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COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT Complaint No. 2000-110 et seq

In the Matter of Investigation of: :
The Honorable Maria I. Lopez, :
Associate Justice, Superior Court :
Department :

BEFORE: Hearing Officer E. George Daher, Chief Justice (Ret.)

Harvey Chopp, Clerk

APPEARANCES:

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99 Summer Street, Suite 1800,
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Maria I. Lopez.

held at:
Edward W. Brooke Courthouse
24 New Chardon Street
Boston, Massachusetts
February 28, 2003
9:39 a.m.

(Jane M. Williamson, Registered Merit Reporter)

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Good morning. 3 Please accept my apologies for being a little 4 late. 5 MR. WARE: Good morning, Your Honor. 6 MR. EGBERT: Good morning, Your Honor. 7 Your Honor, my purpose here today is to not rehash the hundreds and hundreds of pages of briefs 8 9 that have been filed in this case. I think that 10 they are extensive. I hope that they have provided 11 to the Court information helpful in garnering the 12 evidence and looking for law. 13 My intention really is to highlight some 14 matters that are more likely left for oral argument 15 in person and frankly to encourage the Court to ask any questions of me that the Court might see fit, 16 17 because after some 600-odd pages of briefing, there 18 may be questions, either through inartfulness or 19 through simply things left out. 20 Let me also say to you and to Judge Lopez 21 and to tell you that this is not only an important 22 moment, it is a momentous moment, and it is one 23 which I take with the highest degree of

responsibility and trust that Judge Lopez has placed

in me, and the Court, and I hope and intend to act upon that trust.

The backdrop of what brings us here however can't be escaped and I think needs some discussion. There have been recently discussions in the media or otherwise that this case somehow has affected or impacted the Judicial Conduct Commission in such a way as to bust their budget or seek supplemental budgets and the like. And there were public intimations by the Commission that this is a bizarre consequence of the statute and that most judges settle and they never anticipated such a lengthy hearing. That publicity generated just before this argument struck me as something less than coincidental.

But you should know and the record of this case is crystal clear that Judge Lopez is not the one who did not seek settlement. Judge Lopez appeared before the Commission, as you know, and you admitted the testimony and you heard evidence concerning those proceedings. She appeared before the Commission at the time and attempted to resolve this matter in a manner which she felt and her counsel felt was then appropriate to save an

extraordinary expense to the Commonwealth, an extraordinary expense to her and her family, and to try to put a context to the allegations here. And that's the testimony that was brought before you by the Commission.

At no time did the Commission ever even make a proposal, contrary to virtually all prior Commission proceedings. The Commission never proposed a resolution to counsel or to Judge Lopez. The Commission never sent a proposal or discussed a proposal. So we're here not from any lack of trying to go through the process in a less expensive, less arduous and, quite frankly, less insulting manner.

So if there is anyone out there who is crying about the money that's been expended, believe me, it was not brought on by Judge Lopez. And those who ask should ask themselves in this system, just as starting out where we are, how many judges can fight back? How many judges, when charges are brought like this, can expend the time, the energy, the emotion and the money to fight back? Judges aren't high-salaried employees in the Commonwealth. Judges' pay in the Commonwealth is low by comparison and do not permit the kind of economic war, so to

speak, that this takes.

So to the extent that Judge Lopez has opted to get into this fight, has opted to speak out to what she believes in, has opted to spend her personal funds and her family funds and to expose her family, her children, her emotions and the very essence of her life in these public proceedings should not be a slap to Judge Lopez but should, by every judge in this Commonwealth and by every citizen in this Commonwealth, stand up and say, well good, when you're charged with something like that, it's fair to fight back and it's fair to fight back hard.

The Commission through its pleadings in this case has concocted a new form of judicial misconduct: fighting back, fighting for your rights. The papers in this case were so shocking to me, when I received them, for the Commission to urge upon you that, for a judge to have the gumption to stand up to their charges is contempt of the Commission, for a judge and its counsel to cross examine witnesses, present evidence and point out the deficiencies in the Commission's case, should be seen by you as contempt of the Commission.

 I suggest to you that those statements by the Commission are in contempt of the system. They are in contempt of everything that we are taught to believe in this system of justice.

The statute requires due process. Due process means just what it says: the ability to present evidence, to cross examine witnesses, all of the witnesses, to confront the witnesses and confront, in essence, your accusers or adversaries. That's what was done here. She's entitled to no less than every other citizen. A judge does not put on the robe and throw away the Constitution.

The manner and venom and stridency of the pleadings in this case by the Commission must exhibit to this Hearing Officer that there is something more at work here than the facts that were brought before you.

I wonder where any body that is charged in this system that we have here, where the Judicial Conduct Commission ultimately must decide this case -- you are merely sending it back to them with your findings and rulings. They are the ones charged, as you are, but in the subsequent event, of being fair, impartial, with open minds and open ears

to the matter of Judge Maria Lopez. And yet they found themselves in a position of filing documents before you telling you that the Commission on Judicial Conduct says that she should be removed from the bench on these facts and on these circumstances, that the Commission on Judicial Conduct calls her a liar in misrepresentative filings before you, that the Commission on Judicial Conduct alleges and does this and does that and does this and does that. It is inappropriate, it is wrong.

I don't know what it would do to any future of this matter, should it have a future, but it should not impact you, because you are in fact the arbiter and the decider of these facts.

Throughout the Commission's filings in this case they have asked you to disregard the burden of proof. They have asked you to speculate. They have asked you to infer -- inference upon inference upon inference. They have asked you to take every act and statement of Judge Lopez and treat it as a lie and every act and statement of every other witness in contravention and call it the truth, without any reference to the facts or the statements or the

context in which they were put.

But the burden of proof which you must apply is clear and convincing evidence, strong, positive and free from doubt. This is not some minor affair. These are important affairs in the lives of the judiciary, this judge.

Around and surrounding that burden, and this is something that I think has been missed in virtually all of the pleadings in this case, is the statutory exemption, preclusion for review of certain matters by the Judicial Conduct Commission.

And I think reading the statute is imperative. It's Chapter 211 C, Section 2. "In absence of fraud, corrupt motive, bad faith or clear indications that conduct violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, no action may be taken for making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, applying the law as the judge understands it." And probably more telling is the last line: "The Commission proceedings shall not be a substitute for an appeal."

This statute basically acts as a backstop. More than a backstop, it acts as a shield. I don't want to liken it to the presumption of innocence in

a criminal case, because it never leaves. The presumption of innocence in a case can be overcome by certain quantums of proof. This never leaves.

And why? Well, the reason is because litigants often leave the courtroom angry. Litigants often see judges as having done them wrong in one fashion or another, have not done as they asked, have taken their property, taken their money, taken their children, taken their liberty. And emotions run high in instances like that.

And so the Legislature wanted to make clear and did make clear that the Commission is not here to second guess judicial decisions. It is not here to say, I would have done it differently. It is not here to say, well, that judge allowed in that piece of evidence; that was erroneous. None of that is before you, nor can it be.

And yet that is the primary argument throughout the Commission's pleadings here. We've spent hours and hours of testimony, and we will spend pages and pages of transcript, with the Commission arguing to you that Judge Lopez should or shouldn't have relied on a particular document, should or shouldn't have relied on a particular

piece of testimony, should or shouldn't have given a certain amount of weight or less weight or more weight to particular matters. Nice for a law school course. It's nice for a judging course. But it has no place here. It simply does not.

 $\,$ And so I will come back to these precepts during my argument so that we may try to put them in perspective.

I also, as our brief did, Judge, will discuss these matters chronologically, but I want to step aside for a minute. The history of the judicial conduct cases is that singular instances, events, of judicial actions generally, unless they are of the most corrupt sort of bribe taking and the like, which frankly and fortunately are few and far between, but kind of singular events of a judge's conduct are rarely, if ever, seen as disciplinable in a public forum. They most often are rectified by an apology or by a, quote, letter of admonition or the like.

And recognizing that fact and deciding that they wanted to turn up the heat on this case in a manner which has never been done before, the Commission charged this matter as six counts of all

the same stuff, calling it a different name, tweaking it in a different forum, but all the same event; today this statement about suburbs -- and I'll get to all of this -- is a violation of this canon, and on Page 20 that same statement is a violation of this canon, when they're probably not a violation at all.

But my point is this: The manner in which this case has been charged has been an attempt to take a singular event in these lives of the Horton case and parse it and cut it and chop it and chop it and at the end call it a pattern. And by calling it a pattern, the Commission says, Aha, see, now there's a pattern. Now we can step up the volume in this case, and as they urged upon you, argue that removal from the bench is an appropriate sanction in this case.

That should be not permitted. It has no meaning, and it's unprecedented in the law.

The Commission asked you, as I've indicated, to find that every time that Judge Lopez made a partially inconsistent statement in 15 or 20 hours of testimony, find it's a lie; every time that she expanded upon an answer when asked a question on

one time and asked to explain another, if the explanation went beyond the limited answer given, find it a lie; every time that you can take a word and twist it in one paragraph and twist it again in another paragraph, find it a lie.

Well, I say to you, Judge, that that's not what you do. But how do you come into this picture and try to figure out in fact what is going on here, who is the liar and who isn't? What are the lies and what aren't? What were people's conduct motivated by? What was actually going on here? And that's what I hope to discuss with you.

But when I discuss it with you, I want you to know that I'm discussing Judge Maria Lopez, not some unknown person who comes before you without background and not some person who comes before you with bad background.

Maria Lopez comes to you with a lifetime of public service dedicated to the disadvantaged, the underrepresented, the poor in our society. That's what she was before she was a judge. That's what every inch of her professional career was devoted to. You can't throw that away. That isn't a plea for mercy. It is a plea that this Court, in judging

this human being, judge her on who she is when you make your inferences about what she was thinking or doing, because who we are is a big part of what we do.

When she did these things, when she joined these enterprises, such as Boston Legal Services for the poor, the Department of the Attorney General's Civil Rights Division, the Office of Refugees and Immigrants as general counsel, she did that as an articulate, bright, attractive Spanish-speaking lawyer. What was the call, back in the mid '80s, for a bright, articulate, attractive Spanish-speaking lawyer in our professional system?

She could have had the world as her oyster, money rolling in from big firms, all the accolades, all the money, all the prestige. But, no, she expended her considerable talents in public service to those who were less fortunate. That must tell you something about her. It must tell you something about what motivates her. And it must tell you something about who she is as she sits here today.

And during the 14 years that she was on the bench, she was singularly recognized for her work: bright, articulate, took all tasks without

complaint, took the most serious case that the Superior Court had in a long time and handled it with efficiency and intellect.

People came in here and testified she was fair, she gave all sides a chance to be heard, both prosecutors and defense lawyers.

This is the person who arrived before you, who when she acts and speaks, you must judge what she means and what she says and what motivates her to say it. She arrives with never having had a complaint before the Judicial Conduct Commission, never having had a complaint before her Superior Court Chief Justices.

So she arrives to you in these facts and to the Horton case with these facts in a manner which I suggest to you is one with an exemplary professional life.

I want to go through the events that start this whole ball rolling. And it really talks about -- and what we have to figure out is this broad question. And I'm not going to go into every canon and its minutia, because the questions I think are broader, when you apply them with these broad questions in mind. And that is, was Judge Lopez

biased against Leora Joseph in such a way -- and biased doesn't mean, by the way, that you have a feeling about someone. That's not bias. Judges are not automatons. When people come before them, whether they be defendants, lawyers, court officers and the like, they're entitled to have feelings. What they're not allowed to do is to let any feelings that they have interfere with or create a bias against that individual from either doing their work or being heard or whatever the case may be.

On the other hand, a judge does not have to disregard the conduct of counsel or the conduct of a defendant in determining what to believe when the counsel is speaking, what to make of what the counsel is doing, and whether or not one can trust or believes a particular statement of counsel as being credible or not.

I suggest to you that the record in this case shows without question that neither was Judge Lopez biased against Leora Joseph, nor did she act upon any such bias. In fact, it's true, what may be said is the contrary. And let's take it from the beginning, because you have to go back to one early time, and that is the Estrada case. That's where it

starts.

And what happens in the Estrada case? Well, it's worthy of note in some detail, because it is the shroud that Leora Joseph wears for the rest of this case.

What happened in Estrada? Well, the first thing that happens is there's a standard, everyday plea conference. Now, I think by this time, Judge, and I know that you never sat in the criminal courts, and we have all attempted by witness and otherwise to present evidence to this Court that would at least present an understanding of what is a different court and a different group of procedures. And I urge you, again, if there are questions in this regard, to speak --

HEARING OFFICER DAHER: I've gone over Chief Justice DelVecchio's testimony, I've gone through all the pages, and I'm quite familiar with what goes on in Superior Court now.

MR. EGBERT: Quite honestly, that changes day to day, as it does in every court.

HEARING OFFICER DAHER: That's what I'm learning about it.

MR. EGBERT: But in any event, at least as

to the Estrada case, it's pretty clear. It was a standard plea conference. What that came to mean and what you know it means is that Judge Lopez, as other Superior Court judges would, would sit down with counsel and hear from counsel what it is they thought about the case, the facts and the like, down to counsels' recommendations on a plea.

And as you've heard, those could come from two widely divergent places. The Commonwealth can say that the evidence is black, and the defense can say, No, no, the evidence is green. And they're never to agree on that evidence.

But as they start to melt down to a possible plea, the evidence becomes less important and the disposition becomes what it's about. And if the disposition is one which the defendant will accept in some circumstances or the Commonwealth in other circumstances, then it can be done.

And these are -- as you probably know, virtually 99 percent of the work done in criminal courts is by guilty plea. And if you want to see a system go broke, by the way, and a court system come to a halt, change that statistic from 99 percent to 1 percent and have a few more thousand trials a

month in the superior courts and see what would occur.

So the plea takes place, everybody testifies, Leora Joseph testifies. Nothing happened out of the ordinary. She had a full and fair opportunity to speak her mind, a full and fair opportunity to recommend what she wanted for her sentence, a full and fair opportunity to address each and every matter the defense counsel brought before Judge Lopez.

By the same token, Judge Lopez heard from the defense counsel. And in Estrada you had one of these situations that presents one of the kind of complex, urban horror shows that we have come to see. But these complex, urban horror shows come with complex problems.

And what was one of the complex problems here? Well, you had the family, including the victim, the victim's mother, begging the Judge not to send him to jail, not because it didn't happen, not because they, as Leora Joseph later said, supported rape, but because they'd be on the streets, they'd be destitute. The mother, the victim and the victim's infant son would have all

 been on the streets. And they, as the victim's in the case, urged the Judge to not send him away and urged the Judge to do something else, to protect them at the same time, not an easy task.

So what did Judge Lopez do? Well, she fashioned a sentence which she thought was appropriate under the circumstances. Now, let me stop there. Whether the Commission thinks it's a good sentence or a bad sentence is irrelevant. Whether the Commission thinks that she should have done something else is irrelevant. That's where the statute comes in. The statute makes it crystal clear.

So Judge Lopez did everything she could do that day. She actually called, if you remember, the victim's mother up to the witness stand and the victim up to the stand. "Is this what you really want me to do?" And she did it and then added on her own that there would be sex offender counseling.

So it was done. It was done. Everybody
knew what the sentence was going to be. And now it
was a matter of just getting the plea, because the
defendant's constitutional waiver of rights is a
very important part of a plea. But it was over.

1 Leora Joseph wasn't pleased. We know that. But what did Leora Joseph do during the plea 2 hearing? The plea hearing is set in two parts. 4 There is the plea colloquy, where the Commonwealth 5 is asked to put in facts that they would prove at 6 trial, for the defendant to admit those facts exist, 7 the basis of the plea; and then there is, subsequent to the acceptance of the plea, a sentencing hearing. 8 9 They're not all mixed together. They're 10 two different functions. And the reason you don't 11 mix them together is because the defendant is going 12 to be asked at the end of the colloquy, "You've 13 heard what the prosecutor said. Do you agree with those facts?" And if the prosecutor is putting in 14 15 hyperbolic statements that aren't fact, it's going 16 to cause the defendant oftentimes to say, "Wait a 17 minute. I don't agree I'm a no-good bum. I don't 18 agree I'm a menace. I don't agree that that's part 19 of this case," and the like. So they come in two 20 places. 21 But Leora Joseph couldn't contain herself. 22 Now, not the most horrible of transgressions the 23 first time, not the most horrible, but worthy of 24 being called upon so it doesn't happen again. And

by the way, if you look at the Estrada transcript, you'll see that Judge Lopez didn't bring this up on her own. In the midst of Leora Joseph's statements, it was defense counsel who obviously stood up to object, because you can see Judge Lopez say, "Well, I'll get to that" or "I'll let her put it in for now." It was wrong. She shouldn't have done it, Leora Joseph, but again, not worthy of anything horrible. Worthy of a review, worthy of being told by the Judge, "Don't do that again in my courtroom." I don't think anyone disagrees with that.

She put in facts in the plea colloquy like this: "The wife and the pastor have supported" -- the pastor, who was standing there. "The wife and the pastor have supported his criminal behavior, even at the expense of this girl's well-being." That was not fact in this criminal case. Certainly the defendant wasn't going to admit to it.

"The defendant's therapist identified him as a reactive sex offender, though it was unclear what he was reacting to when he was repeatedly shoving his erect penis into her mouth when she was 11 years old." That whole priest and therapy wasn't coming into this case, and that kind of diatribe

wasn't there. So everybody knew it shouldn't be there and it had to be dealt with.

Now, here's where we start to get a picture of what's going on here. Leora Joseph told us under oath on the bench, "At the end of the hearing Judge Lopez screamed to me." You remember the impression Ms. Joseph was trying to make with you. "She screamed to me. She humiliated me. I have never, ever, ever been spoken to like that in my life. It was horrible, horrible."

Why would she do that, Judge? Why would she do that under oath here before you? We all know why. She thought she could get away with it. The Commission thought they could get away with it. Everybody thought that they could come in and testify and vilify Judge Lopez because she's sitting here as a target and it was easy to do.

All there was was a transcript.
Transcripts don't talk. All we had was the words.
They put the transcript in evidence, had her give
this spiel about this horrible event. There's only
one thing, they didn't know we had a tape. They
didn't know. They didn't go check to see whether or
not the court reporters in that session had tapes

too, and we did.

And the tape made it a lie. Is there any doubt, is there any doubt that the rendition Leora Joseph gave was simply not true? And is that something you'd forget?

Now, the Commission says, Oh, forgive her, Judge. Forgive her. It was just a tough time for her. Maybe that's the way she perceived it. Bull. Come on.

This is not some 10-year-old child. This is a prosecutor who the Commission, throughout their briefs, said, "This is a responsible prosecutor, well known in the law," da, da, da, da, da, da. And she can't tell the difference between the Judge saying, "Excuse me, would you please not do that again in my courtroom" versus screaming and yelling and humiliating?

It was a lie on the stand under oath to get her. That's all it was, period. And it should stick with everything Leora Joseph says in this case. She can't shed it off. It's with her forever. And not to mention one other piece of information we gleaned from that little Estrada case, and that was that Ms. Joseph, because she's so

high and mighty and she's so angry, she thinks that she doesn't have to stand when a judge is talking to her.

Now, you notice in that transcript that Judge Lopez has to say to her, "Will you stand," "Will you stand," "Stand." Now, lawyers know, I think, that they're supposed to stand when talking with a judge. They're supposed to show some respect. It was another one of these insolent, childish expressions by Ms. Joseph which we saw throughout these proceedings.

Now, I am not -- my purpose is not here, as the Commission says, my purpose is not to vilify Ms. Joseph. I could care less about Ms. Joseph. I could care less whether she ever practices law or doesn't practice law or the like. But this conduct was done in front of Judge Lopez, and this started to make the history that she had in front of Judge Lopez, and this started to create for Judge Lopez, and rightfully so, what kind of credibility does this lawyer have with me, what do I believe, what do I not believe. But more important, this follows her with you, because she lied to your face.

And I'm not talking some mixing of words,

like the Commission's filing on Judge Lopez, trying to find a word here and a word there. That was a big up, blown-out lie.

Now, the only other excuse is there was no lie, that she actually is so demented and so emotionally unstable that she doesn't know what's happening in a courtroom, that she actually could perceive a judge talking to her in a normal tone of voice, because she didn't like what she was hearing, as being screaming, yelling and humiliating, in which case that must follow her throughout these proceedings, and those perceptions and inability to perceive must follow her throughout these proceedings.

So when the Commission says to you at the outset of these filings that she did nothing wrong, that's not true; she didn't deserve to be admonished, that's not true; and that Judge Lopez did something wrong, that's simply not so.

Let me ask something, Judge, by the way, and this is a procedural matter. I don't intend to go until I've put everybody to sleep, but do you have a time limit in mind? You hadn't mentioned one.

HEARING OFFICER DAHER: You can take as much time as you want. If you want to come back on Sunday, we can do that. But take as much time as you want. I don't want to be guilty of foreclosing -- you go ahead and take as much time as you need. My schedule is free, subject to your -
MR. EGBERT: It is my intention not to go for long.

HEARING OFFICER DAHER: As a matter of fact, I'm enjoying this review of the facts. Go ahead.

MR. EGBERT: Now, what happens after the Estrada hearing, and what can we infer? Well, we've now seen Leora Joseph up close and personal, seen her lie to the Court, seen what she said about that tape. And what happens next?

Well, we've got an angry Leora Joseph. She didn't like the sentence and she didn't like what Judge Lopez said to her. You don't have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that she was mad. So she had her chance, not through advocacy, but she had her chance to get publicity and to go after the Judge in the press.

And there is something about going after

judges in the press in an unfair manner. Every judge is subject to criticism and ought to be when it's respectful and fair. But no judge should be subject to misrepresentative criticism. That's unfair and it's wrong. It's unprofessional, it's probably unethical, and it is certainly unbecoming.

She went and met with Eileen McNamara. And now we get to this parsing of words. Well, Eileen McNamara called her, she didn't call Eileen McNamara; therefore she didn't call in the press. But we know what "call in the press" means in the vernacular with lawyers. It means get out there in the press and slap a judge around. That's what it means.

And when lawyers do it, they do it at their peril, because they better do it carefully, respectfully and not misrepresent the facts. And in this case, she went there and fully and completely misrepresented what happened at that hearing in order to make that judge look bad. That's what it was all about.

There is nothing in the article that -- you read the article. Try to find anything that matches what was said in the hearing, anything anywhere, any

argument, any statement by Leora Joseph, any sentencing statement. Nowhere. You would think you were talking about two different events.

But how does she phrase these comments to McNamara? In talking about the Estrada case, "If you say he is not a threat because he just raped a girl in his own household, then can't you say the car thief," et cetera, et cetera. Who? If who says? We're talking about a sentence that just occurred and a judge who just gave the sentence and about the judge's sentence.

This is a message -- this is a wrong, deceitful message to the public: "Judge Lopez says it's okay if you rape people in their house. That's a distinguishing factor. It's a mitigating factor. He's not a threat, because he just raped a girl in his own household."

It goes on to say, "Society does not condone the rape and beating of children, quote, even in your own house."

So here's what she tells Eileen McNamara and the public. Oh, this judge, this nutcase judge, she's got this rule that if you're in your house, it's not really a rape. If it's your child and you

live with them, it's not really a rape. And that's why this judge sentenced to probation. And that's wrong, and that is wrong, and she knew it.

And what she is trying to do is to make herself look good at Judge Lopez's expense, instead of advocating her case appropriately or instead of telling Eileen McNamara, "Hey, here were the arguments on each side. Here was my argument for sentencing. It didn't fly."

But to leave the impression with the public that this judge released this person on probation with the conditions he did because the rape occurred in his own home with his own child is disgraceful.

What does the Commission respond? It's that these comments are benign, benign, and that they're not a personal attack on Judge Lopez -- get this one -- because she didn't mention Judge Lopez's name.

Well, Judge, I suppose if I walked out of here tomorrow and somebody said to me, "How is that hearing on Judge Lopez going? How are you being treated in those rulings?" "Well, those rulings I'm getting in that courthouse," da, da, da, da, da, da, da. Just don't say the word "Daher."

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This is supposed to be -- this is about a judge and her future, and it's not supposed to try to shape the facts in such a way, to such a far out understanding, as to be both unfair and quite frankly without credibility.

These remarks were about Judge Lopez. They were made in an article about Judge Lopez. That's what she was talking about when they were there. And it was a misrepresentation of what it was, and it was done with malice aforethought.

10 So now, we have conduct in the Estrada case and lying about the Estrada case, conduct in the McNamara article. And by the way, you reap what you sow in this business. You reap what you sow as a lawyer. If you were a judge for more than a decade -- and I don't know how much more, but a lot -- and I suspect, without urging it upon the Court, that you would have formed impressions of the 19 people who stood before you and determined how much 20 inquiry had to be made to various representations that were being made. And the reason you did that is based on experience. And the reason you 23 conducted yourself -- and that's typical fact 24 finding. And that's typical judging.

Well, a year passes or thereabouts, and there's been no contact with Ms. Joseph, Judge Lopez. I guess Ms. Joseph was out and had a baby for a while, and their paths didn't cross after that.

But here comes the truest expression that you can find that the Horton case was not a result of any bias between counsel and Lopez.

They come in before Judge Lopez. And, one -- this was after the fact. Everybody wants to go back and recreate history. One, Ms. Joseph indicated that, to her, the Horton case was very important -- and I believe it was; it was important to her professionally, and I took everything she said about its importance in her head at face value -- but that she was petrified of Judge Lopez. She was petrified because she was humiliated, wrongfully, by the way, remember, in her mind, in Estrada. She was yelled at, screamed at and humiliated wrongfully.

Well, when a lawyer goes before a judge in an important case and has evidence that the judge is biased, what does the lawyer do? He or she moves to recuse the judge. It's done every day. Sometimes

these things happen. Sometimes a judge just can't stand a particular lawyer and a lawyer can't stand a particular judge, and sometimes those things have to find another place in the courthouse.

And Ms. Joseph came, not as some neophyte litigant coming before Judge Lopez. She had the full and complete authority and force of the Suffolk County district attorney's office behind her. That is not an instrumentality without power. Elected official. They have full media contact, they have contact with the Legislature, they have direct contact with the court system all the time. They're a powerful organization. And if they think they're getting a raw deal before a particular judge, they know how to move to recuse.

Well, it wasn't done because it wasn't so. So they go before Judge Lopez, and they have their lobby conference on Horton. And the conference occurs as it does in every other case. Even Leora Joseph had to testify she had a full, complete and fair opportunity to present her side of the matter, to make her recommendations. Anne Goldbach got a full, fair and complete opportunity to do the same.

But what's the one remark, Judge, that

tells you that, if you look at it, you can say, Aha, I know why -- I can see clearly there was no bias here. What is it? It's when Leora Joseph testified, if you recall -- and she was reluctant to do it, because I had her saying in a deposition and she didn't want to say it again, the ramifications of it, but she finally admitted it -- that when Judge Lopez was listening to the case -- these are Ms. Joseph's words -- when she was listening to the presentation, she said, "This case looks pretty serious, Anne. I don't think I can give probation here."

And then what happened? She looked at the Katz report, and the words were, "she seemed to be swayed by the report." Well, if it was a product of bias when Ms. Joseph came in, that statement never would have been made.

It was typical judging. It was typical judging. Here you have a judge. She's heard part of the presentation, part of what Anne Goldbach has to say, and she's talking out loud, "I don't think I can do that in this case. It looks a little too serious."

Is that a judge who was biased against the

Commonwealth or Leora Joseph? No. It's a judge who was saying, "This one looks like it might deserve this sentence." And she maintained that position until she was provided other information which convinced her otherwise, which swayed her, and that's the so-called Katz report.

Now, I want to stop for a minute here, because the Commission makes much of this Katz report in this regard. But I think this whole event kind of puts the lie to it.

One, the Commission says that Judge Lopez now, for the first time, is using the Katz report as kind of a rationale for her sentence, that it was never a big deal; she never hardly looked at it. It really wasn't why she sentenced him to that, but now we're making this up for the purpose of this hearing.

Well, not according to Leora Joseph, not according to Leora Joseph. Leora Joseph says that she was becoming swayed by the Katz report. That's what she testified to. And that's what Anne Goldbach testified to. And Anne Goldbach testified -- and by the way, when you want to compare witnesses in the case, both their demeanor,

their professionalism, their knowledge and their attempt to speak the truth on the witness stand, you compare Anne Goldbach to Leora Joseph, and I'll take that horse in that race any day.

And Anne Goldbach testified quite clearly that Judge Lopez read the report carefully, she went over it, asked questions about it and the like, and it was what fashioned the ultimate description of what she thought the sentence ought to be.

Now, we come to an area right now where the Court had a number of questions during the hearing. And we tried to explain through witnesses and whatever, but I want to at least take up a couple of points.

This Court said, I think, well, how come the DA didn't get a copy of the report? Well, you've heard Anne Goldbach's testimony. She tried on three separate occasions to give her one. It is not the Court's obligation to provide copies to counsel. Certainly the courts have accommodated counsel upon request, "Could I have a copy of that Judge. I forgot mine," that kind of thing. But it's not the Court's obligation to -- with a lawyer standing right there, the Court would expect that if

the Court had a document that counsel wasn't given, that counsel would say, "Well, excuse me, Judge, I don't have that," or "It was never provided to me."

Now, why didn't Ms. Joseph stand up and say that? Because she knew it was given to her and she simply disregarded it. In the arrogance of power, in the arrogance of her position, she pooh-poohed it and said, "I don't want that. It's got nothing for me. This is a jail case," not understanding, quite frankly, how serious that particular document was going to become in terms of the information it provided to Judge Lopez. It's dangerous lawyering, dangerous lawyering, and she paid for it.

Two, why didn't Judge Lopez keep a copy? I think it's crystal clear now, certainly from Judge DelVecchio's testimony, Anne Goldbach's testimony and Judge Lopez's testimony, that that's the way it's done in those proceedings. You take it, the Judges make notes in their books and whatever, and then the sentencing occurs. Most times the sentencing occurs within five minutes, by the way, it goes right then -- but in this case it was continued for a few days -- and if it's going to be used to opt for probation, just as it was in this

case. So there was nothing unusual in its treatment.

Now, counsel in this case says, when they argued to you, you must hold up the statute, 211 C, and say, No, no, no, that can't play here. Katz worked for the CPCS. It can't play here.

The weight she gave the report is the weight she gave the report, period. Period. Unless you find clear and convincing evidence that her reviewing that report and giving it weight was done with a corrupt motive or in bad faith, it's off the table, as it should be. Otherwise, we'd be relitigating judges' determinations in the context of judicial conduct.

That's not to say that this report wasn't valid and informative, which I suggest to you it was, but I don't need to nor will I go down that road. But certainly the information was there. Judge Lopez chose to rely on it. That's that.

Judge Lopez chose to rely on it. That's that.

Did the Commonwealth do anything? Because
now you might say, Well, here I can find some
evidence of bias. Here would be bias if the
Commonwealth said to the Judge at the time, "Whoa,
Judge. This Katz report is baloney. We want to

have a hearing." Maybe then if the Judge said, "No, no, no. You can't speak." Would that be evidence of bias? I don't know. Would it be evidence of something? It would certainly be something different than we have here today? A little bit.

If the Commonwealth said, "Can we have our own examiner? Give us a week's continuance, Judge, for our own examiner," and she said, "No," then maybe we might want to examine that ruling, if it's to be examined, what was the cause. But you have none of that here.

What you have through every person who was at this hearing -- including Ms. Joseph with her head down saying, "No, I never asked for that. I never asked for a continuance. I never asked for an independent study. I never asked to take the report and rebut it or argue about it or for an evidentiary hearing or otherwise" -- that is off the table.

What is it off the table here? Well, there's a remark made by Ms. Joseph at this plea hearing at the end, when she's not getting what she wants, when she wants to tell the Judge that she doesn't like what the Judge is doing, she does what's starting to be a pattern of advocacy by that

office, she gives the veiled threat about the media.

Now, her explanation is so phony, it is so unbelievable because it's built on a lie. And here's what I'm saying. On her way out the door, as she's lost the case, she says to Judge Lopez "Our office takes this very seriously. The media is watching" or "The media is paying attention" or "The media is concerned," words to that effect.

Now, with the education you've received here from Judge Russo, I think you get a sense of what that remark means over there in Suffolk County. But her explanation was, "Oh, the reason I said that is not to give the Judge a tickle, not to let her know, Hey, we're going to slam you. I just -- it was only fair for me to warn her of the media attention. Just a heads-up," I think she said.

The problem was, there was no media attention. There had been no media interest. The only article of media that she could conjure up anywhere was a small article in some Dorchester weekly a year and a half earlier.

So she wasn't giving her any heads-up. She was giving her a warning. And the warning was, "Hey, you don't do what we say, Judge, and we will

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crack you up in the media. And we know how to do
it."

3 And if you need any more proof of that, 4 Your Honor, that that's what was going on, look to 5 the Deakin/Russo testimony and look to that event, the same office, same people, same people dealing 6 7 with this press release. And what does Deakin say to Judge Russo in a conference when he's afraid 9 Judge Russo is going to do something he doesn't like? "I'm going public." "I'm going public"? Is 10 11 that a citation to some case? That's a threat. 12 That's just what Judge Russo thought it was, a 13 threat. And he said he found it insolent, 14 demeaning, and he understood it to mean, If you do 15 this, Judge Russo, we'll go public and make you look bad in the media. 16

Now, Deakin denied it. A clear question. I asked him a crystal clear, "Did you ever say to Judge Dominic Russo the words 'I'll go public'?"
"No." "Anything like it?" "No." "Ever anything like it?" "No, no, no." "Ever happen?" "No."

Judge Russo came on the stand. Do you think he wanted to be here? He came on the stand, and he testified to exactly what happened. And he

said, why does he remember it so? It's the first time in 22 years on the bench he ever called and made an adverse comment about a lawyer. That's how bad it was.

And do you remember what happened then? The Commission's counsel stood up to you and said, "Oh, Judge, if you're going to let this in, we're going to bring in all his superiors to show Judge Russo was not telling the truth about that, that he had conversations with these superiors, and that's not what he said." And of course you saw them bring in those witnesses, you saw them bring in Ms. Keeley and Ms. Borghesani and Ralph Martin. That's on a day when none of us were here, apparently.

But that's what they said in open court. That's what they told you would put the lie to Judge Russo.

So let's make it crystal clear. Deakin lied on the witness stand on this very same subject matter, because this is what they do over there. And Judge Lopez took it, just as she should have, as this kind of little threat by the DA's office: Once again, we'll go to the press and we'll make you look bad.

And that's not okay. That's not okay. That's not free speech. That's not advocacy. That's not professionalism.

What happens next? Make a prediction and it will come true. On August 3rd a press release is issued by the district attorney's office. It is sad, to say the least. It is unethical and unprofessional, to say the most.

Why do I say those things? Well, what possible purpose other than to rile up the masses with prurient testimony do you put "A transgendered man to plead guilty tomorrow," "Transgendered man who dresses like a woman to plead guilty tomorrow"? There was virtually no legitimate purpose for that statement.

Put in anything you want. If you want to write tomorrow, "Charles Horton will plead guilty" -- "will plead guilty" is a problem as you can see from the rules -- "will plead guilty in a criminal case," da, da, da, whatever. "He's charged with" this, that and the other thing. You can put that in.

But can there be any doubt in anyone's mind what the reason for that phrase was, particularly

after the conduct of Ms. Joseph in the McNamara article and her threat to Judge Lopez and Mr. Deakin's threat to Judge Russo?

And it's interesting to note that Leora Joseph calls Anne Goldbach about four o'clock on the afternoon of August 3rd, as Goldbach testified, wanting to find out if the plea is going to go through the next day. Why? Well, I suggest to you one of the reasons was because she and Deakin had that press release in hand.

And what do you say, Judge, to the hear-no-evil, see-no-evil, speak-no-evil testimony of Deakin and Joseph when it comes to this press release? This is the immaculate press release. It is inconceivable. Their testimony is so silly that it is troublesome.

She is the line prosecutor. He's the boss. She just told the Judge, "Watch out for the press," and, bingo, here comes the press release in this case: "Transgendered, dresses like a woman."

And you know they got -- they accomplished what they wanted. They really did. The next morning the courthouse is packed, plenty of media, plenty of cameras, plenty of reporters. They had to

see the guy who dresses like a woman. They had to see Ebony's dress. They had to see Ebony's hair. They had to take pictures of her.

We are not -- cannot blind ourselves to this. This was not some scheduling notice. This was an invitation to a circus, a freak show. That's what it was, and that's what it became.

And what did it cause? Well, it caused harm beyond harm, not that they called in the press, not that the press was there; but this attempt to generate this frenzy and to generate this prurient kind of spectacle, that's what it was about.

So what happened? Everything gets derailed. You heard all the testimony of Ms. Goldbach, Judge Lopez and Leora Joseph. The parties come in, the press -- by the way, I hate to have the press think I don't understand their rights. They have every right to be there. But that doesn't mean that there are occasions that the press and litigants can get so convoluted that bad things can happen, and maybe it ought to be controlled in a different fashion.

The mother won't come out of the elevator. Ebony Horton won't come out of some room. There's

swearing and jostling and banging around with cameramen. Anne Goldbach's crying or near tears, a lawyer of 20-odd years experience.

Anne Goldbach says to Leora Joseph, "Did you do this?" And what does Leora Joseph say to her? "I'm shocked that the press is here. I'm absolutely shocked. I had no idea." Do you believe that? Why were they all so afraid to admit that they sent out this press release? Because they knew it was wrong. Because they knew what they were trying to do.

Well, they did. They managed to drill this plea. Because Anne Goldbach testified -- and I suggest to you not only is her testimony and was her testimony credible, but it was probable, too. Here's this person who was not really ready to plead in the first place and was coming in that day for a final decision, so to speak, hit with all of this attention and the like and tumult. And Anne Goldbach said, "I'm not pleading him today." She told Joseph that and she told Judge Lopez that.

Now, Joseph, in her inimitable fashion, denies that that conversation took place. Ms. Goldbach swears on her professional reputation that

it took place. That was the reason she went to see the Judge. That was the reason she went to see the Judge, to get a continuance. She had no other purpose to go to see the Judge. If she didn't want a continuance or she wasn't asking for a continuance, there was no reason to go see the Judge. None. She couldn't do anything about the cameras. We all know the rules for cameras in the courtroom.

So what was her purpose? Just as she spoke, to get a continuance, because it wasn't going to happen today. She told the Judge and you, it wasn't going to happen, because the defendant wouldn't let them do it, and it wasn't going to happen, because she wouldn't do it. It would be unprofessional conduct of her to allow a plea to go forward under that kind of emotional strain and circumstance, and she would not do it, and a continuance was going to be granted that morning, and Judge Lopez said so.

Now, the Commission says in their pleadings, there was no discussion of a continuance, and this was all made up. Fine. I leave it to you, Judge. If you think Anne Goldbach and Judge Lopez

were incredible on the issue of this continuance, then you so find. But where can you find a scintilla of believable evidence to the contrary?

Now, what happens when they go in? Well, so far Judge Lopez has been lied to by Joseph, threatened by Joseph, maligned and disrespected by Joseph. And now when she comes in and looks and she's asked, basically, "Did you have anything to do with this?" or "Who did this?" or words to that effect, she clams up and denies it.

Well, Judge Lopez said "I think you've lost credibility with me. I think you're mean. And I think you belong prosecuting" -- either "prosecuting cases in the suburbs" or "in the suburbs," with the clear understanding, it seems to me, by everybody she meant prosecuting cases in the suburbs.

Was Judge Lopez happy with those choice of words? No. Did she indicate both here and otherwise should she have selected better words? Yes. But that's not the end of the inquiry, nor is it evidence of bias. It certainly isn't evidence of bias in one's dealings in professional matters.

She was mean, Judge. She was mean in creating this event with these groupings of people,

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both victims and defendants who were in a highly emotional and suffering state. That is mean. That's mean by anybody's book.

4 Suburbs? Well, as Judge Lopez described 5 it, the first number of times she described it, both 6 in depositions and otherwise, what she meant by that 7 was, these are edgy issues that you often find in urban areas, particularly Suffolk County courts and 9 the like, these edgy issues of transgenderedism, of 10 alternative lifestyles, of underground lifestyles. 11 These tend to become more urban issues and require, 12 when you have such things, as the psychological 13 backgrounds and the whole issue of how to get 14 punished and how it affects families, and the 15 Estrada case. These require a different kind of 16 thinking than some of the cases in the suburbs, 17 which -- and by the way, it's not demeaning to 18 prosecutions in the suburbs, but we know there are 19 some differences in the level of them. 20

The nails remark? Well, I meant someone who polishes nails stays home. You read the transcript. That was after about five questions by Mr. Ware where she explained fully all the reasons she had it and she made some flippant answer. That

is not punishable by anything.

But it turns out that she was right, that the way these matters were handled by Ms. Joseph and continually handled, calling a victim's mother supportive of rape in the Estrada case, calling a pastor a supporter of rape in the Estrada case, calling in a press on a transgendered person case, lacks the urban professionalism needed to deal with these kinds of matters.

And you know, Judge, she did it -- and this kind of plays out interestingly -- she did it in her lobby, not in front of 100 lawyers. She did it in her lobby, took her in there, she spoke to her and did it in a manner which let her know how she felt about it, gave her a little wake-up call on her professionalism in this regard, and it was done and it was over.

Ms. Joseph tells you that this was -- the magic words -- screaming, yelling, horrible, horrible, horrible screaming and yelling. Ms. Goldbach told you that it wasn't. She heard it all. I think she described it as stern but normal, and in fact listened to the tape in the Estrada case when Judge Lopez spoke and said it was not

dissimilar to those remarks -- not those remarks, but that tone of voice.

Well, having in mind what Ms. Joseph perceives as screaming, and having in mind the credibility of Ms. Goldbach, I suggest it should be crystal clear what occurred in that lobby.

In our brief, Judge, there is a section which I won't go through now but which really lays out, I think -- it's around 23 to 26 of the brief -- lays out the kind of information that Judge Lopez possessed at the time of her statements to Ms. Joseph, which I suggest to you would indicate that she was reasonably warranted in making the statements she made and the like.

But you know, Judge, even with that, I've been practicing 32 years in the courts of the Commonwealth, and I know we've made quite a production out of these two statements, mean and the suburbs part of pleadings and hearings and the like, but I've got to tell you, if that's the worst that's said in a judge's lobby to lawyers in this Commonwealth, then I'd be quite surprised. Whether it rises to this level of televised hearings is beyond me.

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1 There is, no doubt, not a judge who has spent any time trying cases or otherwise who hasn't 2 made a similar comment and, at best, have been asked 4 to apologize if it ever came to light. 5 Now we come to the important part of August 6 4th, which is --7 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Mr. Egbert, do you 8 want to take a five- or ten-minute break here? 9 MR. EGBERT: Sure. 10 (Recess) 11 MR. EGBERT: May I proceed, Your Honor? 12 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Please. 13 MR. EGBERT: So on August 4th, sometime 14 later in the day, when Judge Lopez takes the bench, 15 what's everybody's state of mind? She thinks the 16 case is just being continued, after they've had this 17 meeting in the lobby. She's told counsel it's going 18 to be continued. It has to be continued, there's no 19 question about that, because the defendant is not 20 about to plead, and for those various reasons. And 21 she's already had her say to Ms. Joseph in terms of 22 what she thought was appropriate to say.

She comes up, and no one has, to this

point, no one has said to her, "I object to what

you're doing." No one. She thinks when she comes up it's another day at the bench and there's no reason to go into any great detail about who, what and where, no reason to put her private comments public and the like.

And so she comes out, and you recall that basically her words are, "Okay. This case is going to be continued. I have a number of bails and things to do, and we'll do it over in Middlesex, because I'm moving to Middlesex," I think in a day or so.

Now, the Commission urges you to say that that was a lie and a pretense, when all it was was an attempt to get the case moving without bothering anybody, if you know what I'm saying. It was true, she had a lot of bails. It was true that she had other things to do. It was true it was going to be continued. She didn't see any reason to -- no one objected to this point -- to go into a long history of what happened. And I think she was right for that. It was appropriate. She wasn't looking for trouble, quite frankly, and she wasn't looking for anyone to look bad. And it would have been over.

The Commonwealth was the one who sought

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findings at that point. They had all day for Ms. Joseph to make it known to the Judge she objected to a continuance, but she didn't. The Commonwealth gives them the motion and says, "We object to the continuance, and we want you to make findings" and the like.

Well, remember, Judge Lopez is sitting there on the bench saying to herself, why am I continuing this case? What are the reasons I'm continuing this case? And as she goes back to her lobby and chambers -- and the Commonwealth says, by the way, she couldn't have been that busy. She had plenty of time to write her findings; she writes the findings in hand on the side. And I don't know how long the Commission thinks it takes to do 16 or 18 bail reviews, but I suggest to you not very quickly.

So now she goes into chambers and she writes out her finding. Now, first of all, Judge, 19 let me stop and once again hold up Chapter 211 C, 20 Section 4, and say to you and to the Commission, these are findings of the Court, and they are not to be part of any judicial conduct inquiry or hearing 23 unless this court finds that they were made in bad 24 faith or with a corrupt motive, not as the case was

tried by the Commission, and that is, would you have found the same way, are they supported in the evidence, did you have an evidentiary hearing and the like. None of that has anything to do with anything.

Now, if, of course -- as you sit in Judge Lopez's seat you ask yourself, could she have believed this, basically? Could she have inferred these facts to make these findings? Could she have in any possible way that wouldn't be the product of bias or corrupt motive?

The first finding, and I'm only going to press the findings that the Commission objects to, is "ADA Joseph, unhappy with the court's position, called the press in." ADA Joseph was clearly unhappy with the Court's position and made that known. She had warned Judge Lopez, in that veiled threat of hers, that the press is looking at this, and the press release gets issued in her case from her office saying "Transgendered person going to plead."

Who else would have done it? It's her case. She's lead counsel. She's trial counsel. Who else would have been involved in it? And

certainly didn't she have the right to infer that Ms. Joseph followed the rules of professional responsibility, which say that any line lawyer basically must take reasonable steps to make sure that no one in their office or their employ issues any statements to the press that they couldn't issue themselves? It's clearly something that is both supportable, durable and correct.

Then she says, "Ms. Joseph has a habit of doing this." What she meant by that, as she explained, and it's clear, she meant the McNamara article. And in her mind, this was just another time where this particular prosecutor was going to try to jack up the Judge in the press and say things in the press or create press in that manner. She was perfectly warranted in so finding. You may not ever. She may not ever (indicating). She was perfectly warranted in doing so. It certainly wasn't done on the basis of any corrupt motive or bias.

"The district attorney attempted to embarrass and ridicule a defendant suffering from a psychological disorder." What other purpose could there have been to put that statement in the press

release? What was it? What other purpose could it have been?

Let me ask you something, Judge. If this case were the same case, same factual case, and the district attorney put in the press release "Joe Smith, a man with a colostomy who carries a bag of waste around his side in flowery colors, is pleading tomorrow to the rape and kidnap of so and so," would that be the same thing? Wouldn't it be the same thing? Just nothing more than an attempt to embarrass and ridicule a defendant in matters that ought not to have been -- certainly she had the right to infer that and make a finding. It wasn't done out of a corrupt motive or bias, not particularly with the history she had seen in this particular case.

And then there's been much about this "suffering from a psychological disorder." I don't mean to be flip here, Judge, but have you heard any evidence that there are any transgendered people who are undergoing hormone therapy to enlarge their breasts in an attempt to get ready to have an operation so that they can remove their penis and insert a vagina, and who have wanted to be girls

since very young in life and suffer from suicidal tendencies and depression, who don't suffer from a psychological disorder? Do you know of any evidence in this case that, with those combinations of factors that were before Judge Lopez, that that person — that she did not have the right to find and be warranted in finding that the defendant suffered from a psychological disorder?

Take a look at the DSM and see what you

Take a look at the DSM and see what you need to diagnose that psychological disorder, and I suggest to you this goes well far beyond it.

And of course we've spent much time with Mr. Ware saying to Judge Lopez, You're the only one who thinks this fellow has a psychological disorder; it's not in this report. All of those factors are listed in the report and in the DSM, so she certainly had every right to find that.

"The DAs caused the continuance and sought to turn the court proceedings into a circus." Well, they did turn it into a circus, although there weren't lions and tigers and bears. But we know what you mean when you turn an event into a circus. It was pandemonium, it was tumultuous, it was

24 leering, it was prurient, and it was anticipated by

the Commonwealth. And certainly Judge Lopez had the right to find in that regard, it was warranted in finding, that particular matter.

And now the one that the Commission says is a callous rejection of the victim in this case, which couldn't be further from the truth. "It will have little if no impact on the victim, as this is a plea." What will have little if no impact on the victim? Not the case, not the assault, not the facts as underlying the event. That's not what this is talking about.

The continuance will have little if no impact on the victim. In other words, another couple of weeks to get this thing done right and in order will have little if no impact on the victim.

And she goes on to write, "as this is a plea." What does that mean? Well, the victim is not even here in the courtroom, petrified and ready to testify, undergoing the trauma of being ready to testify, and have to give testimony. Judge Lopez knows what a child sexual assault trial can be like for a child. She's had that experience.

And so what this is saying, which is perfectly appropriate, is, Look, continuing this

case for a few weeks, or whatever, is not going to affect this victim in a significant way.

Why did she say that? Well, nobody told her any different either. And remember, although the Commission wants to gloss over this, it's the Commonwealth's obligation, in finding that opposition under Section 16 F, to tell the Judge, quote, to put on the record what the impact of the victim was. They totally didn't do anything. They said, "The grandmother's here."

Then they come into court before you and they put on this big show about how they promised to have it done before he goes to school and all of that. Do you recall all that testimony, Judge?

Well, that was great, but they never bothered telling Judge Lopez that. And they're trying to make a splash in this courtroom, but they never told Judge Lopez they wanted her to rely on it. It doesn't make sense.

These findings may have hurt their
feelings. These findings may have gone up their
professional back. But these findings were
warranted, and they were certainly not based on a
corrupt motive or bias.

How do you know that? Well, you look for things in people's conduct to figure out where they stand, because we all can go back -- I can go back in history and pull some things you said or did out and talk about it 20 years later and manufacture something about it, or what the court reporter said, and manufacture something about it. But it's their actions at the time that explain to us what's going on.

And each of these DAs, Deakin and Joseph, testified that these were insulting attacks on their professionalism, attacks on their jobs, or that they were public expressions of admonishment by the Court against them, and, and, they were totally unfounded. And they were totally unfounded.

Now, I don't know about you, Judge, but if somebody made a professional attack upon me in a permanent record of a court that I thought were unfounded, I might at least file one little bitty motion asking that it be reconsidered, one little bitty motion asking for a hearing, one little bitty piece of paper saying that I want you to reconsider, one little bitty piece of paper before the SJC saying these findings were made about me and my

conduct. They are unfounded, they have no basis, and I want it overturned. Not one. Not one.

And the reason for that is because they knew if they tried to attack these findings and wanted a hearing, they would have got a hearing, and all this business of what they did with the press, all this business of what they put in the press release, all the stuff that they had done in this case would have come out on the record in an evidentiary hearing, and it would have been worse for them, not better.

This is the Suffolk County DA's office. And by the way, not only do they have a professional responsibility to themselves, but they have an advocate's responsibility to both the Commonwealth and the victim in this case to assure themselves that they are able to try the case and handle the case and that they will in fact be able to do their job.

So you can't have it both ways. If Judge Lopez's findings were totally unfounded, that means she's biased, right? That's what the Commission says. If they were based on whole cloth, then they must have been from bias.

Well, if they were based on bias, then the prosecutor should have moved to recuse her. That's their responsibility. If they got a document in the mail and said, "Hey, this is a totally unfounded attack on us as professionals. She's biased. Let's move to recuse her so our client doesn't suffer," did they do that? No. So their actions speak louder than their words now.

Their words of crying foul mean nothing, because at the time of the event, they didn't do one singular thing that a lawyer would do when faced with those findings if they were a product of bias or if they were a product of lack of foundation.

Ah, but what did they do? The best Lawyer Leora Joseph and David Deakin know how to do, the only lawyering it seems to me that that office was doing at the time. Where did they make their plea? In the newspaper the next day. That's where they went. Not to the courtroom, not to the courthouse, not to the judge, not to the SJC. To the newspaper.

Are you starting to see a pattern, Judge? Are you starting to see a pattern? The same pattern that Judge Lopez watched day in and day out in these events? Don't litigate with me. Litigate out

 there, where you can say what you want, you can say what you want without getting in trouble, you can say what you want without a judge ruling.

And what did they say? I think this is Exhibit 15 in the record, Judge. "Martin spokesman James Borghesani noted that Lopez concluded that Horton suffers from a psychological disorder, quote, without hearing any evidence from experts." Lie. Lie. Dead-out lie. She had the Katz report days before that. It was presented to her. Katz is clearly an expert. And all of that information was in there.

So they lied, because it's easy. The Judge isn't there to say, "Overruled. That's not so."
They lied. They simply lied. Why? Because it makes her look bad. It just makes her look bad.
"Look at this judge. She's making findings without even getting any expert information. What's the matter with her?"

Then they go on to say the following. "No one should be deceived by this smokescreen." This is a judge they're talking about. These are a bunch of lawyers who just lost an event. "No one should be deceived by this smokescreen. Judge Lopez was

prepared to hand down an extremely lenient sentence, and she balked when the media was present to witness it."

They knew full well that the reason it was continued is because the plea couldn't go forward. They knew full well that. Did they put in here that Anne Goldbach moved for a continuance because her client was not ready to plead, as was his constitutional right to do or not to do? No.

They attacked a Superior Court judge because they didn't like what the sentence was going to be, and they didn't know how to be advocates in the courtroom. They only knew how to be bullies in the newspaper.

Now, there is only so much, it seems to me, that people can do, lawyers can do, before they are subject to discipline or reprimand. But the fact of the matter is that nothing was done about that, and it was let lie.

And if you need to understand the makeup of a judge, a good judge, without regard to whether you or I or anybody who sentenced higher or lower than her or anything else, she could have run from this case. How many opportunities did she have to let

 that kind of lawyering win, to let newspapers win over judging, to let prosecutors use the press to beat up a judge and to get her off the case or to change her mind.

She could have walked away from this case on any number of occasions. When she was going to Middlesex, she could have said, "I'm going to Middlesex. You do this when you want." She could have read that newspaper article and said, "Leave it at Suffolk."

But she had the courage of her convictions to say, "I'm doing what I believe to be right for the reasons that I've thought about them." And so she continued on with the case. But she didn't continue on with it without an institutional memory of events or an institutional memory of history.

So what did she do? Well, the first thing she did was she made security arrangements, if you recall. Now, even though we've been calling this a Commission complaint, for them to file documents before you that so torture the facts of the case and all of our understanding of what goes on in a courthouse to try to get a conviction seems to me to be over the top.

The Commission's argument on this is a few fold: one, that Judge Lopez made arrangements for the defendant to come to the back door without telling the district attorney, and that's somehow wrong. Why it's wrong, where it's wrong or how it's wrong, they don't say. Everybody does it, we now know from both Judge DelVecchio and Brian Grifkin, who is the deputy chief court officer of Middlesex. It's a regular occurrence done.

Why was it done? It was done for obvious good reason. Look what went on in Suffolk when there was no control of the meetings between the litigants and the press? There was this circus, and everything derailed. So it was not only the smart thing to do and the right thing to do, it was the intelligent thing to do.

And by calling them special arrangements, it's like making it up to be some kind of goody basket, like it really matters to Ebony Horton in terms of specialness to go in the front door or the back door. In fact, Ebony Horton went in the front door anyhow. There was nothing special about it. It was an attempt to keep the place sane and to keep the matter sane.

All the orders with regard to the cameras were just the same. They weren't solicitous of anyone. She wanted this plea to happen. This judge wanted this plea to happen and happen in a way that it could be handled. And you're dealing with emotional people with emotional problems and highly volatile situations.

So what did she do? She said cameras can fully have and view the proceedings, but I'm not going to have this defendant, full-faced view, pictured. Why? One, because it's the prurient interest of some of the media in this male/female show; two, because this particular defendant has already shown that confrontations with cameras may derail him and not get this proceeding completed.

And so what? She didn't hide anything. She hid the defendant's face. Big deal. The defendant's face often is not shown, because he's sitting with his back to the press. But it certainly wasn't done out of bias and favored solicitousness to the defendant. It was done in a well-intentioned and frankly intelligent attempt to let this plea go forward in a rational fashion.

We come upon the 6th of September, the plea

itself. And there's been much discussion of what was really going on here. I'm going to suggest to you what was really going on here, and I think after all you have seen and heard, you'll see that that's the case.

This proceeding now on September 6th was a formality. Now, I don't mean formality in the sense that the defendant's constitutional rights and the waiver thereof is not an extraordinarily important event in any case, but the rest was a formality. The sentence had been determined. It was already determined on August 1st. It was in place on August 4th. And it was there, undisturbed, on September 6th. It was over.

Now, the Commission kind of minces these words in some of its filings you'll see. "Well, Judge Lopez could have changed the sentence. She could have changed the sentence." And I could jump over the Empire State Building. But the circumstances of this case, she could not. Why? The sentence had been told to the defendant. No one had moved for reconsideration. They were there to take the plea. And the defendant was there to get the sentence that he had already been told would be

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the sentence in this case in return for his plea. It was over.

3 What further evidence do you have that it's 4 over? She tells the defendant before he ever enters 5 his plea, now, you know, right on the record. In 6 Exhibit 22 she says to him, on Page 8 -- this is 7 before the defendant is waiving any constitutional rights -- "Okay. Now the sentence, and I think I 8 9 indicated I was going to place the defendant on 10 probation for a period of five years. I had 11 initially indicated that I would be placing him in 12 Community Corrections. It appears he will not be 13 accepted into the Community Corrections program. 14 Therefore I'm going to place him on probation for a 15 period of five years, on electronic monitoring for a 16 period of one year, and you'll be required to attend 17 counseling, and you're to stay away from children 18 under the age of 16, okay? Do you understand that 19 this is the sentence that you are going to get? 20 "Yes."

It's over, Judge. All that we're here to do from a constitutional standpoint is for the defendant to waive his constitutional rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and for the

judge to make such a finding and for a clerk to read what the judge had already said.

So when Mr. Deakin got up and went on in his lengthy description of the facts, those of us or anyone who's been in the business long enough knows those statement of facts weren't being delivered to Judge Lopez. Those long statement of facts were being delivered to our friends in the media, and it wasn't there for sentencing purposes. The sentencing had already been done. It was kind of this long, flowing statement which we get out into the media and try to jack this case up, which is fine, which is fine, except now you have to put in context what Judge Lopez was doing.

She's sitting there saying, "Okay. All I need is sufficient facts so I can finally ask the defendant, are these facts true." By the way, you don't even have to ask the defendant, are these facts true, can they prove these facts, or do you disagree with these facts. But in any event...

So he goes on, and at one point Judge Lopez interrupts him, if you can call it that, politely. And it is at a point right when all the facts have been given and they announce, "and the defendant was

arrested," which was a natural break point for the judge to say, "Okay." And then Mr. Deakin said, "No. I want to say more," basically. And she let him go, and off he went and said more.

So for the Commission to argue that that was some kind of bias is to simply take every word spoken, every event, and say there's no other explanation but it's bias. It was a natural break point and was certainly not bias nor did it look to be bias.

Interestingly enough -- and to this day I can't figure out why. I have tried to figure it out, but I can't. If you can when you make your findings, I'm anxious to read them. But why -- when we now know from that videotape, we now know that the victim told the district attorney's office that he had been pulled off the street by force into the car, that Ebony Horton threatened to kill him in the car if he didn't shut up, and that Ebony Horton laid on top of him in the car in the passenger's seat -- why those three facts were never communicated to Judge Lopez by any competent prosecutor.

There is no doubt that those would have jacked up the price of this case in anybody's mind:

a threat to kill, a forcible pulling off the street into the car, actual laying on top, body to body, in the car. There's simply no doubt as to the impact that those facts would have had. And I cannot get my arms around what it was the prosecutors were thinking. But I can get my arms around one concept: this nonsense that they tried to feed us in this courthouse that they all two of them forgot those three most important facts does not make any sense in any world which we live in, period. It doesn't. The three most important facts -- the three worst facts in the case, both prosecutors at different times in different proceedings forget.

Now, there was something else amiss, and again, I haven't been able to put my finger on it, but it certainly goes to the credibility of these prosecutors and what they were doing here. To say they forgot is an outrage. To say they forgot is simply incredible.

And during this statement that Mr. Deakin is making, one of the first objections, so-called, of the Commission or an argument that Judge Lopez was either biased or failed to give a proper opportunity to speak was by not permitting -- that's

their words -- not permitting Leora Joseph to read the victim impact statement.

They came into court, Deakin and Joseph. They sat down. When counsel was asked to identify themselves, Mr. Deakin stood. Mr. Deakin stood. Whether that was one more little piece of Leora Joseph saying to Judge Lopez, "I don't stand in your presence" or not, I don't know. But Mr. Deakin stood, and he identified himself as clearly the person who would be speaking on behalf of the Commonwealth. And he in fact did all the speaking on behalf of the Commonwealth.

And when it came time to read the victim impact statement, it was Mr. Deakin who went to the side bar and told the judge that he was going to read parts of the statement. And apparently, according to their testimony, when one of the statements was about to be read, Ms. Joseph went to stand up -- that's the best I can make of it, because we can't find it anywhere in the proceedings -- and according to them, Judge Lopez said, "Mr. Deakin, would you please read it." Perfectly appropriate, not biased.

That's the way courthouses are run. People

just don't jump in proceedings and say, "Hey, me, too." That's not the way it happens. You don't stand up -- Ms. DeJuneas, you would be shocked to see her stand up in the middle of my argument and have her say, "Judge, I want to say a couple of words, too." It's inappropriate. That's not the way things are done.

It's done by one lawyer speaking on a subject. And if there's plans otherwise, then seek the Court's permission respectfully and ask. None of that was done -- whether or not it was deliberate or not is unimportant -- and Judge Lopez exercised her legitimate discretion and said, "No. You're standing. Go ahead and read it." It's not as if she was going to be doing any lawyering, by the way. She's simply going to read somebody else's statement, which doesn't take much lawyering.

So now we get to what I consider the famed "1 to 10" remark. Now, as a beginning point, does Judge Lopez wish she never engaged in this colloquy with Mr. Deakin, no matter what point they're each trying to prove? Well, of course, because look where it went. Look where it went.

Its initial purpose was not a bad one, just

1 like the question about where would you house him, 2 in a male or a female prison, was not a bad one. This was a public forum, and the public was watching 4 this sentencing. And these were some of the impacts 5 or the considerations that would impact this very bizarre set of circumstances in developing this 7 sentence. And there's nothing wrong with the public being educated on those kinds of issues. And in 9 fact, Mr. Deakin was well prepared to answer those 10 issues. So he obviously expected them to come. 11 The question asked, though, was not as has 12 been portrayed over and over by the Commission. 13 question was -- I'm sorry. 14 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Go ahead. 15 MR. EGBERT: I'm just trying to keep myself 16 from going too long. 17 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: I can honestly say 18 that my first assessment of Sunday seems to be 19 holding true. But go ahead. You take your time. 20 I'm free, and I'm sure Mr. Ware has nothing else to 21 do. So you take your time, and I mean that very 22 sincerely. Go ahead, Mr. Egbert. It's too 23 important to cut it short. Take your time.

MR. EGBERT: The question as framed, Judge,

by Judge Lopez was not -- and this is important both for the Court and frankly the public to understand -- the content of the question and the import of the question was not how would he rate this case, 1 to 10, in all the world of cases. It was, how does this case rate, 1 to 10, in the world of child sexual assault cases. That's what was being asked. And it was taken out of context by the Commission. It was taken out of context on often occasions on attacks on Judge Lopez. But the fact of the matter is what she was saying and did say is the following:

She first asked him, how many cases in the whole have you brought in the child sexual assault unit. So that's the universe that we're talking about. And he brings the figure down to about 100 cases. And she says, "And of those 100 cases in terms of the facts of this case, on a scale of 1 to 10, where would you put this case?"

In other words, in terms of child sexual assault cases, where does this one fit? Not what was portrayed in the media, Oh, this is a low-level crime as compared to walking your dog on the street or malicious destruction or whatever. In the realm

of these very serious cases -- there's no child sexual abuse cases that aren't serious. In the realm of these very serious cases, where does this one fit, and on the factors that one considers when fitting them there.

And she heard Mr. Deakin's response, and she believes that he was calling it a 10. That was her interpretation of what he was saying, and a rational interpretation of what he was saying. Whether she was right or wrong is almost irrelevant, but that was what she heard when he said "10" and didn't give any other number and basically went through the crime. That's what she testified to, and of course, that's what she said in her response.

She then said that Mr. Deakin was disingenuous. "I find you to be disingenuous." Why did she say that? Well, because, Judge, in the scheme of sexual assault cases involving children and the like, this case was, whether in the guidelines or the factors in the guidelines or in human experience, a lower level case.

Why was it? Well, unlike in the Estrada case, for example, the victim had not been sexually brutalized through penetration or with any organ

member. If you recall, there was no penile penetration, there was no oral penetration, there was no conduct other than -- and I don't diminish it -- other than the supposed sucking on the screwdriver and finger. And that is a far cry, as we know, from penile or vaginal penetration.

And it was not a repeated case. In many cases where a child is sexually abused, we know from cases like Estrada and others, it involved repeated sexual crimes over a period of time with lack of reporting.

Unlike in the Calixte case, there had been no nonsexual physical brutalization. What I mean by that, there were no beatings and the like and there was no brutalization in that regard. And unlike both Calixte and Estrada, this case did not involve the obtaining of sexual favors from positions of trust and the like, parents or guardians and the like, which has been a well-known curse of the criminal justice system.

According to the unrebutted psychological assessments of the offender, you had unlikely to be a recidivist, not likely to be a pedophile suffering from these various disorders, and having no other

involvement with children in terms of a sexual nature and the like and that he had complied with all these various matters for probation, making him, let's say, a different kind of offender than the norm.

And so whatever you may say, Judge Lopez's statement that in her mind, in terms of child sexual assault cases, that this was at a low level was both correct and warranted and not meant to be demeaning and not meant to be insensitive to anybody, including most especially the victim or their family. Because even though it was, in her opinion, a low-level crime in that realm of crimes, it was both a serious and important crime for the victim and for society.

But what happened then? What happened then is she turns, after saying "I think you're disingenuous" or "I find you disingenuous," she turns and she says, as is her right as the judge of the Court, "I will hear from defense counsel."

Now, after all the conduct of Mr. Deakin and Ms. Joseph, after everything that had gone on in the past, after all their playing with the press and the newspapers and the like, after all that had gone

on, you would think that they would have sat down and obeyed the Court's order, but he did not. And he testified that he knew he was disobeying the Court order, that he knew it when he did it and he consciously decided to do it.

And why did he decide to do it? To defend his honor. Well, he had no right to defend his honor there. He has no right to defend his honor — he has a right to zealously advocate for his client. He has no right to defend his own personal honor at that time. He can ask for a hearing. He can ask to see the Court. He can ask for whatever. But he was told to sit down and to hear from defense counsel so the proceedings could go on. And he refused, and he jacked this thing up, and she exploded and she was wrong. She was wrong. She has said she's wrong.

But she's not wrong in a vacuum. This Judge of 14 years, without a prior complaint, is not wrong in a vacuum. When you look at some of the cases that have been cited to you over time, particularly the Brown case, for example, which is the most resent demeanor kind of case that we have found. In that case Judge Brown, who we all know and have a great deal of respect for, Judge Brown

was on his third bite of the judicial conduct apple. He had been previously sanctioned twice and had just one month before this event of In Re Brown signed an agreement of sanctions to never do it again.

So, clearly, this is not Judge Lopez. And Judge Brown's conduct of coming after, shall I say, using words to a particular litigant that were inappropriate weren't justified in any way. There was nothing to lead up to that conduct. There was no conduct by the person but walking in the door with a case that led to that diatribe.

This was a case with history, where the lawyers had taken after the Judge, who had threatened the Judge, and who had disrespected the Judge publicly and the like. So that simply cannot be taken out of the mix.

But she was wrong, and she has said she was wrong. How many times must she say it for Commission counsel to finally get it? Commission counsel confuses and refuses to see when someone says, Yes, I was wrong, but explains the circumstances of how it came to be, to explain her wrongfulness and to understand how it happened. That's how it happened. As the story that I've just

told you, that's how it happened. And she exploded.

I wonder how it feels for Judge Lopez to be the only judge that ever yelled at a lawyer in a courtroom of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, because you would think that's what it is. We all know better. It doesn't excuse it. It doesn't excuse it, but it does put some perspective on it. And it also puts perspective on it when you realize that she is 14 years without a complaint.

As evidence of the fact that she was both capable to continue to hear the case and permit the Commonwealth to be heard, once she realized that Mr. Deakin then later wanted to speak on another matter, she not only permitted him to speak but found in his favor as to various conditions which he was seeking.

And then, as they say in Glocamora, it hit the fan. And there was this mixture of dislike of her sentence and use of this one-minute clip of video to make a point.

Did you ever have videos in your court, Judge, or in all the courts in the Commonwealth? One second of a judicial life where she screams at this prosecutor and, man, if you watch television, then you can close your eyes and do it by heart.

And the fact of the matter is that there was nothing wrong with her sentence. It was a correct sentence and a lawful sentence. Some may disagree with it. Many who disagreed with it were never really given the fact of what led to it in her decision.

But that doesn't matter, again. Chapter 211 C, Section 4, tells you it doesn't matter. You just have to sit here right now, Judge, and say to yourself the following: Was Judge Lopez biased in this sentence? I suggest to you that the answer is crystal clear.

Well, after September 6th the Commission now wants to allege that -- well, basically a couple of things: One, that Judge Lopez is a liar, that their witnesses tell the truth, Joseph and Deakin, and that Judge Lopez lied and provided false information to Ms. Kenney at the judicial information office to, one, disseminate or see to it that wrongful information got disseminated, or two, to issue a false press release, or three, to somehow protect her to the public. And I know I'm talking in a broader sense.

Well, first of all, Judge Lopez hadn't done

anything wrong, besides yell at the prosecutor. She hadn't done anything wrong. Judge Lopez wasn't afraid of her sentence at the time, no more than she's afraid of it now. She thought it was the right thing to do then. She thinks it's the right thing to do now. So she wasn't afraid or attempting to get information out there to justify her sentence.

Look what she was trying to do and what was going on. Do you remember the word "sensitivity," "insensitive"? It came out through this, "I didn't want to be portrayed as insensitive," and "I didn't want the public to understand his sentence as insensitive."

What did she mean by that? What she meant by that is -- she wasn't responding to nothing. She was responding to the hysterical newspapers and talk shows that were showing up on her doorstep, calling her house and people calling her house, calling her a spik and a Jew lover and her husband a Jew-loving spik and the like.

And the Commission and counsel expected her to be acting absolutely with her head square on her shoulders during a time like that, careful with

every word and careful with every thought and able to consider and sit back and calmly deal with this situation? Come on. She's a judge, but she's a human being. Her children threatened, people got --my God, it should be a lesson to us in what not to do in terms of dealing with our public officials, or we'll never have any.

Object all you want, but that kind of conduct does nothing but create chaos and create chaos in the mind of a woman who cares for her family and her children and her husband.

But she had nothing to hide or disseminate. And in fact, in her conversations with Ms. Kenney, you'll note that Ms. Kenney was pretty much around the pike -- she was the essence of an honest witness. And she kept saying, "I don't recall all this stuff." She was really -- she didn't help me too much, whatever. But that's all right. She said she couldn't remember.

And she was really quite clear that there were bits and pieces of conversations that she had with Judge Lopez. She took bits and pieces from those conversations, couldn't remember all of them.

I asked her if she recalled talking about

the psychological report, for example. She said, "I don't recall that." And I asked around, "Does that mean no or does that mean, no, you don't know one way or the other?" You know, "Do you recall this or that?" "No," she said, "I don't remember one way or the other."

And really there's not a large difference or much difference between what Judge Lopez says and she says they all talked about. They talked about the facts of the case, who said what, what the background of the defendant was, why she gave her sentence. What do you think she'd be talking to Kenney about? She'd be talking to Kenney about, "Joan, all these people screaming and yelling, here's why I gave the sentence the way I did. I didn't think this guy was a pedophile. I had these reports. I didn't think he was this. In the guidelines and the factors that judges consider, this case was not on the high level of sexual assault cases. It was on the lower level of sexual assault cases."

Imagine the conversation, Judge. You know, they want to take people's memory of one word and say, "Aha it's a lie." Imagine what the

conversation would have had to have been. "Joan, here's what happened. Here's why I did it. Here's what I was thinking," and all of that.

And, Judge, they hold out to you -- the Commission's whole aspect of this case is, "Aha. She said 'guidelines' and she was lying, lying, because when she went before the Commission on deposition, she tried to explain it." She said, "Well, I wasn't thinking of the actual guidelines. I was thinking of factors according to the guidelines, those kinds of things. And I thought the press release" -- you will recall what she said at deposition -- "I thought the press was materially accurate, and it was okay for a press release."

Now, think of the sequence of events in trying to determine whether or not she was lying and whether or not that makes sense. The press release says "appropriate level of sentencing guidelines." Commission counsel gets her in a deposition and asks her about that statement. All she had to do to avoid all of this last 30 pages of this judicial conduct complaint was say, "Yes, I was talking about the guidelines," period. Period. Nothing anyone could have done. They could have argued about her

interpretations of the guidelines, they could have said, Well, it's higher than that or lower than that or upside down or down from that. Nothing. There wouldn't have been a word anybody could have said.

But instead, she was honest. Instead, she said, "Look, I didn't mean the guidelines themselves. I meant these factors and all the things I thought about and all of this and the like" in trying to explain it to them.

And what do they do? They take their explanation, which she simply could have said -- if she were a liar, she could have simply said, "Hey, I said the guidelines. I meant the guidelines." Bam.

But, no, she chose to explain it to them honestly, and they indict her for it. That's what you get. She's before a Commission investigation supposedly — that's supposed to be fair and honest. She gives them appropriate, honest answers, and now they say she's a liar because of what she said in the press release. It's an outrage.

This whole concept that she spoke to Joan Kenney to encourage misleading public comment is built on straw. Ms. Kenney testified clearly she wasn't going to make any public comment in this

case; she wasn't permitted to. Maria Lopez could have told Joan Kenney that the victim had twelve legs and four arms and the defendant flew in from Mars and all this occurred, and Joan Kenney wasn't going to say anything publicly, because as she told you under oath that her conversations with Judge Lopez were confidential, period. And the only matters which would be released is if Judge Lopez told her to release anything. And the only matters Judge Lopez gave her the okay to release were this one, singular press statement.

Now, it doesn't make a lot of sense, does it, that if Judge Lopez's whole purpose in talking Joan Kenney was to get all -- disseminate all this information, this wrongful information out there to encourage misleading public comment, if that was her purpose, she probably should have been smart enough to tell Joan Kenney it's okay to repeat it.

Part of this relates to this document -- I'll try not to belabor it -- but this document that the Commission filed about all of Judge Lopez's statements. This was a press release. It wasn't a sentencing memorandum. It wasn't a full statement of everything Judge Lopez knew. It was a press

release.

Now, in the first instance the Commission says she's a liar, a liar, when she testified, "This was my first press release." Liar. Why? "Because her personal life is immersed in the media." In other words, translation, her husband owns the Phoenix. Okay? And that's what this Commission bases a statement that somebody's a liar when they say, this is my first press release, because her husband owns the Phoenix.

We have sunk to levels in this case that are beyond any dimension fathomed when this Commission was statutorily authorized. She would have been better off if she gave a sentencing memorandum. And when you go back, Judge, and you read the Commission's statements about how she lied about what she could and couldn't say, you'll say —if you read them carefully, you'll see that what she's saying is, in all occasions, back in deposition and here, there's a confusion. You can't say publicly that which is not public or in the public record. You can put anything you want in your findings and anything you want in your sentencing memorandum, as long as it's based on

something that's before you, and then it becomes public.

And there was this whole confusion of those events. And so that's why we went through this exercise in the press release of adding in what you can say in a press release versus in a sentencing memorandum, because they're different.

Now, sure, would she have been better served now, as we look back on it, to have written out a ten-page press release with all -- strike that -- a ten-page sentencing memorandum with all her thoughts and all her reasons and the reports? Yes, she would have.

But she was being onslaughted with opinion. She was being told by Judge DelVecchio, "Stay away from the press. They'll kill you." She was being told by her lawyer, "Don't do anything." She was being told by her husband, "Hey, it's the press. Get out there and do it." She was being told by her friends, "You've got to do something."

What was she to do? What was she to do? So she let this press release go out. It was, as she says, materially accurate. It was, yes, good enough for a press release. It gave the concept and

tone of what this was about, and it in fact was true.

Now we take this press release and pick it apart word by word and call it a lie and charge her with lying and giving false information. It is beyond comprehension to me.

Did she think the case was pending? Was it pending? There's law everywhere. Take a jurisdiction, I'll find you some law.
Unfortunately -- how are you supposed to act? If it were a criminal case, it would be easy. Dismissed, whatever. Void for vagueness -- if it was a constitutional challenge, void for vagueness. Don't be so sure it won't be a constitutional challenge at some point.

But we're talking here about misconduct, not mistake. So the first thing you have to ask yourself is, do you know the law and did you know it back on whatever date before you started this hearing on a pending case. Did you know about the Bruzzese decision in the SJC? Did you know about the Georgia Advisory Committee? The answer is, no, you didn't, of course, and none of us did.

And so what we were acting upon was our

common sense understanding and her judicial understanding of what a pending case was. Judge Lopez -- and it's probably the law. The law is argued beautifully in the briefs by both sides. I'm not going to try to recreate it here.

But I am going to say this: If you didn't know what it meant, you didn't know what it meant, I didn't know what it meant, they didn't know what it meant, Judge DelVecchio didn't know what it meant, did she have at least a right to maintain, I've finished my sentencing, the guy's on probation, this case is not around anymore, it's over? That's Judge DelVecchio's stated position under oath, it's not pending. That's Judge Lopez's position.

And why else should she be entitled to the benefit here and to show that it is not clear and convincing evidence of a violation? Well, I know Judge DelVecchio testified that each judge is autonomous and they're responsible for their own decision. But, you know, when you're sitting around with your Chief Judge and the head of the Public Information Office in the SJC, and you're a 14-year or five-year or six-year Superior Court judge, and the Chief doesn't say, "Hey, this case is pending,

you can't issue this" -- in fact, he's making markups on it -- and Joan Kenney doesn't say, "You can't
issue this," it goes to her good faith in her
understanding as to whether or not this was a
pending case. It goes to whether or not she thought
she was right and was acting in accordance with the
law and the like.

And I leave for a better day whether or not
the case is pending or not pending and the like

And I leave for a better day whether or not the case is pending or not pending and the like. But I think, without regard to any of it, her conduct was not proven to be misconduct by clear and convincing evidence in that regard.

Can we take a five-minute break? I'm getting close to wrapping up.

HEARING OFFICER DAHER: That would be fine. (Recess)

17 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Mr. Egbert. Pick 18 it up, Mr. Egbert.

MR. EGBERT: Thanks, Judge.

Two quick comments on the interaction of
Ms. Kenney and Judge Lopez and what you should take
from that and what the Commission has done. And now
is a good time for me to bring up this document that
the Commission filed, this inconsistent statements

or lies document. And I assure you I have no intention of going through it piece by piece, which we have in full response, my office. And I think you know that the way we responded is by including what we thought was appropriate.

But the very first example in the book relates to Ms. Kenney, and it should be emblazoned in the Court's memory as, quite frankly, what the Commission has done here is an attempt to play with the transcripts and the facts in this case, which is unheard of in the most highfalutin civil trials for trillions of dollars, not where we're supposed to be basically in a search for some understanding of the conduct of a judge.

But in the first -- the very first portion the Commission cited to you, they told you that Judge Lopez told Joan Kenney -- that she lied to Joan Kenney and that she told Joan Kenney that the boy was not kidnapped. And they say to you that you should then find that Judge Lopez is a liar because Joan Kenney -- because Judge Lopez told her that the boy was not kidnapped.

And they put in a section of the transcript that reads as follows: "Judge Lopez told you this

1 was not a kidnapping; isn't that right?" by Mr. Ware. "Answer: That's correct." 2 3 "So your best recollection is those were 4 her words without qualifiers; is that correct?" Ms. 5 Kenney: "Yes." And left out -- and had the gall to 6 leave out the rest of her testimony, where she says 7 the following, and answers the following questions -- I asked her the following question. 8 9 "Judge Lopez didn't use half a sentence. She didn't 10 say, 'This wasn't a kidnap.' You've testified 11 continuously, what she told you is, it wasn't a 12 traditional kidnap, that the boy got into the car 13 willingly, correct?" Ms. Kenney answered, "Yes." "That's what she said, correct?" "Answer: Yes. The 14 15 implication was he wasn't snatched off the street 16 and kidnapped; he got into the car willingly." 17 She was asked, "He got in willingly? He 18 was not snatched off the street by the arm or 19 something, correct?" She answered, "Correct." 20 "Question: Or by gun point, whatever the case may 21 be? Answer: That's correct." 22 So in an attempt to get you to make a 23 finding that Judge Lopez lied to Ms. Kenney and told 24 her that it was not a kidnap, when of course the

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1 fellow had pled guilty to kidnap, and to simply not provide you with the appropriate transcript 2 3 references where she clearly says what Judge Lopez 4 was saying to her was it was not a kidnap in the 5 traditional sense, meaning he wasn't snatched of the 6 street by force, is a fraud. It is fraudulent 7 lawyering. It is fraudulent advocacy. It is 8 something that you would think that the Commission 9 on Judicial Conduct would not stoop to in order to 10 try to obtain a conviction here, so called. 11 It is replete in their filing of those 12 matters. I am not going to go through every one. 13 We have filed, as you know, a 150-page response. 14 But I would ask that you consider, when they do 15 their PowerPoint presentation, that you make sure 16 when you're being shown transcripts on that 17 PowerPoint or matters on that PowerPoint, that 18 you're not being misled by halves and quarters of 19 the transcript. And this is replete throughout this 20 document. 21

With regard to Judge Lopez and Ms. Kenney, you should know there's this whole issue of what did Jay Greene say -- the Jay Greene event, let me call it. Well, the evidence in this case is clear: The

only thing that Judge Lopez knew that Jay Greene would say is what he told her, and that is that all the time in the street, I think he said, that Ebony Horton was flamboyant, was known around the streets, Ebony Horton was, and that he, Greene, did not think she was a danger to children or a pedophile.

That's what he told Judge Lopez. And Judge Lopez had every expectation that when she gave Joan Kenney that number, that that's what he would tell Joan Kenney. Now, what he told Joan Kenney, according to Joan Kenney, is I'm sure what he must have told her. But Judge Lopez would have no way of knowing that, first of all. And based upon what we now see of Jay Greene and his failure to testify here, his prior deposition transcript where he said he never talked to anybody, the level unfortunately of what he might say at any given time is unfortunately of some consequence.

But one thing Judge Lopez said in her deposition and in these proceedings, which ought to ring out, she said, "Look" -- she was asked, "Did you talk to people, friends and whatever, about this case?" And she said, "Yes." What person wouldn't? The press is in her front door and everything else,

a lot of people speaking out of turn.

And then the Commission asked her, "And what was your major discussion?" And just as she said here and she said everywhere else, "I didn't want anybody to think I had released a predatory pedophile." That's all she cared about. She has been a judge that has been involved in sentencing all her life, and the one thing she didn't want the community to think was that she was involved in releasing a predatory pedophile.

And so why is Jay Greene of consequence to her, as she said in her own testimony and deposition? Because it gave her some reassurance that, when a cop on the beat who knows everybody there, who knows Ebony Horton, who's a tough cop, at least had a reputation as such, when he says he's not a predatory pedophile, it assisted Judge Lopez in her mind that she had judged it right in that particular matter, as she was getting her brains beat in from every corner at every question.

The next area, so-called, is the alleged ex parte conversations with Goldbach and Leahy. I'll treat those shortly. They've been briefed quite well. Simply not ex parte contacts in the sense of

appropriate here.

the rule. They're not about any adjudicative matters. They're not such that it would affect any rulings or orders and the like. The case was not pending. All of that harassment of all that was been provided to the Court.

But bring it down to a more -- a simpler level, if I may. Goldbach says she was not asked or enticed to give any statements about the sentence. Judge Lopez said she called Leahy and told him to get out there and defend the sentencing, the process of the institution. Mr. Leahy, the head of CPCS, he's an institutional person with an institutional drive and bent, both legislatively and otherwise.

What's wrong with it? Joan Kenney testified that these things happened. She asked the Judge, "Who should I call for you to be out there and be surrogates?" That was her testimony. It's the Commission that has said, you can't do indirectly what you couldn't do directly. Well, by the same token, this is clearly permissible, this indirect kind of getting the surrogates to speak on these procedural matters and matters of institutional fairness, and it was perfectly

And as you cut the line -- and I guess here is what I would say, but I don't want to spend a lot of time with it. As you cut the line and look at the Commission's filing, they're desperately trying to find a way to make this bad, something nefarious, to make it all full of these people would be indebted to her now because they talked to her or some such nonsense -- it's to defy judging and to defy the integrity of the judiciary.

If our judiciary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts cannot be trusted to read a lawyer's name in the paper saying something about him and be trusted to act without bias in the next case with him and be trusted to act and not give away the store because some lawyer said something nice about them, then who's kidding who?

That's the concept that they're under. They basically said, she can't ever sit down with any lawyer who might appear in the Superior Court at any time, have lunch, have dinner, give pleasantries or whatever; our judges aren't expected to do that. And I suggest, if Your Honor please, when you look at the Goldbach contacts and the like, you will look at them from the same perspective.

The last allegation, the so-called pattern allegation, ends with Ms. Beaucage and the call to Ms. Beaucage. We'll treat the call first for what it is and then talk about this pattern. And I confess I do not understand the Commission's filing about how Judge Lopez was lying when she said she called Ms. Beaucage because she was concerned that the complaint was a phony. They say she's lying about that.

What possible reason would she have to call Ms. Beaucage if she wasn't trying to confirm her identification and her reality, so to speak? She didn't call and say, "I'm Judge Lopez. Look out." She didn't have somebody else calling for Judge Lopez, which probably would have been more intimidating. She simply called and said, "Hi. Is this Angela Beaucage?" "Yes." "Nice to speak with you."

Now, is eleven o'clock at night -- should she have called at eleven o'clock at night? I don't know. People call me at eleven o'clock at night and I get angry. But is that judicial misconduct? I mean, she called her to find out if she really exists. And that's exactly the way Ms. Beaucage

took it, by the way, when she testified. If you look at her testimony on my cross, she said she was pleasant, she was polite, nonharassing, non-intimidating. It seemed to her to be a confirmatory phone call. That's what it was.

By the way, she wasn't intimidated, hurt, upset or anything else until she went into the other room and looked at the call waiting and said, "Oh, it's Judge Lopez." How was she supposed to know that she had call waiting and that she would take it like that?

This is trumped up. But more importantly, this is what the Commission puts together and says, Aha, this is the pattern, because somehow this isn't related directly to the Horton case.

Well, when you read the record, I think you'll see that Judge Lopez had every right to be nervous and concerned about some of the complaints she was getting. She made a call, which was not wrong, was not intimidating, there was nothing wrong with it. Somebody took it wrong.

But really -- it's interesting. I want you to go back, Judge, and look at our brief and one aspect of it, and that's where we ask you to

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1 reconsider this ruling that you made on what happened before the deposition where they go off the 2 record with Ms. Beaucage, where she comes out and 4 says -- they're asking about the case. Mr. Braceras was there. And then they go off the record. And come off the record, and her first words without asking or being asked a question are, "Intimidated." And when you look at that, it must give you pause to 9 wonder what on earth goes on in those, quote, 10 investigative depositions. 11

You have permitted the Commission to go I haven't quarreled with your ruling in that last. regard and I'm not going to. I don't care. I'll go when I'm told to go.

But I would caution you, frankly, the way I would caution the jury, and that is that going last is not the freedom to misspeak and it is not the freedom to mislead. And going last, because it's the last word, doesn't mean it's the right word. Mr. Ware is a fine lawyer. He will make a fine presentation, I'm sure.

But I would ask the Court, based upon all of what's gone on in this case, to keep an open eye and an open ear, as I know you will, and to

consider, as you're sitting here today and as you sit through these proceedings, have you ever thought that there would be a proceeding like this of its length, tenor and duration for something that wasn't corruption, that wasn't dastardly abuse of office, that wasn't bribary, extorsion or fixing cases or using one's influence in a case in a wrongful manner to thwart our criminal justice or judicial system?

Did you ever think in a million years we would be here talking about a case where Judge Lopez screamed at a prosecutor for a minute after much justification and that now we can quibble and quarrel and wink and twink about her press release after days and thousands of dollars?

I ask you, Your Honor, no matter what you do, to keep this in perspective. And I know you will make your fact findings based on the real world, not some fanciful world, on the real record, not some misrepresented record. And I ask you to consider, as you do, the woman who sits before you, all that she has accomplished and done, in asking yourself what did she mean when she said this, and what did she mean when she said that, and what was she trying to accomplish, and the many things she

has accomplished.

I'm satisfied, Your Honor, that you have spent obviously the time and given us the patience to listen to us to make these determinations. I'm equally satisfied that you will be as time consuming and spend as much detail as you always have.

What I'm less than satisfied in is that the system which is in place in judicial conduct cases is a good one or a fair one or an intelligent one, quite frankly.

But I ask you to not worry about that. Simply look at what has been put before you and ask yourself whether or not the Commission has proved to you by clear and convincing evidence that this Judge has committed misconduct in any way. Think about that. Think about that. Think about, if I find a little something, what do I do with it. Think of this: in the scheme of what has occurred in this courthouse, the blasphemy of the Commission asking for the removal of this Judge.

Remember, not months ago there was a case before the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth, In Re Markey. A judge used his judicial position to deliberately interfere and

1 intercede in a case to affect the outcome of a case in front of another judge. And that judge suffered 2 a short suspension. Now think about that when the 4 Commission on Judicial Conduct wants you to remove 5 Judge Lopez for yelling on tape. Thank you, Your 6 Honor. 7 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Thank you, Mr. 8 Egbert. 9 Mr. Ware, we can pick it up at 1:30, a very 10 short break? Is that okay? 11 MR. WARE: It's really your choice, Your 12 Honor. My own preference would be just to skip 13 lunch, but I'm going to obviously defer to the 14 Court. 15 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: We'll take a 45-16 minute break, until 1:30, and I'll go as long as you 17 need to today. 18 (Luncheon recess) 19 20 21 22 23

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1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Mr. Ware, you may 3 proceed. 4 MR. WARE: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court. 5 6 First, Your Honor, let me respond to some 7 of Mr. Egbert's preliminary comments and to make clear that at this juncture the Commission has not 8 9 and does not intend to recommend, quote, removal of 10 Judge Lopez. That is not the position of the 11 Commission at this stage of the game. 12 The Commission intends to look at this 13 Court's findings, intends to look at the entire 14 record, and will make its own independent judgment 15 with respect to what sanction, if any, is 16 appropriate, based in no small part on what you 17 decide based on the evidence before you. 18 That is different from saying, as counsel, 19 we have presented you with a range of alternatives 20 based on the evidence as we see it, evidence which 21 obviously is not binding on you and does not purport 22 to speak for a Commission which has not yet had a

I can say, however, that no one takes

record presented to it for action.

pleasure in being here in this courtroom on behalf of the Commission. This is not a task to which anyone would look forward. It is not a proceeding to which the Commission looks forward. I'm sure it's not a proceeding or a further proceeding to which this distinguished Court looks forward.

To the extent Mr. Egbert has represented or referred to argument that the Judge is, quote, in contempt of the Commission, I don't know what that means. I don't know where it comes from. The Judge, of course, has an absolute right to defend herself here, and I think there's no greater testimony to that fact than that we've been here since November 18, 2002, over a number of weeks in a vigorous, heated debate about the facts in this case.

The Judge has had every opportunity not only to testify, but to present witnesses, and I can only presume that this Court will take a dispassionate view of that evidence.

And with that, let me turn to the evidence, because I think a good deal of what Mr. Egbert has said has filled in the gaps with his own opinion and with a number of characterizations, as distinguished

from the evidence. And to me, the most important evidence in this case is the testimony of Judge Lopez. She is the individual who knows what went on. She is the individual who made decisions with respect to what she would do, beginning on August 1st, running right through November 1, 2002 --excuse me, 2000. And so her testimony, to me, takes on not a disproportion, but a high proportion, a high importance in this proceeding, and that's why we have given it tremendous weight in the documents which we filed before the Court.

On August 1st, Your Honor, there's no dispute that there was a plea conference. And I, too, will go through this chronologically for ease of everyone's understanding. That plea conference, by the testimony, lasted somewhere between 10 and 20 minutes. That's it. On the high end, 20 minutes. On the low end, 10 minutes.

This was in the First Session of Suffolk Superior Court. For those of us who have been there, it's a busy session, not a deliberative session. It is largely a negotiation of what's about to happen. And the Commission does not contend that in that proceeding the Judge did not

afford the district attorney an opportunity to express her views.

The Judge disagreed with those views. The Judge announced the sentence. And the Judge, Judge Lopez, here has made a heavy point of the fact that as of August 1st, it was all over. She has said it repeatedly. She made a sentencing decision on that occasion. She never changed it. And as will be evident in a moment, but as has been said repeatedly by Mr. Egbert and in the testimony itself, the rest was a matter of form, according to the Judge. The district attorney requested a sentence of 8 to 10 years, based on sentencing guidelines, based on the facts of the case as she understood them and articulated them.

We now know that this social worker's report, which was proffered to the Judge, and on the basis of which the Judge said she made her decision, is a pretty flimsy document. I'm not saying that the Judge knew all of that at the time, although the Judge did testify before you that she had experience with such reports, that she had seen many of them before. And plainly on its face, this was a document generated by an employee of the defense

counsel, from CPCS.

I think Mr. Egbert is right. We're not here to question whether the Judge could in fact impose that sentence. She did. And I'm not here to test whether that is the appropriate sentence or an inappropriate sentence.

But in the course of that, the Judge also made a number of comments. The testimony is largely undisputed that she said something to the effect that she knows transgendered people. Ms. Joseph testified that she said, "I have a house in Provincetown. I know these people. They're not violent." Mr. Goldbach testified slightly differently, saying, "The Judge did say something about knowing transgendered people."

So on whatever basis the Judge made this decision, it's apparent that what she had before her was some argument, a four-page social worker's report, which we now know was prepared at the Nashua Street -- or following one meeting at the Nashua Street jail in 1999 by a social worker for the defense counsel.

According to Mr. Egbert, the heart of this case begins on August 3rd with the press release

issued by the District Attorney's office. That is the touchstone, the foundation stone, the linchpin of this entire defense argument here that the District Attorney's office was retaliating against Judge Lopez, that they were engaged in a reprisal, an offensive strike against this Judge.

A fundamental question unanswered, however, is why. Of the thousands of cases the office prosecutes and of the hundreds of cases they've had before Judge Lopez, many of which have resulted in probation, what is their motivation for picking this one case out of the hat on the basis of which to seek reprisal? And more extraordinarily, why is it that a young prosecutor, who necessarily would jeopardize her career in doing so, would single out this case to, quote, retaliate against Judge Lopez?

And if you look at the very first page of the briefs filed on behalf of Judge Lopez, the word "retaliate" appears repeatedly. The entire thrust of the Judge's defense here is, "I am a victim. I'm a victim of the District Attorney's office. I've been victimized by that District Attorney's office. They were out to get me. They conspired to do so. Deakin and Joseph made an affirmative decision. The

district attorney's office ginned up a press release to infuriate me and drew me into a circumstance in which I had no choice but to discipline them in the way that I did."

So let me draw the Court's attention to that press release, Exhibit 7, which I have put on the monitor.

First of all, what's notable here is the headline, "Boston Man Expected To Plead To Child Kidnapping, Sexual Assault." That's the headline. Nothing about transgendered persons, nothing about dressing like a woman. The headline, the attention-grabber from a District Attorney's office is factual in nature. It is specific to a type of crime; namely, that a Boston man is expected to plead to child kidnapping and sexual assault.

Now, this press release has been treated by the defense as if, literally and in other ways, as if it's some kind of criminal act on the part of the District Attorney's office, when in fact, not only is this release not unethical; it is an exercise of appropriate judgment and discretion by a public law office.

Like every other public law office and

agency, the District Attorney's office has limited resources. It's entitled to feature to the public what kinds of cases it is prosecuting, what kinds of crimes will result in retribution from that public law office, what law enforcement efforts our taxpayer dollars are being used to enforce. Not only is this not unethical, it is an entirely appropriate message to the public about what that office is doing. And there is nothing, nothing whatsoever unethical about this press release. And yet the Judge here purports to claim that this is somehow unethical.

And there's discussion about Rule 3.8 and so forth in the briefs. Suffice it to say at this point, since this can be debated in writing, those rules go to a circumstance in which there may be a jury trial and whether or not a prosecutor says something which could taint a jury.

This is not a jury trial. This is a guilty plea. This kind of press release occurs all the time, whether in federal court or in state courts across the country, and moreover, is in fact the judicial use and appropriate use of that office's resources to announce to the public what kinds of

crimes are being prosecuted; and for that matter, to give notice to those individuals in the community who may be tempted to engage in that kind of conduct that indeed, they'll be prosecuted. It is a good thing, not a bad thing.

Now, Judge Lopez says, Well, what's really wrong with this press release is that it refers to, quote, a transgendered person who appears as a woman. Again, entirely factual, not inflammatory language. I don't think it's the first time the public has heard a description of an individual as transgendered. Since this man's name is Charles Horton, it's no secret that if he's transgendered, he would appear as a woman. And in fact, obviously when he was in court for the public to see in a public proceeding, that was apparent.

So what is the problem here? This is two days too early? That does not make the press release unethical or improper in any way, shape or form.

And I think what is important to understand here, Your Honor, is that the use of this as the building block for the conspiracy by the District Attorney's office is fundamentally flawed. It isn't

such a building block. There is nothing wrong with it. There is, of course, the issue Judge Lopez would put to you, which is, did Leora Joseph inspire this press release. And I'll turn to that in a few moments. But while we have this on the screen, I ask you to note that it purports to be from Mr. Borghesani.

Now, Mr. Borghesani was on Judge Lopez's witness list, not ours. It's Judge Lopez who chose not to call him, presumably because he didn't have anything to say that she wanted to hear. But the more important point here is that this press release features specifically the head of the press office. The district attorney's office is a big organization. It has a specifically unambiguous structure as to how public relations and public information is to be handled.

The notion that a 30-year-old assistant district attorney, one of hundreds, has the authority to issue press statements is ludicrous, and it's inconsistent with the evidence. Both Deakin and Joseph have testified -- and of course, we have the District Attorney's manual -- that in fact, they have no such discretion and that what

happened here was the following of channels, and that those channels were scrupulously observed.

Until this trial, Judge Lopez never took the position that this press release was unethical. In fact, she took the contrary position. And she testified before the Commission, when asked about the press release, as I've put up now on the screen, that there is nothing inappropriate, nothing unethical about the press release.

She said it that time. I'm sure she would say today that she disagreed with it. She didn't think that attention should be drawn to an individual who was transgendered, even if he was a criminal defendant. Fair enough.

But the point is this whole notion of the press release being unethical or inappropriate is part of a trial epiphany in this case. When the Judge testified in October of 2001, a year before trial, at what our Supreme Judicial Court considers analogous to a grand jury proceeding, her testimony was, "There is nothing unethical, nothing inappropriate about this." In fact, she notes that the District Attorney's office, among other things, is headed by a political office and that there are

reasons for these kinds of press releases.

I think that's significant, Your Honor. And I think it substantiates that the Judge is being situational in her ethics, her own ethics about this press release. It is not a building block of anything in this case.

On August 4th, when the parties appeared in court, much has been said about media frenzies, circuses and so forth. If you actually go back and look at the testimony in this case, Your Honor, there was no media frenzy; there was no circus.

The literal testimony about the press that was at the Suffolk County courthouse on August 4th is as follows: Ms. Goldbach saw nothing whatsoever, did not see a camera poked in the face of the defendant's mother. Her testimony, at most, is she heard some yelling. That's what Ms. Goldbach testified to.

The testimony of the assistant district attorney is there was one camera in the courtroom, no different than the camera that's before us now. Hardly a media circus.

Maybe it's true that a camera was put in the face of Mr. Horton and his mother as they

attempted to get off an elevator. That's just too bad. He is a criminal defendant in a public proceeding. The press is entitled to take his picture. And if he doesn't like it, maybe he shouldn't commit the crime. But it doesn't make a media circus. And it didn't interfere in any way whatsoever with anything that was going to be going on in the courtroom, because it didn't occur in the courtroom.

The courtroom had one camera, and there's not a shred of evidence in this case to the contrary. So this notion of media circuses or frenzies as having caused disruption in the proceedings is a creature of tactics in this litigation. It's not what the evidence says.

With respect to what occurred on August 4th, what we know is that almost immediately, when Ms. Goldbach, the defense lawyer, saw the cameras — the camera in the hallway, the camera in the courtroom, whatever, and realized that the camera in the courtroom was there for the Horton matter, she requested a conference. She was emotional about it.

When the parties went into the lobby to see Judge Lopez, there was no reasoned discussion, What

can we do about this. There was no reasoned discussion about how can we solve the problem or whether indeed there was a problem. The evidence is consistent that what happened in the lobby was that the Judge began excoriating the assistant district attorney, Ms. Joseph; from the inception began, in Ms. Joseph's words, to attack her.

Now, maybe at another point Ms. Joseph, regarding the Estrada case, fine; she overstated it. I will concede that. There's no question that based on the audiotape, she wasn't yelling. All well and good. Maybe she was too emotional. Maybe she was overwrought. I don't know. And the evidence doesn't tell us.

But the more important point is, the fact that she overstated it doesn't change what occurred on August 4th, because that testimony is unrebutted and is confirmed by Anne Goldbach and the Judge, that she said, "You belong in the suburbs. You are mean. You are cruel."

Now, I, too, have been in this profession a good many years; and to my way of thinking, that's not a professional review. That is not the way in which responsible judges deal with what they

perceive to be problems. And had Judge Lopez truly thought that this plea was in jeopardy of not occurring or that one camera in the courtroom would somehow be disruptive, the Judge could have raised that with counsel and had a discussion about, for example, changing courtrooms or continuing a case, none of which occurred.

Rather, the evidence is, the Judge got immediately into an accusatory frame of mind, made highly personal comments to the assistant district attorney and announced that she was going to continue the case; and for good measure, when Ms. Joseph was leaving the lobby, said to Ms. Goldbach, "Maybe we should continue this case to a date when Ms. Joseph is on vacation."

I don't think that represents a professional, dispassionate consideration by an experienced Superior Court Judge of a basis upon which a case should or might be continued. Rather, it indicates a judge already out of control or a judge who is in fact biased, either against Ms. Joseph as an individual, because of her prior experience, or the District Attorney's office in general, because she's infuriated that attention was

drawn to this case at all.

In either event, the Judge had an obligation to do something about that. If the Judge had a bias to which she's entitled, fine. But it was her obligation to disclose the bias and to do something about that, which is to say, request that someone else handle the case from the District Attorney's office, which ultimately, in effect, she did by forcing Mr. Deakin to handle the matter; or for that matter, handing off the case to another judge, sending the case to another session, if not for the plea conference, since that had already occurred, to take the plea itself. All of this could have been done in a dispassionate, professional way.

One of the ironies here of touting the incident with Judge Russo is that, in fact, that's exactly what Judge Russo did. Judge Russo did not issue a bunch of personal findings excoriating David Deakin for unprofessionalism, telling him he belonged in the suburbs, faxing off a press release to the Boston television stations and trying to embarrass him.

What did he do? He did what any

professional person or judge would do. He picked up the phone. He called the district attorney, and he said, you know, "I've got a problem with this guy and I want to correct it." Now, whether Judge Russo was right or he was wrong, whether he correctly perceived what Mr. Deakin was doing or, as Mr. Deakin says, "I didn't say that" -- or at least he didn't intend that, we don't know.

But the fact is Judge Russo had the presence, the dispassion, the fairness, the professionalism to handle the matter in a professional way, not in an emotional way, exhibiting bias and underscoring to the public that the judge could not promote confidence in the integrity of the judiciary; but rather, through her court order, dragged the entire proceeding into the mud and into personal comments about the assistant district attorney.

It is not evidence, Your Honor, but it's intuitive as human beings that when, as a 60-year-old man, I deal with a 30-year-old lawyer, I have to cut that lawyer some slack. I have to have some understanding about the fact that that's a younger individual who has a long career. I would expect a

judge with 14 years experience to take the same factors into account. I would expect that judge, if truly distressed on a professional level about an assistant district attorney, I would expect that judge to handle that in a professional way which could be constructive for that assistant district attorney and improve that district attorney's habits or course of conduct as she goes forward in her career.

What I would not expect is what Leora Joseph got in this case, which was an excoriation, a whipping, a personal embarrassment by Judge Lopez, who was in a bullying position. Obviously the contest between a Superior Court Judge and a 30-year-old prosecutor is not a fair fight.

Judge Lopez did not call Ms. Joseph into her chambers and on a one-on-one basis say, "You know, I don't like the fact that the press was here. That bothers me, and I want you to level with me about what went on." That could have happened. did not happen, and it did not happen, because this judge chose not to be a professional but to be personal and to be unprofessional. And that is the essence, Your Honor, of bias.

With respect to Ms. Joseph's role in the press release, Your Honor, the evidence here is that she did what office policy requires; that is to say, she went back from the lobby conference with Judge Lopez, she reported events to her supervisor, Mr. Deakin, and that supervisor took the issue up the chain to Elizabeth Keeley and eventually to Mr. Borghesani. Obviously, the decisions for a prospective press release were made at a more senior level.

And I remind the Court that the Judge's theory of retaliation doesn't square with the evidence here, because Ms. Joseph testified that way back in December of 1999 or January of 2000, the original Superior Court arraignment in the Horton case in January of 2000, that Mr. Borghesani button-holed her at that time and said, "I know you've got this case, but I want you to keep me posted on it."

So the fact that in August of that same year Ms. Joseph went back to her office and reported to her superior and raised the question whether press attention is appropriate is entirely consistent with what she had been asked to do and is

entirely consistent with what any young professional prosecutor would be expected to do.

The attack on Ms. Joseph, I would suggest to the Court, is entirely unsupported and unjustified by the Judge. She harkens back to the Estrada case. And she says that on the basis of that Estrada case, she had animosity at some level about Ms. Joseph and that that gave rise to her attitudes on August 4th. And she points in particular to the Eileen McNamara article. And I asked the Judge in the course of her testimony whether or not she viewed that article as a comment that Ms. Joseph had been unethical, and she said that she did.

I've put on the monitor a bit of testimony. "And you characterized that column as representative of Ms. Joseph's criticizing you or your sentence, is that so? Answer: In making what I deemed to be inappropriate and probably unethical comments to the press."

Now, Judge, we went over at some length the McNamara column, and I certainly invite the Court to look at it again and look at it at your leisure. I don't intend to do that. I will say that this

labored dissection of the McNamara article, as it appeared in Judge Lopez's brief, is ludicrous. That dissection purports to find ghosts around every corner in that article.

And yet in fact, the article is no more than a comment by the District Attorney's office, a comment in which Ms. Joseph was requested by that office to sit for an interview. She took a precaution of being accompanied by a more senior person in that office, and she did nothing in that article to personally criticize Judge Lopez.

Is it true that inferentially it is critical of the Judge's decision? Yes, I would say that's true, insofar as anybody can string together the fact that these were Judge Lopez's cases and it's disagreeing with the sentence. If you want to call that a criticism of the Judge's sentence, yes, so be it.

But it was in no way, shape or form an inappropriate comment on the Judge, her ethics, her views of the world, her predispositions. It was a perfectly legitimate comment to the newspaper about the basis of sentencing, the theoretics of sentencing, the philosophical reasons for sentences.

A heavy point has been made by Mr. Egbert and the Judge about the Estrada case and what is claimed to have been an overreaching statement in the course of the guilty plea by Ms. Joseph that gave rise to the Judge's suspicions, ongoing suspicions about her.

But, Your Honor, if you look at that case, here is a case, just to refresh, in which a 11-year-old child between the ages of 11 and 15 is repeatedly raped by this guy who lives in her house -- stepfather or boyfriend or whatever it was -- in a closed bathroom, with this man taking out his penis and sticking it in this kid's mouth. And the assistant district attorney referred to that as "vile." Well, you know what? It sure as hell is vile. It was vile then. It's vile now.

If anything, the assistant district attorney understated the issue on that occasion. I would say that is commendable restraint on the part of the assistant district attorney to have referred to that merely as "vile." It is far more than that.

I think for Judge Lopez to come before you and try to use that as an illustration of an overreaching prosecutor who somehow is trying to

retaliate against the Judge, says more about Judge Lopez than it will ever say about Leora Joseph. That is a distortion of what is right. It is a distortion of the kinds of values that good judges bring to bear when they sit in judgment on people.

There is absolutely nothing wrong with what Leora Joseph said. There is nothing wrong with pointing out that the pastor, the mother, whoever wanted this guy around for economic reasons -- she was entitled to say, "That's a mistake. Those are misplaced values, Judge. That is wrong. Stick the guy in jail." Of course she should say that. She owed the public that kind of representation in that courtroom.

Mr. Egbert and the Judge, for that matter, tried to say to you, Oh, well, wait a minute. This wasn't the sentencing phase. This was just providing a factual basis for a plea. And they've made repeated — this strained argument that when a prosecutor is reciting facts for purposes of sufficiency of a guilty plea, that somehow has to be constrained. That's supposed to be this narrow little set of facts just sufficient to get this plea over the bar. That is not the legal requirement.

Any prosecutor, federal or state, has discretion to state such facts as that prosecutor believes she or he would prove in the event the case went to trial. To the extent that a defendant feels those facts are overstated, that defendant can do exactly what Mr. Horton did. He can disagree with them, and the Judge can then say, Well, I'm going to take into account what you disagreed with and what you've agreed with. I find that there are or are not sufficient facts to warrant this guilty plea.

So this artificial notion that the prosecution should not have said something is not reality. It is not a legal requirement. This is not the Judge's province. She can say what she wants. Mr. Egbert can say what he wants. The prosecution's burden — the prosecution's discretion is to decide what evidence they would proffer were the case to go to trial. That is not Judge Lopez's discretion. And the prosecution has wide latitude to articulate such facts as they believe are appropriate, the obvious check being the defendant can disagree with them.

Again, I think what's important here is, this is a distortion by the Judge of what went on in

the Estrada case. It is a distortion of what the prosecution's right is. There was absolutely nothing wrong with what this young prosecutor said.

I turn, if I may now, to the August 4th findings. And the Court may recall the testimony here that what happened on the afternoon of August 4th preceding these findings was that Mr. Deakin himself went to the courthouse.

Not mentioned this morning by my colleague is the fact that the first thing Mr. Deakin did was ask for a meeting with the Judge. He asked to see her in the lobby. And he told us that the reason he did that was that he hoped to get the temperature down. He wanted to diffuse what was obviously already a circumstance out of control, based on the comments that the Judge had made to Leora Joseph earlier that day.

Judge Lopez refused. She would not see him with or without defense counsel. She would not permit a professional exchange about the differences. Rather, the Judge let the parties stew for a few hours in the courtroom. When the last matter had finally been called, Mr. Deakin went to the clerk and said, "Hey, what about this case?"

Finally the Judge came out. She considered the case. Statutorily she was required to make certain findings because of its continuance. I think, truth be told, in candor, she was mad as hell at the prosecution that they were forcing her to make those findings and said so. "You'll get your findings."

And she wrote these findings out, no doubt in extreme anger, anger generated that morning, anger generated because there was a camera, anger generated because the Judge believed she was right in the sentence that she had decided upon for Mr. Horton. And she saw this as creating a problem.

But the fact is there is no way to look at those findings and not to conclude that a good deal of emotion surrounded the Judge in which she got caught up as she wrote these findings.

The Judge, when she came out, indicated, improperly, that she was too busy to hear the matter. That plainly was not correct. Fine, she had 18 bails. So be it. But the fact is the Judge did have time to do the findings and fax them off by 4:00. No question she had the time. More importantly, she had already continued the case in

the morning in the lobby. She announced immediately she was going to continue the case.

So to come out on the bench and announce on the record that she was doing this because she was too busy is plainly not candid. It's plainly not the truth about what the Judge was doing or why she was doing it.

In these findings, Your Honor, the Judge has agreed that she intended them to mean that the District Attorney's office had acted unethically in this press release. And if I could, I just want to put up one quick exchange, and this is simply my question to the Judge:

"It follows... that you were saying that the District Attorney's office at large acted unethically in this case, isn't that so?" We were talking about the findings here in the press release. "And you knew that was the impact of your order?"

"Correct."

So here is the Judge agreeing -- not my words, not my characterization -- that she intended with this order to accuse the District Attorney's office of acting unethically. That, Your Honor, is

wholly unsupportable or insupportable, whichever it is.

There is no evidence that this was an unethical act on the part of the District Attorney's office. The Judge goes on to say -- and I'm not going to put it up at the moment -- that her findings were intended to say that Leora Joseph and Mr. Deakin and the district attorney's office acted intentionally to create a circus, acted intentionally to embarrass and ridicule a defendant.

There is no evidence whatsoever of that. I think if you take a step back at this juncture, Your Honor, and you think about what kinds of findings would a responsible Superior Court Judge need to make on a continuance -- I mean, this labored argument is made that the district attorney's office could have appealed a continuance. Can you imagine it? I don't care if it's theoretically possible or not under some statute. No one appeals a continuance. And that's what this was.

But more importantly, taking that step back, the question here is, what in this order was necessary to have a continuance? Did the Judge need to make a finding that the assistant district

attorney intentionally tried to embarrass and ridicule the defendant? That didn't have anything to do with the continuance, according to the Judge.

Did the Judge need to make a finding that the District Attorney's office tried to turn this into a media circus, which she says meant they intentionally tried to do that? Did that have anything to do with the continuance? No. These were gratuitous personal slaps at the individual lawyers and at the district attorney's office in general.

I think if we could look at the findings for a moment. This particular finding has been labored over -- and I'm going to spend only seconds on it -- the issue of calling the press in. I mean, I would certainly agree that in the most general sense, because Ms. Joseph was the prosecutor in the case and communicated to her superior, in that broad sense, she communicated the fact that the case was on for a guilty plea. If you want to call that "calling the press in," I suppose it is.

But this finding is more specific. This is saying Ms. Joseph, not the district attorney's office, called the press in. That's wrong. She

reported to her superiors, and her superiors followed a well-worn path, consistent with the policy of that office.

Her finding that Ms. Joseph attempted to embarrass and ridicule a defendant I think is simply unjustified. It is another example of the Judge being overreaching and personal in a way that she simply did not need to be. If what the Judge was trying to justify here was a continuance, what difference does it make? How did this help? Why be gratuitous?

If the Judge does not have a bias, why make this personal attack on a 30-year-old prosecutor, using her name and testifying here that she intended that to mean Ms. Joseph was unethical and that she did it on purpose.

And finally, this business of the district attorney's office having sought to turn the proceedings into a circus, there is no justification for that. Is that because there was a press release on August 3rd? Does that constitute turning the proceedings into a circus? I don't think so, Your Honor. The district attorney's office sends out press releases every day, sometimes in anticipation

of guilty pleas, sometimes for other purposes. It does not follow inexorably from that that they're trying to interfere with court proceedings or judges and turn the courthouse into a circus.

I think also you should note the Judge's language. The language is inflammatory: "circus," "embarrass" and "ridicule." These aren't words of dispassion and finding by a judge. They're words of emotion. They're improper words for the context.

And that's at the heart of what went wrong here. Judge Lopez got mad, lost it and made findings that are highly inappropriate and harmful to the people involved, serving no professional purpose.

Importantly, the Judge then scaled up the problems here. And I draw the Court's attention to Exhibit 49, the press release to Channels 4, 5, 7 and 56. And the Court may recall the testimony, which is that after the Judge wrote the findings, I have contended that she labeled this a press release and faxed it off to all the television stations, notably at 4:00 in the afternoon, so it could make the six o'clock news, and she did that specifically and unambiguously to embarrass the prosecution and

the district attorney's office.

Now, the Judge says, Well, wait a minute, that's not my handwriting. Somebody in the courthouse did that, one of the clerks or something did that. I don't think that's credible, Your Honor. I cannot image a clerk in any courthouse, this one or any other courthouse, taking into her or his own hands labeling this as a press release and making some decision to fax it off to local television stations.

It obviously didn't happen that way. I don't care if it's Judge Lopez's handwriting or not. It is obvious enough that the Judge gave a direction to someone, "Send this as a press release to Joan Kenney and tell her to fax it to the TV stations right now." That's what's happened here and that's what Ms. Kenney has testified to. She said, "I got this. I understood it to be a press release. I faxed it off to the television stations."

And again, Your Honor, let's step back and ask ourselves whether this is consistent with a judge's creating, promoting confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Why did the television stations need to see this? Because there had been a

camera in the courtroom and because the case was continued? Is that why? What justified Judge Lopez in faxing this out to all the media with these highly personal comments in it?

Nothing justified that, except the Judge's own sense of retribution, sanctioning the lawyers, firing a shot against the bow of Ralph Martin. That's what this was all about.

And so this had its intended effect. The following day, on August 5, articles did appear in the Boston newspapers. This happens to be one from the Herald. It quotes directly from the Judge's, quote, press release. It specifically identifies Ms. Joseph. And it repeats these findings that are extraneous to the continuance.

I think it's ironic that the Judge would argue to you that the August 3rd press release using the word "transgendered" is bad, is unethical, but that this press release from the Judge is fine. This is good stuff because it comes from a Judge, but that press release that used the word "transgendered" and said the defendant looked like a female, that's unethical. Your Honor, there's something wrong with that argument, and I think this

court can cut through it.

The other contradiction in this, Your Honor, is that here's a judge who tells you under oath, "The whole reason I continued this case on August 4th was press attention. I thought it was unfair. I thought they were going to disrupt the proceeding."

Now, we can pass the question how she could come to that conclusion, since there was no proceeding and there was one camera in the courtroom. I don't know how the Judge could come to that conclusion. We have, as I've said, a camera here. I don't think it's disrupted a great deal today.

But passing that, here's a judge that said to you, "On August 4th I had to continue the case because I thought the press would disrupt things," or "I thought there was a media circus" or whatever.

And yet the Judge, in her press release, goes one better. She goes way beyond the August 3rd press release in terms of what she says about Mr. Horton. She labels him as having a psychological disorder. The district attorney hadn't said anything about that. She labels him as having a

sexual identity disorder.

It's the Judge herself who sticks these labels on Mr. Horton's back. These are all facts which at that time were confidential. No one knew them. They had not yet been disclosed to the public. And yet, Judge Lopez self-righteously comes in here and says to you, "Oh, I had to continue this thing on August 4th, this was awful," meanwhile faxing to television stations her personal views of psychological disorders and sexual identity disorders.

She then scaled it up one more notch. She announced to the public and the newspapers, "By the way, I'm in a vicious fight with the district attorney's office here; and if you want to see the next round, you can all come back on September 6th."

And the newspaper articles in fact print that. They print her findings. They print how the district attorney's office has turned this into a circus, "embarrass" and "ridicule." They print that the next bout will be on September 6th.

So for the Judge now to turn around and say on September 6th, "I was all worked up because the press was there, because I had this history with Ms.

Joseph" is sophistry. The press was there and interested not because this was the first transgendered person they had ever seen, but because the Judge had put out a press release the month before saying, "This is going to be a good one; and if you guys want to see it, show up on September 6th." It's the Judge's press release that scaled this case up into a major incident, and that is a central contradiction in what the Judge has tried to proffer to you here in this proceeding.

I guess a footnote here. I'm reminded, you might recall as well -- let me turn to September 6th.

On September 6th we know that the Judge unilaterally made a number of arrangements. I don't want to over-dramatize or underscore those arrangements. I would certainly agree that a judge has broad discretion to manage the courthouse, to manage the courtroom, to make decisions with respect to security, order, television cameras. That's not the dispute here.

All we're saying here is that this was a circumstance in which the Judge hadn't been asked to do any of that. There was no security issue here.

Mr. Egbert uses the word "security." What's the security issue? Is the defendant to be made secure from a television camera?

There was no security issue. No one had ever used the word "security" on August 4th. Ms. Goldbach didn't even know about these arrangements as they were set up on September 6th until she got to the courthouse -- or I think she said perhaps she got a call from someone earlier.

So the point is, these arrangements were not for security. They were gratuitous.

Now, is that fatal? Is that a terrible thing? No, it's not a terrible thing. But they were gratuitous; and in the aggregate, when combined with other solicitous efforts by this Judge for this defendant, they certainly create an appearance of bias. In and of themselves, they are harmless. In and of themselves, she had the right to do it. But the point here is private elevators for defendant and defense counsel, keeping him in a separate room, when no one's requested it — the district attorney is not even alerted — it isn't that those things are wrong in and of themselves, of course not.

The question is, how do they fit into a

larger mosaic of the Judge's conduct over time and her solicitous attitude toward this defendant? That's their only import. I don't want to glorify them in this argument or in our papers.

I will note, however, that according to the evidence, as a practical matter, what happened on September 6th was Mr. Horton never got the word, and he walked in the front door, and nobody looked at him or photographed him. He took the elevator to the relevant floor and walked into the courtroom and sat down. That's what Ms. Goldbach told us. So there goes your security issue.

In addition, Ms. Goldbach testified that what happened on that day was the cameras were in fact observed to be photographing a different transsexual -- transgendered person in the courthouse. So I don't think we even have any evidence in this case that the press were particularly interested one way or another in Mr. Horton. Obviously they were covering the case; and obviously when proceedings began on September 6th, they were present.

Importantly here, Your Honor -- again stepping back -- by September 6th, about six weeks

had elapsed since the inflammatory relationship between the district attorney and the Judge on August 4th. One has to wonder how it is that a judge with 14 years experience didn't calm down a little bit in those six weeks. How is it that the Judge didn't get in better proportion the fact that she was going back in on September 6th; she knew there would be cameras.

In fact, earlier on September 6th itself, she talked with Joan Kenney about entering an order with respect to the press. All of this was known. It was all anticipated. The Judge herself had sent out her press release. Everything that happened on September 6th was entirely predictable, except the Judge's own conduct. Everything else was predictable; that there would be cameras, that there would be public attention, that the Judge had personally and unambiguously invited that attention with her press release. It was all set up by the Judge. No surprises to Judge Lopez.

How is it, then, if this conduct of the Judge's is said to promote confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and has no appearance of impropriety, how is it that this Judge walked into

court on September 6th with yet another or perhaps the same chip on her shoulder, having it in for the district attorney's office.

There's no evidence here that the district attorney's office, quote, retaliated against Judge Lopez. None whatsoever. If the Judge truly believed that there was an issue after August 4th, why didn't she do something about it? Why didn't she do what Judge Russo did and pick up the phone, have someone else assigned to the case, transfer the case for disposition, a host of alternatives, all within Judge Lopez's control.

Now, as Mr. Egbert said and as I said earlier, according to the Judge's testimony, the sole purpose of what was to happen on September 6th was to legally formalize, according to them -- Jim, could I have the slide -- what had already been decided on August 1st.

And the Judge testified to that herself.

"After you deliver a sentence in court" -- Mr.

Egbert here talking about August 1st -- "has it been your experience that the arguments of counsel thereafter are for form or for substance?

"They are for form," says the Judge.

And repeatedly we've been treated to the argument here that all the important work, all of the heavy lifting happened on August 1st. September 6th was an afterthought -- not an afterthought, too strong; but in any event, a formalistic cementing of the guilty plea and imposition of a sentence to which the defendant had already agreed.

Well, if that's true, Judge, if we take Judge Lopez at her word, that the rest was form, we take her at her word that the heavy lifting was done on August 1st, then the Judge's questions to the district attorney, "Do you suggest a female prison or a male prison?" are simply to bait the prosecution. They have no fundamental substantive purpose. Her question to Mr. Deakin about rating the case had no value in that proceeding, according to Judge Lopez herself. She says, "I had done it all on August 1st."

Why, then, if that's the case, is Judge Lopez asking questions about female prisons and male prisons or rating the case on September 6th? Mr. Egbert argues forcefully that it doesn't really matter whether Judge Lopez on September 6th was right or wrong as she interpreted what Mr. Deakin

said. That was her interpretation. That's enough.
Your Honor, that's not enough. The Judge
owed the prosecution -- who, after all, is the
lawyer for the public, the public's interest -- the
Judge owed that lawyer her attention and her
thoughtful consideration of his views. If she was
going to ask any question, like rating the case, it
was her obligation to hear him out and understand
him and not excoriate him by picking out one number
and saying, "You're being disingenuous."

And in any event, the testimony is absolutely clear -- or the transcript, Exhibit 22, is absolutely clear that Mr. Deakin's answer was highly responsible, breaking down the seriousness of the offense into three components and rating each separately.

But the more important point again, if we take Judge Lopez at her word that this was all form on September 6th, then there's no reason for the Judge to have baited the prosecution. There's no reason for her to have a rating of the case at all. There's no reason for her to suggest, "Do you suggest a female prison or a male prison?"

And I think the inference you can draw as a

fact finder is, she was posturing. She did this because she perceived herself to be gaining some advantage in her arm wrestling with the district attorney's office, and she was herself attempting to expose them in front of cameras.

The Judge goes on to interrupt the prosecutor. Again, fatal? No. Terrible transgression? No. But as part of that overall mosaic, it, too, suggests a bias on the part of the Judge. As I said earlier, it's the prosecution's discretion which, how many, and what level of facts are proffered to the Court on a guilty plea. It's not the Judge's discretion.

There is no law that says you've got to give the minimalist account of the crime. That's not the case. The district attorney's office has a legitimate public purpose in articulating all of the facts it chooses to articulate which support the pleas of guilty. They do not have to do the bare minimum, as the Judge is suggesting here.

Indeed, that's quite an ironic argument, because out of the other side of her mouth she says, "You didn't tell me enough." So on the one hand she argues she had a right to interrupt him and to limit

him to just the facts that are, quote, relevant. That's one argument she makes to you.

And then Mr. Egbert says, Well, wait a minute. There's a bunch of other things you didn't tell me about. So "You didn't say enough," "You said too much," and "You didn't say enough." That is the argument that's been made to you here this morning. And the "not enough" is Mr. Deakin didn't mention that this so-called threat by Horton -- and I don't want to get sidetracked on that, but I will observe that -- the threat, to remind the Court what the evidence was on the tape, allegedly is that the child says on the videotape he, Horton, said to him, "I'm going to get my husband to come out here and kill you if you don't shut up," in effect.

Now, of course, the prosecution knew -- the child didn't, but the prosecution knew that he had no husband. He knew that that wasn't a real death threat. And I'm sure that if Mr. Deakin asserted that fact for purposes of this guilty plea, the Judge would have taken him to task for it.

Mr. Egbert also says, "Well, the prosecution didn't mention that he was being dragged into the car by his arm." Well, the prosecution

didn't have to mention that because Judge Lopez has testified to you that she knew it because Goldbach told her on August 4th. And in Volume III, at Pages 126 and 127, beginning at Line 16, in effect the question is, "Didn't Ms. Goldbach tell you that the victim said he was pulled by the arm through a window of the car?"

Answer from Judge Lopez: "Yes. I believe she had a different version of how the kid got into the car, and it involved some pulling into it, yes."

So what kind of an argument is this, the prosecution didn't mention it, but it was already out there and the Judge knew it? Then why should the prosecution mention it again? The Judge knew it. It was on the table. How is that a problem with what the district attorney's office said? I'd say, more accurately, it's a clever use or nonuse of the testimony in this case by counsel.

As far as the third prong of what the district attorney is alleged not to have said that he should have said is that Mr. Horton lay on top of the child. I'm not clear why that is so significant, since Mr. Deakin clearly said that defendant was intending to do a sexual act. The

defendant admitted that to the police. Mr. Deakin did relate that in the facts.

And if you look at Exhibit 22, which I'm not going to do now, you will see four pages of testimony there, beginning at Pages 12, Line 21, all the way through Page 15, Line 22, that it's just a series of fact after fact after fact, including what Horton had told the police; facts which establish that the child was kidnapped, that he was crying, that he wanted to go home, Horton wouldn't let him, that a screwdriver was put to his neck, that Horton told the police he intended to do a sexual act with the child. Maybe there was more to tell, I don't know, but it seems to me that the prosecution's discretion was appropriately used there.

I do not want to play the videotape at this point. I think we've all perhaps had enough of that. And so I turn to the argument made today and actually made in the papers about Mr. Deakin's refusal to sit down. And you will recall that, during the course of the colloquy, the Judge is yelling at Mr. Deakin, and she says something to the effect, "Sit down now. You may sit down." He says, "Your Honor, may I --" and she says, "You may sit

down now or I'll have a court officer make you sit
down."

And the Judge, I must say to my astonishment, argues to you that's contempt. That's literally what she argues and what she testified to in the trial. And I put on the monitor that testimony.

And the Judge's position on this is her instruction to the lawyer for the Commonwealth that he sit down while he's trying to make a presentation on behalf of the public in a criminal prosecution, and she calls him disingenuous, and he fights back by saying, "Your Honor, if I may, I don't appreciate that." She says, "Well, that's contempt."

Well, Your Honor, what's contemptible is a judge who would make that argument. There's nothing contemptuous or contumacious about anything Mr. Deakin did as a public lawyer having been called disingenuous in a criminal proceeding with a judge out of control. He had no obligation whatsoever to cower under the lash of a Superior Court Judge who has lost it. The obligation he had was to be courteous and forthright.

And the tape demonstrates that at every

1 step of the proceeding, notwithstanding the outrages of the Judge, he was consistently courteous and 2 3 distinguished and an appropriate representative of 4 the people. That is not contempt. He has no 5 obligation to sit there and take it from Judge Lopez 6 or anybody else. In fact, his obligation is to the 7 contrary. To the extent he did not believe he was disingenuous, he had an obligation to explain why. 8 9 He did that with courtesy, with aplomb, with 10 professionalism. And I think it's a distortion of 11 an honorable public servant's work in this case for 12 the Judge to claim to you that it's contumacious. 13 If anything's outrageous, it's the Judge's position. 14 I turn now, Your Honor, to the events after 15 September 6th. And perhaps not surprisingly, I have 16 a somewhat different take on this than Mr. Egbert. 17 First of all, Mr. Egbert talked about the 18 Judge's courage. Well, I think a judge is 19 courageous when a judge, having made findings, is 20 prepared to live with the consequences of those 21 findings. He is prepared to stand the gaff. He is 22 prepared to take whatever criticism is inherent in 23 having made such a decision. That's what good 24 judges do. They do it everyday. And I'm sure they

don't like it. They can't strike back. They have a position of great honor, but also of great responsibility.

This is a judge who made a very, very different decision. She was not courageous. She engaged almost immediately in circulating the wagons of public opinion, and she did that in a highly improper way. And what the evidence shows here is that her dealing with Ms. Kenney and the Supreme Judicial Court's Office of Public Information was anything but candid. She owed that office absolute candor. And yet, her approach to that was, What can I do to get some spin? I've got to do something about my low level comment in court.

At that point -- this is September 7th, the day after the sentencing -- the press had had a field day with her having characterized the offense as "low level." By the way, we can sit here and debate the metaphysics of what the Judge said in court until the cows come home, but common sense looking at the tape will tell you that the Judge was absolutely referring to the offense. And this caricature of an argument today that, Well, yeah, she's talking about the offense, but only in the

context of other serious cases. All child abuse cases are serious, so it's low level within this high level.

That's not what the public understood, because that's not what the Judge said, and I dare say, that's not what the Judge meant, because those aren't her words. That itself is a distortion.

In any event, her approach here was to go to Joan Kenney of the SJC's Public Information Office. She believed that she could use this office to ameliorate the reaction to her sentence. And she treated that as spin. And her testimony on that is quite clear. I'll put some of it on the monitor. This is the Judge's testimony before trial, a year before trial to the Commission counsel. "...I thought they," meaning the office of Joan Kenney, "would have better expertise as to how to frame or what spin to give whatever than I would..." She repeats it again some pages later. "...and they were giving some sort of spin to the low-level statement that was in the tape."

And here at trial she repeated it a third time. My question, "The reason you didn't want to make this information known or any corrections to

Ms. Kenney or Justice DelVecchio is that you viewed this as an exercise in spin?

"Answer: That's correct."

Now, Your Honor, I would contend that that's a perversion of the process; that in dealing with the SJC's Office of Public Information, it's not an exercise of spin. It ought to be an exercise either in truth-telling or in silence. But in no event did Judge Lopez have the right to spin, to spin the truth.

And I think the central problem with spin, with the Judge's use of the Office of Public Information, is that if you think about it, what the Judge is really saying is on September 6th I sat in a courtroom. The defendant was under oath. He admitted to a host of facts which I believe as a judge constituted kidnapping, indecent assault, assault with intent to rape a child under 14. I believe what he admitted to was so serious, that they constitute sufficient evidence to convict him of those five felonies. That's September 6th.

On September 7th the Judge goes to the SJC Office of Public Information, goes behind what she had done in open court, says to Joan Kenney, "There

was no kidnapping" -- I don't care if she said "No kidnapping," "No kidnapping in the usual sense," whatever. It doesn't matter how she characterized the kidnapping. She plainly said, "The screwdriver was not used as a weapon."

Those were false representations by the Judge to Joan Kenney. Absolutely false. And more distressing perhaps, more distressing than the falsity of those statements is the fact that they undercut the fundamental premise of integrity in the judiciary.

She had sat in a courtroom, she had put on the record evidence sufficient for the convictions of these crimes. She turned around the next day and tried to get the SJC's office to put out contrary information. The Judge was personally undercutting what she had done in open court. I cannot imagine a more serious infraction of the Judge's obligation to promote the integrity of the judiciary or the judicial process. It is a complete perversion of her responsibility.

And distressing as well is the fact that its only purpose was for the Judge to protect her own image. After all, the whole business of spin,

the whole business that Judge Lopez wanted the office of press information to put out any kind of a statement was to take the heat off. That's why she was doing it. And the Judge was happy to use that office to spin the information. Your Honor, that's the wrong use of that office. That's not a permissible use of that office. It is one thing for Joan Kenney to be a spokesperson, a filter of information, a buffer against newspapers and television stations. It's quite another for the Judge to permit a statement that she knows to be inaccurate to be put out into the public. And that's what happened here.

Now, the Judge says -- the Judge has taken a couple of positions. A year before this trial the Judge's position at that time was, This wasn't my statement, anyway. I didn't make this statement. This was Justice DelVecchio and it was Joan Kenney. It was theirs. It was presented to me as a fait accompli. "It is not my statement," the Judge says in more than one occasion on Exhibit 32. Obviously the Court can read the entire transcript.

At trial, recognizing that that wasn't going to fly, the Judge backed off that testimony.

information.

And when she testified here, she said, "It is my 1 statement." 2 3 The problem with saying "It is my 4 statement" was that a year earlier, she had already 5 pointed out the number of inaccuracies in the 6 statement, and she had already testified that she 7 never told Joan Kenney about those inaccuracies or Justice DelVecchio -- the most notable one being the 8 9 sentencing guidelines issue. 10 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Mr. Ware, can we 11 take a short recess at this point? MR. WARE: Yes. 12 13 (Recess) 14 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Mr. Ware? 15 MR. WARE: Earlier in his closing comments 16 Mr. Egbert suggested -- perhaps I'm thinking of 17 briefs -- has suggested that it's not the case that 18 Ms. Kenney only had information from Judge Lopez, 19 but in fact, what Judge Lopez was engaged in on 20 September 7th was the creation of what was to be her 21 statement. And Joan Kenney testified quite clearly, 22 as did the Judge, that she knew Joan Kenney was 23 completely dependent on her for accurate

Elsewhere perhaps in the briefs they have argued, Wait a minute, Joan Kenney knew how to read, she could see the Herald, she could see the Globe. She had lots of other sources of information. That's not the point.

The point here is Judge Lopez had gone to her to prepare a statement for Judge Lopez, which was to reflect what Judge Lopez knew, not what The Boston Herald knew.

So when I asked Judge Lopez whether in fact she knew during trial that Ms. Kenney was dependent upon her, she says, yes, that would be her only source of information. And you're entitled to accept that from the Judge. She knew very well that Ms. Kenney was dependent upon her. She knew very well that for her to give other than candid information ran the risk that the public would be told something which was not true.

Ms. Kenney herself said, when asked by me, "Other than the information you got from Judge Lopez, did you have any other sources of information at this time?

23 "Answer: No." 24 And that, again, is for the unremarkable

reason that what Ms. Kenney was doing was preparing the Judge's statement, which of course was solely dependent on what Judge Lopez knew.

So for Judge Lopez to go behind what she had done in the courtroom, accepting a plea, listening to the defendant agree to the fact that he had engaged in a kidnapping, go behind the fact that the defendant had agreed that the screwdriver was used as a weapon; and for her to tell Ms. Kenney the contrary, is not only a distortion of the process of using the Office of Public Information, but is grossly improper on the part of a judge, grossly improper, because the inevitable consequence of anything at that point which Judge Lopez told Ms. Kenney, was she knew that it could show up in a public release to be sent to the newspapers.

And so I don't think I can emphasize strongly enough what I have referred to as a perversion of this process. Here is a judge who on September 6th listens to the agreement of a defendant to all of these facts — screwdriver used as a weapon, kidnapping, child crying, begging to go home, testimony proffered by the district attorney as to what Horton told the police, that he did

intend to engage in a sex act, all of that; and the following day the Judge goes to the Office of Public Information and promptly goes behind what she had done on the public record to try to undercut the seriousness of the offenses in the public press. That is plainly wrong. And there is no mitigating circumstance.

Ms. Kenney was clear in her testimony about what Judge Lopez told her about the kidnapping and the screwdriver. There is no cute use of transcripts here. Here is Ms. Kenney's testimony in volume 10. "What is it the Judge told you about the screwdriver and the kidnapping, as best you recall?" Not a leading question. I just asked her, What did she say to you.

"Ms. Kenney: She didn't think it was a real kidnaping, and the screwdriver was not used as a weapon."

The next day you will recall that you asked whether she could be recalled to dot some Is and cross some Ts. I recalled her. The question is put to her again: "Judge Lopez told you that this was not a kidnapping; isn't that right?

"Answer: That's correct."

And she goes on to say, Those were the words, there were no qualifiers, there were no qualifications to that testimony. That's what Ms. Kenney's sworn testimony is as to what Judge Lopez told her. And that is plainly inconsistent with the truth, plainly inconsistent with what the Judge had done in open court on the record.

I think importantly, Your Honor, if indeed Judge Lopez felt it was appropriate to have the Office of Public Information issue a statement somehow indicating that the victim was not quite a victim or the crime was not as serious as people might have been led to believe from what occurred within open court, if you think about that, if the Judge really believed that, these were not false representations, wasn't it her obligation to vacate the guilty plea? Here is a defendant who stands convicted of kidnapping, assault with attempt to rate, indecent assault on a child under 14, assault and battery. These are serious felonies.

If the Judge somehow came convinced that there was exculpatory evidence, as she claimed at one point, from Detective Green, what was her obligation? It wasn't to put out some spin. Her

moral and legal obligation would have been to say, you know, "There was a wrong here. I've got to right it. I'm going to call in the district attorney and defense counsel, and I'm going to find out whether this is or isn't true."

So the fact that the Judge didn't do that tells you something. And what it tells you is the Judge didn't believe a word of this stuff. No kidnapping, screwdriver not used as a weapon. The defendant had admitted it in front of her. It's on the record. It's in Exhibit 22 for all of us to read. Rather, the Judge was engaged in saving her own hide, trying to get the Office of Public Information to put out a story that would make her look better to the public. Planting those seeds of doubt in contravention of what the Judge had done in open court is plainly, plainly wrong and in violation of every canon in this case.

The Judge also testified in her statement, Exhibit 24, that the reference to "low level" in court was not a reference to a lack of seriousness of the offense; it was a reference to the sentencing guidelines. That's what she testified to in court.

Now, the Judge has been all over the map on

1 this particular issue. And when she testified sometime ago; that is, the year before trial, the 2 3 Judge was unequivocal that the reference to "low 4 level" had nothing to do with sentencing guidelines, 5 nothing whatsoever. And here are a couple of her 6 answers. "It meant in the scale of 1 to 10, where 7 does this case fit. I didn't mean in terms of quidelines, no." She's not talking there about 8 9 factors inherent in guidelines. I don't see 10 anything there about Ronan guidelines from 1981. 11 This is a flat-out statement that the 12 reference in that release was not to sentencing 13 guidelines. "That's not my statement." There, 14 again, is an example of the Judge saying Exhibit 24, 15 put out by Joan Kenney, the Judge's release of September 7th, is not her statement. And indeed, 16 17 that was the position she took and her counsel took. 18 And if you go back and you flip through Exhibit 32, 19 you'll find a point at which her lawyer says, "This 20 was not her statement." And the Judge says it 21 multiple times. And the tactic at that time was to 22 say, "This statement, Exhibit 24, that was put out 23 by Joan Kenney was a Joan Kenney/Justice DelVecchio 24 statement. I didn't have anything to do with it.

Yes, it was wrong. It had errors in it. It talked about 'low level' as a reference to sentencing guidelines. That was wrong."

Here she says that. "I didn't mean guidelines." The reason she's prepared to say the statement is wrong at that time is that she is taking the position a year before trial that it's not her statement anyway. So the fact that it's wrong is of no moment to her.

She goes on in this question, You disagree with the characterization that the reference to low scale was a reference to the appropriate level of sentencing guidelines?

"That's correct. That's not what I intended..."

So again, a year before trial, the Judge is saying in that statement put out by Joan Kenney, the reference to the sentencing guidelines is wrong. She goes on to testify that she never corrected it with Justice DelVecchio and Joan Kenney. She knew it was wrong, she received a draft, but didn't tell them that it was erroneous, and that's why it went out.

Now she comes to trial and the strategy's

changed. She's made a tactical decision that saying it was a Kenney/DelVecchio statement isn't going to work, because it says statement -- Exhibit 24 says right on it "Statement by Maria Lopez." And she makes the decision that she's not going to be able to back away from that statement as she had done a year earlier. And so she now embraces the statement and says, "Okay, it is my statement."

The problem with doing that is she's already conceded a year earlier that it's got errors in it that she didn't alert the Chief Justice to or Joan Kenney. And so she comes up with this elaborate fix to which you have been treated, which is, Well, it's not the sentencing guidelines. There aren't any sentencing guidelines. There are these 1981 guidelines that most of the people in the courtroom are too young to remember. And there are factors inherent in guidelines. That's the new party line.

Once she embraces the statement, she has to say, Yeah, I was referring to guidelines. But since she's already denied that the year earlier, she says, It's factors inherent in sentencing guidelines.

Now, Your Honor, that is just dishonest. And it is trying to put one over on you by confusing these various sentencing guidelines in pretending somehow that these statements which are unambiguously clear that she was not referring to sentencing guidelines somehow have this hidden meaning of factors inherent in sentencing guidelines.

Judge Lopez, when she testified a year before this trial, did tell us what she meant by "low level." And in fact, she was quite candid here. This, I suggest to you, is the truth.
"...the fact that I called it low scale -- look, I had a bad day that day. Okay? So I called it a low scale. I shouldn't have called it a low scale in the scheme of things. All right."

Now, Your Honor, that very likely is the truth. The Judge made a mistake. She got mad on September 6th. She lost her cool. She labeled the offense "low scale." She later regretted it. And here that's what she's admitting. For reasons known only to the Judge, she's completely backed away from this statement in the trial and said now it means factors inherent in guidelines.

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I simply submit to the Court that not only is this sophistry, but it's blatantly untrue and it's wrong to perpetrate it on this court, which brings me to the heart of what's at issue in terms of the Judge's testimony here.

I think it very likely that the Judge did in fact just lose her temper and say something ill-advised, that the offense is low scale. For whatever reason, she's unwilling to admit that in this courtroom.

11 After September 6th, the Judge makes a 12 series of calls to defense counsel. I won't belabor 13 them, but there is certainly a legitimate issue 14 whether the case is pending in ordinary 15 circumstances throughout a period of probation. I 16 don't dispute that. I don't want to claim that the 17 Judge should have been on notice that for a 18 five-year period of probation, she needed to 19 consider the case pending, nor do I dispute that 20 there may be many circumstances in which judges, 21 following cases, talk to the lawyers -- on their 22 own, at bar association sessions, on the street, as 23 friends, over lunch. It happens all the time. 24 There's nothing rare about it, nothing wrong about

it.

What makes this case unique is something quite different. And that is several things. One, this was in the middle of a firestorm. The case, in a very real sense, was not over. We're talking about phone calls to defense counsel, No. 1, who continued to represent the defendant. In fact, Ms. Goldbach told us -- told you in this courtroom, that she has continually represented the defendant since this case in September of 2000 and represents Mr. Horton today.

So there is an ongoing representation here that isn't usual. Typically when a case is over, if you have a conversation with a lawyer or I have one with a judge, the representation has ended. The relationship has ended. There is nothing yet to go on in the case.

This was different. The lawyer was still engaged for the defendant, No. 1. No. 2, the Judge specifically retained jurisdiction. She did not have to do that. She was asked to do it by defense counsel and she did it.

She testified quite openly here that she knew that what that meant is if there were a problem

down the road that involved resentencing Horton, parties would be back in front of her. That, too, distinguishes it from the ordinary situation in which lawyer and judge talk after a case.

The fact that the Judge had retained jurisdiction, that is not usual in a case. It's not unheard of, but it's not a run-of-the-mill circumstance.

Third, Your Honor, there is the possibility of appeal here of the conditions of probation. We've cited Commonwealth against Power and another case today, which I've forgotten at the moment. And so, while it's probably true that it's a stretch to say a case is pending for all five years of probation, we're not talking about that here. We're talking about the first five days after the case had been sentenced.

And during that period of time, you'll recall here that the Judge changes one of the conditions of sentencing on the spot on September 6th. Originally, as you'll see in Exhibit 22, Horton was to be sentenced to the Community Corrections Program. It isn't until September 6th that the Judge announces to Horton, "I'm not going

to do that. I'm going to put you on probation." So she is changing fundamentally the sentence there.

Now, obviously he agrees to that, because he pleads guilty to it. But the law in this state appears to be that for some period of time it is possible to appeal the conditions of probation. And certainly that period of appeal runs for at least the first ten days.

Fourth, I would say that this case is fundamentally different because of the storm of protest that was ongoing and because the Judge was then engaged in dealing with the case with the Office of Public Information and with others. So this is very unlike the average case in which lawyers and judges may talk.

In addition, Your Honor, this was not a single, ill-advised call to a defense lawyer. It was a series of calls. And we know from the testimony that there were two or three such calls after September 6th. At least one of those calls was to defense counsel's home on a weekend. That or another call with defense call was one in which Judge Lopez and defense counsel discussed whether Judge Lopez should have legal representation, a

lawyer.

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All of these calls, according to the testimony, involved some discussion about Mr. Horton, his well-being. And while the defendant here, Judge Lopez, can contend that that's not talking about the case, we're really splitting hairs on that one. I don't know how the Judge calls Ms. Goldbach and enlists her help with the public press to deflect attention from Judge Lopez without talking about the case. If she means by that, we didn't discuss whether he was guilty or not guilty, okay. But that's not enough. This was an ongoing relationship. And whether or not the case is pending, the conduct is violative of at least four other canons of ethics. So it's really a red herring whether the case is pending and certainly unnecessary to any finding the Court might make. I think the notion that a Superior Court

I think the notion that a Superior Court Judge of this experience or any experience can call defense counsel and enlist their help with the public press defending what that Judge did, which after all, by definition, meant saying something to make the crime look less serious than it was -- why else would the Judge get a benefit from defense

counsel talking with the press? That is fundamentally wrong. It's wrong because she shouldn't be going to defense counsel. And it's wrong because it's inconsistent with what the Judge had done in open court. So here she is undermining her own decisions on September 6th.

I would point out as well, Your Honor, on the whole pending issue -- not to belabor it -- if you look at Exhibit 24, which is the series of the press releases, the very first line of Judge Lopez's statement says, "A judge can't talk about a pending or impending case." So one would think that inherent in that is Judge Lopez's belief at the time that the case was pending. And what she's saying is, "I can't say more in this release because this case is pending or impending."

I think also, Your Honor, that the Judge finds herself in another dilemma here. If we compare this effort again to the August 3rd press release of the district attorney's office, how is it that the Judge can say to you with a straight face, The district attorney's office press release using the word "transgendered" is somehow unethical and wrong, but for the Judge to go to defense counsel

and get them to make statements about how the crime is less serious than what the Judge said it was on September 6th, that's fine. There's an inherent contradiction there. And it seems to me the Judge is impaled on that contradiction.

The conversations with Detective Green are basically in the same category. I don't see how those can be brushed aside. I do not agree that it's proper for a Superior Court Judge to be calling a Boston cop, trying to enlist his help with the press office to say something that will take the heat off the Judge.

Again, the only information which could take the heat off the Judge would be information that the crime is less serious or the defendant is well known or the victim isn't really a victim, all of which is inconsistent, again, with what the Judge had done on the public record.

It is plainly improper for a judge to be calling an investigator in the case, particularly this investigator. The Judge has treated you to the argument that he was on scene and he was therefore integral to the investigation. He was part of the investigation. If that's true and if something goes

wrong with this whole sentencing and there's eventually any trial or probation is revoked, this man could be a witness.

Now, I don't want to stretch that too far. I grant that that's relatively remote, but judges are in the business of being protective of people's rights and the appearance of fairness. This Judge had no right to compromise that potential fairness down the road.

And finally, Your Honor, as regards to the facts, anyway, I turn to the Beaucage incident. The defense here really has been, "I don't know why they're raising this." And I find that an astonishing defense. Because in effect, what Judge Lopez says to you today is "I could do this tomorrow and it would be proper. I could call up any complainant -- maybe I shouldn't call them at 11; I should call them earlier in the day. There's nothing wrong with that."

I don't agree with that, Your Honor. As I said in our brief, in other contexts, words like "obstruction of justice," "witness tampering" would be thrown around. And I'm not suggesting here that Judge Lopez was engaged in witness tampering with

1 all its connotations, but I am suggesting that this is appallingly bad judgment. And for Judge Lopez to 2 3 come before you and say, "Oh, no, it's just fine. I 4 don't know why Mr. Ware is even raising this point," 5 is itself appallingly bad judgment. Because as I 6 say, it amounts to an argument, "I could do it 7 tomorrow. I could call up any one of the 8 complainants whose names are here in evidence and 9 there would be nothing wrong with that, as long as 10 all I was trying to do is find out who they were." 11 There's a lot wrong with it, Your Honor. 12 And what's wrong with it is exactly what Ms. 13 Beaucage said. 14 And the argument that's made in the briefs 15 to you is, "Wait a minute, here. The Commission's counsel has conjured all this up." If you look at 16 17 the testimony taken by Mr. Braceras, the witness uses the word "intimidated" after there's been a 18 19 break, so he must have fed the words to her, and so

this is all a put-up job.

But, Your Honor, that totally ignores what

Ms. Beaucage wrote in her own complaint months
before she had contact with anybody from the

Commission. I don't believe I had even been

appointed at that time.

So this notion that somehow we put words in her mouth is again sophistry. It's an effort to mislead you here, and it's fundamentally wrong.

The testimony from the witness' own complaint, as you can see on the monitor, is Judge Lopez said, "I am pleased to meet you" and hung up. Now, the "pleased to meet you" corresponds to Sister Beaucage's complaint itself, which says, "I have never met this woman." And so Judge Lopez, I would contend is saying here, "I am pleased to meet you" because she's responding to what the complainant has said in writing. She says, "I got up, I checked the caller ID." Quote, "This was a disturbing phone call, to say the least."

Well, if it's a disturbing phone call to an elderly nun, why does anyone think it's disturbing? It's disturbing because she doesn't know what it means. She doesn't know whether it's a threat or an intimidation or what it is. And it's late at night.

She goes on to say in her complaint that, One could easily view this, quote, as a threat, like "I know where you live" in the phone call. Now, we had nothing to do with that. It was all carved in

stone. It was writ before Commission counsel had anything to do with this woman or ever met her.

So this argument to which you're being treated, that somehow her testimony has been tainted, totally ignores the written record; namely, the complaint itself.

But the more fundamental point I think is this, Your Honor: It cannot be the case that in an administrative investigation of any kind -- and bear in mind that in the Roache case, the Supreme Judicial Court in this state has likened Commission's counsel investigation to a grand jury proceeding. That's the law here.

It cannot be that a judge under investigation is free to start calling up the complainants. How is it that a complainant should be subjected to a confrontation by a judge under investigation? One can imagine that going terribly wrong at some point in the future. It cannot be. It is fundamentally wrong.

We listened for several days to a lot of distinguished people who came in here and told us how bright, how talented, how perceptive this woman is. And I'm not here to dispute that. But if that

is so, the corollary is she was bright enough, smart enough, talented enough, and with 14 years on the bench, knew that it was highly improper to make this phone call. Knew that. You can't have it both ways -- a talented bright, smart and experienced, but I can call up complaining witnesses. I don't think it will wash. That dog don't hunt.

Now, I think Your Honor, in addition, you will recall the testimony here that in fact, the Judge had set up a system. She introduced Exhibits H and I. Those were these letters which we were told were Demoulas letters. She had set up her own courthouse system to check out this very kind of thing. And she had done that by having a court officer make phone calls during business hours, and she had taken the results of that. She didn't involve herself in the least.

How is it, then, on November 1, 2000, with the investigation pending for a couple of months, the Judge takes matters into her own hands. And worse yet to me, is that she comes here and says, "Oh, this was fine. I could do it tomorrow. This was right. I don't know why Mr. Ware is even raising this with you."

I'm raising it because it does fundamental violence to the statutory and rule-making scheme here. None of is of us is pleased to be in the courtroom today. None of us wants this to be going on. None of us wants to be standing before you talking about the future of a judge. And we're not here because we like this. We're here because we owe it to the public, period, paragraph.

And one of the things the public is entitled to is fairness from the judge during the course of an investigation.

Your Honor, I'd like to turn just briefly to what I think are some -- since we're there. Comment has been made about the fact that I have asserted in the papers the Judge's lack of candor. And that's true; I have, some of it quite forcefully.

Again, I point out that the Commission has taken no position here with respect to potential penalties. And naturally would not do so unless and until this court makes certain findings.

But my role here is different. Part of it is as advocate. Part of it is to bring to this court's attention the spectrum of possibilities and

the law that surrounds those possibilities.

One fact of life is the case law out there is uniform in saying that in these proceedings, judges have to be candid; that all well and good that they defend themselves. And I don't diminish the importance of Judge Lopez engaging the best lawyers in the city, which she has, to come in here and defend this case. No one could ask for better representation than the combination of counsel with whom this Judge has worked. Fair enough.

But the corollary is the Judge has to be honest. She has to cooperate in the investigation up to a point, not to compromise her defense. But she has to be candid in her statements to you and she has to be candid in her statements in Exhibit 32, in October of 2001, the year before this.

And the law is really -- this is just an example of it, Massachusetts Supreme Court; "The Judge was under an obligation to be completely candid with the Commissioner." This is also was with the Judicial Conduct Commission. That obviously was fundamental to the process.

All of the states that considered this come out the same way with respect to any absence of

 candor. And that is, that it is inevitably the most serious of breaches. Regardless of any underlying problem which the Judge may have faced, if the Judge is not candid in the investigation and in the proceedings, that is a fundamentally disqualifying fact. And that's the issue that I've asked this Court to look at in the course of your deliberations.

I'm not here to say that the underlying offenses, if you will, transgressions, breaches of the canons would in any way justify the Judge's removal. Frankly, I don't believe they would. And I would not be an advocate of her removal. But I think the more serious issue is if on top of that you find that this Judge has not been honest in her sworn testimony, either before the Commission on October 2001 or before this court or both, which I believe is the case, that's a horse of another color. And the consequences of that are serious, indeed.

Obviously it's up to this court to make a recommendation and not up to me. But the examples of inconsistency are legion, and I've spelled them out at some length in our brief. I want to go

through just a couple of them, and then I will sit down.

In this first example, Your Honor. In October of 2001 the Judge says quite clearly that she wanted to continue the case because she believed there would be another news story that would be hotter. In other words, she was not continuing it because of a full calendar. She was continuing it by virtue of the fact she wanted to avoid the press attention. She flatly denies that here before you. That's a blatant contradiction. I don't know of any other way to interpret that.

In this next example, Your Honor, the Judge says in her response here, filed only last summer, a year and a half, two years almost after this investigation began, that she did not have the district attorney's press release when she makes these findings on August 4th. That's the representation that's made.

Now, this isn't a response filed quickly. This is a deliberate response, years after the investigation began, to which the Judge must be held. And yet, she claimed in cross examination, somewhat to my surprise, that in fact, she had the

findings. She had the press release at the time she makes the August 4th findings.

Again, a blatant contradiction in the testimony before you.

I think you are owed more, Your Honor.
The third one just to draw your attention
to, the Judge's unequivocal testimony in October of
2001 before Commission counsel that there was
nothing unethical about the District Attorney's
press release. Nothing unethical, nothing
inappropriate. And then the Judge says that the
district attorney's office was unethical, and that
the root of that here, as argued today, was the
press release of August 3rd.

And additionally, as I've been saying throughout the afternoon, when it suited her in October of 2000 -- excuse me, October of 2001, the Judge took the position that the statement issued through Joan Kenney's office was not her statement. You saw an earlier example of this testimony. "This is not my statement." And yet, here the Judge is saying on November 2, "It purports to be your statement, correct?"

"Answer: It is my statement," flatly

contradicting the positions she had taken a year earlier.

There is then testimony in October of 2001, this reference to "certain facts." I asked her, "What are those facts?" This was in her statement. There was a reference to certain facts which would change everyone's mind. I said to her, "What are those facts?" She said, "I don't know." Now, she was saying that because at the time she took the position that this was not her statement.

And yet here in the trial before you, you're treated to a very different answer. Now the "certain facts" are everything -- from the Katz report, disputed facts, the lobby conferences, criminal records, a blatant contradiction.

And finally, I think, Your Honor, again, the reference here from October 2001, where she says in the statement prepared by Joan Kenney in the reference to "low level," the Judge is saying on the left-hand side, "I didn't mean in terms of guidelines. That's not my statement," again saying this Kenney document is not her statement.

I ask her, "So the statement is erroneous?"
"Answer: Correct." And the Judge goes on to say a

couple of pages later, "The characterization of what I was doing in open court, that it referred to sentencing guidelines, is not accurate." That's her position in 2001.

Here you're treated to a very different version. You're treated to a version that says, Well, it's not quite accurate, but it's good enough for government work, good enough for a press release. That's a major rewrite, a major repackaging of the truth, Your Honor.

And finally, "Before you drafted the statement" -- this is a question to Joan Kenney -- "did you learn additional facts?" And she goes on to say, Yes. Judge Lopez told her she did not believe it was a kidnapping, did not believe that the screwdriver was used as a weapon. We've been over that to some extent.

And then when she is recalled the following day, that's repeated. She says that those are the Judge's exact words, insofar as she can remember.

Here the Judge denies that in front of you, denies that testimony.

Now, Your Honor, I believe strongly in the Judge's right to defend herself. And I'm sorry that

the Judge is in a position in which she has to do that. But Your Honor, defending oneself as a judge means also observing the principles of honesty that are inherent in this process. How can it be that a judge who cannot tell the truth in this courtroom before you can sit by as a witness takes an oath to tell the truth and monitor the testimony of that witness?

That is why all the courts of the United States which have considered this have a great deal of problem with this and inevitably say, If the Judge hasn't been candid in a proceeding, that is fundamentally disqualifying.

This is an example from Michigan, really just saying that lack of candor is fundamentally disqualifying to a judge. There's a similar California case and others, and this one talking specifically about deliberately false information to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.

So again, Your Honor, with a degree of sadness, I say to the Court, Unfortunately, you have to consider the candor of the Judge's testimony and you have to consider ultimately the consequences that flow from that lack of candor.

1 Thank you, Your Honor. HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Thank you. We have 2 3 until the middle of March for any reply response. 4 March 14 for reply responses. 5 MR. WARE: May I confer? 6 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Sure. Go ahead. 7 You want to confer with him? 8 (Off the record) 9 MR. WARE: Your Honor, at this time I'd 10 like to make available to the Court and counsel the slides. 11 12 HEARING OFFICER DAHER: Yes. 13 MR. EGBERT: I can agree on the 21st. 14 Apparently, they want to extend the date you gave us 15 from the 14th to the 21st. That's fine. HEARING OFFICER DAHER: It's okay with me. 16 17 That will be fine. 18 MR. WARE: Secondly, Your Honor, I have 19 available, as we have throughout the trial, copies 20 of the slides for the Court and counsel. 21 MR. EGBERT: Judge, the slides are for 22 final argument and are not part of the record, so I 23 have an objection that they be made a part of the

record to this Court. They've had their display --

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MR. WARE: I'm not asking they be marked as an exhibit, but just for identification. We have turned over the slides throughout the case. They're every bit as much available to you as the closing arguments, which I understand are going to be transcribed. HEARING OFFICER DAHER: I'm going to accept it. It's going to be of help to the Court. I appreciate it. We have until the 21st, gentlemen. That will be fine. Do you want to add anything? MR. EGBERT: The only thing I want to add, frankly, is to say that they have supplied you half-transcripts, which I'll call them, as they've done in the past. I would just urge the Court to refer to the file, which has all of these transcripts. I'm not going to get up now and rehash it. HEARING OFFICER DAHER: I will, indeed. (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 3:51 p.m.)

1	CERTIFICATE
2	I, Jane M. Williamson, Registered
3	Professional Reporter, do hereby certify that the
4	foregoing transcript, Volume XV, is a true and
5	accurate transcription of my stenographic notes
6	taken on Friday, February 28, 2003.
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10	Jane M. Williamson
11	Registered Merit Reporter
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