

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TAZEWELL COUNTY

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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,)	
<i>EX REL.</i> MARK R. HERRING,)	
ATTORNEY GENERAL,)	
)	Case No. CL18-1076
	Plaintiff,)	
v.)	
)	
PURDUE PHARMA L.P.,)	
PURDUE PHARMA INC.,)	
THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY,)	
RICHARD SACKLER,)	
JONATHAN SACKLER,)	
KATHE SACKLER, and)	
MORTIMER D.A. SACKLER,)	
)	
	Defendants.)	
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AMENDED COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff, Commonwealth of Virginia, by, through, and at the relation of the Attorney General of Virginia, Mark R. Herring (“Plaintiff” or “the Commonwealth”), petitions this Court to declare that the activities in which Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company (collectively “Purdue”), and Richard Sackler have engaged, and are engaging, constitute violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”), Virginia Code §§ 59.1-196 through 59.1-207; to declare that the actions in which Purdue has engaged constitute a public nuisance; to declare that monetary transfers made from Purdue to Defendants Richard Sackler, Jonathan Sackler, Kathe Sackler, and Mortimer D.A. Sackler (collectively “the Sacklers”), or to entities they control, constitute fraudulent conveyances pursuant to Virginia

Code §§ 55-80 and 55.1-400¹; to enjoin the acts and practices that constitute VCPA violations; to restore to all persons the sums acquired from them in violation of the VCPA; to disgorge the benefits and ill-gotten gains acquired in connection with these VCPA violations; to enjoin the acts and practices that created the public nuisance; to award the sums necessary to abate the public nuisance and compensate any damages stemming therefrom; to declare the monetary transfers from Purdue to the Sacklers or to entities they control void as fraudulent conveyances; to impose a constructive trust upon any funds transferred from Purdue to the Sacklers or entities they control; to enter judgments against the Sacklers for the amounts of the fraudulent conveyances transferred from Purdue to them; to award the Commonwealth civil penalties, expenses, and attorneys' fees, as provided for in the VCPA; and to grant such other relief as the Court deems equitable and proper.

INTRODUCTION

The United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia are faced with a profound public health crisis in the opioid epidemic. Each year, hundreds of Virginians die, and thousands more require emergency hospitalization, treatment, or other long-term care. This crisis is the direct and foreseeable result of a decades-long, complex, large-scale campaign of misrepresentations and deception by the opioid manufacturers, including Purdue. For many years, Purdue marketed its prescription opioids as safe, effective, and having a low risk of abuse and addiction. It did so knowing those claims were unproven at best and demonstrably false at worst. In 2007, Purdue and three executives pled guilty in federal court, and Purdue entered into a multistate Consent Judgment brought by 26 Attorneys General, due to its misbranding and deceptive promotion and marketing of its signature opioid drug, OxyContin. Nevertheless, Purdue continued to

¹ Virginia Code § 55-80 will be repealed as of October 1, 2019, and is being recodified in substantially similar form as Virginia Code § 55.1-400, which will become effective on the same date.

deceptively market its opioids to consumers and health care providers across the Commonwealth and the country, while its owners—all members of the Sackler family—enriched themselves by extracting billions of dollars in distributions from the company. As a result, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Virginians to hold Defendants accountable and begin the process of remedying the harms they have caused.

Among other conduct alleged in this Amended Complaint, Purdue has violated the VCPA by deceptively marketing prescription opioids, specifically in misrepresenting the risks of addiction and the ease in preventing it; the potential benefits of opioids, especially as related to other non-opioid pain relief; and the effectiveness of prescription opioids in offering treatment and relief for chronic pain. Though multiple Sackler family members were involved in Purdue's operations, Richard Sackler in particular directed, oversaw, controlled, managed, and actively participated in Purdue's sales and marketing functions, including many of the sales and marketing strategies and tactics at issue. Moreover, Purdue's conduct has created a public nuisance, adversely affecting a significant portion of the public by unreasonably interfering with a right common to the general public, and causing injury to the Commonwealth and its residents. Lastly, the Sacklers caused Purdue to make monetary transfers totaling over four billion dollars (\$4,000,000,000.00) to members of the Sackler family or to entities they controlled, in an effort to place those funds beyond the reach of the Commonwealth and other claimants and creditors who are entitled to compensation and relief for the harm caused by the opioid crisis Defendants created.

The Commonwealth prays that this Court grant the relief requested and states the following in support thereof:

PARTIES

1. The Plaintiff is the Commonwealth of Virginia, by, through, and at the relation of Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia.

2. Defendant Purdue Pharma L.P. is a foreign limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Connecticut.

3. Defendant Purdue Pharma Inc. is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of New York, with its principal place of business in Connecticut. Purdue Pharma, Inc. is the general partner of Purdue Pharma, L.P.

4. Defendant The Purdue Frederick Company (“Purdue Frederick”) is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Connecticut.

5. At all relevant times, Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., and Purdue Frederick acted in concert with one another and acted as agents and/or principals of one another in relation to the conduct described in this Amended Complaint. Whenever any reference is made in this Amended Complaint to any act of “Purdue,” or to the acts of any one of the Purdue entities, such allegations shall be deemed to include Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., and Purdue Frederick, acting jointly and severally, as if the act of any one of them were the act of the others, whether as principal, under an express or implied agency, or with actual or apparent authority to perform the acts alleged.

6. Purdue transacts business in Virginia and nationwide by manufacturing, promoting, marketing, advertising, and selling a number of prescription opioids. Its branded products include or have included: Oxycontin, MS Contin, Dilaudid, Dilaudid-HP, Butrans, Ryzolt, Hysingla, and Targiniq, among others.

7. At all relevant times, Purdue has been owned and controlled by members of the Sackler family. The Sackler family members named as Defendants in this action previously served as officers of Purdue, and served on the board of Purdue Pharma, Inc. (the “Purdue Board”) during the time period relevant to this Amended Complaint.² The Sackler family held a controlling majority of the Purdue Board throughout the relevant time period. Through their ownership interests and their positions on and control of the Purdue Board, the Sackler family controlled Purdue.

8. Defendant Richard Sackler (“Richard”) is a natural person who resides in New York, Florida, Connecticut, and Texas. He served on the Purdue Board from 1990 until 2018, and served as its co-chair from 2003 to 2018. He was also Purdue’s head of research and development from at least 1990 to 1999, and its president from 1990 to 2003.

9. Whenever any reference is made in this Complaint to any act of Purdue, such allegations shall be deemed to include Purdue and Richard Sackler, acting jointly and severally, as if the act of any one of them were the act of the other, whether as principal, under an express or implied agency, or with actual or apparent authority to perform the acts alleged.

10. Defendant Jonathan Sackler (“Jonathan”) is a natural person who resides in Connecticut. He served on the Purdue Board from 1990 until 2018. On or before May 31, 2007, he also served as a Senior Vice President of Purdue Pharma, Inc. and Purdue Pharma L.P.

11. Defendant Kathe Sackler (“Kathe”) is a natural person who resides in New York and Connecticut. She served on the Purdue Board from 1990 until 2018. On or before May 31, 2007, she also served as a Senior Vice President of Purdue Pharma, Inc. and Purdue Pharma L.P.

12. Defendant Mortimer D.A. Sackler (“Mortimer”) is a natural person who resides in

² Over the years, other members of the Sackler family who are not named as Defendants here have served as directors on the Purdue Board. They include David Sackler, Ilene Sackler Lefcourt, Beverly Sackler, and Theresa Sackler, all of whom served on the Purdue Board during the time period relevant to this Amended Complaint.

New York. He served on the Purdue Board from 1993 until 2019. On or before May 31, 2007, he also served as a Vice President of Purdue Pharma, Inc. and Purdue Pharma L.P.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. The Circuit Court for Tazewell County has authority to entertain this action and to grant the relief requested herein pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 8.01-620, 17.1-513, 55-80, 55.1-400, 59.1-203, 59.1-205, 59.1-206.

14. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants under Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(1), (3), and (4) because Defendants have transacted business in the Commonwealth of Virginia; Defendants have caused tortious injury by an act or omission in the Commonwealth; Defendants have caused tortious injury in the Commonwealth by an act or omission outside the Commonwealth; and Defendants have regularly done or solicited business, engaged in a persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in the Commonwealth.

15. Venue is permissible in this Court under Virginia Code § 8.01-262(3) and (4) because Purdue regularly conducts substantial business activity within Tazewell County and the cause of action arose, in part, in Tazewell County.

16. Venue is preferred in this Court pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-261(15)(c) because some or all of the acts to be enjoined are, or were, being done in Tazewell County.

17. In accordance with Virginia Code § 59.1-203(B), prior to the commencement of this action, the Commonwealth gave written notice to Purdue that these proceedings were contemplated and provided Purdue a reasonable opportunity to appear before the Office of the Attorney General to demonstrate that no violations of the VCPA had occurred, or in the alternative, to execute an appropriate Assurance of Voluntary Compliance (“AVC”) that would

be acceptable to the Commonwealth. Purdue chose not to exercise this opportunity to appear to demonstrate that no violations had occurred or to execute an appropriate AVC.

18. Also in accordance with Virginia Code § 59.1-203(B), prior to the filing of this Amended Complaint, the Commonwealth gave written notice to Richard Sackler that these proceedings were contemplated and provided him a reasonable opportunity to appear before the Office of the Attorney General to demonstrate that no violations of the VCPA had occurred, or in the alternative, to execute an appropriate AVC that would be acceptable to the Commonwealth. Richard Sackler appeared by and through his counsel before the Office of the Attorney General, but failed to demonstrate that no violations had occurred and has not agreed to execute an appropriate AVC.

FACTS

A. The Prescription Opioid Crisis and Defendants’ Role in Creating It

19. The United States is in the midst of a public health crisis, as drug overdose and other opioid-related deaths continue to increase.

20. Sixty-one percent (61%) of overdose deaths involve an opioid,³ and on average, 115 Americans die each day from an opioid overdose.⁴

21. In 2015, 22,598 people died of a prescription opioid overdose. This number is more than five times higher than in 1999.⁵

22. According to the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), prescription opioids are the primary factor in the dramatic increase in opioid-related deaths.

³ Rudd, Rose A., Seth, Puja et al. *Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths — United States, 2010–2015*. MMWR Morb. Mortal. Wkly Rep. ePub: 26 Dec 2016. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm655051e1>.

⁴ CDC/NCHS, *National Vital Statistics System*, Mortality. CDC Wonder, Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2017. Available at <https://wonder.cdc.gov>.

⁵ National Institute on Drug Abuse, *Overdose Death Rates*, Rev. Sept. 2017. Available at: <https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates>.

23. Virginia also has experienced the painful rise in overdoses: from 2007 to 2017, 4,929 Virginians fatally overdosed on prescription opioids.⁶

24. In fact, according to the Virginia Department of Health Professions, prescription opioids remain the most common category of opioids involved in overdose deaths in Virginia.⁷

25. Opioids are a class of drugs that attach to opioid receptors in the central nervous system. Examples include morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, codeine, buprenorphine, methadone, and fentanyl.

26. Opioids generate a euphoric response by stimulating the brain's pleasure centers. This euphoric response masks or relieves pain, but also can lead opioids to be highly addictive.

27. Opioids come in two main categories: immediate release and extended release. Extended-release opioids are concentrated versions of immediate-release opioids, but contained in a delivery system designed to release the drug over time.

28. In 2013, in response to a citizen petition from the Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") stated that the use of extended-release opioids in particular presented "serious risks of misuse, abuse, NOWS (neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome), addiction, overdose, and death."⁸

29. Purdue manufactures and markets extended-release branded opioids, including OxyContin and others previously identified in this Amended Complaint.

30. In the past, the prevailing medical consensus supported the use of prescription

⁶ Number and Rate of All Fatal Prescription Opioid (Excluding Fentanyl) Overdoses by Locality of Injury and Year of Death, 2007-2017, Va. Dep't of Health, <http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/18/2018/04/Rx-Opioids-Excluding-Fentanyl-Q417.xlsx> ("VDH Opioid Deaths").

⁷ Overdose Deaths and Prescription Risk Measures in Virginia, 2010-2015, Va. Dep't of Health Professions, http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/COE_documents/Add_to_TTAC/VirginiaPBSSDataBrief10062016.pdf.

⁸ Food and Drug Administration, Letter to Dr. Kolodny in Response to the Citizen Petition from Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing ("PROP"), Sept. 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.supportprop.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FDA_CDOR_Response_to_Physicians_for_Responsible_Opioid_Prescribing_Partial_Petition_Approval_and_Denial.pdf ("FDA Letter").

opioids only in cases of acute pain, recovery from surgery, cancer pain, and palliative care in terminal patients.

31. This medical consensus stemmed from the concern that opioids posed a significant risk of addiction and overdose.

32. However, beginning in or about 1995, Purdue and the Sackler family sought to change the dominant medical norms surrounding opioid use for chronic pain and the risk of addiction associated with that use.

33. In its marketing and promotional strategy for its prescription opioid OxyContin, Purdue falsely represented that it was not only effective for the treatment of moderate to severe chronic pain, but also carried little risk of addiction, abuse, or diversion.

34. The goals for Purdue and the Sackler family were to increase the number of doctors prescribing OxyContin, increase the number of patients taking OxyContin, and increase the OxyContin dosages prescribed by doctors—all to increase OxyContin sales and generate profits for Purdue and the Sacklers.

35. In 2007, following an investigation by the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Virginia and the Office of the Virginia Attorney General, Purdue Frederick and three of its top executives entered guilty pleas in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to federal criminal charges of misbranding of a drug for their marketing of OxyContin.⁹

36. The three individual executives pleaded guilty to misdemeanor offenses, while Purdue Frederick pleaded guilty to a felony charge, after which Purdue Frederick effectively went out of business. Purdue and the executives paid a combined total of over \$634 million in

⁹ The three executives who pleaded guilty were Michael Friedman, Purdue Frederick's President and CEO; Howard Udell, Purdue Frederick's Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer; and Paul Goldenheim, Purdue Frederick's Executive Vice President of Worldwide Research & Development and Chief Scientific Officer.

finances, forfeiture, restitution, disgorgement, civil settlements, monitoring costs, and other payments to resolve the criminal charges against them related to this marketing and promotional strategy.¹⁰

37. The payments to which Purdue and the Sackler family agreed included a payment of \$20,000,000.00 into a trust account for the operation of the Virginia Prescription Monitoring Program, and a payment of \$5,300,000.00 to the Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's Program Income Fund. Purdue also paid \$59,384,202.75 into an account to be distributed among the states participating in the settlement, including Virginia, as reimbursement for Medicaid payments made to settle false claims related to OxyContin misbranding.

38. The three Purdue executives who pleaded guilty paid a total of \$34.5 million to the Virginia Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's Program Income Fund.

39. The federal prosecutors who investigated Purdue's deceptive marketing and promotion of OxyContin initially wanted, as part of the plea agreement, to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

40. However, Purdue and the Sackler family petitioned [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

41. In so doing, Purdue acknowledged that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

42. Ultimately, [REDACTED], and Purdue kept sending its sales representatives to market opioids directly to doctors in Virginia and elsewhere.

¹⁰ *United States v. Purdue Frederick Co*, W.D. Va. Case 1:07-cr-00029-JPL, Dkt. 6-9.

43. Purdue acknowledged in the plea agreement that it had intentionally marketed and promoted OxyContin in a deceptive manner for several years. For instance, Purdue admitted, “Beginning on or about December 12, 1995, and continuing until on or about June 30, 2001, certain PURDUE supervisors and employees, with the intent to defraud or mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications[.]”¹¹

44. [REDACTED]

45. The Purdue Board also [REDACTED]

46. Among other things, [REDACTED]

47. [REDACTED]

48. Concurrently with the guilty plea in federal court, in May 2007, the Purdue Board also unanimously approved and caused Purdue to enter into a civil Consent Judgment with the

¹¹ *United States v. Purdue Frederick Co*, W.D. Va. Case 1:07-cr-00029-JPL, Agreed Statement of Facts (May 9, 2007), ¶ 20. *See also* ¶¶ 21-43 (describing further intentionally deceptive acts by Purdue in the marketing and promotion of OxyContin).

Commonwealth of Virginia, along with 25 other states and the District of Columbia, concerning its marketing and promotion of OxyContin, and alleged violations of state consumer protection laws, including the VCPA. Purdue paid \$19.5 million in settlement funds to the states.¹²

49. Among other terms, the Consent Judgment prohibited Purdue from making any false, misleading, or deceptive claims in the promotion or marketing of OxyContin or any controlled-release drug distributed by Purdue that contains oxycodone as an active pharmaceutical ingredient.

50. The Consent Judgment also prohibited Purdue from misrepresenting any such drug's potential for abuse, addiction, or physical dependence. In addition, Purdue was required to implement and maintain an OxyContin Abuse and Diversion Detection Program to identify potential abuse or diversion of such drugs, including the identification and reporting of problematic prescribing behaviors.

51. Defendants were therefore on notice as to the risks of abuse, diversion, and addiction associated with OxyContin and other opioids, and as to the problems with Purdue's sales and marketing of opioids.

52. Despite being on notice of these risks and problems, and despite the federal criminal sanctions and the multistate civil Consent Judgment, Purdue continued to deceptively market and promote its prescription opioid products.

53. As before, the Sacklers continued to drive and direct Purdue's opioid sales and marketing efforts, particularly Richard Sackler.

54. The Sacklers derived billions of dollars in personal financial benefits from the opioid sales generated by these activities, as described further below.

¹² *Commonwealth, ex. rel Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General v. Purdue Pharma L.P.*, Richmond City Circuit Court, Case No. CL07-2400. The Commonwealth is not seeking relief in this action for any claims or damages released pursuant to this 2007 settlement.

55. Thus, for more than two decades, Purdue has engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign to convince prescribers and patients that:

a. prescription opioids, including extended-release opioids manufactured by Purdue, were effective at relieving chronic pain;

b. prescription opioids were a superior form of treatment to other pain-relieving options, such as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”); and

c. the adverse effects of prescription opioids, primarily abuse and addiction, were overstated and could be mitigated.

56. As discussed in this Amended Complaint, Purdue pursued this marketing campaign through its own branded materials, as well as unbranded materials from third-party “pain advocacy” groups that were characterized as “independent” but were funded by Purdue.

57. Purdue not only provided these materials to health care providers, but also sent Purdue representatives to conduct one-on-one, in-person visits with health care providers to reinforce their deceptive and misleading messages.

58. This marketing campaign has been devastatingly effective: an estimated 20% of patients presenting to physician offices with chronic pain symptoms or pain-related diagnoses (including acute and chronic pain) receive an opioid prescription.¹³

59. In 2012, health care providers wrote 259 million prescriptions for opioid pain medication, enough for every adult in the United States to have a bottle of pills.¹⁴

60. Opioid prescriptions per capita increased 7.3% from 2007 to 2012, with opioid prescribing rates increasing more for family practice, general practice, and internal medicine

¹³ Matthew Daubresse et al., *Ambulatory Diagnosis and Treatment of Non-Malignant Pain in the United States, 2000-2010*, 51 *Med. Care* 870 (2013).

¹⁴ Deborah Dowell, Tamara M. Haegerich & Roger Chou, *CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain—United States, 2016*, 65 *Morb. and Mort. Wkly Rep.* 1 (2016) (“2016 CDC Guideline”).

compared with other specialties.¹⁵

B. Defendants' Complex and Multifaceted Campaign of Deception

61. Defendants used a multi-pronged approach to disseminate false, deceptive, and misleading information about opioid prescribing and Purdue's opioid products specifically.

62. First, Purdue communicated with health care providers, in the form of in-person visits from sales representatives, continuing medical education ("CME") programs, advertisements in medical periodicals, and websites, among other methods.

63. Purdue also communicated directly with consumers, through unbranded public-facing websites such as the "Partners Against Pain" and "In the Face of Pain" sites, advertisements and publications aimed at the public at large, and other means.

64. In addition, Purdue controlled, funded, and facilitated third-party organizations that were purportedly "independent" to give the appearance of objectivity and credibility to their claims.

65. From 2006 through 2016, Purdue provided more than \$68 million in direct grants to third-party organizations, including:

- a. \$1.7 million to the American Academy of Family Physicians;
- b. \$1.1 million to the American Academy of Pain Management;
- c. \$700,000 to the American Academy of Pain Medicine;
- d. \$300,000 to the American Academy of Physician Assistants;
- e. \$1 million to the American Osteopathic Association;
- f. \$1.3 million to the American Pain Foundation;
- g. \$600,000 to the American Pain Society;

¹⁵ Levy B, Paulozzi L, Mack KA, Jones CM. *Trends in opioid analgesic-prescribing rates by specialty, U.S., 2007–2012*, Am J Prev Med 2015;49:409–13.

- h. \$2.4 million to the Center for Practical Bioethics;
- i. \$1.1 million to the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy;
- j. \$4.5 million to the Patient Advocate Foundation;
- k. \$400,000 to the American Society of Consultant Pharmacists; and
- l. \$200,000 to the US Pain Foundation.

66. Purdue acted in concert with these organizations to spread its message regarding the benefits and risks of prescription opioids.

67. Finally, Purdue engaged medical professionals, referred to as “key opinion leaders” (“KOLs”), to promote their narrative surrounding prescription opioids and their risks and benefits.

68. These KOLs include, but are not limited to, Dr. Russell Portenoy and Dr. Lynn Webster.

69. As with the third-party organizations, the purpose of these KOLs was to have allegedly independent actors lend legitimacy to Purdue’s claims surrounding prescription opioids.

70. Through all of these avenues, Purdue communicated misrepresentations surrounding the risk of addiction to prescription opioids, the benefits of opioids, and the efficacy of opioids in the treatment of chronic pain.

71. Subsections C through F below describe examples of the strategies, tactics, and initiatives used to disseminate false, deceptive, and misleading information or misrepresentations about opioid prescribing and Purdue’s opioid products, and to deceptively downplay, obscure, or conceal the risks associated with those products.

72. The strategies, tactics, and initiatives used in Purdue’s campaign were conceived

and implemented with the Sacklers' knowledge and under their direction, most notably Richard Sackler, who (as discussed further below) directed, oversaw, controlled, aggressively managed, and actively participated in Purdue's sales and marketing functions and activities.

C. Purdue Misrepresented the Risks Associated with Addiction to Prescription Opioids

73. In promoting Purdue's extended-release prescription opioids, Purdue misrepresented the potential for addiction; mischaracterized the symptoms of addiction, including through the concept of "pseudoaddiction"; minimized any discussion of the risk of addiction (or omitted it altogether); and misrepresented the extent to which addiction risk could be mitigated or controlled.

1) Purdue Misrepresented the Risk of Addiction to Prescription Opioids

74. Prescription opioids are highly addictive. Studies have found diagnosed addiction rates in primary care settings as high as 26%.¹⁶

75. In 2013, the FDA observed that extended-release opioids present "disproportionate safety concerns" and pose a greater risk of misuse and abuse.¹⁷

76. Moreover, the risk of addiction is greater the longer a patient uses opioids.

77. A 2017 study conducted by the CDC determined that a patient initially prescribed one month of opioids has a 29.9% chance of still using after one year.¹⁸

78. In one 2011 study, 60% of patients who used opioids for at least 90 days were still using opioids five years later.¹⁹

79. Many patients become addicted to opioids even when they originally take opioids

¹⁶ 2016 CDC Guideline, *supra* note 14.

¹⁷ FDA Letter, *supra* note 8.

¹⁸ Anuj Shah, Corey J. Hayes & Bradley C. Martin, *Characteristics of Initial Prescription Episodes and Likelihood of Long-Term Opioid Use – United States, 2006-2015*, 66 *Morb. and Mort. Wkly Rep.* 265–69 (2017).

¹⁹ Bradley C. Martin et al., *Long-Term Chronic Opioid Therapy Discontinuation Rates from the TROUP Study*, 26 *J. Gen. Internal. Med.* 1450 (2011).

pursuant to a valid prescription.

80. In fact, one study found that 75% of those addicted to opioids first took opioids pursuant to a prescription.²⁰

81. Patients can also become addicted to opioids even with no prior history of substance abuse or addiction.

82. In a review of clinical evidence conducted to guide health care providers on appropriate prescribing of opioids, the CDC found “insufficient evidence to determine how harms of opioids differ depending on past or current substance abuse.”²¹

83. Despite all medical evidence to the contrary, Purdue sought to mislead health care providers and consumers about the risk of addiction associated with extended-release opioids.

84. For example, Purdue’s sales representatives were trained to carry the message that the risk of addiction is “less than one percent,” and included this message in its programs for physicians.

85. Purdue also funded, sponsored, and directed third-party efforts, including a variety of “educational” publications, that downplayed the risk of addiction, including the following:

a. Purdue sponsored the American Pain Foundation’s (“APF”) *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain* (2007), which maintained that addiction was rare and limited to extreme cases, such as unauthorized dose escalations, obtaining opioids from multiple sources, or theft. *Treatment Options* also stated that “[d]espite the great benefits of opioids, they are often under-used,” and “[r]estricting access to the most effective medications for treating pain is not the solution to drug abuse or addiction.”

²⁰ Cicero TJ, Ellis MS, Surratt HL, Kurtz SP. *The Changing Face of Heroin Use in the United States: A Retrospective Analysis of The Past 50 Years*. JAMA Psychiatry. 2014;71(7):821-26.

²¹ 2016 CDC Guideline, *supra* note 14.

b. Purdue also sponsored APF's *A Policymaker's Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management* (2011), which claimed that "less than 1 percent of children treated with opioids become addicted" and that pain is undertreated due to "[m]isconceptions about opioid addiction."

c. Purdue sponsored APF's *Exit Wounds* (2009), which taught veterans that "[l]ong experience with opioids shows that people who are not predisposed to addiction are very unlikely to become addicted to opioid pain medications."

d. The APF publication *Getting the Help You Need* states "[s]tudies and clinical practice have shown that the risk of addiction is small when [opioids] are appropriately prescribed and taken as directed," and "[u]nless you have a past or current history of substance abuse, the chance of addiction is low when these medications are prescribed properly and taken as directed."

e. In the "Commonly Asked Questions and Answers" section of the APF website, it states "addiction is very rare when pain medicines are properly prescribed and taken as directed," and "[k]eep in mind, pain medicine in and of itself does not cause someone to become addicted."

86. Upon information and belief, Purdue made all of the above misrepresentations to Virginia health care providers and consumers.

87. Finally, Purdue's own unbranded site "In the Face of Pain," told its visitors: "Knowledge is power. Many people living with pain and even some health care providers believe that opioid medications are addictive. The truth is that when properly prescribed by a health care professional and taken as directed, these medications give relief—not a 'high.'"

88. Virginia residents accessed the "In the Face of Pain" website 12,177 times

between 2010 and October 2015.²²

89. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led consumers to request or begin using opioids when they otherwise would not have.

2) Purdue Misrepresented that Certain Signs of Addiction were Instead Indicative of “Pseudoaddiction”

90. Purdue repeatedly misrepresented that many individuals showing signs of addiction were actually experiencing the unsubstantiated concept of “pseudoaddiction.”

91. The concept of “pseudoaddiction” was originally proposed by Dr. J. David Haddox—who later became a vice president of Purdue.

92. Dr. Haddox’s “pseudoaddiction” concept distinguished the term from “true addiction,” because it purportedly was a result of undertreated pain. Supposedly, “pseudoaddiction” could be addressed by prescribing even more, or higher dosages of, opioids.

93. The concept of “pseudoaddiction” has not been substantiated by unbiased scientific evidence.

94. For instance, one study that reviewed all academic medical publications discussing “pseudoaddiction” determined that “[o]f the 224 articles, none exist that attempted to empirically validate the concept of pseudoaddiction,” and those that considered “pseudoaddiction” as a “genuine clinical phenomenon” were funded by opioid manufacturers, including Purdue.²³

95. Moreover, the study concluded that:

The existence of pseudoaddiction, and its distinction from true addiction, is

²² Purdue deactivated the “In the Face of Pain” site in October 2015 as a result of an investigation by and settlement with the New York Attorney General’s Office.

²³ Greene, Marion S. & Chambers, R. Andrew, *Pseudoaddiction: Fact or Fiction? An Investigation of the Medical Literature* *Curr Addict Rep.* 2015; 2(4): 310–17.

understood by proponents as being based on the patient’s reported motivation for pain relief (e.g., if their behavior results from pain, then they have pseudoaddiction, not addiction). The reliability of this conceptualization seems to hinge on the assumption that addiction and pain do not co-occur However, it is not the case that pain and addiction are mutually exclusive conditions, and no clear evidence exists that having pain protects against the genesis or expression of addiction.²⁴

96. Nevertheless, Purdue’s sales representatives were trained to—and did—minimize and misrepresent the threat of addiction by, among other things, parroting the fictions of “pseudoaddiction” and how to distinguish it from “true addiction” when discussing abuse, addiction, and diversion with health care providers.

97. Purdue also marketed this false concept of “pseudoaddiction” to health care providers and consumers through publications and pamphlets, including the following:

a. Purdue sponsored the publication *Responsible Opioid Prescribing* (2007), which claimed that behaviors such as “requesting drugs by name,” “demanding or manipulative behavior,” seeing more than one doctor to obtain opioids, and hoarding were all signs of “pseudoaddiction,” rather than true addiction.

b. Purdue made similar representations in its pamphlet *Clinical Issues in Opioid Prescribing*, directed at health care providers but available on its “Partners Against Pain” website, where it explained “[p]seudoaddiction is a term which has been used to describe patient behaviors that may occur when pain is untreated Even such behaviors as illicit drug use and deception can occur in the patient’s efforts to obtain relief.” This pamphlet also stated that “pseudoaddiction” is distinguishable from true addiction “in that the behaviors resolve when the pain is effectively treated.”

c. In the Purdue-sponsored *A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management* (2011), which included the concept of “pseudoaddiction,” it explained that

²⁴ *Id.*

“[p]atients with unrelieved pain may become focused on obtaining medications and may otherwise seem inappropriately ‘drug seeking,’ which may be misidentified as addiction by the patient’s physician.”

d. Finally, Purdue published a pamphlet for several years entitled *Providing Relief, Preventing Abuse*, which initially described “pseudoaddiction” in 2008 as “the misinterpretation by members of the health care team of relief-seeking behaviors in a person whose pain is inadequately treated as though they were drug-seeking behaviors as would be common in the setting of abuse,” and in the 2011 edition explained that “[t]he term *pseudoaddiction* emerged in the literature to describe the inaccurate interpretation of these behaviors”²⁵

98. The above misrepresentations were made to Virginia consumers and health care providers.

99. For instance, of the 158,023 copies of *Providing Relief, Preventing Abuse* ordered by Purdue sales representatives from 2007 to 2017, 7,817 were ordered specifically for distribution in Virginia.

100. Purdue’s “solution” for the treatment of “pseudoaddiction” was the prescription of more opioids.

101. For example, the Purdue-sponsored *Responsible Opioid Prescribing* (2007) publication suggested that, in order to tell whether a patient is addicted to opioids, the provider should give the patient more opioids and see if he continues engaging in “demanding or manipulative behavior” after his demands are met.

²⁵ Though the 2014 edition of the pamphlet did not contain the term “pseudoaddiction,” it included an “Other Considerations” section that taught “[s]ome patients may exhibit behaviors aimed at obtaining pain medication because their pain treatment is inadequate. Such behaviors may occur occasionally even with successful opioid therapy for pain; a pattern of persistent occurrences should prompt concern and further assessment.”

102. Purdue’s misrepresentations surrounding the concept of “pseudoaddiction” and the treatment thereof induced many health care providers—including those in Virginia—to continue prescribing opioids (and indeed, to *increase* opioid dosages) despite clear signs of addiction.

103. Indeed, one health care provider in Alexandria, Virginia, facing disciplinary action by the Virginia Board of Medicine for repeatedly overprescribing opioids, including OxyContin, cited as his defense a belief that his patient was in pain and displaying symptoms of “pseudoaddiction,” rather than abuse or addiction.²⁶

104. As Dr. Lynn Webster, one of Purdue’s KOLs, later acknowledged, the concept of pseudoaddiction “obviously became too much of an excuse to give patients more medication It led us down a path that caused harm. It is already something we are debunking as a concept.”²⁷

3) Purdue Misrepresented the Additional Risks of Increased Doses of Opioids

105. Because Purdue recommended that the response to identifiable signs of addiction was to increase opioid dosages, it also misled health care providers and consumers about the risks associated with those increased doses.

106. Purdue thus misrepresented to health care providers and consumers—including those in Virginia—that they could increase opioid dosages indefinitely without added risk.

107. For example, Purdue funded or sponsored third-party efforts, including a variety of “educational” publications, including the following:

- a. APF’s *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain* (2007)

²⁶ The Virginia Board of Medicine was not persuaded by this defense, and issued the provider a reprimand. The Board also restricted his ability to write prescriptions for Schedule II or III controlled substances for any duration beyond 14 days.

²⁷ Fauber, John & Gabler, Ellen, *Networking Fuels Painkiller Boom*, Milwaukee Wisc. J. Sentinel, Feb. 19, 2012.

claimed that “physical dependence is normal” and not a sign of addiction, that some patients need a larger dose because of their pain worsening, and that certain opioids have “no ceiling dose.”

b. APF’s *A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management* (2011) explained that dose escalations are “sometimes necessary,” even indefinite ones, but did not disclose the risks from high-dose opioids.

c. A Purdue-sponsored CME entitled *Overview of Management Options*, and edited by KOL Dr. Portenoy, taught that NSAIDs and other drugs, but not opioids, are unsafe at high doses. The program appears to still be available for CME credit online.²⁸

108. In addition, on Purdue’s “In the Face of Pain” website, Purdue encouraged patients to be “persistent” in finding doctors who will treat their pain, and promoted the position that if a patient’s doctor does not prescribe what is, in the patient’s opinion, a sufficient dosage of opioids, he should find another doctor who will.

109. As stated above, Virginians visited this site over 12,000 times in less than five years.

110. Purdue’s sales representatives also carried this message, making sure that patients were receiving “appropriate doses” of their pain medications (with no indication that any dose might be too high).

111. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to increase the dosages of opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led consumers to request higher dosages of opioids when they otherwise would not have.

²⁸ AMA Education Center, Module 02 – Pain Management – Overview of Management Options, <https://cme.ama-assn.org/activity/1296783/detail.aspx> (last visited September 2019).

4) Purdue Misrepresented the Ease of Preventing or Mitigating the Risk of Addiction

112. In addition to downplaying the risk of addiction and mischaracterizing the signs of addiction, Purdue also misrepresented the ease of preventing addiction.

113. Purdue sought to reassure health care providers that any risk of addiction could be managed and addiction prevented in patients by using tools provided by Purdue or third-party groups.

114. Specifically, Purdue falsely claimed in publications for health care providers and consumers that screening could manage addiction risks, including the following:

a. Purdue-sponsored APF publication *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain* (2007) informed patients that so-called “opioid agreements” between doctors and patients could “ensure that you take the opioid as prescribed.” Opioid agreements are written or oral agreements between a prescribing provider and a patient regarding how the patient will use the prescribed opioids.

b. A Purdue-sponsored webinar taught by KOL Dr. Webster in 2011 called *Managing Patient’s Opioid Use: Balancing the Need and Risk* claimed that screening tools, urine tests, and patient agreements prevent “overuse of prescriptions” and “overdose deaths.”

115. Upon information and belief, the above misrepresentations were made to Virginia consumers and health care providers.

116. In addition, Purdue sales representatives gave prescribers the Partners Against Pain “Pain Management Kit,” which contained several “drug abuse screening tools,” including the “Opioid Risk Tool” (“ORT”).

117. The ORT was a five-question screening tool that identifies, through patient self-reporting, whether there is a personal history of substance abuse, sexual abuse, or “psychological

disease.”

118. Purdue promoted this tool by claiming it could be used to predict and manage the risk of opioid addiction.

119. Purdue also promoted the ORT in CME materials, including a 2013 CME entitled *Is It Pain?*

120. Purdue sales representatives distributed pain management kits, which included the ORT, in Virginia.

121. Purdue sought to convince prescribers and consumers that addiction risk could be managed in order to increase the overall number of prescriptions for their opioid products.

122. However, as the CDC concluded in a comprehensive review in 2016, “the body of evidence” is insufficient to support “the effectiveness of use of risk assessment tools and mitigation strategies in reducing harms,” including “improving outcomes related to overdose, addiction, abuse, or misuse.”

123. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that use of the ORT and other tools meaningfully reduced the risk of addiction.

D. Purdue Misrepresented the Benefits of Prescription Opioids

124. Purdue not only minimized or omitted the risks associated with use of its prescription opioids, but also misleadingly touted their benefits, including in comparisons to other non-opioid products, such as NSAIDs.

1) Purdue Misrepresented the Abuse-Deterrent Properties of Purdue’s Prescription Opioids

125. In 2010, Purdue introduced a reformulation of its flagship opioid OxyContin that

was labeled “abuse deterrent,” ostensibly designed to make the pills harder to dissolve, crush, or otherwise manipulate to defeat their extended release character.

126. As Purdue’s website explained, the abuse-deterrent formulation was “intended to help deter the abuse, misuse, and diversion of these prescription pain medications, while ensuring that patients in pain continue to have appropriate access to these important therapies.”

127. Purdue marketed its abuse-deterrent formula of OxyContin as “tamper-proof, abuse-deterrent, tamper-resistant, and abuse-resistant.”

128. Further, Purdue launched a marketing initiative to promote its abuse-deterrent formula as the “socially responsible” choice for health care providers prescribing opioids.

129. KOLs gave presentations on behalf of Purdue that claimed the abuse-deterrent formulas “make opioids you prescribe harder to abuse and make all clinicians part of the solution to prescription opioid abuse.”

130. Upon information and belief, the above misrepresentations were made to Virginia health care providers and consumers.

131. Purdue’s efforts to characterize its abuse-deterrent formulation as safer and a bulwark against opioid addiction have proven effective: a 2014 survey found that 46% of physicians surveyed erroneously believed that abuse-deterrent formulations were less addictive than non-abuse-deterrent formulations.²⁹

132. However, the CDC’s 2016 review found no evidence or studies in support of the claim that abuse-deterrent formulas have any effectiveness as a risk mitigation strategy for deterring or preventing abuse or addiction.³⁰

133. In fact, Purdue acknowledged internally that “there is no evidence that the

²⁹ Catherine S. Hwang et al., *Primary Care Physicians’ Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding Prescription Opioid Abuse and Diversion*, 32 *Clinical J. Pain* 276 (2016).

³⁰ 2016 CDC Guideline, *supra* note 14.

reformulation of OxyContin is less subject to misuse, abuse, diversion, overdose, or addiction,” and its own research identified 32 publicly-circulated “recipes” to defeat the abuse-deterrent formula.

134. Moreover, in response to negative press coverage about the marketing of its abuse-deterrent formula, Purdue prepared company talking points that admitted “[t]he current FDA-approved products with abuse-deterrent properties address abuse through certain routes, but they only make abuse more difficult, not impossible, and they provide no deterrence against swallowing the intact tablet.”

135. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that use of the abuse-deterrent formulas reduced the risk of abuse and addiction.

2) Purdue Misrepresented the Superiority of Prescription Opioids to Other Pain Treatment Options

136. Purdue misrepresented its branded opioids, and prescription opioids in general, as superior to other pain treatment options, such as NSAIDs.

137. Purdue presented misleading comparisons between the risks and benefits of opioids and NSAIDs, and exaggerated the risks of NSAIDs while minimizing known risks of long-term opioid use.

138. For example, Purdue touted its products’ lack of a “dose ceiling” as compared to NSAIDs or other medications, in the following ways:

a. APF’s *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain* (2007) states that certain opioids have “no ceiling dose as there is with NSAIDs. As pain worsens, these medications continue to be useful unless side effects occur.”

b. Purdue-sponsored APF publication *Exit Wounds* (2009) stated that NSAIDS “have an important limitation, called a ‘dose ceiling.’ Taking doses above the ceiling will significantly raise the risk of serious side effects, such as kidney failure, which can be life-threatening.”

c. Purdue distributed a letter to doctors titled *Maximum Dose of OxyContin Tablets* which claimed “when used appropriately, there is no established or fixed upper limit on the dosage of full, single entity, opioid agonists such as oxycodone.”

d. A 2010 version of the above letter explicitly compared Purdue’s product to other pain treatment options, saying “[l]ike all pure opioid agonist analgesics, with increasing doses there is increasing analgesia, unlike with mixed agonist/agonists or non-opioid analgesics, where there is a limit to the analgesic effect with increasing doses.”

139. Upon information and belief, these materials and correspondence were distributed to, and viewed by, health care providers and consumers in Virginia.

140. Purdue made these superiority claims despite the absence of any scientific evidence that higher doses of opioids are more effective for treating pain, and while minimizing the risks associated with higher dosages (including, as described above, an increased risk of addiction).

141. Purdue’s own internal documents stated that Purdue “cannot represent or suggest” that its drugs are “safer” or “more effective,” or “make any other sort of comparative claim,” because it had “no drugs” with the evidence to support such a claim.

142. Purdue’s internal documents further acknowledged that “[m]aking comparative statements of our products versus a competitor’s product is never appropriate” because the “necessary substantial evidence” for such a claim was lacking.

143. Nevertheless, Purdue continued to make comparative superiority claims, despite knowing the claims lacked evidentiary support.

144. In addition, Purdue misrepresented the risks of other non-opioid drugs such as NSAIDs or acetaminophen, relative to the risks posed by prescription opioids.

145. For instance, APF's *Exit Wounds* (2009) lists all of the "serious side effects" of NSAIDs, including gastrointestinal bleeding, decreased kidney function, and possible risk of stroke or heart attack, and highlights that higher doses of acetaminophen can cause "possible liver damage."

146. In contrast, the same publication lists the "side effects" of opioids as constipation, nausea and vomiting, sleepiness, mental cloudiness, itching, dizziness and difficulty urinating, and states that "most side effects disappear after a few days for most (not all) people."

147. Another Purdue-sponsored APF publication, *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living in Pain* (2007), states that "NSAIDs can cause life-threatening side effects in some persons," and attributes "10,000 to 20,000 deaths each year because of the side effects of this class of medications." The actual number was around 3,200 annually at the time.

148. This same publication had no references to severe or life-threatening side effects of prescription opioids, or the number of deaths caused by them.

149. Purdue made these comparisons as part of their marketing strategy to convert NSAID users to long-term opioid use.

150. At Purdue's 2016 National Sales Meeting, its "Take the Lead" presentation stressed that "NSAIDs are a key opportunity for growth" to expand the market of its extended-release opioid Butrans. The presentation then set a goal for how Purdue would "measure success": 10% of Butrans prescriptions reflecting a conversion from NSAIDs.

151. Purdue’s claims of superiority in safety or efficacy were not supported by scientific evidence, and were intended solely to increase the sales of its products.

152. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that use of opioids was better or safer than the use of other non-opioid options, such as NSAIDs.

E. Purdue Misrepresented the Efficacy of Prescription Opioids

153. Along with repeatedly misrepresenting the risks associated with opioid use, and deceptively highlighting the benefits of its products, Purdue also marketed its drugs as a solution to the undertreatment of pain, effective to treat or relieve long-term chronic pain and improve overall function.

1) Purdue Misrepresented the Efficacy of Purdue’s Opioids in the Treatment of Chronic Pain

154. As described in this Amended Complaint, beginning in the 1990s, Purdue and the Sacklers began a calculated campaign to change the prevailing medical standards on the use of prescription opioids such as OxyContin for the treatment of chronic pain.

155. Purdue did so in part through the third-party publications it funded, such as APF’s *Exit Wounds* (2009), which stated that the “pain relieving properties of opioids are unsurpassed; they are today considered the ‘gold standard’ of pain medications, and so are often the main medications used in the treatment of chronic pain. Yet, despite their great benefits, opioids are often underused.”

156. Moreover, Purdue expanded the definition of “chronic pain” in the medical community and marketed opioids for the treatment of specific conditions not previously considered for their use, such as:

a. Purdue's *In the Face of Pain* (2011) fact sheet stated that "[c]hronic pain is widely believed to represent disease itself" and listed among its chronic pain conditions "chronic fatigue syndrome, endometriosis, fibromyalgia, inflammatory bowel disease, interstitial cystitis, temporomandibular joint dysfunction, and vulvodynia."

b. Purdue's 2013 sales training program, *Introduction to Pain Management 2013 Level 100*, defined "chronic pain" as either "due to an ongoing disorder," "after an injury has healed" or "not always associated with a preceding event" and included as examples of chronic pain "arthritis pain" and "lower back pain."

157. Purdue marketed its products for long-term use, and specifically for the treatment of "chronic pain," despite a lack of evidence as to the effectiveness of long-term opioid use and its knowledge of this evidentiary deficiency.

158. For instance, as recently as 2014, an internal review of studies conducted by Purdue admitted that "more evidence of long-term effectiveness and safety is needed."

159. In 2016, the CDC concluded that "[n]o evidence shows a long-term benefit of opioids in pain and function versus no opioids for chronic pain with outcomes examined at least a year later."³¹

160. There is also no evidence that the increase in prescription opioid use has resulted in less pain for patients.

161. In fact, despite a 600% increase in opioid consumption in the past 20 years,³² overall patient-reported pain has remained consistent.³³

162. Purdue's misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in

³¹ 2016 CDC Guideline, *supra* note 14.

³² Donald Teater, Nat'l Safety Council, *The Psychological and Physical Side Effects of Pain Medications* (2014), citing Leonard Paulozzi et al., *CDC Grand Rounds Prescription Drug Overdoses – a U.S. Epidemic*, 61 *Morb. and Mort. Wkly Rep.* 10 (2012).

³³ Daubresse et al., *supra* note 13.

Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that opioids were effective, even preferred, for the treatment of chronic pain.

2) Purdue Misrepresented Its Opioids as More Effective than Non-opioid Alternatives in the Treatment of Chronic Pain

163. Along with misrepresenting the efficacy of opioids for pain and quality of life, Purdue also deceptively promoted its products as more effective than other alternatives.

164. As stated above, Purdue hailed opioids as the “gold standard” for pain relief because the “pain relieving properties of opioids are unsurpassed.”

165. In a Purdue-sponsored CME for the American Medical Association, Purdue also claimed “opioid analgesics are conventionally considered the first-line therapy for . . . severe persistent pain due to cancer, AIDS, and other advanced illnesses.”

166. Purdue was aware that claims of greater effectiveness were questionable at the very least.

167. Purdue’s own internal compliance training cautioned speakers for Purdue that “comparative and implied superiority claims” were gaining “increased scrutiny.”

168. In reality, prescription opioids are no more effective than NSAIDs, acetaminophen, or other non-opioid options for the treatment of chronic pain.

169. In fact, the National Safety Council states that, even in cases of acute pain, no scientific evidence supports a preference for opioids over NSAIDs, for example, and “the evidence seems to indicate that NSAIDs are more effective for severe pain.”³⁴

170. Moreover, according to the CDC Guidelines, even when opioids are prescribed for chronic pain, “they should be combined with non-pharmacologic and non-opioid

³⁴ Teater, *The Psychological and Physical Side Effects of Pain Medications*, *supra* note 32, at 6.

pharmacologic therapy, as appropriate, to provide greater benefits to patients in improving pain and function.”³⁵

171. Upon information and belief, these and other misrepresentations were made to health care providers and consumers in Virginia.

172. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that opioids were more effective than other non-opioid options in the treatment of chronic pain.

3) Purdue Misrepresented the Ability of Purdue’s Opioids to Improve Function

173. In addition to misrepresenting the efficacy of its prescription opioids for the treatment of pain, Purdue also misrepresented that opioids increase long-term functionality.

174. Purdue funded and sponsored third-party efforts, including a variety of “educational” publications that highlighted the increased function patients could expect from taking prescription opioids, including:

a. Purdue-sponsored publication *Responsible Opioid Prescribing* (2007) claimed that “[w]hile significant pain worsens function, relieving pain should reverse that effect and improve function.”

b. APF’s *Treatment Options: A Guide for People Living with Pain* (2007) claimed that opioids, when used properly “give [patients] a quality of life we deserve.”

c. APF’s *Exit Wounds* (2009) asserted that, if taken properly, opioids “increase a person’s level of functioning.”

d. APF’s *A Policymaker’s Guide to Understanding Pain & Its Management*

³⁵ 2016 CDC Guidelines, *supra* note 14.

(2011) claimed that opioids are “often a necessary part” of a plan to “restore functioning and improve quality of life.”

e. Purdue-sponsored content in *The Atlantic* magazine advanced the claim that “all physicians who treat chronic pain with opioids have a significant number of patients in our practices that are back at work as full-time employees or back at school as full-time students because their pain is tolerable and under control.”³⁶

175. Purdue made these misrepresentations without any reliable scientific evidence that long-term use of opioids improve function or quality of life while minimizing any risks.

176. Indeed, the CDC’s 2016 review and guidance stresses that “[w]hile benefits for pain relief, function, and quality of life with long-term opioid use for chronic pain are uncertain, risks associated with long-term opioid use are clearer and significant.”³⁷

177. Upon information and belief, these and other misrepresentations were made to health care providers and consumers in Virginia.

178. Purdue’s misrepresentations led health care providers—including those in Virginia—to prescribe opioids when they otherwise would not have, and led providers and consumers to believe that opioids were effective, even preferred, for improving functionality and quality of life.

F. Purdue Discouraged Reporting Suspicious Providers and Promoted Opioids to Prescribers it Knew to be Problematic

179. Purdue kept a database of health care providers who were suspected of prescribing opioids excessively or inappropriately, and tracked the number of prescriptions and revenue generated by these prescribers. This database of suspect prescribers was code-named

³⁶ Aronoff, Gerald *Take My Pain Away: A Physician’s Perspective of Prescription Opioids and Pain Management*, Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/purdue-health/take-my-pain-away/202/> (last visited June 2018).

³⁷ 2016 CDC Guideline, *supra* note 14.

“Region Zero.”

180. Once a prescriber was placed in the database, Purdue sales representatives were not supposed to visit the prescriber’s office and market opioids to the prescriber in person.

181. However, Purdue failed to report the vast majority of these prescribers to any governmental or regulatory authorities, to insurers, or to the public, and continued for years to benefit from the revenue generated by the opioid prescriptions they wrote.

182. In July 2010, the Purdue Board asked the sales staff [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

183. In response, Purdue’s sales staff prepared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

184. Among other things, the information sent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

185. Defendants knew that there were problematic prescribers all over the country, including in Virginia, who were suspected of prescribing opioids excessively or inappropriately. Defendants nevertheless failed to report the vast majority of them to any governmental authorities, professional licensing or regulation boards, insurers, or the public.

186. Instead, Defendants continued to profit from the opioid sales generated by Region Zero prescribers.

187. In March 2011, Purdue’s sales staff again reported [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

188. In 2013, the *Los Angeles Times* published an article revealing the existence of the Region Zero database, and confirming that Purdue had failed to report the vast majority of the Region Zero prescribers to the authorities.³⁸

189. A Purdue representative confirmed to the *Los Angeles Times* that Purdue had reported only 154 of the over 1,800 prescribers in the database, or about 8%.³⁹

190. Not all problematic or suspect prescribers were placed in the Region Zero database.

191. Indeed, many problem prescribers were never placed in the database, and Purdue sales representatives continued to aggressively and deceptively market opioids directly to them, often with knowledge of problems or other “red flags” concerning these prescribers.

192. This activity occurred across the country, including in Virginia.

193. From 2007 to 2017, Purdue employed approximately 86 sales representatives in Virginia to visit health care providers, including as many as 40 in 2012.

194. These sales representatives interacted with health care providers, distributing marketing materials that misrepresented the risk of addiction; the occurrence of pseudoaddiction; the risks of increasing opioid dosages indefinitely; the ease of preventing addiction; the benefits of Purdue’s abuse-deterrent drugs, including in the prevention of addiction; the efficacy of prescription opioids in treating chronic moderate and severe pain; and the superiority of prescription opioids to other pain treatments.

195. Purdue sales representatives kept notes regarding their visits with providers; these notes are referred to as call notes.

196. According to these notes, Purdue sales representatives made 229,011 calls on

³⁸ Scott Glover and Lisa Girion, “OxyContin maker closely guards its list of suspect doctors,” *Los Angeles Times* (Aug. 11, 2013), available at <https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-rx-purdue-20130811-story.html>.

³⁹ *Id.*

health care providers in Virginia between 2006 and 2017, including 1,359 calls on health care providers in Tazewell County between 2008 and 2017.

197. Among the health care providers to whom Purdue sales representatives made routine visits were health care providers who were known or suspected to be prescribing its opioids excessively or inappropriately.

198. Indeed, Purdue's sales representatives were disincentivized to report suspicious provider activity, while incentivized to call on high-volume prescribers of Purdue's opioid products, and to push those prescribers to prescribe even more of those products.

199. Purdue's Incentive Bonus Program, effective January 1, 2013, made clear that sales representatives would not receive a bonus based on sales from providers who the sales representatives reported and were placed in a "cease calling" status, but could potentially receive a bonus for those in "cease calling" if the sales representative did not initially report the provider.

200. The Incentive Bonus Program stated:

Where the Sales Representative reports a prescriber . . . and the Law Department ultimately determines that the Sales Representative should cease calling on that prescriber, the sales and sales history attributable to that prescriber will remain removed from the Sales Representative's bonus calculations.

* * *

Conversely, where the Law Department determines that a Sales Representative should cease calling on a prescriber who was not initially reported by the Sales Representative, the sales history attributable to that prescriber may be manually added back into the Sales Representative's bonus calculations at the company's discretion following a review of the circumstances.

201. Therefore, if a Purdue sales representative reported a suspicious provider, that sales representative did so at the risk of removing sales attributable to that provider from the representative's bonus calculations. Purdue's Incentive Bonus Program thus effectively disincentivized reporting suspicious providers.

202. Purdue also structured bonuses for sales representatives to focus on its highest

volume prescribers, which it termed “super core” and “core” prescribers.

203. Purdue awarded points in a point system that allocated bonuses and rewarded sales representatives who had the highest percentage of total sales calls with “super core” or “core” prescribers.

204. “Super core” and “core” prescribers were also those most likely to be engaged in inappropriate or suspicious prescribing.

205. Purdue’s call records show they regularly called on problematic prescribers in Virginia, including the following examples, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]:

a) Dr. Shriharsh Pole

206. Dr. Shriharsh Pole was an internal medicine physician in Woodbridge, Virginia, who was disciplined by the Virginia Board of Medicine multiple times before he ultimately agreed to a voluntary suspension of his license in October 2013.

207. The Board concluded in 2009 and again in 2013 that Dr. Pole inappropriately prescribed opioids and other controlled substances, as well as failed to monitor or manage patients’ use of, and possible addiction to, said substances.

208. In fact, pending a full disciplinary hearing in 2013, the Board took a separate step to restrict Dr. Pole’s license and prohibited him from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances, warranted by “a substantial danger to public health or safety.”

209. Purdue’s records show that it was very familiar with Dr. Pole: Purdue’s sales representatives made 240 calls on Dr. Pole from January 2006 to August 2013.

210. From their first visits in 2006, Purdue’s sales representatives recognized that the doctor was failing to have patients adhere to pain management agreements and failing to dismiss

patients who had violated these agreements.

211. In fact, in the first seven months of 2006, a sales representative for Purdue mentioned this to Dr. Pole no fewer than six times.

212. Despite Dr. Pole's failure to follow these agreements and their requirements with his patients, Purdue sales representatives continued to call on Dr. Pole.

213. In fact, Purdue representatives had several discussions with Dr. Pole over the next year touting the "indestructible" OxyContin tablets and the "benefit of a proven [delivery] system" they offer.

214. These representatives also highlighted the benefits of OxyContin's multiple dosages, and discussed with Dr. Pole "how pts [patients] need to be educated on proper dosing."

215. Purdue sales representatives even noted the benefit of new dosing options for older patients, explaining "the value of the new strengths, particular[ly] in the elderly pt [patient] where now you have both the 10 and 15" milligram doses, which "may allow for greater chance of being able to tolerate" the prescription opioid.

216. In June 2009, the Virginia Board of Medicine suspended Dr. Pole's license pursuant to a Consent Order, finding that he had failed to adhere to the required standards in the prescribing of controlled substances, including OxyContin, to 14 patients from 1999 to 2008.

217. The Board's findings determined that Dr. Pole had failed to establish treatment plans, ignored drug seeking behavior, failed to enforce pain management contracts, and even ignored a patient's pleas to reduce her opioid dosages.

218. Notwithstanding this suspension, Purdue sales representatives continued to call on Dr. Pole—including in the period from June 2009 to October 2009, when his license was suspended.

219. Purdue's sales representatives met with Dr. Pole as if nothing had happened—scheduled lunches, discussed his patients, and pitched him on prescribing Ryzolt and Oxycontin.

220. Indeed, Purdue's sales representatives' notes reflect that Dr. Pole is “admittedly [sic] using less opioids, taking time off” and “when he is back full time,” Dr. Pole will follow some of the representative's suggestions.

221. The sales representative also recorded when Dr. Pole's suspension had been lifted: a note in October 2009 says the representative “[I]earned that he is back in action, no more ‘fill-in’ doctors.”

222. Purdue's sales representatives' notes identify the reason Purdue continued to call on Dr. Pole and pitch their prescription opioids to him: Dr. Pole was “looking to fashion himself as the predominant pain management specialist in Woodbridge when all is said and done.”

223. As a result, Purdue sales representatives ignored problematic statements or behavior from Dr. Pole on calls. For example:

a. Dr. Pole informed a sales representative that he had learned at a conference about new standards of care requiring doctors to follow specific safety procedures, and increased documentation in the prescribing of controlled substances. Dr. Pole stated, however, that his prescribing of Purdue's products would continue: “he is not diswayed [sic] by this, he will continue to use all types of pain products.”

b. In early 2010, a Purdue sales representative told Dr. Pole that he “might get a call” about a patient who had died using OxyContin. Dr. Pole's response was noted by the sales representative: “He still is willing to use Oxycontin, do not know how many new starts we can get from the appropriate patients. He didn't seem to hold Oxycontin solely accountable for his patient that was using Oxycontin and overdosed. He seems to be comfortable.”

c. When introduced to Purdue's new product, Butrans, in 2011, Dr. Pole was eager to begin prescribing it, even indicating to a sales representative that he had newly prescribed it to three patients in less than a week. Despite this, Dr. Pole was not prescribing the proper doses to patients, and the sales representative had to "clarify" and "review" several times to Dr. Pole the appropriate prescriptions for "opioid naive patient as well as opioid experienced patient" on Butrans.

d. After several months of prescribing Butrans, Dr. Pole stated to a Purdue sales representative that he did not feel Butrans was strong enough for some patients, and "said he is going to continue to prescribe it for patients that are experiencing 'mild' pain because he said he doesn't feel that it works on moderate to severe chronic pain." Though the sales representative went over the correct indications for Butrans with the doctor again, the representative did not stop recommending that Dr. Pole prescribe Butrans.

224. Purdue sales representatives continued their regular visits to Dr. Pole from 2009 to 2013—157 visits through August 2013.

225. During these visits, sales representatives regularly pushed OxyContin "new starts," or new patients, as well as conversions from short-acting opioids like Percocet to long-acting OxyContin.

226. In 2013, the Virginia Board of Medicine once again stepped in, restricting Dr. Pole's ability to write prescriptions for controlled substances.

227. Regardless of this restriction, however, Purdue sales representatives continued to visit Dr. Pole, even making multiple pitches specifically for OxyContin "new starts," from April 2013 to July 2013.

228. Dr. Pole was finally suspended indefinitely in October 2013, when he surrendered

his license voluntarily.

229. The Virginia Board of Medicine, in its Order, cited his egregious treatment of five female patients, including prescribing one patient 5,079 dosage units of oxycodone and another 3,040 dosage units of oxycodone despite his awareness of their drug-seeking behavior and addiction.

230. In 2015, Dr. Pole was arrested by the Prince William County Police Department and charged with seven counts of illegal drug distribution for continuing to write prescriptions after his license was suspended.

231. In 2018, Dr. Pole and a nurse practitioner who worked for him pleaded guilty in federal court to charges of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, “including oxycodone, oxymorphone, morphine sulfate, and hydrocodone, outside the scope of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose.”⁴⁰ On April 26, 2019, Dr. Pole was sentenced to seven years in prison for his crimes.⁴¹

b) Dr. Hillary Hawkins

232. Dr. Hillary Hawkins, a primary care physician in Mechanicsville, Virginia, was disciplined by the Virginia Board of Medicine in March 2017.

233. The Board determined that Dr. Hawkins was overprescribing opioids, including OxyContin, to patients with chronic pain conditions from July 1995 to 2015, despite evidence that the patients were addicted, drug seeking, and overmedicated.

234. In one case, a patient’s son pleaded with Dr. Hawkins that his mother was

⁴⁰ Peggy Fox, “Former doctor, nurse plead guilty to illegally distributing 600,000 oxycodone pills,” WUSA (Nov. 29, 2018), available at <https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/virginia/former-doctor-nurse-plead-guilty-to-illegally-distributing-600000-oxycodone-pills/65-618847228>.

⁴¹ Rachel Weiner, “‘Pill mill’ doctor who lost license three times is sentenced to seven years in prison,” *Washington Post* (Apr. 26, 2019), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/pill-mill-doctor-who-lost-license-three-times-sentenced-to-seven-years-in-prison/2019/04/26/dc525b5c-669a-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html.

overmedicated, yet she kept prescribing, believing it was malpractice not to treat the patient's pain.

235. In another instance, a patient's insurer told Dr. Hawkins on multiple occasions that it was inappropriate to treat fibromyalgia with opioids like OxyContin, but Dr. Hawkins continued prescribing it.

236. Purdue's records show frequent contacts between its sales representatives and Dr. Hawkins. From 2006 to 2017, Purdue called on the physician's office 293 times.

237. From their early visits to Dr. Hawkins's office, Purdue sales representatives attempted to assuage the doctor and her staff about addiction and diversion concerns, and convinced them to prescribe more and higher doses of OxyContin.

238. For example, in 2006, a Purdue sales representative "spoke to [Dr. Hawkins's] nurse for a while about her concerns with abuse and diversion with some of their patients." The sales representative's response was to go over "the definitions for addiction, physical dependence [sic] and pseudoaddiction," after which the nurse "agreed that some of the patients she feared were seeking or watching the clock may not be receiving appropriate doses of their pain medication."

239. Just over a week later, the sales representative held an "in-service" for Dr. Hawkins and her staff on abuse and diversion, and provided them with copies of *Providing Relief, Preventing Abuse*.

240. Purdue sales representatives went further than this with Dr. Hawkins. A sales representative specifically "asked her to discuss opioid benefits with patients in addition to the risk and side effects." Dr. Hawkins agreed that was "a good point" and "asked the nurse to review and educate the patient about the benefits of oxycontin."

241. Over the next several years, Purdue sales representatives regularly encouraged Dr. Hawkins to prescribe OxyContin, including discussing its benefits for elderly patients; the “flexibility of seven strengths” of the opioid for multiple uses; and the conversion of patients from short-acting opioids, such as Percocet, to long-acting OxyContin.

242. A Purdue sales representative explicitly asked Dr. Hawkins in 2008 to “continue to identify new and appropriate patients for all strengths” and contact local pharmacies about the availability of the new strengths of OxyContin.

243. In addition, the Purdue sales representatives discussed the affordability and coverage of OxyContin by insurance companies—and managed care, in particular—and regularly provided “savings coupons” for patients’ files.

244. In 2009, Purdue sales representatives introduced their product Ryzolt to Dr. Hawkins. She agreed to begin prescribing it, and later admitted “patients that have not complied with ‘narcotics’ [were] the type of patient” she prescribed Ryzolt to, and “occasionally as an adjuvant to stronger opioids.”

245. In 2011, Dr. Hawkins showed a similar willingness to begin prescribing Butrans when introduced to it by the Purdue sales representatives.

246. Dr. Hawkins became such a reliable prescriber of Purdue products that she was asked to be part of Purdue’s speaker series—though she declined due to a busy schedule—and was invited by the sales representative to “peer-to-peer” lunches to convince others to prescribe Purdue products.

247. Because Dr. Hawkins was such a committed prescriber of their products, Purdue sales representatives ignored problematic statements or behavior from Dr. Hawkins on calls. For example:

a. In discussing appropriate patients to whom she was prescribing OxyContin, Dr. Hawkins stated she was “focusing on fibromyalgia patients as a key part of her patient population,” and was “treating some of these patients with fibromyalgia pain with oxycontin,” after having been told multiple times by an insurance provider that OxyContin was not an appropriate treatment for fibromyalgia.

b. Dr. Hawkins explained that she had a current patient she was contemplating converting to Butrans, who was “currently taking 120 mg oxycodone per day.” Despite that being an extremely high dose of a prescription opioid, the sales representative’s only remark was that “the patient she had in mind was on too high of a dose for conversion to Butrans.”

c. Dr. Hawkins related to a sales representative that her patients were on high doses of prescription opioids and believed “her patients [were] beyond Butrans in most cases.” She reiterated this to the sales representative a few months later, stating her patients were “on too strong of opioids for Butrans” to be effective.

d. Dr. Hawkins stated that almost all of her patients were on regular doses of prescription opioids, indicating she “rarely if ever [had] an ‘opioid-naïve’ patient.”

248. In March 2017, the Virginia Board of Medicine issued a formal reprimand to Dr. Hawkins for overprescribing of prescription opioids and failing to recognize and address addiction in her patients. Dr. Hawkins was ordered by the Board to transition out all outpatient narcotic chronic pain patients within 12 months, and to attend additional medical education on proper prescribing for chronic pain and recognizing addiction.

c) Dr. Brenda Waller

249. Dr. Brenda Waller, a physical medicine and rehabilitation physician in

Lynchburg, Virginia, was disciplined in January 2016 by the Virginia Board of Medicine.

250. The Board concluded that from 2005 to 2014, Dr. Waller prescribed opioids and other controlled substances without proper medical diagnosis or rationale and failed to monitor or manage patients' usage of controlled substances.

251. According to the findings of fact in her Board disciplinary order, Dr. Waller ignored evidence her patients were doctor-shopping to get additional drugs; failed to heed family members' pleas to stop prescribing to addicts; ignored suspicious urine tests; and ignored recommendations from other providers and pharmacists to stop prescribing opioids for certain patients.

252. Purdue's records show constant contacts between its sales representatives and Dr. Waller during this time, with 212 calls upon the physician from January 2006 until June 2014.

253. Purdue sales representatives provided Dr. Waller with pain management starter kits for patients to use, coupons to pass on to patients for Purdue's drugs, and lunches for Dr. Waller and her staff.

254. Purdue sales staff regularly encouraged Dr. Waller to prescribe Purdue's opioids, despite Dr. Waller saying as early as 2007 that she was "not a pain doctor, but a function doctor who wants to help her patients function better."

255. Throughout 2006 and 2007 visits with Dr. Waller, a sales representative repeatedly reminded her to check "brand medically necessary" ("BMN") on her prescriptions to ensure that patients received OxyContin specifically.

256. In fact, the BMN designation was discussed with Dr. Waller and her staff 20 times over less than two years.

257. This tactic worked: in September 2007, a sales representative "asked [Dr. Waller

and her staff] to commit to writing BMN on every script of oxycontin. [T]hey agreed.”

258. Dr. Waller became a committed prescriber of OxyContin. She stated often to her sales representatives that she felt “oxycontin is by far the best pain control medication.”

259. Purdue sales representatives noted that Dr. Waller “use[d] oxycontin very regularly,” was “very interested in support from Purdue in the form of patient information brochures and training materials for staff,” and was “very pleased with oxycontin and agreed additional doses are very useful.”

260. As a result, Purdue sales representatives ignored problematic statements or behavior from Dr. Waller on calls. For example:

a. Dr. Waller stated to a sales representative that she “like[d] using Oxycontin because it is pure with no fillers & she likes it for her geriatric females where there is no worry of abuse.”

b. Dr. Waller noted to a Purdue representative that “she likes Oxycontin & uses it a lot; she thinks patients do grow tolerant of it,” then admitted to prescribing the highest available dose of the drug (80 mg) every eight hours instead of every 12 as required.⁴²

c. Dr. Waller discussed with a Purdue sales representative that she had an OxyContin prescription denied for a patient covered by Medicaid because she had not done any “step therapy,” trying other pain-relieving options before writing a prescription for long-acting OxyContin. She then explained that she wrote “a good amount of Oxycontin” and “her max is 80mg [three times a day] & most of the patients on this dosing have come to her from other practices.”

d. Dr. Waller asked a Purdue sales representative “to find out how she could

⁴² Though the sales representative did review the 12-hour approved dosing with Dr. Waller on that visit, Dr. Waller admitted to writing the same prescription (three times a day, or every 8 hours) less than a month later. No subsequent review or correction was made by the sales representative.

purchase Oxycontin direct from Purdue at a good price,” and Dr. Waller’s staff member then stated that “she [was] interested in opening a pharmacy in her office.”

e. Dr. Waller described having about 5 new patients each week, and stated that she was “testing patients who say their meds are not working to see if they are metabolizing opioids effectively; she said she has found about 4 of 12 that can not [sic] metabolize oxycodone.”

f. Dr. Waller stated “Oxycontin [was] her first line long acting & having abuse deterrent characteristics [was] important to her.” She complained that “recent referrals [to her practice] have been very difficult patients on high doses of meds,” and “converting oxycodone ir [immediate release] to Oxycontin was easy for her & the patients.”

261. In January 2016, the Virginia Board of Medicine disciplined Dr. Waller for overprescribing or improper prescribing, placing her license on indefinite probation and restricting her from prescribing Schedule II or III controlled substances, including opioids, until she completed additional medical education on proper prescribing for chronic pain and recognizing and treating addiction. Her license has since been reinstated.

262. In sum, despite their known problems and red flags, [REDACTED], and continued marketing opioids to them.⁴³

G. The Sacklers Directed and Controlled Purdue’s Marketing and Promotion of Opioids

1) The 1990s to 2007—The Sacklers Orchestrated a Deceptive Marketing Campaign That Resulted in Criminal Sanctions

263. The Sackler family owns and controls Purdue, and has been instrumental in

⁴³ [REDACTED] Pole was suspended from practice in 2013, so [REDACTED]

orchestrating and directing the company's efforts since the mid-1990s to change the norms and practices for prescribing opioids.⁴⁴

264. Defendants accomplished this by implementing an aggressive, deceptive, and multi-faceted marketing and public relations campaign to push health care providers to prescribe more opioids at higher doses, especially for patients with chronic pain.

265. Defendants' campaign obscured, omitted, concealed, and misrepresented the facts about opioids, their effectiveness and suitability, and the risks associated with them, including their potential for abuse, addiction, and overdose.

266. The campaign had its desired effect, as opioid prescriptions and use dramatically increased. With this increased use came increased revenues and profits for Purdue and the Sackler family—and dramatic increases in opioid abuse, addiction, overdose, and death among patients and the public at large, in Virginia and nationwide.

267. Richard Sackler (hereinafter referred to individually as "Richard") in particular was heavily involved in Purdue's aggressive and deceptive marketing strategies and practices since the early days of its campaign to change the opioid landscape.

268. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the time, a

blizzard had paralyzed much of the United States east coast. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁴⁴ The claims in this Amended Complaint are based on conduct and practices that have occurred since the 2007 criminal and civil settlements discussed above. However, the Commonwealth is providing information about some examples of pre-2007 events, activities, and practices for background and contextual purposes, and to illuminate Defendants' knowledge and intent.

[REDACTED]

269. Richard pressed for and directed aggressive efforts to sell more and more opioids, while knowing of and seeking to downplay, minimize, obscure, or conceal their risks. He often did so with callous disregard for the human toll of the growing opioid crisis.

270. A key early component of Purdue’s deceptive marketing strategy was to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

271. Initially, Richard expressed concern [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

272. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Emphasis added.)

273. Thus, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, rather than take steps to correct this “critical misconception,” they sought to perpetuate it.

274. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

275. According to [REDACTED]

⁴⁵ As discussed above, Michael Friedman would later serve as CEO of Purdue Frederick, and in 2007 would plead guilty to a federal criminal charge in connection with Purdue’s deceptive marketing of OxyContin.

[REDACTED]

276. From that point on, Richard encouraged and participated in Purdue's efforts to perpetuate the false narrative that OxyContin was weaker than other drugs like morphine, and was appropriate for widespread use against non-malignant pain.

277. A little over a month later, [REDACTED]

278. Indeed, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Emphasis added.) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

279. A few days later, another member of Purdue's OxyContin team [REDACTED]

280. Richard responded [REDACTED]

281. Thus, from OxyContin's earliest days, Purdue's marketing was based on a false

narrative about the drug’s strength and suitability for widespread use.

282. The deceptive marketing of Purdue opioids would continue and expand over time. Even as the opioid epidemic worsened, the Sacklers (especially Richard) remained focused on pushing opioid prescriptions and sales as much as possible, and on obscuring, concealing, and misrepresenting the facts about Purdue’s opioids and their risks.

283. As one former Purdue sales representative later told a reporter: “We were directed to lie. Why mince words about it? Greed took hold and overruled everything. They saw that potential for billions of dollars and just went after it.”⁴⁶

284. This focus on sales was reflected in Purdue’s internal discussions and communications.

285. For example, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

286. Richard Sackler casually dismissed the dangers posed by opioids and the human cost of the growing epidemic.

287. For instance, in February 2001, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

⁴⁶ Christopher Glazek, “The Secretive Family Making Billions From The Opioid Crisis,” *Esquire Magazine* (Oct. 16, 2017) (quoting Purdue sales representative Shelby Sherman), available at <https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12775932/sackler-family-oxycontin/>.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Emphasis added.)

288. Instead of re-evaluating its marketing approach, Purdue’s response was to blame the victims of addiction.

289. Richard Sackler frequently expressed contempt for addicts in derisive, callous, and insulting comments promoting false misconceptions about addiction. He believed that addicts alone were solely to blame for their addiction and for the growing opioid epidemic, that they *wanted* to be addicted, that they deserved their plight, and that they merited no sympathy or treatment, just harsh condemnation and punishment.

290. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

291. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

292. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

293. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

294. This tactic of blaming the victims of addiction became part of Purdue’s marketing strategy, as Purdue continued to insist in its opioid marketing that the addiction risks were low and any abuse, diversion, or addiction that occurred was the fault of users who were either predisposed to addiction or reckless and irresponsible, not the drug itself or the manner in which it was promoted.

295. As concerns about OxyContin increased, Defendants pushed back. Some of these efforts were directed specifically at Virginia.

296. In February 2001, Virginia’s then-Attorney General Mark Earley requested a meeting with Purdue officials to “review the way the powerful painkiller [OxyContin] is marketed.”⁴⁷ At the time, OxyContin had been linked to “nearly 30 fatal overdoses ... in the past

⁴⁷ Rex Bowman, “Earley Wants to Talk With Drug Maker,” *Richmond Times Dispatch* (Feb. 16, 2001), at B1.

two years in Southwest Virginia.”⁴⁸

297. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

298. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

299. Later that year, in August 2001, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

300. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

301. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁴⁸ *Id.* See also News Note from the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* (Feb. 16, 2001), available at https://www.richmond.com/city-life/news/article_44c94b89-99c9-5eb6-b7c8-18ee44b53357.html (noting that Virginia Attorney General Mark Earley had requested a meeting with Purdue officials “to discuss how one of its products, OxyContin, is marketed and distributed,” and that OxyContin had been linked to “nearly 30 deaths in Southwest Virginia”).

302. Despite the Sacklers' efforts, the following year, federal and state agencies in Virginia began investigating Purdue's deceptive marketing and promotion of OxyContin.

303. As discussed above, that investigation ultimately ended with Purdue Frederick and three of its senior executives pleading guilty in May 2007 to federal criminal charges, and collectively paying over \$634 million in fines, forfeiture, restitution, disgorgement, civil settlements, monitoring costs, and other payments to the United States and Virginia governments.

304. Purdue Frederick admitted in the plea agreement that it had, "with the intent to defraud or mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications."

305. Concurrently, Purdue entered into a civil Consent Judgment with 26 states (including Virginia) and the District of Columbia concerning its deceptive opioid marketing and promotion practices.

306. The Sacklers were officers of Purdue during at least some of the time period covered by the federal criminal plea agreement and the multistate civil Consent Judgment, during which the deceptive and illegal practices at issue in those investigations occurred.

307. By the time of the 2007 criminal and civil settlements, the Sacklers had resigned as officers of Purdue. Richard resigned in 2003, and any other Sacklers who had served as officers resigned over the ensuing years. They remained directors on Purdue's Board, however,

and together with other members of the Sackler family, they controlled the Board.

308. The Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] They also continued to control Purdue, and to direct its opioid marketing and sales efforts.

2) Purdue’s Deceptive Opioid Marketing Continued Under the Sacklers’ Direction

309. As described above, Purdue’s deceptive opioid marketing continued even after the 2007 criminal and civil settlements, and even after the Sacklers were unquestionably on notice as to the risks associated with opioids and the prior problems with Purdue’s opioid sales and marketing practices.

310. The Sacklers oversaw, directed, and were informed in great detail about Purdue’s opioid sales and marketing, with Richard Sackler taking a particularly active and aggressive role in directing, controlling, and participating in those functions and activities.

311. Despite resigning as corporate officers by 2007, the Sacklers—especially Richard Sackler—never stopped acting as *de facto* officers of the company.

312. This was acknowledged [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

313. Following the 2007 civil and criminal settlements, Richard and the other Sacklers leveraged their ownership of the company and their control of Purdue’s Board to continue Purdue’s deceptive opioid marketing and their drive to increase opioid prescriptions.

314. The Sacklers controlled the process of deciding how large Purdue’s sales force

would be and how it operated.

315. From 2007 to 2016, the Sacklers repeatedly [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

316. From 2007 to 2016, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

317. The Sacklers also [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

318. The Sacklers further directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

319. They regularly demanded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

320. The Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

321. They directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

322. At times, Richard Sackler's micromanagement of sales and marketing was so extreme that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

323. Sometimes Richard and the other Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

324. The Sacklers acted with knowledge that the opioid addiction crisis was growing, and of the abuse, diversion, and addiction risks associated with OxyContin and Purdue's other opioid medications.

325. Nevertheless, they continued to [REDACTED], and repeatedly [REDACTED]

326. Sometimes, [REDACTED]

327. These executives implemented the Sacklers' wishes and drove the company's marketing and sales practices to meet their demands, especially the ever-increasing demands of Richard Sackler.

328. The following section describes some examples of how Richard and the other Sacklers drove Purdue's marketing and promotion of opioids since the 2007 federal plea agreement and multistate civil Consent Judgment.

a) After the 2007 Guilty Plea and Civil Settlements, the Sacklers Refocused on Increasing Opioid Sales

329. The Sacklers regularly demanded [REDACTED]

330. For instance, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

331. In 2007, staff reported [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

332. Like many of Purdue’s publications, these contained false and misleading statements downplaying the risk of addiction, and instructing doctors that signs of addiction and drug-seeking behavior could actually be “pseudoaddiction,” which doctors should treat by prescribing more opioids.

333. These publications were distributed to health care providers in Virginia.⁵⁰

334. As another example, one tactic Purdue used to generate more opioid sales and keep patients on opioids longer was opioid “savings cards,” which were essentially coupons that gave patients discounts on their initial prescriptions.

335. Purdue learned that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

336. The Sackler Defendants recognized that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

337. In early 2008, Richard Sackler sought [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

338. Meanwhile, when the sales staff proposed [REDACTED]

⁵⁰ Purdue’s *Providing Relief, Preventing Abuse* publication, which also contained similar misleading and deceptive discussions of “pseudoaddiction,” was also distributed in Virginia.

[REDACTED]

339. The Sacklers knew that sales representatives would push higher doses of Purdue's opioids.

340. In February 2008, Richard Sackler directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

341. Defendants pushed this approach despite knowing that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

342. The Sacklers, especially Richard, micromanaged many of the company's functions, including sales and marketing. This micromanagement often exasperated the company's staff and executives, and led them to explore ways to reduce its intrusiveness, or at least manage it in an effort to minimize the disruption and risks it caused.

343. In late February 2008, for instance, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

344. In early March 2008, Richard Sackler again directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

345. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

346. The employee further explained that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

347. That same weekend in 2008, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

348. Gasdia then [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

349. That same Saturday night, Richard Sackler sent Gasdia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

350. When Gasdia responded that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

351. When another sales staff member responded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

352. As he had threatened, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

353. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b) April 2008—The Sacklers Adopted a Strategy of Maximizing Opioid Revenue While Extracting Large Cash Distributions from the Company for Themselves

354. In April 2008, about 11 months after the federal plea agreement and multistate civil Consent Judgment, Richard Sackler sent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

355. The memo warned that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The memo further discussed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

356. Richard argued that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

357. According to the memo, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

358. That month, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

359. From 2008 until 2018, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁵¹

360. In essence, the Sacklers leveraged their control over the Board to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

361. The Sacklers knew and understood that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

362. For instance, when the CDC issued guidelines and recommendations for opioid prescribing in March 2016, [REDACTED]

⁵¹ The [REDACTED] are set forth below at ¶¶ 500-505.

[REDACTED]

363. They estimated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c) The Sacklers Continued to Drive Sales and Marketing

364. Despite knowing the risks and dangers associated with opioid medications, the Sacklers continued to push Purdue staff to sell more and more of them, at higher doses.

365. To this end, Richard Sackler repeatedly involved himself in Purdue's sales and marketing operations at a granular level. His presence was pervasive, and often required sales and marketing staff to drop whatever they were doing and perform additional and unplanned work to satisfy his demands and directives.

366. In April 2008, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

367. Purdue sought to expand its base of patients taking higher doses of opioids, and staying on opioids for longer periods of time.

368. Richard Sackler sent Gasdia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

369. In May 2008, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

370. The materials included [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

371. In October 2008, Purdue staff told the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

372. That same day, staff reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

373. Staff also reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

374. The following month, the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

375. In June 2009, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gasdia responded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

376. Gasdia also reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

377. The sales staff reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

378. In July 2009, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

379. The following month, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

380. At this August 2009 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

381. Purdue's staff also reported on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

382. Staff also reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

383. In October 2009, Richard Sackler directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

384. Some staff members [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

385. Ultimately, however, the staff decided to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

386. In November 2009, the Sacklers [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

387. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

388. In January 2010, Richard Sackler requested [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

389. Gasdia sought [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

390. Nevertheless, Richard continued [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

391. In February 2010, Purdue's Sales and Marketing Department reported [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

392. For the next several years, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

393. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

394. In March 2010, Richard Sackler directed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

395. Purdue staff also reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

396. The Sacklers controlled and tightly monitored Purdue's staff's sales visits.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

397. In July 2010, the sales staff presented [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

398. The plan noted that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

399. It also projected that, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

400. Also in July 2010, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

401. CEO John Stewart had to tell Richard [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

402. As discussed above at ¶¶ 182-184, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

403. Purdue's sales staff prepared and sent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

404. Among other things, the information sent to the Board [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

405. The Sacklers knew that there were problem prescribers all over the country, including in Virginia, who were suspected of prescribing opioids excessively or inappropriately. They nevertheless failed to report the vast majority of them to any governmental authorities, professional licensing or regulation boards, insurers, or the public. Instead, they continued to profit from the opioid sales generated by Region Zero prescribers.

406. Also at the July 2010 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

407. In November 2010, Purdue staff advised the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

408. In January 2011, Richard Sackler met [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

409. Throughout February 2011, Richard Sackler made increasingly onerous and urgent demands of the sales team.

410. After a sales report showing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

411. Over the following weeks, he pressed the sales staff [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

412. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

413. At the February 2011 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

414. Staff also presented information, including [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

415. In March 2011, Purdue staff reported to the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

416. The presentation indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

417. In June 2011, Purdue staff reported to the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

418. Staff advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

419. Richard Sackler asked Gasdia to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

420. Gasdia also reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

421. Richard criticized the managers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

422. Gasdia reached out to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

423. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

424. Ultimately, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

425. Subsequently, Purdue's sales staff sought to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

426. Gasdia suggested that, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

427. In November 2011, Purdue staff reported to the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

428. The Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

429. In 2012, a new sense of urgency arose as prescriptions and sales of Purdue's opioids dropped.

430. Richard Sackler continued to involve himself in sales and marketing, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

431. At one point, Gasdia [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

432. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

433. Gasdia asked Stewart [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

434. A few days later, Richard e-mailed Gasdia, Stewart, and others to criticize U.S. Butrans sales as being “among the worst” in the world.

435. This pattern continued over the next several months, with Richard constantly

[REDACTED]

436. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

437. When Gasdia tried [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

438. In November 2012, Purdue staff presented [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

439. Thus, staff reported they would [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

440. In March 2013, Purdue staff provided [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

441. Nevertheless, Purdue and the Sacklers continued to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

442. Gasdia presented a report on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

443. Gasdia then described [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

444. Other actions included [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

445. All of these initiatives and programs represented strategies and tactics to push increased prescriptions and sales of higher doses of opioids, despite the growing public awareness of the risks of abuse and addiction associated with opioids.

446. Indeed, as awareness increased and opioid sales declined, the Sacklers and Purdue redoubled their efforts to increase sales, especially at the more profitable higher doses.

447. In July 2013, the Sacklers discussed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

448. Purdue's staff sent the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

449. Staff said they would [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

450. Staff further advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

451. Over the next few months, the Sacklers received and discussed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

452. In February 2014, Purdue staff delivered [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

453. Staff further advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

454. Also in February 2014, staff reported to the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

455. In 2014, the Sacklers hired a new CEO, Mark Timney, and removed Russell Gasdia as Vice President of Sales and Marketing.

456. In March 2014, Timney created [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

457. In June 2014, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

458. In the latter half of 2014, Purdue's staff reported to the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d) Purdue and the Sacklers Explored Entering the Market for Opioid Addiction Treatment Medications

459. With the opioid crisis growing, the Sacklers saw those addicted to opioids—many of whom had become addicted on Purdue's opioid products—as a potential business opportunity.

In September 2014, Purdue began to explore [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

460. While the project was ultimately shelved, internal Purdue documents generated during this initiative confirmed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

461. A presentation prepared [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

462. The presentation illustrated [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

463. The presentation went on to describe [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

464. In fact, Purdue itself—and Richard Sackler in particular—had [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

465. The same [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

466. This statement directly contradicted one of the core messages at the heart of Purdue’s opioid marketing—that opioids are “safe” and pose little addiction risk for most people, and that patients only become addicts if they are predisposed to addiction or irresponsible.

467. In February 2015, Purdue staff gave a presentation of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

468. The presentation included a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

469. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

470. Ultimately, the Purdue Board [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

471. For years, the Sacklers and Purdue maintained publicly that opioids posed a low risk of abuse and addiction, and were safe if used as directed.

472. Privately, however, they not only knew the risk was significantly higher, they believed it was high enough to generate a sufficient stream of addicts to support a potential profit opportunity.

e) Despite Knowing the Risks, the Sacklers Continued to Drive Purdue's Marketing and Sales of Opioids to the Public

473. In October 2014, Purdue staff presented a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

467. In February 2015, Purdue staff gave a presentation [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

468. The presentation included [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

469. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

470. Ultimately, [REDACTED] Though it never came to fruition, [REDACTED]

471. For years, the Sacklers and Purdue maintained publicly that opioids posed a low risk of abuse and addiction, and were safe if used as directed.

472. Privately, however, they not only knew the risk was significantly higher, they believed it was high enough to generate a sufficient stream of addicts to support a potential profit opportunity.

e) Despite Knowing the Risks, the Sacklers Continued to Drive Purdue's Marketing and Sales of Opioids to the Public

473. In October 2014, Purdue staff presented a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

474. In November 2014, Purdue staff reported to the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

475. At the same time Purdue was trying to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], during the autumn of 2014 Purdue was also [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], while acknowledging internally in the course of that initiative

that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

476. On New Year's Eve of 2014, Richard Sackler [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

477. On January 7, 2015, Richard Sackler again [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

478. Timney responded that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

479. Timney said it would take [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

480. In November 2015, the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

| [REDACTED]

481. As discussed above, in March 2016, the Centers for Disease Control issued new guidelines and recommendations for opioid prescribing. Purdue staff [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

482. Purdue staff estimated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

483. In June 2016, the Sacklers considered [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

484. To evaluate the market, the proposal called [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

485. Also in June 2016, Purdue staff presented [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

486. This presentation advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

487. In May 2017, Purdue staff advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

488. Purdue staff said the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

489. Also in May 2017, the Sacklers were [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

490. Landau also noted that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

491. Among other things, he proposed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

492. The Sacklers hired Landau as Purdue's new CEO a few weeks later.

493. In June 2017, Purdue staff advised the Sacklers that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

494. Staff also noted that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

495. In November 2017, Purdue staff reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

496. In January 2018, Richard Sackler received a patent for an opioid addiction treatment drug. He assigned it to Rhodes Pharmaceuticals L.P., a different company controlled by the Sacklers.

497. The patent says, among other things, that opioids “display an addictive potential in view of their euphorigenic activity” and may lead to “psychological as well as physical dependence” if “taken by healthy human subjects with a drug seeking behavior.” The patent also refers to addicts as “junkies.”⁵²

498. In January and February 2018, the Sacklers considered [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

499. Richard Sackler resigned from the Purdue Board in July 2018, followed by Jonathan, Kathe, and Mortimer in early 2019.

f) The Sacklers Enriched Themselves as the Opioid Crisis Grew

500. From 2008 through 2018, as Purdue’s deceptive and misleading practices continued and the opioid epidemic metastasized, the Sacklers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁵² U.S. Patent No. 9,861,628.

502. Upon information and belief, the total amount [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

503. At the time the Sacklers authorized and directed these distributions, they knew and intended that the amounts in question included profits from opioid sales in Virginia.

504. They further knew that Purdue faced liabilities to multiple states and other parties, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, for its deceptive sales practices and the harms they caused.

505. The Sacklers acted with the intent to drain Purdue of cash and place those funds beyond the reach of claimants and creditors like the Commonwealth, thus depriving the Commonwealth and its citizens who were harmed by Defendants' conduct of an effective remedy.

H. Defendants are Responsible for an Opioid Crisis That Has Severely Impacted the Commonwealth of Virginia

506. As a result of Purdue's sophisticated marketing campaign of misrepresentations and deception, the sale of opioids—and the opioid-use rates among consumers—have dramatically increased.

507. Between 2007 and 2016, Purdue promoted and sold an estimated \$18.7 billion of its branded opioid products.

508. Of the above-mentioned sales, Purdue products constituted the filling of 2,157,959 prescriptions in Virginia from 2008 to 2017, and the dispensation of 149,658,236 units (i.e., pills or patches) in the Commonwealth.

509. The cost of many opioid prescriptions is incurred by Virginia. In 2013 alone,

Virginia spent \$26 million through Medicaid funds filling opioid prescriptions.⁵³

510. While Purdue and the Sacklers collected significant profits from widespread increases in opioid prescription and use, countless individuals and communities in the Commonwealth of Virginia have suffered the consequences.

511. For instance, in the last ten years, 4,929 Virginians have fatally overdosed on prescription opioids.⁵⁴

512. In 2017, 504 deaths in Virginia were attributable to prescription opioids (excluding fentanyl)—more than in any previous year.⁵⁵

513. Even when opioid users do not die from an overdose, they may require significant medical intervention and incur health care costs.

514. One such cost is the immediate administration of Narcan (a brand of naloxone), which counteracts the effects of an overdose.

515. Virginia reported 4,076 administrations of Narcan in 2016.⁵⁶

516. The cost of distributing naloxone to emergency services personnel is significant: since April 2016, the Commonwealth has spent over \$1.046 million in state funds on naloxone kits for emergency use.

517. Moreover, in 2017, unintentional opioid overdoses among Virginia residents resulted in 8,578 emergency room visits.⁵⁷

⁵³ Barnes, Andrew & Neuhausen, Katherine *The Opioid Crisis Among Virginia Medicaid Beneficiaries Prepared for the House of Delegates of Virginia*, January 2016. Available at: https://hbp.vcu.edu/media/hbp/policybriefs/pdfs/House_OpioidCrisisPolicyBrief_Final.pdf.

⁵⁴ (“VDH Opioid Deaths”) *supra* note 6.

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ Virginia Opioid Addiction Indicators, Va. Dep’t of Health, Available at: <http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/data/opioid-overdose/>.

⁵⁷ Emergency Department Visits for Overdose by Opioid, Unspecified Substance and Heroin among Virginia Residents. Available at: http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/13/2018/02/2017-ED-Visits-for-Overdose-by-Opioid-and-Heroin-in-Virginia_Suppressed.xlsx This number, reflected in data collected by the Virginia Department of Health, reflects overdoses due to “opioids or unspecified substance,” but excludes heroin.

518. Of those visits, 35 involved residents of Tazewell County.⁵⁸

519. These visits do not come without a cost; for example, in 2013, Virginia spent \$28 million on hospital visits due to opioid use.⁵⁹

520. The Commonwealth also bears the costs of medication for opioid overdoses and the treatment of opioid use and addiction.

521. Since 2007, Virginia's Department of Medical Assistance Services has spent over \$87.6 million on medication-assisted treatments (such as methadone or buprenorphine) and opioid overdose medications (such as naloxone).

522. Opioid addiction and abuse has also had a profound impact on public safety and criminal justice costs in the Commonwealth.

523. The Virginia Department of Forensic Science ("DFS") has reported a significant increase in the number of requests for evidence testing of prescription opioids. Though down from its highest in 2012, DFS received 5,488 requests for testing in 2016, with 28% of those requests from Southwest Virginia.⁶⁰

524. The impact on criminal justice can also be seen in the sentencing of criminal offenders in Virginia.

525. From July 2017 to December 2017, 27.2% of sentencings in the Commonwealth where drug offenses were the primary offense involved opioids. Of those sentencings, 31.6 percent, or 396 sentencings in the last six months of 2017, involved opioids other than heroin and fentanyl.

526. Finally, those who wish to combat a serious addiction to opioids in Virginia

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ Barnes, *supra* note 53.

⁶⁰ Drug Cases Submitted to the Virginia Department of Forensic Science: Calendar Year 2016, Va. Dep't of Forensic Science. Available at: http://www.dfs.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/CY16DfsDataReport_Final.pdf.

require both short- and long-term treatment.

527. In 2016, of the more than 31,000 individuals in Virginia who sought treatment at local Community Service Boards for substance use disorder, over 35% were seeking services for opioid use.

528. All of these costs—including those borne by the Commonwealth of Virginia—are the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions described throughout this Complaint.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Count I: Virginia Consumer Protection Act Against Purdue

529. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 528 and their subparagraphs.

530. Virginia Code § 59.1-197 provides that the VCPA is to be applied as remedial legislation to promote fair and ethical standards of dealings between suppliers and the consuming public.

531. During all relevant times, Purdue is or was a “supplier” of “goods” or “services” in connection with “consumer transactions” as those terms are defined in § 59.1-198 of the VCPA.

532. In connection with consumer transactions, the VCPA prohibits suppliers from:

- a. Misrepresenting that goods or services have certain quantities, characteristics, ingredients, uses, or benefits pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-200(A)(5);
- b. Misrepresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-200(A)(6); and
- c. Using any other deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or

misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-200(A)(14).

533. In its marketing, promoting, advertising, and selling of prescription opioids, Purdue violated Virginia Code § 59.1-200(A)(5), (6) and (14) through the acts and practices described in this Complaint, including:

- a. Misrepresenting the risk of addiction to prescription opioids, by:
 - i. Misrepresenting that prescription opioids present a low risk of addiction, and that patients without a prior history of addiction would likely not become addicted to opioids;
 - ii. Misrepresenting that many individuals who display signs of opioid addiction are actually experiencing “pseudoaddiction,” which should be treated by increasing a patient’s opioid dose;
 - iii. Misrepresenting the risks in taking high dosages of prescription opioids; and
 - iv. Misrepresenting the ease in preventing or mitigating addiction.
- b. Misrepresenting the benefits of the use of prescription opioids, by:
 - i. Misrepresenting that abuse-deterrent properties or formulations of its prescription opioids could prevent or reduce the risk of opioid abuse, misuse, or addiction;
 - ii. Misrepresenting that its prescription opioids are superior or preferable to NSAIDs for pain because opioids have no dose ceiling; and
 - iii. Misrepresenting that its prescription opioids are superior or preferable to NSAIDs for pain by focusing on the side effects for NSAIDs while minimizing the side effects or risk of addiction with prescription opioids.

c. Misrepresenting the efficacy of prescription opioids, by:

i. Misrepresenting that prescription opioids are effective in the treatment or relief of long-term chronic pain;

ii. Misrepresenting that prescription opioids are more effective than non-opioid alternatives in the treatment of chronic pain; and

iii. Misrepresenting that long-term treatment with prescription opioids produces positive outcomes, including improved functionality.

534. Purdue willfully engaged in the acts and practices described in this Complaint in violation of the VCPA.

535. Individual consumers have suffered losses as a result of the aforesaid violations of the VCPA.

Count II: Individual Liability of Richard Sackler for Violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act by or Through Purdue

536. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 535 and their subparagraphs.

537. Pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 59.1-203(A) and (B), 59.1-205, and 59.1-206(A), the Attorney General is authorized to bring an action for civil penalties, injunctive relief, and restitution against any person who violates the VCPA.

538. Virginia Code § 59.1-198 defines “person” for purposes of the VCPA to include “any natural person.” Richard Sackler is therefore a “person” within the meaning of the VCPA.

539. At all times relevant to this Amended Complaint, Richard Sackler was a director of Purdue. Richard Sackler further, at all times relevant to this Amended Complaint, was and still is a partial owner of Purdue, and exercised control over Purdue due to his ownership interest.

540. A corporation can act only through its officers and agents, and where the business

itself involves a violation of the law, all who participate in it are liable.

541. As set forth in this Amended Complaint, the business of Purdue involved numerous violations of the law, including but not limited to willful violations of the VCPA.

542. At all times relevant to this Amended Complaint, Richard Sackler, individually or together with others, directed, controlled, approved, or participated in the acts and practices of Purdue, including those acts and practices that are the subject of this Amended Complaint, including but not limited to Purdue's deceptive and misleading sales, marketing, and promotion of OxyContin and other opioid medications.

543. Richard Sackler acted willfully in directing, controlling, approving, or participating in the acts and practices of Purdue that are the subject of this Amended Complaint.

544. By virtue of his active participation in the wrongful acts of Purdue, Richard Sackler should be held personally liable for all violations of the VCPA committed by or through Purdue.

Count III: Public Nuisance
Against Purdue

545. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 544 and their subparagraphs.

546. Purdue, through the actions described in this Amended Complaint, has created—or was a substantial factor in creating—a public nuisance, which adversely impacts a significant portion of the public by unreasonably interfering with a right common to the general public, or a public right.

547. The Commonwealth and its residents have a public right to be free from significant interference with the public health, safety, peace, comfort and convenience that has stemmed from Purdue's false, deceptive, and misleading marketing of prescription opioids.

548. The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health is among the most important duties of government.

549. At all times relevant to the Amended Complaint, Purdue's false, deceptive, and misleading marketing campaign substantially and unreasonably interfered in the enjoyment of this public right, by engaging in a pattern of conduct that:

- a. Misrepresented the risks of addiction to prescription opioids;
- b. Misrepresented the benefits of the use of prescription opioids; and
- c. Misrepresented the efficacy of prescription opioids.

550. This conduct resulted in health care providers—including those in Virginia—prescribing opioids when they otherwise would not have, resulting in a dramatic increase in opioid prescribing and opioid medications available to the public.

551. As described above, Purdue also substantially and unreasonably interfered in the enjoyment of this public right by:

- a. Designing an incentive bonus program that discouraged reporting problematic prescribers, and
- b. Failing to report said problematic prescribers—or even ceasing to call on them—in order to increase their overall sales of prescription opioids.

552. Purdue created, or was a substantial factor in creating, the nuisance through multiple means, including:

- a. Disseminating advertisements and promotional materials, including “savings coupons” for its prescription opioid products;
- b. Sponsoring and disseminating third-party publications with false, deceptive, and misleading information about prescription opioids;

- c. Creating and sponsoring “educational” materials and CME lectures by KOLs, with false, deceptive, and misleading information about prescription opioids;
- d. Making in-person sales calls; and
- e. Failing to report, or cease calling on, problematic prescribers.

553. The injury to the public includes, but is not limited to:

- a. High rates of opioid abuse and addiction;
- b. Overdoses, resulting in not only fatalities, but also emergency medical treatment;
- c. Greater need for, and use of, emergency services, law enforcement, addiction treatment, and incarceration; and
- d. Increased health care costs for residents of Virginia, their families, and the Commonwealth.

554. Purdue’s actions were a substantial factor in creating the public nuisance; without Purdue’s actions, opioid use, abuse, and addiction would not have become so pervasive, resulting in the opioid epidemic now facing Virginia.

555. The public nuisance was foreseeable to Purdue, which knew or should have known of the harm it would cause.

556. As stated above, Purdue engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign to promote opioid prescribing and to minimize the risks of addiction, the purpose of which was to vastly expand the prescription opioid market.

557. Widespread prescription opioid use, abuse, addiction, and diversion were all reasonably foreseeable outcomes of this expansion of the prescription opioid market.

558. Indeed, these outcomes were contemplated in Purdue’s 2007 multistate

settlement, which included an OxyContin abuse and diversion detection program—putting Defendants on notice that these outcomes were a foreseeable consequence of its conduct.

559. This public nuisance can be abated through truthful, non-deceptive marketing of the risks and benefits of the long-term use of prescription opioids; educational efforts for health care providers and consumers on safe and appropriate prescribing; addiction education and treatment; drug disposal and takeback programs; and other means.

Count IV: Fraudulent Conveyances
Against All Defendants

560. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 559 and their subparagraphs.

561. As set forth above, from 2008 through 2018, the Sacklers authorized monetary distributions from Purdue to themselves and other members of the Sackler family by way of other entities that they control. Upon information and belief, these transfers of funds totaled at least four billion dollars (\$4,000,000,000).

562. At the time the Sacklers authorized all of these transfers, they knew that Purdue faced the threat of litigation by, and liabilities to, various states and other parties, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, for (among other things) Purdue's deceptive and misleading opioid sales and marketing practices, and the harms they caused.

563. In authorizing these transfers, the Sacklers sought to drain Purdue of cash and to place these funds beyond the reach of Purdue's creditors and claimants to whom Purdue faced liabilities due to its deceptive and misleading opioid sales and marketing practices, thus depriving the citizens of the Commonwealth who were harmed by Defendants' conduct of an effective remedy.

564. The Sacklers authorized these transfers with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud

creditors of Purdue and other persons, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to.

565. The Sacklers authorized these transfers with fraudulent intent, for no consideration, and for the purpose of rendering the funds inaccessible to the Commonwealth and other parties with valid claims against Purdue. The Sacklers acted with knowledge that Purdue faced a “dangerous concentration of risk” due to the threat of litigation arising from its deceptive, misleading, and illegal opioid sales and marketing practices.

566. Under Virginia Code §§ 55-80 and 55.1-400,⁶¹ the distributions and transfers authorized by the Sacklers are fraudulent conveyances, and are therefore void. Moreover, because the fraudulent conveyances at issue involved money, the Commonwealth is entitled to judgment against the Sacklers and an order requiring them to return the fraudulently conveyed funds, or their equivalent value.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Virginia, prays that this Court:

A. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Purdue and Richard Sackler, as well as all of their officers, employees, agents, successors, and assigns, from violating the VCPA pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-203;

B. Grant judgment against Purdue and Richard Sackler, jointly and severally, and award to the Commonwealth all sums necessary to restore to any consumers the money or property acquired from them in connection with violations of the VCPA pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-205;

C. Enter an order against Purdue and Richard Sackler requiring disgorgement of any

⁶¹ As noted above at footnote 1, Virginia Code § 55-80 will be repealed as of October 1, 2019, and its recodification in substantially similar form as Virginia Code § 55.1-400 will become effective on the same date.

benefits or ill-gotten gains acquired by either or both of them in connection with violations of the VCPA;

D. Grant judgment against Purdue and Richard Sackler, jointly and severally, and award to the Commonwealth civil penalties of up to \$2,500.00 per violation for each willful violation of the VCPA pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-206(A), the exact number of violations to be proven at trial;

E. Grant judgment against Purdue and Richard Sackler, jointly and severally, and award to the Commonwealth its costs, reasonable expenses incurred in investigating and preparing the case up to \$1,000.00 per violation of the VCPA, and attorneys' fees pursuant to Virginia Code § 59.1-206(C);

F. Find that Purdue has created a public nuisance, and permanently enjoin Purdue and its officers, employees, agents, successors, and assigns, from the acts and practices that created the nuisance;

G. Order Purdue to abate the public nuisance it has created, and grant judgment against Purdue in the amounts necessary to abate the public nuisance;

H. Grant judgment against Purdue and award damages to the Commonwealth caused by the public nuisance Purdue created;

I. Declare void as fraudulent conveyances all distributions of profits or other funds from Purdue to the Sacklers, whether directly or by way of other entities the Sacklers controlled, that the Sacklers authorized;

J. Order the Sacklers to return the fraudulently conveyed funds, or their equivalent value;

K. Impose an attachment, constructive trust, or other appropriate protective remedy

to preserve the funds fraudulently conveyed by the Sacklers from Purdue to themselves;

L. Enjoin Defendants from any further transfers or distributions of profits or other funds from Purdue to the Sacklers;

M. Enter judgment against Defendants in the total amount of the distributions that the Sacklers fraudulently conveyed from Purdue to themselves; and

N. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable and proper.

**COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
EX REL. MARK R. HERRING,
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