon the circumstances presented - Summary decision under the Standard Rules was also inappropriate because physician's failure to file answer or responses to undeliverable mail sent to him at last known addresses of record did not show absence of genuine or material factual dispute as to Board's allegations against him - Default decision was available, however, under provision of Standard Rules allowing presiding officer, on motion, to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or with the Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 - Default decision would afford "just and speedy determination" that Standard Rules required, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(2)(b), because DALA had given notice to physician that the Rules required; no better notice could be given because mailings to him were undeliverable; neither Massachusetts nor out-of-state medical board could find an alternative address for him; physician had supplied no other address to either board and had filed no papers with DALA that might have supplied a different address; and effort to send mailing to physician's out-of-state criminal defense counsel shown by federal PACER system and other records had not prompted any filing on physician's behalf - Further mailings to physician were futile in these circumstances and would only lead to additional notice taking a round trip through the United States

mail - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision making final its allegations against physician without further notice to him.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

Practicing Medicine While Ability to Practice is Impaired by Alcohol or Drugs

—Order of Default

Failure of physician to file answer to Board's statement of allegations - Notice of prehearing conference returned by U.S. Postal Service as "not deliverable as addressed" - Subsequent order to show cause why default should not enter for want of prosecution sent to same address but not returned by U.S. Postal Service - No response to order to show cause - Order of Default and Recommended Decision adverse to physician issued.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Russell, Docket No. RM-17-089, Order of Default-Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 7, 2017).

Sexual Misconduct

—Insufficient Evidence

Married hospitalist - Patient with history of panic attacks admitted to hospital after presenting in emergency room with possible heart attack symptoms - Hospitalist diagnosed demand ischemia (stress on heart but not heart attack), discussed sources of stress in patient's life, including husband and children, switched medication from Atavan (prescribed previously for panic attack control) to longer-lasting Klonopin and told her to follow with her primary care physician for anxiety and with endocrinologist regarding high level of thyroid-stimulating hormone - Found patient attractive, hugged her and wished her good luck prior to discharge (which she found at the time to be strange but caring) but did not ask whether he could see her following her discharge from hospital - Discharge ended doctor-patient relationship for hospitalist - Shortly after returning home, patient initiated contact via Facebook friending request - Exchange of text messages, subsequent meeting in parking lot, at hotel, and in local park, all without sex - Hospitalist returned home to Florida and stopped responding to former patient's text messages - Exaggerated or misleading statements by former patient in complaint she filed against hospitalist regarding his intention to "maneuver" her into a sexual relationship that did not occur - Routine answers by hospitalist to patient's brief questions about use of Klonopan and Atavan during conversations following discharge insufficient to establish continuing doctor-patient relationship - No evidence of sexual relationship - No evidence

that hospitalist used knowledge of former patient's medical problems to exploit her during brief romantic relationship following discharge from hospital - Evidence showed, instead, brief personal relationship between two adults with marital problems, following former patient's hospital discharge, and from which both backed away - No ethical violation.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Soumelidis, Docket No. RM-15-25, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 2, 2016), *additional findings made following Board remand, without changing conclusions*, Amended Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2017).

Summary Suspension of Physician as Immediate and Serious Threat to Public Health, Safety or Welfare

—Generally

Immediacy and seriousness of threat or potential threat posed by physician to public health, safety or welfare - Evidence - Board of Registration in Medicine's delay in moving to suspend physician - Only slight indication that physician did not pose immediate and serious threat, or possible serious threat, to public health, safety or welfare - Testimony by Board investigator that investigation related to physician's conduct took a year, depending upon Board's staffing, how readily records and experts could be obtained, and whether it had higher priorities, and potentially more serious dangers to public health, it needed to address - Delay in taking disciplinary action not necessarily indicative of lack of immediate and serious threat to public health, safety or welfare.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Cushing, Docket No. RM-16-249, Summary Recommended Decision on Order of Temporary Suspension (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2017).

—Insufficient Evidence

Physician licensed to issue medical marijuana certificates and working at medical marijuana practice - Issuance of medical marijuana certificate to pregnant patient, three months before child's birth, while patient was taking Subutex (similar to Suboxone), from which baby would later require withdrawal - No action by Board of Registration in medicine for more than 1½ years after receiving complaint from staff person at Massachusetts Department of Children and Families regarding physician's issuance of medical marijuana certificate to pregnant mother - Physician established bona fide

relationship with patient - No record support for Board's argument that physician could not have spent more than 20 minutes with patient based upon total number of medical marijuana certificates he issued and number of says he worked - Expert testimony (by physician board-certified in internal medicine and addiction medicine, with 15 years of experience as medical director of local hospital's addiction recovery program, and with academic credentials in addiction medicine) that 20 minutes of time with patient sufficed to determine whether had a debilitating medical condition qualifying for medical marijuana certification and establish a bona fide physician-patient relationship - Department of Public Health's medical marijuana regulations did not specify how doctors should evaluate patient and decide whether to issue medical marijuana certificate, and neither statute nor regulations did not disqualify anyone categorically from receiving a medical marijuana certificate, including a pregnant woman - Issuance of medical marijuana certificate to pregnant woman by physician did not itself show that physician was immediate or serious threat, or may be a serious threat to public health, safety or welfare - Medical history of which physician was aware included four bad disks, severe back of several years' duration, worsening pain following epidural injection, ineffectiveness of physical therapy in relieving back pain, opinion of treating physician that surgery would not relieve pain, recent back injury, patient's pregnancy and addiction to opioids and participation in drug rehabilitation program taking Suboxone, which ruled out use of opioids for pain relief, and declining pain medication, patient's use of cane and back brace, patient taking Prozac and using marijuana, fetus already exposed to whatever risks were posed by use of Suboxone, marijuana and Prozac, risk that patient would seek illegal marijuana (with questionable concentration and quality, including risk of containing pesticide residue) if not issued medical marijuana certificate, risk that chronic pain posed to pregnant woman and fetus including fetal loss, stillbirth and pregnancy complications, patient's exhaustion of other medical options not posing known risks to fetus before seeking medical marijuana - Variability of medical and scientific studies regarding risks to children from exposure to medical marijuana while in womb - Reasonableness of issuing medical marijuana certificate to patient in circumstances - No violation of applicable standard of care - No violation of medical marijuana statute or regulations - Physician's subsequent decision not to issue medical marijuana certificates to pregnant women minimized any risk to public health, safety and welfare that such issuance would pose - Recommendation not to temporarily suspend physician.

> *Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Cushing*, Docket No. RM-16-249, Summary Recommended Decision on Order of Temporary Suspension (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2017).

Physician licensed to issue medical marijuana certificates and working at medical marijuana practice - Proposed summary suspension based upon physician's status as third-highest issuer of medical marijuana certificates in Massachusetts - No correlation between number of marijuana certificates issued and immediacy or seriousness of threat to public health, safety or welfare - Medical marijuana statute (St. 2012, c. 369)

contemplated that some physicians licensed to issue medical marijuana certificates would issue more of them than would others - At least some large medical institutions avoiding involvement with medical marijuana due to receipt of federal funds and continuing illegality of marijuana under federal law - No allegation that physician violated medical marijuana statute or regulations promulgated under statute by Massachusetts Department of Public Health regulations other than as to single, pregnant patient - No control by physician over his ranking in terms of number of medical marijuana certificates issued in state - Expert opinion testimony (by physician board-certified in internal medicine and addiction medicine, with 15 years of experience as medical director of local hospital's addiction recovery program, and with academic credentials in addiction medicine) that judgment of physician care and conduct based upon number of marijuana certificates issued to patients without knowledge of those patients' circumstances was "unsound extrapolation of data to prove a preconceived belief" - No blanket immunity under medical marijuana statute's immunity clause providing that physician shall not be penalized under Massachusetts law or denied any right or privilege for "[p]roviding a qualifying patient with written certification based upon a full assessment of the qualifying patient's medical history and condition, that the medical use of marijuana may benefit" that patient (*see* St. 2012, c. 369, § 3) - Immunity clause does mean, however, that physician cannot be disciplined for simple act of issuing one valid medical marijuana certificate, or (as in this case), 4,648 valid certificates, or for being the third-highest issuer of valid medical marijuana certificates - Recommendation not to temporarily suspend physician.

> *Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Cushing*, Docket No. RM-16-249, Summary Recommended Decision on Order of Temporary Suspension (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2017).

Physician's self-prescription of medication classified as controlled substance (Clonazepam) to assist sleeping and control seizures related to his Parkinson's Disease - Single instance of self-prescription five years earlier after prescription from another physician ran out - Conduct placed only physician at risk, and risk was hypothetical in circumstances - Recognition by physician that self-prescription was error - Unquestioned that self-prescription of controlled substance violated Board regulations - No evidence, however, that single instance of self-prescription in question likely compromised physician's professional objectivity and unduly influenced his medical judgment , or that he was an immediate and serious threat, or may be a serious threat, to the public health, safety or welfare - Recommendation not to temporarily suspend physician.

> *Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Cushing*, Docket No. RM-16-249, Summary Recommended Decision on Order of Temporary Suspension (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2017).

Improper delegation of physician's authority to issue medical marijuana certification to nurse practitioner - Recommendation to not suspend physician - Insufficient evidence of delegation - Independent authority of nurse practitioners to issue marijuana certification.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nadolny, Docket No. RM-16-238 , Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 23, 2016).

Prescribing medication outside usual course of practice to girlfriends and female acquaintances with drug problems - Recommended limited suspension - Insufficient evidence to support general summary suspension - Sufficient to support suspension from prescribing to girlfriends and female acquaintances outside normal course of physician's hospital practice.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Shepherd, Docket No. RM-16-350, Recommended Decision on Summary Suspension (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 14, 2016).

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Decision Upon Written Submissions

Petitioner's waiver of hearing and submission of case upon written submissions, pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(8)(c) - Appropriateness - Neither party disputed any facts presented or challenged any submitted documents - Appeal presented only legal issues that could be decided based upon the parties' exhibits and memoranda.

Hogan v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-243, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Default Decision

—Availability and Legal Basis

Physician discipline proceeding - Alleged misconduct in practice of medicine - Failure of physician to file answer to Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine's statement alleging misconduct, including fraudulent prescribing of controlled substances, for which physician's license to practice medicine was revoked by out-of-state medical board (California) - Following Board's referral of its statement of allegations to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, multiple mailings to physician by Board and by DALA to his last

known addresses in California and Indiana returned by U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and unforwardable - Physician also failed to update contact information with California Medical Board - Board moved for entry of default order and summary decision, and sent copy of motion to physician's criminal defense attorney in San Francisco - No response by physician to Board's motion - Default decision granted pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA, or with law - "Law" includes M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which allows agency conducting adjudicatory proceedings to make "informal disposition" of proceeding by "default," among other things, and M.G.L. c. 30A, § 9, which requires that adjudicatory proceedings conducted according to standard rules or approved substitute rules of procedure - Neither of the Standard Rules governing dismissal, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(g), and summary decision, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(h), provides for a default order specifically based upon the circumstances presented - Summary decision under the Standard Rules was also inappropriate because physician's failure to file answer or responses to undeliverable mail sent to him at last known addresses of record did not show absence of genuine or material factual dispute as to Board's allegations against him - Default decision was available, however, under provision of Standard Rules allowing presiding officer, on motion, to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or with the Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 - Default decision would afford "just and speedy determination" that Standard Rules required, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(2)(b), because DALA had given notice to physician that the Rules required; no better notice could be given because mailings to him were undeliverable; neither Massachusetts nor out-of-state medical board could find an alternative address for him; physician had supplied no other address to either board and had filed no papers with DALA that might have supplied a different address; and effort to send mailing to physician's out-of-state criminal defense counsel shown by federal PACER system and other records had not prompted any filing on physician's behalf - Further mailings to physician were futile in these circumstances and would only lead to additional notice taking a round trip through the United States mail - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision making final its allegations against physician without further notice to him.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

—Default Decision Issued or Recommended

Order of Default Recommended Decision issued - Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine issued order to respondent physician to show cause why she should not be disciplined after her license to practice medicine was revoked by another state (Maryland) for failure to provide details of medical records to three of her patients, her failure to respond to Maryland Board of Physicians' three separate requests for response to three patient complaints, and improper billing for care she provided to three of her

patients - Following Board's referral of matter to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, DALA's notice of prehearing conference mailed to physician was returned by United States Postal Service as "not deliverable as addressed" - DALA's remailed notice to physician at more recent address supplied by Board was not returned, but physician did not appear for prehearing conference, and also did not file a response to Board's order to show cause, as required by the Standard Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. 1.01(6)(d) - Respondent's conduct implied her lack of intent to defend against Board's action or a furtive attempt to delay adjudication - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision sustaining Board's allegations against physician, and imposition by Board of appropriate sanctions against her.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nelson, Docket No. RM-18-0550, Order of Default Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 4, 2019).

Order of default directed decision issued - Failure of physician to file answer to Board's statement of allegations - Notice of prehearing conference returned by U.S. Postal Service as "not deliverable as addressed" - Subsequent order to show cause why default should not enter for want of prosecution sent to same address but not returned by U.S. Postal Service - No response to order to show cause - Order of Default and Recommended Decision adverse to physician issued.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Russell, Docket No. RM-17-089, Order of Default-Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 7, 2017).

Directed Decision

—Granted as "Summary Decision" Following Hearing

Physician Discipline Proceedings

Practicing medicine in violation of probation agreement with Board of Registration in Medicine and permanent restrictions imposed by Board on medical license following allegations of substandard practice (practice of medicine confined to private offices; no performance of surgical procedures, whether in-patient, out-patient or office-based; practice limited to performance of non-surgical orthopedics and conducting independent medical examinations; expansion of this restricted medical practice prohibited - indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine stayed pending compliance with probation agreement) - subsequent expansion of practice - Treating workers' compensation claimants and providing rehabilitation services and physical medicine (performing examinations and then referring patients for physical therapy treatments by individual whose license to practice medicine had been

revoked by Board following criminal convictions on multiple controlled substances violations unsupervised by licensed physician) and ownership interest in this practice - Failure to notify Board of this business relationship or involvement of person with revoked medical license - Failure to disclose, to Board, ownership interest in facility providing physical therapy services - Aiding and abetting unlicensed person to perform activities requiring a license - Performance of activities beyond conducting independent medical examinations, as required by probation agreement, and therefore outside parameters of restricted license to practice medicine - Conduct undermining public confidence in integrity of medical profession, and comprising dishonesty, fraud or deceit related to practice of medicine - Lifting of stay of indefinite suspension of license to practice medicine sustained.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Nasif, Docket No. RM-16-163, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Retirement Appeals - Accidental Disability Retirement

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Public school teacher assistant - Assignment to classroom with several behaviorally-challenged students - Fibromyalgia - Nausea, vertigo and disequilibirum - Superannuation retirement - Subsequent application for accidental disability retirement based upon medical conditions (Fibromyalgia, Meniere's Disease (severe vertigo) and Sjogren's Syndrome (long-term autoimmune disease affecting moisture-producing glands)) exacerbated by job requirements and work-related stress - Accidental disability denial sustained on appeal - Undisputed material facts - Failure of teacher assistant to prove that she sustained compensable personal injury, or that her employment presented a hazard not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations - Vertigo and nausea symptoms occurred at work only once, and were generally experienced in the evening, after work - Absence from work toward end of employment due to leave to care for grandson under Family Medical Leave Act - No notice of injury report or incident report filed with employer - No evidence in record as to effect (if any) of medications she was taking in development of her vertigo - No showing of mature and established disability when teacher's assistant last performed her duties - No contemporaneous report in record from treating physician supporting teacher assistant's claim to be totally and permanently disabled on last day of employment - Admission, in disability retirement application, of non-job related factors exacerbating her Fibromyalgia, Meniere's Disease and Sjogren's Syndrome, including constant movement and exposure to elements and "all sorts" of weather conditions including hot, cold, rain and wind, none of which were job-related hazards, and all of which were common and necessary exposures related to daily life in New England - No positive medical panel evaluation supporting her claim (2 of 3 members voting yes as to disability and its permanence, of whom 1 voted yes and

1 voted no as to job-related causation, and 1 member voting no as to disability, based upon finding normal hearing and ears and no Meniere's Disease, and therefore not answering remaining questions as to permanence of disability and job-related causation) - No evidence that panel members lacked pertinent facts, applied erroneous standard or were biased.

Lambert v. Hampden County Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-209, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 7, 2017).

Retirement Appeals - Group Classification for Retirement Purposes

[no entries]

Discovery

—Document Requests

Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Motion to compel denied in part and granted in part - Physician discipline proceeding - Documents requested by physician related to affirmative defense that Board's statement of allegations against physician was null and void because discussion preceding vote on allegations statement was led by Board Chair and Chair participated in vote, in violation of Board's Conflict of Interest Policy 2017-01 - Physician's motion to compel production of documents related to contributions to specified hospital or its affiliates by Board Chair, her immediate family members, or entities they controlled beginning one year prior to Chair's appointment denied because Board lacked custody or control of those documents - Motion to compel production of Board minutes, draft minutes and minute-taker and paralegal notes, and communications between Board's Executive Director and Board members or employees regarding physician's discipline case allowed because any facts contained in documents that were central to the Board's action were essential to physician's affirmative defense regarding alleged conflict of interest policy violations, Board was custodian of the documents requested, statutory requirement that investigative records or information kept confidential at any time did not apply to requests from the person under investigation, per plain language of M.G.L. c. 112, § 5, and Board did not show with any specificity that any exemption or privilege applied to the documents that the physician sought.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Little, Docket No. RM-17-935, Ruling on Motion to Compel Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Motion to compel denied - Retirement appeal - Creditable service purchase request by retired public school teacher for prior teaching at nonpublic school (Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph) - Denial by retirement system - Teacher's eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluding retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Request by teacher to retirement system for documents regarding other system members allowed retirement credit for prior service at Boston School for the Deaf - Information beyond scope of material factual issues, notwithstanding retirement system's production of limited, redacted documents regarding members who taught previously at the School but had not worked there for ten years and did not qualify for retirement benefit from Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - No discretion under statute to allow retirement credit for prior service at School if retirement system member qualified for benefit under Retirement Plan - Order to compel production of other documents unnecessary - Retirement system produced documents and remained under continuing obligation to supplement production if it found other relevant documents.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 24, 2017).

Motion to Serve Record-Keeper Subpoena

Subpoenas allowed - Appeal of creditable service purchase denial - Retired public school teacher - Prior teaching at nonpublic school - Health and physical education teacher - Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph - Eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluding retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Receipt of payment from Plan after employment at nonpublic school ended - Subpoenas to record-keepers of successors to Plan administrator and actuary - Records regarding contributions to Plan, and payment by Plan to former teacher - Relevance to factual inquiry under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p): whether teacher was eligible to receive retirement benefits under Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan, and whether payment she received from Plan after her employment at Boston School for the Deaf ended was retirement allowance.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Remedies for Failure to Produce Documents

Dismissal for persisting failure to produce documents - Veterans' benefits appeal - Joint federal income tax return filed by veteran and his wife for year in question, including Schedule Cs for self-employment income, and LLC's operating agreement and membership list during that time - These documents were the best evidence of nature of LLC, whether its profits and losses were passed through to the wife and belonged to her alone, and whether the LLC's expenses in generating income were properly offset against the veteran's income, and were material in determining whether income veteran's spouse received from a limited liability company was hers alone or should be counted in determining whether veteran was financially eligible for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits during the time period in question in view of his income from all sources - Veteran's persisting failure to produce any of these documents despite being requested, and then ordered, to produce them justified dismissal of his appeal seeking reinstatement of his Chapter 115 benefits payments, which were a form of needs-based public assistance.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Dismissal for persisting failure to produce documents - Veterans' benefits appeal - In adjudicatory appeal by a veteran seeking to reinstate M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits payments terminated because the veteran did not provide sufficient information regarding his income from all sources, including income from his own sole proprietorship and income-generating expenses that allegedly offset income his wife received from a limited liability company, Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services was not required to seek information regarding tax returns filed by veteran and spouse via a request by its commissioner to the Massachusetts Department of Revenue pursuant to M.G.L. c. 62C, § 21(b)(10) before it could request their production by the veteran, or seek an order compelling their disclosure.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Dismissal for persisting failure to produce documents - Veterans' benefits appeal - That veteran seeking by adjudicatory appeal to reinstate M.G.L. c. 115 benefits payments discontinued for insufficient proof of financial eligibility for them was also a certified public accountant who prepared joint federal tax return that he and his wife filed did not entitle him to withhold production of the return based upon accountant's privilege against disclosure of client confidences - Veteran was also the client, and could produce them in that capacity - Having declined to do so, his appeal was properly dismissed as a discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference

that federal tax return and other documents regarding income from sole proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Motion for reconsideration - Decision dismissing veterans' benefits appeal for lack of prosecution, and as discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference that documents veteran refused to produce regarding income from sole proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits - Reconsideration denied - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected, without producing related documents veteran failed to produce earlier, including arguments that spouse's LLC-related income belonged to her alone and should not be counted in determining veteran's financial eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits, and that Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Benefits had no need for joint federal tax return that veteran and spouse filed for 2014 in order to determine whether he was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits during that year - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Dismissal for petitioner's failure to produce documents and resulting adverse inference drawn against him - Veterans' benefits appeal - Financial eligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits by local veterans' services department , and placement into "refund status" for receipt of benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question, based upon failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency attributed full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses , and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner

was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - During DALA appeal, persisting failure by petitioner to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Continuing failure to benefits recipient to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

—Interrogatories

Generally

Prior leave of Administrative Magistrate required for service of interrogatories - Standard for deciding motion for leave to serve - Relevance of information sought - "Relevant information" not defined by Standard Rules of Practice and Procedure - Application of standards used by courts to determine relevance of information sought through discovery under Massachusetts and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Retirement Appeals

Partial allowance of interrogatories, with subject-matter limitations - Proposed interrogatories to contributory retirement system - Appeal of creditable service purchase denial - Retired public school teacher - Prior teaching at nonpublic school - Health and physical education teacher - Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph - Eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluding retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Receipt of payment from Plan after employment at nonpublic school ended - Proposed interrogatories related to denial of creditable service based upon eligibility to receive retirement allowance from any source allowed as seeking relevant information - Proposed interrogatories asking whether tuition of students that teacher taught at Boston School for the Deaf was publicly funded in whole or part denied as seeking irrelevant information - Retirement credit not denied on this ground, and no claim on appeal that it was - Proposed interrogatories seeking information regarding other public school teachers allowed retirement credit for prior teaching service at Boston School for Deaf denied as seeking irrelevant information - Denial of credit for prior teaching service at nonpublic school pursuant based upon eligibility for retirement benefit from "any source" not discretionary - Teacher allowed to pursue discovery via allowed interrogatories, and via subpoenas to successor to Retirement Plan administrator and actuary, regarding factual issues relevant to inquiry under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p): whether she was eligible to receive retirement benefits under Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan, and whether payment she received from Plan after her employment at Boston School for the Deaf ended was retirement allowance.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Dismissal

—Dismissal as Discovery-Related Sanction

Dismissal for persisting failure to produce documents - Veterans' benefits appeal - Joint federal income tax return filed by veteran and his wife for year in question, including Schedule Cs for self-employment income, and LLC's operating agreement and membership list during that time - These documents were the best evidence of nature of LLC, whether its profits and losses were passed through to the wife and belonged to her alone, and whether the LLC's expenses in generating income were properly offset against the veteran's income, and were material in determining whether income veteran's spouse

received from a limited liability company was hers alone or should be counted in determining whether veteran was financially eligible for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits during the time period in question in view of his income from all sources - Veteran's persisting failure to produce any of these documents despite being requested, and then ordered, to produce them justified dismissal of his appeal seeking reinstatement of his Chapter 115 benefits payments, which were a form of needs-based public assistance.

> *Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services*, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Failure by M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits recipient to produce documents related to financial eligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits, and resulting adverse inference drawn against him - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 benefits by local veterans' services department, and placement into "refund status" (recoupment by offset against any future Chapter 115 benefits for which petitioner might become eligible) - Receiving benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question - Failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency erred in attributed full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses, and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - During DALA appeal, persisting failure by petitioner to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns, showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Petitioner's continuing failure to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse

inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

—Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

Failure to State a Claim for Relief

Motion to dismiss granted - Constitutional claim - Retirement appeal - Forfeiture of pension approved by retirement board pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) following retirement system member's 2015 conviction in federal district court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiring to defraud United States, and sentencing to three months' imprisonment and $100 fine - Potential pension loss as a result of forfeiture estimated to be $679,430 - Member's request to retirement board to reinstate pension following Supreme Judicial Court's 2016 decision that pension forfeiture under M.G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) qualified as "fine" under "excessive fines" clause of U.S. Const. Amend. VIII (*see Public Employee Retirement Administration Comm'n v. Bettencourt*, 47 N.E.3d 667 (2016) - Decision by retirement board not to act on request - Appeal of retirement board's "no-action" decision to DALA by member, based upon claim that pension forfeiture was excessive fine in violation of U.S. Const. Amend. VIII - DALA lacked jurisdiction to decide constitutional claim, and no specialized factfinding by DALA was necessary to decide it - In addition, because member's challenge to retirement board action or decision "with reference to" his involuntary retirement or dereliction of duty was already pending before a Massachusetts district court, court was empowered to make required factfinding regarding constitutionality of pension forfeiture as part of its statutory jurisdiction to determine whether board's action was justified (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, §16(3)).

Fitzpatrick v. Chelsea Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-216, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 29, 2017).

Motion to dismiss granted - Statutory invalidity claim - Retirement appeal - M.G.L. c. 90G3/4 - Statute governing retirement system member's election to discontinue retirement deductions at age 70 while continuing employment - District Court full-time first assistant clerk magistrate - Recision, by Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC), of State Board of Retirement's approval of clerk magistrate's accidental disability retirement application based upon disabling

mold exposure at courthouse, on ground that as a result of election to discontinue contributions to retirement system, clerk magistrate was no longer a "member in service," per M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(1)(a)(I), and was therefore ineligible for accidental disability retirement - Appeal by clerk magistrate challenging PERAC decision - Alternative claim that to extent it made election to discontinue retirement deductions at age 70 while continuing to work irrevocable, M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4 violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq*. - Claim rejected, as Division of Administrative Law Appeals lacks authority to declare a statute invalid - However, statute did not appear to be invalid on its face, as it allowed a retirement system member who continued working past age 70 to decide whether or not he wanted to continue contributing to his retirement system based upon which course of action best suited his particular circumstances, and did not preclude the member from continuing to contribute to the retirement system - Eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits determined on clerk magistrate's main claim on appeal (no loss of "member in service" status, or eligibility for accidental disability retirement under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), as a result of election to discontinue retirement contributions under M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4).

Reardon v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-15-91, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 5, 2017).

Lack of Standing

Motion to dismiss granted - Agricultural resource appeal - Herbicide application to manage right of way - Electric transmission utility - Five year vegetation management plan approved by Department of Agricultural Resources and requiring Department's approval of yearly operating plan - Approval of operating plan for 2016 specifying areas off-limits to herbicide spraying, including Zone I areas with public water supply wells - Appeal of operating plan by Cape Cod municipalities where herbicides would be applied - Asserted interference with municipal obligation to provide drinking water to residents - Lack of standing - Failure to allege specific facts showing aggrievement (actual injury different in kind or magnitude from that suffered by general public) - Claim that leaching herbicides would enter groundwater from which towns may draw water unsupported by factual allegations regarding location of spraying relative to town water sources and likely direction of groundwater flow - Failure to assert detail sufficient to support claim that yearly operational plan was inconsistent with five-year vegetation management plan.

Town of Brewster v. Dep't of Agricultural Resources, Docket Nos. MS-16-393, 394, 395 and 396, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 27, 2017).

Mootness

Appeal dismissed - Retirement appeal - Department of Developmental Services (DDS) Mental Retardation Worker IV - Appeal challenging denial of request to reclassify position from Group 1 to Group 2 - Superannuation retirement at age 66 while appeal of group reclassification denial was pending - State Board of Retirement's motion to dismiss appeal as moot granted - Superannuation retirement allowance calculated, per M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2), as product of retirement system member's creditable service, member's annual rate of regular compensation, and an age factor determined by member's age at retirement and group classification - Maximum age factor used in calculation is 2.5 - Maximum age factor of 2.5 reached in Group 1 at age 65, and in Group 2 at age 60 - Upon retirement at age 66, DDS employee reached maximum age factor of 2.5 for Group 1 employee, and would have reached it earlier, at age 60, had he been classified in Group 2 - Reclassification in Group 2 would not increase his retirement allowance, as he was already receiving the maximum retirement allowance - Reclassification appeal was therefore moot.

Pierre-Louis v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-10-20, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 21, 2017).

Dismissal recommended - Physician discipline proceeding - Alleged violation of standard of care by physician - Prescription of opioids to pregnant patient and to other patients without recognizing their drug-seeking behavior - Failure to develop and implement treatment plans and meet minimum requirements for medical record keeping - Physician's death following DALA hearing, filing of closing briefs, and closure of record - Recommended decision that matter be dismissed as moot.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Fraser, Docket No. RM-13-224, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 4, 2017).

Appeal dismissed - Retirement appeal - Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP) - Denial of ERIP application - Employment by non-qualifying agency - University of Massachusetts - Appeals - Dismissal - Mootness - Withdrawal of ERIP application - Expiration of ERIP application deadline.

Jochim v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-328, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 28, 2016).

Appeal dismissed - Veterans' benefits appeal - Termination of M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits payments for failure to document current residence - Agreement by parties resolving veteran's appeal, comprising handwritten, signed provisions and

amplifications to which parties stipulated during prehearing conference - Continued Cambridge, Massachusetts residence established sufficiently by veteran's temporary residence at Salvation Army men's shelter in Cambridge six days at a time, resumed after several days at a Watertown apartment maintained by another organization - Residence arrangement complied with number of consecutive days the Cambridge shelter allowed for being furnished with a bed, and was likely to improve veteran's chance of obtaining Cambridge inclusionary housing for which he had applied - Although not currently financially eligible to receive M.G.L. c. 115 veteran's benefits, veteran could reapply for them if he signed a lease and incurred rental expenses, or if he incurred medical expenses not reimbursed by other sources - Waiver of any obligation veteran may have had to refund benefits paid to him after local veterans' services department terminated Chapter 115 benefits payments remains in place and applies to benefit payment issued to him while his appeal was pending - No objection by parties to draft order of dismissal clarifying terms of agreement - Veteran's appeal dismissed as moot based upon agreement.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 31, 2017).

Untimeliness

Generally - Date of appeal filing - DALA adheres to the "postmark rule" and considers an appeal to have been filed when it is postmarked at a United States Postal Service facility.

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Generally - Date on which time to appeal began to run - Receipt of appealed decision - Regular course of mails, and receipt of mailing, are presumed in Massachusetts - Presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that showing that mail in question was not received.

Fernandes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-942, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018), *reconsideration denied* ((Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 8, 2018).

Timely appeal - Retirement appeal challenging denial of creditable service application - Denial decision by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) dated October 19, 2016 - Appeal by petitioner dated November 13, 2016 and received by DALA on November 14, 2016 - Appeal appeared to have been filed

well beyond 15-day appeal period set by M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Appeal period runs from date appealed decision was received - Petitioner alleged, however, that she received decision in the mail on October 31, 2016 - Although ordinarily, credulity would be stretched by assertion that decision mailed by MTRS from Charlestown, Massachusetts to West Boylston, Massachusetts, where petitioner resided, was not received until 12 days after it was mailed, MTRS was moving to Charlestown, and was adapting to its new location, in October 2016, and it was therefore feasible that it did not mail the decision until several days following the date it was generated, and, therefore, that petitioner did not receive it until October 31, 2016 - Appeal would be treated as having been timely filed within 15 days following that date of receipt, and decision would be rendered on the merits.

Milton v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-513, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 15, 2019).

Timely appeal - Retirement appeal filed within 15 days of notification of the retirement board's decision, as required by M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Denial by retirement board of firefighter's request for Group 4 classification for his prior call firefighter service - Board's decision postmarked December 26, 2014 - Petitioner could not have received notice prior to the postmark date - Appeal postmarked January 10, 2015 was exactly 15 days after the earliest date he could have been notified of Board's decision - Board's challenge to appeal's timeliness during hearing therefore rejected.

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Timely appeal - Retirement - Accrual of 15-day appeal period - No notice of action by retirement board or right to appeal - Board's refusal to change amount of former spouse's monthly retirement benefit allocation payment from retiree's monthly accidental disability retirement benefit amount - Former spouse originally designated as sole beneficiary of former husband's retirement benefits, pursuant to 2008 Probate and Family Court Domestic Relations Order (DRO) - New DRO issued in 2009 reduced amount of former spouse's allocation payment amount - Upon receiving notice of new DRO, retirement board reduced former spouse's benefit allocation portion of retiree's benefits payment to lower amount the new DRO ordered - Former spouse sent letter to Board in January 2010 objecting to reduction of her benefit allocation amount - Board counsel replied in February 2010 that board was bound by new DRO and could not change former spouse's reduced monthly benefit allocation amount without either a court order directing it to do so, or an agreement to do so by the parties to the Probate and Family Court proceeding - Reply letter did not state that board's refusal to change amount of former spouse's reduced monthly benefit

allocation amount was an action appealable pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), and did not state time within which former spouse could appeal it - Former spouse did not appeal at that time - Five and half years later, in November 2015, former spouse sent letter to Board counsel stating that she had not been notified of her right to appeal the Board's refusal, and requesting that she be told what her appeal rights were - Board counsel's reply was that there had been no decision by the board because (1) it had simply implemented the reduced monthly benefit allocation amount the new DRO had ordered; (2) it was unclear how the former spouse had been aggrieved by the Board's compliance with the court order; and (3) her objection to the new DRO should be directed to the court - On December 11, 2015, former spouse appealed, to DALA, the board's refusal to change her monthly benefit allocation amount - DALA had jurisdiction to decide appeal because (1) as former sole beneficiary of husband's gross monthly retirement benefit, and then as alternate payee of that benefit, former spouse had pecuniary interest in allocation amount she received from her former husband's gross monthly retirement benefits, and she was financially affected by the reduction of her monthly allocation of her former husband's retirement benefit payment; (2) retirement board's refusal to change amount of former wife's allocation, although based upon new DRO, was a board action appealable pursuant too M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4); (3) former spouse's time to appeal this action would have expired 15 days after she received board counsel's February 2010 reply to her objection to her allocation amount reduction if, and only if, the reply had included a statement of her appeal rights under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Although statute's 15-day appeal period applied, it was difficult to determine when the appeal period had accrued and started to run, since (1) the board insisted that it took no action on former spouse's January 2010 objection to reduction of her allocation amount that was appealable under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), and did not advise that she had any particular time to challenge this action or inaction; and (2) section 16(4) does not state that 15-day appeal period runs from earliest date on which one had actual knowledge that the board had acted or failed to act - In these circumstances, the appeal clock never started running on board's 2010 refusal to change the amount of former spouse's monthly retirement benefit allocation, and each reduced allotment check the board issued to her subsequently reiterated the board's refusal to change that amount, and started the appeal clock running anew - This cycle of appealable actions continued until the board issued a notice of action with a statement of former spouse's appeal rights (which never happened), or the former spouse filed an appeal, which she did on December 11, 2015, after receiving a benefit allotment check for that month - Appeal was therefore timely - DALA could not grant relief sought on appeal because only Probate and Family Court had jurisdiction to change her retirement benefit allocation amount, but its decision confirmed that retirement board had reduced former spouse's allocation amount consistent with 2009 DRO, that DALA was without jurisdiction to change that amount, and that former spouse had exhausted her remedies under M.G.L. c. 32.

Creedon v. Lexington Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-662, Decision (Mass.

Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Untimely appeal - Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction following hearing - Retirement appeal challenging denial by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) of creditable service purchase request - Request to purchase, for retirement purposes, service at charter public school prior to July 2007 as "technology integration specialist" (TIS) and "user support technician" but not as teacher, and before he earned a Department of Elementary and Secondary Education teaching certification, inclusion of his position in school's teaching contract, and becoming technology teacher at school and MTRS member - Creditable service purchase was denied because applicant did not begin teaching students until after July 2007 - Denial notice, dated February 24, 2016, included statement of appeal rights under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), including right to appeal denial to Division of Administrative Law appeals (DALA) within fifteen days of receiving notice - Although applicant emailed school's director of finance beginning March 1, 2016 to dispute conclusion that his prior TIS position was not a teaching position, and he carried on an email correspondence about this point with the finance director until March 15, 2016, when director informed him that his prior years of service were not pursuant to a teacher contract, he did not appeal MTRS's creditable service denial until March 17, 2016, when he faxed an appeal to DALA - Under "postmark rule," which DALA has adopted, appeal is deemed to have been filed either when mailed, as evidenced by postmark from United States postal facility, or, if filed by electronic medium, on the date DALA receives it during regular business hours, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(4)(b) - MTRS's denial was mailed either on day it was dated (February 24, 2016), in which case the 15-day appeal period ran from following day (meaning that the last day to appeal to DALA was March 11, 2016, or it was mailed on February 25, 2016, the day after the date shown on it, in which case applicant received it within two days (on February 27, 2016), in which case he had 15 days to mail or fax-file his appeal, and that appeal period expired at the close of business on March 14, 2016 (because the fifteenth day, March 13, 2016, was a Sunday, when DALA was closed) - The appeal was therefore fax-filed late, on March 17, 2016, DALA was without jurisdiction to hear it, and the appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction - Even if the email correspondence with the school director "rectified" the appeal's timeliness (for example, by tolling the day on which the 15-day period to appeal MTRS's denial to DALA until the director sent her last email on March 15, 2016 standing by MTRS's conclusion that the applicant had not worked in the school as a teacher prior to July 2007), his appeal was without merit - Applicant was not engaged in teaching pupils prior to July 2007 - Charter school teachers are subject to state teacher retirement system, and service as charter school teacher is creditable service for retirement purposes, *see* M.G.L. c. 71, §§ 89(k) and (y), but prior to July 2007 applicant was neither employed by the school as a teacher, nor a member of MTRS or eligible to become a member, and nor was he yet certified as a teacher.

Belanger v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-120, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 8, 2019).

Untimely appeal - Retirement - Appeal challenging Retirement Board's denial of request to reclassify agency clinical director's position from Group 1 to Group 2 for retirement purposes - Denial decision dated June 29, 2017 and mailed by Board to petitioner on July 3, 2017 - Appeal filed on November 2, 2017 - 15-day appeal period, per M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), computed from date of notification of action by retirement board - Petitioner claimed she first learned her reclassification request was denied when retirement board sent her a letter dated October 18, 2017 responding to her inquiry about pending matters before the board - October 17, 2017 Board letter and July 3, 2017 mailing of reclassification denial were mailed to same address, and petitioner clearly received the latter mailing - Regular course of mails, and receipt of mailing, are presumed in Massachusetts - Presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that showing that mail in question was not received - Petitioner presented no evidence suggesting that she did not receive retirement board's July 3, 2017 mailing of reclassification denial sent to same address as board's later mailing - As receipt of the mailing is presumed and presumption was not rebutted, appeal filed well after 15 days following petitioner's presumed receipt of reclassification was untimely, and DALA was without jurisdiction to decide it.

Fernandes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-942, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018), *reconsideration denied* ((Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 8, 2018).

—Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution

Educator License Revocation Appeals

Lack of prosecution dismissal granted - Educator license revocation - Notice of probable cause to revoke license - Criminal indictment, and failure to report it to Department of Elementary and Secondary Education - Failure to attend two previously-scheduled mandatory prehearing conferences - Filing response to order to show cause regarding dismissal, following failure to appear at second prehearing conference, that asserted constitutional right not to appear at DALA conference prior to criminal trial, despite warning in order to show cause that continued pendency of criminal charges was not good cause for failing to attend conference.

Dep't of Elementary and Secondary Education v. Andrade, Docket No. MS-16-430, Final Decision-Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 27, 2017).

Family Child Care Licensing Appeals

Lack of prosecution dismissal recommended - Revocation of family child care provider license - Multiple instances of exceeding licensed child care children capacity, noncompliance with required children to staff ratios and utilizing unapproved caregivers - Failure to comply with sanction order freezing enrollment and reducing child care children capacity - Following appeal by license holder to DALA, failure to file prehearing memorandum or proposed hearing exhibits, and failure to appear for hearing rescheduled at license holder's request - Recommended dismissal of appeal for lack of prosecution, and finalization of family child care license revocation order.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Barbas, Docket No. OC-15-556, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2017).

Lead Inspector Licensing Appeals

Lack of prosecution dismissal recommended - Licensed lead inspector - Appeal of proposed license renewal denial by Department of Public Health - Alleged multiple violations of M.G.L. c. 111, § 197B and DPH lead poisoning prevention and control regulations, 105 C.M.R. § 460.000(H), during residential lead inspections, including failure to follow procedures for initial lead inspection by repeatedly failing to identify or test surfaces in accordance with DPH Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program policies and training materials, using an x-ray fluorescence analyzer that was more than six years old that had not been checked recently for functionality or re-sourced, failure to test and inspect surface or components at several residences including windows, doors, closets and hallways, stairs and/or entire rooms, and falsification of lead inspection test results for areas not tested or that were later found to have dangerous lead levels on both interior and exterior surfaces despite having been reported as negative for lead - Following prehearing conference session, proposed agreement offered by DPH describing what inspector would need to do to renew his lead inspector license, including six-month license non-renewal period, purchase or lease of new x-ray fluorescence analyzer, and completion of apprenticeship inspection s with a license lead inspector - Inspector's response stating that compliance with agreement's terms would be extremely difficult and financially burdensome and that he was no longer interested in becoming a Massachusetts lead inspector or renewing his license, with qualification that he so stated with "all [his] legal rights reserved" and no statement that he was withdrawing his appeal - Order issued directing inspector to clarify whether he wished to withdraw or pursue his appeal, and warning that failure to respond would result in appeal's dismissal and finalization of DPH's refusal to renew his license - No response to order - Recommended decision that DPH Commissioner dismiss appeal for lack of

prosecution and that agency's proposal to deny lead inspector license renewal be made final.

Dep't of Public Health v. Tilahun, Docket No. PH-17-148, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 13, 2017).

Physician Discipline Proceedings

Unavailability of lack of prosecution dismissal against physician respondent, but default decision available instead - Physician discipline proceeding - Alleged misconduct in practice of medicine - Failure of physician to file answer to Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine's statement alleging misconduct, including fraudulent prescribing of controlled substances, for which physician's license to practice medicine was revoked by out-of-state medical board (California) - Following Board's referral of its statement of allegations to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, multiple mailings to physician by Board and by DALA to his last known addresses in California and Indiana returned by U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and unforwardable - Physician also failed to update contact information with California Medical Board - Board moved for entry of default order and summary decision, and sent copy of motion to physician's criminal defense attorney in San Francisco - No response by physician to Board's motion - Default decision granted pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA, or with law - "Law" includes M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which allows agency conducting adjudicatory proceedings to make "informal disposition" of proceeding by "default," among other things, and M.G.L. c. 30A, § 9, which requires that adjudicatory proceedings conducted according to standard rules or approved substitute rules of procedure - Neither of the Standard Rules governing dismissal, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(g), and summary decision, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(h), provides for a default order specifically based upon the circumstances presented - Summary decision under the Standard Rules was also inappropriate because physician's failure to file answer or responses to undeliverable mail sent to him at last known addresses of record did not show absence of genuine or material factual dispute as to Board's allegations against him - Default decision was available, however, under provision of Standard Rules allowing presiding officer, on motion, to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or with the Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 - Default decision would afford "just and speedy determination" that Standard Rules required, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(2)(b), because DALA had given notice to physician that the Rules required; no better notice could be given because mailings to him were undeliverable; neither Massachusetts nor out-of-state medical board could find an alternative address for him; physician had supplied no other address to either board and had filed no papers with DALA that

might have supplied a different address; and effort to send mailing to physician's out-of-state criminal defense counsel shown by federal PACER system and other records had not prompted any filing on physician's behalf - Further mailings to physician were futile in these circumstances and would only lead to additional notice taking a round trip through the United States mail - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision making final its allegations against physician without further notice to him.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

Lack of prosecution dismissal recommended - Physician alleged to have practiced medicine while ability to practice was impaired by alcohol or drugs - Failure of physician to file answer to Board's statement of allegations - Notice of prehearing conference returned by U.S. Postal Service as "not deliverable as addressed" - Subsequent order to show cause why default should not enter for want of prosecution sent to same address not returned by U.S. Postal Service - No response to order to show cause - Order of Default and Recommended Decision adverse to physician issued.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Russell, Docket No. RM-17-089, Order of Default-Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 7, 2017).

Malpractice - Failure of physician to file reports, as ordered, on status of efforts to resolve matter based upon amended sanction - Failure to respond to or communicate with Board counsel - Entry of default and judgment against appealing party recommended.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Provow, Docket No. RM-13-510, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 22, 2016).

Retirement Appeals

Lack of prosecution dismissal granted - Retirement appeal - Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP) - Determination of ineligibility for ERIP - Employee classified in Group 1 for retirement purposes - Reclassification to Group 2 denied - Massachusetts Department of Mental Health - Clinical Social Worker "C" - Dismissal of appeal for lack of prosecution followed failure to file prehearing memorandum and hearing exhibits, failure to appear for hearing or elect to submit appeal upon written filings, and petitioner's statement of intention not to pursue

appeal further.

Howard (Kathleen A.) v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-322, Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 13, 2017).

Veterans' Benefits Appeals

Lack of prosecution dismissal granted - Appeal challenging denial of ordinary veterans' benefits under M.G.L. c. 115 - Veteran's adult dependent, not himself a veteran, and adjudicated incapacitated person with court-appointed guardians not including veteran - Denial based upon veteran's financial ineligibility for benefits, 108 C.M.R. § 5.06(3) - Appeal by veteran as representative of adult dependent and his mother - Failure by veteran to respond to order to clarify representational authority, or whether he intended to proceed with appeal or, instead, request that Department of Veterans' Services Commissioner issue him a waiver of his financial ineligibility for veterans' benefits - Failure to respond to Department's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution - Dismissal without prejudice to request for financial ineligibility waiver that veteran might file, to his dependent's continued receipt of "medical only" Chapter 115 benefits he may be receiving, or to any future determination of dependent's eligibility for ordinary Chapter 115 benefits if veteran applies to Commissioner for, and is issued, a financial ineligibility waiver.

Murphy v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-056, Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 20, 2017).

Wage and Hour Laws Appeals

Lack of prosecution granted - Appeal challenging Fair Labor Division citation for failure to timely pay wages to employee and ordering payment of restitution and civil penalty - Dismissal following warning regarding this sanction, following petitioners' failure to (1) appear for status conference scheduled by prior order; (2) respond to several prior orders directing them to specify grounds on which they challenged citation; (3) identify hearing witnesses and the subject of their expected direct testimony, (4) identify hearing exhibits; (5) identify, on multiple occasions, their authorized representative or notify DALA or the Fair Labor Division of changes of address to which they were requesting that filings, or notices, orders and decisions issued should be mailed in order to reach them; and (6) respond to subsequent order to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed - As a result of lack of prosecution dismissal, appealed citation, together with restitution amount and civil

penalty citation demanded, made final.

Chiles v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-14-439, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 13, 2017).

Jurisdiction

—Constitutional Claims

[no entries at this time]

—Equitable Remedies

Unavailability of equitable remedies at DALA - Retirement appeal - Town police officer - Denial of application to purchase prior reserve police officer service because purchase was not completed prior to officer's retirement date, when officer was still an active member in service or retirement system - DALA magistrate was without statutorily-granted equity power to allow the proposed prior service purchase, but even if that were not the case, there was no equitable basis for equitable relief based upon alleged delay by Retirement Board in invoicing Officer for proposed prior service purchase as he was accused of improper conduct, suspended without pay and decided to retire all within two weeks, and it was not surprising that it took this time for the Board to calculate the amount of prior service buyback and send an invoice.

Lynn v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-550, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 4, 2018).

Unavailability of equitable remedies at DALA - Retirement appeal - Neither Retirement Statute nor section prescribing higher interest rate applicable to purchase of prior creditable service and its effective date, M.G.L. c. 32, § 8(b), made equitable remedy available to retirement system member who did not, by that date, purchase prior service or enter into installment agreement to do so, but even if it did, no such remedy was due in view of facts of case (public school teacher advised by retirement system in email to make purchase at quoted price, whether in one sum or by installment payments, by stated date to avoid higher interest rate, and received invoice in mail containing same information that she failed to open for four months, beyond the cutoff date for purchasing prior creditable service at lower interest).

Levy v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-414, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

—Statutory Invalidity Claim

Motion to dismiss granted - Statutory invalidity claim - Retirement appeal - M.G.L. c. 90G3/4 - Statute governing retirement system member's election to discontinue retirement deductions at age 70 while continuing employment - District Court full-time first assistant clerk magistrate - Recision, by Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC), of State Board of Retirement's approval of clerk magistrate's accidental disability retirement application based upon disabling mold exposure at courthouse, on ground that as a result of election to discontinue contributions to retirement system, clerk magistrate was no longer a "member in service," per M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(1)(a)(I), and was therefore ineligible for accidental disability retirement - Appeal by clerk magistrate challenging PERAC decision - Alternative claim that to extent it made election to discontinue retirement deductions at age 70 while continuing to work irrevocable, M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4 violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq*. - Claim rejected, as Division of Administrative Law Appeals lacks authority to declare a statute invalid - However, statute did not appear to be invalid on its face, as it allowed a retirement system member who continued working past age 70 to decide whether or not he wanted to continue contributing to his retirement system based upon which course of action best suited his particular circumstances, and did not preclude the member from continuing to contribute to the retirement system - Eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits determined on clerk magistrate's main claim on appeal (no loss of "member in service" status, or eligibility for accidental disability retirement under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), as a result of election to discontinue retirement contributions under M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4).

Reardon v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-15-91, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 5, 2017).

—Timely or Untimely Appeals

Generally

Generally - Date of appeal filing - DALA adheres to the "postmark rule" and considers an appeal to have been filed when it is postmarked at a United States Postal Service facility.

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Generally - Date on which time to appeal began to run - Receipt of appealed decision

- Regular course of mails, and receipt of mailing, are presumed in Massachusetts - Presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that showing that mail in question was not received.

Fernandes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-942, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018), *reconsideration denied* ((Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 8, 2018).

Timely Appeals

Timely appeal - Retirement appeal challenging denial of creditable service application - Denial decision by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) dated October 19, 2016 - Appeal by petitioner dated November 13, 2016 and received by DALA on November 14, 2016 - Appeal appeared to have been filed well beyond 15-day appeal period set by M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Appeal period runs from date appealed decision was received - Petitioner alleged, however, that she received decision in the mail on October 31, 2016 - Although ordinarily, credulity would be stretched by assertion that decision mailed by MTRS from Charlestown, Massachusetts to West Boylston, Massachusetts, where petitioner resided, was not received until 12 days after it was mailed, MTRS was moving to Charlestown, and was adapting to its new location, in October 2016, and it was therefore feasible that it did not mail the decision until several days following the date it was generated, and, therefore, that petitioner did not receive it until October 31, 2016 - Appeal would be treated as having been timely filed within 15 days following that date of receipt, and decision would be rendered on the merits.

Milton v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-513, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 15, 2019).

Timely appeal - Retirement appeal filed within 15 days of notification of the retirement board's decision, as required by M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Denial by retirement board of firefighter's request for Group 4 classification for his prior call firefighter service - Board's decision postmarked December 26, 2014 - Petitioner could not have received notice prior to the postmark date - Appeal postmarked January 10, 2015 was exactly 15 days after the earliest date he could have been notified of Board's decision - Board's challenge to appeal's timeliness during hearing therefore rejected.

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Timely appeal - Retirement - Accrual of 15-day appeal period - No notice of action by retirement board or right to appeal - Board's refusal to change amount of former spouse's monthly retirement benefit allocation payment from retiree's monthly accidental disability retirement benefit amount - Former spouse originally designated as sole beneficiary of former husband's retirement benefits, pursuant to 2008 Probate and Family Court Domestic Relations Order (DRO) - New DRO issued in 2009 reduced amount of former spouse's allocation payment amount - Upon receiving notice of new DRO, retirement board reduced former spouse's benefit allocation portion of retiree's benefits payment to lower amount the new DRO ordered - Former spouse sent letter to Board in January 2010 objecting to reduction of her benefit allocation amount - Board counsel replied in February 2010 that board was bound by new DRO and could not change former spouse's reduced monthly benefit allocation amount without either a court order directing it to do so, or an agreement to do so by the parties to the Probate and Family Court proceeding - Reply letter did not state that board's refusal to change amount of former spouse's reduced monthly benefit allocation amount was an action appealable pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), and did not state time within which former spouse could appeal it - Former spouse did not appeal at that time - Five and half years later, in November 2015, former spouse sent letter to Board counsel stating that she had not been notified of her right to appeal the Board's refusal, and requesting that she be told what her appeal rights were - Board counsel's reply was that there had been no decision by the board because (1) it had simply implemented the reduced monthly benefit allocation amount the new DRO had ordered; (2) it was unclear how the former spouse had been aggrieved by the Board's compliance with the court order; and (3) her objection to the new DRO should be directed to the court - On December 11, 2015, former spouse appealed, to DALA, the board's refusal to change her monthly benefit allocation amount - DALA had jurisdiction to decide appeal because (1) as former sole beneficiary of husband's gross monthly retirement benefit, and then as alternate payee of that benefit, former spouse had pecuniary interest in allocation amount she received from her former husband's gross monthly retirement benefits, and she was financially affected by the reduction of her monthly allocation of her former husband's retirement benefit payment; (2) retirement board's refusal to change amount of former wife's allocation, although based upon new DRO, was a board action appealable pursuant too M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4); (3) former spouse's time to appeal this action would have expired 15 days after she received board counsel's February 2010 reply to her objection to her allocation amount reduction if, and only if, the reply had included a statement of her appeal rights under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4) - Although statute's 15-day appeal period applied, it was difficult to determine when the appeal period had accrued and started to run, since (1) the board insisted that it took no action on former spouse's January 2010 objection to reduction of her allocation amount that was appealable under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), and did not advise that she had any particular time to challenge this action or inaction; and (2) section 16(4) does not state that 15-day appeal period runs from earliest date on which one had actual knowledge that the board had acted or failed to act - In these circumstances, the appeal clock never started running on

board's 2010 refusal to change the amount of former spouse's monthly retirement benefit allocation, and each reduced allotment check the board issued to her subsequently reiterated the board's refusal to change that amount, and started the appeal clock running anew - This cycle of appealable actions continued until the board issued a notice of action with a statement of former spouse's appeal rights (which never happened), or the former spouse filed an appeal, which she did on December 11, 2015, after receiving a benefit allotment check for that month - Appeal was therefore timely - DALA could not grant relief sought on appeal because only Probate and Family Court had jurisdiction to change her retirement benefit allocation amount, but its decision confirmed that retirement board had reduced former spouse's allocation amount consistent with 2009 DRO, that DALA was without jurisdiction to change that amount, and that former spouse had exhausted her remedies under M.G.L. c. 32.

Creedon v. Lexington Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-662, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Untimely Appeals

Untimely appeal - Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction following hearing - Retirement appeal challenging denial by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) of creditable service purchase request - Request to purchase, for retirement purposes, service at charter public school prior to July 2007 as "technology integration specialist" (TIS) and "user support technician" but not as teacher, and before he earned a Department of Elementary and Secondary Education teaching certification, inclusion of his position in school's teaching contract, and becoming technology teacher at school and MTRS member - Creditable service purchase was denied because applicant did not begin teaching students until after July 2007 - Denial notice, dated February 24, 2016, included statement of appeal rights under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), including right to appeal denial to Division of Administrative Law appeals (DALA) within fifteen days of receiving notice - Although applicant emailed school's director of finance beginning March 1, 2016 to dispute conclusion that his prior TIS position was not a teaching position, and he carried on an email correspondence about this point with the finance director until March 15, 2016, when director informed him that his prior years of service were not pursuant to a teacher contract, he did not appeal MTRS's creditable service denial until March 17, 2016, when he faxed an appeal to DALA - Under "postmark rule," which DALA has adopted, appeal is deemed to have been filed either when mailed, as evidenced by postmark from United States postal facility, or, if filed by electronic medium, on the date DALA receives it during regular business hours, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(4)(b) - MTRS's denial was mailed either on day it was dated (February 24, 2016), in which case the 15-day appeal period ran from following day (meaning that the last day to appeal to DALA was March 11, 2016, or it was mailed on February 25, 2016, the day

after the date shown on it, in which case applicant received it within two days (on February 27, 2016), in which case he had 15 days to mail or fax-file his appeal, and that appeal period expired at the close of business on March 14, 2016 (because the fifteenth day, March 13, 2016, was a Sunday, when DALA was closed) - The appeal was therefore fax-filed late, on March 17, 2016, DALA was without jurisdiction to hear it, and the appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction - Even if the email correspondence with the school director "rectified" the appeal's timeliness (for example, by tolling the day on which the 15-day period to appeal MTRS's denial to DALA until the director sent her last email on March 15, 2016 standing by MTRS's conclusion that the applicant had not worked in the school as a teacher prior to July 2007), his appeal was without merit - Applicant was not engaged in teaching pupils prior to July 2007 - Charter school teachers are subject to state teacher retirement system, and service as charter school teacher is creditable service for retirement purposes, *see* M.G.L. c. 71, §§ 89(k) and (y), but prior to July 2007 applicant was neither employed by the school as a teacher, nor a member of MTRS or eligible to become a member, and nor was he yet certified as a teacher.

Belanger v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-120, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 8, 2019).

Untimely appeal - Retirement - Appeal challenging Retirement Board's denial of request to reclassify agency clinical director's position from Group 1 to Group 2 for retirement purposes - Denial decision dated June 29, 2017 and mailed by Board to petitioner on July 3, 2017 - Appeal filed on November 2, 2017 - 15-day appeal period, per M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), computed from date of notification of action by retirement board - Petitioner claimed she first learned her reclassification request was denied when retirement board sent her a letter dated October 18, 2017 responding to her inquiry about pending matters before the board - October 17, 2017 Board letter and July 3, 2017 mailing of reclassification denial were mailed to same address, and petitioner clearly received the latter mailing - Regular course of mails, and receipt of mailing, are presumed in Massachusetts - Presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that showing that mail in question was not received - Petitioner presented no evidence suggesting that she did not receive retirement board's July 3, 2017 mailing of reclassification denial sent to same address as board's later mailing - As receipt of the mailing is presumed and presumption was not rebutted, appeal filed well after 15 days following petitioner's presumed receipt of reclassification was untimely, and DALA was without jurisdiction to decide it.

Fernandes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-942, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018), *reconsideration denied* ((Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 8, 2018).

Orders / Actions "Not Inconsistent with Law" or Standard Rules

—Availability and Grounds, Generally

Standard Rules governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA provide, at 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1, that "[a]n Agency or Party may by motion request the Presiding Officer to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or 801 CMR 1.00" - In determining whether proposed order or action sought by motion could be granted appropriately under this Rule, relevant factors to be considered included (1) whether this relief was available specifically under another Rule (for example, whether a proposed default decision against a respondent in a discipline proceeding was available via dismissal or summary decision) and, if not, whether the Rules precluded this type of relief; and (2) whether the relief was consistent with the Rules' directive that they be "construed to secure a just and speedy determination" of every proceeding, with the prior notice that the Rules require, consistent with the circumstances presented (for example, whether attempts to give notice had been made reasonably).

> *Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens*, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

—Default Decisions

Availability and legal basis - Physician discipline proceeding - Alleged misconduct in practice of medicine - Failure of physician to file answer to Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine's statement alleging misconduct, including fraudulent prescribing of controlled substances, for which physician's license to practice medicine was revoked by out-of-state medical board (California) - Following Board's referral of its statement of allegations to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, multiple mailings to physician by Board and by DALA to his last known addresses in California and Indiana returned by U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and unforwardable - Physician also failed to update contact information with California Medical Board - Board moved for entry of default order and summary decision, and sent copy of motion to physician's criminal defense attorney in San Francisco - No response by physician to Board's motion - Default decision granted pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA, or with law - "Law" includes M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which allows agency conducting adjudicatory proceedings to make "informal disposition" of proceeding by "default," among other things, and M.G.L. c. 30A, § 9, which requires that adjudicatory proceedings conducted according to standard rules or approved substitute rules of procedure - Neither of the Standard Rules governing dismissal, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(g), and summary decision, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(h), provides for a default order specifically based upon the circumstances presented - Summary decision under the Standard Rules was also inappropriate because physician's failure to file answer or responses to undeliverable mail sent to him at last known addresses of record did not show absence of

genuine or material factual dispute as to Board's allegations against him - Default decision was available, however, under provision of Standard Rules allowing presiding officer, on motion, to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or with the Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 - Default decision would afford "just and speedy determination" that Standard Rules required, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(2)(b), because DALA had given notice to physician that the Rules required; no better notice could be given because mailings to him were undeliverable; neither Massachusetts nor out-of-state medical board could find an alternative address for him; physician had supplied no other address to either board and had filed no papers with DALA that might have supplied a different address; and effort to send mailing to physician's out-of-state criminal defense counsel shown by federal PACER system and other records had not prompted any filing on physician's behalf - Further mailings to physician were futile in these circumstances and would only lead to additional notice taking a round trip through the United States mail - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision making final its allegations against physician without further notice to him.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

Reconsideration of Final Decisions

—Availability and Grounds, Generally

Timeliness of motion for reconsideration and availability of relief sought - Physician discipline proceeding - August 22, 2016 Order of Default/Recommended Decision recommended default decision in Board of Registration of Medicine's favor based upon physician's failure to prosecute her defense against allegations in Board's complaint, including failure to file reports, as ordered by DALA Administrative Magistrate, on status of efforts to resolve matter based upon amended sanction, and failure to respond to or communicate with Board counsel - Seventeen months following issuance of Recommended Decision, letter from respondent's new counsel, and communication from respondent, requested correction of date on which physician began treating patient - Correction apparently related to physician's efforts to seek employment in a different state - Request treated as motion for reconsideration - After comparing proposed correction with Board's statement of allegations and parties' stipulation of facts in disciplinary proceeding, motion granted as one seeking correction of scrivener's error, and Order of Default/Recommended Decision corrected to show that physician began treating patient on April 1, 2009, not April 9, 2013.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Provow, Docket No. RM-13-510, Ruling on Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 9, 2018).

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal - Motion for reconsideration of Decision dismissing veterans' benefits appeal for lack of prosecution, and as discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference that documents veteran refused to produce regarding income from sole proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits - Reconsideration denied - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected, without producing related documents veteran failed to produce earlier, including arguments that spouse's LLC-related income belonged to her alone and should not be counted in determining veteran's financial eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits, and that Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Benefits had no need for joint federal tax return that veteran and spouse filed for 2014 in order to determine whether he was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits during that year -

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017).

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Forfeited claim - Claim amounting to lack of personal jurisdiction asserted in appealing agency action may be forfeited, and thus may present no ground for reconsidering final decision - Forfeiture is fact-specific and depends upon circumstances presented and party's conduct, including degree to which party participated in appeal, or in its resolution by agreement, without moving for dismissal or summary decision, and delay in reasserting jurisdictional claim, *e.g.*, until final decision was issued and party then moved for reconsideration.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for

Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

—EMT Certification Revocation Proceedings

Proposed revocation of respondent's EMT certification and EMT instructor/coordinator and examiner certification upheld by summary decision - Respondent charged with conducting EMT-Basic initial training course at unapproved location (local fire department), and with providing false information to Department of Public Health investigators as to whether course had started and the number of currently-enrolled students - Respondent's history of noncompliance included temporary revocation of his instructor/coordinator and examiner certification and EMT certification - Unopposed motion for summary decision by Department - No genuine or material factual issues as to whether respondent conducted unapproved EMT training course or made omissive or false statements to Department - No evidence offered to show that despite mishandling of training program responsibilities, respondent could still be trusted to act as EMT.

Dep't of Public Health Office of Emergency Medical Services v. Stepien, Docket No. PHET-17-830, Decision on Motion for Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 26, 2018).

—Physician Discipline Proceedings

Timeliness of motion for reconsideration and availability of relief sought - Physician discipline proceeding - August 22, 2016 Order of Default/Recommended Decision recommended default decision in Board of Registration of Medicine's favor based upon physician's failure to prosecute her defense against allegations in Board's complaint, including failure to file reports, as ordered by DALA Administrative Magistrate, on status of efforts to resolve matter based upon amended sanction, and failure to respond to or communicate with Board counsel - Seventeen months following issuance of Recommended Decision, letter from respondent's new counsel, and communication from respondent, requested correction of date on which physician began treating patient - Correction apparently related to physician's efforts to seek employment in a different state - Request treated as motion for reconsideration - After comparing proposed correction with Board's statement of allegations and parties' stipulation of facts in disciplinary proceeding, motion granted as one seeking correction of scrivener's error, and Order of Default/Recommended Decision corrected to show that physician began treating patient on April 1, 2009, not April 9, 2013.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Provow, Docket No. RM-13-510, Ruling on Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 9, 2018).

—Retirement Appeals

Motion to reconsider decision dismissing, as untimely, appeal challenging denial of petitioner's request for group reclassification for retirement purposes - Motion denied - Petitioner asserted no clerical or mechanical error or significant factor that was overlooked, repeated previous arguments to effect that petitioner never received notice of reclassification denial mailed to her by retirement board until several months later, rejected by Decision based upon unrebutted presumption that mailing was received, and (as was true of her earlier memorandum opposing dismissal) motion for reconsideration did not address jurisdiction at all.

Fernandes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-942, Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 8, 2018).

Motion to reconsider decision sustaining retirement system's denial of member's request to purchase additional prior service for retirement credit - Retired town fire chief - Failure of member to prove by preponderance of the evidence that he worked permanent 20-hour per week schedule during time period at issue - Retirement system's denial of member's request to purchase additional prior service for retirement credit - Retired town fire chief - Failure of member to prove by preponderance of the evidence Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal - Time sheets that member prepared showing hours he worked offered for first time in motion for reconsideration and to reopen record, following evidentiary hearing and decision - No ground for reopening record for purpose of introducing new evidence - Time sheets showing hours worked were neither new evidence nor evidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence and produced at time of hearing - Evidence also unhelpful to member's case even if accepted and record were reopened - Time sheets not dated between 2007 and 2010, time period for which fire chief sought to purchase service, and hours member worked after becoming retirement system member late, in 2009, were not in dispute - Motion for reconsideration (and to reopen record) denied.

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017).

—Veterans' Benefits Appeals

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal - Motion for reconsideration of Decision dismissing veterans' benefits appeal for lack of prosecution, and as discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference that documents veteran refused to produce regarding income from sole

proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits - Reconsideration denied - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected, without producing related documents veteran failed to produce earlier, including arguments that spouse's LLC-related income belonged to her alone and should not be counted in determining veteran's financial eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits, and that Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Benefits had no need for joint federal tax return that veteran and spouse filed for 2014 in order to determine whether he was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits during that year -

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Overpayment of benefits - "Refund" status - Amount of veterans' benefits overpayment modified on petitioner's motion for "clarification" of DALA decision, treated as motion for reconsideration - Decision sustained termination of M.G.L c. 115 veterans' benefits and placement into refund status in an amount based upon overpayment of veterans' benefits for which he was not financially eligible, as a result of failure to disclose income earned painting a house, and the value of assets he did not disclose (antique automobile)s - Modification of refund status amount denied as to unreported income from house painting job - Claim of having performed work without compensation unsupported by evidence - Assertion that one of the antique automobiles was compensation in kind for housepainting also unsupported by evidence - No written contract for such payment, and no testimony from homeowner, offered to support assertion - Agreed-upon payment for painting house was $1,700, and petitioner did not report this income to local veterans' services officer, as required by 108 C.M.R. § 8.05, or produce documents disclosing it, as required by 108 C.M.R. § 6.01 - That income made petitioner "over income" (over the income he was permitted to have and still qualify for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits) by $797.39 - However, refund status amount should not have been increased based upon value of antique automobiles shown by NADA vehicle price guides - Actual appraisal of automobiles petitioner obtained was more reliable evidence of these undisclosed assets than NADA guides - Appraiser actually inspected vehicles and valued them based upon the poor condition he noted - Total appraised value of vehicles ($3,650) was less than the $5,000 non-excludable asset limitation that DVS established, and therefore did not support increasing the benefits overpayment amount petitioner received.

Morris v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-130, Ruling on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 19, 2018).

Motion for reconsideration - grounds for denial - Veterans' benefits appeal - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for

Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Motion for reconsideration - Grounds for denial - Veterans' benefits appeal - Forfeited claim - Claim amounting to lack of personal jurisdiction asserted in appealing agency action may be forfeited, and thus may present no ground for reconsidering final decision - Forfeiture is fact-specific and depends upon circumstances presented and party's conduct, including degree to which party participated in appeal, or in its resolution by agreement, without moving for dismissal or summary decision, and delay in reasserting jurisdictional claim, *e.g.*, until final decision was issued and party then moved for reconsideration.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Veteran's "reply" to final decision - Treated as motion for reconsideration made pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l) - Reconsideration denied for failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Termination of M.G.L. c. 115 veteran's benefits - Lack of cooperation by failure to document current residence (*e.g.*, with a current lease or rent receipt) or, thus, eligibility to receive benefits through local veterans' services department - Appeal to DVS (which sustained benefits termination but waived recoupment of benefits paid to veteran after notice of termination was issued) and then to Division of Administrative Law Appeals - Claim that benefits termination was void for improper mailing (to prior residential address that was no longer valid due to veteran's eviction, rather than to veteran's post office box number) and for issuance by a person allegedly without authority to do so (local DVS's manager of benefits and services rather than by local veterans' services officer, notwithstanding notice was issued on local DVS letterhead with veterans' services officer's name printed at top) - Forfeiture of defective benefits termination claim in circumstances presented and as a result of veteran's conduct, including degree to which he participated without objection in resolving the DALA appeal by agreement, failure to object to draft Order of Dismissal based upon agreement sent to parties by DALA Administrative Magistrate for their review, belated reassertion of claim after Order of Dismissal was issued when none of the parties objected to the draft, and veteran's request, in seeking reconsideration, that Administrative Magistrate approve payment to him of additional Chapter 115 benefits to which he was not entitled under DVS regulations or under the agreement resolving the matter.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Reopening the Record

—Availability and Grounds, Generally

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, treated as motion to reopen record to extent petitioner sought to introduce additional evidence after hearing and decision, denied - Additional evidence (in retirement appeal, time sheets petitioner kept showing hours he worked during period of prior service he sought to purchase for retirement credit) was not new evidence or evidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence and produced at time of hearing (*see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(k)).

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017).

—Retirement Appeals

Motion to reconsider decision treated as motion to reopen record as well - Decision sustained retirement system's denial of member's request to purchase additional prior service for retirement credit - Retired town fire chief - Failure of member to prove by preponderance of the evidence that he worked permanent 20-hour per week schedule during time period at issue - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal - Time sheets prepared by member showing hours he worked offered for first time in motion for reconsideration and to reopen record, following evidentiary hearing and decision - No ground for reopening record for purpose of introducing new evidence - Time sheets showing hours worked were neither new evidence nor evidence that could not have been discovered by due diligence and produced at time of hearing - Evidence also unhelpful to member's case even if accepted and record were reopened - Time sheets not dated between 2007 and 2010, time period for which fire chief sought to purchase service, and hours member worked after becoming retirement system member late, in 2009, were not in dispute - Motion for reconsideration (and to reopen record) denied.

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017).

Subpoenas

—Records-Only Subpoena

Subpoena seeking only records from non-party, but not appearance by record-keeper or

other witness - Available, upon motion, pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as "not inconsistent" with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure or with " law" Applicable law is Supreme Judicial Court's recognition of the use of this type of subpoena in Massachusetts civil practice for the first time in 2015 amendments to Mass. R. Civ. P. Rule 45 - Subpoena must comply with procedural safeguards governing use of this type of procedure that amended Rule 45 provides (advance notice of subpoena to the other parties; notice to the other parties of any objections to the subpoena - reasonable time to produce records in response to subpoena (30 days unless shortened or lengthened by order allowing records-only subpoena ; opportunity for any party, or subpoenaed third party, to contest subpoena or its enforcement via motion for protective order; protection of third party required to produce documents against undue burden or expense in producing them) - Procedural safeguards may be incorporated in subpoena as conditions so that its issuance is "not inconsistent with law."

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Winterer, Docket No. RM-17-1004, Decision and Order Allowing Service of Records-Only Subpoena (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 29, 2017).

Physician discipline proceeding (commenced by Board of Registration in Medicine's suspension of physician's license to practice medicine, and issuance of statement of allegations of misconduct) - Board's motion for "records-only" subpoena to clinic requiring production of records of treatment by physician of three patients on specified dates allowed, pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1, as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure or with "law" - "Law" with which records-only subpoena must be "not inconsistent" is Supreme Judicial Court's recognition of the use of this type of subpoena in Massachusetts civil practice for the first time in its 2015 amendment of Mass. R. Civ. P. Rule 45 - Amended Rule 45's procedural protections made conditions to subpoena (advance notice of subpoena to the other parties; notice to the other parties of any objections to the subpoena - reasonable time to produce records in response to subpoena (30 days unless shortened or lengthened by order allowing records-only subpoena; opportunity for any party, or subpoenaed third party, to contest subpoena or its enforcement via motion for protective order; protection of third party required to produce documents against undue burden or expense in producing them).

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Winterer, Docket No. RM-17-1004, Decision and Order Allowing Service of Records-Only Subpoena (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 29, 2017).

—Subpoena Duces Tecum

Record-Keeper Subpoena

Retirement appeal - Denial of creditable service purchase - Retired public school teacher - Prior teaching at nonpublic school as health and physical education teacher - Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph - Eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluding retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Receipt of payment from Plan after employment at nonpublic school ended - Subpoenas to record-keepers of successors to Plan administrator and actuary - Records regarding contributions to Plan, and payment by Plan to former teacher - Relevance to factual inquiry per M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p): whether teacher was eligible to receive retirement benefits under Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan, and whether payment she received from Plan after her employment at Boston School for the Deaf ended was retirement allowance - Subpoenas allowed.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Summary Decision

—Availability and Grounds, Generally

Absence of genuine, material factual issue requiring adjudication by hearing - Burden of party moving for summary decision to make this showing with competent evidence, as well as its entitlement to summary disposition in its favor as a matter of law.

Corliss Landing Condominium Tr. v. *North Attleborough Planning Bd.,* Docket No. MS-15-661, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2016).

Party entitled to summary decision - Motion searches record to determine whether any genuine, material factual issue is presented - Party opposing motion may be granted summary decision if applicable law, and absence of genuine, material factual dispute, compels this outcome, even if opposing party did not cross-move for this relief.

Corliss Landing Condominium Tr. v. *North Attleborough Planning Bd.,* Docket No. MS-15-661, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2016).

Denial of motion for summary decision even though non-moving party filed no response to summary decision motion - Facts presented by motion or record insufficient to show absence of genuine, material factual issue - Record revealed existence of genuine, material factual issue.

Corliss Landing Condominium Tr. v. *North Attleborough Planning Bd.,* Docket No. MS-15-661, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2016).

—Family Child Care Provider License Denial Appeals

Summary decision affirming license denial recommended - Appeal challenging discretionary denial of family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in January 2017 - Background check by EEC showed 2008 "51B report" by Department of Children and Families (DCF) of applicant's alleged child neglect (seven month old child left alone in bathtub, and applicant's own three year old son left alone in play pen, while she walked to a bus stop to pick up another child who was being dropped off) - Determination by EEC that 51B report showed applicant to be unsuitable to receive family child care license in view of the circumstances and seriousness of the prior child neglect incident including the age of the children involved, applicant's provision of conflicting stories to investigators about the incident, including claim that an unauthorized care giver (applicant's brother) was watching the two children and opinion that at least someone was watching them - Broad discretionary authority delegated to EEC by statute (M.G.L. c. 15D, §§ 3, 7 and 8) to determine who is suitable for employment or licensure in agency-licensed programs, in light of concern for safety of children - On appeal, DALA is not to re-evaluate EEC's discretionary decision, but rather it should evaluate whether or not the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not supported by law - No genuine dispute as to allegations of neglect supported by a 51B report, or that EEC followed its regulations in considering a discretionary license disapproval based upon a DCF record check, including evaluation of the factors specified by the regulations and affording the applicant an opportunity to submit other relevant information (*see* 606 C.M.R. § 14.13(3)) - Claim on appeal that while leaving the children unattended was wrong, the incident was not "not so horrible an act" that she should be denied a family child care provider license, and that she was an excellent care giver and could call witnesses to support that assertion at a hearing, did not show that the factual basis for D.F.'s discretionary license denial was genuinely or materially disputed, and instead sought re-evaluation of D.F.'s discretionary decision based upon undisputed facts.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Reyes, Docket No. OC-17-086, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 1, 2017).

Summary decision sustaining denial of family child care provider license renewal recommended - Denial of application to renew family child care provider license by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in late 2016, following initial license approval in 2006 and renewal in 2012, both when applicant's son was not yet 15 and subject to background record check, despite son having been found guilty, at age 12, of assault and battery charge - Disqualifying background of family member - Massachusetts Criminal Record Information (CORI) check in 2016 revealed delinquency finding as to son regarding anal penetration of friend during sleepover, when both were 13, witnessed by victim's 10 year old brother - Discretionary license renewal denial by EEC based upon potential risk of harm to children based upon son's disqualifying background check, applicant's refusal to ensure that son was out of home during family child care hours, son's downplaying of earlier assault and battery conviction, and no demonstrated rehabilitation by son - EEC discretion to determine appropriateness of applicant for licensure in light of concern for safety of children - Applicant given opportunity to respond - Discretionary decision based upon sufficient facts, not arbitrary or capricious, and not otherwise unsupported by law - Undisputed material facts.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Hoyt, Docket No. OC-17-034, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2017).

Summary decision sustaining family child care provider license denial recommended - Discretionary family child care provider license denial by Department of Early Education and Care (EEC) in late 2016 - History of child neglect - Background check by Department of Children and Families showing neglect of her own children (1999 sexual abuse of applicant's then-five year old son by playmate as a result of lack of supervision; 28 days of school missed by then -six year old son who had already been held back for one year once before; 2008 neglect based upon admission by applicant that she disciplined her then-fourteen and eleven year old children by open-hand face slapping) - Determination of unsuitability for day care provider licensing - EEC discretion to determine appropriateness of applicant for licensure in light of concern for safety of children - Prior child neglect findings undisputed - Thoughtful and lengthy analysis of background check by Department of Early Education and Care and Department's discretionary decision to deny family child care license application - Applicant given opportunity to respond - Discretionary decision based upon sufficient facts, not arbitrary or capricious, and not otherwise unsupported by law - Undisputed material facts.

Dep't of Early Education and Care v. Correa, Docket No. OC-16-548, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 18, 2017).

—Expedited Permit Appeals (M.G.L. c. 43D)

Summary decision granted - Expedited permit appeal (M.G.L. c. 43D) - Appeal challenging expedited permit for industrial/commercial development in industrially-zoned area within designated "priority development site," granted constructively when town planning board's failed to take final action on permit application before statutory 180-day review period expired - Appropriateness of summary decision to decide appeal - Parties' joint status report identified no genuine, material factual issues precluding summary decision - Parties sought ruling as to legal issues only: whether any of procedural defects claimed on appeal required annulling constructively-granted permit; scope of permit (what work it allowed, whether any permit conditions were properly read into it, and which work was outside permit's scope and was reserved for future resolution).

Corliss Landing Condominium Tr. v. *North Attleborough Planning Bd.,* Docket No. MS-15-661, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2016).

—Physician Discipline Appeals

Unavailability of summary decision against physician respondent, but default decision available instead - Alleged misconduct in practice of medicine - Failure of physician to file answer to Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine's statement alleging misconduct, including fraudulent prescribing of controlled substances, for which physician's license to practice medicine was revoked by out-of-state medical board (California) - Following Board's referral of its statement of allegations to Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, multiple mailings to physician by Board and by DALA to his last known addresses in California and Indiana returned by U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and unforwardable - Physician also failed to update contact information with California Medical Board - Board moved for entry of default order and summary decision, and sent copy of motion to physician's criminal defense attorney in San Francisco - No response by physician to Board's motion - Default decision granted pursuant to 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 as not inconsistent with Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure governing adjudicatory proceedings before DALA, or with law - "Law" includes M.G.L. c. 30A, § 10, which allows agency conducting adjudicatory proceedings to make "informal disposition" of proceeding by "default," among other things, and M.G.L. c. 30A, § 9, which requires that adjudicatory proceedings conducted according to standard rules or approved substitute rules of procedure - Neither of the Standard Rules governing dismissal, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(g), and summary decision, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(h), provides for a default order specifically based upon the circumstances presented - Summary decision under the Standard Rules was also inappropriate because physician's failure to file answer or responses to undeliverable mail sent to him at last known addresses of record did not show absence of genuine or material factual dispute

as to Board's allegations against him - Default decision was available, however, under provision of Standard Rules allowing presiding officer, on motion, to issue any order or take any action not inconsistent with law or with the Rules, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(a)1 - Default decision would afford "just and speedy determination" that Standard Rules required, *see* 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(2)(b), because DALA had given notice to physician that the Rules required; no better notice could be given because mailings to him were undeliverable; neither Massachusetts nor out-of-state medical board could find an alternative address for him; physician had supplied no other address to either board and had filed no papers with DALA that might have supplied a different address; and effort to send mailing to physician's out-of-state criminal defense counsel shown by federal PACER system and other records had not prompted any filing on physician's behalf - Further mailings to physician were futile in these circumstances and would only lead to additional notice taking a round trip through the United States mail - DALA Administrative Magistrate would therefore recommend entry of default decision making final its allegations against physician without further notice to him.

Bd. of Registration in Medicine v. Owens, Docket No. RM-17-840, Recommended Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 9, 2018).

—Retirement Appeals

Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits

Summary decision sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement benefits- Psychological or emotional injury - Former Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Administrative Assistant I - Alleged emotional injury sustained as a result of exposure to "identifiable condition" not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations - Bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, anxiety and depression allegedly resulting from workplace policy changes, following 2010 change in administration at MCAD office where administrative assistant worked, regarding absences and time off for health-related issues and alleged discriminatory application to her - Prior to these changes, history of taking leave for depression and anxiety, chronic bronchial asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, chronic pain, management of panic attacks, difficulty performing work following prescription of medications for depression and anxiety - Belief by administrative assistant that supervisory staff demeaned her efforts and scrutinized her behavior when she took time off - Filed complaint in October 2010 with agency's deputy general counsel against supervisors alleging unfair treatment and undue monitoring (including being required to bring in a doctor's's note following every appointment) on account of being Hispanic and disabled, and of being targeted and accused unfairly of abusing sick time - Additional medical problems including chest pain and abdominal distress, and trips to emergency room due to panic and anxiety symptoms, resulting in more missed work - Cocaine use and, on one occasion, wrist-cutting

while under influence of cocaine - Instructed to speak with supervisor prior to being absent from work - During early 2011 meeting with supervisor, accused of abusing sick time and reporting to work late - Belief by administrative assistant that she was being subject to retaliation and ordered to followed policies and procedures applicable to no other employees - Grievance filed with union, with no action taken - Changes by supervisor regarding information to be included in reports on MCAD complaints received and action taken on them - Further panic attacks - Reprimanded in March 2011 for failure to comply with supervisor's directives - Fear of further reprimands and termination - Leave taken under federal FMLA in March 2011, and absent from work for six months, for to mental health reasons - Return to work in mid-September 2011 followed, two months later, by attempted suicide and subsequent hospitalization in intensive care unit and then in adult inpatient psychiatric unit - Based upon report of primary care physician, allowed to return to work part-time on May 14, 2012, - Allowed five-minute breaks to carry out her "anxiety management strategies" each preceded by informing her supervisor she was leaving her work station so there would be appropriate coverage in her absence - Stationed at front desk rather than in former cubicle, which was occupied by another employee - Feeling that she was no longer part of staff, administrative assistant resigned on June 3, 2012 - Applied on March 6, 2013 for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related emotional injury and resulting disability due to "identifiable condition" not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations, with inability to perform job duties as of May 2010 - Employer's statement portion of application noted absence of records of accidents or work-related conditions that created or exacerbated alleged disability - Unanimous positive medical panel certificate as to disability, permanence and work-related causation - Despite panel certificate, denial of accidental disability retirement application, and ordinary disability retirement benefits approved instead - Following appeal to DALA, motion by State Board of Retirement for summary decision - Motion granted, with summary decision in retirement board's favor sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement benefits - No notice of injury reports filed - Alleged work-related stress centered around strained relations with new managers beginning September 2010, mostly administrative assistant's disagreement with attendance and work procedure policies - Documents in record showed that new attendance policy and other guidelines were issued to entire staff and not only to administrative assistant, which undercut her assertion of being singled out and treated unfairly - No showing that alleged emotional injury amounted to more than personal feelings of persecution and perpetual victimization, or that managerial behavior to which administrative assistant was subjected was extreme and outrageous and beyond all bounds of human decency - No evidence that actions of supervisors were intended to inflict emotional distress - History of chronic, excessive absenteeism beginning prior to 2010 change of management and implementation of new leave and absence policies - Not unreasonable for supervisors to require that administrative assistant account for her absences - Supervisors required, as part of their own jobs, to implement quality control measures and hold employees accountable - Actions complained of were

bona fide personnel actions - Evidence insufficient to show a compensable personal injury entitled administrative assistant to accidental disability retirement benefits, or that alleged emotional work-related injury and its permanence was subject of genuine, material factual issue that could not be determined summarily.

Reyes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-598, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 29, 2017).

Summary decision sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement benefits - Psychological or emotional injury - Police chief - Harassment by selectmen - Stress and depression - Absence of genuine or material factual issue - Injury not sustained within two years prior to accidental disability retirement application - Failure to file written notice of injury within 90 days after its occurrence.

Ackerman v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-11-405, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 5, 2016).

—Veterans' Benefits Appeals

Summary decision sustaining denial of M.G.L. c. 115 benefits by local Veterans' Service Officer and, on appeal, by Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services, based upon ineligibility for benefits due to nature of service in Armed Forces - Petitioner's discharge document (DD-214) showed, beyond genuine or material factual dispute, that his only active duty service was for training as a reservist in the Air Force, and he was therefore specifically ineligible for M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits per the eligibility requirements recited by M.G.L. c. 115, §§ 1and 6A and 108 C.M.R. § 3.02.

Franco v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-636, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 20, 2018).

Summary decision sustaining M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits suspension, and recipient's placement into "refund status" on account of benefits overpayment - Failure to look for work - Duplicative benefits - Rental assistance payments received while rent was being paid by another source.

Brelsford v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-594, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 9, 2016).

—Wage and Hour Laws Appeals

Summary decision against employer affirming citation for failure to pay overtime wages -

Painting company - Willful failure to pay overtime wages - Second or subsequent offense - Citation demanding payment of restitution and civil penalty ($7,500) affirmed - No response to Fair Labor Division's motion for sufficiently made and supported summary decision motion showing no genuine dispute as to occurrence of violations, consideration of statutory penalty factors in determining whether to issue civil penalty, and applicable statutory maximum penalty amount for second or subsequent wage and hour violations ($25,000).

Farh v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-15-107, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 12, 2016).

—Watershed Protection Act Variance Appeals

Proposed construction of single-family residence and septic system within 200 feet of pond within Wachusett Reservoir watershed from Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) - Appeal challenging denial of applicant's request for variance from prohibition of alteration within portions of watershed within 200 feet of bank of tributary or surface waters or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir recited by Watershed Protection Act, *see* M.G.L. c. 92A½ § 5(a) and DCR Regulations, *see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2 - Argument by DCR that it was nearly impossible for new construction within the 200-foot "primary protection zone" of reservoir to occur without substantial detriment to public good and without impairing water quality in the watershed, and that no such variance had been granted in the Act's 25-year history, did not state basis for summary decision in DCR's favor - As nearly impossible as obtaining a variance for a new lot in a primary protection zone might appear, DCR's variance regulations did not preclude an applicant from trying.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Motion by Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) for summary decision in appeal challenging its denial of a Watershed Protection Act variance denied - Proposed single family residential construction - Alleged project futility (inability to obtain other necessary approvals or permits) - Letter from Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) stating that proposed single family home's septic system for which applicant sought Watershed Protection Act variance also needed local approval, as well as a variance that DEP would not issue unless applicant showed that denying it would be "manifestly unjust" because it would deprive lot owner of substantially all beneficial use of the property - Insufficient ground for summary decision as matter of law - DCR regulations (313 C.M.R. § 11.01 *et seq*.) do not require that applicant seeking Watershed Protection Act variance from statutory and regulatory

prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir demonstrate that it had obtained final septic system approval or other necessary approvals or permits for proposed work - Regulations also provide that they do not preempt or preclude more stringent protection of areas governed by Watershed Protection Act by other statutes, ordinances, bylaws or regulations (*see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.08) - Although DEP letter alerted applicant to significant roadblock in its effort to ultimately obtain all necessary approvals needed to build the project, this did not automatically preclude DCR from issuing Watershed Protection Act variance, and was not a sufficient reason to grant DCR summary decision affirming its denial of a Watershed Protect Act variance.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Motion by Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) for summary decision in appeal challenging its denial of a Watershed Protection Act variance denied - Proposed single family residential construction - Genuine and material factual issues precluding summary decision - Report prepared by applicant's consultants responding to grounds DCR asserted for denying variance - DCR's assertions that (1) although report addressed proposed project's impact on stormwater and Department of Environmental Protection's Stormwater Management Standards, it did not address other impacts of project, including "insurmountable" short and long-term impacts on water quality within the 200-foot primary protection zone of reservoir where project would be built; and (2) site's slope, topography and soils were not particularly favorable for granting a variance, did not show the absence of genuine, material factual issues - Applicant's appeal responded to each ground DCR gave for denying a variance (for example, it asserted that the slope at the site was less than 5% and that the soils were ideal for septic systems, and that installing a residential well would take only three days and would be carried out with safety precautions in place, thereby minimizing effects of constructing well within 30 feet of waterbody using heavy equipment) - Competing positions as to project's projected impact on watershed and water quality raised genuine, material factual issues that could not be resolved by summary decision.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Applicant appealing denial by Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) of Watershed Protection Act variance for proposed single family residence and septic system construction on lot within 200 feet of pond within Wachusett

Reservoir watershed was not entitled to decision vacating denial and issuing the requested variance on ground that DCR did not timely forward its appeal and hearing request to Division of Administrative Law Appeals, and did not timely file an answer to the appeal - DCR regulations did not prescribe such remedy for the agency's delays - Vacating the denial and issuing a variance based upon the delays in question would undercut the stringent criteria for a variance prescribed by the Watershed Protection Act, *see* M.G.L. c. 92A½ § 5(a), and by the DCR regulations, *see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

RETIREMENT

Accidental Death Benefits

—Generally

Beneficiary of public employee retirement system member who died as natural and proximate result of personal injury sustained or hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties without serious and willful misconduct on his part is entitled to accidental death benefits under M.G.L. c. 32, § 9(1) - Beneficiary has burden of establishing this causal connection between the retirement system members' death and the injury sustained or hazard undergone by a probability or by "more than the possibility or chance" that the causal connection exists - Because proof of such connection is beyond common knowledge, expert testimony is needed to show causation, in particular a medical opinion expressing the cause of death with reasonable medical certainty.

Hopkins v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-470, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

—Retiree's Death as a Result of Condition for Which He or She was Retired

Death of accidental disability retiree - Eligibility of beneficiary for accidental death benefit pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 9(1) - "Proper proof" that retiree's death was a result of the condition for which he was retired - Surviving spouse of former police chief retired in 1994 on accidental disability pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 7 and M.G.L. c. 32, § 94 ("Heart Law") - Retirement due to progressive atherosclerotic coronary artery disease - Numerous catheterizations, stenting and bypass surgeries in years following retirement - Hospitalization several times in years immediately prior to death in 2013 for acute congestive heart failure, ischemic cardiomyopathy and atrial fibrillation - Death certificate listed cause of death as congestive heart failure due to or as consequence of diabetes mellitus - Cardiologist who

treated retiree for 10 years, and PERAC-appointed single physician medical panel member, also a cardiologist, opined that immediate cause of death was congestive heart failure and that advanced coronary artery disease was natural and proximate cause of death - Opinions supported by medical evidence and reliable - Retirement board obtained second opinion from another cardiologist who opined that retiree died due to progressive hypoxic respiratory failure from end stage interstitial disease (hypoxic respiratory failure), and not atherosclerotic heart disease - Retirement board denied surviving wife's application for Section 9 accidental death benefits - Supporting letter by treating cardiologist noted severe and advanced cardiac condition prior to retiree's death, that it was impossible for physician to discern to what degree shortness of breath was due to heart causes rather than lung causes, and that death was caused by severe underlying cardiac condition exacerbated by pulmonary fibrosis - That retirement board was not satisfied with opinions of treating cardiologist and panel cardiologist and obtained second opinion was not controlling as to whether proof sufficed to show that retiree's death was result of condition for which he was retired - Little support in record for position of board and opinion of second cardiologist that underlying coronary artery disease was dormant or asymptomatic during final months of his life, and in fact retiree suffered myocardial infarction during hospitalization one month prior to his death - Opinions of treating cardiologist and panel member cardiologist accorded greater weight as both were keenly aware of progressive nature of retiree's coronary artery disease - Denial of accidental death benefits application reversed.

Bell v. Franklin Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-600, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

—Suicide of Retirement System Member

Although suicide is arguably "serious and willful misconduct," a retirement system member's suicide does not itself preclude a beneficiary's recovery of accidental death benefits under M.G.L. c. 32, § 9(1) if suicide was natural and proximate result of mental illness caused by or resulting from employment - However, beneficiary must show it to have been more than a mere possibility that work-related psychological stresses caused a mental breakdown resulting in suicide.

Hopkins v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-470, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Suicide as a result of mental illness not shown to have been caused predominantly by work-related duties - Ineligibility for accidental death benefits - Police officer - Difficulty separating himself from incidents to which he responded as police officer, in particular a domestic dispute between a mother and her son following which the son killed the mother, a car crash into a tree where the driver's body was burned beyond recognition, and an elderly man struck and killed while walking his dog - Officer filed no injury report of being

traumatized by these events, sought no mental health treatment or therapy, and did not tell a fellow officer who would later testify about behavioral changes about any emotional trauma he was experiencing - Marital difficulties leading to arguments and nasty text messages to the officer from his wife - On day of suicide, officer returned home while on break from work, argued with wife in front of infant daughter immediately, and then shot himself in front of them with his work-issued gun - That suicide occurred while officer was at home on break did not preclude widow from receiving benefits, and whether suicide occurred while officer was in performance of his duties depended, instead, upon whether it was related to work-related stresses or mental health problems the officer developed as a consequence of performing his job and encountering traumatic incidents - Insufficient proof - Psychiatrist certified in forensic psychiatry who had not treated officer and who, in evaluating case for widow, opined that traumatic situations he witnessed as police officer and inability to deal with them caused him to become depressed and isolated, was unaware of his marital conflicts, including the one that immediately preceded the suicide and may have been an immediate and acute stressor that brought on an impulsive and depressed state prompting suicide - No expert opinion in record ruling out marital stress as causative, or evaluating whether marital stress was related to job-related mental health problems - Evidence showed that officer worked for some time in his depressed state - More certainty needed to establish that suicide was brought on by depression caused primarily by exposure to traumatic incidents at work - Psychiatric opinion did no more than suggest possibility of job-related causation - Retirement board's denial of accidental death benefits affirmed.

Hopkins v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-470, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

—Termination and Restoration of Accidental Death Benefits

Remarriage - Repeal of "Remarriage Penalty" - Retroactivity of Benefits Restoration

Until July 1, 2000, accidental death benefit paid pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 9 to surviving spouse of a public retirement system member who died "as the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained or hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties," and retirement benefits paid to surviving spouse of various public safety officers pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 100, were paid so long as surviving spouse remained unmarried - Repeal of this "remarriage penalty" provision of both statutes was repealed effective July 1, 2000 by St. 2000, c. 159, which also deleted other provisions of Chapter 32 that terminated the payment of retirement benefits to surviving spouses upon remarriage, and in doing so made accidental death benefits payable to the spouse so long as the spouse survived - While the amending language was straightforward in eliminating the remarriage penalty, it did not indicate that the amendments, or reinstated accidental death benefit payments terminated previously per a repealed "remarriage penalty" provision, were supposed to be retroactive, prospective

or self-executing - Per the Superior Court's 2014 *Carell* decision (*Boston Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.*, Civ. No. 2013-02476-H (Mass., Suffolk Super. Ct., Feb. 2, 2014), *aff'g Carell v. Boston Retirement Bd.*, Docket No. CR-11-325 (Mass. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 2013)) and a 2015 Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission memorandum based upon *Carell*, surviving spouse whose accidental death benefit payments were terminated prior to 2000 due to remarriage was entitled to reapply for their reinstatement, and reinstatement was to be paid prospectively from the date of reapplication - Surviving spouse's reinstated accidental death benefit amount is not amount of payment that was discontinued upon remarriage, but instead what it would have been if she had applied for the first time when she applied for the benefit's reinstatement.

Cedarquist v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-232, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 29, 2018).

Because cost-of-living adjustments and their retroactivity were not raised by surviving, remarried spouse in appeal challenging date to which her reinstated accidental death benefits were made retroactive (which was the date of her reinstatement application, not the date of her remarriage, when the benefits were terminated under the since-repealed "remarriage penalty" provisions of M.G.L. c. 32, §§ 9 and 100), DALA would not determine whether cost-of-living adjustments granted to benefit recipients prior to the date of surviving spouse's benefit reinstatement application were to be included in the reinstated benefit.

Cedarquist v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-232, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 29, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits

—Eligibility to Claim Benefits

"Member in service," as defined at M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(1)(a)(I), eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits - Retirement system member working past age 70 and electing to discontinue contributions to retirement system pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4 - District Court full-time first assistant clerk magistrate - Recision, by Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC), of State Board of Retirement's approval of clerk magistrate's accidental disability retirement application based upon disabling mold exposure at courthouse, on ground that as a result of election to discontinue contributions to retirement system, clerk magistrate was no longer a "member in service,", and was therefore ineligible for accidental disability retirement - Appeal by clerk magistrate challenging PERAC decision - Alternative claim that to extent it made election to discontinue retirement deductions at age 70 while continuing to work

irrevocable, M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4 violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq*. - Claim rejected, as Division of Administrative Law Appeals lacks authority to declare a statute invalid - However, statute did not appear to be invalid on its face, as it allowed a retirement system member who continued working past age 70 to decide whether or not he wanted to continue contributing to his retirement system based upon which course of action best suited his particular circumstances, and did not preclude the member from continuing to contribute to the retirement system - Eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits determined on clerk magistrate's main claim on appeal (no loss of "member in service" status, or eligibility for accidental disability retirement under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), as a result of election to discontinue retirement contributions under M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4).

Reardon v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-15-91, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 5, 2017).

First assistant clerk magistrate employed full time at the Malden District Court who elected to continue working full-time in this position past age 70 but who elected to discontinue retirement deductions, as M.G.L. c. 32, § 90G3/4 allowed him to do, did not accrue more creditable service toward a superannuation retirement while continuing to work, per the statute, but remained a "member in service" of the State Employees' Retirement System, per the definition recited at M.G.L. c. 32. § 3(1)(a)(I) - Clerk magistrate remained regularly employed in the performance of his duties - Section 90G3/4 neither terminates the retirement system membership of a member who elects to discontinue retirement deductions nor changes the member in service status of an employee who makes the election and continues his employment - Clerk magistrate therefore remained eligible for accidental disability retirement pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - Decision of Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) rescinding State Board of Retirement's decision approving court clerk's accidental disability retirement application based upon exposure to molds at courthouse where he worked, following majority affirmative medical panel as to disability and job-related causation, therefore reversed.

Reardon v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-15-91, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 5, 2017).

—Grounds to be Proved

Causation (Causal Nexus Between Work-Related Injury and Disability), Generally

An employee's work must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have been a significant, rather than merely a contributing, cause of his disability in order to show a causal nexus between the disability and a job-related personal injury, and where it

is merely a contributing cause, the "natural and proximate result" test for causation necessary to the recovery of accidental disability retirement benefits under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7 has not been satisfied.

Henderson v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-466, Decision (Mass. div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2018).

Unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate was not conclusive of ultimate fact of causation and was, instead, a mere statement of medical possibility.

Henderson v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-466, Decision (Mass. div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2018).

Applicant seeking accidental disability retirement benefits must demonstrate that disability stemmed from a single work-related event or series of events or, if disability was the product of gradual deterioration, that his employment had exposed him to an identifiable condition that is not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations.

McDonough v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-98, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 8, 2017).

A mental or emotional disability resulting from a single injury or a series of work-related injuries has been recognized as a personal injury under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - Personal injury is to be interpreted in harmony with workers' compensation statute, M.G.L. c. 152 - Under this statute, personal injuries "include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring within employment." M.G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A).

McDonough v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-98, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 8, 2017).

Suicide cases - Although suicide is arguably "serious and willful misconduct," a retirement system member's suicide does not itself preclude a beneficiary's recovery of accidental death benefits under M.G.L. c. 32, § 9(1) if suicide was natural and proximate result of mental illness caused by or resulting from employment - However, beneficiary must show it to have been more than a mere possibility that work-related psychological stresses caused a mental breakdown resulting in suicide.

Hopkins v. Bristol County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-470, Decision

(Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Causation - Insufficient Proof

Insufficient evidence of causal nexus between work-related injury and disability - Unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate as to causation not determinative - ADR benefits denied - Medical evidence insufficient to rule out prior non-work-related employee fight as causative of neck pain-related disability exacerbated by subsequent work-related lifting injuries - ADR Benefits denied - Former municipal truck driver/laborer - Fight with fellow worker during non-work-related lunch-hour card game in February 2010, during which he was grabbed by the neck - Continued to work until June 2010 when, after complaining of headaches, he underwent an MRI that showed extensive periventricular white matter disease - After exhausting his sick leave and being advanced 20 additional sick leave days during summer, returned to work September 10, 2010 - Refused to work with employee with whom he had the card game fight - Repaid 13 of the 20 advanced sick leave days by late June 2011, and then agreed to withdraw workers' compensation claim in exchange for waiver of repayment of the seven remaining advanced sick leave days - On September 7, 2011, while assigned to work crew with employee with whom he had fought in February 2010, pinched nerve in neck while lifting bag of brush to throw into truck, and then continued working for an hour and a half but then left because he did not want to work with the other employee any longer, and went to hospital with complaint of dizziness following neck pain related to lifting heavy bag of wet leaves - Cervical spine MRI taken at hospital showed C5-6 disc herniation and left foraminal stenosis, right-sided, and central disc herniation at C-4 level, and small central C3-4 disc herniation - Discharged with diagnosis of possible near syncopal event (loss of consciousness and postural tone caused by diminished cerebral blood flow) with headache - Continued working until October 14, 2011, when he began using sick leave - Following diagnosis on October 25, 2011 of cervical stenosis, cervical sprain/strain, cervical spine pain and HNP cervical with radiculopathy, no myelopathy, treating physician cleared him to return to work with restriction of no overhead lifting above chest, but did not return to work - Beginning November 4, 2011, received several cervical/thoracic epidural steroid injections for neck pain over next several months resulting in improved neck pain management, along with two cervical/thoracic facet joint injections - Cleared to return to regular duty at work starting April 2, 2012 following six months of modified duty - Decided to return to work after workers' compensation payments ended in mid-March 2012, but then used vacation time through April 10, 2012 and was then on paid administrative leave through April 25, 2012 - Never underwent fitness-for-duty/return to work examination before returning to work on April 27, 2012, when he worked on leaf bag truck and lifted bags to height of 36-37 inches (chest level) - After working several hours, reported that "neck snapped" while picking up heavy trash bags - Did not return to work after, despite town offer to reasonably accommodate him by not requiring him to lift leaf bags, or to lift overhead or above chest - Filed accidental

disability retirement application on October 5, 2012 that asserted three slipped discs in the neck as disabling, inability to perform heavy lifting, and two dates of injury (September 7, 2011 and April 27, 2012), and listing reason for accidental disability as an incident or hazard exposure (lifting heavy brush and pinched neck and nerve) - Town noted, in employer section of accidental disability retirement application, that it had offered reasonable accommodations but employee did not return to work even after it had agreed to his requests, and also noted that employee had sustained injury limiting his ability to work after being injured by other employee (in February 2010) - Medical panel comprising two neurologists and one psychiatrist examined employee on April 5, 2013, diagnosed multi-level disc herniation of cervical spine, degenerative cervical spine disease (visible on x-rays) and chronic neck syndrome, and concluded unanimously that employee was disabled (as he was unable to perform required mechanical duties including loading and unloading materials and performing heavy labor), disability was likely permanent and unlikely to respond to further rehabilitative efforts, and was proximate result of personal injury sustained or hazard undergone (aggravation of pre-existing condition of degenerative spine disease as a result of September 7, 2011 work-related incident, as evidenced by clinically-significant neck pain-related complaints that impaired his ability to conduct his work activities, and then undergoing epidural steroid injections in effort to manage neck-related pain complaints) - In response to retirement board's questions following panel's unanimous affirmative certificate, medical panel (1) noted its awareness that employee had lost work time following the February 2010 incident with fellow employee; (2) acknowledged it was unaware that employee was cleared for return to work in April 2012, but stated this did not affect panel's conclusion that he was permanently disabled as of September 7, 2011; (3) concluded that employee never fully recovered from neck injury sustained during February 2010 incident but noted that neck pain appeared to have been manageable and that employee was able to carry out work duties; and (4) stated it was unaware that town had offered employee accommodations, but that panel considered only whether employee was medically capable of carrying out duties listed in job description given to panel members - After retirement board asked panel for additional clarification based upon town's description of modified job duties employee would have had to perform consistent with accommodations of no lifting above chest and not lifting leaf bags, panel members examined employee again to evaluate whether he could perform essential duties of position as modified - Panel members concluded unanimously that employee would have been unable to perform modified job duties because, in addition to not being able to lift heavy things such as leaf bags, he could not perform asphalt work, shrub-trimming, snow plowing or leaf-raking and a variety of other required duties due to neck pain - Panel also clarified that employee's disability was caused by both the February 2010 tussle with the fellow employee and the September 7, 2010 leaf bag-lifting incident, and that if the February 2010 incident was not work-related, then the September 7, 2010 leaf bag-lifting incident would be an exacerbation or aggravation of a pre-existing condition, namely the neck injury sustained during the February 2010 incident, as there was no evidence of an earlier pre-existing condition -

Retirement board denied accidental disability retirement application based upon failure to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was totally and permanently unable to perform essential work duties of job by reason of personal injury sustained as result of, and while in performance of, his duties at some definite time and place - Denial sustained - Neck injury caused by non-work-related incident - Although aggravation of pre-existing condition to point of total and permanent disability satisfies the "natural and proximate cause" requirement of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1), the work-related incident must have been more than a "contributing" or "aggravating" factor and must be found to have been, instead, a "significant contributing cause to [the] employee's disability" - Employee listed two dates of injury on his accidental disability retirement application (September 7, 2011 and April 27, 2012) , but not the February 2010 injury - Medical panel opined that February 2010 injury was either a disabling work-related injury or, if not work-related, caused a pre-existing condition that the September 7, 2010 injury exacerbated - It was not for the panel to decide this issue, and neither of its two theories was conclusive - Employee testified at hearing that he did not want to return to work after September 7, 2010 because he did not want to work with the other employee wit whom he had fought in February 2010 - Employee already suffered from a degenerative cervical spine condition when he was injured during the February 2010 non-work-related incident - Combination of progressive cervical disease and discomfort of working with fellow employee with whom he had fought previously were the reasons for his failure to return to work - Injuries suffered during September 7, 2011 and April 27, 2012 incidents were therefore contributing, but not significant, causes of the personal injury the employee suffered, and were thus not sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements for accidental disability retirement - Employee did not show by preponderance of evidence that there was a causal nexus between the disability and his work - At best, lifting-related injuries that followed the card game fight in February 2010 contributed to the effects of the neck injury he sustained during the non-work-related incident, but the medical evidence was too sparse to rule out the February 2010 fight as causative of the employee's disability.

Clark v. Norwood Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-536, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 20, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Causation - Insufficient evidence of causal nexus between work-related injury and disability - Unanimous negative medical panel certificate as to causation - ADR benefits denied - Former municipal supervisor of custodians and hearing plants - Treatment beginning in May 1998 for cervical spine dysfunction secondary to significant degenerative cervical spondylosis - Cervical decompression surgery in June 1998 with gradual return to normal activities, and return to work on limited duty with restrictions directed by treating neurologist - Injury to back, legs and neck in October 1999 during fall on municipal city hall staircase - Filed report of occupational injury on day of injury - Following

examination in November 1999, treating neurologist noted "complicate situation" due to significant cervical spine disease, postoperative status, and untreated lumbar spinal stenosis, and that while the October 1999 fall worsened his condition, "most of the abnormalities [were] consistent with prior deficits (before surgical decompression," and that the worsening resulting from the fall was myelopathic and was slowly improving, and recommended a "conservative, observational approach" - March 2000 cervical spine MRI, reviewed by the treating neurologist, revealed moderate spinal stenosis below site of the cervical decompression surgery with a disc herniation and mild left C7 root compression - Treating neurologist noted, in June 2000, significant improvement in custodian's neck and left arm as a result of physical therapy, but that he had not returned to his condition prior to the October 1999 fall - Custodian remained at work on limited duty until last day of work, on or about September 30, 2011 - Underwent lumbar laminectomy on October 3, 2011 due to L2-L3 progressive stenosis and neurogenic claudication (limping or walking with difficulty), and never returned to work following this operation - Treating neurologists's December 2011 medical report opined that October 1999 fall at work was "primarily responsible for custodian's significant subsequent deterioration and disability with severe cervical myelopathy" and was "therefore responsible for the patient's major exacerbation of his pre-existing cervical spine disease" and was "more likely than not responsible for the major portion of his current neurologic disability" - Physician who performed fitness for duty examination in June 2012 concluded that based upon custodian's limited mobility and morbid obesity, he was unable to safely perform all the tasks included in his job description, including climbing ladders and performing tasks requiring more than mild exertion, and because of high risk of untreated sleep apnea was at increased risk of a driving accident - Following city's involuntary ordinary disability application, and custodian's accidental disability retirement application, regional medical panel comprising two neurologists and a physician specializing in pain management examined custodian - Panel issued certificate that was unanimous as to disability making it impossible for custodian to perform essential job duties, and its likely permanence, including a serious risk of re-injury in view of his unsteady gait with right foot drop alleviated with use of cane - Panel's certificate was also unanimously negative as to disability's work-related causation, based upon long duration of low back pain, no evidence of definitive neurologic impairment prior to surgery, known degenerative changes in custodian's lumbar spine prior to the October 1999 accident, fact that custodian worked for many years after the fall, and absence of evidence that the October 1999 fall worsened his underlying lumbar condition - Retirement board denied former custodian's application for accidental disability retirement benefits in April 2013, and approved ordinary disability retirement - Denial affirmed on appeal to DALA - No proof that medical panel lacked pertinent facts or employed an erroneous standard in issuing its unanimous negative certificate as to work-related causation - Panel members examined former custodian, reviewed the medical information and essential job duty information provided to them, and carried out their statutory obligation to determine the questions posed to them regarding incapacity, its permanence and work-related causation - Panel report properly

discussed former custodian's medical issues, treatment and fitness for duty evaluation, and its narrative detailed the physical examination performed by the panel members, and their diagnosis of cervical and lumbar stenosis and spondylosis, and showed that they properly considered the relationship between the disability's nature and the custodian's job - Medical evidence in the record supported the panel's unanimous negative certificate as to work-related causation, particularly its conclusion that the former custodian had a significant, degenerative cervical myelopathy and untreated lumbar spinal stenosis, evidenced by his unsteadiness and leg pain, that was not a result of the 1999 fall and was, instead, a non-work related pre-existing condition - Panel members were not obligated to agree with the contrary opinion of the custodian's treating neurologist that his disability was primarily the result of the 1999 fall, and the fact that the treating neurologist opined to the contrary was not evidence that panel employed an erroneous standard.

Aliano v. Somerville Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-284, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Causation - Insufficient evidence of causal nexus between work-related injury and disability, despite unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate - 8th grade teacher **-** Collision with disruptive student attempting to leave classroom - Alleged subsequent post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and need to avoid schools and school-related events, rendering teacher unable to perform essential teaching duties - Teacher filed assault and battery on staff referral form with school and asked principal to remove student from her class, and also filed criminal complaint against student in district court - Teacher worked for several more days and then never returned to position, after 5.6 years of service - Informed primary care physician at that time that she suffered from late night panic attacks, heart palpitations, disrupted sleep and anxiety upon entering school building following the incident - Unanimous affirmative medical panel as to disability, its likely permanence, and work-related causation not conclusive - Panel opinion rejected as not conclusive and unsupported by sufficient evidence of work-related disability in record - "Elevation of incident" by teacher to attempted assault and battery - Although one student witness reported that student in question had pushed the teacher while trying to run out of the classroom and called her an obscene name, other student witness interviews suggested that student in question was attempting to duck under teacher's arm when the two collided - Teacher's pre-incident history of longstanding personality problems and chronic depression unrelated to workplace incident, but without impairing ability to perform teaching duties, suggested "subsequently matured disability" that cannot form basis for disability retirement - Evidence that disability was not likely permanent - Opinion of impartial examining psychiatrist that adjustment disorder subsequent to incident was resolving and that continued psychological and psychiatric treatment would allow teacher to return to work if she were motivated to do so - Opinion of second impartial examining psychiatrist that the incident was the only cause of

teacher's psychiatric difficulties but that prognosis for recovery and better work-related functionality was "fairly good" with ongoing treatment and aggressive use of psychiatric medications - Teacher did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that she was totally and permanently disabled on last day of work due to a work-related disabling condition or incapacity - Denial of accidental disability retirement benefits affirmed.

Rockett v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-824, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 29, 2018).

Accidental disability retirement (ADR) - Causation - Insufficient evidence of causal nexus between work-related injury and disability, despite unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate - ADR benefits denied - Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC) Operations Service Repair Person I - Essential duties included performance of water and sewer infrastructure repairs, and installing and repairing water and sewer pipes and making necessary connections - Employment began in 1990 - History of non-work related medical conditions including poorly-controlled insulin Type 2 diabetes with severe related neuropathy, high blood pressure, alcohol abuse, prostate cancer, obesity, bursitis, and meniscus tears in the left knee that produced bone splints - Intermittent Family Medical Leaves of Absence (FMLA) due to chronic diabetes and high blood pressure from December 1, 2000 to November 27, 2001 - Treatment for chronic alcohol abuse in 2007 - In July 2007, filed employee incident report describing "constant rubbing by steel toe boots" that caused foot pain, and workers' compensation claim - Treating physician recommended he not wear boots - Intermittent FMLA and personal leaves of absence from September 21, 2007 through August 16, 2010 due to diabetes, hypertension, prostate cancer and Fournier's gangrene - In April 2009, BWSC notified employee that it intended to file for his involuntary retirement because he had been out of work for 19 months and appeared unable to resume essential duties of his position - After being cleared for return to work without restrictions by treating physicians and physical therapist, employee returned to work August 17, 2010 after being out for 35 months - In late September 2010, podiatrist diagnosed osteomyelitis, right toe ulcer, diabetes and neuropathy, and recommended toe amputation to prevent further destruction of foot tissue - A second podiatrist concurred, removed portion of right fourth toe, treated developing keratotic lesion on left fourth toe, placed employee in surgical shoe, instructed him to daily change gauze pad on toe wounds and clean the wounds using Betadine, and return for post-surgerical medical appointments - Podiatrist also recommended six-weeks absence from work - Employee failed to show up for followup appointment with podiatrist in early October 2010 - During October 22, 2010 followup visit, podiatrist noted employee's failure to change bandages on toes, which were wet and dirty, although there was no sign of infection - Followup visits on October 29 and November 1, 2010 showed wounds healing well, and cleared employee for using a closed show, and podiatrist cleared him for return to work on full duty with no

restrictions - On November 15, 2010, podiatrist examined employee due to development of new ulcers on both feet, noted his need to wear boots at work, again noted employee's diabetes and neuropathy and related risk of further foot ulcerations and surgeries, and directed that he keep affected foot areas dry and protected with surgical shoes while staying out of work - Podiatrist requested that BWSC excuse employee from work through December 13, 2010 due to development of new foot ulcers - BWSC, noting that employee had reported for work on only 24 days during preceding 38-month period, proceeded with termination hearing on November 24, 2010, which resulted in issuance of termination notice to employee on November 30, 2010 - Subsequent independent medical examinations in 2011-2012 related to workers' compensation claim noted loss of vibratory sense from ankles to forefoot consistent with severe longstanding diabetic neuropathy, as well as further toe amputation (nearly all of the right great toe) and a new ulceration in the fifth toe, and examining physicians opined that preexisting diabetic neuropathy in combination with steel-toed shoes caused the need for foot ulcer treatment, that employee could return to work that did not require the use of foot gear such as steel toe boots that would negatively impact his feet - In November 2014, physician performing independent medical examination opined that although employee claimed his work boots caused his disabling foot condition, his inability to return to work was due to the natural progression of his chronic insulin dependent diabetes mellitus - Lump-sum settlement of workers' compensation claim in March 2012 was based upon development of ulcers on feet due to physical activity in wet, steel-toes boots and, following fourth right toe amputation, development of new ulcers that prevented him from working, with medical coverage for medical treatment related to the foot ulcers but not for employee's pre-existing diabetic neuropathy - Employee filed application for accidental disability retirement on July 9, 2014 based upon BWSC's refusal to provide him with properly-fitting work boots, which he asserted was the cause of his foot infections and toe amputations, but he did not identify a medical reason or personal injury for filing the application, or the date on which he became unable to perform the essential duties of his position - Podiatrist who had performed the September 2010 toe amputation and who filed treating physician's statement stated that employee was last able to perform the essential duties of his job in October 2010, that the suffered from irreversible diabetic neuropathy and was at extremely high risk for loss of a foot or a leg, and that his incapacity was causally related to his severe neuropathy (lack of protective sensation in feet caused by foot ulcers when he wore work-issued steel toe boots - Following examination, medical panel comprising three neurologists issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to disability, its likely permanence and work-related causation - Retirement System hearing officer concluded that medical panel had employed erroneous standard and that its conclusion was therefore not binding, and Retirement System subsequently denied the ADR application - On appeal to DALA, ADR denial affirmed - Insufficient evidence that employee's work was a significant, rather than a contributing, cause of his disability - Medical panel certificate was not conclusive of the ultimate fact of causation and was , instead, a mere statement of medical possibility - Employee suffered from poorly controlled

insulin dependent diabetes due to noncompliance (with prescribed treatment), related progressive neuropathy of his feet, and related toe amputations and other medical procedures - Conclusion that performing essential duties of employee's position caused the injuries to his feet was not supported by preponderance of evidence - Evidence showed preponderantly, instead, that employee suffered from progressive symptoms of diabetes, which was a major contributing factor in the development of his diabetic foot ulcers, failing to care for this condition generally, and failing to care for his insensate feet specifically - Records of treating physicians showed noncompliance with periodical care procedures, including failure to change bandages - No evidence that employee requested that BWSC accommodate him by purchasing new boots for him or defraying their cost - Employee continued to wear tight boots that had been exposed to sewage, and had refused to purchase new, properly-fitted boots on his own because he believed it was BWSC's responsibility to supply him with shoes and, having failed to mitigate his condition in this manner, elected instead to expose himself to pain, infection, ulcers and, ultimately, amputation - Employee's disability was therefore not owing to a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone while in the performance of his duties.

Henderson v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-466, Decision (Mass. div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 15, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Denial - Insufficient evidence that total and permanent disability resulted from work related injury - Former municipal police officer - ADR application based upon permanent gastrointestinal-related disability (ulcerative colitis and Crohn's Disease symptoms) - Alleged exacerbation by work-related stress - No report ever filed by officer with employer alleging that an injury he sustained in the performance of his duties brought about his ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease symptoms, and officer was not receiving, and had never received, injured-on-duty benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F for any stress-related gastrointestinal symptoms - Officer had sought counseling in 2006 for anxiety and panic attacks and related being emotionally distraught due to breakup with girlfriend, rather than to job-related issues - Treatment for ulcerative colitis in 2007, and, following removal of colon and creation of j-pouch in 2010 and subsequent treatment for pouchitis, diagnosis changed to Crohn's disease, and reversal of loop ileostomy performed at end of 2010 following hospital admission for ulcerative colitis - Treatment for Crohn's disease continued into July 2015, when officer ceased working and applied for accidental disability retirement benefits based upon gastrointestinal-related disability - Application did not identify personal injury or hazard undergone in performance of his duties as proximately causing his disability - Notes of treating physicians who treated officer were replete with reference to his debilitating bowel symptoms but were without specific references to any job-related injury that caused or exacerbated these symptoms, such as stressful incidents in the course of police work - Medical records show officer's concern with difficulties carrying out his duties

while suffering from incontinence, gastrointestinal pain, bloody stools and infections he contracted following surgical procedures, but concern was for effect of symptoms on ability to perform job duties, and officer did not assert to treating physicians that job stresses had caused or exacerbated those symptoms - Officer did not meet burden of proving that he sustained personal injury or was compelled to undergo a hazard while performing his police duties that might be the proximate cause of his total and permanent gastrointestinal disability - Officer also failed to give timely notice to retirement board of injury sustained or hazard undergone within two years prior to filing accidental disability retirement application - No report ever filed by officer with employer alleging that an injury he sustained in the performance of his duties brought about his ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease symptoms, and officer was not receiving, and had never received, injured-on-duty benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F for any stress-related gastrointestinal symptoms - Officer not entitled to claim any of the incidents for which he did file reports (none of which related to his gastrointestinal condition) as satisfying timely notice requirement of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) relative to his ADR application.

Osborn v. Pittsfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-446, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Denial - Failure to give timely notice of injury to retirement board of injury sustained or hazard undergone within two years prior to filing ADR application - Insufficient evidence that total and permanent disability resulted from work related injury - Former municipal police officer - ADR application based upon permanent gastrointestinal-related disability (ulcerative colitis and Crohn's Disease symptoms) - Alleged exacerbation by work-related stress - No report ever filed by officer with employer alleging that an injury he sustained in the performance of his duties brought about his ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease symptoms, and officer was not receiving, and had never received, injured-on-duty benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F for any stress-related gastrointestinal symptoms - Officer had sought counseling in 2006 for anxiety and panic attacks and related being emotionally distraught due to breakup with girlfriend, rather than to job-related issues - Notes of treating physicians who treated officer were replete with reference to his debilitating bowel symptoms but were without specific references to any job-related injury that caused or exacerbated these symptoms, such as stressful incidents in the course of police work - Medical records show officer's concern with difficulties carrying out his duties while suffering from incontinence, gastrointestinal pain, bloody stools and infections he contracted following surgical procedures, but concern was for effect of symptoms on ability to perform job duties, and officer did not assert to treating physicians that job stresses had caused or exacerbated those symptoms - Officer did not meet burden of proving that he sustained personal injury or was compelled to undergo a hazard while performing his police duties that might be the proximate cause of his total and permanent gastrointestinal disability - Officer

also failed to give timely notice to retirement board of injury sustained or hazard undergone within two years prior to filing accidental disability retirement application - No report ever filed by officer with employer alleging that an injury he sustained in the performance of his duties brought about his ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease symptoms, and officer was not receiving, and had never received, injured-on-duty benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F for any stress-related gastrointestinal symptoms - Officer not entitled to claim any of the incidents for which he did file reports (none of which related to his gastrointestinal condition) as satisfying timely notice requirement of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) relative to his ADR application.

Osborn v. Pittsfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-446, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Denial - Insufficient evidence that total and permanent disability resulted from work related injury - Public school custodian employed by school department since 1987 - History of upper back pain following heart attack in 2008 - Lower back pain beginning April 30, 2010, while working on elementary school playground inspecting swings and checking trash barrels, after being head-butted, or given a running "bear hug," by five year old child - Petitioner weighed 288 pounds at the time - Petitioner reported injury to school principal; no disciplinary action against pupil - His May 3, 2010 injury report described incident as student running into him with his head, hitting him in lower back and causing pain in lower back area - Arbitrator's award and decision in October 2012 noted custodian last worked on May 12, 2010, date on which DALA Magistrate relied even though petitioner told medical care providers in May and early June 2010 that he was still working his normal shift - X-rays taken on May 12, 2010 during visit regarding pain following head-butting incident revealed mild degenerative joint disease, and initial diagnosis was contusion of lumbar spine - Physical therapy unhelpful, and petitioner underwent MRI on June 9, 2010 that revealed no evidence of acute or subacute compression deformity, but subtle Grade 1 anterolisthesis of L5 on S1 was noted and thought to be secondary to L5 spondylosis; MRI also revealed mild foraminal narrowing at L5-S1 secondary to anterolisthesis, and no nerve root impingement - Workers' compensation benefits received from May 13, 2010 to April 30, 2010, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 152, § 34, and, as weekly benefits by award, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 152, § 35, from March 25, 2011 to-date - Assault pay awarded on October 5, 2012, following arbitration - Application for accidental disability retirement filed on July 1, 2011 based upon total and permanent disability due to low back injury sustained at work o April 30, 2010, with supporting statements by primary treating physician and another treating physician - Application denied by retirement board on September 1, 2014 without convening a regional medical panel based upon conclusion that petitioner was "not in the performance of his duties" when he was injured, and the underlying facts regarding the alleged injury were "inconsistent" and insufficient to support a work injury - Petitioner appealed denial without convening a medical panel

to DALA, but withdrew it on December 24, 2015 because he was granted a medical panel examination - Following their examination of plaintiff on April 7, 2016, medical panel (two orthopedists and a neurologist) unanimously found petitioner to be totally and permanently incapacitated from performing his essential duties as a senior custodian, including general maintenance and groundskeeping, and repair, but that the incapacity was not such as might be the natural and proximate result of the April 30, 2010 injury - Unanimous negative opinion as to causation based upon "significant preexisting chronic upper back/chest pain for which [petitioner] takes a multitude of narcotics and medications," and panel members' impression that his symptoms were related to a soft tissue injury he sustained on April 30, 2010 rather than to any exacerbation of his degenerative arthroitis as a result of that incident - Retirement board denied accidental disability retirement application on May 4, 2016 - Denial affirmed - Petitioner did not meet burden of proving that his disability was caused by the April 30, 2010 head-butting incident on which his accidental disability retirement application was based, or that the incident exacerbated a preexisting degenerative condition in his lumbar spine, or even that his current limitations were due to any progression of his preexisting lumbar spine condition - Retirement board, DALA and Contributory Retirement Appeal Board cannot substitute their judgment as to causation for that of the medical panel majority when they have performed their function properly, and nor can the supportive report of a treating physician outweigh the panel majority's conclusion - Petitioner failed to show, as it was his burden to do in the face of the medical panel's negative opinion as to causation, that the panel majority failed to perform its function properly, lacked knowledge of the petitioner's job description or of his medical treatment history, or was improperly comprised - Medical panel performed its function properly by obtaining petitioner's medical history, performing a detailed clinical examination of him, and reviewing pertinent medical reports pertaining to his treatment for the injury petitioner sustained and related diagnostic studies before reaching an opinion as to disability, and stated the grounds on which it reached a unanimous negative opinion that the petitioner's incapacity was "not such as might be the natural and proximate result of the personal injury sustained or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed," which were the specific words of the statute (M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)) and showed that the panel members had addressed the precise question they were called upon to address.

Foley v. Springfield Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-222, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 28, 2018).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Failure to prove by preponderance of the evidence that regional medical panel employed incorrect standard or lacked pertinent medical information when it answered question as to disability's work-related causation in the negative - Municipal police officer - Stress-exacerbated hypertension and visual acuity problems - Diagnosed as insulin-dependent diabetic

when 12 years old - During first year of work in 1989, responded to call about five year old girl unconscious after drowning in a park, performed CPR, but girl died shortly afterward at hospital, and officer spent time with girl's family and attended the autopsy - Event had tremendous emotional impact because officer had a child the same age, but officer did not file an injury report - Diagnosed with hytpertension in 2003, and diabetes noted as not being well-controlled - Following 18 years as patrolman (1989-2005), reassigned to dispatcher position after suffering left eye hemorrhage while at work and having surgery that repaired some of the eye damage - Performed dispatcher work without restriction until January 25, 2007, when, after arriving at work and logging onto computer, he felt chest tightness, nausea, severe headache and dizziness and was taken to hospital by ambulance, where he was noted to have no vision in left eye and minimal vision in right eye - Unable to return to work and retired for superannuation - No application for or receipt of workers; compensation benefits - Following retirement, officer filed accidental disability retirement application on March 20, 2007 based upon hypertension and job stress contributing to visual impairment, referencing several dates of work injuries or hazards from 1989 to 2007, including work conditions in Dispatch (poor air quality, poor air circulation, dust, and absence of windows) - No mention of PTSD in application, and no diagnosis of PTSD-related hypertension or vision problems, in supporting physician's statement, which stated that work-related stressors increased officer's hypertension and worsened his visual acuity - Examination in July, 2007 by medical panel comprising two cardiologists and one internist - medical panel's certificate unanimously affirmative as to disability and its likely permanence, but unanimously negative as to work-related causation - Noting medical records showing that officer's hypertension was under control, and finding no evidence of disabling cardiac condition or disabling hypertension, panel members concluded that his retinopathy, renal insufficiency and proteinuria were related to diabetic neuropathy brought on by his long-standing diabetes - After panel issued its certificate, retirement board denied accidental disability retirement application, which retired officer appealed in October 2007 - Diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in April 2014 - PTSD diagnosis confirmed by another physician in October 2016 - Denial of accidental disability retirement application sustained - Failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that medical panel employed incorrect standard or lacked pertinent medical information when it answered question as to work-related causation of disability in the negative - Panel members reviewed all medical records sent to them, examined the retired officer, was aware of his job stress claim from review of his retirement application and its supporting physician's statement, and mentioned the work stress the officer related in the history section of the panel's narrative report - Panel members also found no evidence of a disabling cardiac condition or hypertension - History of officer's hypertension, diabetes, job stress, anxiety and depression were all before the medical panel and the retirement board - PTSD diagnosis and treatment for mental health issues occurred after the panel examined him, and were not before the panel and, as a result, panel could not consider it and failure to do so was not evidence that it applied improper standard or failed to

consider the medical evidence - PTSD claim was also time-barred - It related to drowning of young girl he attempted to save in 1989, but officer did not file an injury report, and the event and the stress the officer claimed as a result occurred more than two years before he filed his accidental disability retirement application in 2007 - PTSD-related claim not an injury or hazard undergone within two years of date on which retirement application was filed, and could not support accidental disability retirement application unless written notice of injury was timely provided to retirement board or other statutory exception to this two-year rule, recited at M.G.L. c. 32, §§ 7(1) and 7(3)(a) and (b), applied, and none did - No worker's compensation received for the injury he alleged, and at any rate, police officers are ineligible to receive worker's compensation - No record of mental injury sustained or hazard undergone in police department's official records - No evidence that any official in police department knew that officer sustained a work-related injury, in particular a stress-related injury as a result of the 1989 child drowning death, or that it had any reason to notify the retirement board about such an injury - Accidental disability retirement claim therefore confined to any injury or injuries that occurred in the two years prior to his retirement application and exacerbated his pre-existing mental health condition - Unclear how the hazards or injuries he claimed to have undergone while he worked as a dispatcher between 2005 and 2007 were so significant as to advance his pre-existing mental health condition - His hearing testimony, and that of his wife, emphasized the 1989 child drowning incident as having caused him the most distress as a police officer, but he could not rely on that event as it occurred more than two years before he filed his accidental disability retirement application, and none of the statutory exceptions to the two-year lookback rule of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) applied.

Carr v. Brockton Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-07-1033, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Emotional or psychological injury - Registry of Motor Vehicles Clerk IV - Alleged harassment and retaliation by Registry branch office staff from 1996 through 2010 - Claim of permanent disability based upon exposure to identifiable condition (constant workplace hostility and harassment) - Conflicts with co-workers and state trooper assigned to branch office - One-day suspension in 2000 for unprofessional conduct toward customer - Discipline overturned following grievance through union - Second suspension, for three-days, issued for directing customer to return unnecessarily to automobile insurer to correct registration error made by another Registry clerk - Loud, harsh and public verbal reprimand heard by fellow employees and by customers issued by supervisor - Suspension overturned following grievance - One-day suspension in 2001 for allegedly failing to assist another staff member while on shift - Perception of being targeted for discipline not meted out to other staff - Employee entered comments about years of harassment, rude treatment and interference with job performance other staff and by management in response to FY 2002 employee performance review

form - Management failure in late 2002 to respond to request to take personal day, and marked off-payroll, followed by grievance and attendance correction and reinstatement of pay - 2005 transfer to another Registry branch, followed by three-day suspension for refusal to assist customers, refusal to process transaction for drive-up customer, damage to customer's car caused by opening emergency exit into customer drive-through area, a violation of branch rules, and other violations - Suspension rescinded following hearing - Transferred to another Registry branch in 2005, along with former supervisor - Perception that work environment at new branch was hostile - In March 2009, after questioning elderly customer about identification and medical support for handicap placard application, conflict with co-worker as to why she did not simply give the customer the placard, in view of her age - Manager sided with co-worker, prompting employee to complain of hostile treatment and working conditions - Subsequent verbal altercation, in July 2009, with co-worker upset about her work load, who told employee to mind her own business, called employee "stupid and crazy" and threatened to "kick [her] ass" - Co-worker not disciplined - Employee's request for transfer to a different Registry branch based on hostile work environment denied - Continued hostility by same co-worker, this time with racial overtones - Employee fainted at work in July 2009, believed she was kicked when she was on floor, and was taken to hospital - After returning to work several days later, perception that other workers were trying to get rid of her - Employee filed complaint with union about workplace hostility in August 2009 - Conclusion by Registry counsel that employee had provoked the initial bickering with co-worker - Employee given written warning about her confrontational and volatile behavior, and then, in January 2010, after being overheard making comments about wanting to punch co-worker and give others what they deserved, placed on paid administrative leave pending determination as to whether she posed a danger to herself and others in workplace - Subsequent negative psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation, with examining physician's recommendation of intensive psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment prior to returning to work and re-evaluation, along with recommendation of occupational therapy to assist employee with workplace relations and working cooperatively with co-workers - Subsequent counseling and treatment generated diagnosis of serious mental illness including major depression, insomnia, low energy and anxiety - Dismissal from behavioral health treatment program due to conflict with another patient - Accidental disability retirement application filed in March 2011 based upon permanent disability due to severe depression, stress, anxiety and PTSD due to workplace harassment and retaliation - Unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate as to disability, permanence and work-related causation (identified by all three panel members as a series of work-related events) - Retirement board approved ordinary disability retirement but denied accidental disability retirement application, despite unanimous affirmative panel certificate - Denial sustained - Neither employee nor her superiors filed any notice of injury between 1997 and 2010 despite allegations of continuing harassment - Employee's credibility as to continuing nature of alleged harassment, and reliability of her recollection of events suspect, on account of perceived constant fabrications and "set-ups" in five Registry branches over 13 years,

with almost no supporting contemporaneous entries in medical records, and without any witness corroboration of employee's self-serving testimony - No evidence supporting claim of career-long exposure to workplace hazards - No identifiable condition not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations - No showing that alleged injury amounted to more than personal feelings of persecution and perpetual victimization.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-372, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Public school teacher assistant - Assignment to classroom with several behaviorally-challenged students - Fibromyalgia - Nausea, vertigo and disequilibirum - Superannuation retirement - Subsequent application for accidental disability retirement based upon medical conditions (Fibromyalgia, Meniere's Disease (severe vertigo) and Sjogren's Syndrome (long-term autoimmune disease affecting moisture-producing glands)) exacerbated by job requirements and work-related stress - Denial of accidental disability retirement benefits sustained on appeal - Undisputed material facts - Failure of teacher assistant to prove that she sustained compensable personal injury, or that her employment presented a hazard not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations - Vertigo and nausea symptoms occurred at work only once, and were generally experienced in the evening, after work - Absence from work toward end of employment due to leave to care for grandson under Family Medical Leave Act - No notice of injury report or incident report filed with employer - No evidence in record as to effect (if any) of medications she was taking in development of her vertigo - No showing of mature and established disability when teacher's assistant last performed her duties - No contemporaneous report in record from treating physician supporting teacher assistant's claim to be totally and permanently disabled on last day of employment - Admission, in disability retirement application, of non-job related factors exacerbating her Fibromyalgia, Meniere's Disease and Sjogren's Syndrome, including constant movement and exposure to elements and "all sorts" of weather conditions including hot, cold, rain and wind exacerbated, none of which were job-related hazards, and all of which were common and necessary exposures related to daily life in New England - No positive medical panel evaluation supporting her claim (2 of 3 members voting yes as to disability and its permanence, of whom 1 voted yes and 1 voted no as to job-related causation, and 1 member voting no as to disability, based upon finding normal hearing and ears and no Meniere's Disease, and therefore not answering remaining questions as to permanence of disability and job-related causation) - No evidence that panel members lacked pertinent facts, applied erroneous standard or were biased.

Lambert v. Hampden County Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-209, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 7, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Correction officer - Post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety as a result of incidents witnessed and experienced directly as correction officer during two years of employment as correction officer - Decreased sleep and appetite, recurrent intrusive thoughts, and drinking after witnessing incidents between inmates - Tightness, chest pains, and arm pain after speaking with inmate outside his cell - Major depressive disorder and panic attack diagnosed by treating physicians - Unanimous affirmative psychiatric medical panel certificate as to disability, its likely permanence, and job-related causation - Retirement board denial of accidental disability retirement application despite panel certificate based upon lack of specific dates of injury due to inmate violence, and assertion of stress and trauma based in part upon allegations of injury to other correction officers that employee did not witness - Denial affirmed - Affirmative medical panel certificate not conclusive as to work-related causation - Injuries to third parties (including suicides and suicide attempts among correction officers) insufficient to show compensable personal injury - Credibility issues - Failure to file incident reports as to violence witnessed - Discrepancies in narratives of alleged violence at correctional facility given to physicians, including apparent conflation of memories with alleged reports of co-workers - Presence at related incidents, or even being on duty at time, not documented by incident reports filed by others - Insufficient evidence of specific events that could serve as basis for accidental disability retirement application - No evidence of work environment different from those in which other correction officers worked - No evidence of outrageous working conditions in comparison with work other correction officers in facility performed - No evidence of work-related aggravation of pre-existing psychiatric condition, including depression related to childhood abuse, that appeared to have become clinically quiescent before correction officer employment began, particularly since employee did not followup with psychotherapy or trauma therapy recommended by treating physician and therefore could not show that treatment could not have resolved anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder - No workmen's compensation benefits awarded for any of the alleged work-related incidents - Receipt of lump-sum workmen's compensation benefit payment by agreement evidence of legal compromise only, not merits-based resolution of claim.

Gale v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-205, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation, and untimeliness of claim - Public school teacher - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (depression and anxiety longstanding since childhood) after 20 years of successful teaching with the aid of psychotherapy and prescribed psychiatric medication - Increasing anxiety about ability to perform classroom duties, meet deadlines and attend to student progress or lack of progress - Development of hair and weight loss, and hoarding and eating disorders,

and worsening inability to concentrate, loss of organizational skills, and forgetful, incoherent thought, observed by treating psychiatrist - Attribution to difficult work environment at school, particularly difficult students, increasing administrative work load, and arrival of a new, critical and unsupportive principal - Teacher's transfer to new school with supportive principal, with resulting, but temporary, diminishment of anxiety and restored level of function as teacher - Resumption, and worsening, of psychiatric symptoms for five years following teacher's transfer - Affirmative certificate by psychiatric medical panel majority as to disability, permanence and work-related causation - Rejection by Board following hearing, based upon minority panel member's rejection of work-related causation, for lack of specific traumatic at-work events, and opinion that natural progression of anxiety disorder, rather than work-related injury, caused increasing difficulty in managing job duties and, ultimately, the teacher's disability - Failure to prove job-related causation by preponderance of evidence - Affirmative medical panel findings as to causation not conclusive - No evidence of work-related event or series of events contributing significantly to teacher's psychiatric disability - Evidence supported underlying anxiety about job duties, rather than conditions of job, as the significant factor precipitating teacher's disability - Failure to obtain workmen's compensation for psychological disability itself not preclusive of accidental disability retirement benefits - Failure to submit accidental disability retirement application within two years following allegedly-precipitating events at former school, with no workmen's compensation payments to mitigate lapse of time, violated timely application provisions of M.G.L. c. 32, §§ 7(1) and 7(3)(a).

Milton v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-19, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 17, 2017)

Evidence sufficient to show medical panel error as to causation - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (knee osteoarthritis) - Public works department laborer - Knee injury (twisting and medial meniscus tear) sustained on the job - Unanimous negative panel finding as to causation - Medical panel error requiring examination by new panel - Plainly wrong conclusion and application of incorrect standard - Attribution of injury to weight and deconditioning without medical record support - Unreasonable expectation that weight loss and strength training would allow performance of essential job duties despite ineffectiveness of post-injury physical therapy.

Cayo v. West Springfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-468, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Sheriff's office employee - Lung cancer - Office mold exposure - Negative unanimous medical panel as to causation, based upon lack of solid medical evidence linking mold exposure to lung cancer development - Panel considered relationship mold may have played in development of employee's lung cancer - No evidence that panel applied incorrect standard or

lacked pertinent information in reaching its conclusion, or that conclusion was plainly wrong - Fact that treating physician offered contrary opinion as to causation did not displace panel's medical opinion or show that panel applied incorrect standard - No evidence that treating physician suggested performance of tests relative to alleged connection between mold exposure and cancer before medical panel examined employee.

Hanover v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-575, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 21, 2016)

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Probation case specialist with clerical and secretarial duties - Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) allegedly caused by humiliation of having to meet with supervisors regarding unfair accusations against her, unfair targeting and discipline, and unkind and unequal treatment by supervisors and co-workers - Termination following alleged sick leave abuse, excessive personal use of work email, and conflicts with supervisor and co-workers - Unanimous affirmative certificate by medical panel (2 psychiatrists and 1 neurologist) as to disability (extreme anxiety), permanence and causation that alleged incidents in workplace caused PTSD not dispositive as to causation - No showing that supervisors did not engage in bona fide personnel actions - No showing that alleged workplace ill will, job conflicts and arguments with superiors and co-workers that generated feelings of persecution and unfair treatment was an identifiable condition not common or necessary to a great many occupations.

Sinopoli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-223, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 10, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Steam fireman at state college - claimed work-related exposure to natural gas fumes following third party's gas line installation, and, during emergency room visit that followed, injury to hand during blood draw - no proof that right-sided weakness or confusion were caused by temporary workplace exposure to natural gas - absence of emergency room or other medical records, or employer's records, confirming gas exposure - Nearly three-year gap between alleged exposure and specific complaint - Unsupported hypothesis by treating physicians of reaction to natural gas exposure - No contemporaneous records connecting blood draw following alleged gas exposure to hand weakness - No affirmative medical panel certificate as to work-related causation of injury claimed - No improper panel composition or panel error - denial of accidental disability retirement benefits affirmed.

Maillet v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-327, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 3, 2016)

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Housing Authority maintenance worker - Left shoulder injury - Pain experienced first while lifting heavy bag of trash into dumpster, then while removing mowing deck from tractor - Questionable subscapularis tear - History of other injuries and underlying cervical spondylosis - Medical panel - Negative majority panel finding as to job-related causation - No improper panel composition, or application of improper standard or other panel error - Denial of accidental disability retirement benefits affirmed.

Soldi v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-525, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 20, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation - Housing authority maintenance worker - Left shoulder injury - Refusal to undergo recommended surgery for torn rotator cuff - No disqualification from receiving a disability retirement - Medical providers disagreed as to existence of rotator cuff tear warranting surgical intervention, or whether shoulder pain resulted from arthritis and/or cervical pathology - Academic issue - Medical panel did not issue positive certification as to disability's job-related causation.

Soldi v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-525, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 20, 2016).

Causation - Sufficient Proof

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate, following remand by Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB), as to disability, its likely permanence and work-related causation - Night custodian at elementary school - Mid and lower back injury sustained in September 2006 while installing a heavy (80-100 pound) battery tray into floor machine preparatory to cleaning floors - Original medical panel comprising two orthopedists and one neurologist issued certificate in 2008 that was unanimously affirmative as to disability and its likely permanence but unanimously negative as to whether claimed injury could have been main cause of disability, based on what they perceived as resolved lower back injury and disability due to thoracic spine condition (thoracic spine arachnoid cysts, and syrinx (cyst within the spinal cord seen in imaging))- 2012 DALA decision affirmed retirement board's denial of accidental disability retirement based upon claimant's failure to show that medical panel applied erroneous standard or did not have all pertinent records - Remand by CRAB in September 2013 with instructions to request that medical panel reconsider its original (2008) negative conclusion as to causation, because it was not supported or explained by the panel's certificate or the medical record - New medical panel convened (as before, two

orthopedists and a neurologist) - After reviewing former custodian's medical records and job description, and examining him, panel diagnosed "chronic back pain secondary to lumbar sprain, osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, and exaggerated by the individual's obesity and deconditioning" (referring to fact that former custodian had been out of work for seven years, was not conditioned to perform the type of work he had done as a school custodian, and was doing nothing that required heavy lifting of objects weighing 40-50 pounds) - New panel's certificate was unanimously affirmative as to disability, its likely permanence, and work-related causation - Panel report emphasized that as a result of September 2006 injury and deconditioning, former custodian could not return to line of work where there was a potential need for him to perform heavy lifting, and that the disability was therefore related to the duties identified in his job description - Following request for clarification by retirement board, panel members reiterated conclusion that former custodian was disabled by the injury to his lower back in September 2006, explained that recurrence of disabling back pain former custodian experienced as a result of that injury was likely if he returned to work that required heavy lifting as an essential duty and explained why he could not do so, and opined that the arachnoid cysts in his thoracic region were likely congenital rather than acquired by injury but were not disabling, and that the syrinx "almost surely" antedated the cysts - New medical panel's unanimous certificate was supported by the diagnostic studies and medical reports in the record, and all of this evidence sufficed to sustain his burden of proving his entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits due to the back injury he sustained in September 2006 - medical panel members reached their conclusion after reviewing the medical records and work history provided to them, conducted an appropriate clinical examination, and prepared a clear and concise analysis - No evidence medical panel members applied any erroneous standard - Retirement board directed to award accidental disability retirement benefits to former custodian.

Pellin v. Franklin Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-125, Decision on Remand (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2018.)

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Emotional or psychological injury - Unanimous affirmative medical panel as to disability, its likely permanence, and job-related causation - Alcohol and Drug Addiction Counselor I and (during last two years of employment, from 2010 to 2012) Director of Residential and Addictive Services at Chelsea Soldiers' Home - Series of work-related events leading to injury - Following promotion to director position in 2010, increased depression, feeling of increased stress, increased and uncharacteristic uncertainty in determining correct treatment for residents who relapsed into substance abuse - After recommending that one resident who had relapsed be placed on restrictions at the Home, resident disagreed and went over his head, and director was told to leave the resident alone, causing him stress and more self second-guessing - Director wanted resident to enter a detox program but resident disagreed - Against his usual practice and for fear of

being overruled, Director decided to send resident to a doctor for another opinion, but doctor told him that the resident did not need detox, and Director placed resident on restriction rather than send him to detox - Resident found dead in his room at Home the next morning (cause of death not in record). - Director learned of this while driving to work in telephone call from another resident he was counseling (as per his duties), who was emotionally upset about the death- After Director arrived at Home, his immediate supervisor confirmed the resident's death, told Director it was not his fault, and sent Director home because he was devastated, beside himself and unable to function as a result of this development - Director felt that if resident had been admitted to detox facility, he would not have been able to continue his drug use, or he could have received medical treatment if his death was due to other causes - Director felt guilty for not having sent resident to detox facility - After staying out of work for a week and then returning, Director could not stop thinking that if he had sent resident to detox the outcome might have been different, and continued to feel he was being second-guessed about his counseling and treatment of residents - Director continued counseling with psychiatrist who had treated him previously for depression, attention deficit disorder and anxiety, and continued working for ten weeks before going on medical leave, and never returning to work afterward - Ordinary and Accidental disability retirement applications filed subsequently based upon generalized anxiety disorder, recurrent major depressive disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as well as for cardiac and orthopedic-related issues, and identified resident's death as both personal injury and hazard undergone that had caused his emotional and psychological disability - Regional psychiatric medical panel unanimously affirmative as to disability, its likely permanence and work-related causation - Panel members viewed new responsibilities Director undertook following his 2010 promotion as having overwhelmed him, and as primary stressor predisposing him to post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of resident's death, along with worsening depressive and anxiety symptoms - Ordinary disability retirement granted by retirement board based upon emotional injury, leaving only the issue of work-related causation to be determined - Retirement board denied accidental disability application despite unanimous affirmative panel certificate based upon conclusion that Director's condition was not caused or aggravated by a personal injury he sustained or a hazard he underwent as a result of, and while performing, his work related duties - Denial reversed - Director filed accidental disability retirement application within two years of events upon which he relied, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - Director sustained burden of proving emotional injury's work-related causation, by showing a series of events leading to his injury (increasing uncertainty as to his own decisions on counseling and consequences for residents, reliance upon doctor's opinion rather than his own judgment in assigning resident to restriction rather than sending him to detox, telephone call from upset resident he received while driving to work informing him of resident's death, and supervisor's confirmation of resident's death) - Whether emotional injury is considered to have been result of series of events or any one of them, the events occurred while Director was at work and in performance of his duties, haunted him after the resident's death, and caused remorse over his decision

not to assign resident to detox, all of which left him emotionally unable to perform his counseling duties and left him disabled - Important to note that Director was in the performance of his duties when he learned of resident's death - Taking phone call from distraught resident fell within scope of his duties regarding prevention of resident relapse into substance abuse - Retirement board directed to grant Director's accidental disability retirement application.

McDonough v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-98, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 8, 2017).

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Disability as a result of single injury - Massachusetts Hospital School Nursing Assistant I - Transfer of patient from chair to bed during work shift - Immediate lower back injury with unresolving, disabling lower back pain - Inability to sit or stand for more than five minutes - Majority affirmative orthopedic medical panel opinion, and opinion of treating physicians, as to causal relationship between patient-transfer incident and disabling back injury - Credible testimony by petitioner as to incident and immediacy of back symptoms - No medical evidence of prior back problems or inability to perform duties, despite pre-existing obesity - Sufficiency of evidence to meet petitioner's burden of proof as to causation and shift burden of producing contrary medical evidence to retirement board.

Cobb v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-367, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 3, 2017).

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Water system maintenance worker - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (degenerative spinal condition) by work injury sustained in performance of job duties - Exposure to identifiable condition not common to a great many occupations - Regularly lifting and moving heavy machinery, pipes, and piles of dirt and rocks outdoors in trenches regardless of weather and light - Aggravating injury sustained while attempting to move very heavy pipe cutter out of way of moving crane, so as to avoid imminent collision, during water pipe trench work - Preponderance of evidence as to causation included affirmative certificate by medical panel majority as to causation - Affirmative certificate consistent with opinions of treating physicians and medical records.

Loura v. Taunton Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-186, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 2, 2016)

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) by work injury sustained in performance of job duties - Head injury sustained upon falling from moving sanitation truck - Public works and sanitation department laborer - Preponderance of evidence - Unanimous

affirmative certificate by medical panel (psychiatric) - Consistency with opinions of treating physicians and medical records - Absence of panel error - Appropriateness of psychopharmacological treatment following injury.

Hollup v. Worcester Retirement Board, Docket No. CR-15-221, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 2, 2016).

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Principal clerk at municipal senior center - Preexisting injury (chronic left foot conditions and injuries treated previously by surgery) aggravated by work injury sustained in performance of job duties (fall in medical equipment shed while putting away wheelchair and commode, causing left foot to become jammed in wheelchair wheel) - Following injury, unresolving left foot reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome, intensifying left foot pain, marked changes in foot temperature, and need to use cane for ambulating - Affirmative certificate by orthopedic medical panel majority as to causation - Majority panel opinion entitled to great weight - No evidence panel majority applied incorrect standard, lacked pertinent medical facts, or engaged in procedural irregularities in reaching conclusion as to causation - Conclusion consistent with opinions of independent medical examiners and treating physicians that unresolving left-foot symptoms related to, and were likely exacerbated by, work injury in question - Medical evidence in record confirmed that left foot symptoms worsened to point of disability and would not resolve over time.

Collari (Sharon) v. Marlborough Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-179, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 9, 2016).

Disability (Disabling Injury or Hazard Sustained While in Performance of Duties) Generally

Injury on the way to work does not make public employee eligible for accidental disability retirement.

Civetti v. Plymouth Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-411, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 22, 2019).

Because right shoulder injury identified by medical panel as having caused police officer's likely-permanent disability did not occur while officer was in performance of his duties or while he was traveling from one workplace obligation to another, and occurred, instead, before he reported for duty, it was not sustained while officer was in performance of his duties - Retirement board could therefore reject medical panel's conclusion that officer's disability was caused by employment-related injury, and deny accidental disability retirement application for insufficient proof that disabling injury

occurred while officer was in performance of duties, and board's denial of accidental disability retirement application on this ground was therefore affirmed.

Civetti v. Plymouth Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-411, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 22, 2019).

Burden of proof - Retirement system member must establish total and permanent incapacity as of the date he actively performed the essential duties of his position, per *Vest v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.*, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 668 N.E.2d 1356 (1996) - Therefore, police officer claiming disability based upon hypertension and heart disease on last day of work had burden of proving that he was totally and permanently disabled from performing his essential duties as a result of these conditions on the last day he worked.

Brace v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-561, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 19, 2018).

Under current retirement scheme, employers routinely expect employees to try and remain in optimum physical health, take routine lunch and rest room breaks, and transport themselves to and from work, and none of these activities are considered to be in the actual performance of the employees' duties.

Marathas v. Dukes County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-096, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2018).

Disability (Disabling Injury or Hazard Sustained While in Performance of Duties) - Insufficient Proof

Insufficient proof that permanently-disabling injury occurred while public employee was in performance of duties - Police officer - Right shoulder injury sustained while traveling to work (exiting car in police station parking lot before reporting for duty) - Right shoulder injuries sustained in 2011 and 2014 - First injury sustained in July 2011 during fall from bicycle while performing duties as part of police patrol mountain bike unit, with resulting right shoulder acromioclavicular (AC) joint separation and traumatic rotator cuff tendonitis, which treating physician noted as having resolved by early November 2011, when he cleared police officer to return to full duty without restriction, and with no further right shoulder treatment until second fall more than two years later - Second right shoulder injury sustained in early February 2014 as result of slipping on ice when exiting his car in police station parking lot, where officer had arrived to work midnight shift, but several minutes before shift began, and before he reported for duty - X-rays taken in local hospital

emergency room showed no acute right arm fractures or abnormalities - Diagnosis was maximal tenderness around AC joint most consistent with AC separation - MRI of right shoulder in late March 2014 revealed right-shoulder injuries including rotator cuff tear and torn intra-articular biceps tendon with split tear of extra-articular biceps tendon, as well as severe AC joint degenerative change - Upon recommendation of orthopedic surgeon who examined him, officer underwent right shoulder surgery in early August 2014 comprising arthroscopic massive rotator cuff reconstruction, arthroscopic subacromial decompression, and arthroscopic debridement, with post-surgical physical therapy - Prior to and after 2014 surgery, police captain assigned officer to light duty (being assigned to police station and working as dispatcher among them, but excluding operating police vehicles or interacting with prisoners), but per police chief, police department could not continue to accommodate officer's condition because officers were expected to be able to perform all duties - Upon completion of physical therapy at end of March 2015, officer continued to have mild to moderate shoulder pain when reaching overhead and carrying out daily living activities - Opinions of two orthopedic surgeons who evaluated officer during the summer of 2015 were, respectively, that he was unable to return to full duty activity due to right shoulder weakness, and that he had taken his shoulder treatment as far as was medically possible and would be unable to perform full-time unrestricted police work on a permanent basis - Officer's accidental disability retirement (ADR) application, filed in October 2015, was based upon pain and weakness due to massive rotator cuff reconstruction surgery following 2014 injury, was based upon both 2011 and 2014 right shoulder injuries, with the latter having re-aggravated shoulder injuries sustained in 2011 - ADR application supported by physician's statement by orthopedic surgeon who had recommended the 2014 surgery, who opined that disabling injury was massive right shoulder tear that would continue indefinitely due to right shoulder weakness on account of weak rotator cuff - Medical panel comprising two orthopedic surgeons and occupational medicine specialist examined officer in June 2016, and issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to officer's being disabled as a result of a work-related injury, and the disability's likely permanence - Cause of the permanently-disabling injury was identified by the two orthopedic surgeon panel members as the 2014 injury, with both noting that the officer had returned to work following the 2011 injury, and by the occupational medicine specialist panel member as both the 2011 and 2014 injuries - Board denied officer's ADR application on ground that the 2014 injury was not sustained while in the performance of his duties as a police officer - Denial of ADR application affirmed - 2014 injury, which majority of panel members identified as having caused the officer's permanently-disabling injury, did not occur while officer was in performance of his duties or while he was traveling from one workplace obligation to another, and occurred, instead, before officer reported for duty - Injury on the way to work does not make a public employee eligible for accidental disability retirement - Medical panel's unanimous opinion that officer's permanent disability was employment-related was not conclusive of ultimate fact that disability was result of injury sustained in performance of duties - Because injury occurred while officer was traveling to work rather than in performance of

duties, retirement board properly rejected panel's conclusion that disabling injury was work-related - Although there was some evidence that officer's 2011 injury persisted and played a role in his ultimate disability, it was outweighed by officer having been cleared to return to work without restriction later that year and having done so, and there was no medical evidence supporting officer's claim that pain from 2011 injury persisted - In addition, although orthopedic surgeon who signed statement in support of ADR application listed 2011 right shoulder injury, as well as 2014 right shoulder injury, as having caused officer's disability, and officer sustained 2011 while in performance of his duties, orthopedic surgeon also acknowledged that disability was caused by massive right shoulder tear sustained as a result of (non- work-related) 2014 injury.

Civetti v. Plymouth Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-411, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 22, 2019)

Insufficient evidence of disability - Denial of accidental disability retirement (ADR) application without convening medical panel affirmed - Police officer - Application filed on August 5, 2015 based upon hypertension, myorcardial dysfunction and kidney disease, with officer unable to perform essential duties after May 15, 2015 - Application supported by twp statements from treating physician, one (dated April 15, 2015) stating that officer was last able to perform essential duties on April 15, 2015 due to high blood pressure and previous myocardial infarction, and the other (dated May 15, 2015) stating that officer was last able to perform essential duties on May 15, 2015 due to hypertension and myocardial dysfunction - Although officer was admitted to hospital and treated for high blood pressure (240/140) and a hypertensive emergency with complaints of blurry vision, headache and chest pains in early October 2014, he was discharged following extensive treatment on October 14, 2014 with blood pressure of 156/89, and city physician cleared officer to return to work without restriction one week later with blood pressure of 140/88 - On April 15, 2015, when officer was on duty without restrictions, he injured right ring finger while assisting partner with fastening handcuffs on arrested person, requiring use of finger splint for several weeks and resulting in placement on leave on same day pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41m § 111F, which was his last day of work - Record was without evidence that any doctor declared officer unfit to perform essential duties due to hypertension and heart disease prior to finger injury on April 15, 2015, or up to time he filed ADR application in August 2015 - Officer was bound by facts asserted in ADR application, and could not change date of alleged total and permanent incapacity, or date on which he became unfit to perform essential duties, after application was denied - Statements by treating physician giving two different dates of incapacity and ascribing it to hypertension and related condition were without support in medical records or physician's statement declaring officer unfit for duty.

Brace v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-561, Decision (Mass. Div.

of Admin. Law App., Oct. 19, 2018).

Insufficient evidence of disabling injury sustained while on duty by accidental disability retirement (ADR) applicant, a former EMT telecommunicator working in dispatch operations - ADR application, filed on June 11, 2014, was based upon disabling right knee trauma allegedly sustained on June 9, 2013 when, while driving to work in personal vehicle at around 10:50 p.m., applicant stopped at scene of motor vehicle accident on way to work to assist occupant of vehicle that had flipped onto its side - Knee injury allegedly resulted because applicant had to climb onto, and then into, overturned vehicle, and then had to kick through windshield to remove himself and injured occupant from vehicle - ADR application asserted that a total knee replacement was required as result of this injury, and that resulting disability consisted of inability to perform essential duties of position, which application listed as lifting, carrying, squatting, kneeling, climbing, pivoting, walking, and sitting - Applicant asserted that supervisor "activated" him (meaning, presumably, that while off-duty he called in the incident, was logged into the EMT dispatch system, an incident report was to be generated, and he was assigned to that incident) - Main job duty of EMT-Telecommunicator was to control and coordinate communications on designated EMS channels and, "[i]n addition to responding to emergencies and providing care," carrying out order of Dispatch Operations Supervisor and Command staff, receiving, screening and evaluating requests for EMT service and determining response requirements, operating radio, telephone and computer systems, taking 911 calls and dispatching ambulances, notifying public safety agencies such as police, fire, marine and air rescue services when their response was required, and directing ambulances, aircraft and marine units entering the region with critical patients to proper routes, airports, docks and hospitals - EMT Telecommunicator typically worked at EMT Dispatch Center and did not work in an ambulance, and occasionally gave emergency care, such as when an injured person entered, or was brought to, the Dispatch Center - Employer statement regarding ADR application stated that EMT telecommunicator position did not require any lifting or bending, and work required was primarily receiving and dispatching 911 calls;- in addition, applicant was working as of June 9, 2013 on a modified duty assignment in dispatch operations, had been reasonably accommodated since 2008 due to a prior unrelated health issue, and could return to his telecommunicator position in Dispatch Operations - Medical panel majority (two orthopedists) opined that applicant was physically incapable of performing essential duties of job, disability was likely to be permanent, and incapacity might be the natural and proximate result of the injury he alleged, but one of them described applicant's position as "EMT," not EMT telecommunicator, and stated that in view of applicant's knee injuries and multiple knee-related surgeries, including a total right knee arthroplasty in May 2014, it did not appear that he could return to his prior work capacity at present or in the future "as an EMT" - Unclear whether this panel member realized that applicant was an EMT telecommunicator, rather than an EMT who worked in an ambulance - Second orthopedist opined that applicant was completely

disabled from performing any job, because limitation of motion in right knee would make him uncomfortable even in sitting position - Occupational medicine physician opined that applicant was not physically incapable of performing essential duties of job because, per employer's job description, he had been working a sedentary administrative job in an ergonomically-designed work space dispatching calls, and was fully capable of performing that work; in addition, he described applicant as having told him that he felt a "pop" in his right knee when he lowered himself into the overturned vehicle, and that he and a state trooper at the accident scene "together broke out" the car's windshield, a narrative he had dictated in the applicant's presence during the examination - During subsequent examination related to worker's compensation claim in January 2015, applicant told independent medical examiner that he had felt a pop in his knee when he jumped down into the overturned vehicle, and that he had used his right leg to kick out the windshield while the trooper attempted to smash the windshield with a device he had - Following a hearing, retirement board denied the ADR application on ground that applicant could perform duties of sedentary EMT telecommunicator - There were other instances of discrepancies in the applicant's various descriptions of how the knee injury occurred, including in his workers' compensation application and his ADR application (which related that he had climbed down into the overturned vehicles), and what various treating and examining physicians related the applicant as having said (that he had jumped down into the vehicle) - These sources also presented inconsistent versions of how applicant had injured his knee (by entering the vehicle, whether by climbing or jumping down into it, or by kicking out the windshield), and his post-hearing brief did not take a position as to what had caused his alleged knee injury - It was also unclear whether, and if so, when, applicant had felt a "pop" in his knee during the June 9, 2013 incident, as knee-popping was mentioned in the medical notes of several physicians and in the applicant's testimony both before DALA and the Department of Industrial Accidents, but it was not mentioned in the Worker's Compensation Services Report of Occupational Injury or Accident that the applicant signed, in his worker's compensation application, and in several statements by physicians who had mentioned the knee popping elsewhere, and in addition applicant did not mention knee-popping to the EMTs who treated the cuts he sustained while assisting the overturned vehicle occupant on June 9, 2013 - Also unclear was whether applicant had kicked the windshield or whether the trooper had removed it using a tool and then peeling the windshield up, which indicated that he did not kick through the windshield - Applicant had burden of proving that he sustained a disabling knee injury on July 9, 2013, but failed to do so - Applicable policy and procedure manual's description of EMT telecommunicator position made clear that while persons holding this position might be needed to provide emergency care, he was not required to do so, and that EMT telecommunicator who used a wheelchair, cane or walker who declined to provide medical care would not be disciplined - Although applicant was performing an EMT function on June 9, 2013, he was not performing his duty as he was not required, as an EMT telecommunicator, to provide emergency medical care when he came across an emergency, and there was no evidence that he was actually activated

to duty as an EMT other than his own testimony that he was - As the evidence showed that he was not performing a duty on June 9, 2013, and because the applicant did not prove that he was injured on that date or that any such injury disabled him, denial of his ADR application was affirmed.

Benoit v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-426, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 5, 2018).

Insufficient evidence of permanent work-related disability - Municipal police officer - During employment with Town A, history of lower back injuries and pain while on duty between 2007 and 2014, each followed by being placed on leave and then returning to work, during incidents that included including diving into improperly parked vehicle that was rolling downhill in order to stop it on August 22, 2007, bending over to lift and clear broken parts of crashed vehicle from road on October 24, 2011, and jumping 12-15 feet into water to rescue a drowning individual in May 2013, after which he was deemed fit for active duty as a police officer - Hired by Town B as patrol officer in July 2014 and deemed to be probationary for one year after - Lower back re-injured while performing routine workout in police department's on-site gym on August 9, 2014, resulting in severe pain causing difficulty in walking and bowel incontinence - Despite this pain, officer proceeded to go out on scheduled cruiser patrol on same day with another officer - Due to extreme pain, officer remained in cruiser during response to minor noise complaint involving local bar, which the other officer handled, and was shaking, sweating and suffering through stabbing pain in lower back - After noise complaint was resolved, police officer and other officers had to run to break up a fight in front of the bar, and officer collapsed in pain - Upon returning home after shift ended, officer laid down on floor, could not get up again for remainder of night, and struggled to move the next morning, necessitating emergency room visit and, a day later, was taken by ambulance to hospital on August 11, 2014 due to extreme pain - MRI showed degenerative changes, annular tear and diffuse disc bulge at L5-S1 and diagnosis of degenerative disease of lumbar spine with radiculopathy - Filed injury report, was placed on leave, and remained out of work and collected benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F, during which time he experienced another episode of pain-induced bowel incontinence - X-rays taken in September 2014 revealed multi-level degenerative disc disease in lumbar spine, with diagnosis of lumbar spondylosis with lower back pain - Treatment in pain management program through December 2014, when orthopedist related officer's complaint of constant aching, stabbing, sharp and nagging bilateral back pain to degenerative disc changes at L5-S1 that included disc herniation and some mild facet arthropathy, and adminsitered a lumbar interlaminar epidural steroid injection - Cleared for full duty work without restrictions on January 15, 2015 - Worked from January 2015 until late spring or early summer of 2015, when pain returned, legs went numb, and officer had trouble wearing 22-pound duty vest - Stopped working and was placed initially on administrative leave in June 2015, and then terminated from

employment by police chief on June 30, 2015, for failing to disclose long-term injuries he sustained during his prior employment as officer with Town A during the hiring process with the Town B police department, and also becuase he had used his entire amount of accrued vacation, comp tme and sick leave and had beceom a scheduling b urden for the department, as well as being seen at a bar during a m otorcycle meeting while he was on sick leave in May 2015, and going on extended vacation out-of-state while he was on leave and collecting section 111F benefits in 2014 - Following termination, unable to obtain employment as police officer - Applied for accidental disability benefits on February 16, 2016 based upon injuries sustained on August 22, 2007 and jumping into rolling vehicle to stop it, bending over to lift and clear broken parts of crashed vehicle from road on October 24, 2011, both while working as police officer for Town A, and while working out in Town B police department gym on August 9, 2014 - Per statement by treating physician in support of ADR application, officer had not been able to work since June 2015 and that lower back pain had flared up in summer of 2015 during his attempt to return to work - Medical panel comprising three orthopedic surgeons issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to incapacity from performing essential duties, likely permanence of this disability, and work-related causation (incapacity might be the natural and proxiate result of the work injuries on which ADR retirement was claimed) - Narrative report of one of the panel members referred to "series of events" on August 9, 2014 during course of officer's employment "ending in a fight in which [the officer] was involved that evening - Retirement Board denied ADR application on February 28, 2017 - Denial affirmed on appeal to DALA - Former officer did not show by preponderance of evidence that accidents or injuries on which he based ADR application caused him permanently-disabling personal injury, since he returned to work and resumed all of the essential functions of a police officer following the 2007 and 2011 injuries, and was cleared for return to work without restriction following the August 2014 injury - Following injury in police department gym on August 9, 2014, officer was in position to mitigate his injury by reporting it but chose not to disclose injury or resulting discomfort, as he was still within probationary period of employment - Officer was not in actual performance of duties when he re-injured his back during routine gym workout - Under current retirement scheme, employers routinely expect employees to try and remain in optimum physical health, take routine lunch and rest room breaks, and transport themselves to and from work, and none of these activities are considered to be in the actual performance of the employees' duties - In addition, no medical evidence that officer was advised to retire based upon disability before June 30, 2015 based upon total and permanent disability as a result of worsening pain, and in fact he applied for a position with another town police department - Inference is that officer believed at the time that he was capable of performing duties of police officer - Despite unanimous afformative medical panel, therefore, there was no permanent disability on which officer could base his ADR application when he left Town B police department in June 2015 - If back pain became permanently disabling afterward, it was a subsequently-matured disability that could not be the basis for an accidental disability retirement, per *Vest v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd*., 41

Mass. App. 191, 668 N.E.2d 1356 (1996).

Marathas v. Dukes County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-096, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2018).

Insufficient evidence of disability - Former first-grade public school teacher - Emotional disability (post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and panic attacks) based on single incident at school where teacher worked on March 13, 2012—Alleged verbal abuse by school janitor during "code blue" at school (emergency or potential emergency of a medical nature requiring students and faculty to clear the hallways and retreat to classrooms or offices so paramedics could respond without obstruction and so that circumstances surrounding the medical condition were not revealed) - Janitor responsible for assuring that hallways were clear when code blue was called - Upon encountering teacher leading pupils through hallway to classroom, a departure from school's code blue procedure, janitor ordered her to get her students out of the hallway, allegedly while screaming loudly and calling her "moron" - Immediately following incident, teacher experienced shortness of breath, racing heart, nausea, development of body rash and elevated blood pressure, and was taken by wheelchair to school nurse, after which she was taken home by daughter - Teacher unable to work for five weeks - PTSD diagnosis by primary care physician, who prescribed anti-anxiety medications - Workers' Compensation benefits denied, but teacher received compensation for 29 sick days per M.G.L. c. 152, § 29 agreement - Following return to work, teacher felt school minimized event and that she was being called a liar and described as having "freaked out" and taken a leave of absence - Encountered janitor at school several times without experiencing "major inner feelings" - Positive attendance record through end of school year without suffering panic attack - Per teacher's licensed mental health counselor, all symptoms had resolved and no follow-up counseling sessions were requested - Primary care physician recorded that teacher was disabled at time of incident during "Code Blue" at school but that disability did not appear to be permanent and that teacher could return to school - Teacher opted to retire after school year ended and apply for accidental disability benefits based upon PTSD as a result of verbal assault in workplace, and asserted that after returning to work, seeing the janitor had resulted in further panic attacks and that school principal had harassed her and attempted to intimidate her, and that she was unable to perform any job because she was required to take "serious medicine" to treat her condition - Medical panel comprising two psychiatrists and a neurologist issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to disability, its work-related causation and its likely permanence, based primarily upon teacher's assertions during examination by panel members, and panel members' impression that being around children or in a school situation triggered unmanageable anxiety to the point that the teacher would be unable to concentrate on her work and her interactions with students and other school personnel, that she could not even approach the school without incapacitating anxiety, and that there was no likelihood of significant improvement of her condition in the

foreseeable future despite appropriate treatment for over a year - Upon questions posed by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, medical panel responded that it had no evidence as to whether teacher was disabled on last day of employment, and that in view of teacher's confusing accounts, it was impossible to opine as to any possible connection between her encounter with janitor during "code blue"and her condition following the incident- Panel also responded that although medical history showed teacher had experienced stress and stress-caused physical symptoms as far back as 1995, when she was raising her own children, and had continuing intermittently, her anxiety had not abated to point where she could perform her job as of June 2012, and that members panel stood by their original unanimous affirmative certificate - Notwithstanding unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate, teacher failed to prove that she was totally and permanently disabled on last date of her employment, based upon (a) return to work and ability to face janitor without major negative inner feelings, (b) voluntary cessation of visits to her social worker who reported that teacher's symptoms had resolved, (c) no request by teacher to employer for accommodations in order to carry out duties through remainder of school year, (d) no evidence of inability to perform essential duties of position through school year's end, and (e) report by teacher's primary care physician after school year ended that while she was disabled after the code blue incident in March 2012, she was not permanently disabled and would be returning to work - Janitor performed delegated code blue responsibilities in directing teacher and her pupils to clear hallway, albeit forcefully - No evidence that teacher was justified in leading students through hallway after code blue was called - No evidence that janitor knew or should have known that his conduct would likely cause emotional distress - Conduct not extreme, outrageous or beyond all possible bounds of decency - No evidence that workplace hostility teacher perceived upon returning to work after incident went beyond degree of workplace friction and ill will common to many occupations and rose to level of injury sustained in workplace - That teacher felt startled, embarrassed or disrespected by janitor during code blue incident did not suffice to show that she had sustained compensable personal injury at the time or was disabled on last day of work.

Perez v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-155, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 30, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of disability - Maintenance worker at correctional facility - Ankle sprain while spreading ice melt and sand on correctional facility steps - Return to work with varying degrees of foot pain, and ankle pain and stiffness, and ability to run, walk and stand - Varying diagnoses of treating physicians, including adult acquired flatfoot deformity - without finding of permanent work-related disability or of worker having reached an end result in terms of treatment or ability to continue work with limitations on standing or use of supportive footwear - No imaging studies showing bone fracture - Whole body bone scan three years after injury showed degenerative changes in ankles and mid-feet - Worker performed duties at work for

eight months before resigning from job - No evidence that worker was totally and permanently disabled on last day of work, which was four years after injury - Some evidence that worker argued with supervisor before resigning - Unanimous negative medical panel as to disability from performing essential job duties - No evidence panel members lacked pertinent facts including worker's job description and medical records or applied erroneous standards, or that conclusion as to lack of disability was plainly wrong - No entitlement to review by new medical panel.

MacGeachey v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket Nos. CR-13-403, CR-16-220, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 21, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of disability - District Attorney support staff at district court performing data entry, document scanning and duplication, case file preparation, general office and administrative support work - Right arm strain/frozen shoulder syndrome/rotator cuff tear while organizing file cabinet - Improved range of motion and decrease in pain level following rotator cuff surgery - Unanimous negative certificate as to disability by medical panel (2 orthopedic surgeons, one pain management physician) - No evidence that panel applied erroneous standard or lacked pertinent facts - Panel examination revealed modest range of motion loss in arm and shoulder - Medical records showed no large rotator cuff tears or post-surgical lifting requirements - Insignificant omissions from records given to medical panel members - Omissive job description describing receptionist's position without mentioning file management responsibility countered by employee's full description of duties to panel members, including frequently lifting and carrying files weighing 10-15 pounds, and panel's evaluation of file weight and range of motion needed to carry and lift files - Sufficient basis in medical records reviewed, and from employee's responses to questions during panel's examination, from which panel members could conclude that surgery had helped her despite lacking operative report - Panel's unchanged opinion following subsequent review of missing documents supplied by retirement board - No showing that further examination by medical panel would have provided new information material to disability - Request for new medical panel denied - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

Henry v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-530, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 21, 2016)

Insufficient evidence of disability - Developmental Service Worker - Knockdown during work shift during attempted contact by mentally-challenged male group home resident - Lower back injury resolving over time - Post-injury surveillance video showing bending and lifting (picking up large parcels, pushing shopping carts, placing packages of various sizes into vehicle) - No complaint of shoulder injury or pain during physical therapy sessions following injury - Insufficient proof of total and

permanent disabling injury sustained during employment.

Schofield (Debra) v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-494, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 6, 2016)

Disability (Disabling Injury or Hazard Sustained While in Performance of Duties) - Sufficient Proof

[no current entries]

Permanence of Disabling Work-Related Injury

Accidental disability retirement - Denial of accidental disability retirement based upon insufficient proof of disabling work-related injury's likely permanence, based upon refusal to undergo repeat surgery on left shoulder injured in slip-and-fall accident at work, reversed - Special education / Grades 2 and 3 public elementary school teacher - Duties required bending, squatting, kneeling, light lifting, standing and sitting - Injured during fall on puddle of water near her office at school while moving between two work tasks - With no genuine dispute as to occurrence of shoulder injury in early October 2013 while in performance of duties, main issue was whether teacher's shoulder injury rendered her permanently incapable of performing essential job duties - Application for accidental disability retirement filed in May 2014 - In late July 2014, following physical therapy for left shoulder that reduced pain minimally, and MRI showing high grade partial thickness rotator cuff tear, and diagnosis of possible adhesive capsulitis (frozen shoulder), teacher underwent left shoulder arthroscopic surgery, manipulation under anesthesia, capsular release, debridement, acromioplasty, and rotator cuff surgery - Subsequent MRI showed that surgery repaired the rotator cuff, but left shoulder range of motion remained limited, and shoulder movement remained painful - Physician who performed independent medical examination (relative to workers' compensation application) opined that left shoulder disability might be permanent or would continued for indefinite period, and recommended physical therapy to avoid a frozen shoulder - Teacher experienced considerable pain when she performed some physical therapy at home, and experienced improved ability to move shoulder following Depo Medrol (Methylprednisolone, an anti-inflammatory glucocorticoid) injection and 1 cc of ½ % Sensorcaine in left shoulder in late November 2014, and teacher received physical therapy, but she had limited exercise tolerance - Functional capacity evaluation in late January 2015 showed limited left shoulder range of motion and inability to perform full duty as Special Education teacher, or even performance below a sedentary level of physical demand with regard to load handling, and recommendation was pain management program to maximize

functional capacities - Orthopedic specialist who had treated teacher since shortly after her injury noted, in early April 2015, lack of improvement in left should range of motion, as well as considerable decline in flexibility, and he discussed potential benefit from further surgery (manipulation under anesthesia, and arthroscopic capsular release) to address loss of motion, but also noted that further surgery could worsen teacher's left shoulder condition, including arm breakage during manipulation - Second independent medical examiner concluded, in mid-April 2015, that teacher would be at medical end result if she declined surgery, and that basis for second surgery was unclear because first surgery did not significantly improve teacher's condition, and it was unlikely that condition would improve substantially from a second procedure; in addition, teacher had poor therapy tolerance, and major complaint was pain and sensitivity, even during examination, and it was unlikely that manipulation would resolve this - Based upon this opinion, municipality in which teacher worked declined to pay for second surgery, and teacher declined further surgery because of risk of worsening her left shoulder condition - Medical panel comprising three orthopedic surgeons examined teacher in January 2015 - Panel majority concluded that left shoulder injury was causally related to teacher's job, had significantly restricted shoulder motion, had left teacher unable to perform essential duties of her job, and that incapacity was likely to be permanent - Third panel member disagreed as to permanence of disability and inability to perform job duties, thought that teacher's frozen shoulder needed further treatment, and estimated 10-12 months for recovery - Following further examination by all three medical panel members in February 2016 at retirement board's request, panel majority remained convinced that teacher's left shoulder disability and inability to perform essential job duties were permanent - Minority panel member modified stance as to permanence by noting that although second surgery could potentially help, teacher did not want to proceed this way due to risk of potential complications including breaking her arm, and that without the additional surgery, incapacity due to left shoulder injury was likely to be permanent - Upon request for clarification by board as to disability's permanence, teacher's orthopedic specialist stated that he could not be certain that further left shoulder surgery would allow teacher to return to her work, but thought it more likely than not that she would be able to do so, although recovery would not be possible immediately following surgery and that teacher would require use of a home continuous passive motion machine, as well as frequent physical therapy immediately following surgery, to maintain shoulder motion - Upon further questions by board regarding risks and benefits of second arthroscopic surgery, medical panel minority member identified standard risks of surgery (including infection, blood vessel and nerve injury, stiffness, deep venous thrombosis, or fracture or dislocation) as less than five percent, and that if teacher obtained "ultimate improvement" from the second surgery she would likely be able to return to her job because it was relatively sedentary" - Board denied ADR benefits based upon teacher's failure to prove that her disabling injuries were permanent - Denial reversed on appeal to DALA - As a result of modifying her originally negative opinion as to the disabling shoulder injury's permanence, third panel member changed panel's majority affirmative certificate as

to permanence to a unanimously affirmative certificate, even though the panel member added caveat that disability would be permanent if teacher declined a second surgery (which she had done) - Evidence sufficed to show that in her present condition, without repeat surgery, teacher's disability due to her left shoulder injury was permanent - In declining repeat surgery, teacher did not unreasonably refuse standard or routine medical care that was not inherently dangerous and that would probably effect a cure by rendering her disability temporary - Although treatment of frozen shoulder by manipulation under anesthesia was a standard treatment for that condition, teacher had already undergone that procedure, as well as physical therapy, pain management and a steroid injection, none of this had worked particularly well for her, and although it had repaired her rotator cuff, treatment had neither increased the mobility of her shouldern or relieved her shoulder pain, and physical therapy had proved to be painful and was not well-tolerated - Although surgery to correct a problem that arose during the first surgery might be reasonable, that would not be the objective here, and instead it would do little more than repeat a surgery that had already proven ineffective, as one of the independent examiners noted - There was disagreement among the examining physicians as to the value of a repeat surgery, and repeating it raised a real risk of further or worsened injury, including breaking the arm - There was also no certainty that the second surgery would result in left shoulder improvement sufficient to allow the teacher to perform her job again, particularly since the shoulder's condition had deteriorated after the first surgery, repeat surgery would have to be followed by physical therapy and six months of recovery before there could be a return to teaching, and the underlying assumption was that teacher's duties were relatively sedentary ones - Retirement statute required that ADR applicant demonstrate that disabling injury was likely to be permanent, not that it certainly would remain so - Evidence showed that as things now stood, applicant could not perform duties of a special education teacher, and there was insufficient evidence that repeating a surgery that had not healed her shoulder would allow her to resume her teaching duties - With likelihood that disability due to work-related injury was permanent shown sufficiently, teacher was eligible to receive ADR benefits.

Delinsky v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-596, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 1, 2019).

Aggravation of pre-existing injury (knee osteoarthritis) - Public works department laborer - Knee injury (twisting and medial meniscus tear) sustained on the job - Unanimous negative panel finding as to causation - Medical panel error requiring examination by new panel - Plainly wrong conclusion and application of incorrect standard - Attribution of injury to weight and deconditioning without medical record support - Unreasonable expectation that weight loss and strength training would allow performance of essential job duties despite ineffectiveness of post-injury physical therapy.

Cayo v. West Springfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-468, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

School custodian - Elbow, forearm and shoulder injury sustained on job - Permanence of injury - Medical panel error - Negative panel majority finding as to permanence of disability - Application of incorrect standard (medical certainty, rather than likelihood, of disability's permanence) - Ongoing pain evaluation not preclusive of disability's likely permanence.

Lanni v. Everett Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-116, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 19, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of permanence - Department of Developmental Services Developmental Service Worker I - Non-disabling knee, shoulder and arm injuries sustained while lifting or assisting clients at developmental facilities over several years prior to retirement, each time returning to full-time work - Full-duty work without accommodation prior to retirement - Disability retirement application based upon inability to lift or transfer group home residents, or perform outdoor maintenance duties, due to COPD, emphysema, severe arthritis, and numbness and pain in shoulder - Insufficient evidence of permanent disability on last day of work - Absence of medical evidence - Social Security disability award based upon disability under federal law on day after superannuation retirement became effective - Not persuasive of permanent disability on last day of work - History of return to full-time work, and performance of full-time work without accommodations, persuasive of no permanent disability on last work day - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

Closser v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-111, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 24, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of permanence - Housing Authority maintenance worker - Left shoulder injury - Pain first while lifting heavy bag of trash into dumpster, then while removing mowing deck from tractor - Questionable subscapularis tear - History of other injuries and underlying cervical spondylosis - Medical panel - Negative majority panel finding as to job-related causation - No improper panel composition, or application of improper standard or other panel error - Denial of accidental disability retirement benefits affirmed.

Soldi v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-525, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 20, 2016).

Insufficient evidence of causation - Housing authority maintenance worker - Left shoulder injury - Refusal to undergo recommended surgery for torn rotator cuff - No disqualification from receiving a disability retirement - Medical providers disagreed as to existence of rotator cuff tear warranting surgical intervention, or whether shoulder pain resulted from arthritis and/or cervical pathology - Academic issue - Medical panel did not issue positive certification as to disability's job-related causation.

Soldi v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-525, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 20, 2016).

"Without Serious or Willful Misconduct" on Applicant's Part

M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) requires that the Petitioner have not engaged in "serious and willful misconduct" when disabling, permanent work-related injury occurred, in order for accidental disability benefits to be granted.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018, *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

In order to prove willful misconduct on part of accidental disability retirement applicant when he was injured while in performance of employment duties, retirement board would have to establish facts to support its claim that accidental disability retirement applicant acted with deliberate indifference to probable grave injury when he was injured.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel, on account of serious or willful misconduct by petitioner when he was injured, and because injury did not occur while petitioner was in performance of his duties, reversed, initially with remand to retirement board for purpose of having medical panel convened, and then (after applicant's examination by medical panel several years earlier and panel's issuance of affirmative certificate as to disability, permanence and work-related causation was brought to the Administrative Magistrate's attention), decision amended to direct that board grant the accidental disability retirement application - Town Highway Department heavy equipment operator - Permanently

disabling right shoulder injury - Failure to wear seat belt while in highway department vehicle being towed - Following breakdown of 18,000-pound dump truck equipped with snow plow that he was operating in rain and snow storm in February 2008, and vehicle's attachment with single chain to front-end loader towing it to highway department repair shop, petitioner remained in cab of disabled dump truck, at the direction of Highway Superintendent, who was also his supervisor, and in accordance with highway department practice, to steer and brake vehicle to prevent collision with towing vehicle - Petitioner not wearing seat belt - Upon failure of disabled vehicle's brakes during towing, dump truck rear-ended front-end loader, throwing petitioner forward and causing him to re-injure his right shoulder, which was injured previously in July 2007 when, while at work, he slipped on fuel oil upon exiting truck - Although failure to wear one's seatbelt generally is a violation of M.G.L. c. 90, § 13A, M.G.L. c. 90, § 14A(e) provides that anyone involved in the operation of taxis, liveries, tractors and trucks with a gross weight of 18,000 pounds or over is exempt from the provision in Section 13 requiring use of seat belts - Petitioner's failure to fasten seat belt while his 18,000-pound dump truck was being towed did not violate seat belt statute, therefore, did not establish willful, wanton and reckless misconduct upon which retirement board could base its denial of his accidental disability retirement application - Petitioner's injury occurred while in performance of his duties, as he was still involved in returning plow truck when it collided with front-end loader towing it to the garage.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

—Medical Panel Review

Generally

When convened to evaluate an accidental disability retirement application, medical panel is vested with responsibility for determining medical questions beyond the common knowledge and experience of the members of loca retirement board's members.

Delinsky v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-596, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 1, 2019).

Medical panel must find applicant to be permanently disabled either from work-related injury or hazard in order for applicant to qualify for accidental disability

retirement benefits, and there can be no award of such benefits without medical panel's positive certificate as to permanence of disabling injury sustained during employment.

Delinsky v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-596, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 1, 2019).

In reviewing accidental disability retirement application, examining applicant and issuing certificate as to whether applicant was totally and permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of her position as a result of a personal injury sustained or hazard undergone while in the performance of her duties, medical panel's function is to determine medical questions which are beyond the common knowledge and experience of the local retirement board or Appeal Board.

Carlson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-160, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 12, 2018), *citing Malden Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd*., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 298 N.E.2d 902 (1961).

Unless the medical panel employs an erroneous standard or fails to follow proper procedures, or unless its certificate is "plainly wrong," the local retirement board may not ignore the panel's medical findings.

Carlson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-160, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 12, 2018), *citing Kelley v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board,* 341 Mass. 611, 171 N.E. 2d 277 (1961).

Without a thorough understanding of the ADR applicant's actual job requirements, the medical panel majority could not possibly perform an adequate assessment of her condition and assess her ability to perform her essential job duties, and its findings as to total and permanent incapacity due to a work-related injury or hazard undergone can carry no weight.

Carlson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-160, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 12, 2018)

Initial Panel Review

Denial of accidental disability retirement (ADR) application without convening medical panel affirmed - Police officer - Application filed on August 5, 2015 based

upon hypertension, myocardial dysfunction and kidney disease, with officer unable to perform essential duties after May 15, 2015 - Application supported by twp statements from treating physician, one (dated April 15, 2015) stating that officer was last able to perform essential duties on April 15, 2015 due to high blood pressure and previous myocardial infarction, and the other (dated May 15, 2015) stating that officer was last able to perform essential duties on May 15, 2015 due to hypertension and myocardial dysfunction - Although officer was admitted to hospital and treated for high blood pressure (240/140) and a hypertensive emergency with complaints of blurry vision, headache and chest pains in early October 2014, he was discharged following extensive treatment on October 14, 2014 with blood pressure of 156.89, and city physician cleared officer to return to work without restriction one week later with blood pressure of 140/88 - On April 15, 2015, when officer was on duty without restrictions, he injured right ring finger while assisting partner with fastening handcuffs on arrested person, requiring use of finger splint for several weeks and resulting in placement on leave on same day pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F, which was his last day of work - Record was without evidence that any doctor declared officer unfit to perform essential duties due to hypertension and heart disease prior to finger injury on April 15, 2015, or up to time he filed ADR application in August 2015 - Officer was bound by facts asserted in ADR application, and could not change date of alleged total and permanent incapacity, or date on which he became unfit to perform essential duties, after application was denied - Statements by treating physician giving two different dates of incapacity and ascribing it to hypertension and related condition were without support in medical records or physician's statement declaring officer unfit for duty.

Brace v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-561, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 19, 2018).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel on account of serious or willful misconduct by petitioner when he was injured, and because injury did not occur while petitioner was in performance of his duties, reversed, and matter remanded to board for purpose of having medical panel convened - Town Highway Department heavy equipment operator - Failure to wear seat belt while in highway department vehicle being towed - Following breakdown of 18,000-pound dump truck equipped with snow plow that he was operating in rain and snow storm in February 2008, and vehicle's attachment with single chain to front-end loader towing it to highway department repair shop, petitioner remained in cab of disabled dump truck, per direction of supervisor and highway department practice, to steer and brake vehicle to prevent collision with towing vehicle - Petitioner not wearing seat belt - Upon failure of disabled vehicle's brakes during towing, dump truck rear-ended front-end loader, throwing petitioner forward and causing him to re-injure his right shoulder, which was injured previously in July 2007 when, while at work, he slipped on fuel oil upon exiting truck - Although failure to wear one's seatbelt generally is a

violation of M.G.L. c. 90, § 13A, M.G.L. c. 90, § 14A(e) provides that anyone involved in the operation of taxis, liveries, tractors and trucks with a gross weight of eighteen thousand pounds or over is exempt from the provision in Section 13 requiring use of seat belts - Petitioner's failure to fasten seat belt while his 18,000-pound dump truck was being towed did not violate seat belt statute, therefore, did not establish willful, wanton and reckless misconduct upon which retirement board could base its denial of his accidental disability retirement application - Petitioner's injury occurred while in performance of his duties, as he was still involved in returning plow truck when it collided with front-end loader towing it to garage.

Sanko v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-659, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018), *confirmed by Amended Decision* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Entitlement to initial medical panel review of accidental disability retirement application - Former town highway department truck driver/laborer who began work in 1999 - Following complaints of left shoulder pain and limitations to his treating physician and a left shoulder MRI in December 2012, diagnosed with a complete rotator cuff tear and atrophy of the cranial muscle fibers - Last worked on or about August 29, 2013 - Employer's first report of injury dated December 23, 2013 gave injury date as September 6, 2013 and first day or total or partial incapacity as September 9, 2013 - Application for accidental disability retirement pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 7 filed on March 18, 2014 claiming disability due to "bilateral rotator cuff tears, lower right and left" as a result of a work hazard described as "cumulative stress of heavy work activities" - Employee received Workers' Compensation benefits pursuant t M.G.L. c. 152, § 34 from January 12, 2014 to May 14, 2014 based upon same disability - Retirement Board denied accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel, based on conclusion that right shoulder injury was exacerbation of prior injuries sustained originally in 2001 and 2002 and were time-barred, and his work had not exposed him to identifiable condition not common to all or to a great many occupations - Denial vacated and matter remanded for convening of medical panel to evaluate accidental disability retirement application - Threshold requirements for processing an accidental disability retirement application met, and burden of proving entitlement to evaluation by a regional medical panel sustained - Application was complete and included a physician's certification as to his total disability, its likely permanence, and its work-related causation - Employee's daily work , even during inclement weather and during the winter months, included heavy lifting, pushing, pulling, lifting and reaching above chest height (among other things, in the course of moving frames and grates used for drainage that weighed more than 100 pounds), shoveling tar, dirt, gravel and stone, driving trucks, operating a chain saw, and cutting and splitting wood either in a bucket loader or stockpile, and showed that his job was distinguishable from a great many occupations as well as from everyday life - By virtue of having been awarded Workers' Compensation benefits

related to cumulative stress in his left shoulder and the irreparable left shoulder rotator cuff tear, which was diagnosed in 2012, he fulfilled notice requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § (7)(1).

Sibley v. Franklin Regional Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-54, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2018).

To be entitled to a medical panel examination, employee must provide sufficient evidence which, if unrebutted and believed, would allow a factfinder to conclude that he was entitled to accidental disability retirement; in other words, the employee must make out a prima facie case to reach the medical panel stage, meaning that he must prove total and permanent disability by reason of a personal injury sustained or hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties at some definite place and at some definite time, and if the employee's injury was sustained due to serious and willful misconduct on his part, it is not considered to have been sustained while the employee was performing his duties.

Poirier v. New Bedford Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-503, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

In considering whether an employee was engaged in serious or willful misconduct when he suffered the injury on which his accidental disability retirement application was based, all immediately-attending circumstance should be considered - "Serious" refers to the conduct itself and not its consequences, and "willful" implies intent or such recklessness as is the equivalent of intent - Serious and willful misconduct is "conduct of a quasi-criminal nature, done intentionally while either knowing it was likely to result in serious injury or with a wanton and reckless disregard of its probably consequences - Violation of a law or regulation does not constitute serious and willful misconduct absent an admonition or contrary instruction - Likewise, an assumed violation of a policy statement, standing alone, does not rise to the level of serious and willful misconduct.

Poirier v. New Bedford Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-503, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel reversed, and retirement board directed to request that medical panel be convened to examine applicant - High school custodian - Knee and hip injury sustained in fall while attempting to close below-ground classroom window that was difficult to reach and required standing on ladder, chair and/or two-foot-wide "univent" heating unit - Issue whether use of chair and standing on univent, rather than using ladder, was

serious or willful misconduct negating entitlement to accidental disability retirement - Regular duties included closing windows, considered to be important task in terms of preventing vandalism, especially in first floor classrooms with ground-level windows - Failure to close windows could result in disciplinary action against custodians - Custodian covering for absent colleague noticed ground-level classroom window left fully open - Required reaching past 4-6 inch wide sill and pulling window inward - Although school administration advised using ladder to reach window, almost all school custodians, and their supervisor, used a chair to climb onto univent and pull window inward - Either method required standing on univent - Ladder placed person using it further from window with less leverage than standing on univent - Using chair was faster and made it unnecessary to carry ladder around from classroom to classroom - No custodians had been disciplined for not using ladder to close window - Plants placed on window sill by teacher obstructed clear access to windows - Custodian had alerted supervisor about this hazard previously, and supervisor had stated he would try to get them removed but for custodian to do the best he could until that happened - While attempting to pull window inward, one of the window tracks that helped control window opening and closing became stuck, causing custodian to lose grip on small window handle, and his elbow to strike one of the larger windowsill plants, in turn causing him to lose balance and fall, first to univent, and then to floor - Left knee and lower back injuries treated at hospital - Despite history of knee arthritis and right knee cartilage tear, custodian had performed job duties prior to accident without pain or restriction - Custodian and colleagues had previously closed this window without incident, and without moving plants on window sill - Accidental disability retirement application denied without convening medical panel because custodian was not in performance of job duties, and medical records indicated that injury was not permanent - In determining that custodian more likely was standing in univent while trying to close window than with one foot on univent and one on chair, greater weight was given to what custodian told supervisor immediately following accident, and what supervisor stated in accident report, than on report custodian filed a day later, when he was in a great deal of pain and could easily have made an error in describing how his injury occurred - Without question, custodian was performing one of his most important job duties, closing a classroom window, when he was injured, and was therefore in performance of his duties unless the way he tried to close the window in question is considered serious and willful misconduct - No such misconduct - Although use of ladder was only authorized method of closing window in question, ladders were used primarily for changing classroom light bulbs, most of custodian staff used a chair rather than a ladder to access window, and no custodian had been disciplined for doing so - Standing on univent was necessary to reach and close a fully-extended open window whether or not a ladder was used - Failure to move materials on univent and plants on sill did not rise to level of serious and willful misconduct, as custodian and colleagues had previously closed window in question nearly 100 times without moving any of these items, and items on univent did not contribute to custodian's fall - Failure to close window from outside was not serious or willful misconduct since window could not be locked from outside, and custodian

still would have had to come inside and climb up to window in order to lock it, and in addition, custodians were short-staffed and under pressure to complete assigned tasks and those they were performing for absent colleagues, and extra trips outside to close, but not lock, windows was not an efficient way to perform these tasks - Although it might be considered risky in retrospect, custodian's decision to attempt window closing as he did involved a calculated informed risk based upon his knowledge of and experience with closing the window in question, and was therefore reasonable in the circumstances rather than serous and willful misconduct, and he was therefore in the performance of his duties when he was injured.

Poirier v. New Bedford Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-503, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel affirmed - Public high school special education secretary - Increased work load, beginning in summer of 2011, due to budget-related layoff of four other information systems clerks - In addition to regular workload, secretary required to complete 150 student individualized education plans the laid off clerks did not complete, and, at school principal's directive, complete the middle school transportation list - Directive communicated to her in what she believed were "strident tones" - Overwhelmed by great expansion of work duties, secretary experienced symptoms including dizziness, increased anxiety and stress - Left job during lunch break, went home, and called school to say she would not be returning to work - Diagnosed by primary care physician with work-related adjustment disorder and advised not to return to work until further notice - Ultimately advised by primary care physician to return to work in part-time or light duty capacity - Met with principal, employee assistance program counselor and human resources office representative to plan her return to work, and requested personal and vacation days in addition to bereavement time due to father's death - Principal directed her to return to work on specific date and told secretary to speak with employee assistance program counselor if she needed extra time - Program counselor directed her to speak with the principal - Principal spoke in 'strident language" making secretary feel she was not welcome to return to work - During phone call from school reminding her to report for work on specific date, she responded that school principal did not want here to report to work - Despite further reminders from school to return to work, secretary did not do so or contact the school to arrange for resignation - Given reprimand and ultimately advised that termination proceedings had begun - Involuntarily terminated for position abandonment - Filed workers' compensation claim related to injury allegedly sustained when school principal told her in strident tones that in addition to regular and additional work she was assigned, she had to complete the transportation plan - Notwithstanding secretary's description of her workload as that of four other persons in addition to her own, independent medical examiner unable to determine her specific job assignments or whether they were unreasonable, and found her claims to be vague and indicative

of conflict with others at work, and also found her active daily and social life and the interests she pursued inconsistent with a significant mental disorder, and concluded that her condition was in remission or had resolved, and that she required no further mental health treatment - Accidental disability retirement application based upon post-traumatic stress disorder brought about by school principal's verbal abuse and feeling horror and helplessness as a result - Psychiatrist's physician's statement in support of application referred to secretary's being verbally attacked and intimidated by superior, preceded by hostile work environment, and stated that secretary had not made significant progress in 18 months of treatment including a daily drug regimen - Denied by retirement board without convening medical panel because secretary's claim did not constitute personal injury or hazard undergone while in performance of her duties - Denial affirmed - No witnesses to hostile work environment, verbal attacks or intimidation that secretary alleged - No corroborating evidence that principal or any other school staff ever verbally accosted secretary - Addition of middle school transportation list to secretary's duties was a bona fide personnel action taken as school wrestled with budget cuts - No proof that secretary was subject to identifiable condition that was not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations - Job conflicts with superiors and subordinates, despite generating feelings of persecution and unfair treatment and, ultimately, a diagnosed mental illness, were not different from wide variety of other occupations where employees faced similar pressures and demands - Alleged statements made by principal, such as "the job is not yours" and "nobody likes you," were not "extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society" and therefore did not meet standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress - Asking employee to do work for which they were not ordinarily responsible also not extreme or outrageous, even if employee felt anxious or depressed as a result - No proof that when secretary stopped working after being told to prepare transportation plan she did so due to medical condition on which accidental disability retirement application was based - Even if symptoms of that medical condition were experienced after last day she performed her duties, secretary would have, at best, a subsequently-matured disability that cannot form basis for disability retirement, as disability must mature no later than last day of performing job duties - No evidence that secretary was totally or permanently disabled on her last day of work due to work-related disabling conditions - As a result, secretary could not be retired based upon disability, as a matter of law, and denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel was therefore proper.

Faggioli v. Fall River Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-296, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 18, 2017).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel affirmed - Psychological or emotional injury - Municipal administrative assistant in city auditing office and, following transfer, in city purchasing office - Formal

complaint filed in initial position against supervisor alleging persistent abuse, including derogatory and foul language, aggressive physical behavior and harassment by supervisor - Counseling sought at time - Prescribed antidepressants - History of depression and antidepressant prescription, with apparent success - Following transfer to city purchasing office, micromanagement by new supervisor and subjection to attendance and telephone use monitoring, and deductions to the minute from lunch or breaks to which other employees were not subjected - Treatment for depression and stress by licensed social worker and EAP counselor, and by psychologist and social worker - Prescribed antidepressants and also medication for thyroid disorder - Absence from work due to diverticulitis and colitis - Progressively withdrawn and incapable of engaging in regular work or other activities - Ceased work on August 30, 2012 - Following workers' compensation-related examination by independent medical examiner and administration of MMPI-2 test (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test assessing personality traits and psychopathology of persons suspected of having mental health or other clinical issues), examining physician concluded that the employee did not suffer from acute psychiatric disorder related to work stress, was not mentally or emotionally unstable, and was subjectively claiming disability due to longstanding personality problems including passive-dependent style not related to work stress or injury, had negative work attitudes, exaggerated her symptoms, blamed others for her problems, could return to work if she was motivated to do so, and was malingering for secondary gain - Evaluation by impartial psychiatrist who diagnosed depression and maladaptive personality traits on the borderline and/or histrionic category, including obsessional manner of going over and over a litany of many prior perceived abuses and a relentless fixation on having been treated poorly by colleagues for over two decades, as well as opinion that the employee was temporarily psychiatrically disabled without having reached a psychiatric end point, and that although she may have suffered some degree of mistreatment by co-workers, there was no causal connection between her condition and the work events she described - Accidental disability retirement application asserted that on her last day of work (August 30, 2012) she was performing her regular job duties, office was short-staffed, and she was attempting to assure coverage in her department when the "last straw" occurred and her supervisor harassed her "multiple times" throughout the day, although she also detailed her harassment in her prior city auditor office position by her former supervisor, and she described circumstances, events or physical conditions contributing to her disability as including "cold sore, impetigo, PTSD, depression, insomnia, anxiety, can't focus, can't concentrate, cry all the time, obsessive talk of traumatic (thoughts, flashbacks), fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, nausea and throwing up, thyroid hypo, diverticulitis, colitis, nervousness, nightmares of work related incident" - Noncompliance with city's return-to-work order - City investigation of harassment allegations beginning in October 2012, in which employee declined to participate and her attorney did not respond to requests that she be interviewed, revealed no corroboration by co-workers of harassing behavior employee had alleged - Retirement board approved involuntary retirement application filed by city on her behalf due to absence with, but then without, leave for an extended period, and denied

accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel - No reliable evidence that employee was disabled as of last day she performed her duties - Employee stopped working voluntarily on August 30, 2012 - No proof that alleged disability was permanent and was causally related to her work - Findings and conclusions of independent medical examiners, including no permanent work-related disability despite maladaptive personality traits and lack of motivation to work, were not countered by evidence that employee was mentally disabled when she left employment after working on August 30, 2012 - Symptoms experienced after leaving work were irrelevant to whether employee was disabled on last work day.

Koerber v. Somerville Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-66. Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel affirmed - Psychological or emotional injury - Accountant IV/Financial Analyst - Alleged stress and anxiety due to workplace environment and staff retaliation for "whistleblowing" - Failure to articulate mental or emotional injury arising out of bona fide personnel action, or intentional infliction of emotional harm - Independent medical review for workmen's compensation review performed by psychiatrist negative as to psychiatric condition causally-related to event or events at workplace - No medical record support for work-related emotional injury.

Manning v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-325, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 29, 2016).

Application for accidental disability retirement properly denied without convening medical panel - Denial affirmed - Subsequently-matured disability - Retired firefighter - Accidental disability retirement application filed October 21, 2013, subsequent to superannuation retirement in April 2009 - Claimed "heart law presumption" for firefighters (M.G.L. c. 32, § 94) and history of atrial fibrillation as "hazard undergone" - No notice of injury filed with retirement board as to asserted heart-related injury (palpitations and chest pain experienced while climbing stairs during response to house fire in 2006, five years prior to filing of accidental disability retirement application) - No mention of these symptoms or of firefighters' on-site evaluation by EMTs in incident report regarding this fire - No notice of injury filed regarding cardiac event in May 2007 - Hospital records reported history of hypertension, but electrocardiogram following 2007 event showed no atrial fibrillation - Firefighter declined hospitalization and signed himself out of hospital against medical advice - No workers' compensation-related exception to failure to file written notice of injury because firefighters, as Group 4 members, are not eligible to receive workers' compensation - Exception to notice of injury requirement based upon record of injury sustained on file in fire department's official records inapplicable as claimant produced no such record - Atrial fibrillation diagnosed on January 9, 2009 (prior to

superannuation retirement), but followup EKG on January 29, 2009 showed regular heart rate and no atrial fibrillation, and firefighter was cleared to return to work - No treatment for atrial fibrillation until May 2010, subsequent to retirement, when attempt to correct this condition failed - Heart condition was, per the record, a disability that matured subsequent to retirement in 2009.

Benoit v. Everett Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-821, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Initial medical panel review denied - Municipal police chief - Hypertension and knee injury - Nonspecific date of alleged disability - Return to work following alleged disability - Ineligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits - Legal pointlessness of medical panel review.

Holland v. Malden Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-538, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 1, 2016).

Review by New Medical Panel

Denial of accidental disability retirement (ADR) application based upon inability to perform essential job duties on account of work injury to left hand and wrist vacated, and review by new medical panel ordered - Petitioner, a municipal traffic signal technician employed by public works department, was responsible for installing, repairing and maintaining traffic signals and related equipment, including repairing underground conduit lines, laying and rodding ducts, pulling or pushing signal cable, drilling and crawling through duct entrances, and lifting objects weighing over 25 pounds, all of which placed a burden on both wrists - Left hand and wrist injury, including left wrist distal radius fracture, sustained in February 2013 during slip and fall on ice while retrieving tools to repair a knocked-down traffic signal at street intersection -Petitioner was cleared to return to work, but experienced left wrist pain in vicinity of original injury when lifting heavy objects such as a traffic signal - Treating physician cleared petitioner for modified duty with restriction on lifting more than 10-15 pounds, but he was not offered modified duty by his supervisors - Petitioner ceased working in July 2013 and began physical therapy, but continued to experience left wrist pain and underwent left wrist arthroscopy and ulnar shortening osteotomy in October 2013- In January 2014, he indicated to physical therapist that he was unable to pull himself from a truck or climb a ladder, and could not use left hand as an assist to screw bolts - Independent medical evaluation in January 2015 showed continuing left wrist pain, which examining physician diagnosed as chronic dorso-ulnar wrist pain for which treatment had been reasonable but unsuccessful, and opinion that while petitioner could return to work, he required limitations on use of left hand and wrist - Petitioner filed accidental disability retirement application in

October 2015 on which he stated that upon returning to work during the spring of 2015, he could not perform his essential job duties - In employer's statement accompanying ADR application, municipal public works department supervisors stated that employee could not perform his essential job duties if her were reasonably accommodated, and that there were no other positions he could hold in the department - Orthopedic medical panel convened to evaluate ADR application issued certificate that was majority negative as to disability and its likely permanence, and stood by its conclusion when asked to clarify it - One of the two majority panel members as to absence of permanent disability opined, without referring to specific essential job functions, that employee was not physically incapable of performing the essential duties of his position - However, second panel majority member issued addendum stating that although employee did not have symptoms relevant to ulnar side if keft wrist where original injury occurred, he acknowledged that a full re-examination might be appropriate in view of recommendations of occupational therapist who performed functional capacity evaluation in January 2017 that showed limited ability to push or pull, limitations on reaching in all directions, handling gross manipulation and fingering with fine motor manipulation, all on account of continuing left wrist pain - First panel majority member criticized functional capacity evaluation's findings as "surprising and not consistent" with left distal fracture diagnosis, and did not change his opinion that employee could perform essential duties - Board denied ADR application - On appeal, DALA Administrative Magistrate concluded that petitioner was deprived of a proper medical panel evaluation, and that medical panel majority members applied erroneous standard by failing to take into account all of his essential, physically-demanding duties or account for the fact that there were no modified duty offerings by the municipal public works department, meaning that he could not return to work with the benefit of any of the lifting or other restrictions recommended by his treating medical professionals - The panel majority treated these limitations cursorily and one member did not explain satisfactorily why he discredited the more recent functional evaluation or state what a proper evaluation would be or what he would expect to learn from it - He also did not discuss what specific essential job duties petitioner could perform with limited use of his left hand - That second panel majority member acknowledged re-examination to be in order was a partial step back from his original negative conclusion as to total disability's absence, and left no negative panel majority as to permanent disability - As a result, denial of ADR was reversed, and matter was remanded to retirement board for convening of new medical panel, with panel members to be given petitioners' full job duty description and all records through the January 2017 functional capacity evaluation.

Astacio v. Springfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-17-521, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 8, 2019).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application based upon left shoulder pain reversed and review by new medical panel ordered - Former school nurse injured at

work by student who assaulted her - Change of affirmative panel opinion as to disability's likely permanence to majority negative opinion, after panel issued certificate, panel was questioned as to possibility of reasonable accommodation of injury, panel member ceased performing accidental disability retirement applications, and new panel member was appointed in his place - Applicant deprived of proper majority medical panel evaluation as to her left shoulder pathology and applicable job duties - Former school nurse, employed starting November 1995, was left-hand dominant - Job duties included dealing with all medical emergencies on campuses of two junior/senior high schools, including lowering students from desk chair to floor in medical emergencies, assisting students off floor and into wheelchair, and pushing wheelchair over grass, track surface, driveway and around school building, performing CPR and Heimlich maneuver, engaging in rapid response with medical bag and defibrillator, lifting objects weighing up to 40 pounds - Importance of school nurse's emergency response was underscored by fact that only one ambulance was available to service entire town - Nurse sustained prior left shoulder injury while walking through airport in 2004, requiring arthroscopic surgery with decompression to repair partial rotator cuff tear - Following that procedure, nurse returned to work, and worked without issues or need for accommodation, until January 19, 2012, despite persistent left shoulder fatigue and rotator cuff inflammation for which she received intermittent subachromial injections - While in her school office on January 19, 2012, nurse sustained left shoulder injury when student pushed through her office door after being involved in an altercation, and slammed nurse into a wall - X-rays taken at hospital emergency department revealed some degenerative changes but no acute fractures or malalignment - February 2012 MRI revealed supra and infraspinatus tendinopathy, with fluid in bicep sheath with split longitudinal area, along with some abnormal findings - School nurse attended physical therapy sessions through November 2012, and underwent a one-time left-sided intraarticular glenohumeral joint corticosteroid injection in early April 2012 that provided no relief - July 2012 left shoulder arthrogram revealed detachments of inferior aspect of anterior labrum, and superior sublabral recess - Physician who performed independent medical examination in August 2012 diagnosed chronic left shoulder joint pain and chronic left hand/finger numbness, and opinion that nurse had sustained labral tear as a result of the January 2012 incident at school, and could work full time with restrictions on lifting (no more than 10 pounds), pushing and pulling (no more than 25 pounds), no lifting above shoulder height utilizing the left upper extremity, and avoiding overhead reaching with left upper extremity - Nurse continued to complain of pain and weakness, stiffness, and decreased range of motion in left shoulder - Primary care physician reported in early September 2012 that nurse was not ready to return to work, as she would have difficulty performing CPR and needed to avoid overhead or repetitive-type lifting activities - Nurse stopped physical therapy in November 2012 due to continued pain - After orthopedist opined that nurse's left shoulder contusion had progressed into an adhesive capsulitis and recommended examination, manipulation and possible arthroscopic release with debridement, primary care physician performed left shoulder arthroscopy in February 2013 and nurse commenced third course of

physical therapy, which was discontinued in September 2013 due to continued pain and lack of progress - Left shoulder pain, weakness and stiffness continued and, beginning in August 2013 and continuing through March 2014, hospital medical records noted that nurse was likely to have a permanent partial disability in left shoulder and might never be able to return to work as school nurse - ADA interactive conferences involving school nurse, school principal and union representative were unable to resolve whether nurse's left shoulder injury could be accommodated reasonably in view of her lifting and other restrictions in using her left shoulder, and her essential job duties as school nurse - Principal informed nurse in September 2013 that she was being dismissed from her position as school nurse pursuant to M.G.L. c. 71, § 42 in view of her exhaustion of FMLA benefits and lack of success in attempting to accommodate her in manner that would allow her to perform her essential job functions - Nurse filed accidental disability retirement (ADR) application in November 2013 based upon left shoulder rotator cuff tendinitis, deconditioning and capsulitis caused by work injury suffered on January 19, 2012 - ADR application was supported by primary care physician, who stated that nurse could not perform "CPR/lifting/overhead/repetitive activity [left] arm" - Other physicians evaluated nurse and opined that work-related injury on January 19, 2012 was major cause of her left arm and shoulder injuries, which were disabling - Two of the three medical panel members found that school nurse was totally and permanently disabled from performing her essential duties, and that disability was such as might be the natural and proximate result of the injury she sustained at work on January 12, 2012 - The third panel member agreed as to disabled as a result of the January 2012 injury, but answered in the negative as to the disability, noted her previous diagnosis of cervical spondylosis of her neck with some left radiculitis, and opined that if her neck condition were treated with physical therapy, heat, electrical stimulation, ultrasound, massage and traction, most of her symptoms could be resolved so that she could return to her regular work - Subsequently, the two panel members comprising the affirmative panel majority answered questions from PERAC as to whether nurse's condition would improve with physical therapy in the negative, and maintained their position as to the likely permanence of the nurse's left shoulder injury and her inability to perform the essential duties of a school nurse, such as performing CPR or responding quickly in an emergency - Prior to a hearing by MTRS on the nurse's ADR application, MTRS counsel requested clarifications by medical panel members regarding accommodations offered by nurse's employer, including modifications of school nurse job description that allegedly made it unnecessary for nurse to perform CPR, lift, or reach for medications from medical cabinet, and allowed school to make arrangements with another nurse to perform those duties - One of the two majority affirmative panelists as to the disability's likely permanence did not change his position that the nurse was incapable of performing her essential duties; however, second panelist who opined affirmatively as to disability's permanence was no longer performing ADR application evaluations, and re-evaluation of job duties was performed by a different physician who, after evaluating nurse, opined that she was not totally disabled from performing her essential duties, which changed the panel's

opinion on this issue to a majority negative one - New physician did not review medical records before examining former nurse, told her to bring him "up to speed," opined to her that she had a sedentary job, and did not perform or observe physical examination, which was performed by his physical therapist while his back was turned and he took notes - New physician's subsequent report referred to 2004 MRI of former nurse's left shoulder and 2005 x-rays, neither of which were part of the medical record, in determining that as of January 2012 she had an old rotator cuff tear, degenerative shoulder changes and high-grade tear of supraspinatus tendon as of January 19, 2012, and diagnosing degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder - New physician's opinion changed panel majority as to likely permanence of former nurse's disability from affirmative to negative - MTRS denied ADRS application subsequently because former nurse did not have a proper affirmative medical panel majority opinion as to the shoulder injury's likely permanence - As to panel's ultimately-negative majority opinion as to the likely permanence of nurse's shoulder-related disability, panel majority's errors included reliance upon (1) proposed job accommodations that were not offered before nurse was terminated from her employment in 2013, and (2) school nurse job description, not in place when former nurse was employed, that eliminated requirements of performing CPR and Heimlich maneuver, as well as pushing and pulling requirements, as well as (3) unreasonableness of belief that sole school nurse for junior and senior high schools in a one-ambulance town who was responsible for entire school staffs and student bodies would not actually be required to perform life-saving CPR or Heinrich maneuver in emergencies, despite formal job description - Panel majority was therefore without a complete or accurate understanding of essential duties that former nurse would have actually had to perform on a regular basis, despite her shoulder-related limitations and, as a result, it applied an erroneous standard in determining that her incapacity was not permanent - Panel majority also did not explain how former nurse could be expected to carry out her essential duties despite her limited range of motion and chronic shoulder pain without injuring herself or jeopardizing the welfare of those coming under her care - New panel physician member also did not himself examine the former nurse and relied upon medical records that were not part of the case record - Panel majority also ignored medical records showing that former nurse obtained little or no relief from physical therapy and pain-related injections after January 19, 2012 - As a result, former school nurse was deprived of a proper medical panel evaluation of her left shoulder-related disability - Denial of ADR application therefore reversed, and case remanded to MTRS for purpose of convening new medical panel to conduct a valid, complete physical examination, conduct a thorough review of all pertinent medical records, along with the pre-December 2013 job description that was in effect when the former school nurse was employed, and employ the correct standards in evaluating the ADR application.

Carlson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-160, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 12, 2018).

New medical panel ordered - Former municipal rubbish collection laborer - Lower back injury - In concluding unanimously that laborer's permanent disability was due to uncontrolled diabetes and related complications (including morbid obesity, diabetic neuropathy, peripheral vascular disease, multiple toe amputations for chronic osteomyelitis, Charcot joint, gouty arthritis with knee joint problems, and surgical history of knee and foot surgery) and therefore was not such as might be the natural and proximate result of lumbar strain and sciatic sustained on job when he attempted to lift a heavy trash bag, medical panel (two orthopedists and one neurologist) employed an erroneous standard and issued a negative certificate as to causation that was plainly wrong;" panel ignored fact that petitioner was able to perform his duties up until the injury despite his morbid obesity, diabetes and related complications, contradicted its own conclusion that but for the diabetes and related complications the petitioner would have been able to recover from his lumbar strain and resume his job, and did not relate an accurate medical history in stating that petitioner had undergone three toe amputations rather than the two he had actually undergone; denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening a medical panel reversed, and case remanded to retirement board for purpose of convening a new medical panel.

Mulvey v. Chicopee Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-55, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 30, 2018).

New medical panel ordered - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (knee osteoarthritis) - Public works department laborer - Knee injury (twisting and medial meniscus tear) sustained on the job - Unanimous negative panel finding as to causation - Medical panel error requiring examination by new panel - Plainly wrong conclusion and application of incorrect standard - Attribution of injury to weight and deconditioning without medical record support - Unreasonable expectation that weight loss and strength training would allow performance of essential job duties despite ineffectiveness of post-injury physical therapy.

Cayo v. West Springfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-468, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

New medical panel denied, and denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed - Insufficient evidence of disability - District Attorney support staff at district court performing data entry, document scanning and duplication, case file preparation, general office and administrative support work - Right arm strain/frozen shoulder syndrome/rotator cuff tear while organizing file cabinet - Improved range of motion and decrease in pain level following rotator cuff surgery - Unanimous negative certificate as to disability by medical panel (2 orthopedic surgeons, one pain management physician) - No evidence that panel applied erroneous standard or lacked

pertinent facts - Panel examination revealed modest range of motion loss in arm and shoulder - Medical records showed no large rotator cuff tears or post-surgical lifting requirements - Insignificant omissions from records given to medical panel members - Omissive job description describing receptionist's position without mentioning file management responsibility countered by employee's full description of duties to panel members, including frequently lifting and carrying files weighing 10-15 pounds, and panel's evaluation of file weight and range of motion needed to carry and lift files - Sufficient basis in medical records reviewed, and from employee's responses to questions during panel's examination, from which panel members could conclude that surgery had helped her despite lacking operative report - Panel's unchanged opinion following subsequent review of missing documents supplied by retirement board - No showing that further examination by medical panel would have provided new information material to disability.

Henry (Donna) v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-530, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 21, 2016).

New medical panel denied - Municipal firefighter - Fall from ladder during firefighting emergency - Left ankle sprain and left hand sprain that healed, and left knee contusion, with continued pain following arthroscopy - Split medical panel finding leaving no affirmative panel majority as to disability's job-related causation - No evidence that panel members failed to consider pertinent facts, applied erroneous standard in determining issues of disability, its permanence, or likelihood of its job-related causation, or made clearly wrong findings based upon what medical records showed.

Rodriguez v. Springfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-216, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 13, 2017).

New medical panel granted - Middle school paraprofessional - Disabling lower back injury following assault by special needs student - Pre-existing condition (degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis and gradually-developing facet arthritis) - Asymptomatic and able to perform job duties prior to work-related injury - Majority negative panel certificate as to job-related causation - Failure to evaluate impact of assault on pre-existing condition - New medical panel needed to fully assess aggravation issue.

Bernier v. Hampden County Regional Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-555, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 13, 2017).

—Panel Affirmative as to Disability, Permanence, or Work-Related Causation

Majority Affirmative Panel

Transformation of majority affirmative panel opinion to unanimous affirmative opinion - Likely permanence of work-related disability - Medical panel's 2-1 majority affirmative opinion—that teacher's disability due to left shoulder injury sustained in slip-and-fall accident at work and range-of-motion limitations and pain that were not resolved by shoulder surgery were likely permanent— became unanimous affirmative opinion as to disability's permanence when third panel member modified her negative opinion as to disability's likely permanence, following re-examination of teacher at retirement board's request, by agreeing that repeat surgery could potentially help, but noted that teacher did not want to proceed this way due to risk of potential complications including breaking her arm, and that without the repeat surgery, incapacity was likely to be permanent.

Delinsky v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-596, Decision (Mass. div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 1, 2019).

Majority affirmative panel finding as to causation found unpersuasive - Public school teacher - Aggravation of pre-existing injury (depression and anxiety longstanding since childhood) after 20 years of successful teaching with the aid of psychotherapy and prescribed psychiatric medication - Increasing anxiety about ability to perform classroom duties, meet deadlines and attend to student progress or lack of progress - Development of hair and weight loss, and hoarding and eating disorders, and worsening inability to concentrate, loss of organizational skills, and forgetful, incoherent thought, observed by treating psychiatrist - Attribution to difficult work environment at school, particularly difficult students, increasing administrative work load, and arrival of a new, critical and unsupportive principal - Teacher's transfer to new school with supportive principal, with resulting, but temporary, diminishment of anxiety and restored level of function as teacher - Resumption, and worsening, of psychiatric symptoms for five years following teacher's transfer - Affirmative certificate by psychiatric medical panel majority as to disability, permanence and causation - Rejection by Board following hearing, based upon minority panel member's rejection of work-related causation, for lack of specific traumatic at-work events, and opinion that natural progression of anxiety disorder, rather than work-related injury, caused increasing difficulty in managing job duties and, ultimately, the teacher's disability - Failure to prove work-related causation by preponderance of evidence - Affirmative medical panel findings as to causation not conclusive - No evidence of work-related event or series of events contributing significantly to teacher's psychiatric disability - Evidence supported underlying anxiety about job duties, rather than conditions of job, as the significant factor precipitating teacher's disability.

Milton v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-19, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 17, 2017)

Orthopedic medical panel - Majority affirmative panel certificate as to causation - Entitlement to great weight - Principal clerk at municipal senior center - Preexisting injury (chronic left foot conditions and injuries treated previously by surgery) aggravated by work injury sustained in performance of job duties (fall in medical equipment shed while putting away wheelchair and commode, causing left foot to become jammed in wheelchair wheel) - Following injury, unresolving left foot reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome, intensifying left foot pain, marked changes in foot temperature, and need to use cane for ambulating - No evidence panel majority applied incorrect standard, lacked pertinent medical facts, or engaged in procedural irregularities in reaching conclusion as to causation - Panel conclusion as to causation consistent with opinions of independent medical examiners and treating physicians that unresolving left-foot symptoms related to, and were likely exacerbated by, work injury in question - Medical evidence in record confirmed that left foot symptoms worsened to point of disability and would not resolve over time.

Collari v. Marlborough Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-179, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 9, 2016).

Affirmative majority medical panel opinion as to job-related causation - Some evidence as to causation, but not conclusive as to this issue - Nursing assistant - Disabling lower back injury sustained while transferring patient from chair to bed during work shift - Affirmative majority panel opinion sufficient to sustain employee's burden of proof as to causation, together with other proof presented: treating physicians' supporting opinions; employee's credible testimony as to incident in question and immediacy of lower back symptoms; no evidence in medical records of prior back problems or inability to perform job duties, despite pre-existing obesity.

Cobb v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-367, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 3, 2017).

Unanimous Affirmative Panel

Transformation of majority affirmative panel opinion to unanimous affirmative opinion - Likely permanence of work-related disability - Medical panel's 2-1 majority affirmative opinion—that teacher's disability due to left shoulder injury sustained in slip-and-fall accident at work and range-of-motion limitations and pain that were not

resolved by shoulder surgery were likely permanent— became unanimous affirmative opinion as to disability's permanence when third panel member modified her negative opinion as to disability's likely permanence, following re-examination of teacher at retirement board's request, by agreeing that repeat surgery could potentially help, but noted that teacher did not want to proceed this way due to risk of potential complications including breaking her arm, and that without the repeat surgery, incapacity was likely to be permanent.

Delinsky v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-596, Decision (Mass. div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 1, 2019).

Denial of accidental disability retirement benefits affirmed - Insufficient evidence of permanent work-related disability - Municipal police officer - During employment with Town A, history of lower back injuries and pain while on duty between 2007 and 2014, each followed by being placed on leave and then returning to work, during incidents that included including diving into improperly parked vehicle that was rolling downhill in order to stop it on August 22, 2007, bending over to lift and clear broken parts of crashed vehicle from road on October 24, 2011, and jumping 12-15 feet into water to rescue a drowning individual in May 2013, after which he was deemed fit for active duty as a police officer - Hired by Town B as patrol officer in July 2014 and deemed to be probationary for one year after - Lower back re-injured while performing routine workout in police department's on-site gym on August 9, 2014, resulting in severe pain causing difficulty in walking and bowel incontinence - Despite this pain, officer proceeded to go out on scheduled cruiser patrol on same day with another officer - Due to extreme pain, officer remained in cruiser during response to minor noise complaint involving local bar, which the other officer handled, and was shaking, sweating and suffering through stabbing pain in lower back - After noise complaint was resolved, police officer and other officers had to run to break up a fight in front of the bar, and officer collapsed in pain - Upon returning home after shift ended, officer laid down on floor, could not get up again for remainder of night, and struggled to move the next morning, necessitating emergency room visit and, a day later, was taken by ambulance to hospital on August 11, 2014 due to extreme pain - MRI showed degenerative changes, annular tear and diffuse disc bulge at L5-S1 and diagnosis of degenerative disease of lumbar spine with radiculopathy - Filed injury report, was placed on leave, and remained out of work and collected benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F, during which time he experienced another episode of pain-induced bowel incontinence - X-rays taken in September 2014 revealed multi-level degenerative disc disease in lumbar spine, with diagnosis of lumbar spondylosis with lower back pain - Treatment in pain management program through December 2014, when orthopedist related officer's complaint of constant aching, stabbing, sharp and nagging bilateral back pain to degenerative disc changes at L5-S1 that included disc herniation and some mild facet arthropathy, and adminsitered a lumbar interlaminar epidural steroid injection - Cleared for full duty work without restrictions on January

15, 2015 - Worked from January 2015 until late spring or early summer of 2015, when pain returned, legs went numb, and officer had trouble wearing 22-pound duty vest - Stopped working and was placed initially on administrative leave in June 2015, and then terminated from employment by police chief on June 30, 2015, for failing to disclose long-term injuries he sustained during his prior employment as officer with Town A during the hiring process with the Town B police department, and also becuase he had used his entire amount of accrued vacation, comp tme and sick leave and had become a scheduling burden for the department, as well as being seen at a bar during a motorcycle meeting while he was oon sick leave in May 2015, and going on extended vacation out-of-state while he was on leave and collecting section 111F benefits in 2014 - Following termination, unable to obtain employment as police officer - Applied for accidental disability benefits on February 16, 2016 based upon injuries sustained on August 22, 2007 and jumping into rolling vehicle to stop it, bending over to lift and clear broken parts of crashed vehicle from road on October 24, 2011, both while working as police officer for Town A, and while working out in Town B police department gym on August 9, 2014 - Per statement by treating physician in support of ADR application, officer had not been able to work since June 2015 and that lower back pain had flared up in summer of 2015 during his attempt to return to work - Medical panel comprising three orthopedic surgeons issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to incapacity from performing essential duties, likely permanence of this disability, and work-related causation (incapacity might be the natural and proxiate result of the work injuries on which ADR retirement was claimed) - Narrative report of one of the panel members referred to "series of events" on August 9, 2014 during course of officer's employment "ending in a fight in which [the officer] was involved that evening - Retirement Board denied ADR application on February 28, 2017 - Denial affirmed on appeal to DALA - Former officer did not show by preponderance of evidence that accidents or injuries on which he based ADR application caused him permanently-disabling personal injury, since he returned to work and resumed all of the essential functions of a police officer following the 2007 and 2011 injuries, and was cleared for return to work without restriction following the August 2014 injury - Following injury in police department gym on August 9, 2014, officer was in position to mitigate his injury by reporting it but chose not to disclose injury or resulting discomfort, as he was still within probationary period of employment - Officer was not in actual performance of duties when he re-injured his back during routine workout - In addition, no medical evidence that officer was advised to retire based upon disability before June 30, 2015 based upon total and permanent disability as a result of worsening pain, and in fact he applied for a position with another town police department - Inference is that officer believed at the time that he was capable of performing duties of police officer - Despite unanimous affirmative medical panel, therefore, there was no permanent disability on which officer could base his ADR application when he left Town B police department in June 2015 - If back pain became permanently disabling afterward, it was a subsequently-matured disability that could not be the basis for an accidental disability retirement, per *Vest v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd.*, 41 Mass. App. 191, 668

N.E.2d 1356 (1996).

Marathas v. Dukes County Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-096, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 21, 2018).

Accidental disability retirement benefits awarded - Unanimous affirmative medical panel, certificate following remand by Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB), as to disability, its likely permanence and work-related causation - Night custodian at elementary school - Mid and lower back injury sustained in September 2006 while installing a heavy (80-100 pound) battery tray into floor machine preparatory to cleaning floors - Original medical panel comprising two orthopedists and one neurologist issued certificate in 2008 that was unanimously affirmative as to disability and its likely permanence but unanimously negative as to whether claimed injury could have been main cause of disability, based on what they perceived as resolved lower back injury and disability due to thoracic spine condition (thoracic spine arachnoid cysts, and syrinx (cyst within the spinal cord seen in imaging))- 2012 DALA decision affirmed retirement board's denial of accidental disability retirement based upon claimant's failure to show that medical panel applied erroneous standard or did not have all pertinent records - Remand by CRAB in September 2013 with instructions to request that medical panel reconsider its original (2008) negative conclusion as to causation, because it was not supported or explained by the panel's certificate or the medical record - New medical panel convened (as before, two orthopedists and a neurologist) - After reviewing former custodian's medical records and job description, and examining him, panel diagnosed "chronic back pain secondary to lumbar sprain, osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, and exaggerated by the individual's obesity and deconditioning" (referring to fact that former custodian had been out of work for seven years, was not conditioned to perform the type of work he had done as a school custodian, and was doing nothing that required heavy lifting of objects weighing 40-50 pounds) - New panel's certificate was unanimously affirmative as to disability, its likely permanence, and work-related causation - Panel report emphasized that as a result of September 2006 injury and deconditioning, former custodian could not return to line of work where there was a potential need for him to perform heavy lifting, and that the disability was therefore related to the duties identified in his job description - Following request for clarification by retirement board, panel members reiterated conclusion that former custodian was disabled by the injury to his lower back in September 2006, explained that recurrence of disabling back pain former custodian experienced as a result of that injury was likely if he returned to work that required heavy lifting as an essential duty and explained why he could not do so, and opined that the arachnoid cysts in his thoracic region were likely congenital rather than acquired by injury but were not disabling, and that the syrinx "almost surely" antedated the cysts - New medical panel's unanimous certificate was supported by the diagnostic studies and medical reports in the record, and all of this evidence sufficed to sustain his burden of proving his entitled to accidental disability

retirement benefits due to the back injury he sustained in September 2006 - medical panel members reached their conclusion after reviewing the medical records and work history provided to them, conducted an appropriate clinical examination, and prepared a clear and concise analysis - No evidence medical panel members applied any erroneous standard - Retirement board directed to award accidental disability retirement benefits to former custodian.

Pellin v. Franklin Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-125, Decision on Remand (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2018.)

Unanimous affirmative panel finding as to causation found unpersuasive as to work-related causation - Correction officer - Post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety as a result of incidents witnessed and experienced directly as correction officer during two years of employment as correction officer - Decreased sleep and appetite, recurrent intrusive thoughts, and drinking after witnessing incidents between inmates - Tightness, chest pains, and arm pain after speaking with inmate outside his cell - Major depressive disorder and panic attack diagnosed by treating physicians - Unanimous affirmative psychiatric medical panel certificate as to disability, its likely permanence, and job-related causation - Retirement board denial of accidental disability retirement application despite panel certificate based upon lack of specific dates of injury due to inmate violence, and assertion of stress and trauma based in part upon allegations of injury to other correction officers that employee did not witness - Denial affirmed - Affirmative medical panel certificate not conclusive as to work-related causation - Injuries to third parties (including suicides and suicide attempts among correction officers) insufficient to show compensable personal injury - Credibility issues - Failure to file incident reports as to violence witnessed - Discrepancies in narratives of alleged violence at correctional facility given to physicians, including apparent conflation of memories with alleged reports of co-workers - Presence at related incidents, or even being on duty at time, not documented by incident reports filed by others - Insufficient evidence of specific events that could serve as basis for accidental disability retirement application - No evidence of work environment different from those in which other correction officers worked - No evidence of outrageous working conditions in comparison with work other correction officers in facility performed - No evidence of work-related aggravation of pre-existing psychiatric condition, including depression related to childhood abuse, that appeared to have become clinically quiescent before correction officer employment began, particularly since employee did not followup with psychotherapy or trauma therapy recommended by treating physician and therefore could not show that treatment could not have resolved anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder - No workmen's compensation benefits awarded for any of the alleged work-related incidents - Receipt of lump-sum workmen's compensation benefit payment by agreement was evidence of legal compromise only, not of a merits-based resolution of claim.

Gale v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-205, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Probation case specialist with clerical and secretarial duties - Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) allegedly caused by humiliation of having to meet with supervisors regarding unfair accusations, unfair targeting and discipline, and unkind and unequal treatment by supervisors and co-workers - Termination following alleged sick leave abuse, excessive personal use of work email, and conflicts with supervisor and co-workers - Insufficient evidence of causation - Unanimous affirmative certificate by medical panel (2 psychiatrists and 1 neurologist) as to disability (extreme anxiety), permanence and causation that alleged incidents in workplace caused PTSD - Not dispositive as to causation - No showing that supervisors did not engage in bona fide personnel actions - No showing that alleged workplace ill will, job conflicts, and arguments with superiors and co-workers that generated feelings of persecution and unfair treatment comprised an identifiable condition not common or necessary to a great many occupations.

Sinopoli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-223, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 10, 2016).

—Panel Negative as to Disability, Permanence, or Work-Related Causation

Generally

Retirement board, DALA and Contributory Retirement Appeal Board cannot substitute their judgment as to causation for that of the medical panel majority when they have performed their function properly, and nor can the supportive report of a treating physician outweigh the panel majority's conclusion.

Foley v. Springfield Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-222, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 28, 2018).

In view of the medical panel's negative opinion as to causation, it was the petitioner's burden to show that the panel majority failed to perform its function properly, lacked knowledge of the petitioner's job description or of his medical treatment history, or was improperly comprised.

Foley v. Springfield Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-222, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 28, 2018).

Medical panel that was unanimously negative as to alleged disability's work-related

causation performed its function properly by obtaining petitioner's medical history, performing a detailed clinical examination of him, and reviewing pertinent medical reports pertaining to his treatment for the injury petitioner sustained and related diagnostic studies before reaching an opinion as to disability, and stated the grounds on which it reached a unanimous negative opinion that the petitioner's incapacity was "not such as might be the natural and proximate result of the personal injury sustained or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed," which were the specific words of the statute (M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)) and showed that the panel members had addressed the precise question they were called upon to address.

Foley v. Springfield Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-222, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 28, 2018).

In view of unanimous negative medical panel certificate as to whether retired recreation facilities supervisor's permanent disability was the natural and proximate result of a shoulder injury he sustained at work, it was petitioner's burden to prove either that the panel was improperly comprised, employed an erroneous standard in reaching its conclusion, or lacked knowledge of petitioner's job duties - Fact that all three panel members found petitioner to be totally disabled from performing his job duties left no room for argument that panel did not have an accurate description of his job - Rationales of medical panel majority were well-documented and supported by medical records, and were not tantamount to application of erroneous standard, and nor were they an unqualified negative opinion as to causation or erroneous as a matter of law - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-268, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 9, 2018).

M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) sets out the conditions for allowing an accidental disability retirement application and, in conjunction with M.G.L. c. 32, § 6(3)(a), sets out a carefully-defined procedure for processing the application - Section 6(3)(a) requires that following its examination of the applicant, a three-physician regional medical panel issue a certificate as to (1) the applicant's mental or physical incapacity for duty, (2) the likelihood that the incapacity is permanent, and (3) whether the disability is such as might be the natural and proximate result of the accident or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed - Purpose of medical panel examination and certificate is to vest in the panel the responsibility for determining medical questions that are beyond the common knowledge and experience of retirement board members - Retirement board and Contributory Retirement Appeals Board (and, thus, DALA) are bound by medical panel certificate when majority of panel responds in the negative to any of the three questions posed by the certificate (as to disability, its likely permanence, and its work-related causation), unless medical panel has employed an

erroneous medical or legal standard or lacked pertinent medical information.

Carr v. Brockton Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-07-1033, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Medical panel's negative response to any of the three questions posed to it (as to disability, its likely permanence, and its work-related causation) precludes allowing accidental disability retirement benefits application unless panel applied erroneous standard, failed to follow the proper procedure, or its decision is plainly wrong.

Hallen v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-572, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Applicant appealing denial of application for accidental disability retirement benefits had burden of proving, by preponderance of the evidence, that Board improperly denied application on basis of invalid medical panel certificate.

Hallen v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-572, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Medical panel is not required to agree with opinions of other physicians - That panel majority's negative findings as to permanence of disability did not agree with findings or opinions of other physicians who examined accidental disability retirement applicant did not show that panel members used erroneous standard in reaching their conclusions.

Hallen v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-572, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Majority Negative Panel

School cafeteria helper - Upper right extremity injury sustained while lifting tray of pasta from oven rack above eye level - Orthopedic medical panel - Majority negative panel answer as to permanence of disability - Applicant's contention that panel members improperly focused on neck rather than shoulder pain contradicted by her accidental disability retirement application, which claimed both neck and shoulder pain resulting from work-related injury, and by her complaints of neck pain to treating physicians, and the histories she gave them regarding her neck injury - Panel member who found neck injury disabling but not permanent correctly considered value of future physical therapy in reaching this conclusion - Applicant's failure to show that

panel members lacked pertinent information or applied erroneous standard - Retirement Board's decision denying accidental disability retirement application based upon majority negative medical panel as to permanence of disability affirmed.

Hallen v. Worcester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-572, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 9, 2017).

Unanimous Negative Panel

Accidental Disability Retirement - Denial - Unanimous negative medical panel as to disability's causation as a result of injury sustained at work - Insufficient evidence that total and permanent disability resulted from work related injury - Public school custodian employed by school department since 1987 - History of upper back pain following heart attack in 2008 - Lower back pain beginning April 30, 2010, while working on elementary school playground inspecting swings and checking trash barrels, after being head-butted, or given a running "bear hug," by five year old child - Petitioner weighed 288 pounds at the time - Petitioner reported injury to school principal; no disciplinary action against pupil - His May 3, 2010 injury report described incident as student running into him with his head, hitting him in lower back and causing pain in lower back area - Arbitrator's award and decision in October 2012 noted custodian last worked on May 12, 2010, date on which DALA Magistrate relied even though petitioner told medical care providers in May and early June 2010 that he was still working his normal shift - X-rays taken on May 12, 2010 during visit regarding pain following head-butting incident revealed mild degenerative joint disease, and initial diagnosis was contusion of lumbar spine - Physical therapy unhelpful, and petitioner underwent MRI on June 9, 2010 that revealed no evidence of acute or subacute compression deformity, but subtle Grade 1 anterolisthesis of L5 on S1 was noted and thought to be secondary to L5 spondylosis; MRI also revealed mild foraminal narrowing at L5-S1 secondary to anterolisthesis, and no nerve root impingement - Workers' compensation benefits received from May 13, 2010 to April 30, 2010, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 152, § 34, and, as weekly benefits by award, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 152, § 35, from March 25, 2011 to-date - Assault pay awarded on October 5, 2012, following arbitration - Application for accidental disability retirement filed on July 1, 2011 based upon total and permanent disability due to low back injury sustained at work o April 30, 2010, with supporting statements by primary treating physician and another treating physician - Application denied by retirement board on September 1, 2014 without convening a regional medical panel based upon conclusion that petitioner was "not in the performance of his duties" when he was injured, and the underlying facts regarding the alleged injury were "inconsistent" and insufficient to support a work injury - Petitioner appealed denial without convening a medical panel to DALA, but withdrew it on December 24, 2015 because he was granted a medical panel examination - Following their examination of plaintiff on April 7, 2016, medical panel (two orthopedists and a neurologist) unanimously found

petitioner to be totally and permanently incapacitated from performing his essential duties as a senior custodian, including general maintenance and groundskeeping, and repair, but that the incapacity was not such as might be the natural and proximate result of the April 30, 2010 injury - Unanimous negative opinion as to causation based upon "significant preexisting chronic upper back/chest pain for which [petitioner] takes a multitude of narcotics and medications," and panel members' impression that his symptoms were related to a soft tissue injury he sustained on April 30, 2010 rather than to any exacerbation of his degenerative arthroitis as a result of that incident - Retirement board denied accidental disability retirement application on May 4, 2016 - Denial affirmed - Petitioner did not meet burden of proving that his disability was caused by the April 30, 2010 head-butting incident on which his accidental disability retirement application was based, or that the incident exacerbated a preexisting degenerative condition in his lumbar spine, or even that his current limitations were due to any progression of his preexisting lumbar spine condition - Retirement board, DALA and Contributory Retirement Appeal Board cannot substitute their judgment as to causation for that of the medical panel majority when they have performed their function properly, and nor can the supportive report of a treating physician outweigh the panel majority's conclusion - Petitioner failed to show, as it was his burden to do in the face of the medical panel's negative opinion as to causation, that the panel majority failed to perform its function properly, lacked knowledge of the petitioner's job description or of his medical treatment history, or was improperly comprised - Medical panel performed its function properly by obtaining petitioner's medical history, performing a detailed clinical examination of him, and reviewing pertinent medical reports pertaining to his treatment for the injury petitioner sustained and related diagnostic studies before reaching an opinion as to disability, and stated the grounds on which it reached a unanimous negative opinion that the petitioner's incapacity was "not such as might be the natural and proximate result of the personal injury sustained or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed," which were the specific words of the statute (M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)) and showed that the panel members had addressed the precise question they were called upon to address.

Foley v. Springfield Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-222, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 28, 2018).

Unanimous negative medical panel as to disability's causation as a result of injury sustained at work - Former Department of Conservation and Recreation "recreation and facilities supervisor" - Employment within probationary period when retiree fell on a grassy hill on June 30, 2010 while proceeding from toolshed to perform raking duties - Right shoulder injury and right knee sprain - Terminated due to conflict with immediate supervisor, earlier on date of injury, as to being passed over for promotion - Knee pain resolved, but shoulder pain did not - Pain and difficulty elevating right shoulder - MRI performed one month after injury revealed complete right shoulder

supraspinatus rotator cuff tear, as well as degenerative changes in two shoulder joints (acromioclavicular (AV) joint at top of shoulder, and glenohumeral joint) - Application for accidental disability retirement filed August 6, 2013 based upon total and permanent disability due to right shoulder rotator cuff injury and right shoulder glenohumeral arthritis alleged to have been sustained as a result of work injury on June 30, 2010 - Following examination by three-physician medical panel, panel members answered unanimously affirmative as to disability and its likely permanence, and unanimously negative as to whether the disability might be the natural and proximate result of the June 30, 2010 personal injury sustained at work - All three panel members related the disability to petitioner's pre-existing osteoarthritis and its natural progression, rather than to the work-related accident - Panel noted that petitioner would have recovered from shoulder injury if it related solely to the rotator cuff, but there were underlying degenerative shoulder joint changes and no evidence in the MRI or x-rays that the 2010 injury had exacerbated osteoarthritic conditions - Although medical records on point were scarce, records suggested that petitioner had undergone previous bilateral shoulder arthroscopies, which supported conclusion that his disability was due to natural progression of the underlying changes in his right shoulder - Petitioner did not meet his burden of proving either that the panel was improperly comprised, employed an erroneous standard in reaching its conclusion, or lacked knowledge of petitioner's job duties - Fact that all three panel members found petitioner to be totally disabled from performing his job duties left no room for argument that panel did not have an accurate description of his job - Rationales of medical panel majority were well-documented and supported by medical records, and were not tantamount to application of erroneous standard, and nor were they an unqualified negative opinion as to causation or erroneous as a matter of law - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-268, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 9, 2018).

Negative medical panel as to disability's work-related causation - Denial of accidental disability retirement sustained - Municipal police officer - Stress-exacerbated hypertension and visual acuity problems - Failure to prove by preponderance of the evidence that panel employed incorrect standard or lacked pertinent medical information - Officer was insulin-dependent diabetic first diagnosed as such at age 12 - During first year of work (1989), responded to drowned juvenile emergency call - Five year old girl unconscious - Officer performed CPR, but girl died shortly afterward at hospital, and officer spent time with girl's family and attended autopsy - Event had tremendous emotional impact because officer had a child the same age, but he did not file an injury report - Diagnosed with hytpertension in 2003, and diabetes noted as not being well-controlled - Following 18 years as patrolman (1989-2005), reassigned to dispatcher position after suffering left eye hemorrhage while at work - Surgery repaired some of the eye damage - Performed dispatcher work without

restriction until January 25, 2007, when, after arriving at work and logging onto computer, he felt chest tightness, nausea, severe headache and dizziness and was taken to hospital by ambulance, where he was noted to have no vision in left eye and minimal vision in right eye - Unable to return to work and retired for superannuation - No application for, or receipt of, workers' compensation benefits - Following retirement, officer filed accidental disability retirement application on March 20, 2007 based upon hypertension and job stress contributing to visual impairment, referencing several dates of work injuries or hazards from 1989 to 2007, including work conditions in dispatch office (poor air quality, poor air circulation, dust, and absence of windows) - No mention of PTSD in application, and no diagnosis of PTSD-related hypertension or vision problems, in supporting physician's statement, which stated that work-related stressors increased officer's hypertension and worsened his visual acuity - Examination in July, 2007 by medical panel comprising two cardiologists and one internist - Medical panel's certificate unanimously affirmative as to disability and its likely permanence, but unanimously negative as to work-related causation - Noting medical records showing that officer's hypertension was under control, and finding no evidence of disabling cardiac condition or disabling hypertension, panel members concluded that his retinopathy, renal insufficiency and proteinuria were related to diabetic neuropathy brought on by his long-standing diabetes - After panel issued its certificate, retirement board denied accidental disability retirement application, which retired officer appealed in October 2007 - Diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in April 2014 - PSD diagnosis confirmed by another physician in October 2016 - Panel members reviewed all medical records sent to them, examined the retired officer, was aware of his job stress claim from reviewing his retirement application and supporting physician's statement, and mentioned the work stress the officer related in the history section of the panel's narrative report - Panel members also found no evidence of disabling cardiac condition or hypertension - History of officer's hypertension, diabetes, job stress, anxiety and depression were all before the medical panel and the retirement board - PTSD diagnosis and treatment for mental health issues occurred after the panel examined him, and were not before the panel - As a result, panel could not consider it, and failure to do so was not evidence that it applied improper standard or failed to consider the medical evidence - PTSD claim was also time-barred - It related to drowning of young girl he attempted to save in 1989, but officer did not file an injury report, and the event and the stress the officer claimed as a result occurred more than two years before he filed his accidental disability retirement application in 2007 - PTSD-related claim not an injury or hazard undergone within two years of date on which retirement application was filed, and could not support accidental disability retirement application unless written notice of injury was timely provided to retirement board or other statutory exception to this two-year rule (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, §§ 7(1) and 7(3)(a) and (b)), applied, and none did - No worker's compensation received for alleged injury, and police officers are ineligible to receive worker's compensation - No record of mental injury sustained or hazard undergone in police department's official records - No evidence that any official in police department knew that officer sustained a work-related injury, in

particular a stress-related injury as a result of the 1989 child drowning death, or that it had any reason to notify retirement board about such an injury - Accidental disability retirement claim therefore confined to any injury or injuries that occurred in the two years prior to retirement application and exacerbated his pre-existing mental health condition - Unclear how mental health condition was exacerbated by the hazards or injuries he claimed to have undergone while he worked as dispatcher between 2005 and 2007 - Testimony of retired officer and his wife emphasized the 1989 child drowning incident as having caused him the most distress as a police officer, but he could not rely on that event as it occurred more than two years before he filed his accidental disability retirement application, and none of the statutory exceptions to the two-year lookback rule of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) applied.

Carr v. Brockton Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-07-1033, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of work-related causation, or that medical panel employed incorrect standard or lacked pertinent medical information when it answered question as to disability's work-related causation in the negative - Unanimous negative medical panel certificate as to causation - Former Senior School District Custodian - Accidental disability retirement claimed based upon disabling lower back injury with pain radiating into both legs due to single injury at work in September 2014 (while cleaning school cafeteria floor and returning table, struck in back by another table moved in his direction by co-worker) - Prior history of lumbar disc disease and cervical radiculopathy beginning in 2008 or earlier - 2010 lumbar spine MRI showed spondylotic changes, lower lumbar scoliotic curvature, bilateral L5 neuroforaminal narrowing, right greater than left, with considerable narrowing of neural foramen at left L3, and disc bulging with facet degeneration at L3-4, L405 and L5-S1 levels - Severe degenerative joint disease of both lumbar and cervical areas noted by treating physician in 2010, but school custodian declined surgery notwithstanding back pain - February 2012 lumbar spine MRI showed spondylotic changes causing decrees of minimal to mild thecal impression without dimensional spinal stenosis, and scoliotic curvature, but with disc bulging facet degeneration causing marked narrowing if right L5 neuroforamen with neural impingement, and some lesser narrowing of L3 and L4 neuoforamen - Treating physician in August 2014 (one month before injury in school cafeteria) found it difficult to see how custodian was able to function with pain he could not control well - Immediately following September 2014 injury, custodian returned to work but found it difficult to perform job, and most of work performed was trash removal (lighter than job duty requirement of being able to lift in excess of 60 pounds and trash buckets the size of 55-gallon drums weighing 80 pounds) - Five days of Workers' Compensation benefits awarded following September 2014 injury - November 2014 MRI showed progression of foraminal stenosis with edema at end plates of lower lumbar discs between L4 and S1 compared to previous MRIs - Evaluating physicians in late 2014 noted age-related changes in lumbar spine and pain

in lower back/buttock area radiating to left foot, and one recommended light duty with lifting restriction (no more than 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently) - January 2015 MRI showed facet rotary scoliosis at L4 with degenerative joint disease at L3-4, and moderate degenerative joint disease at LS1 and - Opinion of physician performing independent medical examination in March 2015 was return to pre-existing state of chronic degenerative lumbar spine disease, with September 2014 work injury causing mild exacerbation of this condition that was expected to abate after three months of conservative treatment, which school custodian was receiving, along with activity modification - Custodian's treating physician noted in June 2015 that oxycodone was relieving pain but believed that his level of functioning had not returned to pre-injury level and that he was totally disabled - Upon re-examination in July 2015, independent examining physician concluded that custodian was partially disabled, and that September 2014 injury had exacerbated, but had not aggravated, his pre-existing chronic symptomatic degenerative condition of his lumbar spine, meaning the injury had caused a temporary increase in the degenerative conditions's symptoms without causing any structural damage - Accidental disability retirement application filed July 20, 2015 based upon disabling low back pain with injury radiating into both legs, and inability to perform essential job duties as of December 14, 2014, as result of September 10, 2014 injury in school cafeteria - Orthopedic surgeon examining custodian in July 2015 opined that September 2014 injury was major contributing cause to his disability based upon 2014 MRI showing edema at end plates of lower lumbar discs between L4 and S1, consistent with worsening axial back pain - Medical panel comprising three orthopedists issued certificate that was unanimously affirmative as to disability, majority affirmative as to the disability's permanence, and unanimously negative as to whether disability was job-related - Negative certificate as to causation based upon opinion that September 2014 incident superimposed injury upon pre-existing degenerative disc disease without causing permanent changes and that would resolve with surgical treatment, and that disability was due to progression of underlying disc disease rather than to September 2014 injury - Custodian failed to prove causal nexus between September 2014 injury and his disability, or an exacerbation of his underlying condition as a result of the injury - No showing that in issuing unanimous negative certificate as to job-related causation, medical panel employed erroneous standard, lacked knowledge of custodian's job description or medical treatment history, or was improperly comprised - Panel members answered the question of causation they were called upon to address, and in doing so noted custodian's history of degenerative disc disease and stenosis throughout his cervical and lumbar spines as shown on MRI studies from as early as 2010, the discomfort and functional limitations he was experiencing in August 2014, immediately prior to the school cafeteria injury, and that he was able to perform all of his duties following the injury - All three panel members diagnosed multi-level degenerative disc disease with stenosis, and none believed that the September 2014 injury aggravated his pre-existing condition to the point of rendering him totally and permanently disabled - Rationales of medical panel physicians in reaching conclusion they did were well-documented and supported by the medical records - Other medical evidence in record supported

medical panel members's analyses - Custodian's return to duty at school and resumption of farming activities, as well as surveillance video showing him shoveling snow during the winter following the September 2014 injury, undercut credibility of his claim that the injury rendered him totally and permanently disabled - Retirement system decision denying accidental disability retirement affirmed.

Strong v. Worcester Regional Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-597, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of disability - Maintenance worker at correctional facility - Ankle sprain while spreading ice melt and sand on correctional facility steps - Return to work with varying degrees of foot pain, and ankle pain and stiffness, and ability to run, walk and stand - Varying diagnoses of treating physicians, including adult acquired flatfoot deformity - without finding of permanent work-related disability or of worker having reached an end result in terms of treatment or ability to continue work with limitations on standing or use of supportive footwear - No imaging studies showing bone fracture - Whole body bone scan three years after injury showed degenerative changes in ankles and mid-feet - Worker performed duties at work for eight months before resigning from job - No evidence that worker was totally and permanently disabled on last day of work, which was four years after injury - Some evidence that worker argued with supervisor before resigning - Unanimous negative medical panel as to disability from performing essential job duties - No evidence panel members lacked pertinent facts including worker's job description and medical records or applied erroneous standards, or that conclusion as to lack of disability was plainly wrong - No entitlement to review by new medical panel.

MacGeachey v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket Nos. CR-13-403, CR-16-220, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 21, 2017).

Certified nursing assistant - Back and neck injury sustained during nursing home patient transfer from chair to bed - Claimed disability due to cervical spine disc herniation - Alleged exacerbation of pre-existing degenerative changes in cervical and lumbosacral spine (hip arthritis and cervical radiculopathy) - Medical record evidence that work-related injury resolved significantly - Clearance for return to work preceded termination for failure to return to work - Unanimous negative certificate by orthopedic medical panel as to disability, its permanence, and work injury-related causation - No evidence that panel members employed erroneous medical standard or lacked pertinent facts in reaching their conclusions.

Asare v. Taunton Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-445, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 5, 2016).

—Procedural Requirements

Notice of Injury to Retirement Board Within 90 Days Following Injury or Hazard Undergone (M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(a)1)

Public employee retirement statute generally limits accidental disability retirement applications to those disabling injuries caused by events or hazards that occurred within two years of the filing of the retirement application, unless notice of an earlier event or hazard was given to the retirement board or some other exception applies (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)).

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

Agency administrative assistant ("program coordinator II") who filed accidental disability retirement application on October 31, 2011 claiming disabling long-term job stress associated with her treatment by her supervisor's manager never submitted a notice of injury regarding any of the work incidents that caused her to take time off due to psychological injuries, and did not assert that any exception to the statutory notice requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) applied; as a result, her application was limited to incidents that occurred on or after October 31, 2009, two years before the date on which she filed her accidental disability retirement application, but that does not make irrelevant an earlier-occurring underlying condition, such as depression, if the claim is that work incidents during the two years preceding the accidental disability retirement application aggravated this underlying condition to the point of permanent disability.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

By virtue of having been awarded workers' compensation benefits related to cumulative stress in his left shoulder and the irreparable left shoulder rotator cuff tear, which was diagnosed in 2012, former town high department truck driver applying for accidental disability retirement in March 2014 fulfilled injury notice requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1).

Sibley v. Franklin Regional Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-54, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2018).

Summary decision sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement - Psychological or emotional injury - Police chief - Harassment by selectmen - Stress and depression -

Absence of genuine or material factual issue - Injury not sustained within two years prior to accidental disability retirement application - Failure to file written notice of injury within 90 days after its occurrence.

Ackerman v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-11-405, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 5, 2016).

No evidence of written notice of injury to retirement board within 90 days following injury or hazard undergone - Notice period not tolled by receipt of workmen's compensation payments for disabling injury claimed - No evidence of receipt of workmen's compensation payments - Steam fireman at state college - claimed work-related exposure to natural gas fumes following third party's gas line installation, and, during emergency room visit that followed, injury to hand during blood draw - Accidental disability retirement benefits also denied for insufficient proof of causation, including failure to obtain a supporting affirmative certificate from medical panel.

Maillet v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-327, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 3, 2016).

Untimely notice of injury to retirement board - Notice period not tolled - Group 4 police officer - Post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression and panic disorder - Absence of workers' compensation-related tolling of notice period - Group 4 police officers ineligible for workers' compensation - No evidence of mental health problems within two years preceding accidental disability retirement application - Failure to get along with co-workers and superiors not so uncommon as to be "identifiable condition" leading to disability - Accidental disability retirement benefits denial affirmed.

Rosario v. Fall River Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-233, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 15, 2016).

Failure to give notice of injury to retirement board - No evidence of injury while in performance of employee's duties within two years of filing accidental disability retirement application - Accidental disability retirement benefits denial affirmed.

Simpreux v. Cambridge Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-770*,* Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 25, 2016).

Occurrence of Injury or Hazard Undergone More Than Two Years Prior to Accidental Disability Retirement Application

Retirement - Accidental Disability Retirement (ADR) Benefits - Ineligibility - Failure to give timely notice of injury to retirement board, and insufficient evidence of work-related disability - Former automotive technology teacher - Student suicide - Psychological injury - Occurrence of injury or hazard undergone more than two years prior to ADR application - ADR application filed in July 2008 based upon a permanent, disabling psychological injury attributed to student's off-campus suicide in March 2001 - If student's suicide is considered to be the teacher's work-related disabling injury, its occurrence more than two years before the teacher filed his retirement application, and his failure to give notice of the injury to the retirement board within 90 days, precluded granting the accidental disability retirement he sought - No delayed accrual of duty to give notice of injury due to delayed understanding of connection between causative event and symptoms - Teacher's testimony and remainder of record revealed teacher's almost-immediate awareness of student suicide's impact on him in 2001-02, even though he did not understand why it had affected him to the degree it did - Teacher mentioned student's suicide during first meeting with a caregiver regarding his relapsed substance abuse and depression in September 2005 - No exception to two-year notice of injury requirement based upon subsequent exacerbation of psychological injury brought on by 2001 student suicide by student interaction - Having to work with or encounter students after the March 2001 suicide was essential to the performance of a fundamental teaching duty, not a series of injuries to, or hazards undergone by, the teacher - Therefore, not even the teacher's interactions and encounters with his students during the two years preceding his July 2008 ADR application qualify as psychological injuries sustained or hazards undergone that support an accidental disability retirement - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

Adams (Mark T.) v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-211, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Retirement - Accidental Disability Retirement (ADR) Benefits - Ineligibility - Failure to give timely notice to retirement board of injury sustained or hazard undergone within two years prior to filing ADR application, and insufficient evidence of work-related disability - Former municipal police officer - ADR application based upon permanent gastrointestinal-related disability - No report ever filed by officer with employer alleging that an injury he sustained in the performance of his duties brought about his ulcerative colitis or Crohn's Disease symptoms, and officer was not receiving, and had never received, injured-on-duty benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 41, § 111F for any stress-related gastrointestinal symptoms - Officer not entitled to claim any of the incidents for which he did file reports (none of which related to his

gastrointestinal condition) as satisfying timely notice provision of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) relative to his ADR application.

Osborn v. Pittsfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-446, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Although corrections officer's 2012 application for accidental disability (based upon disabling PTSD as a result of stabbing by inmate in 2002) was not filed within two years of that injury (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)), his application qualified for "official record" exception to this requirement for retirement Group 2, 3 and 4 members (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(3)(a)) because he was a member of Group 4, and an official report was filed at the time of the 2002 stabbing incident.

Andrade v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-104, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

Retirement system member's injuries or hazard undergone on job that occurred more than two years before date on which application for accidental disability retirement was filed are not considered in evaluating application unless written notice was provided to member's retirement board (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)) or if exception applies under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(3)(a) and (b)).

Benoit v. Everett Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-821, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Retired firefighter - Accidental disability retirement application filed October 21, 2013, subsequent to superannuation retirement in April 2009 - Claimed "heart presumption" for firefighters (M.G.L. c. 32, § 94) and history of atrial fibrillation as "hazard undergone" - No notice of injury filed with retirement board as to asserted heart-related injury (palpitations and chest pain experienced while climbing stairs during response to house fire in 2006, five years prior to filing of accidental disability retirement application) - No mention of these symptoms or of firefighters' on-site evaluation by EMTs in incident report regarding this fire - No notice of injury filed regarding cardiac event in May 2007 - Hospital records reported history of hypertension, but electrocardiogram following 2007 event showed no atrial fibrillation - Firefighter declined hospitalization and signed himself out of hospital against medical advice - No workers' compensation-related exception to failure to file written notice of injury because firefighters, as Group 4 members, are not eligible to receive workers' compensation - Exception to notice of injury requirement based upon record of injury sustained on file in fire department's official records inapplicable as claimant produced no such record - Atrial fibrillation diagnosed on January 9, 2009 (prior to

superannuation retirement), but followup EKG on January 29, 2009 showed regular heart rate and no atrial fibrillation, and firefighter was cleared to return to work - No treatment for atrial fibrillation until May 2010, subsequent to retirement, when attempt to correct this condition failed - Heart condition was, per the record, a disability that matured subsequent to retirement in 2009 - Application for accidental disability retirement properly denied without convening medical panel.

Benoit v. Everett Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-821, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Failure to submit accidental disability retirement application within two years following events at school where teacher worked before transferring, allegedly causing exacerbation of pre-existing anxiety and depression, with no workmen's compensation payments to mitigate lapse of time, violated timely application provisions of M.G.L. c. 32, §§ 7(1) and 7(3)(a) - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed on this ground, and for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that teacher's psychiatric disability was due to a work-related injury.

Milton v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-19, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 17, 2017)

Summary decision sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement - Claimed psychological or emotional injury - Police chief - Harassment by selectmen - Stress and depression - Absence of genuine or material factual issue - Injury not sustained within two years prior to accidental disability retirement application - Failure to file written notice of injury within 90 days after its occurrence.

Ackerman v. Worcester Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-11-405, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 5, 2016).

Steam fireman at state college - claimed work-related exposure to natural gas fumes following third party's gas line installation, and, during emergency room visit that followed, injury to hand during blood draw - Injuries alleged to have caused disability occurred more than two years prior to accidental disability retirement application - Accidental disability retirement benefits also denied for insufficient proof of causation, including failure to obtain a supporting affirmative certificate from medical panel.

Maillet v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-327, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 3, 2016).

—Psychological or Emotional Injury

Generally

Aggravation of an underlying psychological condition to the point of disability can be the basis for accidental disability retirement.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

To the extent that psychological or emotional injuries alleged to have caused permanent disability were caused by bona fide personnel actions, they are not considered to be personal injuries sufficient to establish eligibility for accidental disability retirement, unless the actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional harm, and for those actions to have done so they must have been extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society; accordingly, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be based upon mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities, but the deliberate act of humiliating an employee does not fall into this category and is not a bona fide personnel action as a matter of law.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

Agency administrative assistant ("program coordinator II") who filed accidental disability retirement application on October 31, 2011 claiming disabling long-term job stress associated with her treatment by her supervisor's manager never submitted a notice of injury regarding any of the work incidents that caused her to take time off due to psychological injuries, and did not assert that any exception to the statutory notice requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) applied; as a result, her application was limited to incidents that occurred on or after October 31, 2009, two years before the date on which she filed her accidental disability retirement application, but that does not make irrelevant an earlier-occurring underlying condition, such as depression, if the claim is that work incidents during the two years preceding the accidental disability retirement application aggravated this underlying condition to the point of permanent disability.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

Where accidental disability retirement application is based upon psychological

disabilities alleged to relate to numerous job-related events over a period of years, causation is analyzed by looking at both specific injurious events and general job hazards.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

Applicant claiming to be disabled due to emotional condition must prove that she sustained personal injury sustained or hazard undergone while in the performance of her duties based upon a single incident or series of incidents, or that the injury is the result of exposure to an identifiable condition that is not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations, bearing in mind that (1) unfortunately, some degree of workplace ill will is all too common in many occupations; (2) disagreement with management's attendance and work procedures does not constitute a workplace hazard that is not common to all or a great many occupations; (3) alleged emotional injury amounts to more than applicant's own feelings of persecution and perpetual victimization; and (4) behavior to which applicant was subjected was extreme and outrageous and beyond all bounds of human decency.

Reyes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-598, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 29, 2017).

Mental or emotional disability resulting from a single injury or a series of work-related injuries has been recognized as a personal injury under M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - Personal injury is to be interpreted in harmony with workers' compensation statute, M.G.L. c. 152 - Under this statute, personal injuries "include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring within employment." M.G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A).

McDonough v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-98, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 8, 2017).

Even with an affirmative medical panel opinion, an applicant seeking accidental disability retirement benefits (in this case, correction officer claiming disability as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder suffered as a result of being stabbed by inmate at correctional facility where he worked) had the burden of proving that he was disabled, the disability was likely to be permanent, and his inability to work was the natural and proximate result of an injury he sustained as a result of, and while performing, his duties.

Andrade v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-104, Decision (Mass. Div.

of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

Applicant seeking accidental disability retirement benefits due to psychological or emotional injury must present reliable evidence that she was disabled as of the last day she performed her duties and that she stopped work due to the medical condition upon which her application was based; voluntarily ceasing work but experiencing symptoms after doing so does not suffice to make this showing or, thus, to sustain her burden of proof.

Koerber v. Somerville Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-66. Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

Applicant asserting disability retirement benefits due to emotional condition - Burden of proof - Grounds for accidental disability retirement benefits - Sustained psychological or emotional injury based on single incident or series of incidents - Injury must be shown to have been the result of exposure to an identifiable condition, or that employment presented a hazard, that is not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-372, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Some degree of workplace ill will is all too common in many occupations, and therefore does not itself prove that a claimed disabling psychological or emotional injury was the natural and proximate result of an employment-related injury.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-372, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Emotional suffering resulting from petitioner's inability to get along with co-workers, or their inability to get along with her, does not alone suffice to show a compensable work injury.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-372, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Insufficient Proof; Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits Denial Affirmed

Insufficient evidence of work-related disability, and failure to give timely notice of injury to retirement board - Former automotive technology teacher - Student suicide - Psychological injury - Occurrence of injury or hazard undergone more than two years

prior to ADR application - ADR application filed in July 2008 based upon a permanent, disabling psychological injury attributed to student's off-campus suicide in March 2001 - If student's suicide is considered to be the teacher's work-related disabling injury, its occurrence more than two years before the teacher filed his retirement application, and his failure to give notice of the injury to the retirement board within 90 days, precluded granting the accidental disability retirement he sought - No delayed accrual of duty to give notice of injury due to delayed understanding of connection between causative event and symptoms - Teacher's testimony and remainder of record revealed teacher's almost-immediate awareness of student suicide's impact on him in 2001-02, even though he did not understand why it had affected him to the degree it did - Teacher mentioned student's suicide during first meeting with a caregiver regarding his relapsed substance abuse and depression in September 2005 - No exception to two-year notice of injury requirement based upon subsequent exacerbation of psychological injury brought on by 2001 student suicide by student interaction - Having to work with or encounter students after the March 2001 suicide was essential to the performance of a fundamental teaching duty, not a series of injuries to, or hazards undergone by, the teacher - Therefore, not even the teacher's interactions and encounters with his students during the two years preceding his July 2008 ADR application qualify as psychological injuries sustained or hazards undergone that support an accidental disability retirement - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed.

Adams (Mark T.) v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-211, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Accidental Disability Retirement - Psychological disability - Exacerbation of post-traumatic stress disorder after eight years of successful work following serious work-related head injury - State Department of Transportation Environmental Analyst - Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel affirmed - History of abusive marriage, mental health counseling, and head injuries sustained from two auto accidents prior to 2004 - In March 2004, petitioner sustained head injury with resulting neurological and cognitive impairment after slipping and hitting her head on metal file cabinet while moving desk at work - Return to work part-time in late 2004 and full-time in late May 2005 - No job modification sought upon return to work - Workers' compensation claim filed and settled in 2005 - Worked for eight years with good performance reviews - In 2013, after not being selected for District Environmental Engineer position, supervisor noted that petitioner became angry and defiant - Experienced relapse of cognitive symptoms and began meeting with psychologist who noted work-related stress with signs of depression, PTSD and cognitive function difficulties, and also noted that new supervisor had increased petitioner's workload and changed her work procedures, which had proven difficult for her due to her significant difficulties with new learning, deceptive language comprehension, attention, and memory retention - Placed on administrative leave in April 2014 pending fitness-for-duty evaluation as a result of concerns about petitioner's ability to perform essential job duties without posing a threat to herself or

others - Did not return to duty afterward - In May 2014, petitioner's psychologist noted worsening cognitive disabilities that originated with her previous head injury due to stress of recent job duty and procedure changes, and opined that petitioner was 100 percent disabled from performing her job duties at work - Psychiatrist who performed fitness-for-duty evaluation diagnosed mood disorder, personality disorder and cognitive disorder secondary to traumatic brain injury, personality change after traumatic head injury, history of traumatic head injury, and work problems - While still on administrative leave on June 30, 2015, petitioner retired with Early Retirement Incentive Payment - Filed accidental disability retirement application subsequently, in April 2016 - Application denied by State Board of Retirement for failure to substantiate compensable personal injury - Denial affirmed on appeal - Although petitioner sustained serious head injury with resulting cognitive impairment and emotional changes, no proof that she sustained compensable personal injury within the two years preceding her retirement in 2013 and 2014 - Working with new supervisor who implemented different procedures and altered petitioner's workload was not exposure to hazard, or to an identifiable condition, uncommon to all or a great many professions - No proof that these changes, or passing over petitioner for promotion, were intended to inflict emotional distress on petitioner or did not arise out of bona fide personnel action - No evidence of "subtle campaign of harassment" or hostile workplace environment during her last two years of employment.

Norton-Wenzel v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-498, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 20, 2018).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application based upon disabling long-term job stress associated with her treatment by her supervisor's manager affirmed - Agency administrative assistant ("Program Coordinator II") responsible for data entry - Application limited to work events that occurred within two years preceding filing of accidental disability retirement application on account of failure to file notice of injury regarding any such events that caused her to take time off due t psychological injuries, or to assert any exception to notice requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - As to the two-year period, applicant's claim appeared to be that workplace events during that time, including cruel and demeaning treatment by her supervisor's manager, aggravated her underlying depression to the point of permanent psychological disability - Evidence of any such events occurred within the two-year period preceding the accidental disability retirement application was sparse and equivocal - Record showed personnel actions taken by employer during this two-year period relative to applicant's work performance and missed deadlines, and failure to meet goals stated in remedial plan intended to address this problem - Actions included written warning regarding job performance, implementation of another remedial development plan with goals, and one-day suspension for poor work performance, as well as accommodations to ease burdens placed upon her including assignment of some tasks to other employees, being allowed to stay past 5 p.m. to complete work so long as

supervisor was present, and being allowed to set her own deadlines - No testimony by witnesses other than applicant as to her treatment by the manager - Applicant suffered breakdown during two-year period requiring several days of hospitalization, but hospital records did not show what caused her to be hospitalized - On their face, the employer's actions appeared to be bona fide personnel action and nothing in the written warnings issued to applicant suggested that the grounds they asserted for these actions (mostly performance-related criticisms) were false - Fact that applicant disagreed with them and asserted that some of the grounds for the actions taken against her were untrue, without specifying which grounds were true and which were not, did not suffice to show that actions taken against her were not bona fide personnel actions or that they amounted to intentional infliction of emotional harm - Although several of the manager's comments were cruel, and some of her antics (including storming out of her own office during a meeting with applicant) were not justified, the record also showed that the manager complemented applicant for good work, sought advice of agency Human Resources Department as to how to handle applicant's frequent absences, and suggested that applicant consider FMLA leave to deal with mental health issues, and also that applicant's supervisor (to whom applicant ascribed no ill will) issued or co-signed several of the warnings the applicant was issued - Record also suggested that applicant was eventually worn down by longstanding criticism of her job performance and her fear of losing her job, which made her disability claim one that was based upon bona fide personnel actions and, thus, insufficient to show entitlement to accidental disability retirement.

Donatelli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-496, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 23, 2018).

Summary decision sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement benefits-Psychological or emotional injury - Former Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Administrative Assistant I - Alleged emotional injury sustained as a result of exposure to "identifiable condition" not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations - Bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, anxiety and depression allegedly resulting from workplace policy changes, following 2010 change in administration at MCAD office where administrative assistant worked, regarding absences and time off for health-related issues and alleged discriminatory application to her - Prior to these changes, history of taking leave for depression and anxiety, chronic bronchial asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, chronic pain, management of panic attacks, and difficulty performing work following prescription of medications for depression and anxiety - Belief by administrative assistant that supervisory staff demeaned her efforts and scrutinized her behavior when she took time off - Filed complaint in October 2010 with agency's deputy general counsel against supervisors alleging unfair treatment and undue monitoring (including being required to bring in a doctor's's note following every appointment) on account of being Hispanic and disabled, and of being targeted and accused unfairly

of abusing sick time - Additional medical problems including chest pain and abdominal distress, and trips to emergency room due to panic and anxiety symptoms, resulting in more missed work - Cocaine use and, on one occasion, wrist-cutting while under influence of cocaine - Instructed to speak with supervisor prior to being absent from work - During early 2011 meeting with supervisor, accused of abusing sick time and reporting to work late - Belief by administrative assistant that she was being subject to retaliation and ordered to follow policies and procedures applicable to no other employees - Grievance filed with union, with no action taken - Changes by supervisor regarding information to be included in reports on MCAD complaints received and action taken on them - Further panic attacks - Reprimanded in March 2011 for failure to comply with supervisor's directives - Fear of further reprimands and termination - Leave taken under federal FMLA in March 2011, and absent from work for six months, for to mental health reasons - Return to work in mid-September 2011 followed, two months later, by attempted suicide and subsequent hospitalization in intensive care unit and then in adult inpatient psychiatric unit - Based upon report of primary care physician, allowed to return to work part-time on May 14, 2012, - Allowed five-minute breaks to carry out her "anxiety management strategies" each preceded by informing her supervisor she was leaving her work station so there would be appropriate coverage in her absence - Stationed at front desk rather than in former cubicle, which was occupied by another employee - Feeling that she was no longer part of staff, administrative assistant resigned on June 3, 2012 - Applied on March 6, 2013 for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related emotional injury and resulting disability due to "identifiable condition" not common or necessary to all or a great many occupations, with inability to perform job duties as of May 2010 - Employer's statement portion of application noted absence of records of accidents or work-related conditions that created or exacerbated alleged disability - Unanimous positive medical panel certificate as to disability, permanence and work-related causation - Despite panel certificate, denial of accidental disability retirement application, and ordinary disability retirement benefits approved instead - Following appeal to DALA, motion by State Board of Retirement for summary decision - Motion granted, with summary decision in retirement board's favor sustaining denial of accidental disability retirement benefits - No notice of injury reports filed - Alleged work-related stress centered around strained relations with new managers beginning September 2010, mostly administrative assistant's disagreement with attendance and work procedure policies - Documents in record showed that new attendance policy and other guidelines were issued to entire staff and not only to administrative assistant, which undercut her assertion of being singled out and treated unfairly - No showing that alleged emotional injury amounted to more than personal feelings of persecution and perpetual victimization, or that managerial behavior to which administrative assistant was subjected was extreme and outrageous and beyond all bounds of human decency - No evidence that actions of supervisors were intended to inflict emotional distress - History of chronic, excessive absenteeism beginning prior to 2010 change of management and implementation of new leave and absence policies - Not unreasonable for supervisors to require that administrative assistant

account for her absences - Supervisors required, as part of their own jobs, to implement quality control measures and hold employees accountable - Actions complained of were bona fide personnel actions - Evidence insufficient to show a compensable personal injury entitling administrative assistant to accidental disability retirement benefits, or that alleged emotional work-related injury and its permanence was subject of genuine, material factual issue that could not be determined summarily.

Reyes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-598, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 29, 2017).

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel - Psychological or emotional injury - Municipal administrative assistant in city auditing office and, following transfer, in city purchasing office - Formal complaint filed in initial position against supervisor alleging persistent abuse, including derogatory and foul language, aggressive physical behavior and harassment by supervisor - Counseling sought at time - Prescribed antidepressants - History of depression and antidepressant prescription, with apparent success - Following transfer to city purchasing office, micromanagement by new supervisor and subjection to attendance and telephone use monitoring, and deductions to the minute from lunch or breaks to which other employees were not subjected - Treatment for depression and stress by licensed social worker and EAP counselor, and by psychologist and social worker - Prescribed antidepressants and also medication for thyroid disorder - Absence from work due to diverticulitis and colitis - Progressively withdrawn and incapable of engaging in regular work or other activities - Ceased work on August 30, 2012 - Following workers' compensation-related examination by independent medical examiner and administration of MMPI-2 test (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test assessing personality traits and psychopathology of persons suspected of having mental health or other clinical issues), examining physician concluded that the employee did not suffer from acute psychiatric disorder related to work stress, was not mentally or emotionally unstable, and was subjectively claiming disability due to longstanding personality problems including passive-dependent style not related to work stress or injury, had negative work attitudes, exaggerated her symptoms, blamed others for her problems, could return to work if she was motivated to do so, and was malingering for secondary gain - Evaluation by impartial psychiatrist who diagnosed depression and maladaptive personality traits on the borderline and/or histrionic category, including obsessional manner of going over and over a litany of many prior perceived abuses and a relentless fixation on having been treated poorly by colleagues for over two decades, as well as opinion that the employee was temporarily psychiatrically disabled without having reached a psychiatric end point, and that although she may have suffered some degree of mistreatment by co-workers, there was no causal connection between her condition and the work events she described - Accidental disability retirement application asserted that on her last day of work (August 30, 2012) she was performing her regular job duties, office was short-staffed, and she was attempting to assure coverage in her department when the "last straw"

occurred and her supervisor harassed her "multiple times" throughout the day, although she also detailed her harassment in her prior city auditor office position by her former supervisor, and she described circumstances, events or physical conditions contributing to her disability as including "cold sore, impetigo, PTSD, depression, insomnia, anxiety, can't focus, can't concentrate, cry all the time, obsessive talk of traumatic (thoughts, flashbacks), fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, nausea and throwing up, thyroid hypo, diverticulitis, colitis, nervousness, nightmares of work related incident" - Noncompliance with city's return-to-work order - City investigation of harassment allegations beginning in October 2012, in which employee declined to participate and her attorney did not respond to requests that she be interviewed, revealed no corroboration by co-workers of harassing behavior employee had alleged - Retirement board approved involuntary retirement application filed by city on her behalf due to absence with, but then without, leave for an extended period, and denied accidental disability retirement application without convening medical panel - Denial of accidental disability retirement application affirmed - No reliable evidence that employee was disabled as of last day she performed her duties - Employee stopped working voluntarily on August 30, 2012 - No proof that alleged disability was permanent and was causally related to her work - Findings and conclusions of independent medical examiners, including no permanent work-related disability despite maladaptive personality traits and lack of motivation to work, were not countered by evidence that employee was mentally disabled when she left employment after working on August 30, 2012 - Symptoms experienced after leaving work were irrelevant to whether employee was disabled on last work day.

Koerber v. Somerville Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-66. Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of job-related causation - Unanimous negative medical panel certificate as to causation - Former Senior School District Custodian - Accidental disability retirement claimed based upon disabling lower back injury with pain radiating into both legs due to single injury at work in September 2014 (while cleaning school cafeteria floor and returning table, struck in back by another table moved in his direction by co-worker) - Prior history of lumbar disc disease and cervical radiculopathy beginning in 2008 or earlier - 2010 lumbar spine MRI showed spondylotic changes, lower lumbar scoliotic curvature, bilateral L5 neuroforaminal narrowing, right greater than left, with considerable narrowing of neural foramen at left L3, and disc bulging with facet degeneration at L3-4, L405 and L5-S1 levels - Severe degenerative joint disease of both lumbar and cervical areas noted by treating physician in 2010, but school custodian declined surgery notwithstanding back pain - February 2012 lumbar spine MRI showed spondylotic changes causing decrees of minimal to mild thecal impression without dimensional spinal stenosis, and scoliotic curvature, but with disc bulging facet degeneration causing marked narrowing if right L5 neuroforamen with neural impingement, and some lesser narrowing of L3 and L4

neuoforamen - Treating physician in August 2014 (one month before injury in school cafeteria) found it difficult to see how custodian was able to function with pain he could not control well - Immediately following September 2014 injury, custodian returned to work but found it difficult to perform job, and most of work performed was trash removal (lighter than job duty requirement of being able to lift in excess of 60 pounds and trash buckets the size of 55-gallon drums weighing 80 pounds) - Five days of Workers' Compensation benefits awarded following September 2014 injury - November 2014 MRI showed progression of foraminal stenosis with edema at end plates of lower lumbar discs between L4 and S1 compared to previous MRIs - Evaluating physicians in late 2014 noted age-related changes in lumbar spine and pain in lower back/buttock area radiating to left foot, and one recommended light duty with lifting restriction (no more than 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds frequently) - January 2015 MRI showed facet rotary scoliosis at L4 with degenerative joint disease at L3-4, and moderate degenerative joint disease at LS1 and - Opinion of physician performing independent medical examination in March 2015 was return to pre-existing state of chronic degenerative lumbar spine disease, with September 2014 work injury causing mild exacerbation of this condition that was expected to abate after three months of conservative treatment, which school custodian was receiving, along with activity modification - Custodian's treating physician noted in June 2015 that oxycodone was relieving pain but believed that his level of functioning had not returned to pre-injury level and that he was totally disabled - Upon re-examination in July 2015, independent examining physician concluded that custodian was partially disabled, and that September 2014 injury had exacerbated, but had not aggravated, his pre-existing chronic symptomatic degenerative condition of his lumbar spine, meaning the injury had caused a temporary increase in the degenerative conditions's symptoms without causing any structural damage - Accidental disability retirement application filed July 20, 2015 based upon disabling low back pain with injury radiating into both legs, and inability to perform essential job duties as of December 14, 2014, as result of September 10, 2014 injury in school cafeteria - Orthopedic surgeon examining custodian in July 2015 opined that September 2014 injury was major contributing cause to his disability based upon 2014 MRI showing edema at end plates of lower lumbar discs between L4 and S1, consistent with worsening axial back pain - Medical panel comprising three orthopedists issued certificate that was unanimously affirmative as to disability, majority affirmative as to the disability's permanence, and unanimously negative as to whether disability was job-related - Negative certificate as to causation based upon opinion that September 2014 incident superimposed injury upon pre-existing degenerative disc disease without causing permanent changes and that would resolve with surgical treatment, and that disability was due to progression of underlying disc disease rather than to September 2014 injury - Custodian failed to prove causal nexus between September 2014 injury and his disability, or an exacerbation of his underlying condition as a result of the injury - No showing that in issuing unanimous negative certificate as to job-related causation, medical panel employed erroneous standard, lacked knowledge of custodian's job description or medical treatment history, or was improperly comprised - Panel members answered

the question of causation they were called upon to address, and in doing so noted custodian's history of degenerative disc disease and stenosis throughout his cervical and lumbar spines as shown on MRI studies from as early as 2010, the discomfort and functional limitations he was experiencing in August 2014, immediately prior to the school cafeteria injury, and that he was able to perform all of his duties following the injury - All three panel members diagnosed multi-level degenerative disc disease with stenosis, and none believed that the September 2014 injury aggravated his pre-existing condition to the point of rendering him totally and permanently disabled - Rationales of medical panel physicians in reaching conclusion they did were well-documented and supported by the medical records - Other medical evidence in record supported medical panel members's analyses - Custodian's return to duty at school and resumption of farming activities, as well as surveillance video showing him shoveling snow during the winter following the September 2014 injury, undercut credibility of his claim that the injury rendered him totally and permanently disabled - Retirement system decision denying accidental disability retirement affirmed.

Strong v. Worcester Regional Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-597, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Insufficient evidence of disability - Former first-grade public school teacher - Emotional disability (post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and panic attacks) based on single incident at school where teacher worked on March 13, 2012—Alleged verbal abuse by school janitor during "code blue" at school (emergency or potential emergency of a medical nature requiring students and faculty to clear the hallways and retreat to classrooms or offices so paramedics could respond without obstruction and so that circumstances surrounding the medical condition were not revealed) - Janitor responsible for assuring that hallways were clear when code blue was called - Upon encountering teacher leading pupils through hallway to classroom, a departure from school's code blue procedure, janitor ordered her to get her students out of the hallway, allegedly while screaming loudly and calling her "moron" - Immediately following incident, teacher experienced shortness of breath, racing heart, nausea, development of body rash and elevated blood pressure, and was taken by wheelchair to school nurse, after which she was taken home by daughter - Teacher unable to work for five weeks - PTSD diagnosis by primary care physician, who prescribed anti-anxiety medications - Workers' Compensation benefits denied, but teacher received compensation for 29 sick days per M.G.L. c. 152, § 29 agreement - Following return to work, teacher felt school minimized event and that she was being called a liar and described as having "freaked out" and taken a leave of absence - Encountered janitor at school several times without experiencing "major inner feelings" - Positive attendance record through end of school year without suffering panic attack - Per teacher's licensed mental health counselor, all symptoms had resolved and no follow-up counseling sessions were requested - Primary care physician recorded that teacher was disabled at time of incident during "Code Blue" at school but that disability did not appear to be permanent and that teacher could return to school - Teacher opted to

retire after school year ended and apply for accidental disability benefits based upon PTSD as a result of verbal assault in workplace, and asserted that after returning to work, seeing the janitor had resulted in further panic attacks and that school principal had harassed her and attempted to intimidate her, and that she was unable to perform any job because she was required to take "serious medicine" to treat her condition - Medical panel comprising two psychiatrists and a neurologist issued unanimous affirmative certificate as to disability, its work-related causation and its likely permanence, based primarily upon teacher's assertions during examination by panel members, and panel members' impression that being around children or in a school situation triggered unmanageable anxiety to the point that the teacher would be unable to concentrate on her work and her interactions with students and other school personnel, that she could not even approach the school without incapacitating anxiety, and that there was no likelihood of significant improvement of her condition in the foreseeable future despite appropriate treatment for over a year - Upon questions posed by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, medical panel responded that it had no evidence as to whether teacher was disabled on last day of employment, and that in view of teacher's confusing accounts, it was impossible to opine as to any possible connection between her encounter with janitor during "code blue"and her condition following the incident- Panel also responded that although medical history showed teacher had experienced stress and stress-caused physical symptoms as far back as 1995, when she was raising her own children, and the stress had continued intermittently, her anxiety had not abated to point where she could perform her job as of June 2012, and that members panel stood by their original unanimous affirmative certificate - Notwithstanding unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate, teacher failed to prove that she was totally and permanently disabled on last date of her employment, based upon (a) return to work and ability to face janitor without major negative inner feelings, (b) voluntary cessation of visits to her social worker who reported that teacher's symptoms had resolved, (c) no request by teacher to employer for accommodations in order to carry out duties through remainder of school year, (d) no evidence of inability to perform essential duties of position through school year's end, and (e) report by teacher's primary care physician after school year ended that while she was disabled after the code blue incident in March 2012, she was not permanently disabled and would be returning to work - Janitor performed delegated code blue responsibilities in directing teacher and her pupils to clear hallway, albeit forcefully - No evidence that teacher was justified in leading students through hallway after code blue was called - No evidence that janitor knew or should have known that his conduct would likely cause emotional distress - Conduct not extreme, outrageous or beyond all possible bounds of decency - No evidence that workplace hostility teacher perceived upon returning to work after incident went beyond degree of workplace friction and ill will common to many occupations and rose to level of injury sustained in workplace - That teacher felt startled, embarrassed or disrespected by janitor during code blue incident did not suffice to show that she had sustained compensable personal injury at the time or was disabled on last day of work.

Perez v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-155, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 30, 2017).

Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) Clerk IV - Alleged harassment and retaliation by RMV branch office staff from 1996 through 2010 - Claim of permanent disability based upon exposure to identifiable condition (constant workplace hostility and harassment) - Conflicts with co-workers and state trooper assigned to branch office - One-day suspension in 2000 for unprofessional conduct toward customer - Discipline overturned following grievance through union - Second suspension, for three-days, issued for directing customer to return unnecessarily to automobile insurer to correct registration error made by another RMV clerk - Loud, harsh and public verbal reprimand by supervisor heard by fellow employees and by customers - Suspension overturned following grievance - One-day suspension in 2001 for allegedly failing to assist another staff member while on shift - Perception of being targeted for discipline not meted out to other staff - Employee entered comments about years of harassment, rude treatment and interference with job performance other staff and by management in response to FY 2002 employee performance review form - Management failure in late 2002 to respond to request to take personal day, and marked off-payroll, followed by grievance and attendance correction and reinstatement of pay - 2005 transfer to another RMV branch office, followed by three-day suspension for refusal to assist customers, refusal to process transaction for drive-up customer, damage to customer's car caused by opening emergency exit into customer drive-through area, a violation of branch rules, and other violations - Suspension rescinded following hearing - Transferred to another RMV branch in 2005, along with former supervisor - Perception that work environment at new branch was hostile - In March 2009, after questioning elderly customer about identification and medical support for handicap placard application, conflict with co-worker as to why she did not simply give the customer the placard, in view of her age - Manager sided with co-worker, prompting employee to complain of hostile treatment and working conditions - Subsequent verbal altercation, in July 2009, with co-worker upset about her work load, who told employee to mind her own business, called employee "stupid and crazy" and threatened to "kick [her] ass" - Co-worker not disciplined - Employee's request for transfer to a different RMV branch office based on hostile work environment denied - Continued hostility by same co-worker, this time with racial overtones - Employee fainted at work in July 2009, believed she was kicked when she was on floor, and was taken to hospital - After returning to work several days later, perception that other workers were trying to get rid of her - Employee filed complaint with union about workplace hostility in August 2009 - Conclusion by RMV counsel that employee had provoked the initial bickering with co-worker - Employee given written warning about her confrontational and volatile behavior, and then, in January 2010, after being overheard making comments about wanting to punch co-worker and give others what they deserved, placed on paid administrative leave pending determination as to whether she posed a danger to herself and others in workplace - Subsequent negative psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation, with examining physician's

recommendation of intensive psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment prior to returning to work and re-evaluation, along with recommendation of occupational therapy to assist employee with workplace relations and working cooperatively with co-workers - Subsequent counseling and treatment generated diagnosis of serious mental illness including major depression, insomnia, low energy and anxiety - Dismissal from behavioral health treatment program due to conflict with another patient - Accidental disability retirement application filed in March 2011 based upon permanent disability due to severe depression, stress, anxiety and PTSD due to workplace harassment and retaliation - Unanimous affirmative medical panel certificate as to disability, permanence and work-related causation (identified by all three panel members as a series of work-related events) - Retirement Board approved ordinary disability retirement but denied accidental disability retirement application, despite unanimous affirmative panel certificate - Denial sustained - Neither employee nor her superiors filed any notice of injury between 1997 and 2010 despite allegations of continuing harassment - Employee's credibility as to continuing nature of alleged harassment, and reliability of her recollection of events suspect, on account of perceived constant fabrications and "set-ups" in five RMV branches over 13 years, with almost no supporting contemporaneous entries in medical records, and without any witness corroboration of employee's self-serving testimony - No evidence supporting claim of career-long exposure to workplace hazards - No identifiable condition not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations - No showing that alleged injury amounted to more than personal feelings of persecution and perpetual victimization.

O'Connor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-372, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Probation case specialist with clerical and secretarial duties - Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) allegedly caused by humiliation of having to meet with supervisors regarding unfair accusations against her, unfair targeting and discipline, and unkind and unequal treatment by supervisors and co-workers - Termination following alleged sick leave abuse, excessive personal use of work email, and conflicts with supervisor and co-workers - Insufficient evidence of causation - Unanimous affirmative certificate by medical panel (2 psychiatrists and 1 neurologist) as to disability (extreme anxiety), permanence and causation that alleged incidents in workplace caused PTSD not dispositive as to causation - No showing that supervisors did not engage in bona fide personnel actions - No showing that alleged workplace ill will, job conflicts and arguments with superiors and co-workers that generated feelings of persecution and unfair treatment was an identifiable condition not common or necessary to a great many occupations.

Sinopoli v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-223, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 10, 2016).

Group 4 police officer - Alleged post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression and panic disorder - Notice of Injury and tolling of notice period - Untimely notice - No workers' compensation-related tolling - Group 4 police officers ineligible for workers' compensation - No evidence of mental health problems within two years preceding accidental disability retirement application - Failure to get along with co-workers and superiors not so uncommon as to be "identifiable condition" leading to disability - Accidental disability retirement benefits denial affirmed.

Rosario v. Fall River Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-233, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 15, 2016).

Accountant IV/Financial Analyst - Alleged stress and anxiety due to workplace environment and staff retaliation for "whistleblowing" - Denial without convening medical panel - Failure to articulate mental or emotional injury arising out of bona fide personnel action, or intentional infliction of emotional harm - Independent medical review for workmen's compensation review performed by psychiatrist negative as to psychiatric condition causally-related to event or events at workplace - No medical record support for work-related emotional injury claimed.

Manning v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-325, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 29, 2016).

Special education and bilingual teacher - Aggravation of pre-existing mental condition (bipolar affective disorder) by work stress, to point of disability - Ongoing harassment by staff and administration (demotion from educational team facilitator position, assignment of additional work duties, required overtime, unfavorable evaluation, reprimands, disciplinary hearing) - Insufficient evidence - Unanimous certificate of medical panel (2 psychiatrists, 1 neurologist), erroneously checked off on certificate as "yes" answer as to work-related causation, actually negative based upon opinion that natural progression of pre-existing bipolar affective disorder, rather than work-related aggravation of pre-existing condition, more likely made the teacher unable to perform job duties (due to inability to organize thoughts, leading to inability to plan, organize, and assimilate evaluations) - Teacher's testimony lacked organization or specificity as to details and dates of alleged harassment, despite representation by experienced counsel and magistrate's direction to better organize the testimony - Inference from teacher's disorganized, rambling testimony that opinions of treating physicians who opined favorably as to work-related causation, none of whom testified, were based upon similarly disorganized statements to them by teacher, and that opinions therefore lacked sufficient factual foundation to be reliable.

Ibanez v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-386, Decision (Mass. Div.

of Admin. Law App., May 13, 2016).

Sufficient Proof; Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits Denial Reversed

Sufficient evidence of work-related causation - Emotional or psychological injury - Unanimous affirmative medical panel as to disability, its likely permanence, and job-related causation - Alcohol and Drug Addiction Counselor I and (during last two years of employment, from 2010 to 2012) Director of Residential and Addictive Services at Chelsea Soldiers' Home - Series of work-related events leading to injury - Following promotion to director position in 2010, increased depression, feeling of increased stress, increased and uncharacteristic uncertainty in determining correct treatment for residents who relapsed into substance abuse - After recommending that one resident who had relapsed be placed on restrictions at the Home, resident disagreed and went over his head, and director was told to leave the resident alone, causing him stress and more self second-guessing - Director wanted resident to enter a detox program but resident disagreed - Against his usual practice and for fear of being overruled, Director decided to send resident to a doctor for another opinion, but doctor told him that the resident did not need detox, and Director placed resident on restriction rather than send him to detox - Resident found dead in his room at Home the next morning (cause of death not in record). - Director learned of this while driving to work in telephone call from another resident he was counseling (as per his duties), who was emotionally upset about the death- After Director arrived at Home, his immediate supervisor confirmed the resident's death, told Director it was not his fault, and sent Director home because he was devastated, beside himself and unable to function as a result of this development - Director felt that if resident had been admitted to detox facility, he would not have been able to continue his drug use, or he could have received medical treatment if his death was due to other causes - Director felt guilty for not having sent resident to detox facility - After staying out of work for a week and then returning, Director could not stop thinking that if he had sent resident to detox the outcome might have been different, and continued to feel he was being second-guessed about his counseling and treatment of residents - Director continued counseling with psychiatrist who had treated him previously for depression, attention deficit disorder and anxiety, and continued working for ten weeks before going on medical leave, and never returning to work afterward - Ordinary and Accidental disability retirement applications filed subsequently based upon generalized anxiety disorder, recurrent major depressive disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as well as for cardiac and orthopedic-related issues, and identified resident's death as both personal injury and hazard undergone that had caused his emotional and psychological disability - Regional psychiatric medical panel unanimously affirmative as to disability, its likely permanence and work-related causation - Panel members viewed new responsibilities Director undertook following his 2010 promotion as having overwhelmed him, and as primary stressor predisposing him to post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of resident's death, along with worsening depressive and

anxiety symptoms - Ordinary disability retirement granted by retirement board based upon emotional injury, leaving only the issue of work-related causation to be determined - Retirement board denied accidental disability application despite unanimous affirmative panel certificate based upon conclusion that Director's condition was not caused or aggravated by a personal injury he sustained or a hazard he underwent as a result of, and while performing, his work related duties - Denial reversed - Director filed accidental disability retirement application within two years of events upon which he relied, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1) - Director sustained burden of proving emotional injury's work-related causation, by showing a series of events leading to his injury (increasing uncertainty as to his own decisions on counseling and consequences for residents, reliance upon doctor's opinion rather than his own judgment in assigning resident to restriction rather than sending him to detox, telephone call from upset resident he received while driving to work informing him of resident's death, and supervisor's confirmation of resident's death) - Whether emotional injury is considered to have been result of series of events or any one of them, the events occurred while Director was at work and in performance of his duties, haunted him after the resident's death, and caused remorse over his decision not to assign resident to detox, all of which left him emotionally unable to perform his counseling duties and left him disabled - Important to note that Director was in the performance of his duties when he learned of resident's death - Taking phone call from distraught resident fell within scope of his duties regarding prevention of resident relapse into substance abuse - Retirement board directed to grant Director's accidental disability retirement application.

McDonough v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-98, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 8, 2017).

Corrections officer - Job description required ability to make decisions and act quickly in emergency and dangerous situations - 2012 application for accidental disability retirement based upon disabling post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) sustained as a result of being assaulted and stabbed on July 1, 2002 while transferring inmate for medical treatment - Stab wound penetrated to ribs, but surgery proved unnecessary - Returned to work in 2002 following counseling with social worker - Deployed to Kuwait with Massachusetts National Guard unit in June 2003 without direct combat but under heavy missile fire for three weeks - Released from active duty due to wife's auto accident and serious injuries - After returning to work, attributed difficulty thinking and "falling apart" to wife's auto accident but returned to counseling with social worker he had seen in 2002 - Social worker diagnosed PTSD relating back to 2002 stabbing incident - Transferred to another correctional facility in attempt to alleviate PTSD - Psychiatric treatment between 2006 and 2008 - Psychiatrist noted increased PTSD symptoms as March 2008 trial of inmate who stabbed him approached, with expectation that corrections officer would testify as key witness - Told co-worker min March 2008 he wanted to blow [his] braines out" - Treated at

hospital for suicidal thoughts, which were attributed to stress from upcoming trial of inmate who stabbed him and wanting to leave his wife, but letter to employer stated he was being treated for PTSD flare-ups related to 2002 stabbing incident - Separated from wife in 2008 and divorced in 2010 - Promoted to rank of sergeant in early 2009 and transferred to work at state hospital - Present when another corrections officer was assaulted by inmate on April 30, 2009 but video footage shows he stood there and did nothing - Terminated, following Department of Corrections hearing, for dereliction of duties during April 30, 2009 incident, but termination later vacated due to corrections officer's history of PTSD, with instructions that corrections officer move forward with workers' compensation and accidental disability retirement claims based upon 2002 stabbing incident - October 2010 medical report mentioned that corrections officer did not act during 2009 incident due to disassociation resulting from extreme PTSD - Two psychiatrists who performed independent medical examinations to determine workers' compensation eligibility each concluded that corrections officer suffered PTSD as a result of 2002 stabbing incident, with one also concluding that PTSD did not prevent him from taking action during the April 2009 assault of other corrections officer, and the other concluding that his PTSD was responsible for his inaction and that his service in Kuwait did not cause or contribute to his PTSD or its symptomatology - Awarded workers' compensation benefits -Application for accidental disability retirement based upon inability to perform required care, custody and control of inmates after the April 2009 event due to PTSD, and disability dates listed as July 1, 2002 and April 30, 2009 - Examination in 2013 by medical panel comprising three psychiatrists - Panel noted no psychiatric history prior to 2002 stabbing, and concluded that there was a connection between the stabbing and corrections officer's behavior change, as noted by prior clinicians - Unanimous conclusion by panel members that corrections officer was injured while engaged in his employment duties, and was permanently disabled from continuing to work because of this injury and the chronic PTSD it caused - State Board of Retirement denied accidental disability retirement application, which corrections officer timely appealed - Continuing receipt by former corrections officer of PTSD counseling and prescription medication that is helpful, but current symptoms include trouble with daily functions, difficulty making decisions, and flashbacks to 2002 stabbing, and belief that he is incapable of making a "snap decision" - Sufficient proof of permanent disability as a result of PTSD caused by stabbing incident while employed as corrections officer - Proof includes social worker's diagnosis in 2004; transfer to another correctional facility to alleviate PTSD; hospitalization in 2008 with suicidal thoughts prompted by oncoming trial of inmate who had stabbed him; inability to assist assaulted co-worker in 2009 due to disassociation from incident caused by PTSD that was noted in subsequent medical record; opinion of one of two independent examining psychiatrists that PTSD prevented corrections officer from acting during 2009 incident; unanimous conclusion of medical panel members as to permanently-disabling PTSD resulting from 2002 stabbing; and preponderance of this evidence as to persisting PTSD-related disability over other factors that arguably showed ability to complete job duties of corrections officer (promotion to sergeant in

2009, and opinion of one of the independent examining psychiatrists that PTSD did not prevent corrections officer from acting during 2009 incident) - Nature of corrections officer's PTSD showed that although he might appear capable of completing routine job duties, he could not be relied upon to act appropriately during emergency situation, as was the case during 2009 incident - Persistence of PTSD over 14-year period following 2002 stabbing showed this condition, and the related disability, to be chronic and permanent, as medical panel concluded - No attribution of PTSD by anyone who treated and/or examined corrections officer to any event prior to 2002 stabbing, or to any cause other than that incident - Although application for accidental disability was not filed within two years of injury that caused it (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1)), corrections officer qualified for "official record" exception for retirement Group 2, 3 and 4 members (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(3)(a)) because he was member of Group 4, and official report was filed at the time of the 2002 stabbing incident - No medical evidence or opinion that PTSD was caused or exacerbated by military service in Kuwait or wife's auto accident, or that anything other than the 2002 stabbing (including his termination for dereliction of duty during the 2009 incident, as the Board argued) was the proximate cause of the PTSD - Denial of accidental disability retirement application reversed.

Andrade v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-104, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 4, 2017).

—Statutory Presumptions

Cancer Presumption

[no entries at this time]

Heart Law Presumption

Retired firefighter - Accidental disability retirement application filed October 21, 2013, subsequent to superannuation retirement in April 2009 - Claimed "heart presumption" for firefighters (M.G.L. c. 32, § 94) and history of atrial fibrillation as "hazard undergone" - No notice of injury filed with retirement board as to asserted heart-related injury (palpitations and chest pain experienced while climbing stairs

during response to house fire in 2006, five years prior to filing of accidental disability retirement application) - No mention of these symptoms or of firefighters' on-site evaluation by EMTs in incident report regarding this fire - No notice of injury filed regarding cardiac event in May 2007 - Hospital records reported history of hypertension, but electrocardiogram following 2007 event showed no atrial fibrillation - Firefighter declined hospitalization and signed himself out of hospital against medical advice - No workers' compensation-related exception to failure to file written notice of injury because firefighters, as Group 4 members, are not eligible to receive workers' compensation - Exception to notice of injury requirement based upon record of injury sustained on file in fire department's official records inapplicable as claimant produced no such record - Atrial fibrillation diagnosed on January 9, 2009 (prior to superannuation retirement), but followup EKG on January 29, 2009 showed regular heart rate and no atrial fibrillation, and firefighter was cleared to return to work - No treatment for atrial fibrillation until May 2010, subsequent to retirement, when attempt to correct this condition failed - Heart condition was, per the record, a disability that matured subsequent to retirement in 2009 - Application for accidental disability retirement properly denied without convening medical panel.

Benoit v. Everett Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-821, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Heart law (M.G.L. c. 32, § 94) creates presumption that when full-time police officer or firefighter is disabled as a result of a heart condition or hypertension, disability is related causally to firefighter's job - Presumption reflects view of heart disease and hypertension as long-term illnesses that can be exacerbated by the stress of working as a police officer or firefighter - If applicable, heart law presumption satisfies one of the three prerequisites for accidental disability retirement—a proximate, work-related cause for a retirement system member's incapacity—and makes it unnecessary for the retirement system member to prove the causal connection any further.

Foley v. Milton Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-118, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 27, 2016).

Heart law presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by competent evidence that (1) the disabling heart disease or heart condition was not suffered in the line of duty; or (2) although he suffered from hypertension, a police officer or firefighter was not retired on account of a hypertension-related disability, or was not totally incapacitated from performing the essential duties of his job when he retired.

Foley v. Milton Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-118, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 27, 2016).

Competent evidence rebutting heart law presumption may include finding of majority of medical panel members that hypertension or heart disease was not incapacitating.

Foley v. Milton Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-118, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 27, 2016).

Former deputy fire chief applying for accidental disability retirement based upon job-related hypertension - Heart law presumption - Applicability - Required showing: (a) Successfully passing physical examination upon entry into fire department or subsequently, with examination revealing no evidence of condition of health impairment caused by hypertension; and (b) Disability as a result of hypertension before retiring.

Foley v. Milton Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-118, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 27, 2016).

Retired deputy fire chief - Application for accidental disability retirement based upon job-related hypertension - Denial of application sustained - Heart law presumption inapplicable even though deputy fire chief suffered from hypertension exacerbated by stress - Failure to report any hypertension-related injury or request leave on account of hypertension before retiring - Majority of the three-cardiologist medical panel opinion, after examining deputy fire chief, that he was not physically incapable of performing his essential job duties - No dispute that the panel's composition was proper or that panel members reviewed official description of the deputy fire chief's essential job duties or his medical records - No evidence that panel majority employed incorrect standard in determining that he was not disabled.

Foley v. Milton Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-118, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 27, 2016).

Beneficiaries of Retirement Contributions

—Benefits

Limitations, Overpayments, and Discretionary Waiver of Recoupment or Repayment

Member-survivor benefits (M.G.L. c. 32, § 12(2)(d)) - Statutory limitation of initial annual benefit amount to deceased retirement system member's actual salary at time of death (M.G.L. c. 32, § 12(2)(d), last para.) - Exception to statute's general rule that monthly survivor benefits to spouse of deceased retirement system member not be less than $250 or $500, whichever applied - Town clerk receiving $1,550 annual salary

upon death in April 2000 - Surviving spouse's annual benefit amount erroneously based upon $3,000 statutory minimum retirement amount ($250 per month) rather than decedent's $1,550 annual salary - Resulting overpayment of member-survivor benefits over ten-year period ($20,310.71) subject to recoupment absent waiver pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 20(5)(c)(3) - Discretionary denial of waiver request - No abuse of retirement board's discretion, even though overpayment resulted from retirement board error in calculating surviving spouse's annual member-survivor benefit amount - Board's benefit reduction and/or request for repayment based solely upon statutory limitation - No allegation or evidence of arbitrary or capricious action by retirement board in denying waiver.

Randall v. Franklin County Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-277, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

—Designation of Beneficiary

Generally

Primary purpose of retirement account beneficiary designation form is to help meet public employee's "core expectation" that the beneficiaries she designates will be the persons the retirement system actually pays after she dies - Second purpose is to facilitate ease of retirement system administration—specifically, the form helps the retirement board determine efficiently, after the retiree dies, who her beneficiaries are, and it also provides the board with the legal basis for paying those beneficiaries to the exclusion of others who may claim what remains in the retirement account.

Lawlor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-514, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 25, 2019).

Issues to be decided on appeal challenging retirement board's decision to distribute amount remaining in retired, deceased public employee's retirement account to her estate rather than to the "option B" beneficiaries she had designated based upon the designation's alleged defects (missing date next to retiree's signature, or omission of beneficiary's name while providing his or her Social Security number, notwithstanding the retiree added the name later at the board's request) were (1) whether the retiree's option designation form included in her retirement application was properly signed and witnessed; and (2) whether she made a valid designation of beneficiaries to whom the board must distribute what remained in her retirement account, or whether the designation was defective and left the board no choice but to pay the remainder to the retiree's estate, per M.G.L. c. 32, § 11(2)(c).

Lawlor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-514, Decision (Mass. Div.

of Admin. Law App., Jan. 25, 2019).

Absence of witness signature following retirement system member's signature on his retirement option designation form is fatal and renders the beneficiary designation without effect, as is failure to indicate the proportion of the remaining balance in the retirement account that a beneficiary is to receive; and if that was indeed the case, the remainder of the retirement account is paid to the deceased retiree's legal representatives, meaning the executor or administrator of the retiree's estate, as it would be if there was no beneficiary of record.

Lawlor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-514, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 25, 2019).

DALA decisions adjudicating disputes over beneficiary designations—for example, where a deceased retiree had several beneficiary designation forms on file with the retirement board—(1) tended to favor results that most likely met the retiree's actual expectations over results consistent with the retirement board's administrative ease; (2) a beneficiary designation on file with the board is not given effect if it it is demonstrably inconsistent with the retiree's intentions; and (3) even if beneficiary designation on file was not quite in the form the board expected, it would be given effect if it substantially complied with the requirements of the state retirement system.

Lawlor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-514, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 25, 2019).

Insufficient Beneficiary Designation

Designation of former spouse as retirement contributions beneficiary - Defective designation by deceased retiree - No witness signature - Proportion of benefits payable to beneficiary left blank - Omissions fatal to beneficiary designation - Entire retirement account payable to decedent's estate.

Fritz-Elliot v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-368, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 22, 2016).

Sufficient Beneficiary Designation

Board's decision to distribute amount remaining in retired, deceased public employee's retirement account to her estate based upon defective beneficiary designation vacated, after hearing, on appeal by four "option B" retirement beneficiaries the employee had designated, and board directed to distribute remaining

amount to each beneficiary in proportion the employee specified (25 percent to each) - Evidence showed that (1) employee signed option selection form without dating it, but while the form provided a space for entering a date, it did not state that a date was required, or that omitting the date would invalidate the retirement option the employee selected or her designation of beneficiaries; (2) although first witness who signed beneficiary designation form was disqualified as witness because she was also a designated beneficiary, form was also witnessed by a second person who was not a designated beneficiary and was not disqualified, and form required only one valid witness signature; (3) the form identified the four petitioners as the employee's beneficiaries, and specified the percentage each of them was to receive of what remained in her retirement account when she died—25 percent each; (4) these percentages would result in distribution of 100 percent of retirement account remainder, which made each beneficiary "primary" even though employee did not check the "primary" or "conditional" box for any of the beneficiaries she designated; (5) following employee's retirement, and well before she died, retirement board asked employee to backdate her signature to the date on which it was actually witnessed, and supply missing information regarding two of the beneficiaries (the Social Security number of one of them, and the name and address of a beneficiary who had been identified by her Social Security number and birth date but whose name had been omitted inadvertently), and she did so immediately; and (6) proceeding in that manner, rather than rejecting employee's retirement option choice and her beneficiary designation, implemented employee's reasonable expectation as to how amount remaining in her retirement account upon her death would be distributed; it also left the board certain as to who the beneficiaries were and what proportion of amount remaining in retirement account each of them was to receive.

Lawlor v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-514, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 25, 2019).

Buyback of Previously-Refunded Retirement Contributions

Restoration to state service after leaving prior state position - Purchase of previously-refunded retirement contributions - Failure to timely exercise buyback option at lower interest rate - Higher actuarially-assumed interest rate applies.

England v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-18, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 2, 2016).

Restoration to state service after leaving prior state position - Installment agreement - Default (failure to make buyback installment payments) - Prevailing actuarial interest rate applicable to new buyback arrangement.

Maddox v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-301, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 2, 2016).

Computation of Retirement Benefits

—Benefits to Former Spouse Under Domestic Relations Order (DRO) or Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)

Retired teacher divorced before retirement - Former husband's marital portion of teacher's pension - Marital settlement agreement incorporated but not merged into court's divorce decree, and confirmed by Qualified Domestic Relations Order issued by Kent County (Rhode Island) Family Court - Provision requiring that teacher receive pension benefits under retirement Option C, with option to select benefits under retirement Option B if former husband "has not remarried" at time of teacher's retirement, with balance of former husband's interest in net equity of marital home to be paid through equitable allocation of her pension - Before teacher retired, former husband remarried and later divorced his second wife - Retirement System denied teacher's election of Option B based upon former husband's remarriage - Phrase "has not remarried" in marital settlement agreement and QDRO not equivalent of "has never remarried" - Per plain language of QDRO, teacher's obligation to select retirement Option C, and ability to select Option B instead, was based upon former husband's marital status when she retired (which was "divorced"), and not before her retirement - Relief from obligation to select retirement option C based upon former husband's "remarried" status before, but not when, she retired, needed to be sought by petitioning the Rhode Island Family Court, which retained jurisdiction over the QDRO - Retirement System's decision requiring that teacher select Option C upon retiring affirmed.

Mason v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-200, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 26, 2017).

Monthly retirement benefit allocation payment to former spouse under DRO - Subsequent DRO reducing payment amount - Retirement Board bound by DRO - Board's refusal to reinstate higher retirement benefit allocation under prior DRO was decision or action appealable to DALA under M.G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), if only for determination that latest DRO bound the Board to reduce former spouse's benefit payment and confirm exhaustion of remedies under retirement statute - Relief regarding reduced benefit amount ordered by DRO, if available, must be sought from Probate and Family Court.

Creedon v. Lexington Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-662, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

QDRO directing computation of ex-spouse's retirement benefit share as if employment ended at time of divorce - Employment group classification at time of divorce, not at later time of statutory group classification change, applies during computation of ex-spouse's retirement benefit share.

Holland v. Boston Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-13, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 1, 2016).

—Retirement Allowance Computation

"Anti-Spiking" Provisions

Per the "anti-spiking" provision of M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a), if in the *"5 years of creditable service immediately preceding retirement*"(meaning the last five years of creditable service before a public employee retires, whether those five years are continuous or interrupted) the employee's salary more than doubled in two consecutive years, her pension will not be based on an average of the three consecutive years of creditable service for which the rate of compensation was the highest, but instead, on the average annual rate of regular compensation received during the "*5 consecutive years preceding retirement*"—also meaning the last five years of creditable service before retiring, whether continuous or interrupted - Interpreting "5 years of creditable service preceding retirement" or "5 consecutive years preceding retirement as referring to five years running continuously without interruption would inject an additional condition for the anti-spiking provision to apply that the legislature did not include, and would also allow an employee whose salary more than doubled in two consecutive years to evade the anti-spiking provision and defeat it by taking leave from work, whether for a year, a month or even a day, during the five years preceding retirement.

Hartnett v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-218, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Retirement - Computation of retirement allowance - "Anti-spiking" provisions - Public employee who worked from 1978 to April 7, 1990 in state service and was a member of the State Retirement System, with a salary during that time ranging between $33,360 and $34,068, and later returned to government service, working as a member in service of the Boston Retirement System for three years and eight months, from July 2002 to April 2006, at a salary ranging between $94,000 and $103,771 - Boston Retirement System properly applied the anti-spiking provision of M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a) in calculating her monthly retirement benefit amount, because her salary more than doubled in two consecutive years compared with her salary when she left state service - In doing so, the Boston Retirement System properly added, to

the retiree's three years and eight months of Boston service at the higher salary, approximately one year and four months of her prior state service prior to April 7, 1990 at the lower salary, as these comprised the last five years of her creditable service before retirement - Even though the Boston service and the prior state service did not run continuously without interruption, the anti-spiking provision of M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a) does not require that the five years in question have run continuously.

Hartnett v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-17-218, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Superannuation Retirement Allowance

Retirement benefit - Applicable option under which benefit is paid to retired member of contributory retirement system - Failure to elect any option upon becoming retirement system member late, or to elect option upon retiring - No option in effect upon retirement - Retirement benefit payment under option B required by statute (M.G.L. c. 32, § 12(1)).

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 20, 2017), *reconsideration denied* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017).

M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2) mandates how state retirement system member's superannuation retirement allowance should be calculated, and State Board of Retirement is bound to utilize this methodology in making this calculation—Member's age factor (as of last birthday) is multiplied by the amount of creditable service the member accrued, and the product is then multiplied by the "average annual rate of regular compensation received by such member during any period of three consecutive years of creditable service for which such rate of compensation was the highest"—Subject to a limitation the statute prescribes, the state retirement system member's superannuation retirement allowance "shall not exceed four fifths of the average rate of regular compensation received during any pay period of three consecutive years of creditable service during for which such rate of compensation was the highest or on the average annual rate of regular compensation received by such member during the period or periods, whether or not consecutive, constituting the last three years of creditable service preceding retirement, whichever is the greater."

Berman v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-549, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 28, 2017).

State retirement system member could not prevail upon claim that calculation of her

superannuation retirement allowance was improper because it did not take into account her actual earnings or the number of business days she actually worked, and did not credit her for pay raises she had earned or for an extra day during 2012, a leap year - No reference to any of these factors by the statute prescribing how a state retirement member's superannuation retirement allowance should be calculated (M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)) - Statute does not contemplate use of member's actual earnings, and instead requires taking into account her average annual *rate* of regular compensation for the final three years of her employment in state service, without regard to pay periods, leap years, or the number of business days in a year - State Board of Retirement was bound to follow this methodology, which it did - However, the Board was required to adjust its calculation of the member's superannuation retirement allowance by using her weighted average annual rate of regular compensation during the years of service for which such rate of compensation was the highest (resulting in an average annual rate of regular compensation of $69,955.50), rather than the average annual rates provided by her employer (the University of Massachusetts), which resulted in an average annual rate of regular compensation of $69,922.44) - Adjustment was retroactive to July 1, 2013, the day following the date on which the member's retirement became effective.

Berman v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-549, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 28, 2017).

—Regular Compensation - Generally

On appeal to DALA by public school teacher challenging Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System's treatment of one-time $300 payment teacher received for work as member of school district "Code of Conduct" committee as per diem expense payment, rather than as part of teacher's "regular compensation" (as defined by M.G.L. c. 32, § 1) on which retirement benefits were based, MTRS was entitled to shift, or add, rationales for excluding the payment (*e.g.*, that $300 payment was not regular compensation because it was paid for special project involving tasks performed on a year-to-year basis, and that teacher had received stipend for committee work performed outside of the normal school year or school hours) because the DALA appeal was *de novo*.

Clark (Lynn) v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-437, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 22, 2018).

Regular compensation is defined by M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 as "compensation received exclusively as wages by an employee for services performed in the course of employment for the employer," and to be considered "regular compensation" under the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) regulations, compensation must be "ordinary, normal, recurrent, repeated, and of indefinite duration," must "be made

on a non-discriminatory basis and be generally available for employees who are similarly situated relative to the purpose of the payment (e.g. a longevity payment made recurrently to all employees in a bargaining unit have attained a specific length of service)," (*see* 840 C.M.R. § 15.01(a)(3) and (5); in addition, the PERAC regulations specifically exclude from regular compensation "any amounts paid as bonuses," which include "any payment to an employee or group of employees which will not recur or which will recur for only a limited or definite term," unless the payment is "made under a salary augmentation plan or salary enhancement program provided for in a collective bargaining agreement (*id*.).

Stevens v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-332, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 1, 2017).

—Regular Compensation - Service or Amounts Included

Public school teachers - Stipends included as wages in pension calculation - Pursuant to collective bargaining agreement, stipends were paid for five years to teachers in town public school system with Masters degrees or higher who took 15 hours of after-school courses approved by the superintendent of schools and taught by other teachers working on doctorates and by the superintendent, in topics that included teaching techniques, mentoring other teachers, and classroom coaching, organizing learning, developing health social climates in the classroom, and integrating technology into the learning process, with teachers who completed the required 15 hours of courses becoming "School Improvement Specialists," although no additional duties accompanied this title - - Per definition of "wages" recited by Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) regulations (*see* 840 C.M.R. § 15.03(3)(b)), the stipends were part of base compensation paid to an employee, because they were (1) "pre-determined" (by the collective bargaining agreement), (2) "non-discretionary" (given to all teachers who took 15 hours of approved courses, with no discretion on part of town public schools as to whether to pay the stipend), (3) guaranteed payments by the employer to similarly-situated employees (in this case, teachers with a Master's degree or higher who took the required 15 hours of approved courses), (4) "payments . . . because of educational incentives" (as they were given in exchange for taking extra training after regular school hours); and also were not pursuant to a "salary augmentation plan" that would "recur for a limited or definite term" (*see* 840 C.M.R. § 15.03(3)(f)), as they were ongoing, to be paid through the terms of at least three collective bargaining agreements - Decision of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System not to include stipends in calculating teacher's pension, on ground that they were a "temporary salary augmentation" not considered as part of base pay each year, reversed.

Ferris v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-503, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 13, 2018).

Public school teachers, generally - Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 1, regular compensation includes "salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form" paid for a retirement system member's service by the employer, with two exceptions with regard to teachers: (1) Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 1, for teacher employed in public day school who is a member of teacher's retirement system, salary payable under terms of annual contract for additional services in the school is regarded as regular compensation rather than as bonus or overtime, and, per Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System regulations, annual contract for a teacher means the collective bargaining agreement governing the rights of MTRS members, whether a one-year or multi-year agreement (807 C.M.R. § 6.01); and (2) Per the MTRS regulations, salary payable under terms of annual contract for additional services are counted as regular compensation so long as additional services are educational in nature, remuneration for these services is provided in the annual contract, and the additional services are performed during the school year (807 C.M.R, § 6.02(1)).

Brunell v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-764, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

Public school teachers - Payment for work performed as summer school director - summer program "meaningfully related to the regular school experience" - Payments qualify as "regular compensation" - Retirement System's refusal to count payments in calculating retirement benefits reversed.

Fay v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-11-770, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 25, 2016).

Prior periods of contract service to state agencies purchased pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1) - Sufficiently permanent and regular service not paid out of "03" subsidiary account - Retirement board policy precluding inclusion of purchased "section 4(1)" contract service from inclusion in computing regular compensation - Policy invalid as exceeding scope of Board's Chapter 32 authority.

Young v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-10-749, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 1, 2016).

—Regular Compensation - Service or Amounts Not Included

Compensation that is <u>Not</u> Ordinary, Normal. Recurrent, Repeated and of Indefinite Duration

Former Building Inspector of one town (Wilbraham) and member of county retirement system) also employed as part-time Town Building Inspector in second town

(Hampden) - Compensation based upon percentages of fees for building permits and inspections - Contribution to retirement system from earnings in both towns - Paid regular salary in Wilbraham, but Hampden compensation was 80 percent of total building permit fees received per annum (as to permits for smaller projects such as roofing, siding, wood stoves or window replacement, inspector kept 80 percent of the $50 single inspection permit fee paid to him and returned 20% to the town; and for larger projects, such as single-family homes that required 5-8 inspections, and for projects such as multi-million dollar country club, church or solar field construction, for which inspections, often multiple ones, were required daily over a 6-9 month period, the inspector's fee was 80 percent of the cost of construction - Annual construction costs of all projects in Hampden between 2008 and 2015 varied between a low of $2.14 million in 2011 and a high of $24.74 million in 2014 - Number of permits that part-time building inspector issued while employed by Hampden, and his earnings from issuing permits, varied from month to month - Inspector earned approximately $88,000 in Hampden in 2012, and then those earnings rose markedly (varying between approximately $148,000 in 2013 and approximately $157,000 in 2015) - After leaving employment in Hampden (but remaining employed in Wilbraham), building inspector requested retirement allowance information from county retirement board based upon retirement options A, B and C if he retired effective June 15, 2017 - County projected allowance based upon his regular compensation in Wilbraham and requested opinion by Public Empoyee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) as to whether his earnings in Hampden constituted regular compensation - PERAC issued opinion in 2016 that payments to building inspector in Hampden, structured as they were, could not be included in regular compensation on which retirement allowance was based because they were not regular, recurring, pre-determined and non-discretionary, per M.G.L. c. 31, § 1 (definition of "regular compensation"); 840 C.M.R. §§ 15.03(1) and (3)(a)(b)(PERAC's regulatory definitions of "regular compensation" for periods prior to July 1, 2009 and afterward, respectively, including requirement that to be considered an employee's regular compensation, it must have been received exclusively as wages for services performed in the course of employment) - On appeal to DALA, retirement board's denial of inspector's request to include earnings from Hampden as regular compensation on which retirement allowance would be based sustained on appeal to DALA - Hampden income was not regular, recurring, predetermined and non-discretionary, and therefore were outside the scope of "regular compensation" as deinfed by M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 - as they were not guaranteed - No base pay, and inspector would have received no payment from permit fees during any month in which no permit applications were filed; in addition, number of permits varied each month, as did amount of earnings inspector received, and earnings month-to-month, as well as annually, were unpredictable - Permit fee-based earnings in Hampden were actually an "indirect" form of compensation rather than regular compensation.

Trevallion v. Hampden County Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-17-282, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 8, 2019).

Extraordinary, Ad Hoc or One-Time Bonus Payment

Public school teacher - One-time, non-recurring $500 payment for 2009-10 school year based upon teacher being at top salary step level with no possibility of further upward salary movement under collective bargaining agreement between school district and teachers' union - One-time payment treated as "bonus" payment rather than part of regular compensation because it was not normal, recurrent, repeated and of indefinite duration, was not a cost-of-living bonus, was clearly a one-time payment, and payment was not for "future salary increases" but instead to compensate those teachers on top salary step who did not qualify for longevity" (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 (definition of "regular compensation") and PERAC regulations clarifying regular compensation definition, 840 C.M.R. § 15.03(1)(a)3, and amounts not considered to be regular compensation, 840 C.M.R. § 15.03(2)(c), or wages, 840 C.M.R. § 15.03(2)(f)) - Payment properly excluded in computing teacher's three-year salary average in computing her retirement allowance pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a).

Santerre (Joyce) v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-12-281, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 17, 2018).

Public school teacher - One-time longevity payment under collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between teacher's union and school district - Bonus payment not included in regular compensation - Public school teacher with 25 years of service - $1,000 payment for academic year 2010-11 paid to all CBA unit members who had reached top salary step prior to July 1, 2010 - CBA described payment as "bonus" - Retirement contributions taken from this payment - Intention of payment, per school system human resources director, was compensation for lack of contractual pay increases for several years, rather than award of bonus for performance of service - Payment was bonus rather than longevity payment treated as regular compensation, as it was extraordinary, ad hoc, one-time and of finite duration, rather than "ordinary, normal, recurrent, repeated, and of indefinite duration," as required by statutory definition of regular compensation (M.G.L. c. 32, § 1) and by PERAC regulations (840 C.M.R. § 15.03(1)(a)(3)) - Teacher received separate longevity pay of $1,200 during 2010-11 and 2011-12 years under CBA, as did all teachers with 25 years of service - Because payment was not regular compensation under retirement law, parties to CBA could not agree to treat the one-time bonus payment as regular compensation, and decision as to whether payment was regular compensation was one for the retirement board to make pursuant to law defining regular compensation - Retirement Board's decision to treat one-time payment as bonus rather than regular compensation affirmed, with any retirement deductions taken from this payment to be refunded to the teacher.

Stevens v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-332, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 1, 2017).

Longevity Payment or Career Incentive Payment

Public school teachers - Enhanced longevity payments due after collective bargaining agreement expired properly excluded from computation of salary for retirement purposes.

Mulcahy v. Mass. Teachers Retirement System, Docket No. CR-09-441, Summary Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 6, 2016).

Public charter school teacher - Annual career incentive payments, in addition to base salary, for performing contract duties and remaining employed by school system - Properly excluded from computation of salary for retirement purposes.

Burke v. Teachers Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-428, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 1, 2016).

Payment for Work Performed During Summer Months That Position and Annual Contract Did Not Require

Computation of Retirement Benefits - Regular Compensation - Service or Amounts Not Included - Periodic Hourly Payments for Summer Work - Appeal by petitioner, a former public school Director of Guidance/Testing K-12 who retired effective June 30, 2013, from decision of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) excluding former Director's summer earnings in 2008 and 2009 for guidance work from calculation of her three-year salary average in determining her retirement allowance - Article XXIX Applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between School Committee and Teachers' Association for period in question provided that Director's work was for 10 months with an additional two weeks as needed and funded - In defining high school guidance counselors' work year, CBA Article XXX provided that two guidance counselors would be employed at the senior high school level for a four-week period beyond the negotiated work year of school counselors at 1/52 of their annual salary - As Director of Guidance, petitioner was responsible for assigning one or more guidance counselors to summer guidance work defined by CBA Article XXX, and she offered this work to other guidance counselors who split one position three ways in 2008 and four ways in 2009 - During summer months of 2008 and 2009, petitioner worked extra days beyond the 10 months and two weeks the CBA specified to perform summer guidance work - In addition to management duties, petitioner performed work of guidance counselor during summer - Guidance counselors performing summer work had to fill out time cards and were paid a daily rate - Petitioner was paid $5,435 for summer guidance work in 2008 and $6,452.76 for summer guidance work in 2009 - Exclusion of payments for summer guidance work

from retirement allowance computation affirmed, on two grounds - (1) MTRS regulations specifically exclude, from definition of regular compensation, any amounts paid for work performed during summer months unless retirement system member's position was for 11 or 12 months and the annual contract so provides (*see* 807 C.M.R. § 6.02(2)(b)) - Only evidence that petitioner was employed pursuant to CBA Article XXX as senior high school level counselor for four-week period beyond the negotiated work year was statement by town public schools Financial Coordinator that petitioner's summer work in question was "guidance summer work" as described in CBA Article XXX - This evidence was not persuasive, as it was both self-serving and uncorroborated - In employer's section of petitioner's retirement application, town public schools Financial Coordinator described summer work in question as "guidance summer work" as described in CBA - Director of Guidance who succeeded petitioner did not mention summer guidance work in describing petitioner's duties in a July 2013 email - School Superintendent stated that Director of Guidance was required to work hours during summer months in July 2013 letter concerning petitioner's retirement application, but did not address petitioner's summer guidance counselor work specifically - Petitioner argued that Superintendent did not do so because he was not asked about petitioner's summer guidance work, but it was petitioner's burden to resolve this point as she had burden of proof, and she did not do so - (2) Payment that petitioner received for summer guidance work in 2008 and 2009 was hourly pay rather than fixed annual salary, and therefore was not regular compensation, *citing Hallett v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd.*, 431 Mass. 66, 68-69, 725 N.E.2d 222, 224 (2000).

Lovering v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-435, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin Law App., Aug. 31, 2018).

Payment or Stipend for Additional Service Not Specified in Collective Bargaining Agreement

Public school teacher - Stipend not specified in collective bargaining agreement - $300 stipend paid for "Code of Conduct Committee" work - No evidence that committee work was special project that continued year-to-year - Teacher did not file prehearing memorandum as ordered and, in lieu of dismissal for lack of prosecution, her appeal was decided on written submissions, but this left nature of her committee work unexplained - Applicable collective bargaining agreement provided for "professional development, co-curricular and extra-curricular" positions including one entitled "Teacher-to-Teacher I," at "level 10" (meaning that it would take up to ten hours to perform) for $300, but did not explain what "Teacher-to-Teacher" meant - Collective bargaining agreement did not provide specifically for a "Code of Conduct Committee" position - School superintendent issued "special assignment" posting for various positions and stipends, subject to availability of funding from local budget or from state and federal grants, among them four representatives from each school who would serve

on a "Code of Conduct Committee" - Posting stated that stipend for this Code of Conduct position was $300 during previous school year but amount for current school year was to be determined based on contract negotiations between the school superintendent and the local Teachers' Association - In teacher's application to retire at end of 2012-13 school year, school district listed $300 payment during 2010-11 school year for "Teacher-to-Teacher I-Code of Conduct" - MTRS excluded this $300 payment from teacher's regular compensation, treating it instead as per diem expense payment - No evidence that it was per diem expense payment, and during appeal MTRS shifted rationale for excluding $300 payment from teacher's regular compensation to arguments that $300 payment was not regular compensation because it was paid for special project involving tasks performed on a year-to-year basis, and that teacher had received stipend for committee work performed outside of the normal school year or school hours - Shift in or addition of rationales for excluding payment from regular compensation was permissible because DALA appeal was *de novo* - No evidence that the teacher's Code of Conduct committee work was outside the normal school year or regular school hours, or how much work was actually performed, and no MTRS regulation prohibited teacher from earning regular compensation for work after school hours or during summer - Although MTRS did not show that Code of Conduct Committee work was a special project involving tasks that did not continue from year to year, teacher did not show that this was not the case - Teacher did not present her case in a prehearing memorandum, barely participated in trying to make a case for treating the $300 payment as regular compensation, and made herself unavailable to be questioned about when the Committee operated, what Committee work the teacher performed, or when she did so, leaving these details unexplained - In addition, although the applicable collective bargaining agreement listed "Teacher-to-Teacher I" as an additional service for which regular compensation was paid, the agreement did not list Code of Conduct Committee work as an additional service for which salary was payable under the contract's terms.

Clark v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-437, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 22, 2018).

Public high school family/consumer science teacher in Shrewsbury Public Schools-Member of collective bargaining unit represented by Shrewsbury Education Association - Stipend payments received for additional services provided as "Coordinator of Elementary Enrichment" during school years included in regular compensation - Coordinator responsible for overseeing approximately 16-day summer program for in science, art, mathematics and language arts serving 600 public school students, not all from Shrewsbury, who paid tuition to attend program - No academic credit granted for attending program - Program not related to curriculum framework of Shrewsbury Public School - Performance as Coordinator not overseen by school committee or school superintendent - Separate side agreement on amount of Coordinator's "extra duty stipend" between subcommittee of Shrewsbury Education

Association members and Shrewsbury Public Schools ratified by School Committee, but position and remuneration not listed in collective bargaining agreement - Side agreement did not state that it added position to collective bargaining agreement or that it was part of, or modified, collective bargaining agreement - Contrary provisions regarding stipends contained in side letters executed by union and public schools do not bind Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System in determining service or amounts included as teacher's regular compensation - Coordinator's stipends also were not regular compensation because summer program she directed did not take place in a public school and was not tied to any public school curriculum or to public school grading or academic credit - Decision of MTRS excluding payments to teacher for her service as Coordinator of Elementary Enrichment from her regular compensation for retirement purposes affirmed.

Brunell v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-764, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

Public school teachers and School District Administrators - Duties performed in addition to regular duties - Minuteman Regional School District - Outreach Coordinator - Payment of specific amount for additional duty provided in employment agreement - Position and payment for it not included in collective bargaining agreement between school district committee and Minuteman Faculty Association during time period in question - Payments for additional duties regular, ordinary and normal, occurring in multiple years, but not regular compensation - Additional duties were not chief responsibilities - Payment for performing additional duties were in accordance with employment side agreements, and were not pursuant to collective bargaining agreement - Exclusion of stipend for additional duties as outreach coordinator properly excluded from regular compensation used to compute retirement benefits.

Taliadouros v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-11-660, Decision ((Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 8, 2016).

Public school teachers - Stipends paid to dean of specialized high school academy - Position and stipend not listed in collective bargaining agreement - Properly excluded from computation of salary for retirement purposes.

Siebecker v. Mass. Teachers Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-773, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 6, 2016).

Payment That Was Not Remuneration for Performing Required Services

Public College Hockey Coach - Compensation from Season Ticket Sales and Summer Hockey Camp Revenue - Incentive for promoting ticket sales and summer program, not compensation for performing required duties - Payments properly excluded from computation of salary for retirement purposes.

Mallen v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-10-460, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 29, 2016).

Stipend, Bonus or Retroactive Raise Paid in Contemplation of Retirement

Public school teacher - Elementary school - Stipends paid in contemplation of employee's retirement rather than as regular compensation for additional duties - Retirement effective June 30, 2015 - Teacher offered positions of "elementary math curriculum teacher leader" for remainder if 2013-14 school year on March 20, 2014, which teacher accepted and for which she received $875 stipend, and "elementary math curriculum teacher leader" for 2014-15 school year on November 17, 2014, which teacher accepted and for which she received $2500 stipend - Stipends not listed in applicable collective bargaining agreement between local teachers' association and school committee - Town school committee knew of teacher's pending retirement when it created both positions and offered them to her - Inference that this knowledge was a motivating factor for the additional payments - Payment rendered in contemplation of her retirement were not regular compensation to teacher - Decision of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System denying teacher's request to include both stipends in computing her regular compensation for retirement purposes affirmed.

McCaw v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-423, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 12, 2018).

Public school superintendent - Retirement agreement following superintendent's complaint against school committee chairperson, and conflict between committee and superintendent - Retroactive pay raises for last three school years in superintendent's position specified in agreement - Raises not performance-based increases to base salary that superintendent would have likely received following positive evaluations - Raises not intended to correct salary-payment error - Raises would not have been paid by school committee if superintendent had not agreed to retire before her contract term ended, and were thus in exchange for agreement to retire - Retroactive increases based upon employer's knowledge of superintendent's retirement, and contingent upon retirement excluded from calculation of retirement benefits - Increases properly excluded by Massachusetts Teachers' retirement system in calculating superintendent's three-year average salary for retirement purposes.

Kane v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-12-80, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Creditable Service

—Discovery Related to Creditable Service Purchase Denial Appeal

Document Requests

Motion to compel production of documents denied - Retirement appeal - Creditable service purchase request by retired public school teacher for prior teaching at nonpublic school (Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph) - Denial by retirement system - Teacher's eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluding retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Request by teacher to retirement system for documents regarding other system members allowed retirement credit for prior service at Boston School for the Deaf - Information beyond scope of material factual issues, notwithstanding retirement system's production of limited, redacted documents regarding members who taught previously at the School but had not worked there for ten years and did not qualify for retirement benefit from Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - No discretion under statute to allow retirement credit for prior service at School if retirement system member qualified for benefit under Retirement Plan - Order to compel production of other documents unnecessary - Retirement system produced documents and remained under continuing obligation to supplement production if it found other relevant documents.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 24, 2017).

Interrogatories

Retired public school teacher - Prior teaching at nonpublic school - Health and physical education teacher - Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph - Eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluded retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Receipt of payment from Plan after employment at nonpublic school ended - Proposed interrogatories related to denial of creditable service based upon eligibility to receive retirement allowance from any source allowed as seeking relevant information - Proposed interrogatories asking whether tuition of students that teacher taught at Boston School for the Deaf was publicly funded in

whole or part denied as seeking irrelevant information - Retirement credit not denied on this ground, and no claim on appeal that it was - Proposed interrogatories seeking information regarding other public school teachers allowed retirement credit for prior teaching service at Boston School for Deaf denied as seeking irrelevant information - Denial of credit for prior teaching service at nonpublic school pursuant to based upon eligibility for retirement benefit from "any source" not discretionary - Teacher allowed to pursue discovery via allowed interrogatories, and via subpoenas to successor to Retirement Plan administrator and actuary, regarding factual issues relevant to inquiry under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p): whether she was eligible to receive retirement benefits under Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan, and whether payment she received from Plan after her employment at Boston School for the Deaf ended was retirement allowance.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017).

Record-Keeper Subpoenas

Retired public school teacher - Prior teaching at nonpublic school - Health and physical education teacher - Boston School for the Deaf operated by Sisters of St. Joseph - Eligibility to receive retirement allowance from "any source" precluded retirement credit for prior nonpublic school teaching service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan - Receipt of payment from Plan after employment at nonpublic school ended - Discovery - Proposed record-keeper subpoenas to successors to Plan administrator and actuary - Records sought regarding contributions to Plan, and payment by Plan to former teacher - Relevance to factual inquiry under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p): whether teacher was eligible to receive retirement benefits under Sisters of St. Joseph Retirement Plan, and whether payment she received from Plan after her employment at Boston School for the Deaf ended was retirement allowance - Subpoenas allowed.

Volpe v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-13-147, Decision and Order on Motion to Conduct Prehearing Discovery (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 11, 2017)

—Interest on Purchase (Buyback) of Creditable Service

Interest on creditable service purchase - Failure to purchase prior service by effective date of applicable higher interest rate (8.25 percent) prescribed by M.G.L. c. 32, § 8(b) - Application of higher "actuarial" interest rate to petitioner's purchase of prior creditable service affirmed - 11.5 years of prior service, including service as Title I tutor in

Wilbraham public school system in early 1975 when petitioner was not a member of the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, and service as a full-time Wilbraham teacher and MTRS member, from 1975 until June 1986 - Left teaching position and took refund of retirement contributions, and then returned to public school teaching full-time in Longmeadow public school system in 2007, without re-depositing contributions from her prior Wilbraham service - Application to purchase prior service filed with MTRS on March 27, 2013 - Email from MTRS on that date directed petitioner to have Wilbraham document her non-member work as a Title I tutor in 1975 by October 2, 2013, and to return her application to purchase her teaching service as an MTRS member by April 2, 2013, in order to avoid higher interest rates for prior creditable service purchases, and advised that purchase price for prior Wilbraham service would be $37,016,75, or over 5 years at $8,013.62 per year for a total of $40,068.10, with an invoice to follow - Petitioner was confused by email and believed that invoice would be a "proposal" showing what the prior service buyback "would look like" after she had filed all the paperwork - Invoice mailed by MTRS to petitioner on March 27, 2013 for the September 1975-June 1986 Wilbraham teaching service buyback stated that it would expire on May 26, 2013 and included an "interest increase alert" stating that if petitioner did not pay invoice or enter into installment agreement for purchase of prior service by May 25, 2013, an increased interest rate of 8.25 percent would apply to the purchase - Petitioner received invoice but did not open it, assuming that she could take care of invoice at a later date - Opened envelope in August 2013, and mailed check to MTRS for first installment payment of $8,013.62 quoted in March 27, 2013 invoice - MTRS rejected payment and issued new invoice at the higher (actuarial) interest rate of 8.25 percent - MTRS denied petitioner's claim for purchase of prior service at the lower buyback interest rate - On appeal, MARS's decision affirmed - Petitioner alone responsible for not responding to buyback invoice or heeding the interest increase alert notice enclosed with the invoice - MTRS not responsible for confusion on her part as to its email or for her failure to open the envelope containing the invoice and interest rate increase warning for four months after she received it, or for making assumptions about the cost of purchasing her prior service without asking questions - MTRS conveyed the interest rate requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 8(b) correctly, and the information it gave petitioner in its email and in the invoice she did not open was correct - Neither this section nor any other provision of Chapter 32 provided an equitable remedy to the petitioner, but even if they did, none was due in this case.

Levy v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-414, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Interest on creditable service purchase - Application of higher "actuarial" interest rate to prior public school service purchase based upon date of application's receipt affirmed - Public school teacher employed by Hudson, Massachusetts public schools since September 1, 2001, when she became member of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MARS) - Purchase of two types of service prior to retirement system membership: (a) non-public school service from September 3, 1982 through June 20, 1985 at Madonna Hall,

a residential school for emotionally disturbed children; and (b) service from September 1991 through September 1999 in Maynard, Massachusetts public school system as substitute teacher and paraprofessional - Per St. 2011, c. 176, amending M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), purchase of prior service at 4.25 percent "buyback" rate of interest had to be purchased in lump sum by, or pursuant to installment agreement entered into, prior to April 2, 2013; otherwise, purchase would be subject to 8.25 percent "actuarial assumed interest" rate - Teacher claimed to have mailed applications to purchase both types of her prior service before statutory deadline, but had no proof of mailing such as return receipt - MARS regional office in Springfield, Massachusetts received application to purchase three years of non-public school service at Madonna Hall, but not the application to purchase prior public school service in Maynard public schools, on March 7, 2013, and stamped the application as received, logged application into computerized system, and sent acknowledgment letter to teacher on March 18, 2013 - Teacher received letter but assumed it acknowledged receipt of both prior service purchase applications, and did not request clarification - Computerized system had no entry pertaining to prior public school system service - Teacher inquired into status of both prior purchase service applications on August 27, 2015 - MARS responded that it had no record of having received teacher's application to purchase prior public school service - Teacher emailed her application to purchase prior Maynard public schools service to MARS on August 27, 2015, which MARS acknowledged as having been received on August 31, 2015, and as to which it notified teacher that higher actuarial interest rate on prior service purchase applied, since application was received after statutory deadline of April 2, 2013 - On appeal, teacher had burden of proving by preponderance of evidence that MARS applied incorrect interest rate to prior service purchase or was culpable in perpetrating a correctable administrative mistake - No evidentiary support for teacher's claim that MARS mishandled and lost her application to purchase prior public school service, or for inferring that application was lost, mishandled, ignored or destroyed, or removed by a third party from envelope MARS received on March 7, 2013, rather than that the application was actually not included or received in same envelope in which MARS received teacher's application to purchase prior non-public school service - Teacher's testimony that she sent both application to MARS in Cambridge, Massachusetts raised some doubt as to her recollection regarding mailing both applications in one envelope, since MTRS's Springfield regional office received and logged-in her application to purchase prior non-public school system service.

Byrne v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-609, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 26, 2018).

Interest on creditable service purchases - Public school teacher - Special buyback interest rate offered by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System before statutory interest rate on creditable service purchases increased, on April 2, 2013, from 4.25% to 8.25% - Sufficiency of notice and failure to make buyback payment before due date - Teacher's application to purchase her prior service as a parochial school teacher postmarked, and filed with MTRS, before April 2, 2013 - MTRS confirmed receipt of application, and

stated that because it was filed prior to April 2, 2013, teacher reserved her right to initial invoice at the lower buyback interest rate - Confirmation also estimated time to process her application to purchase creditable service at lower interest rate to be 12 months or more (due to overwhelming number of service purchase applications at lower interest rate that MARS anticipated) - Confirmation stated that teacher would have 60 days from date MARS issued her an invoice to either pay for the creditable service purchase in full, or to submit signed installment plan and first annual installment payment - Confirmation also noted that if teacher failed to take either of these steps by the invoice due date, or defaulted on the installment purchase agreement, subsequent purchase of her creditable service would be subject to the statutory interest rate in effect at that time - Invoice mailed to teacher on February 21, 2014 in windowed envelope contained bright, hot pink inserts stating need to select payment plan and make payment in full for creditable service or submit first payment under installment purchase payment plan by stated date to take advantage of lower interest rate, and that failure to do so would result higher interest rate applying if creditable service purchase payment was made afterward - Teacher had unlocked mailbox at end of her driveway, and checked it daily, as did her retired husband, with any mail received placed on counter inside house - Teacher first called MARS about status of invoice for her creditable service purchase in October 2014, and was told to be patient and wait - During next telephone inquiry to MARS, on January 6, 2015, teacher was told that invoice was sent to her on February 21, 2014, invoice payment due date was April 20, 2014, and since there was no response by the deadline, teacher was no longer entitled to lower buyback interest date - MARS sent teacher written denial of her request to purchase prior service at lower buyback interest rate, and new invoice for creditable service purchase at higher statutory interest rate - Denial of request to purchase prior service at lower interest rate affirmed - Claim by teacher that she did not receive February 21, 2014 invoice and would have seen it if it had arrived in her mailbox rejected - Delivery in regular course of mails is presumed - MARS presumed to have followed standard business practice of mailing invoices for creditable service purchases as soon as they were generated - No evidence to rebut either presumption - Teacher received other MARS mailings sent to her home address before February 21, 2014 - MARS had no duty to confirm receipt of mailed invoice - No general fiduciary duty in administering retirement system imposed by M.G.L. c. 32 upon retirement board - Sole duty was not to mislead retirement system member - Even if advice teacher received during her October 2014 call to MARS is considered to have been misleading, however, it had no tangible effect upon her rights, as she had already missed the invoice deadline and forfeited the lower buyback interest rate, and her purchase had become subject to higher statutory interest rate on creditable service purchases - Argument that lower interest rate applied despite her failure to pay within 60 days of MARS invoice because it was in effect when teacher filed creditable service purchase application before April 2, 2013, as MARS regulations appeared to suggest (*see* 807 C.M.R. § 23.02) rejected as contrary to M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b), which required payment of prior service purchase in lump sum either within one year of reinstatement or in installment payments by April 2, 2013, whichever was later, and did not provide that applicable interest rate was based on date of application to purchase prior service - Allowing MARS member to secure lower buyback interest rate by filing purchase

application and then delay payment would frustrate statute and underfund her retirement allowance - MARS reconciled members' right to confirm prior service buyback at lower interest rate and statutory requirements regarding buyback payment in view of anticipated buyback application backlog by requiring payment within 60 days of invoicing at lower interest rate - DALA lacked authority to employ equitable remedy relieving teacher of invoice payment deadline based upon her alleged failure to receive the invoice.

Perrault v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-32, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 21, 2017)

Interest on creditable service purchases - Statutory interest rate - St. 2011, c. 176, amending M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b) - Interest rate changed from "buyback" rate of 4.25% to "actuarial assumed interest" rate of 8.25% - retirement system members wishing to preserve right to buyback certain types of service at "buyback" interest rate required to pay that rate, or enter into installment agreement to do so, before April 2, 2013 - Public school teacher - September 2004 application to purchase prior employment in school district as substitute teacher from September 1989 through June 1993- Invoice paid through rollover and installment plan, and purchase completed by February 2008 - Subsequent application in February 2013 to purchase substitute teacher service in school district from September 1993 through June 1994 - Retirement system mailed, to teacher's home address, invoice for buyback, together with alert on the increased buyback interest rate unless she paid for buyback in full or entered into installment plan and made first payment by invoice due date (August 16, 2014) - Teacher did not receive invoice and did not pay by due date - After several inquiries, teacher received new invoice in May 2015 applying new, actuarial interest to the service buyback purchase - Retirement system denied teacher's request to have lower buyback interest rate apply - Teacher retired October 11, 2015 - retirement system fulfilled obligations as to purchase by mailing invoice to teacher's residential address - No obligation to confirm its receipt - Teacher failed to purchase prior service in question prior to August 16, 2014, per statutory requirement - No equitable remedy provided by M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(b) or by statute amending service buyback interest rate, St. 2011, c. 176 - Denial of request to apply lower buyback interest rate provided by statute affirmed.

Lauder v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-303, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Waiver of interest charges - Denial of waiver - School bus driver - Part-time field trip bus driver service rendered while not a retirement system member.

McDonough v. Quincy Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-357, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 9, 2016).

—Prior Service Eligible for Creditable Service Purchase

Prior non-public school service - Adjustment counselor/teacher at private alternative school - Engaged in teaching pupils - Instruction, in classroom setting, in behavioral, coping, social and other skills essential to being able to participate in school classroom or other appropriate special education setting - Skills taught were as essential to student population at this school as were standard academic subjects - Denial of petitioner's application to purchase final four years of this prior non-public school service for retirement purposes reversed.

Lukasik v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-668, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 2, 2018).

Late entry into retirement system membership - Eligibility to purchase creditable service - Town fire chief - Work performed as town fire chief prior to becoming retirement system member in 2009 - Issue was whether retiree was eligible for membership in retirement system during time period in question (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(3), "Late Entry Into membership") - Retirement system adopted policy in 2012 requiring that permanent work schedule requiring at least 20 hours per week of work was required to become retirement system member - Retired fire chief had burden of proving that during the period for which he wished to purchase service as fire chief prior to becoming retirement system member, he worked a permanent 20 hour per week work schedule - Burden of proof on this issue remains with retiree even if municipality's records are inadequate to show hours worked - Retiree testified during hearing that he had copies of time sheets showing he worked 40 hours per week as town fire chief starting in 2007, but he failed to produce them, and testimony that he worked those hours and that the time sheets showed them was therefore given no weight - Fact that town provided health insurance to fire chief even before he joined retirement system was not alterative proof of full-time work - Neither M.G.L. c. 32B nor town's policy and procedures manual prohibited town from providing medical insurance to employees who worked less than 20 hours per week - That town policy and procedures manual required retirement system membership for employees who worked 20 hours per week suggested that fire chief did not work 20 hours per week before his late entry into retirement system membership in 2009 - Statements that retirement system employees may have made in internal emails to effect that fire chief should have been member of retirement system prior to 2009 did not establish that, before 2009, he was working at least 20 hours per week - Statement by selectmen in 2011 during Board of Selectmen meetings regarding retiree's duties as fire chief did not support fire chief's claim that he worked those hours, and showed concern, instead, with fiscal soundness of providing fire chief with medical benefits when it was unclear how many hours he was working - Failure of town to comply with state law and its own personnel policy regarding retirement system membership of employees working at least 20 hours per week did not bind retirement board in determining whether to grant retiree creditable service for work as fire chief prior to becoming retirement system member.

Clement v. Essex County Regional Retirement System, Docket Nos. CR-14-184, CR-13-294, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 20, 2017), *reconsideration denied* (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 21, 2017)

Denial of request to purchase service as part-time municipal employee prior to membership in retirement system, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(2)(c), reversed - Revere Police Department employee - Grant administrator - Part-time work for police department as grant administrator from October 1995 to February 2012, when she became full-time city employee and member of Revere Retirement System - No work contract, with payment upon submitting invoices to police chief or through grants she obtained for Department - Payment only for hours worked, 70-90 hours each month - No vacation or sick time accrued, and not paid when she did not come to work, regardless of reason - No retirement contributions made as part-time employee - Change to full-time employee status in 2012 due to increase in number of grants she administered and time needed to perform this work - Method of payment and number of hours worked changed after becoming full-time employee: regular daily work hours, vacation and sick time accrued, retirement system contributions made - No change in work responsibilities (writing grants, administering grant funds, and filing required reports) or daily activities - No change in direct supervision and control of work by police chiefs - No change in job or job title upon becoming full-time city employee - Request for creditable service for 1995-2012 part-time grant administration work denied by retirement board based upon conclusion that employee had been "vendor" rather than employee during that time - Part-time service was, however, that of "employee" as defined at M.G.L. c. 32, § 1- Payment by political subdivision of Commonwealth while part-time employee - Direct work for municipal police department - Work assigned and supervised by police chiefs - Grant funds from which she was paid for part-time work belonged to city - Full-time police officers employed by Revere Police Department were paid from grant funds as well - Police department also controlled place of work (worked in police department office as both part-time and full-time employee) - Part-time employment was "regular," as opposed to sporadic, intermittent or temporary, because work that grant administrator performed was continuous, even though it was part-time and the number of hours worked each week varied - Proof sufficed to show that petitioner was full-time police department employee eligible to purchase prior part-time service in department as creditable service.

Callahan v. Revere Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-12-523, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 25, 2017).

Purchase of up to four years of compensated state contract employee service in substantially-similar position prior to membership in State Employees Retirement System - Part-time contract employment - Bunker Hill Community College Learning Center monitor - Substantial similarity with permanent position to which she transferred (Bunker Hill

Community College Learning Center Testing Room Coordinator) and in which position she became State Employees Retirement System Member - Eligibility to purchase prior service established by evidence - More than ten years of creditable service while retirement system member- Retirement system membership as active member in service at time of creditable service purchase request - Sufficiency of information to determine dates of prior contract service, compensation rates and hours worked despite loss or destruction of facility's employment records - W2 forms, employment request form listing pay rate, and credible testimony by applicant and co-worker.

Niven-Blowers v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-61, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 5, 2016).

—Prior Service Ineligible for Creditable Service Purchase

Application to Purchase Prior Service by Inactive Retirement System Member

Full-time, permanent police officer may purchase up to five years of prior service as reserve or permanent-intermittent police officer pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(2)(b), but this purchase or transfer of prior service must be made (meaning accomplished, brought about, completed or fulfilled) when officer is an active member of a retirement system—in other words, at a time when he is still working for a government entity that participates in a retirement system.

Lynn v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-550, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 4, 2018).

Application to purchase prior service not filed while retirement system member was active member in service - Police officer - Application to purchase reserve police officer service performed in late 1980s, prior to becoming permanent, full-time member of town police department - Officer placed on paid administrative leave on June 28, 2014, and suspended without pay for five days effective immediately on July 8, 2014, with disciplinary hearing scheduled for July 14, 2014 - Officer filed application for superannuation retirement, and written resignation, on July 8, 2014 - Officer met with Retirement System's Senior Retirement Coordinator on July 8, 2014, and told the Coordinator that he wanted to retire before the scheduled disciplinary hearing - Retirement Coordinator raised issue of purchasing prior reserve officer service during the meeting and said she needed to confirm the dates and amount of this prior service and determine the cost of purchasing it for retirement credit - Officer forwarded copy of his July 8, 2014 resignation letter to Retirement Coordinator on July 10, 2018 - On July 21, 2014, Officer and his union representative signed agreement stating that he offered his irrevocable resignation effective July 7, 2018, and Town Administrator signed it on July 24, 2014 - Invoice for purchase of prior reserve officer

service, sent to Officer on July 22, 2014, stated "this must be purchased by your retirement date" - On July 25, 2014, Officer hand-delivered check to purchase his prior reserve officer service to Retirement System, which returned the check to him on the same day - Town Treasurer/Collector confirmed municipality's acceptance of Officer's irrevocable resignation effective July 7, 2014 - On October 8, 2014, Retirement Board notified Officer that his prior service purchase request was denied - Denial affirmed - Officer was not active member in service when he attempted to complete the purchase of his prior reserve officer service, since (1) he had been suspended without pay on July 8, 2014, and this status continued until July 24, 2014, when Town Administrator signed the Officer's resignation agreement; and (2) Officer did not pay for purchase of prior service until July 25, 2014, so that even if the Officer remained a "member in service" until the day the Town Administrator signed his resignation, he failed to accomplish his purchase of prior service before he retired - DALA magistrate was without statutorily-granted equity power to allow the proposed prior service purchase, but even if that were not the case, there was no equitable basis for equitable relief based upon alleged delay by Retirement Board in invoicing Officer for proposed prior service purchase as he was accused of improper conduct, suspended without pay and decided to retire all within two weeks, and it was not surprising that it took this time for the Board to calculate the amount of prior service buyback and send an invoice.

Lynn v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-550, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 4, 2018).

Application by petitioner town administrative coordinator to purchase prior service as public school substitute teacher by filed after his last date of active service - Member of retirement system employed from June 30, 2015 through July 1, 2015, when petitioner was placed on "administrative leave" after employment agreement expired - "Administrative leave" granted as "exit strategy" with "designated compensation" to petitioner through date of his intended date of retirement, January 1, 2016, his 65th birthday, in exchange for his waiver and release of all claims he may have had against town - Last day of actual work at town hall was July 1, 2015 - Received regular compensation through July 10, 2015 and left town hall for the last time on that date - Subsequent request to retirement board to purchase prior service as public school substitute teacher in a different town from October 3, 2002 to December 31, 2003 - Following appearance before retirement board in November 2015, board denied requested purchase of prior service because town administrative coordinator's active employment had ended effectively on July 10, 2015, making him ineligible to purchase prior service after that date - Superannuation retirement approved without credit for prior substitute teaching service, effective January 12, 2016 - Denial of request to purchase credit for prior substitute teaching service affirmed - Petitioner became "member inactive" of retirement system after July 10, 2015, the last date of his active employment as town administrative coordinator, and he did not show that after that date he was actively employed, collected Workers' Compensation benefits, was on sick

leave, or was on authorized leave of absence, as required by M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(1)(a)(I) - Petitioner's compensation under agreement with town after July 10, 2015 did not show he remained actively employed beyond that date, as it was not "regular compensation" per M.G.L. c. 32, § 1; it was clearly not regular compensation paid to an employee who was performing a service to the governmental entity and was, instead, consideration for employee's release of town's liability to him - Town could not bind retirement board to its agreement with petitioner to regard him as an active employee after his last day of active employment, as retirement board, not the town, would have to find the funds to pay for continuing retirement benefits.

Sharp v. Franklin Regional Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-16-4, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 30, 2018).

Only a retirement system member who is regularly employed in the performance of his duties and is, thus, a "member in service" of the system (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(1)(a) I) is eligible to make purchases of his service prior to public employment allowed by Chapter 32, such as the purchase, by a public school teacher, of prior non-public school teaching service in a Massachusetts publicly-funded school (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p)).

Killough v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-441, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2018).

Prior service purchase application filed after last date of active service as teacher - Public school teacher last employed by regional school district, and therefore last actively employed, on June 30, 2016 - Last lump sum paycheck for the 2015-16 school year received on that date - Submittal by teacher, on August 3, 2016, of applications to purchase service credit for retirement purposes for his substitute, temporary or part-time teaching or tutoring services the school district from September 1997 through June 1998, and for his non-public school teaching in a Massachusetts publicly-funded school from September 1980 to June 1983 - Teacher retired for superannuation effective August 23, 2016 - Teacher was not actively employed, collecting Workers' Compensation benefits, or on sick leave between his final day of active employment (June 30, 2016) and August 3, 2016, the date on which he filed his applications to purchase his prior non-public school service and substitute teaching service, and was therefore a "member inactive" in the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, rather than a member in service, on August 3, 2016, and was ineligible to purchase his prior service - Beyond his uncorroborated self-serving testimony as to when his active retirement system membership ended, there was no evidence that his that he was a member in service until the date of his retirement on August 23, 2016 - Retirement system's denial of prior service purchase applications affirmed.

Killough v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-441, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 16, 2018).

Contract Employment Paid Through Commonwealth's 03 Subsidiary Account

Because M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 explicitly excludes contracted employees paid through Commonwealth's "03 subsidiary account" from its definition of "employee," such employees may not purchase their prior 03 contract service for retirement purposes, and it is irrelevant, for retirement credit purposes, whether conditions of employment and duties made contract employee the equivalent of a regular employee of the Commonwealth.

Harris v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-487, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Petitioner claiming she was employee of state agency rather than contractor paid through Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account has burden of proving employee status, and inability to prove employee status means she cannot prevail in appeal challenging denial of application to purchase prior service as contracted employee as creditable service for retirement purposes.

Harris v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-487, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Contract employee performing full-time service as information technology professional for Massachusetts Commission for the Blind - Source of payment for prior full-time contract service for state agency - Evidence - Admissibility and weight - Testimony by current director of employment services for Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, as keeper of records, that her agency's records showed petitioner was paid as contracted employee through Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account - Keeper of records entitled to testify as to what agency's business records showed as to account from which petitioner was paid, even though she did not hold recordkeeper position when petitioner performed full-time contract service, and there was no one with a contemporaneous memory or contemporary documentation of what account was used to pay petitioner - Petitioner's testimony that she was told at unspecified times by unspecified persons at Commission for the Blind that she was not paid from 03 subsidiary account, and that unspecified person at unspecified time showed her a document or documents showing she was not paid from 03 account was unreliable, and was contradicted by email petitioner sent several years after leaving her position that she was paid from the 03 account for the entire time she worked at the Commission for the Blind - Conclusion of state auditor's report on use of contract employee by certain

state agencies that no employee, including contract employee, could be paid through the Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account did not establish that petitioner could not have been so paid - Uncontradicted evidence, including testimony of director of employment services for Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, as keeper of records, showed that she was, in fact, paid through 03 account - Petitioner's argument that legislature did not intend to create "arbitrary" system of granting or rejecting retirement credit for contract employee service based upon mistake or "gamesmanship" on part of agency payroll manager failed for lack of evidence that her payment through 03 account was by mistake, that Commission for the Blind's payroll manager engaged in "gamesmanship," or that Commission did not comply with law or established procedure - Applicable law furnished no support for petitioner's argument that she should be able to purchase prior contract service for retirement credit based upon the account from which she "should have" been paid, where evidence showed that she was paid from Commonwealth's 03 subsidiary account - Denial of application to purchase prior service as contract employee paid through 03 account affirmed.

Harris v. Boston Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-487, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 13, 2018).

Employer Funded by Federal Job-Training Programs

Service with employers funded by federal job-training programs - Insufficient proof - Employment dates and salary - Employment with Commonwealth government unit or political subdivision.

Filkins v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-11-715, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 10, 2016).

Full-Time Prior Contract Service (M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s))

Retired Department of Mental Health (DMH) case worker, case manager and case coordinator - Application to purchase contract service at DMH between June 7, 1988 and June 24, 1989, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s), as employee of private contractor (Franklin/Hampshire County Community Mental Health Center, Inc.) providing mental health-related services to DMH - Payment exclusively by private contractor, before retiree and fellow Franklin/Hampshire team members became DMH employees - Not employed by DMH or by Commonwealth, and not a contract employer of DMH, during period of contract service - Not employed by "vendor functioning as instrumentality of Commonwealth," per State Board of Retirement regulations, *see* 941 C.M.R. § 2.09(3)(c) - Vendor not a public entity established by legislature and placed within state government - Denial of application to purchase

contract service affirmed.

Hogan (Jonathan) v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-243, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017).

Juvenile Court Assistant Chief Probation Officer - Application to purchase up to four years of contract service, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(s), with Robert F. Kennedy Children's Action Corps (RFK), where applicant worked for eleven years prior to becoming probation officer - Private, non-profit agency that contracted with Massachusetts Department of Youth Services - Work with juvenile offenders and their families - Regular contact with juvenile probation officers in state courts - RFK employee profile showing dates of employment, full-time work throughout tenure of employment, and dates of hourly pay rate increases did not show accounts from which employee was paid or that applicant was considered to be employee of Commonwealth - Employment by third party that contracted with Commonwealth, not by department, agency, board or commission of Commonwealth, as statute requires - Retirement Board's denial of request to purchase up to four years of contract service at RFK as creditable service affirmed.

Gibbings v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-108, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 12, 2017).

Part-Time Prior Contract Service

Part time contract service prior to full-time service - Community college - ineligible for purchase for retirement purposes - Service not performed "immediately preceding" (within 180 days of) membership in state employees retirement system or re-entry into active service in that system - Previous service as "staff assistant" not shown to be substantially service to full-time position as "associate coordinator - Insufficient documentation of part-time hours worked.

Freeman v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-531, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 27, 2017).

Prior Non-Teaching Service in Charter School (M.G.L. c. 71, § 89(y) and M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(5)).

Public school teacher - Application to purchase service performed, prior to becoming member of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, as "user support technician" at Worcester charter public school - Charter school statute provides that only teachers will be members of state teacher retirement system and earn creditable service for service in charter school, *see* M.G.L. c. 71, § 89(y) - User support technician provided technical support to teachers, administrators, students and parents which included

maintaining computer repair services, troubleshooting, inventorying equipment, and training other tech personnel, but job was not fundamentally to provide classroom instruction in academic or vocational subjects - Teaching, if any was performed, was ancillary, not fundamental, to provision of technology support and services to students, their families, teacher and administrators - That applicant obtained, from state Department of Education, certification as an instructional technology specialist at all levels (provisional with advanced standing), and then licensing in this field, was not determinative as to whether she had been a teacher at the charter school - Not certified as a teacher while she worked as user support technician - None of the documents in the record regarding her state certification and licensing as instructional technology specialist contained the word "teacher" - Denial of application to purchase prior service at charter school affirmed.

Flanagan v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-650, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Prior Out-of-State Public School Teaching Service, But Eligible to Receive, or Received, a Benefit Based in Whole or Part Upon Employer Contributions (M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(4) and 807 C.M.R. § 19.04(2)).

Under some circumstances, a member of the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) may purchase prior out-of-state public school teaching service for retirement credit, unless he or she received, or is entitled to receive, a retirement allowance from the other state's defined benefit plan or defined contribution plan that was based in whole or in part upon employer contributions to that plan.

Rusch v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-174, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 7, 2018).

Denial of application by teacher and MTRS member to purchase prior out-of-state public school teaching service for Massachusetts teacher retirement credit affirmed - While working in Virginia public schools as full-time reading specialist between September 1997 and June 2002, teacher was member of Virginia Retirement System and was required to contribute 5 percent of her salary to retirement account via payroll deductions - As allowed by Virginia law at the time, school district paid teacher's 5 percent employee retirement account contribution - After returning to Massachusetts and becoming MTRS member, teacher applied to purchase retirement credit for her work as a teacher in Virginia - MTRS denied application because she was eligible to receive retirement benefit from Virginia Retirement System - While her appeal of this denial was pending, teacher received refund of all contributions to her Virginia retirement account, including employer's payment of her 5 percent contribution - Teacher was therefore eligible to receive, and received, a retirement allowance from

the Virginia retirement plan that was based in whole or part upon employer contributions to that plan, and for that reason could not purchase her Virginia teaching service for retirement credit as an MTRS member.

Rusch v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-174, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 7, 2018).

Prior Service in Non-Public School*, *But Not Engaged in Teaching Pupils, or Tuition of All Pupils in Non-Public School Not Financed in Part or in Full by the Commonwealth (M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p))

Generally - M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) permits any member of a contributory retirement system who is engaged in a teaching position and holds a certificate issued by the Massachusetts Department of Education or who is exempted from the teacher certification requirement, and who was previously engaged in teaching pupils in any Massachusetts non-public school, to purchase up to ten years of creditable service if the tuition of all pupils taught at the non-public school was financed fully or partially by the Commonwealth.

Milton v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-513, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 15, 2019).

Generally - Statutory definition of "teacher" as including school psychologist (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 1) does not make prior non-public school service involving performance of duties similar to those of public school psychologist purchasable for retirement purposes as creditable service pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p), particularly where the prior service was primarily therapeutic in nature and did not involve teaching pupils - Purpose of including school psychologist (and other listed positions) in the statutory definition of "teacher" was to allow these public school employees to join the Commonwealth's teacher retirement system and have the right to purchase former public service, provided that it involved the direct teaching of academic or vocational subjects to pupils.

Loomis v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-269, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Generally - M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) permits any member of a contributory retirement system who is engaged in a teaching position and holds a certificate issued by the Massachusetts Department of Education or who is exempted from the teacher certification requirement, and who was previously engaged in teaching pupils in any Massachusetts non-public school, to purchase up to ten years of creditable service if

the tuition of all pupils taught at the non-public school was financed fully or partially by the Commonwealth.

Romano v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-260 Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Generally - Although school administrators, school adjustment counselors or guidance counselors are entitled to membership in the Massachusetts Teachers' Association, the requirement of M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) for the purchase of non-public teaching service are more stringent, and both DALA and the Contributory Retirement Appeals Board have interpreted the statutory requirement that the teacher seeking to purchase prior Massachusetts non-public school service for retirement purposes have been "engaged in teaching pupils" as pertaining to whether an essential job duty at the non-public school was to directly teach the students academic subjects or vocational skills or, stated another way, whether the primary goal of the non-public school position was fundamentally education or some other purpose; applying this analysis, DALA has held, for example, that a director of social services who performed one-on-one and group therapy and provided oversight to staff at a non-public school was not engaged in teaching pupils, and neither was a specialist whose primary goal was career development and not education involving traditional school subjects, and DALA has also held consistently that providing therapeutic services to students through individual, group and family therapy falls short of the statutory requirement that the teacher seeking to purchase prior non-public school service must have been engaged in teaching pupils.

Romano v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-260 Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Not engaged in teaching pupils - School psychologist - Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System Member - Application to purchase, for retirement credit, approximately 13 months of prior work as "parent worker" at Farr Academy (Chapter 766 school in Cambridge, Massachusetts) - Primary duties involved clinical family contacts, such as meetings with parents in groups and individually, assisting in student intake process and assisting staff in planning effective therapeutic strategies for each student, initiating and developing other resource placements to benefit students such as psychiatric evaluations, alcoholic groups and summer camp placements, developing fund-raising proposals, and observing classes and consulting with staff regarding students who may have had problems at home - "Minimal and moderate" direct interaction with students - Did not teach students in a classroom - No evidence that duties included teaching pupils or, thus, that applicant was previously engaged in teaching pupils at the school and met requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Denial of creditable service purchase application affirmed.

Loomis v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-269, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Not engaged in teaching pupils - Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System member - Prior caseworker service at non-public school - Application to purchase creditable service for prior employment as (1) caseworker or head caseworker at Compass, Inc. (Chapter 766 non-public school) managing caseload of adolescents referred through Boston Juvenile Court, as well as providing individual and group counseling. Home visits, behavior management plans, classroom assistance and tutoring, and recreational activities; and (2) child care worker at Walker Home School and at Italian Home for Children (Chapter 766 non-public schools) providing group activities and behavioral management support for emotionally and behaviorally disordered boys - Although prior service undoubtedly contributed to overall education of children in these non-public schools, applicant was not engaged in teaching pupils, as required by M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Essential job duties did not include directly teaching students any academic subjects or vocational skills, or creating any academic or vocational learning curricula - Developing and creating behavior management plans was administrative duty rather than teaching pupils.

Rose v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-43, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 21, 2017).

Not engaged in teaching pupils - Prior family therapist service at non-public school - Application by Massachusetts teachers' Retirement System member to purchase approximately 13 months of creditable service for her prior work as a family therapist at the Lighthouse School (private, non-profit school for students with severe learning disabilities that prevented them from being able to learn adequately in conventional school settings or participate in regular academic programs offered in their public school districts) - No evidence that applicant directly taught any academic or vocational curriculum to Lighthouse School students or, thus, that applicant was previously engaged in teaching pupils at the school and met requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Denial of creditable service purchase application affirmed.

Romano v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-260 Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Not engaged in teaching pupils - Public school teacher's prior service as special education head teacher and language arts teacher at nonpublic school serving emotionally disturbed pupils aged 8-12 years - Lack of credible evidence that all of teacher's students at private school were funded partially or fully by the

Commonwealth - Denial of creditable service purchase application affirmed.

Wolfson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-12-109, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 17, 2017).

Not engaged in teaching pupils - Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System member's prior service from 1991-1993 as "Head Teacher/Supervisor" of Network High School in Brockton - Non-public school whose students were residential clients of Massachusetts Department of Children and Families - Appeal to DALA from denial, by MTRS, of application pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) because member was not engaged in teaching pupils at non-public school - Duties at Network High School comprised working with teachers, teaching assistants and counselors to help educate students, writing and implementing the school's English and remedial mathematics curriculum, and implementing the school's technology curriculum - Worked in classrooms five hours each day, but was not assigned a classroom and was not a classroom teacher - Classroom work consisted of assisting classroom teachers and managing students, helping students to pay attention and stay on task, intervening with anxious students or those whose behavior was "escalating," presumably into problematic behavior, and helping students with social skills and English, although there was no evidence that he stood in front of students and taught English or English arts - Occasionally took students out of classroom to engage in one-on-one or small group work - Only classroom teaching was episodic (lasting a day, a week or a month), as a "substitute" in school that had no substitute teachers, and also had residential duties - Documentary evidence did not show that applicant was engaged in teaching pupils at Network High School - DALA magistrate so informed member prior to hearing, and advised that it was his burden to demonstrate his classroom activities and prove that he was engaged in teaching pupils - Despite this instruction, member's direct testimony omitted details about his teaching - No testimony that he taught academic subjects while working with students one-on-one or outside the classroom, that "English arts" was an academic subject similar or equivalent to English, or that he taught academics when he was a substitute teacher, and no testimony as to how much time he spent as substitute teacher from 1991-1993 - Questions to member by magistrate about teaching duties not answered forthrightly, or else answers veered off-topic - As valuable as they were, applicant's work as supervisor, helping classroom teachers, and helping students master social skills and control their behavior was not teaching academics - Statutory phrase "teaching pupils" is given narrow interpretation and means teaching academics - Failure of member to prove that he was engaged in teaching pupils was failure to meet prerequisite for purchasing prior non-public school teaching as creditable service under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) - Denial of application to purchase creditable service affirmed.

Carroll v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-15-08, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2016).

Tuition of all pupils taught in prior service at non-public school not financed in part or in full by Commonwealth - Petitioner, a preschool public school teacher and Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System member, sought to purchase, for retirement credit, prior non-public school service as full-time speech therapist for preschool special needs students at Mercy Center in Worcester, Massachusetts between September 1988 and June 1994 - Center was licensed by Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to provide - Tuition of students was paid primarily by Commonwealth via cities and towns that sent students to Mercy Center, but some student tuition was paid privately - Petitioner taught 12-15 students between ages of 3 and 5 from various central Massachusetts communities each year - Students had variety of disabilities, including developmental delays, Down Syndrome, autism, cerebral palsy, and cognitive and motor issues - Program operated pursuant to Worcester Public Schools' calendar, and ran from 8 a.m. to 2:45 p.m. each weekday - Petitioner was responsible for assessing students, teaching them vocabulary, linguistic concepts and comprehension so they could develop communication and social skills prescribed by curriculum, and also performed lunch, snack and recess duties similar to those of teaching staff, held daily speech therapy sessions, led music groups, and was responsible for the speech and language therapy potions of the students' individual education plans, including summarizing each student's goals and objectives - Petitioner did not receive retirement allowance, annuity or pension for her service at Mercy Center - Creditable service buyback application was ambiguous as to whether all of her students had their Mercy Center tuition paid in whole or in part by Commonwealth or by a Massachusetts public school district - Petitioner, and person who completed employer's section of creditable service application on behalf of Mercy Center, believed that the Commonwealth had paid full tuition for approximately 90 percent of her pupils, and that the tuition of 10 percent of her pupils was paid for privately - Although petitioner showed sufficiently that she was engaged in the teaching of pupils at Mercy Center, she did not meet her burden of showing,as M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p) required, that the tuition of all of the pupils she taught there was financed in part or in full by the Commonwealth - Evidence and testimony showed at best that petitioner and Mercy Center did not know the origin of the funding for her pupils' Mercy Center tuition, and that at least some of the pupils' tution had been paid for privately - Decision denying petitioner's request to purchase prior service at Mercy Center for retirement credit was therefore affirmed.

Milton v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-513, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 15, 2019)

Prior Service in School System for Less Than Half-Time as Teacher

To meet definition of "teacher" recited by M.G.L. c. 32, § 1, person must be employed

by one or more school committees or boards of trustees,or combination of the two, on a basis of not less than half-time service as a teacher - Because Massachusetts requires that public schools have at least a 180-day school year schedule, Massachusetts Teachers Retirement System reasonably interpreted "not less than half time service" to mean working 90 days or more as teacher.

Farricker v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-492, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 31, 2018).

Creditable service purchase application denial affirmed - Prior work as out-of-state teacher for less than 90 days during school year - Public school teacher's prior service as per-diem substitute art teacher in out-of-state school public school system - Although prior service performed was that of a "teacher," work was performed for 68 days during the 1976-77 school year, and for 81 days during the 1977-78 school year, both of which fell short of 90 days or more of service required to meet the definition of "teacher" recited by M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 - Prior teaching service during those two school years was therefore for less than half-time service needed to purchase prior out-of-state employment for Massachusetts retirement credit, and creditable service purchase was therefore properly denied for those two years - In contrast, teacher was allowed to purchase service as per diem substitute art teacher in same out-of-state school system for 1978-79 school year because she worked in that capacity for more than 90 days.

Farricker v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-492, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 31, 2018).

Unpaid Leave

Public school teacher - Unpaid maternity leave following paid family leave - Ineligible for credit purchase except for one month discretionary credit exception that retirement board may award.

Hackenson v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-94 (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 1, 2016).

Untimely Creditable Service Purchase Application

Statute authorizing purchase of prior service as uncompensated school committee member repealed - Former municipal school committee member - Prior statute, M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(o), repealed effective July 1, 2009, allowed purchase of uncompensated school committee service by school committee member elected prior to January 1,

1976 for retirement credit - Although former Salem School Committee member elected in January 1974 sent letters in 2002 to Salem Contributory Retirement Board inquiring as to records of prior employment with city and whether retirement deductions were taken for any prior municipal service, and although he telephoned to request an invoice to purchase prior service, he did not actually apply to purchase his prior uncompensated school committee service until 2012, after the authorizing statute had been repealed - Application was properly denied as untimely under the statute - Letters sent prior to July 1, 2009 requesting information about prior municipal service and telephone call requesting an invoice were not applications to purchase prior school committee service - No evidence that retirement board considered them to be such applications - Purchase of service properly denied as not made before M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(o) was repealed - Statute governing errors in retirement records and computing benefit, M.G.L. c. 32, § 20(5)(c)(2), did not clearly apply.

Stafford v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-12-344, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 27, 2018).

Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP)

—Eligibility for ERIP, Generally

To be eligible to participate in the Early Retirement Incentive Program established by St. 2015, c. 19, an employee must be employed by an executive department of the Commonwealth, be a member of the State Employee Retirement System, and be classified in Group 1 for retirement purposes pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 32(2)(g) - Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g), Group 1 includes "[o]fficials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers, laborers, mechanics and all others not otherwise classified, while Group 2 includes "employees of the Commonwealth or of any county, regardless of any official classification, except the sheriff, superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant deputy superintendent and correction officers of county correctional facilities, whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners" - Employee's "regular and major duties" are those that the employee must spend more than half his time doing - "Care" means direct care, and not all direct contact is direct care.

Clement v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-299, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 8, 2017).

To be eligible to participate in the Early Retirement Incentive Program established by St. 2015, c. 19, which allows certain eligible Group 1 employees to receive enhanced retirement benefits (including the addition of five years of creditable service to years of total service), an employee must be employed by an executive department of the

Commonwealth, be a member of the State Employee Retirement System, and be classified in Group 1 for retirement purposes pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 32(2)(g).

Costello-Gordon v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-331, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 12, 2017)

Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 32(2)(g), Group 1 includes "officials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers, laborers, mechanics and all other not otherwise classified," and, per this section's 2012 amendment, which became effective on July 1, 2012, Group 2 includes "employees of the department of children and families holding the title of social worker A/B, C or D or successive titles who have been employed in such titles for 10 years or more," which reflected the legislature's view that all social worker positions involved the direct care, custody, control, instruction or other supervision over children in their Department of Children and Family Services caseloads. The amendment was not retroactive and did not apply, therefore, to social workers who retired before July 1, 2012.

Costello-Gordon v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-331, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 12, 2017).

Social worker who retired before July 1, 2012 (the effective date of an amendment of M.G.L. c. 32, § 32(2)(g) that classified Department of Children and Families social workers employed for 10 years or more in Group 2 for retirement purpose)was properly classified in Group1 absent a showing that his or her regular and major duties required (as the statute required before its 2012 amendment) the "care, custody, instruction or other supervision of parolees or other persons who were mentally ill or mentally defective or defective children or wayward delinquents," and that these regular and major duties comprised at least 51 percent of his or her duties.

Costello-Gordon v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-331, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 12, 2017).

—Eligible to Participate in ERIP

Department of Developmental Services (DDS) "Human Service Coordinator A/B" employed at Fernald School (a residence for mentally challenged individuals in DDS care) - Classification in Group 2 for retirement purposes, which made petitioner ineligible for the Early Retirement Incentive Program (ERIP), reversed - Petitioner, the sole hearing witness, testified credibly that she spent majority of her time coordinating and supervising vendors who provided Fernald residents with direct care, doing paper work including preparing monthly reports, individual service plans for residents and developing field packets, traveling, and conducting team meetings, that she visited individual residents'

residences and met with guardians and held team meetings of care personnel as needed but spent 30 percent of her time dealing with individuals, did not supervise any DDS employees, did not see Fernald residents on a daily basis, did not assist with residents' daily activities including dressing, bathing and medication (which vendors performed), never transported Fernald residences, did not provide hands-on crisis intervention, and spent 40-50 percent of her time in her office each week - petitioner's Form 30 confirmed that her job duties involved coordinating, monitoring and supervising care - Petitioner's job duties and actual duties performed showed that she did not provide direct care to Fernald residents, and that her regular and major duties did not require her to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of the residents - Retirement board directed to reclassify petitioner in group 1 and process her ERIP application.

Clement v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-299, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 8, 2017).

Incorrect Group 2 classification for retirement purposes - Eligibility to participate in St. 2015, c. 19 Early Retirement Incentive Program - Department of Developmental Services (DDS) Psychologist III - As Psychologist III at DDS's Arlington Office, had no caseload, rarely met with individuals receiving care from DDS, and any such meetings occupied approximately two hours of psychologist's 40-hour work week - 95 percent of time prior to retirement devoted to work with DDS's "positive behavioral supports initiative," which met with an advisory board and a subcommittee to implement statewide changes promoting positive behavior in every program and home that DDS funded throughout Massachusetts - As Psychologist III at DDS's Central Middlesex Area office (from 2014 until retirement in June 2015), general job duties and responsibilities were supervising and/or coordinating and providing program direction for provision of professional psychological services including diagnostic evaluations, counseling, therapy or testing, as well as planning programs for individual client treatment recommending suitable referrals for treatment, organizing and coordinating the provision of clinical services, and developing programs - Most recent employee performance review form described duties as including provision of behavioral, psychological and therapeutic support to individuals, providing behavioral support and consultation to families for individuals living in their homes, providing consultation and facilitation to groups, provider agencies and area office staff to address behavioral and psychological issues, managing and facilitating risk management processes, and addressing requests for DDS-funded supports - Helped support individuals who were "mentally defective," but did not have the care, custody, instruction or control of individuals residing in DDS's group homes - Had primarily administrative, consultative, advisory and management duties and minimal contact with individuals supported by DDS - Despite suggestions to contrary in employee performance review form description of duties, rarely provided any direct services to individuals, which is required for Group 2 classification - No evidence that ERIP applicant was engaged in care, custody, instruction or control of individuals even when she met with DDS individuals - Instead, she supported those who provided direct care to them - More than half of her time was occupied with

committee work and office management, and official description of job duties (Form 30) recognized this - Evidence clearly supported classification in Group 1 for retirement purposes - Proper classification for retirement purposes was Group 1 rather than Group 2 - Group 2 classification reversed - Remanded to state Board of Retirement to classify in Group 1 and approve ERIP application, and make any necessary adjustments to retirement allowance.

Roberts v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-297, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., September 1, 2017).

Incorrect Group 2 classification for retirement purposes - Eligibility to participate in St. 2015, c. 19 Early Retirement Incentive Program - Department of Public Health Registered Nurse III - Massachusetts Hospital School (Pappas Rehabilitation Hospital for Children) - Supervision by nurse manager and assistant nursing director - Work as day shift charge nurse for pediatric patients in acute care units specializing in infectious diseases, cardiology, pulmonology, neurology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, as well as dental, orthopedic, behavioral and mental health services and alternative medicine - Majority of patients in units dependent upon staff for personal care and mobility needs - Large portion of time spent consulting with hospital pharmacy staff, updating families and hospital staff as to status of patients, arranging patient transfers to other facilities, overseeing paperwork, and arranging pediatric followup - Minimal work as direct care nurse, once or twice per month - "Form 30" for position described general duties and responsibilities as supervising provision of direct nursing care and treatment to pediatric patients, assessing health and educational needs of patients and families, assisting with patient admission and discharge, and facilitating rehabilitation and supervising assigned staff, as well as supervision from registered nurse of higher grade - Regular and major duties concerned supervision, planning, and evaluating, and policy-related duties, rather than having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of mentally ill or mentally defective persons, the prerequisite for Group 2 classification - Proper classification of position for retirement purpose was Group I - Group 2 classification reversed - Board ordered to process employee's ERIP application.

Morreale v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-332, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 10. 2017).

—Ineligible to Participate in ERIP

Group 2 classification of position by board for retirement purposes - Ineligibility to participate in St. 2015, c. 19 Early Retirement Incentive Program - Employment by Department of Children and Families for 10 years as Social Worker D, working at retirement in January 2016 as screening supervisor who assigned cases to social service

staff - "Form 30" job description for Social Worker D stated that person holding position had responsibility of assigning cases to social service staff, supervising substitute case managers, supervising home-finding and adoption services provided by social workers, supervised and evaluated level and quality of intake, assessment, service planning and case management services, coordinated case reviews, approved major casework decisions and reviewed departmental reports, and provided orientation for new employees and identified employee training needs - Employee Performance Rating Form stated that five separate staff positions reported to a Social Worker D, and that applicant's supervisor evaluated her abilities to implement department policies, and supervise staff, new employees and interns - Duties at time of retirement showed that applicant may have been classified in Group 1 prior to July 1, 2012 (the effective date of an amendment of M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) that classified Department of Children and Families social workers employed for 10 years or more in Group 2 for retirement purpose), but applicant retired after that amendment, in January 2016, and she had worked as a D.F. social worker for more than ten years - Statute as amended in 2012 applied - Applicant classified properly in Group 2 - Claims that she had been classified in Group 1 as a D.F. social worker and that her major duties did not involved care, custody or control of mentally ill children in D.F. care (a claim supported by her job description and supervisor's reviews) amounted to request for equitable relief through treatment as Group 1 employee contrary to statute, which DALA lacked authority to grant - Decision of Massachusetts State Board of Retirement classifying applicant in Group 2 and, therefore, as ineligible for ERIP affirmed.

Costello-Gordon v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-331, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 12, 2017).

Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH) Healthcare Facility Specialist (Surveyor) surveying laboratories under DPH Clinical Laboratory Program monitoring compliance and providing certification and licensure under state and federal law, including Social Security Act section 1864, 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa (federal laboratory inspection program), and Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1998 (CLIA) - Ineligibility of employee holding position to participate in Acts 2015, ch. 19 Early Retirement Incentive Program - Position funded by "federal grant monies" that were not "federal reimbursements," as defined at M.G.L. c. 29, § 1 - Money received by Massachusetts Department of Public Health from federal government to pay for cost of inspecting laboratories to determine whether they complied with federal standards.

Abdelahad v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-292, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Group 2 classification of position by board for retirement purposes - Ineligibility to participate in St. 2015, c. 19 Early Retirement Incentive Program - Massachusetts Department of Public Health Recreational Therapist I - Patient Care Unit of DPH's

Tewksbury Hospital - Ineligibility to participate in Early Retirement Incentive Program - Regular and major duties involving direct patient care - "Form 30" job description for recreational Therapist I position showing no required management experience or supervision of subordinate employees, and listing duties requiring that employee have care, custody, instruction or other supervision of mentally ill or mentally defective persons - Working with patients, some from Department of Developmental Services, with physical and mental disabilities, and providing them with daily activities including bowling, cooking, games, crafts and music - Assessment of individual therapeutic recreational abilities and needs, and setting individual goals and objectives for patients according to assessment - No evidence of classification in Group 1 when employment began, or classification of co-workers in same position being classified in Group I - Denial of ERIP application affirmed.

Carpenter v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-530, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Group 2 classification for retirement purposes - Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Clinical Social Worker "C" - Ineligibility to participate in Early Retirement Incentive Program - Dismissal of appeal - Lack of prosecution - Failure to file prehearing memorandum and hearing exhibits, appear for hearing, or elect submission of appeal upon written filings - Statement of intention not to pursue appeal further.

Howard v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-322, Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 13, 2017).

Employment by non-qualifying agency - University of Massachusetts - Appeals - Dismissal - Mootness - Withdrawal of ERIP application - Expiration of ERIP application deadline.

Jochim v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-328, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 28, 2016).

Group Classification for Retirement Purposes

—Pro-Rating Group Classification

Generally - Until 2011, group classification for retirement purposes depended solely upon the retirement system member's position at the time of retirement - Legislation enacted in 2011 provides that any active retirement system member as of April 2, 2012 who has served in more than one group *may* elect to receive a retirement allowance consisting of

pro-rated benefits based upon the percentage of total years of service that the member rendered in each group, but a public employee who became a retirement system member on or after April 2, 2012 is *required* to pro-rate his service (*see* St. 2011, c. 76, § 14 and M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a)), and pro-rated retirement benefits are calculated as the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) prescribes (*see* PERAC Memorandum # 29, 2012).

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Denial of request to pro-rate retirement system member's years of service in Group 1 and 4 positions affirmed - Pre-retirement request by former firefighter to classify his prior call firefighter service in Group 4, as was his firefighter service, and to then pro-rate his retirement allowance benefits as between his years of service in Group 4 positions (call firefighter, firefighter and EMT) and his Group 1 service as an assistant professor position at a public community college, his position at the time of retirement - Denial of request sustained, but for reasons different than those asserted by the retirement board - Applicant was no longer a public employee, having left his assistant professor position in 2014 to work for a private hospital as an emergency room diagnostic technician - No retirement application yet filed with retirement board, meaning that when he retired he would be a retirement system member who entered service before April 2, 2012 but would no longer be a public employee at the time of his retirement, and would therefore be ineligible to pro-rate his service as between his years of service in different retirement groups and would have to be classified based upon the Group 1 assistant professor position in which he was last employed, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a) - As a result of the statutory requirement, issue of group classification for prior call firefighter service was moot - Re-entry into public employment, and would allow applicant to again request that retirement system to which he belonged at time of retirement pro-rate his past service under Chapter 32, section 5(2)(a).

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017)

Employee's group classification for retirement purposes generally depends on his or her duties upon retiring - In some circumstances, employee who has served in more than one group may receive retirement benefits pro-rated among groups.

Forbes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-146, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

—Reclassification from Group 1 to Group 2

Generally

Group 1 is the group classification for the majority of the Commonwealth's employees; group 2 is a more flexible category, once an employee retires, and is for employees, among others, "whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . persons who are mentally ill," (M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g)) - "Regular and major duties" requirement has come to mean that the employee must spend more than half of his or her time engaged in those duties during his or her last year of employment.

Correia v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-682, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Retiring certified nursing assistant (CNA) in state hospital's transitional care unit who appealed State Retirement Board's denial of her request to be reclassified from Group 1 to Group 2 for retirement purposes (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g), Group 2), on ground that she had provided direct care to mental health patients, had burden of proving that her "regular and major duties" required her to have the "care, custody, instruction or other supervision of persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective," meaning that she spent 50 percent or more of her time providing care, instruction or supervision, or having custody, of this patient population in the unit where she worked.

Massai v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-6, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 16, 2018).

Although CNA who worked in state hospital's transitional care unit may have cared for several mentally-challenged facility residents, some of whom were potentially violent, M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g)'s Group 2 criteria did not include employees who face dangerous situations on a routine basis, and exposure to dangerous situations at work is not a controlling factor in determining Group 2 eligibility.

Massai v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-6, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 16, 2018).

Types of service listed in "Group 2" definition - Having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of "defective delinquents or wayward children"- Department of Youth Services (DYS) Casework Manager - Regular and major duties alleged to have required such care, custody, instruction or other supervision - No definition of "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" at M.G.L. c. 32, § 3((2)(g) - Definitions of phrases removed from General Laws in 1970s - As a matter of law, it appears no

longer possible for a state employee to have regular and major duties requiring him to have "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children" or, on that basis, to be classified in Group 2 or receive pro-rated retirement benefits for Group 2 service.

Curtin v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-317, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

What others may have told petitioner seeking reclassification of service from Group 1 to Group 2 about same work being so reclassified by retirement board was hearsay and did not show any such reclassification reliably - Even if it occurred, previous reclassification of service in question would not have precluded retirement board from changing its mind, particularly if board could no longer reconcile reclassification with M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g)'s Group 2 definition - Even if the Board did not do so, correction could be made on appeal by DALA and Contributory Retirement Appeal Board.

Curtin v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-317, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Per M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g), Group 2 includes "employees of the Commonwealth or of any county, regardless of any official classification, except the sheriff, superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant deputy superintendent and correction officers of county correctional facilities, whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners," while Group 1 has been recognized as the "catch-all" category that includes "[o]fficials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers, laborers, mechanics and all others not otherwise classified."

Mendonsa v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-11-424, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Determination of proper group classification of employee for retirement purposes is based on job the employee held and the duties he performed at the time of retirement - Petitioner challenging denial of group 2 classification based upon claim that he had the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners at a Massachusetts Department of Corrections minimum security prison was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his regular and major duties, or at least 51 percent of his duties, embodied such care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners at the facility, and that when he rendered such care, custody, instruction or other supervision to individual prisoners to any individual inmate or in group sessions, it was

not merely incidental to or in the context of some greater administrative function, and whether he did so or not depends upon what his regular and major duties were, as to which his job description and actual duties performed are important factors.

Mendonsa v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-11-424, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Types of service listed in "Group 2" definition - Having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of persons who are mentally ill - Having contact and interactions with mentally ill people does not constitute having care, custody, instruction or supervision of them - Supervising staff members who have care, custody, instruction or supervision of mentally ill people does not constitute having such care, custody, instruction or supervision.

Sprague v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-10-790, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 16, 2017)

Classification of Commonwealth employees into Groups for retirement purposes under M.G.L. c. 32, §3(2)(g) - Classification based upon job that retirement system members has at time of retirement - Job title and job description are key information used to determine appropriate Group classification - Group 2 includes commonwealth employees "whose regular and major duties require them to have care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective delinquents" - Reclassification - Burden of proof - Retirement system member seeking reclassification from Group 1 to Group 2 based upon direct care, custody, instruction or supervision of mentally ill or mentally retarded persons has burden of proving that her regular and major duties, or at least 51 percent of duties, during her last year of work in position in question comprised this type of work and responsibility, and cannot have been merely incidental to, or in the context of, performing some greater administrative function.

Williams v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-229, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

Department of Youth Services (DYS) Casework Manager - Regular and major duties alleged to have required having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of "defective delinquents or wayward children," a type of service listed in the Group 2 definition, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) - No definition of "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" at M.G.L. c. 32, § 3((2)(g) - Definitions of phrases removed from General Laws in 1970s - Chapter 32 was not amended to reflect the elimination of these terms - No statute, specific court decision, or general principle of statutory

construction provides that references to "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" now mean youth under DYS's care - Elimination of "defective delinquents" and "wayward children" from General Laws means it is no longer possible for state employee to have "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children," or to have regular and major duties involving "defective delinquents or wayward children," and having care, custody, control or other supervision of "youth in DYS's care" therefore cannot be classified in Group 2 or receive pro-rated retirement benefits for Group 2 service on the basis of having "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children."

Forbes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-146, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

Group 2 is retirement classification group for various Commonwealth employees including those whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners, with exception of sheriff, superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant deputy superintendent, and correction officers of county correctional facilities (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g)) - Exception did not apply to superintendent of Massachusetts Alcohol Substance Abuse Center, as this was a Commonwealth, rather than a county, facility - Group 2 is, in addition, for employees who work with prisoners, not detainees.

Martin v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-09-1065, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 2, 2016).

Reclassification Denied - Group 1 to Group 2

Department of Public Health - Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) at Western Massachusetts Hospital's Transitional Care Unit - Locked unit with mixed patient population including Alzheimer's, dementia and other mentally and behaviorally-challenged patients - After filing superannuation retirement application with November 21, 2014 retirement date, State Board of Retirement advised that she was classified in Group 1 for retirement purposes - Timely appeal challenging group 1 classification filed January 7, 2015 - Claim by CNA that she had provided direct care to mental health patients - Evidence insufficient to show (per CNA's burden in appeal challenging Group 2 reclassification denial) that her "regular and major duties" required that she have the "care, custody, instruction or other supervision of persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective," meaning that she spent 50 percent or more of her time providing care, instruction or supervision, or having custody, of this patient population in the Transitional Care Unit - Although CNA unquestionably provided direct care to patients in transitional Care Unit, record lacked specific patient

information regarding mental health diagnoses and did not show amount of time CNA actually spent caring for mental health patients - Per the hospital's description, Transitional Care Unit served many purposes and had many care-related objectives, including providing immediate care at reduced level to patients who no longer met or required the mix and intensity of services provided by specialty care programs, providing end-of-life care, and providing respite care to patients who lived at home but whose home care providers needed a break from caregiving responsibilities, but providing exclusive care of mentally challenged or mentally ill patients was not among the unit's stated purposes and objectives - Although CNA may have cared for several mentally-challenged facility residents, some of whom were potentially violent, M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g)'s Group 2 criteria did not include employees who face dangerous situations on a routine basis, and exposure to dangerous situations at work is not a controlling factor in determining Group 2 eligibility - Denial of request to be reclassified in Group 2 affirmed.

Massai v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-16-6, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 16, 2018).

Department of Youth Services (DYS) - Prior service as DYS Casework Manager - Reclassification of Casework Manager service from Group 1 to Group 2 sought based upon having regular and major duties required having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of "defective delinquents or wayward children," a type of service listed in the Group 2 definition, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) - Denial of reclassification by retirement board affirmed - No definition of "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" at M.G.L. c. 32, § 3((2)(g) - Definitions of phrases removed from General Laws in 1970s - As a matter of law, it appears no longer possible for a state employee to have regular and major duties requiring him to have "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children" or, on that basis, to be classified in Group 2 or receive pro-rated retirement benefits for Group 2 service - Reading phrase "defective delinquents or wayward children" broadly to include juveniles assigned to DYS by the courts *per se* would effectively amend statutory Group 2 definition, which DALA lacks authority to do - Even if phrase could be read properly as including juveniles assigned to DYS by the courts, petitioner did not show that time he spent performing regular and major duties of DYS Casework Manager was spent primarily in exercising direct custody of such juveniles, or in directly providing instruction or other supervision to them, despite his hands-on involvement in the work of one of DYS's community day reporting centers - "Form 30" for DYS Casework Manager did not assign him such responsibility - Casework manager did not carry a caseload as DYS caseworkers did - When casework manager exercised direct custody of, and provided direct instruction or other supervision to, DYS juveniles, it was incidental to or in the context of a greater administrative function he exercised as a Casework Manager.

Curtin v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-317, Decision (Mass. Div. of

Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

Tewksbury Hospital Manager and Licensed/Registered Dietician - Appeal challenging denial of request to reclassify position from Group 1 to Group 2 - Denial affirmed - Hospital had 550 patients, of whom 200-225 were chronically mentally ill, with the remainder medically-involved long-term care patients, 60-70 percent of whom had mental health issues - Although hospital manager covered for direct care providers when they were absent, manager had no caseload of patients for whom hospital manager provided direct care - Even when covering for absent caregiver, manager had no duty to put patients to bed or help them dress, and nutrition assessment was example of the type of duty she covered for - Involved in ethics consultations, which entailed talking to patients if they were conscious, talking to their families, and participating in decisions such as whether to withdraw feeding tubes - Manager held community meetings with patients, sometimes 25 at a time, to hear about issues with food service, and most of her patient contact was in community meetings - On management questionnaire she completed nearly two years before retiring, manager emphasized and described supervisory duties, discussed supervisory decisions she had made rather than decisions regarding direct care of patients, and did not describe any direct patient care - Most recent description of manager's objectives prepared by her supervisor before manager retired listed planning, organization, direction, supervision, evaluation and effective oversight of occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech/language pathology, food and nutrition services, and adaptive equipment departments; functioning as contract manager as to an annual hospital budget of nearly $3.6 million, and providing fiscal and operational oversight of vendor staff; functioning as project manager for conversion of hospital's current food service production and delivery system; and participating in implementation of an executive order requiring state agencies to follow nutrition standards when contracting to purchase food - On group classification questionnaire, manager wrote that she provided supervision and training to approximately 110 direct care employees, and providing care and treatment to medically and mentally ill patients who had behavioral issues and criminal backgrounds, attending patient-centered meetings and rounds, interviewed patients and families, investigating incidents and complaints, provided ethics consultations, reviewed patient charts, audited inspections of patient care areas, did meal rounds, and interacted with patients on a daily basis - At the time of her retirement, and for not less than 12 months preceding it, manager's regular and major duties did not require her to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of mentally ill people, and record did not reveal when her duties last required this - Forms describing duties did not indicate that manager spent 51 percent of her time having the care, custody, instruction or supervision of patients - Manager's difficulty, during her hearing testimony, breaking down the percentages of her time spent on her various duties, including managing clinical and non-clinical services, providing leadership, direction and training to departments and programs, budgeting, serving on committees, and delivering direct care, revealed the ambiguity of her claim to have spent most of her

time engaged in providing direct patient care to mentally ill patients, and was not enough to sustain her burden of proof on this point.

Nelson v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-10, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Department of Developmental Services (DDS) Mental Retardation Worker IV - Appeal challenging denial of request to reclassify position from Group 1 to Group 2 - Superannuation retirement at age 66 while appeal of group reclassification denial was pending - State Board of Retirement's motion to dismiss appeal as moot granted - Superannuation retirement allowance calculated, per M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(2), as product of retirement system member's creditable service, member's annual rate of regular compensation, and an age factor determined by member's age at retirement and group classification - Maximum age factor used in calculation is 2.5 - Maximum age factor of 2.5 reached in Group 1 at age 65, and in Group 2 at age 60 - Upon retirement at age 66, DDS employee reached maximum age factor of 2.5 for Group 1 employee, and would have reached it earlier, at age 60, had he been classified in Group 2 - Reclassification in Group 2 would not increase his retirement allowance, as he was already receiving the maximum retirement allowance - Reclassification appeal was therefore moot.

Pierre-Louis v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-10-20, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 21, 2017).

Massachusetts Hospital School for disabled children - Retired Power Plant Supervisor - Position not among public safety-related jobs or others listed in statute describing group 2 (M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g))- No responsibility for custody and care of delinquents or wayward children, or of any children, at the school.

Kennefick v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-317, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 17, 2017).

Department of Youth Services (DYS) - Prior service as DYS Casework Manager - Reclassification of Casework Manager service from Group 1 to Group 2 sought based upon having regular and major duties required having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of "defective delinquents or wayward children," a type of service listed in the Group 2 definition, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) - Denial of reclassification by retirement board affirmed - Department of Youth Services (DYS) Casework Manager - Regular and major duties alleged to have required having care, custody, instruction or other supervision of "defective delinquents or wayward children," a type of service listed in the Group 2 definition, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) - No definition

of "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" at M.G.L. c. 32, § 3((2)(g) - Definitions of phrases removed from General Laws in 1970s - Chapter 32 was not amended to reflect the elimination of these terms - No statute, specific court decision, or general principle of statutory construction provides that references to "defective delinquents" or "wayward children" now mean youth under DYS's care - Elimination of "defective delinquents" and "wayward children" from General Laws means it is no longer possible for state employee to have "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children," or to have regular and major duties involving "defective delinquents or wayward children," and having care, custody, control or other supervision of "youth in DYS's care" therefore cannot be classified in Group 2 or receive pro-rated retirement benefits for Group 2 service on the basis of having "the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . defective delinquents or wayward children" - Petitioner also did not show that he spent at least 51 percent of his time as a Casework Manager engaged in care, custody, instruction or other supervision of youth assigned to DYS - Testimony showed that at most half of his duties were administrative and half entailed working directly with youth under DYS's care - Although evaluations of his performance as Casework Manager referred to his "caseload," Form 30 for Casework Manager did not mention maintaining a caseload, and "caseload" comprised filling in for case workers if they were on vacation, on leave, or had conflicting appointments.

Forbes v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-146, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 23, 2016).

Superintendent of Massachusetts Alcohol Substance Abuse Center (MASAC) - Commonwealth (not county(facility for criminally-sentenced, minimum security male inmates and civilly-committed male detainees in 30-day detoxification and substance abuse program under M.G.L. c. 123, § 35, which does not refer to prisoners or otherwise indicate that persons committed under this statute are prisoners or inmates - Group 2 classification is for employees who work with prisoners, not detainees - MASAC Superintendent held supervisory position requiring management of $7 million budget, making personnel decisions including hiring, firing, promotions and discipline, and supervision of 172 employees - Conducted morning staff meeting regarding detainees (but not inmates) sent to facility by courts for detoxification, but detainees were not present during these meetings,- Office was inside facility perimeter - Observed, and sometimes was approached by, inmates, and was available to hear, and possibly resolve, inmate grievances - Supervised the care, custody, instruction, and other supervision of inmates and detainees by other facility staff, but did not herself engage in it - Denial of reclassification of position from Group 1 to Group 2 for retirement purposes affirmed.

Martin v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-09-1065, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 2, 2016).

Department of Developmental Services Program Monitor/Program Coordinator III - Regular and major duties did not include direct care, custody, instruction or other supervision of persons who are mentally ill or defective.

Camara v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-15-460, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 16, 2016).

Department of Children and Families (DCF) Social Worker "D" - Inapplicable statutory reclassification of DCF social workers in Group 2 - Retirement Prior to effective date of statutory reclassification.

Bombaci v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-11-324, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 24, 2016).

Massachusetts Hospital School - Staff Registered Nurse V and Staff Education Nurse - Regular and major duties not primarily care, custody, instruction or other supervision of mentally ill or defective persons.

Dewey v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-58, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., June 3, 2016).

Holyoke Soldier's Home - Registered Nurse II - Insufficient evidence that regular and major duties required care, custody, instruction or other supervision of mentally ill or mentally defective persons - Facility provided medical rather than psychiatric care - No quantification, in classification specifications for RN II position, of number of mentally ill patients required to be in care of RN II in any single shift - No reference to care of mentally ill patients in employee performance review form.

Borucki v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-683, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 22, 2016).

Reclassification Granted - Group 1 to Group 2

Massachusetts Department of Mental Health - Taunton State Hospital Registered Nurse (RN) 4 - RN-4s were supervisors and did not directly care for patients, and RN-2s were among the nurses who provided such direct care - However, hospital avoided paying overtime to RN-2s by having RN-4 (when more than one was on duty) assume the duties of an RN-2 (specifically, a charge nurse, meaning a nurse in charge) who was absent from a shift due to sickness or vacation, in order to provide direct-care duties

for a shift, which included taking patients' vital signs, conducting skin assessments, monitoring patient nutrition, changing dressings, administering oxygen, conducting patient admission procedure, and restraining patients - During last year of work at hospital in 2011-12, petitioner, an RN-4, assumed the duties of a charge nurse and spent at least 50 percent of her time during the shifts she worked each month caring for mentally ill patients - In three of her last 12 months of work, she cared for mentally ill persons more than 50 percent of the time, and therefore had the "care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . persons who are mentally ill," as required by M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) for Group 2 classification - Petitioner was therefore entitled to Group 2 classification for retirement purposes - State Board of Retirement's decision denying her application for reclassification from Group1 to Group 2 reclassification application reversed.

Correia v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-682, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Massachusetts Department of Corrections- Appeal challenging denial of request to classify in Group 2 petitioner's service at in various program manager positions at two state prison facilities (MCI Shirley Minimum Security Prison and South Middlesex Correctional Center) - Denial reversed, and retirement board directed to recalculate retirement benefits based upon group 2 classification - Petitioner, who was the only hearing witness, showed by preponderance of the evidence that his major duties in each position required him to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of prisoners - As Unit Manager/Program Manager 3 at MCI Shirley, he was in frequent communication with inmates, toured facility, performed checks within each housing unit, and was required to be familiar with the inmates, and handled all interactions with inmates by himself but carried a radio so he could call another employee for assistance if needed - As Director of Treatment/Program Manager 4 and 5 at MCI Shirley, he was in charge of developing, implementing and overseeing programs for inmates including library services, chapel, gym, recreation activities, education classrooms, and other programs he developed, had an office inside the facility near the programming areas, and conducted some administrative duties but spent a majority of his time supervising inmates during their participation in the facility's programs - As Deputy Superintendent/Program Manager 8 at South Middlesex Correctional Center, his duties included conducting searches of inmate sleeping quarters, and he was responsible for all inmate housing and activity, both of which showed he had responsibility to supervise the inmate population, and in addition his communication and contact with inmates was face-to-face, frequent, and not ancillary to his regular and major duties, incidental, or in the context of a greater administrative function.

Mendonsa v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-11-424, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 17, 2017).

State Department of Mental Health - RN IV Infection Preventionist - Constant patient contact while providing nursing services and care to mentally ill and mentally retarded clients committed to state custody at Worcester State Hospital - No supervisory responsibility as to licensed practical nurses at facility - Work during last year of employment - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift Monday through Friday included routine meeting with any patient at state hospital who presented with communicable disease or rash of unknown origin; meeting with any person prescribed anti-biotic medication, regardless of cause; assisting outside providers seeing state hospital clients including podiatrists, cardiologists and dentists, including administering EKGs and taking blood oxygen levels for cardiologists, clipping toenails and changing bandages for podiatrists, assisting with dental procedures, performing annual physicals; performing blood draws, acquiring respiration data and taking vitals; administering vaccinations during flu, pneumonia, meningitis and mumps clinics; assisting specialists with suturing in clinics, changing dressings and evacuating wounds; transporting state hospital patients to appointments with medical providers, and walking them back to their housing units after their appointments; attending one-hour, daily treatment team meetings during afternoons with individual client, facility psychiatrist, social worker, Registered Nurse, Mental Health worker and Rehabilitation Specialist; visiting 20-25 patients during remaining afternoon hours each day to perform tasks including lining space assessments, skin evaluations and assessment, and determination of patient antibiotic tolerance, with no other staff members present - First two duties listed in Form 30 general statement of duties and responsibilities were treating all patients with dignity and respect through interaction and by optimally integrating patient perspective into all aspects of care and advocating for patients, and obtaining appropriate diagnostic results and findings - Regular and major duties consisted of providing care, custody, instruction or other supervision to clients in state custody at Worcester state Hospital for at least 51 percent of the time - Administrative and supervisory duties of RN IV Infection Preventionist position were ancillary to client care, supervision and instructional functions - Denial of reclassification reversed - Remanded to state Board of Retirement to classify petitioner in Group 2 instead of Group 1.

Williams v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-12-229, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 28, 2017).

—Reclassification from Group 1 to Group 4

Generally

Municipal utility's "energy supply manager" had burden to show that his position should properly be classified for retirement purposes in Group 4 rather than Group 1 - Determination of proper group classification of employee for retirement purposes is based upon job held and duties performed at time of retirement - M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) defines Group 1 as including "[o]fficials and general employees including

clerical, administrative and technical workers, laborers, mechanics and all others not classified" - Statute defines Group 4 as including "employees of a municipal gas or electric generating or distribution plant who are employed as linemen, electric switchboard operators, electric maintenance men, steam engineers, boiler operators, firemen, oilers, mechanical maintenance men, and supervisors of said employees who shall include managers and assistant managers" - 1994 addition of "managers and assistant managers" to Group 4 indicated legislature's intent to include municipal utility managers in Group 4 even if they only "supervised the supervisors" of Group 4 employees - For municipal utility managers and assistant managers, there is no requirement that they supervise Group 4 employees directly, but all other municipal utility supervisors must supervise Group 4 employees directly, and that supervision must be part of their required duties - Absent statutory language saying so directly, legislature did not intend that retirement boards sort out whether municipal utility's senior managers , who reported to the manager but were not titled "assistant managers," nonetheless performed jobs that might be considered at the level of an assistant manager and also had some responsibility for supervising Group 4 employees - Instead, legislature is presumed to have established category in Group 4 ("managers and assistant mangers" of municipal utility) that retirement board could apply easily) - "Assistant manager" therefore refers to assistant manager of entire utility who would necessarily have supervision of Group 4 employees, rather than to persons not titled as assistant manager and whose managerial responsibilities were within a particular utility department, such as its energy receipt stations, rather than within the entire utility.

Contrino v. Westfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-212, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 19, 2017).

Reclassification Denied - Group 1 to Group 4

Denial by retirement board, in 2015, of request by "energy supply manager" of municipal utility (Westfield gas & electric Light Department) to be reclassified from Group 1 to Group 4 for retirement purposes - Denied because board found no supervision of other Group 4 employees by energy supply manager - Energy supply manager responsible for managing municipal utility's "energy receipt stations" under direction of utility's general manager - Energy receipt stations received gas or electricity from suppliers and, in case of electricity, transformed electricity received from 115,000 volts to 23,000 volts - Work on electric receipt stations was performed by electric linemen employed by utilities, while work on gas receipt stations was performed partly by utility maintenance personnel or by outside contractors - Energy supply manager supervised two analysts and also a utility supervisor who, in turn, supervised the linemen and other utility employees who worked on energy receipt stations - Utility supply supervisor job description listed duties as including scheduling and supervising construction and maintenance activities involved in electric and gas receipt and distribution, and managing construction, maintenance and reporting

requirements regarding municipal utility's electric generation and storage facilities - Utility supervisor and linemen he supervised are in Group 4 - Utility study showed that linemen and electric station operators spent 67-100 percent of their time working outdoors and in hot, cold or wet surroundings, that utility supervisors spent up to one third of their time in similar circumstances, and that these conditions did not apply to energy supply manager's job - Energy supply manager went to energy supply stations to see how work was progressing, and estimated that he spent about 90 percent of his time in the office and ten percent in the field inspecting work of linemen or, when there is a storm, helping to coordinate work and estimating time repairs will take; in addition, he directly supervised linemen when utility supervisor was out of the office, and recalled doing so once during a storm in October 2011 - This direct supervision was not included in energy supply manager's job description - Occasional direct supervision of Group 4 employees therefore did not make energy supply manager eligible for Group 4 classification - Energy supply manager was also not "assistant manager," as phrase is used in statutory Group 4 definition, as he was not titled "assistant manager," was a manager within a particular department (the energy receipt stations) rather than the assistant manager of the entire municipal utility, and did not have supervision of Group 4 employees in the entire utility - Denial of request to reclassify energy supply manager in Group 4 therefore affirmed.

Contrino v. Westfield Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-212, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 19, 2017).

Chicopee Electric Light Department - Field engineer - Group 1 classification - Review of Light Department positions by Chicopee Retirement Board to determine whether positions were classified properly - Determination that Light Department field engineer and field engineer supervisor positions should be assigned in Group 1, not Group 4 - Specification of positions included in Group 4 by M.G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) - "employees of a municipal gas or electric generating or distribution plant who are employed as linemen, electric switch board operators, electric maintenance men, steam engineers, boiler operators, firemen, oilers, mechanical or maintenance men, and supervisors of said employees who shall include managers and assistant managers" - "Field engineer" not one of positions specified by statute - Undisputed that petitioner did not supervise any Group 4 employees - Group 1 classification affirmed.

Swain v. Chicopee Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-15-80, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 26, 2017).

Reclassification Granted - Group 1 to Group 4

State Department of Mental Retardation - Mental Retardation Specialist Supervisor - Regular and major duties required direct care to mentally ill patients - Direct care of

mentally ill patients consumed 75 percent of typical regular eight-hour shift.

O'Brien v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-721, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 25, 2016).

"Killed in the Line of Duty" Benefit (Pension - M.G.L. c. 32, § 100)

—Generally

"Killed in the line of duty" benefit, made available by M.G.L. c. 32, § 100, is a full pension payable to the surviving spouse of a firefighter, police officer or corrections officer killed in the performance of his duties - Statute specifies three situations in which the circumstances of a firefighter's death give rise to the spouse's eligibility for a pension equal to the full amount of the firefighter's salary had he continued in service in the position he held at the time of his death: Under section 100, clauses 1 and 2, the death or injuries leading to death must be as a result of an accident while the firefighter is engaged in specific activities, including travel to or from the scene of a fire or other emergency; while section 100, clause 3 applies if the firefighter dies or suffers injuries resulting in death "while at the scene of a fire or other emergency," and under this clause, death in the performance of duties need not be the result of an accident.

Smith v. Gloucester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-249, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 24, 2018).

Fact that nearly 14 years elapsed between injury in the line of duty that firefighter's surviving spouse alleged (lung injury from smoke and toxic fume inhalation while fighting a large fire for over 12½ hours, oftentimes without air canisters for a self-contained breathing apparatus, in August 1998) and his death from lung cancer 2012, following an earlier Stage IV non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in early 2000 that was placed into remission, but was not cured, with aggressive chemotherapy and radiation treatment, does not itself make it impossible to prove that the 1998 injury was the direct cause of the firefighter's death or preclude the surviving spouse from establishing her entitlement to M.G.L. c. 32, § 100 "killed in the line of duty" benefits.

Smith v. Gloucester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-249, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 24, 2018).

Section 100 does not state what must be proved for "killed in the line of duty" benefits applicant to show entitlement to medical panel review where retirement board denied claim for section 100 benefits by surviving spouse of firefighter without convening medical panel, based upon medically-related decision by Public Employee Retirement System

Administration Commission that firefighter's death from metastatic cancer in 2012 was result of radiation treatment firefighter received to treat Stage IV non-Hodgkin's lymphoma that was diagnosed in early 2000 rather than from direct exposure to smoke and toxic fumes while fighting a large fire for 12½ hours in 1998, oftentimes without air canisters for a self-contained breathing apparatus - Absent any statutory language or caselaw to the contrary, it was reasonable to require that to obtain medical panel review of her section 100 benefits application, surviving spouse needed to make out prima facie case with evidence that, if unrebutted and believed, would allow factfinder to conclude that prerequisites for section 100 benefits were met—injury to firefighter's lungs while in the performance of his duties as a municipal firefighter, and "while at the scene" of the 1998 fire that resulted in a condition of aggressive, metastatic cancer, and that this injury directly resulted in the firefighter's death from metastatic cancer in 2012.

Smith v. Gloucester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-249, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 24, 2018).

—Benefit Awarded

[no entries]

—Benefit Denied

[no entries]

—Medical Panel Review

Retirement board decision denying application of deceased municipal firefighter's surviving spouse for "killed in the line of duty" death benefit pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 100, without convening a medical panel to review the application, reversed, and matter remanded for medical panel review - Surviving spouse's evidence, including medical records and competent expert opinion, made out prima facie case supporting her claim that firefighter died as result of injury sustained in line of duty—(1) injury to his lungs as a result of directly inhaling smoke and toxic fumes, including known human carcinogens, while fighting a catastrophic pier fire in August 1998 for 12 ½ hours, oftentimes without access to air canisters for a self-contained breathing apparatus; (2) causing, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the development of an aggressive non-Hodgkin's lymphoma that was already at Stage IV and present within the firefighter's lymphatic system and part of his right lung when it became symptomatic and was detected in early 2000; (3) requiring an aggressive regimen of chemotherapy, and then, when the firefighter's lymphoma persisted, radiation treatment to arrest the disease; (4) which was temporarily successful, until the condition of metastatic cancer involving the respiratory and lymphatic systems

returned in 2012, and proved fatal - Contrary conclusion of Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, on which retirement board relied, was that firefighter died as a result of intervening cause not related to injury sustained in line of duty (his radiation therapy) rather than as a result of his initial lymphoma, and that the lymphoma's causation by work-related exposure to smoke and toxic fumes during August 1998 pier fire cannot be stated with medical certainty - That others could reach this conclusion did not negate sufficiency of the surviving spouse's prima facie case - Evidence sufficed to place, before a medical panel, the issue of whether firefighter sustained an injury during the 1998 fire that directly resulted in his subsequent death from metastatic cancer, and board should await panel's certificate before it decides whether to allow or deny surviving spouse's section 100 benefits application.

Smith v. Gloucester Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-13-249, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 24, 2018).

"Killed in the Line of Duty" Benefit (One-Time Award - M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A)

—Generally

Applicability of M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A, which provides for a one-time award payable to the family of a deceased public safety employee "who while in the performance of his duties and as a result of incident, accident or violence, was killed or sustained injuries which were the direct and proximate cause of his death, is not limited to situations in which a public safety official dies immediately from something that occurred while he was on duty. If death occurs later on, eligible family members seeking this benefit must prove that the public safety official was injured on duty, the injury was caused by an "incident, accident or violence," and the injury was the direct and proximate cause of his death.

Fletcher v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-246, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

In providing (at M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A) a "killed in the line of duty" award based upon death or injuries sustained by public safety employee as a result of "incident, accident or violence" while in the performance of his duties, legislature did not define "incident" or direct that it be interpreted narrowly, and the word is therefore interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning which, per dictionary definition, is "occurrence or event."

Fletcher v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-246, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

By not including, in M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A, a time limit on "killed in the line of duty"

claims, the legislature recognized that a public safety employee might not have died right away as a result of "incident, accident or violence" while in the performance of his duties, and that the resulting death sometimes occurs years later.

Fletcher v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-246, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

That police officer who contracted polio in 1955 while resuscitating a drowning child in response to a call he received who had all three strains of the disease, died approximately 57 years after his polio was first diagnosed shortly after he rescued the child, and approximately 33 years after his accidental disability retirement, does not make the connection between his death and the polio he contracted too attenuated to meet the requirements of M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A for a "killed in the line of duty" benefit, and does not rule out polio as the proximate cause of his death - Absent contradicting medical evidence or witness testimony, letters from two physicians stating that the officer's death was likely caused by his polio, and the testimony of the officer's spouse as to the progression of his polio-related complications, were persuasive as to proximate cause - The intervention of decades between the officer's contraction of polio and his death as a result of its sequellae was consistent with the characteristics of the disease, including the permanent, and ultimately fatal, consequences of the paralysis suffered by a victim who was exposed to polio when no vaccination was available to confer immunity, and the long-term progression to this outcome was consistent with polio's course.

Fletcher v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-246, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A provides for a one-time award of $150,000 payable to the family of a deceased public safety employee "who, while in the performance of his duties and as a result of incident, accident or violence, was killed or sustained injuries which were the direct and proximate cause of his death."

Paré-Doherty v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-829, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Applicant seeking accidental death benefit pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A must meet a much higher standard than that imposed by M.G.L. c. 32, § 9 upon applicant seeking accidental disability retirement - Instead of merely requiring that the employee's death be a "natural and proximate result" of a personal injury sustained in the performance of his duties (the standard for accidental disability retirement), section 100A requires that the incident, accident or violence have occurred "while in the performance of his duties" and was the "direct and proximate cause of his death" - Therefore, while an accident or injury that arises *as a consequence* of a workplace accident may qualify for an accidental death

benefit, the employee's death will not qualify for an accidental death-in-the-line-of- duty benefit unless it was *directly brought about* by the workplace accident or incident in question.

Paré-Doherty v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-829, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

—Benefit Awarded

Police officer - Metropolitan District Commission Police - Death from complications of polio 57 years after contracting disease, in November 1955, while responding to call reporting child drowning and performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on child who had all three strains of paralytic poliomyelitis - Diagnosis of officer with all three strains of polio three weeks later - Treatment for paralysis affecting larynx and ability to swallow, including choking episodes and difficulty speaking, required extensive use of sick leave beginning in 1956 - Legislature passed resolve in 1960 recognizing officer's contraction of polio while in performance of his duties and allowing him sick leave with pay for period January 15, 1956 through October 7,1956- Officer continued to work intermittently through mid-February 1979 - Accidental disability retirement approved by State Retirement Board in 1979 - "Killed in the line of duty" benefit statute (M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A) enacted in 1994 (*see* St. 1994, c. 69, § 1) - Officer stricken with post-polio syndrome in November 2004, which worsened his condition significantly - Hospital admissions several times between 2005 and 2012 for aspiration pneumonia, and placement on feeding tube - Death from cardiac arrest due to aspiration at age 92 on May 31, 2012 - Application by surviving wife for accidental death benefits pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 9 granted in June 2012 - Application by officer's daughter on her mother's behalf for "killed in the line of duty death benefit" pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, § 100A in April 2014 denied by State Board of Retirement - Application was supported by statement of officer's treating physician opining "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that substantial contributing cause of officer's death was poliomyelitis contracted in November 1955 while in performance of his duty as MDC police officer, which led him to develop aspirational pneumonia causing him difficulties throughout his life and eventually leading to his death - Officer's response to drowning child call and action he took to save her life, resulting in his contraction of same polio strains she had, was an occurrence or event, and was therefore an "incident" within the meaning of the word as used by statute, while he was in the performance of his duties, and he contracted polio as a result of that incident - The many years between the officer's contraction of polio and his death from related complications did not rule out polio as proximate cause of his death - Absent contradicting medical evidence or witness testimony, letters from two physicians stating that the officer's death was likely caused by his polio, and the testimony of the officer's spouse as to the progression of his polio-related complications, were persuasive as to proximate cause - The intervention of decades between the officer's contraction of polio and his death as a result of its sequellae was consistent with the characteristics of the disease, including the permanent, and ultimately

fatal, consequences of the paralysis suffered by a victim who was exposed to polio when no vaccination was available to confer immunity, and the long-term progression to this outcome was consistent with polio's course.

Fletcher v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-14-246, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

—Benefit Denied

Benefit denial affirmed - Failure to show that death was direct and proximate cause of workplace injury - Department of Correction HVAC Industrial Instructor - Death from acute intoxication due to combined effects of ingesting ethanol and oxycodone as a result of chronic substance abuse, one year after sustaining physical and emotional injuries from accidental fall from roof while at work - Injuries sustained as a result of workplace accident included injuries to head, neck, back, shoulder and knee, including concussion and herniated discs, post-concussion syndrome, memory impairment, blurred vision, headaches, depression, loss of motivation and interest in previously-enjoyed activities, anxiety, and sleep disorder - Treatment included cortisone shots, physical therapy and prescription opioid pain medication - Personality changes as a result of post-concussion syndrome included depression due to chronic pain, and exacerbation of PTSD from childhood sexual abuse - Although he had been sober for a number of years prior to workplace accident, decedent relapsed into alcohol and substance addiction , including abuse of prescription opioid medication, and self-harming behavior including cutting - Psychiatric treatment sought three months after workplace injury following suicide attempt - Accidental death benefits awarded to spouse, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 32, §9, based upon change in personality and cognitive ability, and depression, as a result of head injury sustained during workplace accident - Absence of direct and proximate cause between workplace accident and death - Death not the direct result of injuries sustained in the accident - History of substance abuse prior to accident - Chronic substance abuse was intervening cause of death interrupting chain of events leading from workplace injury - Even if decedent would not have over-consumed alcohol and opioids if not for the emotional and personality changes brought about by his post-concussion syndrome following the workplace accident, the workplace accident was not the direct and proximate cause of his fatal over-consumption of drugs and alcohol.

Paré-Doherty v. State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-17-829, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., May 25, 2018).

Pension Forfeiture

Constitutional claim - Dismissal - Lack of jurisdiction - Failure to state claim on which DALA could grant relief - Forfeiture of pension approved by retirement board pursuant to M.G.L. c.

32, § 15(4) following retirement system member's 2015 conviction in federal district court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiring to defraud United States, and sentencing to three months' imprisonment and $100 fine - Potential pension loss as a result of forfeiture estimated to be $679,430 - Member's request to retirement board to reinstate pension following Supreme Judicial Court's 2016 decision that pension forfeiture under M.G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) qualified as "fine" under "excessive fines" clause of U.S. Const. Amend. VIII (*see Public Employee Retirement Administration Comm'n v. Bettencourt*, 47 N.E.3d 667 (2016) - Decision by retirement board not to act on request - Appeal of retirement board's no-action decision to DALA by member, based upon claim that pension forfeiture was excessive fine in violation of U.S. Const. Amend. VIII - DALA without jurisdiction to decide constitutional claim, and no specialized factfinding by DALA necessary to decide it - In addition, with member's challenge to retirement board action or decision "with reference to" his involuntary retirement or dereliction of duty already pending before Massachusetts district court, court was empowered to make required factfinding regarding constitutionality of pension forfeiture as part of its statutory jurisdiction to determine whether board's action was justified (*see* M.G.L. c. 32, §16(3)).

Fitzpatrick v. Chelsea Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-216, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 29, 2017).

Post-Retirement Earnings Limitations

—Exceptions

Retired teacher employed by school district based upon critical shortage of certified teachers - Boston public school headmaster - Lack of state education department waiver - Irrelevance - State Education Department regulatory waiver requirements not clearly applicable during time in question.

Kemp v. State Bd. of Retirement, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 14, 2016).

Retirement Contributions, Deductions and Refunds

—Refund of Excess Retirement Contributions

Interest on Refund of Excess Retirement Contributions

Interest payment denial affirmed - Public school teacher and member of Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) received refund of excess retirement withholdings from his teacher pay, while he was still a member in active service -

MTRS determined that retirement contribution amount was erroneously withheld by school district at incorrect higher rate (7 percent plus 2 percent, starting in 1995, rather than at 7 percent rate that applied when he started teaching and became MTRS member in 1977, and that continued to apply because teacher always kept retirement contributions on account with MTRS) - Following refund of excess retirement deductions (over $14,700), teacher requested that MTRS pay him interest on refunded amount - Interest payment denied, and denial affirmed on teacher's appeal to Division of Administrative Law Appeals - M.G.L. c. 32, § 20(5)(c)(2) provides that (1) retirement boards correct errors in their records that were made in computing a benefit that led to a system member or beneficiary receiving more or less than what he was entitled to receive, and (2) if a member is determined to have contributed an incorrect amount to the retirement system, the board shall either require that he contribute an amount sufficient to correct such error or pay the amount to the member to correct the error, as the case may be - Statute clearly requires that retirement board refund excess retirement deductions - However, statute does not provide for payment of interest on excessive pension deductions - Section 20(5)(c) authorizes refunds with interest only when board's error affected retirement benefits that member was already receiving, and requirement to pay interest on refund of excessive pension deductions should not be read into statute where legislature has not provided for it specifically (*citing Hollstein v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd*., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 109, 111, 710 N.E.2d 1041, 1042-43 (1999)), and *distinguishing Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd*., 465 Mass. 801,808-09, 992 N.E.2d 250,256-57 (2013)(interest at rate to be determined by Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission must be paid on lump sum retroactive retirement benefit payments that retirement board had erred in denying, a circumstance that had not occurred here).

Adams v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-16-90, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 12, 2018).

Retirement Plus (Enhanced Alternative Superannuation Retirement) Program

—Eligibility

[no entries]

—Ineligibility

[no entries]

—Teachers Hired Before July 1, 2001

Failure to Elect Retirement Plus before Statutory Deadline

Statute establishing Retirement Plus (enhanced alternative superannuation retirement program, *see* M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(4)(I) and St. 2004, § 387), statutory deadline for enrolling in Retirement Plus, and Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System procedures for electing enrollment in the program, including forms required to make election and manner of submitting them, are interpreted strictly by DALA administrative magistrates even when presented with the most sympathetic of circumstances.

Desiré v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-200, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Late-filed election to participate in Retirement Plus program - Failure to elect program before July 1, 2001 statutory deadline prescribed by M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(4)(I) - Inapplicability of late Retirement Plus election provisions of St. 2004, § 387 or late Retirement Plus election exception provided by Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) policy - Insufficiency of claims by public school teacher and MTRS member who missed statutory deadline for enrolling in Retirement Plus that she never received "Retirement Plus election package" that MTRS mailed out to its active and inactive members in February 2001, and that she and co-workers filled out forms they believed to be Retirement Plus election forms at school where she worked and a co-worker hand-delivered them to public school department payroll office, but payroll office did not mail them to MTRS - Late retirement plus election provisions of St. 2004, § 397 allowed teachers' retirement system member who filed retirement Plus election form prior to July 1, 2001 with city, town or school district in which teacher was employed by filing application with state teachers' retirement board no later than October 1, 2004 on form prescribed by MTRS, along with certificate of city, town or school district officer confirming that member had filed election form prior to July 1, 2001 - MTRS policy regarding late Retirement Plus Election exceptions provided that if payroll officer of school district who mailed Retirement Plus election form to state teachers' retirement board late acknowledged, in writing, that he or she had assumed responsibility for mailing in completed Retirement Plus election forms, the late form was considered timely - In 2004, MTRS advised members of Retirement Plus election exception for late-filed election forms by mail and email, sent a press release to Massachusetts Teachers Association, and posted information on MTRS website - Teacher did not fill out election form required by MTRS in instructions included with its February 2001 mailing or by MTRS's subsequent late Retirement Plus exceptions policy - Neither exception to Retirement Plus election filing deadline provided by St. 2004, § 397, nor MTRS late-filed election form exception, applied - No evidence that payroll officer mailed Retirement Plus election form completed by teacher to state

teachers' retirement board late - Importance of election form was clear, as was requirement that it be submitted to retirement board - No followup by teacher until personal financial advisor informed her in 2012 that her payroll stubs showed no 11 percent rate deduction from her wages for Retirement Plus - After meeting with MARS in July 2013 and being informed that she was not enrolled in Retirement Plus, teacher submitted completed Retirement Plus election form to MARS in 2014, thirteen years after the original statutory deadline for doing so - With none of the late filing exceptions provided by St. 2004, § 397 and the MTRS policy applicable, neither MTRS nor DALA could act contrary to specific mandates of M.G.L. c. 32, § 5(40(I), including the original July 2001 deadline for electing Retirement Plus on the required form.

Desiré v. Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System, Docket No. CR-14-200, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jul. 7, 2017).

Retirement Systems

—Membership

Local Retirement System

Improper termination of local retirement system membership - Termination for purpose of tabling accidental disability retirement application - Certified occupational therapist assistant employed by public school - Incorrect conclusion that employee should have been enrolled in Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System - Employee's assistant position excluded from statutory definition of "teacher" and from membership in MTRS under that system's regulations and policy.

Delorme v. Shrewsbury Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-540, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System

Teacher - M.G.L. c. 32, § 1 definition - Positions excluded from definition - "Assistant" position that involves some teaching but is not a full-fledged teaching position licensed by state Department of Education (or successor Department of Elementary and Secondary Education), such as teaching assistant, research assistant, tutor, instructor, instructional aide, or certified occupational therapist assistant**.**

Delorme v. Shrewsbury Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-540, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System membership - Membership based upon criteria specified by MTRS regulation, 807 C.M.R. § 4.02(1) (contractual agreement with school committee or board requiring not less than half-time service, and holding certificate granted by board of education or granted waiver pending certification by board of education), or upon MTRS administrative policy accepting, as MARS members, occupational therapists licensed by Board of Allied Health Professionals but not by state education department, and employed by Massachusetts public schools - Policy exception inapplicable to certified occupational therapist assistant who worked in public school but was not licensed or employed formally as occupational therapist, performed under occupational therapist's supervision, and performed work similar to that of teaching or research assistant, tutor, instructor, or other person who did not meet statutory definition of "teacher."

Delorme v. Shrewsbury Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-540, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

Prior erroneous enrollment of persons holding assistant positions in Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System - MTRS not bound to continue erroneous enrollment - Correction of error mandated by M.G.L. c. 32, § 20(5) - MTRS not estopped from declining to enroll others holding assistant positions, such as certified occupational therapist assistants.

Delorme v. Shrewsbury Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-540, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

—Rescission, Revocation or Termination of Membership

Improper termination of local retirement system membership - Termination for purpose of tabling accidental disability retirement application - Certified occupational therapist assistant employed by public school - Incorrect conclusion that employee should have been enrolled in Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System - Employee's assistant position excluded from statutory definition of "teacher" and from membership in MTRS under that system's regulations and policy.

Delorme v. Shrewsbury Retirement Bd., Docket No. CR-14-540, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Feb. 24, 2017).

—Retirement Board Regulations

Subject to approval by the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission

(PERAC), a local retirement board has authority, under M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(2)(b), to promulgate regulations fixing and determining how much service by a retirement system member in any calendar year is equivalent to a year of service, and in the case of service of any state official or any person elected by popular vote to a county or municipal office or position, the local retirement board "shall fix or determine the amount of creditable prior service, if any . . . ."

Stoneham Retirement Bd. v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-12-548, Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Because the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) has general superintendence of public employee retirement systems, it has power to approve and disapprove regulations proposed by local retirement boards, and in determining whether to sustain PERAC's disapproval of parts of a proposed retirement board's regulations, PERAC's interpretations of the state retirement law must be given deference where they are reasonable and not contrary to M.G.L. c. 32.

Stoneham Retirement Bd. v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-12-548, Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Proposed local retirement board regulation regarding creditable service earned by retirement system members as local elected officials - Decision sustained PERAC's disapproval of proposed regulation that would grant no creditable service to local elected officials (including town moderator and members of Board of Assessors) for any service rendered after July 1, 2009 if annual regular compensation was less than $5,000 - Reconsideration sought by PERAC to clarify decision as to creditable service earned by local elected officials who earned $5,000 or more annually - Modification of decision that would result from clarification PERAC sought denied - Administrative Magistrate had understood PERAC's position to be that elected officials were entitled to creditable service only for the time they actually worked, which was consistent with M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(a), as amended by St. 2009, c. 21, and was therefore entitled to deference - PERAC's clarified position that elected town officials should receive credit for each day they served in an elected office regardless of actual days worked was contrary to the 2009 amendment of M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(a), and therefore not entitled to deference - No basis in amended statute for granting creditable service for "time served" by simply occupying elected office - Argument that it was impractical for elected official to keep track of work performed and time worked rejected - Local retirement board's argument that it had power to determine annual creditable service for town moderator or member of Board of Assessors paid less than $5,000 annually regardless of time that these officials actually worked also rejected, as contrary to M.G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(b) - Rather than granting no credit for this service,

Board was required to treat elected official paid less than $5,000 annually as part-time position for retirement purposes, and apply the same regulations on creditable service for part-time work that it applied to other retirement system members.

Stoneham Retirement Bd. v. Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission, Docket No. CR-12-548, Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 3, 2017).

Termination Retirement Benefits

—**Ineligibility**

Termination for violations of laws, rules and regulations pertaining to employee's position - Summary decision.

Belliveau v State Bd. of Retirement, Docket No. CR-13-456, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 1, 2016).

VETERANS' BENEFITS

Benefits Under M.G.L. c. 115, Generally

Purpose and structure of Chapter 115 benefits - Needs-based form of public assistance to veterans - Financial assistance to indigent veterans and dependents to assist with expenses - Municipalities, through local veterans' services departments, process Chapter 115 veterans' benefits applications - Local veterans' services officer (VSO) for town or city in which veteran resides prepares "budget" showing veteran's financial needs in various categories such as shelter and fuel (108 C.M.R. § 5.01(3)), using standards prescribed by DVS regulations (at 108 C.M.R. § 5.02(2), Table 2) - Commonwealth, through Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), reviews applications and, once authorized, reimburses municipality for 75 percent of benefits paid (M.G.L. c. 115, § 6).

McConnell v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-16-275, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Determination of Benefits

—Calculating an Applicant's Needs-Based "Budget"

Applicant's Financial Need, Generally

[no entries]

Applicant Living Alone

[no entries]

Applicant and Spouse

[no entries]

Institutional and Transitional Housing Residents

Difference between institutional and transitional housing resident under DVS regulations is that an institutional resident receives shelter, food and other services at no cost from a facility such as a homeless shelter, hospital nursing home, Soldiers' Home or U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs residential home, while a transitional housing resident must pay for shelter or food and return to the same bed every night, although other services may be provided at no cost (108 C.M.R. § 2.02, definitions of "institution" and "transitional housing").

McConnell v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-16-275, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Chelsea Soldiers' Home, Domiciliary Section, Transitional Unit resident for over seven and a half years - Classification as "institutional" resident, which entitled veteran to Chapter 115 benefits payments at $179 per month, rather than as "transitional housing" resident eligible to receive higher benefits payments of $667 per month, affirmed upon veteran's appeal challenging classification - Originally classified by Chelsea Soldier's Home as institutional resident - ten dollar daily care charge waived due to limited income, with $8,192 in daily care charges waived over course of her long-term residence - Incorrect reclassification as institutional resident by DVS based upon recommendation of local veterans' services officer, and payment of higher benefits rate for five months until local VSO advised DVS of error - Evidence showed that transitional residents of Chelsea Soldiers' Home were required to participate in highly-structured program (including independent living skill development, mental and

substance abuse counseling, employment search assistance and housing search assistance) that returned them to community within two years, using VASH vouchers to obtain housing from local housing authority - No evidence that appealing veteran participated in this program - Evidence of intent to reside in institution for long-term, rather than transition to housing in local community - Veteran and now-deceased spouse she married while living at Chelsea Soldier's Home attempted, without success, to have Home create in-house married living accommodations, contrary to setup of buildings as separate men's and women's accommodations, residential domiciliary handbook provision prohibiting physical sexual contact in all areas of Home, Home's policy of moving transitional residents into local housing within two years, and Home's offer to locate couple in suitable local housing, which the couple declined based upon their preference not to relocate from Chelsea Soldier's Home and disrupt friendships with veteran friends at the Home - Request for transitional housing residence classification based upon stated need for funds to improve living standard in what was in effect permanent housing rather than move into independent housing outside of Soldier's Home, the purpose of transitional residence and classification.

McConnell v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-16-275, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

"Medical Only" Benefits

[no entries]

Dismissal of Veterans' Benefits Appeals

—Failure to Produce Documents

Dismissal for persisting failure to produce documents - Veterans' benefits appeal - Joint federal income tax return filed by veteran and his wife for year in question, including Schedule Cs for self-employment income, and LLC's operating agreement and membership list during that time - These documents were the best evidence of nature of LLC, whether its profits and losses were passed through to the wife and belonged to her alone, and whether the LLC's expenses in generating income were properly offset against the veteran's income, and were material in determining whether income veteran's spouse received from a limited liability company was hers alone or should be counted in determining whether veteran was financially eligible for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits during the time period in question in view of his income from all sources - Veteran's persisting failure to produce any of these documents despite being requested, and then ordered, to produce them justified dismissal of his appeal seeking reinstatement of his Chapter 115 benefits

payments, which were a form of needs-based public assistance.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Financial ineligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits by local veterans' services department, and placement into "refund status" (recoupment by offset against any future Chapter 115 benefits for which petitioner might become eligible) - Receiving benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question - Failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency erred in attributed full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses, and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - During DALA appeal, persisting failure by petitioner to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Continuing failure by benefits recipient to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of

Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

In determining whether income veteran's spouse received from a limited liability company was hers alone or should be counted in determining whether veteran was financially eligible for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits during the time period in question in view of his income from all sources, the basic documents, and best evidence, of the LLC's nature, whether its profits and losses were passed through to the wife and belonged to her alone, and whether the LLC's expenses in generating income were properly offset against the veteran's income were the LLC's operating agreement and membership list during that time, and, as to how the veteran and his wife treated LLC-related income and income-generating expenses, the best evidence was their federal income tax return including attached Schedule Cs for the year that included this time period, and veteran's persisting failure to produce any of these documents despite being requested, and then ordered, to produce them justified the dismissal of his appeal seeking reinstatement of his Chapter 115 benefits payments.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

In an adjudicatory appeal by a veteran seeking to reinstate M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits payments terminated because the veteran did not provide sufficient information regarding his income from all sources, including income from his own sole proprietorship and income-generating expenses that allegedly offset income his wife received from a limited liability company, Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services was not required to seek information regarding tax returns filed by veteran and spouse via a request by its commissioner to the Massachusetts Department of Revenue pursuant to M.G.L. c. 62C, § 21(b)(10) before it could request their production by the veteran, or seek an order compelling their disclosure.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

That veteran seeking by adjudicatory appeal to reinstate M.G.L. c. 115 benefits payments discontinued for insufficient proof of financial eligibility for them was also a certified public accountant who prepared joint federal tax return that he and his wife filed did not entitle him to withhold production of the return based upon accountant's privilege against disclosure of client confidences - Veteran was also the client, and could produce them in that capacity - Having declined to do so, his appeal was properly dismissed as a discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference that federal tax return and other documents regarding income from sole proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans'

benefits.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

Motion for reconsideration - Decision dismissing veterans' benefits appeal for lack of prosecution, and as discovery-related sanction based upon adverse inference that documents veteran refused to produce regarding income from sole proprietorship and wife's income from limited liability company would have shown his financial ineligibility for M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits - Reconsideration denied - Repetition of arguments made previously and rejected, without producing related documents veteran failed to produce earlier, including arguments that spouse's LLC-related income belonged to her alone and should not be counted in determining veteran's financial eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits, and that Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Benefits had no need for joint federal tax return that veteran and spouse filed for 2014 in order to determine whether he was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits during that year - Failure to identify clerical or mechanical error in the decision or significant factor that the DALA Administrative Magistrate overlooked in deciding appeal.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jun. 1, 2018).

—Lack of Prosecution

Financial ineligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits by local veterans' services department, and placement into "refund status" (recoupment by offset against any future Chapter 115 benefits for which petitioner might become eligible) - Receiving benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question - Failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency erred in attributing full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses , and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged DVS's remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - Persisting failure by

petitioner during DALA appeal to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Continuing failure by benefits recipient to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

Ordinary veterans' benefits under M.G.L. c. 115 - Veteran's adult dependent, not himself a veteran, and adjudicated incapacitated person with court-appointed guardians not including veteran - Denial based upon veteran's financial ineligibility for benefits, 108 C.M.R. § 5.06(3) - Appeal by veteran as representative of adult dependent and his mother - Failure by veteran to respond to order to clarify representational authority, or whether he intended to proceed with appeal or, instead, request that Department of Veterans' Services Commissioner issue him a waiver of his financial ineligibility for veterans' benefits - Failure to respond to Department's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution - Dismissal without prejudice to request for financial ineligibility waiver that veteran might file, to his dependent's continued receipt of "medical only" Chapter 115 benefits he may be receiving, or to any future determination of dependent's eligibility for ordinary Chapter 115 benefits if veteran applies to Commissioner for, and is issued, a financial ineligibility waiver.

Murphy v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-056, Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 20, 2017)

Eligibility for Veterans' Benefits

—Ineligible Service

Active Duty Training as Reservist in Any Branch of Armed Forces

In order to be eligible to receive M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits, an applicant must meet the eligibility requirements of M.G.L. c. 115, §§ 1 and 6A for active service in the United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force or Coast Guard; military service does not include active duty for training purposes in the Army or Air National Guard, or "active duty for training as a reservist in any branch of the Armed Forces."

Franco v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-636, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 20, 2018).

Where the petitioner's service as reflected on his discharge form (DD-214) consisted of active duty service training in the United States Air Force (between September 22, 1982 and February 18, 1983); following boot camp, completing a munitions systems specialist course and then separating from active duty with the Air Force and returning to the reserves; placement on active duty again in the Air Force from August 3, 1988 through March 27, 1989 during which he completed basic military training, flight screening, and completing a munitions systems specialist course, leadership school and academy of military science, all of which was active duty for training; and service limited to duty as a reservist between 1989 and 2010, his only active duty service was for training as a reservist in the Air Force; he was therefore ineligible for M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits per the eligibility requirements recited by M.G.L. c. 115, §§ 1and 6A and 108 C.M.R. § 3.02, and the denial of benefits by the Holyoke Veterans' Services Officer and the Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services would be affirmed by summary decision, as the nature of petitioner's active duty service as having been for training as a reservist was not the subject of a genuine or material factual dispute.

Franco v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-636, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 20, 2018).

—"Medical Only" Benefits

[no entries]

—Ordinary Benefits

Ordinary veterans' benefits under M.G.L. c. 115 - Veteran's adult dependent, not himself a veteran, and adjudicated incapacitated person with court-appointed guardians not including veteran - Denial based upon veteran's financial ineligibility for benefits, 108 C.M.R. § 5.06(3) - Appeal by veteran as representative of adult dependent and his mother - Failure by veteran to respond to order to clarify representational authority, or whether he intended to proceed with appeal or, instead, request that Department of Veterans' Services Commissioner issue him a waiver of his financial ineligibility for veterans' benefits - Failure to respond to Department's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution - Dismissal without prejudice to request for financial ineligibility waiver that veteran might file, to his dependent's continued receipt of "medical only" Chapter 115 benefits he may be receiving, or to any future determination of dependent's eligibility for ordinary Chapter 115 benefits if veteran applies to Commissioner for, and is issued, a financial ineligibility waiver.

Murphy v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-056, Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Oct. 20, 2017).

Overpayment of Benefits - "Refund Status"

Financial ineligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits by local veterans' services department, and placement into "refund status" (recoupment by offset against any future Chapter 115 benefits for which petitioner might become eligible) - Receiving benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question - Failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency erred in attributed full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses , and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - During DALA appeal, persisting failure by petitioner to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either

of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Continuing failure by benefits recipient to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

Amount of benefits overpayment modified on petitioner's motion for "clarification" of DALA decision, treated as motion for reconsideration - Decision sustained termination of M.G.L c. 115 veterans' benefits and placement into refund status in an amount based upon overpayment of veterans' benefits for which he was not financially eligible, as a result of failure to disclose income earned painting a house, and the value of assets he did not disclose (antique automobile)s - Modification of refund status amount denied as to unreported income from house painting job - Claim of having performed work without compensation unsupported by evidence - Assertion that one of the antique automobiles was compensation in kind for housepainting also unsupported by evidence - No written contract for such payment, and no testimony from homeowner, offered to support assertion - Agreed-upon payment for painting house was $1,700, and petitioner did not report this income to local veterans' services officer, as required by 108 C.M.R. § 8.05, or produce documents disclosing it, as required by 108 C.M.R. § 6.01 - That income made petitioner "over income" (over the income he was permitted to have and still qualify for M.G.L. c. 115 benefits) by $797.39 - However, refund status amount should not have been increased based upon value of antique automobiles shown by NADA vehicle price guides - Actual appraisal of automobiles petitioner obtained was more reliable evidence of these undisclosed assets than NADA guides - Appraiser actually inspected vehicles and valued them based upon the poor condition he noted - Total appraised value of vehicles ($3,650) was less than the $5,000 non-excludable asset limitation that DVS established, and therefore did not support increasing the benefits overpayment amount petitioner received.

Morris v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-130, Ruling on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Jan. 19, 2018).

Overpayment and refund status raised for first time by Department of Veterans' Services

during appeal by veteran resident of Chelsea Soldiers' Home challenging her classification as institutional resident rather than as transitional housing resident eligible for higher monthly Chapter 115 benefits payments - Five-month period during which veteran was mistakenly reclassified as transitional housing resident and paid benefits at higher rate - No notice given to veteran of placement into refund status for overpayment of Chapter 115 benefits, as required by 108 C.M.R. § 8.06(2) - No opportunity, as a result, for veteran to request a waiver of refund by local veteran's services officer based upon financial hardship (108 C.M.R. § 8.06(2)), or, if request were denied, to appeal further to DVS and then to DALA (108 C.M.R. §§ 8.07(2), (3)) - No evidence that DVS or local veteran's services officer ordered veteran placed in refund status for the overpayment in question - No reference by DVS hearing officer to refund status in decision of prior appeal to agency regarding institutional resident classification - DVS request that DALA order placement into refund status if it upheld institutional resident classification was therefore premature, and DALA was without jurisdiction to grant it.

McConnell v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-16-275, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 11, 2017).

Failure of veteran receiving M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits to look for work - Placement into refund status for overpayment - Receipt of duplicative benefits - Rental assistance payments received while rent was being paid by another source - Summary decision.

Brelsford v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-594, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 9, 2016).

Termination of Benefits

Financial ineligibility for needs-based Chapter 115 benefits - Termination of petitioners' M.G.L. c. 115 state veterans' benefits by local veterans' services department, and placement into "refund status" (recoupment by offset against any future Chapter 115 benefits for which petitioner might become eligible) - Receiving benefits to which petitioner was not financially entitled during four-month period in question - Failure to report income from all other sources- Income from LLC to spouse deposited in benefits bank account held by benefits recipient or jointly with spouse - On appeal to Massachusetts Department of Veterans' Services (DVS), assertion by petitioner that local agency erred in attributed full amount of LLC revenue passed through to his spouse as income without offsetting LLC's expenses , and that doing so resulted in net loss rather than income making petitioner financially ineligible for Chapter 115 benefits - No showing that petitioner or spouse were members of LLC to whom that entity's profits and losses were passed through - DVS hearing officer vacated benefits termination and placement into refund status, and remanded matter to local veterans' services department and Veterans' Services Officer (VSO) to determine petitioner's legitimate business expenses and, after offsetting them against LLC-related revenue, whether petitioner was financially eligible for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal to DALA by petitioner challenged remand and sought determination that he was financially eligible for benefits based upon net losses sustained from

income derived from LLC and petitioner's own sole proprietorship - During DALA appeal, persisting failure by petitioner to produce documents requested by DVS related to income from other sources, including federal tax returns showing whether Chapter 115 benefits recipient or spouse was LLC member to whom LLC passed-through profits and losses, whether benefits recipient or spouse treated income from LLC as partnership income, and which expenses either of them claimed as offsets to income from LLC - Continuing failure by benefits recipient to move for protective order as to DVS's document request, with supporting authority, despite being ordered to do so - Failure to produce documents impeded DALA's ability to adjudicate eligibility for Chapter 115 benefits during time in question, as well as ability of DVS and local Veteran's Services Officer to determine financial eligibility for benefits - Adverse inference properly drawn in circumstances that documents, if produced, would have shown petitioner's financial ineligibility for Chapter 115 benefits - Appeal dismissed in part as sanction for failure to produce documents and adverse inference drawn as result, and in part for lack of prosecution based upon petitioner's failure to move for protective order, respond to motion by DVS to compel production of documents, and DVS's motion to dismiss - Termination of petitioner's Chapter 115 benefits payments and placement into refund status for full amount of benefits paid to him during time in question ordered, effective immediately.

Britton v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-203, Decision - Order of Dismissal (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 11, 2018).

Termination of M.G.L. c. 115 veteran's benefits - Lack of cooperation by failure to document current residence (*e.g.*, with a current lease or rent receipt) or, thus, eligibility to receive benefits through local veterans' services department - Appeal to DVS (which sustained benefits termination but waived recoupment of benefits paid to veteran after notice of termination was issued) and then to Division of Administrative Law Appeals - Claim that benefits termination was void for improper mailing (to prior residential address that was no longer valid due to veteran's eviction, rather than to veteran's post office box number) and for issuance by a person allegedly without authority to do so (local DVS's manager of benefits and services rather than by local veterans' services officer, notwithstanding notice was issued on local DVS letterhead with veterans' services officer's name printed at top) - Forfeiture of defective benefits termination claim in circumstances presented and as a result of veteran's conduct, including degree to which he participated without objection in resolving the DALA appeal by agreement, failure to object to draft Order of Dismissal based upon agreement sent to parties by DALA Administrative Magistrate to parties for their review, belated reassertion of claim after Order of Dismissal was issued when none of the parties objected to the draft, and veteran's request, in seeking reconsideration, that Administrative Magistrate approve payment to him of additional Chapter 115 benefits to which he was not entitled under DVS regulations or under the agreement resolving the matter.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Dec. 1, 2017).

Termination of M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits payments for failure to document current residence - Agreement by parties resolving veteran's appeal, comprising handwritten, signed provisions and amplifications to which parties stipulated during prehearing conference - Continued Cambridge, Massachusetts residence established sufficiently by veteran's temporary residence at Salvation Army men's shelter in Cambridge six days at a time, resumed after several days at a Watertown apartment maintained by another organization - Residence arrangement complied with number of consecutive days the Cambridge shelter allowed for being furnished with a bed, and was likely to improve veteran's chance of obtaining Cambridge inclusionary housing for which he had applied - Although not currently financially eligible to receive M.G.L. c. 115 veteran's benefits, veteran could reapply for them if he signed a lease and incurred rental expenses, or if he incurred medical expenses not reimbursed by other sources - Waiver of any obligation veteran may have had to refund benefits paid to him after local veterans' services department terminated Chapter 115 benefits payments remains in place and applies to benefit payment issued to him while his appeal was pending - No objection by parties to draft order of dismissal clarifying terms of agreement - Veteran's appeal dismissed as moot based upon agreement.

Welch v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-17-290, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Aug. 31, 2017).

Termination of M.G.L. c. 115 veterans' benefits payments for failure to look for work - Duplicative benefits - Rental assistance payments received while rent was being paid by another source - Placement into refund status for overpayment - Summary decision.

Brelsford v. Dep't of Veterans' Services, Docket No. VS-15-594, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 9, 2016).

WAGE AND HOUR LAWS

Civil Penalties

—Intentional Violations

Painting company - Intentional failure to pay overtime wages - Second or subsequent offense - Citation demanding payment of restitution and civil penalty ($7,500) affirmed - Summary decision - No response to Fair Labor Division's motion for sufficiently made and supported summary decision motion showing no genuine dispute as to occurrence of violations, consideration of statutory penalty factors in determining whether to issue civil penalty, and applicable statutory maximum penalty amount for second or subsequent wage and hour violations ($25,000).

Farh v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-15-107, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 12, 2016)

—Non-intentional Violations

Failure to pay wages timely - Failure to produce payroll records for inspection by Fair Labor Division - Landscaping business - Employees paid mostly by cash in envelopes - Failure to pay wages in timely manner - Checks drawn on company account made out to cash, or to one employee who cashed them and paid other employees - Employee claims for unpaid wages based upon personal recollection, with little or no written record backup - Employer payroll records not produced timely for inspection following Fair Labor Division demand - Fair Labor Division citations to landscaping business owner's now-defunct corporation for failure to pay wages timely ($12,089 restitution, and $2,500 civil penalty) and failure to furnish payroll records for inspection ($3,500 civil penalty) - Documents in response to payroll records request produced late, at prehearing conference of employer's appeal (ledger showing wage payments to employees not kept contemporaneously and prepared, instead, for DALA hearing; handwritten timesheets kept by owner with varying company names or name of employer omitted; check records with owner's notations reflecting source of cash used to pay employees, such as payment from homeowners and businesses for landscaping services) - Citations treated as issued to landscaping business owner, who was corporation's sole officer, consistent with proof at hearing, including employees' understanding of who employer was, responsibility for wage payments imposed by M.G.L. c. 149, § 148, and persons treated as employer by statute - Citation and civil penalty for failure to produce payroll records sustained, primarily because employer did not keep wage and hour records in good order that could have been timely produced upon demand by Fair Labor Division - Difficulty determining unpaid wages for each employee due to cash payments, some via another employer given cash to distribute to others - Total restitution amount modified from $12,089 to $7,144.25, reflecting

DALA administrative magistrate's recalculation of wage payments based upon credibility evaluations of written evidence and testimony at hearing by employees and employer - Penalty for failure to pay wages timely modified - Absent evidence showing how it was calculated, penalty for nonpayment of wages modified from $2,500 to $1,477 in proportion with the modified restitution amount (59 percent of the amount demanded by the citation).

Nessralla v. Fair Labor Div., Docket Nos. LB-14-387, LB-14-388, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 18, 2017).

Failure to pay proper overtime rate - Failure to keep true and accurate payroll records - Restitution - Paycheck deductions for lunch breaks employees were denied or that did not occur - Civil penalties - Non-intentional violations - Computation - Penalty amounts substantially lower than maximum allowed by statute.

Castellano v. Fair Labor Div., Docket Nos. LB-15-224, LB-15-225 and LB-15-226, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 18, 2016).

Failure to Pay Wages Timely

Cleaning services business - Failure to pay wages timely to employees - Citation for $8,613 restitution and a $2,000 civil penalty - Petitioners (incorporated cleaning business, its president and its treasurer), the cleaning contractor for a supermarket, entered into sub-contract agreement with another cleaning company (PCM) in April 2014 to clean the supermarket, which included (a) monthly $20,000 service fee payment by contractor to subcontractor for previous month's cleaning service, with subcontractor responsible for payment of all applicable government taxes and income taxes, (b) no authority given to subcontractor to delegate subcontract the work in question unless contractor agreed, and (c) subcontractor's agreement not to induce employees, other subcontractors or cleaning specialists to leave the contractor's employment or entice them away from the contractor - Although petitioners issued checks to subcontractor between April and November 2014, only two checks were for $20,000 (for, respectively, May 2014 and June 2014), and others were for smaller amounts, which according to petitioners' hearing testimony were made so subcontractor could pay the employees in question, as was the $20,000 check paid on May 16, 2014 for work to be performed in June 2014 - Petitioners authorized subcontractor to hire one of the employees in question for several days in May 2014, and petitioner's treasurer paid this employee with a personal check - Petitioners authorized the subcontractor to employ two of the other employees in question to work in June and July 2014, and paid both with personal checks for work performed during that time period - Petitioner's treasurer denied hiring these employees and claimed that the subcontractor hired them - Cleaning services business experienced financial difficulties during summer of 2014 - Supermarket parent company was dissatisfied with PCM's work and discontinued the cleaning contract with the petitioners in late 2014, and the petitioners learned that the person with whom they had entered into the PCM subcontract did not own PCM and

had absconded, possibly to Brazil - Five employees filed non-payment of wage complaints with OAG Fair Labor Division in December 2014, and Division issued petitioners a citation seeking restitution for unpaid wages and a civil penalty in July 2016, which petitioners appealed - Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proving that the individuals in question were not employees or that citation was issued erroneously - Subcontract agreement between petitioners and PCM did not impose any duty on PCM to pay the employees in question or any of petitioners' employees, did not specify that the $20,000 per month fee the petitioners was to be used to pay any of the employees in question, specifically forbade PCM from enticing petitioners' employees away or interfering with their employment relationships with petitioners, and did not allow further subcontracting unless petitioners consented - Petitioners authorized PCM to employee several of the employees in question and paid them with personal checks - Evidence allowed reasonable inference that petitioners considered the employees in question to be their employees, rather than employees of PCM - Citation sustained as to both restitution amount (less partial restitution payment amounts already made under stipulation following prehearing conference), and civil penalty amount.

Santos v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-16-361, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Sept. 15, 2017).

Landscaping business - Employees paid mostly by cash in envelopes - Failure to pay wages in timely manner - Checks drawn on company account made out to cash, or to one employee who cashed them and paid other employees - Employee claims for unpaid wages based upon personal recollection, with little or no written record backup - Employer payroll records not produced timely for inspection following Fair Labor Division demand - Fair Labor Division citations to landscaping business owner's now-defunct corporation for failure to pay wages timely ($12,089 restitution, and $2,500 civil penalty) and failure to furnish payroll records for inspection ($3,500 civil penalty) - Documents in response to payroll records request produced late, at prehearing conference of employer's appeal (ledger showing wage payments to employees not kept contemporaneously and prepared, instead, for DALA hearing; handwritten timesheets kept by owner with varying company names or name of employer omitted; check records with owner's notations reflecting source of cash used to pay employees, such as payment from homeowners and businesses for landscaping services) - Citations treated as issued to landscaping business owner, who was corporation's sole officer, consistent with proof at hearing, including employees' understanding of who employer was, responsibility for wage payments imposed by M.G.L. c. 149, § 148, and persons treated as employer by statute - Citation and civil penalty for failure to produce payroll records sustained, primarily because employer did not keep wage and hour records in good order that could have been timely produced upon demand by Fair Labor Division - Difficulty determining unpaid wages for each employee due to cash payments, some via another employer given cash to distribute to others - Total restitution amount modified from $12,089 to $7,144.25, reflecting DALA administrative magistrate's recalculation of wage payments based upon credibility evaluations of written evidence and testimony at hearing by employees and employer - Penalty for failure to pay wages timely modified - Absent evidence showing how it was calculated, penalty for

nonpayment of wages modified from $2,500 to $1,477 in proportion with the modified restitution amount (59 percent of the amount demanded by the citation).

Nessralla v. Fair Labor Div., Docket Nos. LB-14-387, LB-14-388, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 18, 2017).

Unresolvable issues of witness and evidence credibility - Appealed civil citation for unintentional failure to make timely wage payments to employee vacated as erroneously issued - Demand for restitution ($5,100) and civil penalty ($1,100) - Salesperson - Performance of business development and sales work at market research business services company, primarily through via email and telephone contacts - Same pay as business owner ($25 per hour), with owner proposing (but not committing) to phase in employee as partner, with increasing percentage of ownership as business achieved specified net revenue benchmarks and maintained that net revenue level for three consecutive months - Following last two paychecks ($3,000 for 120 hours of work, and $2,000 for 80 hours of work), no pay for two-month period when employee was absent from office, including one month for medical reasons, without notice of absence to owner, who was away at time - Termination of employment upon owner's return for failure to generate business - Complaint filed with Fair Labor Division claimed $12,000 in unpaid wages for 10-week period without disclosing $2,000 payment - Unpaid wage restitution claim reduced by Division to $5,100, following audit of business payroll records, with eight hours of work per day at $25/hour rate credited for any day on which employee sent email from home on her business email account - Dispute as to whether employee could, or actually did, work from home, and whether employee was commission-only salesperson whose hourly pay rate was drawn against commissions earned, and whether employee was entitled to full day's pay credit for any day on which she sent email using business email account - Credibility issues regarding unpaid wage claim and computation not resolved by hearing testimony or exhibits - Emails not in evidence - Email log created by Fair Labor Division inspector not contemporaneous with alleged days of emailing - Employee's inability to recall with specificity what work she performed while away from office during two month period - Absence of telephone logs showing whether employee followed up emails from home with telephone calls to business clients and customers - Insufficient evidence that employee worked on days she was absent from office or, thus, that any particular amount of wages was unpaid and owed to employee, or that citation could be modified to demand different restitution or penalty amounts.

McNeil v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-16-211, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 22, 2017).

Lack of prosecution dismissal of appeal challenging citation for failure to pay wages timely, following warnings of this sanction - Failure to appear for status conference scheduled by prior order - Ignoring several prior orders directing petitioners to specify grounds on which they challenged citation, identify their hearing witnesses and the subject of their expected direct

testimony, and identify their hearing exhibits - Petitioners' failure to identify, on multiple occasions, their authorized representative or notify DALA or the Fair Labor Division of changes of address to which the petitioners were requesting that filings, or notices, orders and decisions issued, were to be mailed, and failure to respond to subsequent order to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed - Appealed citation, including restitution amount and civil penalty, made final.

Chiles v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-14-439, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Mar. 13, 2017).

Overtime Wages

Aircraft cleaning services company - Failure to pay proper overtime rate - Failure to keep true and accurate payroll records - Restitution - Paycheck deductions for lunch breaks employees were denied or that did not occur - Civil penalties - Non-intentional violations - Computation - Penalty amounts substantially lower than maximum allowed by statute.

Castellano v. Fair Labor Div., Docket Nos. LB-15-224, LB-15-225 and LB-15-226, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 18, 2016).

Painting company - Willful failure to pay overtime wages - Second or subsequent offense - Citation demanding payment of restitution and civil penalty ($7,500) affirmed - Summary decision - No response to Fair Labor Division's motion for sufficiently made and supported summary decision motion showing no genuine dispute as to occurrence of violations, consideration of statutory penalty factors in determining whether to issue civil penalty, and applicable statutory maximum penalty amount for second or subsequent wage and hour violations ($25,000).

Farh v. Fair Labor Div., Docket No. LB-15-107, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., July 12, 2016)

Payroll Records Maintenance and Production

Aircraft cleaning services company - Failure to pay proper overtime rate - Failure to keep true and accurate payroll records - Restitution - Paycheck deductions for lunch breaks employees were denied or that did not occur - Civil penalties - Non-willful violations - Computation - Penalty amounts substantially lower than maximum allowed by statute.

Castellano v. Fair Labor Div., Docket Nos. LB-15-224, LB-15-225 and LB-15-226, Decision (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Nov. 18, 2016).

WATERSHED PROTECTION ACT VARIANCES

Applicability of Variance Requirement

Both the Massachusetts Watershed Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 92A½, and the Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) Regulations, *see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2, prohibit any alteration within portions of watersheds that lie within 200 feet of the bank of a tributary or surface waters or within 400 feet of the bank of a reservoir.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Construction of proposed single-family house with paved driveway, septic system and private well on 2.5-acre lot located mostly within 200 feet of Edson Pond, a reservoir in Rutland, Massachusetts, and within the Wachusett Reservoir watershed, required a variance from the Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) issued pursuant to the Watershed Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 92A½ and 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Prerequisites for Variance

Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR)'s regulations, 313 C.M.R. § 11.01 *et seq*., (1) do not require that applicant seeking Watershed Protection Act variance from statutory and regulatory prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir, in order to construct proposed single-family residence and septic system in such area, show that it had obtained final septic system approval by local health department or Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), or other necessary approvals or permits for proposed work; and (2) state specifically that they do not preempt or preclude more stringent protection of areas governed by Watershed Protection Act by other statutes, ordinances, bylaws or regulations, *see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.08. Therefore, although DEP letter to DCR stating that proposed single family home's septic system for which applicant sought Watershed Protection Act variance also needed local approval, as well as a variance that DEP would not issue unless applicant showed that denying it would be "manifestly unjust" by depriving it of substantially all beneficial use of its property, alerted applicant to significant roadblock in its effort to ultimately obtain all necessary approvals

needed to build the project, it did not automatically preclude DCR from issuing Watershed Protection Act variance for proposed work, and was not a sufficient ground for granting DCR a summary decision affirming its variance denial.

> *Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC*, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Standards and Presumptions

Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) may grant variance from statutory and regulatory prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir, *see* Watershed Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 92A½ § 5(a) and 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2, if it "specifically finds that owing to circumstances relating to the soil conditions, slope, or topography of the land affected by such Structures, Uses or Activities, desirable relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good," 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a), although DCR presumes that granting such a variance would be contrary to achieving the Act's purposes.

> *Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC*, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

DCR regulations (313 C.M.R. § 11.01 *et seq*.) do not require that applicant seeking Watershed Protection Act variance from statutory and regulatory prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir demonstrate that it had obtained final septic system approval or other necessary approvals or permits for proposed work - Regulations also provide that they do not preempt or preclude more stringent protection of areas governed by Watershed Protection Act by other statutes, ordinances, bylaws or regulations (*see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.08)

> *Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC*, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Presumption that granting a variance from statutory and regulatory prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir would be contrary to achieving the purposes of the Watershed Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 92A½,

may be rebutted only by the submission of credible evidence by applicant that the variance may be granted "without substantial detriment to the public good and without impairment of water quality in the Watersheds." *See* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(b).

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Variance Denial

—Summary Decision Denied

Watershed Protection Act variance denial - Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) - Proposed construction of single-family residence and septic system within 200 feet of pond within Wachusett Reservoir watershed - Appeal challenging denial of applicant's request for variance from prohibition of alteration within portions of watershed within 200 feet of bank of tributary or surface waters or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir recited by Watershed Protection Act, *see* M.G.L. c. 92A½ § 5(a) and DCR Regulations, *see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2 - Argument by DCR that it was nearly impossible for new construction within the 200-foot "primary protection zone" of reservoir to occur without substantial detriment to public good and without impairing water quality in the watershed, and that no such variance had been granted in the Act's 25-year history, did not state basis for summary decision in DCR's favor - As nearly impossible as obtaining a variance for a new lot in a primary protection zone might appear, DCR's variance regulations did not preclude an applicant from trying.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Motion by Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) for summary decision in appeal challenging its denial of a Watershed Protection Act variance denied - Proposed single family residential construction - Alleged project futility (inability to obtain other necessary approvals or permits) - Letter from Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) stating that proposed single family home's septic system for which applicant sought Watershed Protection Act variance also needed local approval, as well as a variance that DEP would not issue unless applicant showed that denying it would be "manifestly unjust" because it would deprive lot owner of substantially all beneficial use of the property - Insufficient ground for summary decision as matter of law - DCR regulations (313 C.M.R. § 11.01 *et seq*.) do not require that applicant seeking Watershed Protection Act variance from statutory and regulatory prohibition of any alteration, or the generation, storage, disposal or discharge of pollutants, within portions of watershed lying

within 200 feet of bank of tributary or within 400 feet of bank of reservoir demonstrate that it had obtained final septic system approval or other necessary approvals or permits for proposed work - Regulations also provide that they do not preempt or preclude more stringent protection of areas governed by Watershed Protection Act by other statutes, ordinances, bylaws or regulations (*see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.08) - Although DEP letter alerted applicant to significant roadblock in its effort to ultimately obtain all necessary approvals needed to build the project, this did not automatically preclude DCR from issuing Watershed Protection Act variance, and was not a sufficient reason to grant DCR summary decision affirming its denial of a Watershed Protect Act variance.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Motion by Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) for summary decision in appeal challenging its denial of a Watershed Protection Act variance denied - Proposed single family residential construction - Genuine and material factual issues precluding summary decision - Report prepared by applicant's consultants responding to grounds DCR asserted for denying variance - DCR's assertions that (1) although report addressed proposed project's impact on stormwater and Department of Environmental Protection's Stormwater Management Standards, it did not address other impacts of project, including "insurmountable" short and long-term impacts on water quality within the 200-foot primary protection zone of reservoir where project would be built; and (2) site's slope, topography and soils were not particularly favorable for granting a variance, did not show the absence of genuine, material factual issues - Applicant's appeal responded to each ground DCR gave for denying a variance (for example, it asserted that the slope at the site was less than 5% and that the soils were ideal for septic systems, and that installing a residential well would take only three days and would be carried out with safety precautions in place, thereby minimizing effects of constructing well within 30 feet of waterbody using heavy equipment) - Competing positions as to project's projected impact on watershed and water quality raised genuine, material factual issues that could not be resolved by summary decision.

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).

Applicant appealing denial by Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) of Watershed Protection Act variance for proposed single family residence and septic system construction on lot within 200 feet of pond within Wachusett Reservoir watershed was not entitled to decision vacating denial and issuing the requested variance

on ground that DCR did not timely forward its appeal and hearing request to Division of Administrative Law Appeals, and did not timely file an answer to the appeal - DCR regulations did not prescribe such remedy for the agency's delays - Vacating denial and issuing variance based upon these delays would undercut stringent criteria for variance prescribed by Watershed Protection Act (*see* M.G.L. c. 92A½ § 5(a)), and by the DCR regulations (*see* 313 C.M.R. § 11.04(3)(a)2).

Dep't of Conservation and Recreation v. J and K Ventures, LLC, Docket No. DCR-17-1035, Ruling on Motion for Summary Decision and Motion to Dismiss (Mass. Div. of Admin. Law App., Apr. 26, 2018).