COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK,ss.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
One Ashburton Place: Room 503
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-2293

RUSSELL MICHAUD,
Appellant
v.

G2-10-180

DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE,
Respondent

Appellant's Attorney:

Pro Se
Russell J. Michaud

Respondent's Attorney:

Daniel LePage
Assistant General Counsel
Department of Transitional
Assistance
600 Washington St., 4th Floor
Boston, MA 02111

Commissioner:

Christopher C. Bowman

DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

On July 23, 2010, the Appellant, Russell J. Michaud (Appellant), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting his non-selection for the provisional appointment of Benefit Eligibility and Referral Social Worker C (BERS C) by the Department of Transitional Assistant (DTA or Respondent).

A pre-hearing conference was held on August 24, 2010. DTA subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appellant's appeal on September 28, 2010. Despite being granted an extension, the Appellant did not file a reply.

It is undisputed that the Appellant has been employed by DTA since 1984 and has served as s permanent BERS A/B, the next lower title to BERS C, since that time.

On March 15, 2010, DTA posted BERS C supervisor positions that were available at the Department's Fall River, New Bedford and Taunton offices. The postings indicated that the positions would be filled as provisional appointments.

DTA assembled a hiring team which consisted of Jeff Travers, Director of the New Bedford office; John Fraga, Director of the Taunton office; and Christine Boardman, Assistant Director of the Fall River office.

They interviewed all of the candidates that were chosen for an interview and asked them the same questions. After interviewing each candidate, the hiring team graded the candidates on the standard interview assessment form. The nine candidates that scored the best on their interview assessment forms, including provisional BERS A/Bs with no civil service permanency, were selected for the BERS C positions. The Appellant was interviewed for the BERS C positions and was not selected.

DTA's Argument

DTA argues that it has the authority to make provisional appointments to a position if no suitable eligible list exists from which certification of names may be made for such appointment. G.L. c. 31, § 12. Since there is no current eligible list for the position of BERS C, they argue that the provisional appointment was permitted under civil service law and rules.

Although the civil service law and rules do not require DTA to show that the person is most qualified, DTA argues that they followed strict guidelines in selecting the candidate and used a process that was consistent with basic merit principles.

Appellant's Argument

The Appellant argues that the appointment of provisional BERS A/Bs, who are not permanent civil service employees, is a violation of civil service law and rules. Further, according to the Appellant, some of the appointments, including the appointment of employees with far fewer years of experience than him, violates basic merit principles.

Conclusion

The vast majority of non-public safety civil service positions in the official service in Massachusetts have been filled provisionally for over fifteen (15) years. These provisional appointments and promotions have been used as there have been no "eligible lists" from which a certification of names can be made for permanent appointments or promotions. The underlying issue is the Personnel Administrator's (HRD) inability to administer civil service examinations that are used to establish these applicable eligible lists.

This is not a new issue – for the Commission, HRD, the legislature, the courts or the various other interested parties including Appointing Authorities, employees or public employee unions.

A series of Commission rulings and decisions in 1993 and 1994 (Felder et al v. Department of Public Welfare and Department of Personnel Administration, CSC Case Nos. G-2370 & E-632), provide a glimpse of the long and protracted history within the executive, judicial and legislative branch regarding the use of provisional appointments and promotions by Appointing Authorities.

Ironically, the 1993 and 1994 Felder rulings and decisions referenced above occurred as a result of civil service examinations actually being administered by the personnel administrator as mandated by the legislature in Section 26 of the Acts of 767 of the Acts of

1981. The delay in meeting that mandate caused considerable confusion and consternation regarding the status of provisional employees that were hired during the several year span that occurred between enactment of Section 26 and the establishment of the eligible lists. The Legislature ultimately armed the Civil Service Commission with fairly broad authority to protect the rights of these individuals and others, "not withstanding the failure of any [such] person to comply with any requirement of said chapter thirty-one or any such rule …" by amending Chapter 534 of the Acts of 1976 with enactment of Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1993 (over the veto of the Governor at the time).

The Felder rulings culminated with the Commission exercising its new "Chapter 310" authority and granting permanency to certain Department of Public Welfare provisional employees, hired after 1981, who took and passed civil service examinations, but were "bumped" or laid off because Section 26 of the Acts of 767 of the Acts of 1981 only provided protections (through preference on any certifications issued) to provisional employees hired before enactment of Section 26. Since there was a delay in administering these legislatively-mandated examinations, the Felder Appellants were deemed to have been prejudiced through no fault of their own and granted relief (permanency in the title of FASW IV).

In the final paragraph of the 1994 Felder decision, the Commissioners at the time stated:

> "On page 5 of Appendix B, it is provided that 'no provisional hiring or promotions in (certain) titles will occur from 07/01/94 forward.' This is a laudable goal which we hope the DPA and the DPW can meet. Nevertheless, in order to deal with emergency circumstances which are now unforeseen and which the DPA assures us will not occur, we direct that the Proposal be modified to provide that no such hiring or promotions be made without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission, after a hearing, pursuant to our jurisdiction in this matter."

In retrospect, it appears that even the Commissioners were far too optimistic about how positions would be filled on a going-forward basis. There have been no examinations for the BERS titles (which replaced the FASW titles) (or most other non public safety official service titles) in over a decade meaning that no eligible lists have been established. Thus, DTA and all other state agencies, have relied on the use of provisional appointments and promotions to fill the vast majority of non-public safety positions during this time period.

The Commission has issued a series of more recent decisions in which the Commission, although it has repeatedly exhorted parties in the public arena to end the current practice of relying on provisional promotions (and provisional appointments) to fill most civil service positions, states that it must honor the clear legislative intent that allows for provisional appointments and promotions so long as the statutory requirements are followed. If there is a flaw in the statutory procedure, it is a flaw for the General Court to address. See Kelleher v. Personnel Administrator, 421 Mass. at 389, 657 N.E.2d at 234.

In a series of decisions, the Commission has addressed the statutory requirements when making such provisional appointments or promotions. See Kasprzak v. Department of Revenue, 18 MCSR 68 (2005), on reconsideration, 19 MCSR 34 (2006), on further reconsideration, 20 MCSR 628 (2007); Glazer v. Department of Revenue, 21 MCSR 51 (2007); Asiaf v. Department of Conservation and Recreation, 21 MCSR 23 (2008); Pollock and Medeiros v. Department of Mental Retardation, 22 MCSR 276 (2009); Pease v. Department of Revenue, 22 MCSR 284 (2009) & 22 MCSR 754 (2009); Poe v. Department of Revenue, 22 MCSR 287 (2009); Garfunkel v. Department of Revenue, 22 MCSR 291 (2009); Foster v. Department of Transitional Assistance, 23 MCSR 528; Heath v. Department of Transitional Assistance, 23 MCSR 548.

In summary, these recent decisions provide the following framework when making provisional appointments and promotions:

- G.L.c.31, §15, concerning provisional ***promotions***, permits a provisional promotion of a permanent civil service employee from the next lower title within the departmental unit of an agency, with the approval of the Personnel Administrator (HRD) if (a) there is no suitable eligible list; or (b) the list contains less than three names (a short list); or (c) the list consists of persons seeking an original appointment and the appointing authority requests that the position be filled by a departmental promotion (or by conducting a departmental promotional examination). In addition, the agency may make a provisional promotion skipping one or more grades in the departmental unit, provided that there is no qualified candidate in the next lower title and "sound and sufficient" reasons are submitted and approved by the administrator for making such an appointment.
- Under Section 15 of Chapter 31, only a "civil service employee" with permanency may be provisionally promoted, and once such employee is so promoted, she may be further provisionally promoted for "sound and sufficient reasons" to another higher title for which she may subsequently be qualified, provided there are no qualified permanent civil service employees in the next lower title.
- Absent a clear judicial directive to the contrary, the Commission will not abrogate its recent decisions that allow appointing authorities sound discretion to post a vacancy as a provisional appointment (as opposed to a provisional promotion), unless the evidence suggests that an appointing authority is using the Section 12 provisional "appointment" process as a subterfuge for selection of provisional employee

candidates who would not be eligible for provisional "promotion" over other equally qualified permanent employee candidates.

- When making provisional appointments to a title which is not the lowest title in the series, the Appointing Authority, under Section 12, is free to consider candidates other than permanent civil service employees, including external candidates and/or internal candidates in the next lower title who, through no fault of their own, have been unable to obtain permanency since there have been no examinations since they were hired.

Applied to the instant appeal, it can not be shown that DTA violated any civil service law or rule. DTA posted these positions as provisional appointments and selected individuals for the position of BERS C, some of whom had permanency in the next lower title of BERS A/B and some of whom were provisional A/Bs. There has been no allegation or showing, nor is it likely that it could be shown at a full hearing, that DTA used the provisional appointment process as a subterfuge. Rather, DTA candidly acknowledges that, in order to not exclude those provisional employees in the next lower title, some of whom have been with DTA for more than a decade, it followed the guidance and directives contained in the above-referenced Commission decisions and posted these vacancies as provisional appointments (as opposed to provisional promotions).

Further, the Appellant has failed to provide sufficient information that would warrant an investigation of this hiring process using its broad authority under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a).

For all of the above reasons, the Appellant's appeal under Docket No. G2-10-180 is hereby ***dismissed***.

Civil Service Commission

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Christopher C. Bowman
Chairman

By a 3-1 vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chairman – Yes; Henderson, Commissioner – No; Stein, Commissioner – Yes; and Marquis, Commissioner - Yes [McDowell, not participating]) on June 16, 2011.

A True copy. Attest:

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Commissioner

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration shall be deemed a motion for rehearing in accordance with G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1) for the purpose of tolling the time for appeal.

Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by a final decision or order of the Commission may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of such order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Commission's order or decision.

Notice to:
Russell J. Michaud (Appellant)
Daniel LePage, Esq. (for DTA)