

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200

Boston, MA 02114

(617) 979-1900

MARIE RANSOM,

Appellant

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Respondent

Docket Number:

C-24-140

Appearance for Appellant:

Marie Ransom, *pro se*

Appearance for Respondent:

Amanda Rigal, Esq.
Mass Dept of Revenue
100 Cambridge St.
Boston, MA 02114

Commissioner:

Shawn C. Dooley¹

SUMMARY OF DECISION

The Commission denied the reclassification appeal of a DOR employee as she was unable to show that she performed the level-distinguishing duties of the next higher title of Program Coordinator III more than 50% of the time.

DECISION

On August 6, 2024, the Appellant, Marie Ransom (Appellant), pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 49, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the Massachusetts Human Resources Division (HRD) to uphold the determination of the Department

¹ David Tuan, an intern with the Civil Service Commission, assisted in the drafting of this decision.

of Revenue (DOR) to deny her request for reclassification from a Program Coordinator II (PC II) position to the Program Coordinator III (PC III) position.² On October 15, 2024, a remote pre-hearing conference was held. On January 7, 2025, I conducted an in-person full hearing at the offices of the Commission in Boston. The hearing was recorded via Webex.³ Both parties filed proposed decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Appellant's appeal is *denied*.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Appellant entered into evidence 23 exhibits (App. Ex. 1-23) and DOR entered 12 exhibits (Resp. Ex. 1-12) into evidence. Based upon the documents entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by the Department of Revenue (DOR):

- Kimberly Madaglia, Acting Manager, Employee Training & Development Office – Massachusetts Department of Revenue
- Geralyn Page, Human Resources Classification Analyst,⁴ Human Resources Bureau, Massachusetts Department of Revenue.

Called by the Appellant:

- Marie Ransom, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all matters filed in the case and pertinent statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and reasonable inferences therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence establishes the following findings of fact:

² The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR §§ 1.01, *et seq.*, apply to adjudications before the Commission with G.L. c. 31, or any Commission rules, taking precedence.

³ A link to the audio/video recording was provided to the parties. If there is a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If such an appeal is filed, the recording provided to the parties should be used to transcribe the hearing.

⁴ Ms. Page is currently retired but is employed at DOR in a post-retirement capacity.

1. The Appellant works for the Department of Revenue (DOR) in the Registration and Learning Management System (LMS) Unit as the Lead Registrar for DOR and the Lead Administrator for DOR's MassAchieve⁵ program. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
2. The Appellant has been employed by DOR since 1989. She was originally hired to work in the Financial Services Division as an Accountant. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
3. In 1998, the then-Director of DOR's Employee Training and Development office, Anne Leslie, recruited the Appellant and hired for her current position of Program Coordinator II. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
4. The Registration and LMS Unit is commonly referred to as the Employee Training and Development Unit (ETD). (*Testimony of Appellant*)
5. The Registration and LMS Unit is part of the Administrative Affairs Division of DOR. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
6. The Employee Training and Development team is comprised of three members: Valerie Menna (Training Technician III), Donna Quinn (PC III), and the Appellant (PC II). (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
7. The Appellant and all members of the team report to Kim Madaglia. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
8. Ms. Madaglia is classified as Administrator V with the title of Training Manager. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
9. Ms. Madaglia reports to the DOR's Director of Human Resources, John Mariano. (*Testimony of Appellant*)

⁵ MassAchieve is the online program for learning and professional development trainings for Commonwealth of Massachusetts vendors and employees.

10. The second Program Coordinator on the Employee Training and Development team is Donna Quinn, who is classified as a Project Coordinator III. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
11. Ms. Quinn was transferred from DOR's Division of Local Affairs to work with the Appellant and oversee special projects in October, 2018. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
12. Ms. Quinn retained her Project Coordinator III classification from her previous role as Executive Assistant to the Deputy of the Division of Local Affairs. (*Testimony of Page*)

Appellant's Duties

13. The MassAchieve curriculum for DOR and A&F IT employees is comprised of nine courses to be completed within 30 days of initial hire. (*App. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Appellant*)
14. Overseeing the training of DOR's new hires (New Hire Training) comprises 50% of the Appellant's annual workload. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
15. Overseeing incumbent DOR employees' annual mandatory training participation ranges from 30% to 35% percent of the Appellant's annual workload. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
16. Managing her team's daily operations constitutes 20% of the Appellant's annual workload. (*Testimony of Madaglia*)
17. The Appellant assists with updating courses, assigns courses based upon trainee department needs, tracks progression of training, ensures completion by communicating requirements to training subjects and their department, and helps communicate program needs based upon feedback with the managers and supervisors of those being trained. (*App. Exhibits 1, 4, 13-20; Resp. Exhibit 2, 10; Testimony of Madaglia; Testimony of Appellant; Testimony of Page*)

18. The Appellant's updating of training courses includes adjusting course IDs, titles, mediums (*i.e.*, online, in-classroom, assessment, document, or job shadow), descriptions, classifications (*i.e.*, divisional, job specific, management/leadership, mandatory, tax education, or technical), and any supplementary (non-substantive) details. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
19. The Appellant assists Ms. Madaglia when she is developing programs, classes, and curriculum for the nine-to-twelve-month Emerging Leaders Program. The Appellant also handles logistics for this program. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
20. The Appellant assists with the creation of courses, classes, and curricula for incoming seasonal employees. (*Testimony of Appellant*)
21. The Appellant oversees and monitors certain data received from the six Department trainers who are responsible for engaging with contractors to implement mandatory training for those contractors. (*Testimony of Appellant; Testimony of Madaglia*)
22. The Appellant supports trainers in their work by helping them set up the courses for training external contractors. (*Testimony of Appellant*)

Appellant's Reclassification Appeal Timeline

23. The Appellant inquired about reclassification with DOR's Human Resources Bureau (HRB) on October 20, 2022, requesting the written descriptions for the Program Coordinator Series. (*App. Exhibit 1*)
24. Ms. Geralyn Page from HRB responded to the Appellant's reclassification request on November 21, 2022, with a list of Program Coordinator Series descriptions. (*App. Exhibit 2*)

25. On April 6, 2023, the Appellant requested reclassification to Program Coordinator III. (*App. Exhibit 2*)
26. On April 27, 2023, the Appellant submitted her resume, Form 30,⁶ Employee Performance Review System (EPRS) evaluation, and Interview Guide via email to Ms. Page. (*App. Exhibit 5*)
27. Ms. Page denied the reclassification request on March 25, 2024, citing that the Appellant did not meet any of the unique responsibilities to be classified as a Program Coordinator III. (*App. Exhibit 6; Resp. Exhibit 5*).
28. The Appellant submitted a timely rebuttal on April 1, 2024, before the deadline of April 9, 2024. (*App. Exhibit 7; Resp. Exhibit 7*)
29. The Appellant received the denial of her appeal on April 23, 2024. (*App. Exhibit 1*)
30. The Appellant then filed a “Class and Comp[ensation] Appeal” with the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division (“HRD”) on June 5, 2024. (*App. Exhibit 1, 10*)
31. The Appellant received HRD’s decision to deny her appeal on July 29, 2024. (*App. Exhibit 11; Resp. Exhibit 9*)

Ms. Madaglia’s Letter of Support

32. Ms. Madaglia wrote a letter of support advocating on behalf of the Appellant and in support of her being promoted to PC-III. (*App. Exhibit 8*)

⁶ A [Form 30](#), or Position Description, is a written description that depicts a state employee’s positional duties and responsibilities, supervision received, direct reporting staff, and qualifications. The employee and/or the supervisor draft these descriptions annually as a tool for supervisors to regularly communicate with employees their job duties and responsibilities, develop performance criteria, and identify training needs. Furthermore, the form records any changes in the role’s duties from year to year. See HRD [Hiring Guidelines](#) (2025).

33. Ms. Madaglia confirmed that she wrote the letter marked as Appellant's Exhibit 8.
(*Testimony of Madaglia, App. Ex. 8*)

34. Ms. Madaglia testified that she did not write the letter marked as Respondent's Exhibit 12⁷, citing multiple differences in wording throughout the text. (*Testimony of Madaglia, App. Ex. 8, Resp. Ex. 12*)

Program Coordinator Series

35. Since her original appointment in 1989, the Appellant has remained a Program Coordinator II; employees who hold that title belong to Unit 6 within the union commonly known as NAGE.⁸ (*Testimony of Appellant*)

36. In the 1980s, pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 45, the Commonwealth's HRD (then known as the Massachusetts Department of Personnel Administration or "DPA") devised the "Program Coordinator" classification specifications. DPA approved those classification specifications, as they are now being applied in this case, on July 1, 1987. (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)

37. DPA categorized Program Coordinator II as the second-level supervisory job in a series of three similarly named job titles (PC-I through PC-III). (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)

38. As defined by DPA, all employees classified into the Program Coordinator series are expected to undertake the following duties:

⁷ The authenticity of Respondent Exhibit 12 is unclear and will not be considered in the Commission's decision as constituting evidence corroborating the Appellant's job duties, but will be used to address a credibility issue.

⁸ The National Association of Government Employees ("NAGE") is a labor union that represents public and private sector employees. Local 207 includes unionized DOR employees.

- “1. Coordinates and monitors assigned program activities to ensure effective operations and compliance with established standards.
 2. Reviews and analyzes data concerning assigned agency programs to determine progress and effectiveness to make recommendations for changes in procedures, guidelines, etc. and to devise methods of accomplishing program objectives.
 3. Provides technical assistance and advice to agency personnel and others concerning assigned programs to exchange information, resolve problems and to ensure compliance with established policies, procedures, and standards.
 4. Responds to inquiries from agency staff and others to provide information concerning agency programs.
 5. Maintains liaison with various private, local, state and federal agencies and others to exchange information and/or to resolve problems.
 6. Performs related duties such as attending meetings and conferences; maintaining records; and preparing reports.” (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)
39. According to the DPA specifications, the duties of a Program Coordinator II include those generally pertaining to the whole Program Coordinator series and the following unique duties:
- “1. Provide on-the-job training and orientation for employees.
 2. Develop and implement procedures and guidelines to accomplish assigned agency program objectives and goals.
 3. Review reports, memoranda, etc. for completeness, accuracy and content.

4. Confer with management staff and other agency personnel in order to determine program requirements and availability of resources and to develop the criteria and standards for program evaluation.

5. Evaluate program activities in order to determine progress and effectiveness and to make recommendations concerning changes as needed.” (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)

40. According to DPA’s 1987 specifications, supervision by a Program Coordinator III is defined by the following:

“Incumbents of positions at this level exercise direct supervision (i.e., not through an Intermediate level supervisor) over, assign work to, and review the performance of 1-5 professional technical, or administrative personnel; and indirect supervision (i.e., through an Intermediate level supervisor)⁹ over 6-15 professional, technical, administrative and/or other personnel.” (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)

41. The Appellant ensures completion of mandatory training and new hire training for workers employed by either the Department of Revenue (DOR) or the Office of Information Technology within the Secretariat for Administration and Finance (A&F IT) and also ensures that the training for some 1,000 external contractors is completed. (*App. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Madaglia; Testimony of Appellant*)

42. As outlined by the DPA’s Program Coordinator Series descriptions from 1987, a properly classified (not just “grandfathered-in”) Program Coordinator III employee maintains the unique responsibilities to:

⁹ This specification assumes an antiquated hierarchical organizational structure that no longer exists at DOR. (*Testimony of Page*)

“1. **Develop and Implement standards** to be used in program monitoring and/or evaluation.

2. Oversee and monitor activities of the assigned unit.

3. Confer with management staff and others in order to provide information concerning program implementation, evaluation and monitoring and to define this purpose and scope of proposed programs.” (*App. Exhibit 10; Resp. Exhibit 3*)

DOR Interpretation of Program Coordinator Series Description

43. Ms. Page is a post-retiree employee who works as an HR Classification Analyst.

(*Testimony of Page*)

44. Ms. Page has been with the Department of Revenue for 38 years in total, including 16 years in Human Resources as a classification analyst and manager, and another year and one-half as a post-retiree consultant. (*Testimony of Page*)

45. Ms. Page has been doing reclassification appeals for 15 years. (*Testimony of Page*)

46. Ms. Page interprets Program Coordinator II level work as reflecting an operations and compliance role ensuring that training courses are distributed and completed in a timely manner. (*Testimony of Page*)

47. The Appellant does not have the authority to develop standards on her own. (*Testimony of Page*)

48. Any reshaping of standards is determined outside the Appellant’s department or division. (*Testimony of Page*)

49. Ms. Page cites an example whereby the Office of Ethics and Employee Responsibility would send training objectives to DOR’s Employee Training and Development team

where the course is created; after said creation, the Appellant would then upload and assign the coursework to the relevant department. (*Testimony of Page*)

50. Ms. Page interprets the “oversee[ing] and monitor[ing] activities of the assigned unit” (see PC-III duty no. 2 above) as assigning work, monitoring performance, and reviewing performance in a supervisory capacity over others *within* a PC-III’s specific team. (*Testimony of Page*)

51. The Appellant does not have anyone who reports to her. Rather, she tracks, follows up, and ensures completion of the required training for roughly 1,000 external contractors. (*Testimony of Page*)

52. The Appellant does not define the purpose or scope of proposed programs as these are defined by the division responsible for a particular training. (*Testimony of Page*)

53. The Appellant does meet with management regarding training occasionally, but typically she communicates with assistant registrars of the relevant department. (*Testimony of Page*)

54. Again, in the opinion of DOR’s classification analyst, the main difference between Project Coordinator II and Project Coordinator III is that a PC-III has authority and autonomy to (1) make decisions regarding the scope, content, and policies covered by a program; (2) determine its success; and (3) identify the need for any changes. (*Testimony of Page*)

55. DOR’s past practice indicates that the highest position in a job series must include supervisory responsibilities. (*Testimony of Page*)

56. Given the description of Project Coordinator III, Ms. Page believes that a Program Coordinator III role does not exist in the Employee Training and Development section of DOR's Administrative Affairs Division. (*Testimony of Page*)

APPLICABLE LAW:

Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it. If said commission finds that the office or position of the person appealing warrants a different position reallocation . . . it shall be effective as of the date of appeal”

In order to obtain a reclassification, as a general rule, an employee must establish that she is performing duties encompassed within the higher-level position the majority (i.e., at least 50% or more) of the time. See Thompson v. Division of Insurance and HRD, 29 MCSR 565 (2016) (an appellant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence); Pellegrino v. Dep't of State Police, 18 MCSR 261 (2005) (at least 51%); Gaffey v. Dept. of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011) (more than 50%); Morawski v. Dep't of Revenue, 14 MCSR 188 (2001) (more than 50%); Madison v. Dep't of Public Health, 12 MCSR 49 (1999) (at least 50%); Kennedy v. Holyoke Cmty. Coll., 11 MCSR 302 (1998) (at least 50%). More specifically, the Appellant must demonstrate that the majority of the time she performs her duties, she performs activities that are “level distinguishing duties.” Duties that fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties”.

However, particularly where the assigned job title is not a good fit, the Commission is not bound to apply the classification specifications literally in every case. Blodgett v. Massachusetts

Highway Dept., 24 MCSR 588 (2011); Lefebvre v. Department of Early Education, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). When analyzing a reclassification appeal, it is within the Commission's discretion to weigh all of the facts and to make a determination based on the evidence presented. Past reported Commission reclassification decisions have established that the Commission is not bound to interpret the classification specifications in an overly literal fashion when adjudicating a case. Blodgett, 24 MCSR 590 (2011); Lefebvre, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). The Commission also possesses discretion to take into account all the facts and evidence admitted when making a decision in reclassification appeals in cases where the specifications against which current job responsibilities are being measured are as outdated as the 1987 specifications at issue in this case. When accounting for outdated specifications, the Commission has previously considered major shifts in the occupation's field in cases where the description is highly rigid to determine the reasonability of the description. These factors include the role's adaptation of new technology and any evolution or broadening of the scope of duties. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 199 (2024).

ANALYSIS:

First, let me start by saying that according to her supervisor, the Appellant, Marie Ransom, has been an exceptional employee, committed to the job, and goes above and beyond in her ability to oversee the compliance of training for hundreds of employees annually. This testimony was given significant weight in this determination. Unfortunately, the standards for Program Coordinators have not been re-evaluated or updated in nearly 40 years, leaving the Department to try to assign roles based on classifications developed for a very different time and required skillset. Notwithstanding this, the Appellant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was misclassified by the Department of Revenue as a Program Coordinator II. In order to justify the Appellant's reclassification to Project Coordinator III, she needed to not only demonstrate that she assumes responsibilities commensurate with what the duties of a Program Coordinator III may reasonably be construed to consist of today (assuming, in her favor, flexibility in interpreting the 1987 standards), but that those higher-level duties predominate in either her day-to-day work or over the course of a defined period of time (*e.g.*, a month or a year). The Department of Revenue has shown in this case that the Appellant does not perform the additional, level-distinguishing duties expected of a Program Coordinator III at least 50% of the time on an annual and on-going basis.

Besides the fact of not reaching the 50% threshold, and definitely more troubling to me personally, is the disparity between the letter actually authored by Ms. Madaglia, the Appellant's supervisor, and the one that the Appellant submitted to the Commission when filing her appeal. Further, although dated the same, the Appellant then presented the correct (original) letter as an exhibit before the Commission and could not explain the reason for the existence of the letter she first submitted to the Commission when filing her appeal. I did not find the Appellant's

explanation as to why the latter, *ersatz* letter existed to be credible. It appears that the Appellant substantively modified Ms. Madaglia's original letter and then submitted this altered version to the Commission in order to address the shortcomings in her appeal and was attempting to reframe her work product to more closely align with the distinguishing duties of PC-III. The fact that a more comprehensive (and possibly doctored) letter was included in her appeal to the Commission, but the Appellant then submitted the actual one penned by her supervisor as part of her exhibits, raises serious questions about whether the Appellant was trying to mislead the Commission.

The version of the letter in support that Ms. Madaglia testified she did not write or see prior to the hearing was much more comprehensive and made a significantly different claim as to the Appellant's roles and responsibilities. This *ersatz* letter featured a new section that stated her responsibilities included: "develop and implement standards to be used in program monitoring and/or evaluation." The letter stated that these tasks accounted for between 100%-120% of her workday. Both letters stated that her workday also involved: "Oversee(ing) and monitor(ing) activities of the assigned unit." In both letters this accounted for 75% of her workday. In addition, both letters included a section that, while worded slightly differently, stated the Appellant will "confer with management and others in order to provide information concerning program implementation, evaluation, and monitoring and to define the purpose and scope of proposed programs," and this constituted 30% of her workday. Summed up, the claimed workload amounts to between 205% and 225% of the Appellant's workday. Since no person can work 200+% of the available hours in a given workday, the estimates the Appellant provided are not to be relied upon.

As noted by Ms. Page, the Program Coordinator III is the highest level in the series. The DOR asserts, based on past practice, that those in the highest position of a series must undertake a supervisory role. DOR's HR representative contends that no other DOR employee reports to the Appellant, and therefore she is not a supervisor. While she ensures compliance with the training obligations of a large number of employees and consultants, the Appellant never has exercised any direct supervision over them and her communications with them is limited to ensuring completion of the training courses assigned. Furthermore, Ms. Page interprets the unique responsibility of a Program Coordinator III as embracing the authority to create and evaluate training programs in relation to their pedagogical objectives. Given Ms. Page's understanding of the Program Coordinator III role, which I find to be reasonable, she found (as do I) that the Appellant's current duties revolve around enforcement of and compliance with DOR's training policies, but not the creation of such policies. This was the main basis for Ms. Page's decision to deny the reclassification request.

Beginning with the first additional duty of Program Coordinator III, the description states that a Program Coordinator III: "Develop[s] and Implement[s] standards to be used in program monitoring and/or evaluation." Although this description of the first level-distinguishing duty of a PC-III, as set forth in the 1987 classification specification document, is ambiguous and open to interpretation, the record has not demonstrated that the Appellant has this responsibility under any reasonable construction of this requirement. Although she is responsible for monitoring the delivery of training and evaluating whether many hundreds of employees and contractors are in compliance with designated training standards, the Appellant does not "[i]mplement standards" as the record does not demonstrate any role she actually plays in *how* those standards are implemented. Moreover, as noted by Ms. Page, the responsibility for such training development

no longer resides within the purview of the Employee Training and Development team at all.¹⁰ Instead, those decisions are now made by the managers of the respective individuals receiving training and, to some extent, by other departments and divisions external to the Appellant's unit. Furthermore, although the Appellant confers with management in the assigning of pre-existing courses, her actions do not reflect any authoritative role over course content as, per further discussion in relation to duty three, she fulfills largely a compliance enforcement function. Given the current scope of her responsibilities, it is reasonable to conclude, regarding duty no. 1, that she does not exercise authority at the level of a Program Coordinator III.

Shifting to the second additional duty of a Program Coordinator III, the description states that a Program Coordinator III "oversees and monitor[s] activities of the assigned unit." DOR contends that the Appellant does not supervise an assigned unit as no individual in her team reports to her. This is reflected in both Ms. Madaglia's testimony and Ms. Page's, which I credit. The Appellant, on the other hand, contends she does supervise independent contractors as well as trainees in the completion of mandatory training. However, her "supervision" is solely exercised in a training compliance capacity; she does not conduct employee evaluations or otherwise provide substantive feedback regarding other employees' duties. Thus, although she is responsible for assigning and ensuring compliance of training, it would be inaccurate to determine that she has any authority over these individuals except to report their non-compliance on training matters to a manager. Given this lack of supervision, she does not exercise or have the authority commensurate with that of a Program Coordinator III.

¹⁰ This record does not disclose whether the PC-III incumbent who departed ten years ago ever exercised the type of content control that Ms. Page deems necessary to be classified as a PC-III.

Lastly, the third distinguishing duty of a Program Coordinator III states that a PC-III “confer[s] with management staff and others in order to provide information concerning program implementation, evaluation and monitoring and to define this purpose and scope of proposed programs.” DOR contends that she fulfills this duty only a very small proportion of her working time as she primarily communicates through the assistant registrar of each relevant department and only occasionally with management itself. Regarding this duty, the Appellant and Ms. Madaglia both demonstrated that the Appellant communicates routinely (perhaps even daily) with many different units within DOR regarding implementation and monitoring of the agency’s training programs. To achieve the Appellant’s impressive 98% Department-wide compliance rate with MassAchieve, she constantly monitors DOR’s various digital training systems and promptly communicates any lack of compliance with the relevant unit within DOR. However laudatory this effort, this communication is not consistent with the content requirements for Program Coordinator III. Instead, the contents and overall purpose of such communication serve primarily a compliance objective. Hence, the Appellant does not fulfill the third duty of Program Coordinator III on a daily or near-daily basis.

In order to meet the threshold of Program Coordinator III classification, normally the level-distinguishing duties of the position (to the extent those can clearly be defined in 2025 based upon 38-year-old specifications) must be the primary focus of the reclassification requestor’s overall work and occupy more than 50% of her working hours. Because the Appellant does not significantly fulfill the duties necessary for Program Coordinator III and was unable to document a quantifiable allocation of her working hours to PC-III distinguishing duties, she does not surpass the 50% threshold necessary for reclassification.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, the appeal of Marie Ransom, filed under docket number C-24-140, is hereby *denied*.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Shawn C. Dooley
Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, & Stein, Commissioners) on May 15, 2025.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Marie Ransom (Appellant)
Amanda Rigal, Esq. (for Respondent)