



The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

AUDITOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH

ONE ASHBURTON PLACE, ROOM 1819

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108

TEL. (617) 727-6200

A. JOSEPH DeNUCCI

AUDITOR

No. 2004-0509-4T

OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR'S REPORT
ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-RELATED CONTROLS
FOR VIRUS PROTECTION
AT THE MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY

October 9, 2003 through December 16, 2005

OFFICIAL AUDIT
REPORT
MARCH 3, 2006

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INTRODUCTION

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, which was created by the Massachusetts Legislature in 1952, Chapter 81, Section 1, is responsible for operation and maintenance of the Massachusetts Turnpike, Tobin Bridge, and the central artery and harbor tunnels in Boston. The two tunnels and the Boston Extension in the MHS, as well as the Massachusetts Turnpike, operate on toll revenue, supplemented with revenue from leasing, development of land and air rights, and advertising. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority is also responsible for overseeing the Central Artery/Ted Williams Tunnel (CA/T) Project. According to the Authority's web site, "The 138-mile long Massachusetts Turnpike, Interstate 90, spans Massachusetts from West Stockbridge on the New York border to Logan Airport in East Boston, and on to Route 1A. The Turnpike is actually two highway systems the original MassPike, which opened in 1957, and the Metropolitan Highway System (MHS), which the Massachusetts Legislature created in 1997. The Massachusetts Turnpike runs 123 miles between the New York border and Interchanges 14 and 15 at Route 128/I-95 on the Weston-Newton town line. The Boston Extension and portions of the MHS, runs for 15 miles between Route 128/I-95 and Logan Airport/Route 1A through the Ted Williams Tunnel and the I-90 Connector."

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority is located in the State Transportation Building at 10 Park Plaza, Boston, Massachusetts. The Authority's business operations are supported by an IT configuration consisting of a local area network (LAN) with 37 file servers and 450 workstations. The Authority maintains a blocking firewall to the Commonwealth's Information Technology Division (ITD). The firewall was installed to provide increased access security and privacy that are essential to the operation and mission of the Authority. The Authority has connections to MAGNet, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' wide area network (WAN), and uses anti-virus software for scanning of the LAN and all individual workstations. The Commission has 36 individuals in information technology positions who are responsible for the operations and security of IT systems.

AUDIT SCOPE, OBJECTIVES, AND METHODOLOGY

Audit Scope

Our audit, which was conducted from October 6, 2004 through December 16, 2004 and December 8, 2005 through December 21, 2005, consisted of an examination of virus protection activities at the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority for the period covering October 9, 2003 through December 16, 2005. Our examination focused on a review of controls related to policies, procedures and use of software tools to prevent and detect viruses and unauthorized intrusions, assess the level of risk of viruses, report on the occurrence of a potential virus, and to implement corrective measures. The audit was performed in conjunction with similar audits conducted at 32 other state agencies for the period covering October 2003 through January 2005 (see Appendix 1).

Audit Objectives

The primary objective of our audit was to determine whether the Authority's IT resources were adequately protected against virus attacks and malicious intrusions through appropriate preventive, detective, and corrective measures. Specifically, we sought to determine whether adequate policies and procedures were in place to inform and guide personnel in addressing virus protection and to determine whether appropriate software tools, such as anti-virus software, were used to prevent and detect computer viruses. In addition, we sought to determine whether appropriate risk management procedures and tools were in place to limit malicious intrusions, virus entry points and to address vulnerabilities that viruses could exploit. We also sought to determine whether appropriate policies and procedures were in place to respond to detected viruses. Lastly, we determined the extent to which virus protection-related efforts were documented and monitored.

Audit Methodology

Before initiating audit fieldwork, we researched generally accepted management and technical control practices that addressed virus protection. We conducted preliminary research on various anti-virus software programs and their capabilities. We also researched the use of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, anti-adware and anti-spyware programs, patch management, alert notifications, and documentation of incident response and remediation efforts. Research was also performed on IT-related virus activities including the history, creation, detection, and eradication of computer viruses. Our pre-audit work included identifying standard procedures undertaken by the Commonwealth's Information Technology Division (ITD) to address virus protection and to support agencies in detecting and

eliminating viruses. We developed survey questions and audit procedures based upon recommended control practices including the use of software controls to identify and eliminate computer viruses. Our survey questionnaire incorporated questions that focused on management and technical control practices used to address virus protection. The survey was developed to serve as a high-level checklist for agencies to use in reviewing their status with respect to generally accepted virus protection policies and procedures. Our pre-audit work included gaining and recording an initial understanding of the Authority's mission and business objectives through Internet-based research.

Our on-site audit work included verifying our initial understanding of the Authority's mission, business objectives and identifying the entity's IT environment and how IT resources were configured. To determine whether appropriate policies and procedures were in place to provide direction and guidance on addressing virus protection, we determined whether the Authority had identified the level of virus infection risk and established control mechanisms to mitigate the risk. We requested policies and procedures related to virus protection and other documentation regarding the use of anti-virus software. We reviewed and evaluated the Authority's stated policies and procedures regarding virus protection. We determined whether the Authority had access to MAGNet and were MassMail users, and extent to which anti-virus programs had been deployed and kept up to date.

We interviewed the information technology personnel responsible for managing the IT environment to identify specific controls directed toward virus protection. We assessed the level of understanding of virus risks, use of anti-virus programs, and risk management and incident response procedures. With respect to protective measures, we determined whether the Authority's IT environment was subject to firewall protection, intrusion detection, and appropriate update and patch management procedures. Specifically, we ascertained whether the installed anti-virus software had been adequately maintained with the latest software and definition updates.

We reviewed the Authority's experience regarding virus attacks and the steps taken to protect their IT environment. We determined whether the Authority had incident handling procedures to investigate, isolate and eliminate viruses if detected on IT equipment. In addition to inquiring how the Authority may have been affected by viruses, we documented the use of software to detect, eradicate, and prevent viruses. We determined whether control practices were in place to support safe recoveries under business continuity procedures, should a virus render systems inoperable and recovery procedures need to be initiated.

Our audit was conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) and industry auditing practices. The audit criteria used for our examinations were based on applicable control objectives and generally accepted IT control practices. Included in the report's Appendix is a list of generally accepted control practices for virus protection (see Appendix 2). In addition to generally accepted control practices, audit criteria for management control practices were drawn from Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CobiT). CobiT is a generally applicable and accepted standard for information technology security and control.

Virus Background And History

A computer virus is man-made software used to infiltrate and attack a computer's operating system, applications, or data files. In most instances, the attack happens without the knowledge of the computer's owner. The first indication that an attack has occurred is when the computer either does not work or starts to perform incorrectly.

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority relies heavily on information technology, to help carry out its mission and business objectives. We note that over the last few years MAGNet has experienced infection from computer viruses from time to time. According to ITD, there have been 15 successful virus attacks in the 15-month period from October 2003 to December 2004 (see Appendix 3). To maintain a record of the viruses, ITD in 2003 created a software program called Security Alert System (SAS) which allows ITD to track and rank the virus threats with a threat level of low, medium, high, and critical. According to ITD's threat table there were 42 tracked virus incidents between October 9, 2003 and January 5, 2005 (see Appendix 4).

In order to protect the Commonwealth, ITD requires that agencies use anti-virus software, provide a downloadable copy of anti-virus software for agency use, maintain the SAS tracking program, a Help Desk, and firewalls, send out alerts to IT personnel at state agencies; and monitor MAGNet so that agencies with virus infections are disconnected if necessary until the virus has been removed. ITD has also created policies that agencies are required to follow if they are to use ITD resources (see Appendix 5).

To effectively reduce the risk of computer viruses and worms infiltrating an organization, a comprehensive and dynamic anti-virus program needs to be established. There are two major ways to prevent and detect viruses and worms that infect computers and network systems. The first is by having sound policies and procedures in place, and the second is by technical means including, anti-virus software. Both administrative controls and technical tools are required to effectively provide virus protection.

AUDIT CONCLUSION

We determined that sufficient controls were in place at the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority to provide reasonable assurance that information technology resources would be adequately protected against known virus attacks through appropriate preventive, detective and corrective measures. We determined that appropriate software tools were in place and in effect, such as anti-virus software and firewall protection, to prevent and detect computer viruses and questionable or malicious intrusion. Overall, we found that the Authority had not documented their risk assessment considering the impact of virus attacks on operations and business continuity planning. We found that the Authority's documented IT policies needed to be expanded to include virus protection. The documented policies and procedures should contain virus protection controls, including incident handling procedures, that address the requirements identified by the detailed risk assessment. While virus protection efforts appear to be monitored, documented status reports should be prepared for management review.

Due to the evolution of virus programs and the nature of virus attacks, the risk of virus infection is not eliminated, even though entities may have generally-accepted virus protection and security controls in place.

AUDIT RESULTS

All IT equipment including servers, desktop microcomputers and notebooks, had up-to-date anti-virus software installed. Because the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) uses the enterprise version of anti-virus software on all IT computer devices, all files on removable media or files downloaded from the Internet are scanned for viruses prior to installation or opening. According to the Commonwealth's Information Technology Division (ITD) the Authority had not been infected during the period from October 2003 to December 28, 2004 (see Appendix 3). The virus logs of the Authority also show effective quarantining of all viruses detected. The lack of infection was the result of the Authority being able to isolate and remove the attempted virus attacks and thus the Authority did not have to recover data or systems as a result of a virus attack.

We found that IT security controls were in place to help limit the risk of unauthorized access or malicious intrusion. While the Authority, as a client of the Commonwealth's wide area network, MAGNet, relies on the Information Technology Division's (ITD) firewall protection, the Authority also employs additional firewall protection to further safeguard its IT resources. Furthermore, the Authority relies upon ITD's intrusion detection system to provide additional security. We acknowledge that the Authority's own firewall protection in addition to ITD's firewall significantly increases the likelihood that electronic traffic is properly filtered. We found that ITD's firewall management addressed e-mail filtering and blocking capabilities to ensure that all multi-part MIME messages will be blocked at the gateway and that emails, which could be affiliated with a virus are discarded. To help keep viruses isolated, the MTA also has a separate e-mail server protection system.

We found that the Authority had established ground rules with respect to the use of authorized software and the appropriate use of IT resources. Although, existing policies for the use of IT resources provide an acceptable use statement and list unacceptable uses, the latter could be strengthened by emphatically stating additional uses that would be unacceptable. We suggest that the list of unacceptable uses include the restriction that software obtained from external, non-agency sources should not be installed onto agency systems unless reviewed and approved by management. We suggest that software should be reviewed and tested on an isolated machine before being installed on the Authority's IT environment.

Although management indicated that the need for software tools to scan, enhance access security, and push updates or patches to connected machines has been assessed, we recommend that documented policies and procedures be strengthened to require such assessment on an annual basis, or as a result of a virus infection or malicious intrusion. To enhance the level of awareness with respect to appropriate control practices, we recommend that the Authority's policies include language that would prohibit users

from connecting portable drives, including floppy disks, CDs, DVDs, or USB devices, or any other portable electronic media, to any workstation or server on the network, that is not running an up-to-date version of anti-virus protection. As a MAGNet client, the policies should also prohibit the use of additional gateways such as, modems or wireless devices to access the Internet. Regarding the Authority's policy on the use of information technology resources, which states that "employees should exercise reasonable precautions in order to prevent the introduction of a computer virus into the local or wide area network", we recommend that the policy define what would be considered as "reasonable precautions" to help ensure an appropriate level of guidance to all users. For example, if the user does not know the sender, or source of an e-mail or its attachments, the user should determine whether the e-mail should be deleted before opening it.

According to the Authority, operating system vendor-provided updates, designated as "critical updates", are deployed in a timely manner. The Authority's policy should require that "critical" updates, designated as update patches, be reviewed and tested by the IT personnel on a stand alone machine before being installed. Critical security updates should be reviewed, tested if possible, and applied in a time sensitive manner after receiving notification. According to IT personnel, records or logs are maintained of critical security alerts of Windows updates, as well as the determination of applicability and status of the updates. We confirmed that the Authority's anti-virus software was configured to automatically obtain (auto-update) vendor-provided definition files that identified known viruses. In addition, we found that the Authority had centralized monitoring and administration of anti-virus software to ensure that the most recent versions of the anti-virus software are installed across the network. To ensure that IT personnel are aware of potential or new virus-driven risks, the Authority has access to virus alert information from their anti-virus provider, ITD, as well as "Update Expert" by St. Bernard security software and pushed across the Network by way of McAfee's Enterprise Policy Orchestrator and Microsoft's SUS. We also found that the Authority logged all virus and security alerts received. Although there appears to be a general understanding that users should not disable anti-virus software, the restriction should be documented within existing policies to reinforce the understanding by all staff.

Regarding incident response, while the Authority's IT personnel demonstrated a good working knowledge of appropriate steps to execute to identify, isolate, and eliminate viruses, incident response policies and procedures needed to be formally documented. Such policies would require that users and IT personnel follow established procedures. When notified by users of a possible virus attack, IT personnel should determine which incident response steps should be followed, whether all users should be notified and provided with instruction, and whether assistance should be requested from outside sources. Incident response procedures should provide guidance as to when infected computers should be disconnected from

the Authority's LAN and that the computers be kept off the network should a new virus be reported for which no solution has been made available. In addition, the incident response policies should require that following each virus attack, virus protection, notification, and remediation measures and procedures should be reevaluated to promote a sufficient understanding of the event and how it was resolved, and to determine whether changes to virus protection are required.

From a business continuity planning perspective, risk assessment efforts should include virus attacks as one of the potential risks to continued availability of automated systems. In addition, risk management and recovery strategies need to consider what is required to mitigate virus threats. Furthermore, recovery procedures should require that all backup copies of data files and application and system programs, utilities and tools be scanned by anti-virus software as they are reinstalled. If performing a full restoration of the system to recover from a virus attack, one should ensure that current anti-virus software is installed prior to installing data files and application software and other utilities to enable appropriate scanning.

Enterprise Policy Orchestrator (EPO), a high level enterprise management software by McAfee anti-virus, has been installed on one of the MTA servers. This program provides a central point of administration for multiple McAfee products, including VirusScan and Groupshield. From this central point, the Authority is able to enforce a single policy at the desktop and server level across the entire network. Another feature provided by EPO is its ability to generate numerous reports regarding antivirus related activities.

Recommendations:

We recommend that existing policies and procedures regarding anti-virus protection and business continuity planning be expanded to include the requirement that anti-virus software be installed before application programs and related data files. We recommend that the documented policies be expanded to require that periodic risk assessments be performed to identify and re-evaluate gateway vulnerabilities. The risk assessment should identify any existing virus and intrusion access points, determine whether there have been changes to the enterprise configuration requiring updates to installed IT resources or security-related software, and determine whether currently-installed anti-virus tools and procedures adequately meet virus protection objectives.

We recommend the policies and procedures be improved upon to reflect the deleting of non recognizable e-mails and attachments as well as the downloading of .exe (executable files).

We recommend that incident response policies and procedures be documented. Such policies and procedures should emphasize preventing security breaches through containment and eradication of the infection or problem. Incident response procedures should include: planning and notification; identification, containment and eradication of the problem; recovering from the incident and the follow-up analysis. The policy should also clearly state that the objective is to eradicate the virus and not to retaliate against the attacker.

We recommend that the Authority benchmark their IT-related policies against those of ITD to ensure that the policies are in sync with each other. For example, a review of policies would help ensure compliance with the requirement that instant messaging not be allowed within MAGNet. We recommend that appropriate monitoring and evaluation procedures be established to ensure that IT-related policies are being carried out. In particular, mechanisms should be in place to ensure that unauthorized software is not installed or used on the Authority's workstations.

Although the Authority's policies detail unacceptable use, we recommend that the policy strictly prohibit the creation of computer viruses through the intentional writing, producing, generating, copying, propagating or attempting to introduce any computer code designed to self-replicate, damage, or otherwise hinder the performance of any IT resources. From an administrative perspective, we recommend that formal IT policies be dated indicating version or tracking number and that employees be required to acknowledge receipt and understanding by signature of all IT user policies, which would include among other responsibilities, virus protection.

With respect to virus protection, we recommend that an appropriate level of formal training be provided to the Authority's staff to ensure that there is an adequate understanding of anti-virus policy, the risks of computer viruses, indications of infected machines, and notification and incident response procedures. Training should include user responsibilities to install updates for which notification of the availability of the updates has been distributed or "pushed" to their microcomputer workstations.

We also recommend that the Authority consider installing anti-adware and anti-spyware software as part of their security and control strategy.

APPENDIX 1
Agencies Visited

Name

Architectural Access Board
Bureau of State Office Buildings
Commission Against Discrimination
Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing
Department of Fish and Game
Department of Revenue
Department of Social Services
Developmental Disabilities Administration
Disabled Persons Protection Commission
Division of Inspector General
Division of Professional Licensure
Divisions of Career Services and Unemployment Assistance
George Fingold Library
Group Insurance Commission
Human Resources Division
Information Technology Division
Legislative Information Services
Massachusetts Highway Department
Massachusetts Hospital School
Massachusetts Office of Travel and Tourism
Massachusetts Office on Disability
Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission
Massachusetts State Lottery Commission
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
Merit Rating Board
Municipal Police Training Committee
Newton Housing Authority
Office of Child Care Services
Registry of Motor Vehicles
State Ethics Commission
Teachers' Retirement Board
University of Massachusetts Boston
Victim and Witness Assistance Board

APPENDIX 2

Generally Accepted Management and Technical Control Practices for Virus Protection

| Control | Type of Control | Applies to |
|---|---|---------------------|
| <u>Administrative Controls</u> <u>Management Control Practices</u> | | |
| <p>Organizational policies should address virus protection. The virus protection policies should be documented and formally reviewed and approved and should include the following requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To effectively reduce the risk of computer viruses and worms infiltrating an organization, a comprehensive and dynamic antivirus program needs to be established. There are two major ways to prevent and detect viruses and worms that infect computers and network systems. The first is by having sound policies and procedures in place, and the second is by technical means, including antivirus software. Neither is effective without the other. • All IT equipment, such as microcomputer workstations, laptops, and servers, must have up-to-date anti-virus software installed. • All IT-related equipment upon which a virus could execute or propagate should be subject to anti-virus software. Virus scanning software should be installed at the workstation, LAN, WAN, and Mail Server levels. • For all possible Internet gateways, access should be obtained through a firewall. IT equipment that connects to the Internet must be behind a firewall. • Prohibit access to the Internet or external networks through modems or by wireless. • Access to the Internet should only be through approved Internet gateways. • All updates should be reviewed or tested prior to installation. • Appropriate incident response procedures should be in place to guide entity personnel in identifying, quarantining, and eradicating IT viruses. | Policy Preventive Detective Corrective | All IT environments |

| Control | Type of Control | Applies to |
|--|---|----------------------------------|
| <p>Organizations should assess the requirements for having anti-virus software installed in IT equipment in addition to workstations, notebooks, servers, and mainframes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizations should assess the need for software tools to scan, enhance access security, and push updates or patches to connected machines. • Organizations should assess whether the installation of an IPS or IDS is warranted to provide enhanced security. <p>Organizations should assess whether the installation of anti-adware and anti-spyware software is warranted to provide enhanced security.</p> | Policy Preventive Detective Corrective | All IT environments |
| The acquisition of additional software tools should be based upon risk analysis, cost, and resource capabilities to support and use the software. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective | All IT environments |
| Removable media, software or files downloaded from the Internet, or unknown files, should be scanned with anti-virus software prior to installing or opening. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective | All IT environments |
| All users of computer equipment should be trained regarding the risks of computer viruses, indications of infected machines, and notification and incident response procedures. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All staff |
| All security-related programs, such as firewall, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, anti-virus and anti-spyware programs, should be maintained with the most recent vendor updates in a timely manner. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All security programs |
| Vendor-provided updates, designated or determined to be “critical updates” should be deployed in a timely manner after testing by the IT department or the security administrator. | Procedure Preventive | All Windows OS |
| Entities having anti-virus software installed on their workstations, notebooks, and servers where IT resources are configured in LANs or WANs should ensure that centralized monitoring and administration of anti-virus software is in effect. | Procedure Preventive Detective | All centralized control monitors |
| An objective of centralized monitoring and administration of anti-virus software for LAN and WAN environments is to ensure that all IT resources upon which anti-virus software is installed have the most recent versions of the anti-virus software. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizations should use software tools to the extent possible to determine whether IT resources have the most recent versions of anti-virus software installed when the resources log on. • Organizations should consider implementing centralized capabilities to push software or updates. | Policy Preventive Detective | All centralized control monitors |

| Control | Type of Control | Applies to |
|--|--|---|
| Security and LAN administrators should determine in a timely manner as to whether notified alerts apply to their entity's IT environment. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective | If no LAN or administering console, users must update |
| If applicable, Security and LAN administrators should determine whether established incident response steps should be followed, whether users should be notified and provided with instruction, and whether assistance should be requested. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective | Security and LAN administrators |
| Management should ensure that backup copies of security-related software, such as firewall, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, anti-virus and anti-spyware programs, are included with the backup copies of data files and application and system programs needed for the restoration of IT operations at an alternative processing site. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All recording media |
| <p>All backup copies of data files, application and system programs, utilities, and tools should be scanned by anti-virus software before use.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When performing a full restoration of the system to recover from a virus attack, one should ensure that current anti-virus software is installed prior to installing data files and application software to enable appropriate scanning. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective | All recording media |
| <p>Entities should perform periodic risk assessments to identify and re-evaluate gateway vulnerabilities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk assessment should identify any existing virus and intrusion access points, determine whether there have been changes to the enterprise configuration requiring updates to installed IT resources or security-related software, and determine whether currently-installed anti-virus tools and procedures adequately meet virus protection objectives. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All IT environments |
| All reasonable steps should be taken to eliminate the sources of viruses. Recipients of emails for which the sender is unknown should consider deleting the emails without opening them. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All users |
| <p>Only authorized software should be installed on IT systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management should inform the IT user community as to what has been designated as the enterprise's approved or "authorized software." • Installation of software obtained from external, non-agency sources should not be installed onto agency systems unless reviewed and approved by management. All software should be reviewed and tested on an isolated machine or environment before being installed on the entity's system. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective Corrective | All users |
| <p>Incident response policies and procedures should emphasize preventing security breaches through containment and eradication of the infection or problem.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident response procedures should include: planning and notification, identification and assessment of the problem, containment and quarantining of the problem, eradication of the problem, recovering from the incident, and the follow-up analysis. Incident response should never include retaliation. | Policy Procedure Preventive Detective Corrective | All IT administrators |

| Control | Type of Control | Applies to |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Entities should have access to alert information to ensure that they are aware of potential or new virus-driven risks and new critical security risks, either directly from an alert provider or by relying on a trusted source external to the entities. (Alerts may be obtained from a Commonwealth source, such as ITD). | Policy Procedure Preventive | All agencies |
| Infected computers with reported viruses without solutions require keeping the computer off the network until a solution is found. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All staff |
| Following each virus attack, agencies should formally re-evaluate virus protection, notification, and remediation measures and procedures to promote sufficient understanding of the event and how it was resolved, and to determine whether changes to virus protection should be incorporated into contingency planning, notification, and remediation measures. | Policy Procedure Corrective | All staff |
| End users should be administratively restricted from disabling or uninstalling anti-virus or security-related software. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All staff |
| Policies should strictly prohibit the creation, copying, or propagating of computer viruses. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All users |
| Each user is responsible for the IT resources assigned to, or used by, them (computer and peripherals). When an infection due to malicious code is suspected, the user should immediately stop computing and follow the emergency procedure provided by management and/or the security officer. In addition he/she should inform the appropriate parties (security department, help desk, etc.) about the problem in order to mitigate consequences and probability of malicious code propagation within the organization. If the user is not able to follow the procedure, he/she should immediately power off the computer and call the appropriate party (security department, help desk, etc.) for assistance. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All users |
| Management should assign responsibility for evaluating, updating, and monitoring compliance with IT policies. | Policy Procedure Preventive | Administrators |
| Employees are required to acknowledge receipt and understanding of IT policies relating to their responsibilities for the integrity, security, use, and availability of IT resources. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All users |
| Policies should be reviewed and approved by IT and entity management and be dated with appropriate version or tracking numbers included. | Policy Procedure Preventive | IT and entity management |
| <u>Technical Controls</u> | | |
| All IT equipment, such as PCs, laptops, and servers must have up-to-date anti-virus software installed. | Policy Procedure Preventive | IT Administrators |
| There should be a firewall for all possible Internet gateways. | Policy Procedure Preventive | IT Administrators |

| Control | Type of Control | Applies to |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Anti-adware and anti-spyware software should be used in addition to anti-virus software for protection of unauthorized intrusion. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All IT environments |
| Ensure that insecure protocols are blocked by the firewall from external segments and the Internet. | Policy Procedure Preventive | IT Administrators |
| The use of Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) should be in concert with firewalls. | Policy Procedure Preventive | IT Administrators |
| No portable drive, including floppy disks, CDs, DVDs, or USBs, or any other portable electronic media shall be connected to a workstation or server on the network that is not running an up-to-date version of anti-virus protection. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All workstations, LAN environment |
| All connections to external or third-party entities should be monitored and should pass through a firewall. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All MAGNet agencies |
| To access the Internet from LAN or WAN environments, organizations should only use approved Internet gateways, such as those going through firewalls or by VPN. | Policy Procedure Preventive | LAN or WAN environment |
| Security software should be maintained such that installed software is updated to ensure synchronization with the vendor's most recent versions and updates. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All security programs |
| Anti-virus and anti-spyware software should be configured to automatically (auto-update) obtain vendor-provided definition files identifying known viruses and spyware. | Procedure Preventive | All anti-virus software |
| <u>ITD Requirements</u> | | |
| All agency IT equipment that connects to the Internet through MAGNet must be behind ITD's MAGNet-supported firewall protection. | Policy Standard Preventive | All IT environments |
| Firewalls should have virus-scanning software installed. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All firewalls |
| All outside connections from vendors, contractors, or other business partners must pass through the ITD-managed firewall. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All MAGNet agencies |
| Management should ensure that appropriate email filtering and blocking capabilities are employed at the firewall level, including: (a) Blocking all multi-part MIME messages at the gateway; (b) Discarding emails containing files with extensions that are affiliated with a virus; (c) Disallowing private email that is separate and apart from an agency's primary email system. | Policy Procedure Preventive | All mail gateways |

APPENDIX 3

Date of Virus Infection by Agency per ITD

| Virus Infection Date | | | | | | |
|--|------------|-------|---|---|---|---|
| Agency Name | | Virus | | | | |
| Architectural Office Board | | | | | | |
| Bureau of State Office Buildings | | | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Commission Against Discrimination | | | | Y | | |
| Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing | | | Y | Y | Y | |
| Department of Fish and Game | | | | | | |
| Department of Revenue | | | | | | |
| Department of Social Services | | | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Developmental Disabilities Administration | | | | | | Y |
| Disabled Persons Protection Commission | | | Y | | | Y |
| Divisions of Career Services & Unemployment Assistance | | | | | | |
| Division of Professional Licensure | | | | | | |
| George Fingold State Library | | | | | | |
| Group Insurance Commission | | | | | | Y |
| Human Resources Division | | | Y | | | Y |
| Information Technology Division | Y | | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Legislative Information Services | | | Y | | | |
| Massachusetts Highway Department | | | Y | Y | | Y |
| Massachusetts Hospital School | | | | | | |
| Massachusetts Office of Travel and Tourism | | | | | | |
| Massachusetts Office on Disability | | | Y | Y | | |
| Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission | Y | | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Massachusetts State Lottery Commission | | | | | | Y |
| Massachusetts Turnpike Authority | | | | | | |
| Merit Rating Board | | | | | | |
| Municipal Police Training Committee | | | Y | Y | | Y |
| Newton Housing Authority | | | | | | |
| Office of Child Care Services | | | Y | Y | Y | |
| Office of Inspector General | | | | | | |
| Registry of Motor Vehicles | Y | | Y | Y | Y | |
| State Ethics Commission | | | | | | |
| Teachers' Retirement Board | | | | Y | | |
| University of Massachusetts Boston | | | | | | |
| Victim and Witness Assistance Board | | | | Y | Y | |
| 12/28/04 | Randex.CCF | | | | | |
| 12/28/04 | | | | | | |

The system does not record all instances of virus activity. The viruses recorded on the ITD SAS system are based upon viruses detected through scanning or through notification from individual agencies.

APPENDIX 4
ITD's SAS Reported Security Alerts

| Severity | Date | Name |
|----------|----------|---|
| High | 01/05/05 | W32.Randex.SQ |
| Medium | 12/14/04 | W32.Erkez.D@mm |
| High | 12/01/04 | Critical Vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer |
| Medium | 11/19/04 | W32.Sober.I@mm |
| Medium | 10/29/04 | W32.Beagle.AV@mm |
| Low | 10/04/04 | W32.Bagz@mm |
| High | 08/16/04 | W32.Mydoom.Q@mm |
| Medium | 08/10/04 | W32.Beagle.AO@mm |
| High | 07/26/04 | W32.Myddom.M@mm |
| High | 07/15/04 | W32.Beagle.AB@mm |
| High | 07/08/04 | New W32.Sasser.Worm |
| Low | 06/25/04 | JS.Scob.Trojan |
| High | 06/02/04 | W32.Korgo.R |
| Medium | 05/14/04 | Dabber |
| Medium | 05/14/04 | Multiple Vulnerabilities in Symantec Client Firewall Products |
| High | 05/01/04 | W32.Sasser.Worm |
| High | 04/26/04 | W32.Beagle.W@mm |
| High | 04/21/04 | W32.Netsky.Y@mm |
| High | 04/16/04 | W32.Gaobot.AAY |
| High | 04/16/04 | W32.Gaobot.AAY |
| Medium | 03/29/04 | W32.Netsky.Q@mm |
| Medium | 03/26/04 | W32.Beagle.U@mm |
| Medium | 03/24/04 | W32.Netsky.P@mm from 3/22/2004 |
| Medium | 03/18/04 | W32.Beagle.Q@mm |
| Medium | 03/08/04 | W32.Sober.D@mm |
| Medium | 03/03/04 | W32.Beagle.J@mm |
| High | 03/01/04 | W32.Beagle.E@mm |
| High | 03/01/04 | W32.Netsky.D@mm |
| High | 02/25/04 | W32.Netsky.C@mm |
| Medium | 02/24/04 | W32.Mydoom.F@mm |
| High | 02/19/04 | W32.Netsky.B@mm |
| High | 02/17/04 | W32.Beagle.B@mm also Known as W32.Alua@mm |
| Critical | 02/11/04 | Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-007 ASN.1 Vulnerability Could Allow Code Execution |
| Medium | 01/15/04 | 1/27/04 W32/Mydoom@MM, WORM_MIMAIL.R |
| Medium | 12/18/03 | YS OCSCIC Cyber Security Advisory Re: Cisco PIX vulnerabilities |
| Medium | 11/18/03 | W32.Mimail.J@mm |
| Medium | 11/13/03 | New Microsoft Security Bulletin |
| Medium | 11/06/03 | Oracle Application Server SQL Injection Vulnerability |
| Medium | 10/31/03 | W32.Mimail.C@mm |
| Medium | 10/16/03 | Windows New Security Bulletins |
| Medium | 10/09/03 | W32.Welchia.Worm |
| Medium | 10/06/03 | Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer (828750) |

APPENDIX 5
Information Technology Architecture and Enterprise Standards

Virus detection is identified in ITD's Information Technology Architecture and Enterprise Standards as:

- Virus scanning software must be installed at the Workstation, LAN, WAN, and Mail Server levels. ITD also has virus-scanning software at the firewalls.
- The software must be configured to:
 - Periodically scan all files that are stored on physically and logically connected disk drives attached to the computer;
 - Automatically scan any file that is copied onto a disk drive from an external source including floppy disks and CD ROM disks; and
 - Automatically scan any file that is opened by an application such as a word processing or spreadsheet application.
- Virus scanning software and virus signatures must be kept current by incorporating the vendor's most recent versions. Software with auto-update capabilities is strongly recommended.

Norton Anti-Virus Corporate Edition is recommended.

The above text can be found by following the links on the following pages.

Go to ITD's page <http://www.mass.gov/itd/>

Then within the page go to [Enterprise Architecture](#)

Then within the page go to [Information Technology Architecture and Enterprise Standards](#)

Then within the page go to [Security](#)

Virus Detection is the fourth listed standard