## Beyond shopping: How can price transparency improve value-based purchasing?

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## Can we spend less in health care without losing value?

## Spending = Price x Quantity

Many policy strategies use price information to improve value

Target individuals:

- Decision support tools
- Benefit design

Target providers:

- Bundled payments
- Price regulation


## Analysis of novel price dataset from Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA)

- Transparency a key strategy to reduce spending growth in MA
- CHIA has built both consumer-facing and "wholesale" price information assets
- Median fee-for-service prices for 291 outpatient services in Massachusetts during 2015
- Every insurer-provider-service paid price
- N claims per price at least 15 (11 for maternity)
- 8 commercial payers ( $75.4 \%$ commercial market)
- 12,549 healthcare providers
- We use the wholesale data to examine variation in prices by geography, payer and provider


## Measures of Price and Variation

- Service (e.g., CPT-code) level price
- Analyzed variation using Coefficient of Variation
- Compared acute hospital prices vs other providers
- Estimated "implied price" for each provider

$$
\text { Implied Price } j=\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{i=1}^{I} p_{i s j} \times q_{i s j}}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} \overline{p_{s}} \times q_{s j}}
$$

Where $j$ indexes the provider, $i$ indexes the insurer, and $s$ indexes medical services

- Aggregated by geography (HSA), and provider deciles


## Two stylized policy simulations


"State Price Ceiling"

## Geographic Variation within state

Implied Price by Hospital Service Area


## How much variation per service?

|  | Across Provider-insurer prices <br> Mean provider- <br> insurer price (SD) |  | Across Providers <br> Mean Coefficient <br> of variation (SD) |  | N <br> providers | Mean Coefficient of <br> variation (SD) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Across Insurers |
| :---: |
| Mean Coefficient of |

## Variation: Acute hospitals vs other providers



## Variation: Implications for Spending Across 3 Service Types



## Potential savings from "steering" and "price ceiling" stylized policies

|  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Policy Simulation: |  |  | |  | Steer patientsto lower cost providers* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |

Notes: *Simulation models shifting patients from providers paid prices above the 75th percentile price within HSA and within insurer to other providers. Only includes services rendered by at least 5 providers within HSA within insurer.

## Limitations

- Outpatient service prices only here
- No data on quality
- Simulations don't account for all considerations important for policy:
- Incentives for innovation?
- Network sufficiency


## Policy Implications

- Transparency is not just for consumers - payers and regulators may be able to use price information more effectively: through steering tools and other policies
- For what services can we successfully steer patients?
- PT/OT?
- Outpatient Labs?
- Ambulances?
- More analysis could increase our understanding of the price differences - and which ones are associated with the greatest opportunities to increase value

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