March 1, 2017

The Honorable Lamar Smith  
Chairman  
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
2321 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Smith:

I write in response to your February 16, 2017, letter ("Letter") and the subpoena issued by the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology ("Committee") to Attorney General Healey on the same date (the "2017 Subpoena"). In the Letter, you indicate that the Committee is "continuing its investigation of potential adverse effects of the actions of the ‘Green 20’ attorneys general on the national scientific enterprise," reauthorizing your investigation into related actions of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office ("MA AGO"), and reissuing and purportedly narrowing the subpoena that was served on Attorney General Healey on July 13, 2016 (the "2016 Subpoena").

The 2017 Subpoena, like the 2016 Subpoena—but in fact broader in scope and more troubling—is an unconstitutional, impermissible, and unprecedented interference with a legitimate and ongoing state law enforcement investigation and threatens to subvert judicial processes and decisions in pending litigation in multiple courts. Indeed, as we pointed out in connection with the 2016 Subpoena, no Congressional Committee in the nation’s history ever has subpoenaed a state attorney general with respect to work on behalf of his or her state.¹

¹ As Professor Charles Tiefer—former Acting House General Counsel—testified before the Committee in September 2016, the House has "never" issued a subpoena "in two hundred years to a state attorney general." Full Committee Hearing: Affirming Congress' Constitutional Oversight Responsibilities: Subpoena Authority and Recourse for Failure to Comply with Lawfully Issued Subpoenas (Sept. 14, 2016), video at https://science.house.gov/legislation/hearings/full-committee-hearing-affirming-congress-constitutional-oversight. See also Cong. Res. Serv., Evaluation of Federalism Arguments Against the Subpoenas Issued to State Attorneys General by the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee (Sept. 14, 2016) (confirming that "congressional subpoena power has rarely been employed to compel the
Moreover, the expanded scope of the 2017 Subpoena to cover documents related to the Clean Power Plan litigation and its inclusion of vague and ambiguous language further illustrates both the lack of any cognizable authority for the issuance of that subpoena and the fact that the true purpose of your investigation is to harass Attorney General Healey in her legitimate work as a top-ranking state law enforcement official. In particular, the 2017 Subpoena seeks to obstruct Attorney General Healey’s investigation of ExxonMobil Corporation (“Exxon”), which reportedly has made significant campaign contributions to you, and her efforts in the Clean Power Plan litigation, in which you have filed an amicus brief in support of the opposing side.

Attorney General Healey objects to the 2017 Subpoena in its entirety because the Committee cannot use shifting and ambiguous rationales to improperly attempt to investigate a legitimate state law enforcement investigation, interfere in pending litigation, and obtain privileged and protected information.

1. The Committee Lacks Authority to Investigate Attorney General Healey

As set forth in my correspondence to you of July 26, 2016 (“July 26 Letter”), which is attached as Attachment I and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth in this letter, this Committee lacks authority to investigate Attorney General Healey. See Attachment I, pp. 12-18. Specifically, the Committee has no constitutional right to interfere with a lawful state investigation or to obtain privileged and protected investigatory documents. As ranking Committee Member Johnson has repeatedly pointed out, the Committee lacks the authority to pursue an investigation of Attorney General Healey and therefore the Committee’s subpoenas are “misguided” and “clearly an effort to derail appropriate law enforcement actions of state Attorneys General.” Committee Press Release, Ranking Member Johnson’s Statement on Chairman’s Re-Issuance of Subpoenas to NY & MA Attorneys General (Feb. 16, 2017); see also Attachment 1, notes 59, 62. Current state attorneys general agree, noting that “these unprecedented subpoenas exceed your Committee’s constitutional authority and depart from the comity, or proper respect for state functions, which the Supreme Court has held to be a vital consideration that constrains federal action . . .” Letter from Fifteen State Attorneys General to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (Feb. 28, 2107) (internal production of state records from state officials” and finding no prior instance of a Congressional subpoena directed to a State Attorney General).

2 Contribution receipts available through the Federal Election Commission database indicate that since 2009, the Exxon Mobil Corporation Public Action Committee has donated at least $19,500 to Texans for Lamar Smith. See http://fec.gov/finance/disclosure/norindsea.shtml; see also http://mediamatters.org/research/2016/06/21/what-media-should-know-about-house-science-committee-members-defending-exxon/210539 (contribution totals from the fossil fuel industry to Committee members who have signed letters seeking documents from Attorney General Healey).
quotations omitted). Compliance with the 2017 Subpoena would eviscerate Attorney General Healey’s ability to conduct an ordinary and lawful state law investigation—shielded by long-established privileges and protections—and would impermissibly interfere with ongoing litigation involving both Exxon and the Clean Power Plan.

a. The Exxon Investigation

Not only is there no legal basis or precedent for a congressional committee subpoena to a state attorney general, but this effort by the Committee is particularly improper because, as outlined in detail in my July 26 Letter and other correspondence, the 2017 Subpoena seeks documents that were developed or obtained by the MA AGO as part of its ongoing investigation into possible violations of the Massachusetts consumer and investor protection statute by Exxon.

Attorney General Healey’s investigation into Exxon is based on apparent inconsistencies between what company scientists told Exxon management about the expected impact of fossil fuels on climate and of climate change on the company’s business and what Exxon told (or failed to tell) investors and consumers about those issues. To determine whether such inconsistencies constitute unfair and deceptive business practices under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A, the MA AGO served upon Exxon a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID”) seeking relevant documents. To date, Exxon has not produced any documents to Attorney General Healey in response to the CID. Instead, Exxon challenged the CID and Attorney General Healey’s investigation in both Texas federal district court and Massachusetts state court. Recent developments in both cases have made the 2017 Subpoena even more egregious than the 2016 Subpoena.

The letter from the attorneys general asks that you withdraw the subpoena issued to the MA AGO as well as a subpoena issued to the New York Attorney General who, like Attorney General Healey, is involved both in investigating Exxon and in the Clean Power Plan litigation.


In the Texas federal litigation, Exxon sought to conduct extensive discovery into the origins and bases for the MA AGO investigation, including noticing the deposition of the Attorney General herself. The MA AGO objected on the grounds that it is improper to permit discovery into the deliberative and thought processes related to the decision to investigate Exxon and to the ongoing state investigation. Following Attorney General Healey’s filing of a mandamus petition with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to prevent her court-ordered deposition, on December 12, 2016, the District Court cancelled the deposition, and on December 15, 2016, stayed all discovery. Pursuant to the District Court’s further order, it is now determining first whether the Court even has personal jurisdiction over Attorney General Healey. See Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Eric Tradd Schneiderman and Maura Tracy Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469 (N.D. Tex.) (Orders dated December 12, 2016, and December 15, 2016 attached as Attachment 2)

In the Massachusetts state court litigation, the Massachusetts Superior Court affirmed the legitimacy of the MA AGO’s investigation under Massachusetts law by denying Exxon’s motion to set aside the CID and allowing the MA AGO’s motion to compel compliance with the CID in a decision entered on January 12, 2017. See In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, No. 2016-1888-F (Mass. Super. Jan. 12, 2017) (attached as Attachment 3). Specifically, the court found that Attorney General Healey “assayed sufficient grounds—her concerns about Exxon’s possible misrepresentations to Massachusetts consumers—upon which to issue the CID.” Id. at 9. Noting that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A gives the Attorney General “broad investigatory powers to conduct investigations whenever she believes a person has engaged in or is engaging in any conduct in violation of the statute,” id. at 8 (emphasis in original), the court concluded that the Attorney General is authorized to investigate whether Exxon presented to consumers “potentially misleading information about the risks of climate change, the viability of alternative energy sources, and the environmental attributes of its products and services.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting CID Demand).

The court rejected Exxon’s argument that Attorney General Healey’s remarks about the investigation demonstrate any bias or predetermined outcome of the investigation, finding “instead it seems logical that the Attorney General inform her constituents about the basis for her investigations.” Id. at 12. “It is the Attorney General’s duty to investigate Exxon if she believes it has violated the [Massachusetts consumer protection law]. Nothing in the Attorney General’s comments . . . indicates to the court that she is doing anything more than explaining reasons for her investigation to the Massachusetts consumers she represents.” Id.at 13.

By issuing the 2017 Subpoena now—after the federal district court stayed discovery in Texas and the Massachusetts Superior Court affirmed the authority of the Attorney General to conduct the investigation of Exxon—the Committee is essentially demanding that the state’s chief law enforcement official turn over documents relating to an ongoing law enforcement investigation that she has a duty to conduct under Massachusetts law and that has been explicitly upheld by a
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Massachusetts state court. This is a blatant intrusion of state sovereignty and flagrant disregard for prosecutorial independence.6

Massachusetts has a clear sovereign interest in its police power and in the protection of its investors and consumers. “The Constitution . . . contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens,” and “[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920, 928 (1997); see also New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (Constitution does not “confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“States . . . retain substantial sovereign authority under our constitutional system” and these are “powers with which Congress does not readily interfere”). Law enforcement is an area “where States historically have been sovereign” and must remain independent and autonomous. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). The 2017 Subpoena directly interferes with this clearly established state interest.

A prosecutor’s investigatory authority and independence are sacrosanct. Attorneys general and district attorneys must be free to investigate without fear of judicial inquiry or congressional interference, and the same principles that prohibit intrusion into that function by the judiciary prohibit Congress’s similar intrusion here. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the . . . proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decision-making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy”); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977) (“judicial inquiries into . . . executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government”); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (federal courts may not compel the testimony of agency decision-makers to probe their mental processes); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“[l]egislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement[;] [t]he latter are executive functions”); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967) (“discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started, is absolute”); Shepard v. Attorney General, 409 Mass. 398, 401-02 (1991) (“prosecutors (district attorneys and the Attorney General) have broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute” and “[j]udicial review of decisions which are within the executive discretion of the Attorney General would constitute an intolerable interference by the judiciary in the executive department of the government and would be in violation of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights”).

6 Legal scholars also have identified the constitutional concerns raised by the Committee’s subpoenas, finding that the 2016 Subpoena offended notions of state sovereignty and interfered with ongoing enforcement efforts. See, e.g. Letter from Prof. Brandon L. Garrett, et al., to Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (Sept. 13, 2016).
These core and enduring principles ensure that state law enforcement officials are able to uphold their obligation to protect the citizens they serve. Therefore, the Attorney General Healey’s decision to investigate Exxon pursuant to Massachusetts law is not subject to federal congressional review, and the Committee does not have authority to use its subpoena power to interfere in that valid state law enforcement investigation.

b. The Clean Power Plan Litigation

Although your letter claims that the 2017 Subpoena has been narrowed, the opposite is true, in particular because it now seeks communications related to the “Clean Power Plan” with two different sets of individuals, see 2017 Subpoena, Schedule, Nos. 1 and 2, including representatives of numerous other state attorneys general offices, such as Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands Vermont, and Washington. See 2017 Subpoena, Schedule, No. 2. By doing so, the Committee is interfering with the MA AGO’s legitimate conduct in significant federal litigation.

As you know, the Clean Power Plan is a federal environmental rule that mandates reductions in power plant carbon dioxide emissions. There is a challenge to the Clean Power Plan in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in which various attorneys general have intervened as parties, including Attorney General Healey, who joined with multiple state attorneys general to intervene in support of the Clean Power Plan. Indeed, you and several other Committee members have filed an amicus brief in that very litigation on behalf of parties opposing the Clean Power Plan. Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2016). That fact makes it even more concerning that your inquiry has now shifted, yet again, to focus on Attorney General Healey’s participation in ongoing litigation in which you are an adverse party, seeking here to obtain privileged communications from that litigation. Thus, the 2017 Subpoena is an obvious attempt to use the Committee’s subpoena authority as an end run around the judiciary branch rules and procedures that govern the ongoing Clean Power Plan litigation.

c. No Valid Justification for the 2017 Subpoena

Against the backdrop of core state law enforcement and federal court litigation interests, the Committee has not demonstrated any federal legislative interest, much less a specific statutory or other legal authority, to justify its unprecedented attempt to interfere with a state attorney general’s ongoing investigation and ongoing litigation.

While Congress—through committees—has power to investigate in furtherance of its power to legislate, that investigative power is limited. Congressional committees may not investigate

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7 See letter from Richard A. Johnston, Chief Legal Counsel, Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, &
matters “unrelated to a valid legislative purpose,” *Quinn v. U.S.*, 75 S. Ct. 668, 672 (1955), and investigations must be narrowly tailored in order to avoid transgressing constitutional boundaries. *Tobin v. U.S.*, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962), *cert* denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962); *see also Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission*, 673 F.2d 425, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1982), *aff’d sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer energy Council of America*, 43 U.S. 1216 (1983) (the Constitution prevents Congress from exercising its power of “oversight, with an eye to legislative revision,” in a manner that amounts to “shared administration” of the law). Therefore, any investigative demand by a congressional committee requires a “chain of authority from the House” authorizing the inquiry “plainly and explicitly.” *Gojack v. United States*, 384 U.S. 702, 716 (1966). This is particularly important when a committee seeks to use Congress’s subpoena power because congressional investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory process . . . give rise to a need to protect . . . against illegal encroachment.” *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957); *see also Exxon Corp. v. FTC*, 589 F.2d 582, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (material requested was within the scope of the legislature’s investigatory powers because it was not to be used as “exposure for exposure’s sake” and the subject of inquiry was one on which legislation could be had). The need for a narrowly tailored subpoena directed at a specifically defined federal purpose is paramount where, as here, the 2017 Subpoena appears to illegally encroach on well-established constitutional requisites of state sovereignty and separation of powers.

The Committee has no legitimate—much less specific and narrowly tailored—purpose here, as evidenced by the shifting rationales for the investigation and the vague, ambiguous, and overly broad subpoena. Last May, the Committee indicated that it was requesting documents to assist “in its oversight of a coordinated attempt to attack the First Amendment rights of American citizens and their ability to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and threats of prosecution.”

In the most recent Letter, the Committee has changed the alleged purpose to state that it is “continuing its investigation of potential adverse effects of the actions of the ‘Green 20’ attorneys general on the national scientific enterprise.” The Committee also has added requests for documents dealing with “environmental scientific research.” The Committee does not indicate why it modified the purported justification for the 2017 Subpoena, nor has the Committee defined the term “national scientific enterprise” or provided any basis for suggesting that the MA AGO has adversely affected the national scientific enterprise or

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8 Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. to Hon. Maura Healey (May 18, 2016).

environmental scientific research in any way or how documents in the MA AGO’s possession could assist in the Committee’s investigation of any such adverse effects. In fact, a letter signed by the major U.S. science organizations rejected this pretextual premise when used by the Committee in a prior investigation, stating that using science to justify congressional overreach will have “a chilling effect” on federal scientists. Letter from Eight Major U.S. Science Organizations to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space & Tech. (Nov. 24, 2015); see also Letter from 587 former National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Scientists to Hon. Dr. Kathryn D. Sullivan, Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (Dec. 7, 2015) (such tactics do “a disservice to all scientists as well as the American public by stifling critical scientific exploration and analysis”). No matter how the Committee tries to disguise its investigation or how broadly it seeks to construe its jurisdiction, it simply has no oversight authority over what is really at issue here—a legitimate state law enforcement effort to investigate securities, business, and consumer fraud.

In addition to changing the alleged purpose of its investigation, the Committee has changed and expanded the scope of the documents it seeks. The Committee previously sought documents and communications with certain individuals and entities, and other state attorneys general, “referring or relating to” the “issue of climate change.” 2016 Subpoena, Schedule, Nos. 1-3. Now, you seek documents and communications with the same or similar categories of individuals and entities, referring or relating (in addition to the Clean Power Plan documents discussed above) to climate change and “environmental scientific research.” 2017 Subpoena, Schedule, Nos. 1 and 2. In the first instance, it is entirely unclear what the vague and overbroad category of “environmental scientific research” means, and you provide no definition in the Schedule Instructions. Would it include, for example, a communication regarding a hazardous waste cleanup technology? Documents concerning a wetlands mitigation study? How would those topics possibly fall within even the illegitimate and pretextual basis for the Subpoena articulated by the Committee? Far from being narrowly tailored to a specifically defined federal legislative purpose, these requests are utterly untethered to any Committee activity or purpose.

With respect to communications and documents related to the Clean Power Plan, the Committee has made no attempt to identify any connection between privileged Clean Power Plan discussions and the Committee’s purported oversight over federally funded scientific research. As discussed above, adding this category of documents to the 2017 Subpoena is nothing more than a not-so-veiled attempt to obtain privileged material from an adversary in a pending litigation.

The 2017 Subpoena also seeks production of documents that are plainly irrelevant and devoid of a federal legislative purpose—for example, your requests for documents related to a social event
that no one from the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office even attended. See 2017 Subpoena, Schedule, No. 4(c). 10

Put simply, the Committee offers no valid justification for any part of its investigation or for the 2017 Subpoena and therefore cannot use it as a means to compel Attorney General Healey to produce anything. Consequently, Attorney General Healey requests that the Committee withdraw the 2017 Subpoena.

2. The Subpoena Demands Privileged and Protected Information

As indicated above, the Committee's shifting rationale and ambiguous intent seem to serve as a pretext for interfering with a legitimate state law enforcement investigation, litigation by Exxon challenging that investigation, and federal court litigation as to the Clean Power Plan. Your further attempt to obtain privileged and protected information from Attorney General Healey is particularly disturbing given that you are aligned with the opposing parties in those matters, and neither Exxon nor Attorney General Healey's adversaries in the Clean Power Plan litigation would be permitted by the courts to procure that information. Tellingly, certain categories of documents demanded in the 2017 Subpoena are nearly identical to requests for documents Exxon served on the MA AGO in the Texas federal court case. Attorney General Healey objected to those requests on grounds similar to those raised here. As explained above, the Texas court stayed all discovery and has not required Attorney General Healey to comply with the requests for documents.

By demanding documents related to the genesis and basis for an ongoing investigation and pending litigation, the 2017 Subpoena necessarily seeks disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product protection and other similar state law protections for investigatory and deliberative materials. As set forth in my July 26 Letter, in addition to shielding privileged attorney-client communications, Massachusetts law prohibits making documents produced in connection with a CID publicly available and protects privileged documents in which attorneys within the Office discuss their bases for conducting an investigation, as well as work product documents and documents covered by the common interest doctrine. See Attachment 1, p. 12, notes 65, 66. In the context of records maintained by a state attorney general's office, these privileges are rooted in the same principles that protect

10 The 2017 Subpoena has several other textual infirmities. The time frame covered by the subpoena is unclear. In the somewhat muddy opening sentence of the Letter, the Committee appears to refer to conduct “dating back to May 2016.” However, the Schedule to the subpoena does not include any date restrictions, and Paragraph 17 of the Schedule Instructions indicates that the subpoena applies to information “as to the time period January 1, 2015 to present” with no reference to the time frame for documents themselves. Moreover, the last item on the Schedule (Schedule No. 4(d)) ends with “and,” which is either a typographical error or indicative that additional language was inadvertently removed from the schedule.
prosecutorial discretion and independence and therefore cannot be summarily dismissed as the Committee seems to suggest. See, e.g., Tobin, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (congressional requests for a state agency’s “administrative communications” and “internal memoranda” strike at the heart of the Tenth Amendment). Attorney General Healey rejects the Committee’s suggestion that it can ignore and override longstanding common law privileges applicable to her official duties, and she intends to continue to assert these privileges.

Without in any way conceding the right of the Committee to issue the 2017 Subpoena or to require a privilege log as part of an unconstitutional subpoena, in order to help demonstrate to the Committee how compliance with the subpoena would interfere with Attorney General Healey’s core duties and responsibilities, attached as Attachment 4 is a Response to the Schedule to the 2017 Subpoena outlining the types of documents potentially responsive to each of the four categories listed in the schedule and the various privileges that apply to them.

We note that our response is based on a very preliminary review of potentially relevant MA AGO records. The MA AGO reserves its right to update the response as it continues its review and to raise any relevant privileges. Even if the Committee had authority to issue the 2017 Subpoena, and it does not, the Committee’s request for a detailed privilege log at this stage is unreasonable. The breadth of the 2017 Subpoena and the types of privileged material it seeks would require an unduly burdensome review process that would inappropriately divert MA AGO resources from law enforcement to document review and could not realistically have been completed by the subpoena’s return date.11

3. The MA AGO Requests Committee Records and is Willing to Confer with the Committee

Despite Attorney General Healey’s grave concerns about the Committee’s encroachment into areas preserved for the state’s executive branch, we are willing to confer with the Committee staff to discuss the Committee’s and our differing understandings of the 2017 Subpoena, including as to the actual intent of and legal justification for the 2017 Subpoena, the impact of recent court decisions on the subpoena, whether the Committee is in actuality seeking to further the interests of opposing parties in the Exxon and Clean Power Plan litigation, whether the subpoena will be withdrawn, the time period covered by the subpoena, whether the MA AGO has any responsive documents that are outside the scope of pending investigations and litigation, and what privileges and protections apply to any potentially responsive documents.

In order to better understand the Committee’s position and to facilitate a prospective discussion with Committee staff, Attorney General Healey requests, pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2, (e)(1)(A), the following Committee records:

11 On February 24, 2017, you rejected our request for an extension to respond to the subpoena.
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1. Records of all meetings and hearings at which the Committee’s investigations of Attorney General Healey and/or Attorney General Schneiderman were discussed;

2. Records of all votes taken in connection with the Committee’s investigations of Attorney General Healey and/or New York Attorney General Schneiderman, including the transcripts of any proceedings leading up to such votes;

3. Records of all meetings, hearings, and votes taken by the Committee related to the Clean Power Plan;

4. Records of all meetings, hearings, and votes taken by the Committee related to and/or describing any relationship between state investigations of Exxon and “climate change,” “environmental scientific research,” and/or the “Clean Power Plan;”

5. Records of all meetings, hearings, and votes taken by the Committee since January 2016 related to “environmental scientific research;” and

6. Records relating to the Committee’s various rationales for the 2016 and 2017 Subpoenas, including records relating to the Committee’s purported concern with the impact on the “national scientific enterprise” or “environmental scientific research” of Attorney General Healey’s ongoing state consumer protection investigation into Exxon and pending litigation with Exxon and with respect to the Clean Power Plan.

We look forward to your response to our suggestion that you withdraw the 2017 Subpoena, to our proposal that we confer, and to our request for documents pursuant to House Rule XI clause 2, (e)(1)(A).

Sincerely,

Richard A. Johnston
Chief Legal Counsel

Attachments (4)

cc: Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson
Ranking Member, Science Space and Technology Committee
Attachment 1

Letter from Richard A. Johnston, Chief Legal Counsel, Office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Committee on Science, Space, & Technology (July 26, 2016)
July 26, 2016

The Honorable Lamar Smith
Chairman
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
2321 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Smith:

I am Chief Legal Counsel for Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, and I write in response to the July 13, 2016, subpoena issued to her by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (the “Committee”). The subpoena is sweeping in its scope and completely unprecedented in its intended interference with an ongoing regulatory investigation by a state’s attorney general. The subpoena seeks “all documents and communications between any officer or employee of the Office of the Attorney General of Massachusetts” (the “Office”) and nine non-profit organizations and other groups, “any other state attorney general office,” and “any official or employee of the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, or the Executive Office of the U.S. President,” “referring or relating to the [Office’s] investigation or potential prosecution of companies, nonprofit organizations, scientists, or other individuals related to the issue of climate change.”

Attorney General Healey hereby objects to the subpoena as an unconstitutional and unwarranted interference with a legitimate ongoing state investigation. The subpoena is a dangerous overreach by the Committee and an affront to states’ rights. The Committee’s majority members (the “Majority”) arranged for the subpoena in disregard of the detailed letters from Attorney General Healey and the Ranking Member of the Committee setting forth why the Committee has no legal authority to tamper with a state attorney general’s investigation into possible violations of state law by Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”). The Majority also disregarded Attorney General Healey’s objection that most of the documents being requested are either attorney-client privileged documents or protected from disclosure as attorney work product. The Majority delivered the subpoena without even acknowledging Attorney General Healey’s offers to discuss her objections in a conference call with the Chairman and/or Committee staff. This sequence of events suggests that the Majority had no intention of considering the substance of Attorney General Healey’s objections.

1 Subpoena, July 13, 2016, pg. 2.
2 We remain willing to confer by telephone with you as Chairman and/or your staff to discuss Attorney General Healey's objections to the subpoena, as outlined in this letter, provided that the Ranking Member and/or her staff are invited and permitted to participate.
You, Mr. Chairman, yourself reportedly have conceded that the subpoena of a state attorney general is unprecedented in the history of Congress. None of the cases cited by the Committee in any of its correspondence with Attorney General Healey provides authority for the proposition that a Congressional committee can subpoena a sitting state attorney general about a pending investigation by his or her office. Congressional and Committee rules provide no such explicit power, the courts have never recognized such power, and the few legal decisions that the Majority's letters mention relate to quite different situations and therefore provide no authority for the Committee's subpoena. Because the subpoena is unconstitutional and otherwise unlawful, Attorney General Healey respectfully objects to its issuance and declines to produce to the Committee documents related to the Office's ongoing investigation of Exxon.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Attorney General Is the Chief Law Enforcement Officer in Massachusetts and Has Broad Powers of Investigation.

Attorney General Healey is an elected constitutional officer in the state of Massachusetts and is the highest ranking law enforcement official. Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 § 3. The Attorney General determines legal policy for the state and brings legal actions on behalf of the state. Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977); Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 § 5. Attorney General Healey also has various enumerated statutory powers, including the prevention or remedy of damage to the environment, Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 § 11D, and enforcement of the state's consumer protection law, Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws (“Chapter 93A”), which proscribes unfair and deceptive practices in the conduct of business. In Massachusetts the Attorney General is authorized to protect investors, consumers, and other persons in the state against unfair and deceptive business practices through such mechanisms as promulgating regulations, conducting investigations through civil investigative demands (“CID”), and instituting litigation.4

CIDs under Chapter 93A are a crucial tool for gaining information regarding whether an entity under investigation has violated the statute. Since the beginning of 2013, the Office has issued several hundred CIDs pursuant to Chapter 93A to or regarding companies or individuals suspected of committing unfair and deceptive business practices or other illegal conduct. These Chapter 93A investigations have addressed, among other things, foreclosure practices of banks, business practices in the pharmaceutical industry, and marketing of other products and services sold in the state. The Office issued some CIDs as part of joint investigations with other regulators; about 25 CIDs were issued in connection with joint investigations with other states, about 30 were issued in connection with joint investigations involving the federal government, and several involved joint investigations with other states as well as the federal government.

Attorney General Healey's office routinely issues CIDs to large publicly traded companies with business dealings in the state but with principal places of business outside of Massachusetts. Examples since 2013 which have become public through settlement with the target companies

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include: a joint investigation with federal authorities (targeting Oppenheimer\(^5\)); three investigations in which the Office worked with the U.S. government and a small group of states (Citigroup,\(^6\) JPMorgan,\(^7\) and Chase Bank\(^8\)); three which the Office undertook with a large multistate enforcement group (Ocwen,\(^9\) Moneygram,\(^10\) and HSBC\(^11\)); and one investigation with one other state attorney general as a partner (LPL Financial\(^12\)). A very recent, visible example is the Office’s 2016 participation in a joint multistate investigation into Volkswagen’s “clean diesel” deception, which resulted in a partial settlement providing Massachusetts with nearly $100 million in Chapter 93A civil penalties and environmental mitigation payments.\(^13\)

Nearly every other state attorney general has CID or similar investigative authority.\(^14\)

The Office’s Longstanding Efforts on Climate Change.

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For years the Office has been a leader in addressing the threat of climate change, often in collaboration with other state attorneys general. The Office led the federal litigation that resulted in the United States Supreme Court’s determination in *Massachusetts v. EPA* that greenhouse gases are pollutants warranting regulation under the federal Clean Air Act. See *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In the intervening decade, Massachusetts’s injuries from climate change—and the scientific predictions of future injuries—have only grown more devastating. In subsequent litigation, the Office has worked closely with other states to advocate for and defend federal findings and regulations addressing climate change under the Clean Air Act, including the EPA’s Clean Power Plan regulations to reduce power plant greenhouse gas emissions and the EPA’s recent regulations regarding methane emissions from oil and gas facilities. Massachusetts has itself enacted laws that require reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and encourage strategies to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, including the Global Warming Solutions Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 21N, and the Green Communities Act, 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 169 (S.B. 2768) (West).

We understand, that you, Mr. Chairman, have raised questions about the causes of climate change and the extent to which human activity versus other factors such as “natural cycles” and “sun spots” contribute to this problem. Nevertheless, as state and federal law recognize, the overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that human activity, and the burning of fossil fuels in particular, are key drivers of climate change. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers at 2-5 (“Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on humans and natural systems. Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and oceans have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen. Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% of the total GHG emissions increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the increase during the period 2000 to 2010. Globally, economic and population growth continued to be the most important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion.”) (internal citations omitted). The Investigation into Exxon.

Exxon is the largest publicly-traded oil and gas corporation in the world. In 2015, *The Los Angeles Times*, in cooperation with the Columbia University School of Journalism and the news

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organization InsideClimate News, published a series of investigative reports and internal Exxon and other documents establishing that Exxon had a robust climate change scientific research program in the late 1970s into the 1980s that documented the serious potential for climate change, the likely contribution of fossil fuels (the company’s chief product) to climate change, and the risks of climate change to the world’s natural and economic systems, including Exxon’s own assets and businesses. By July 1977, Exxon’s own scientists informed Exxon management that the release of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels was causing global temperatures to increase, a situation that would, the scientists warned Exxon management, give rise to “the need for hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies.” Exxon’s scientists were, in the early 1980s, predicting significant increases in global temperature as a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, and that a 2 to 3 degree Celsius increase could lead to melting of polar ice, rising sea levels, “redistribution of rainfall,” “accelerated growth of pests and weeds,” “detrimental health effects,” and “population migration.” Exxon’s scientists advised Exxon management that it would be possible to “avoid the problem by sharply curtailing the use of fossil fuels.” One Exxon scientist warned in no uncertain terms that it was “distinctly possible” that the effects of climate change over time will “indeed be catastrophic (at least for a substantial fraction of the earth’s population).”

Exxon’s scientists understood that doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide would occur “sometime in the latter half of the 21st century,” and that “CO2-induced climate changes should be observable well before doubling.” Exxon’s own scientists agreed with the scientific consensus that “a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from its pre-industrial revolution value would result in an average global temperature rise of (3.0 ± 1.5) [degrees Celsius].” Exxon also knew what that would mean for humanity and ecological systems: “There is unanimous agreement in the scientific community that a temperature increase of this magnitude would bring about significant changes in the earth’s climate, including rainfall distribution and alternations in the biosphere.”

20 https://insideclimatetnews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken; InsideClimate News was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for its work on the Exxon investigation and the Road Not Taken Series. See https://insideclimatetnews.org/news/18042016/insideclimate-news-pulitzer-prize-finalist-exxon-investigation.
21 According to InsideClimate News, its “reporters interviewed former Exxon employees, scientists, and federal officials, and consulted hundreds of pages of internal Exxon documents, many of them written between 1977 and 1986.” Neela Banerjee, et al., Exxon: The Road Not Taken (InsideClimate News 2015) at 2. InsideClimate News also reviewed “thousands of documents from archives including those held at the University of Texas-Austin, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.” Id.
24 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
this year, 2016, Exxon continues to tell its investors that “[w]e are confident that none of our hydrocarbon reserves are now or will become stranded,”\(^{29}\) and maintains that, “[w]hile most scientists agree climate change poses risks related to extreme weather, sea-level rise, temperature extremes, and precipitation changes, current scientific understanding provides limited guidance on the likelihood, magnitude, or time frame of these events.”\(^{30}\)

Additionally, Exxon made statements in 1980 at an American Petroleum Institute AQ-9 Task Force meeting that demonstrated its knowledge of the fact that as fossil fuels continue to be burned, a “global average 2.5 C rise [is] expected by 2038,” which would cause “major economic consequences.”\(^{31}\) They further projected that at a “3% per annum growth rate of CO2, a 2.5 C rise brings world economic growth to a halt in about 2025,” and that a “5 C rise” by 2067 will have “globally catastrophic effects.”\(^{32}\) In a 1982 memo to Exxon management, a manager at the Exxon Research and Engineering Company Environmental Affairs Program showed concern and predicted that climate change would cause “disturbances in the existing global water distribution balance” and would have “a dramatic impact on soil moisture, and in turn, on agriculture,” stating “there are some potentially catastrophic events that must be considered,” including the melting of the Antarctic ice sheet causing a 5 meter sea level rise, and “flooding much of the U.S. East Coast, including the State of Florida and Washington D.C.”\(^{33}\) At an environmental conference presentation in 1984, another Exxon scientist stated “[w]e can either adapt our civilization to a warmer planet or avoid the problem by sharply curtailing the use of fossil fuels.”\(^{34}\) These statements contrast sharply to statements made by Exxon in 2014 (“[w]e are confident that none of our hydrocarbon reserves are now or will become stranded.”\(^{35}\)) and 2016 (“Oil will provide one third of the world’s energy in 2040, remaining the No. 1 source of fuel, and natural gas will move into second place.”\(^{36}\)). These recent statements fail to mention any of the previous research, projections, or concerns that were expressed by Exxon’s own scientists and disseminated within the company and industry in the 1980s; they instead portray, to a public unaware of this research, a bright future for the Exxon and the oil industry.

\(^{29}\) Energy and Carbon—Managing the Risks (Exxon, 2014) at 1.
\(^{32}\) Id.
\(^{35}\) Energy and Carbon—Managing the Risks (Exxon, 2014) at 1.
Despite its research and knowledge, Exxon appears to have engaged with other fossil fuel interests in a campaign from at least the 1990s onward to prevent government action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 1998, Exxon’s Randy Randol participated as a member of the “Global Climate Science Communications Team,” which engaged in a concerted effort to challenge the “scientific underpinning of the global climate change theory” in the media, and which took the position that “[i]n fact, it [sic] not known for sure whether (a) climate change actually is occurring, or (b) if it is, whether humans really have any influence on it.” A draft plan prepared by that team noted that “unless ‘climate change’ becomes a non-issue, meaning that the Kyoto proposal is defeated and there are no further initiatives to thwart the threat of climate change, there may be no moment when we can declare victory for our efforts.”

In addition to undertaking efforts to forestall government action on climate change that would reduce the use of fossil fuel products in the United States, Exxon seemingly failed to disclose its knowledge of climate change threats in a fully candid way to investors in its securities and to consumers to whom it continued to market and sell such products.

Concerns that Exxon has not adequately disclosed climate risk to Massachusetts investors in its securities appear to be reflected in recent actions by Exxon shareholders (including Massachusetts-based shareholders) to compel the company to more fully assess and respond to climate risks. In the past year Exxon shareholders came close to passing resolutions that would have required Exxon to implement “stress tests” to ascertain more specifically the climate-driven risks to Exxon’s businesses. As the Wall Street Journal reported, the proposals “drew more support than any contested climate-related votes” in Exxon’s history, and indicate that “more mainstream shareholders like pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and asset managers are starting to take more seriously” the effects on Exxon of a “global weaning from fossil fuels.”

Following the publication of the investigative reports and documents by the Los Angeles Times and others, on or about November 5, 2015, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman issued a subpoena to Exxon under New York’s Martin Act, seeking documents regarding Exxon’s climate research and its communications to investors and consumers about the risks of climate change and the effect of those risks on Exxon’s business. According to press statements by the New York

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38 Id.
39 Id.
Attorney General, Exxon is cooperating with the subpoena and has produced more than 700,000 pages of documents so far.\textsuperscript{42}

In January 2016, at the request of members of Congress, the Department of Justice asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate whether Exxon should be prosecuted under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, based on the documents released by journalists.\textsuperscript{43} United States Attorney General Lynch recently confirmed that the investigation is ongoing.\textsuperscript{44}

And in early July 2016, nineteen members of the Senate called for an end to fossil fuel companies', including Exxon's, climate change “misinformation campaign to mislead the public and cast doubt in order to protect their financial interest,”\textsuperscript{45} and offered support for a resolution urging fossil fuel companies to cooperate with “active or future investigation into (A) their climate-change related activities; (B) what they knew about climate change and when they knew that information; (C) what they knew about the harmful effects of fossil fuels on the climate; and (D) any activities to mislead the public about climate change.”\textsuperscript{46}

Given the obligations of the Office to prevent damage to the state's environment and protect Massachusetts investors and consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices, the history of the Office's efforts on climate change, the press revelations about Exxon's apparent undisclosed knowledge about the impact of fossil fuel use on climate change, and the various investigations by other state and federal officials, the Office began looking into Exxon-related issues and determined that an investigation pursuant to Chapter 93A would be warranted. A critical issue under Massachusetts law is whether Exxon told investors and consumers, or led them to believe, that it was appropriate and safe for Exxon to utilize its substantial fossil fuel reserves for the manufacture and sale of petroleum products with knowledge, based on its extensive research, that such practices would cause significant climate change and harm to the world.

In March 2016 the New York Attorney General, Attorney General Healey, and several other attorneys general met in New York and discussed at a press conference their cooperation on a number of national environmental issues.\textsuperscript{47} Attorney General Healey announced that her office also would be investigating Exxon's climate change research and public communications to investors


\textsuperscript{43} https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2730475-DOJ-RESPONSE.html;


\textsuperscript{46} S. Con. Res. 45, 114th Cong. (2016).

and consumers. This press conference was not unusual; multi-state attorney general investigations, litigation, amicus briefs, and other collaborative efforts often have been accompanied by press announcements.48

The Office initiated an investigation of Exxon’s potential liability for violations of Chapter 93A with respect to statements to investors and consumers. On April 19, 2016, the Office served Exxon’s Massachusetts registered agent with its CID. The CID sought documents from Exxon on such topics as “Exxon’s development, planning, implementation, review, and analysis of research efforts to study CO2 emissions”; research on how the effects of climate change will affect Exxon’s costs, marketability, and future profits; and how this information was communicated to consumers and investors.49

The Majority’s Attempted Interference with State Investigations.

It appears that the issuance of the New York subpoena and the Massachusetts CID prompted the Committee to attempt an intervention into state attorneys’ general investigations of Exxon. On May 18, 2016, Attorney General Healey received a letter from Chairman Smith and other Majority members of the Committee requesting that the Office produce “documents and communications between or among employees of the Office” and various non-profit organizations, other state attorneys general, and federal governmental bodies.50 In its letter, the Majority attempted to justify the request on the grounds that the Office’s investigation was an effort “to silence speech,” coordinated through “[e]pollution between the New York Attorney General and [e]xtremist [e]nvironmental [g]roups,” and “may even amount to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.”51 Attorney General Healey responded by letter on June 2, 2016, respectfully declining to produce the requested documents.52 Attorney General Healey’s response pointed out that the Committee mischaracterized the investigation because its true focus is on protecting consumers in the state; that under the Constitution, the Committee has no power to interfere with a state investigation because it

51 Id.
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is not a valid federal legislative purpose; and that the Majority had not identified any Congressional  
authorization to undertake an investigation into the enforcement activities of the Office.  

The Majority members reiterated their requests in a second letter sent on June 17, 2016. This  
time, the Majority claimed that the Office’s investigation had the potential “to chill scientific  
research” and referred to various House of Representatives’ rules and a number of investigations  
that Congress had conducted in both international and domestic matters. None of the cited rules or  
prior investigations, however, involved Congressional investigation into the activities of a state  
attorney general to enforce state laws. Consequently, Attorney General Healey responded to the  
letter on June 24, 2016, reiterating her declination to produce documents to the Committee.  

Ranking Committee Member Eddie Bernice Johnson wrote to you as Chairman as well, urging the  
cessation of “this abuse of authority” and the end of the “exceptionally unusual” document  
requests.  

The Majority members sent Attorney General Healey a third letter on July 6, 2016, threatening to  
use compulsory process. This time the Majority referenced the importance of protecting scientific  
research and the similarities between Office’s CID and the subpoena issued by the Attorney General  
of the Virgin Islands to Exxon and also cited three court decisions, none of which involved  
Congressional interference with a state attorney general’s investigatory or enforcement powers  
under state law. The next day, Ranking Member Johnson issued a statement condemning the  
“abuse of power” and “harassment” of the attorneys general and non-profit organizations to which  
the Majority members had issued such letters. Attorney General Healey responded to this third  
letter in a letter sent July 13, 2016, stating that the Majority still had not furnished any valid legal  
authority for its requests for documents, and that she “continues respectfully to decline to provide  
the requested materials to the Committee.” Attorney General Healey nevertheless indicated that she  
was “willing to confer by telephone” with Chairman Smith or his staff about objections to  
producing documents to the Committee, provided that Ranking Member Johnson and her staff were  

51 Id.  
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also invited and permitted to participate. The Majority did not respond to Attorney General Healey’s offer of a telephone conference.

Instead, a few hours after receiving Attorney General Healey’s third letter (and a similar letter from the New York Attorney General), Committee staff sent a subpoena to Attorney General Healey, and you as Chairman proceeded to hold a press conference announcing subpoenas to the New York Attorney General, Attorney General Healey, and several non-profit organizations. After the issuance of the subpoenas, Ranking Member Johnson, joined by Committee Member Congresswoman Clark and Congressmen Beyer and Tonko, issued a statement condemning the “unlawful subpoenas” issued by the Committee, which had the effect of creating the “Committee’s unfortunate new reputation as a committee of witch hunts.”

On another front, on June 15, 2016, Exxon filed a civil complaint against Attorney General Healey in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Office’s investigation violated its constitutional rights, along with a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Attorney General Healey from enforcing the CID issued to the company. The following day, June 16, 2016, Exxon filed a petition in Massachusetts state court to set aside or modify the CID, along with an emergency motion seeking the same relief, and a request to stay the Massachusetts proceeding pending the outcome of the Texas proceeding. Those actions are still pending. Exxon has not produced any documents in response to the Massachusetts CID.

LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO THE SUBPOENA

The Committee’s subpoena—demanding access to privileged and protected documents relating to an on-going state investigation into a private party—is an unprecedented and unconstitutional attempt to interfere in Attorney General Healey’s exercise of her authority to investigate violations of state law.

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63 Complaint, ExxonMobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469, ECF No. 1 (June 15, 2016); Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Exxon Mobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469, ECF No. 8 (June 16, 2016).
64 Petition of ExxonMobil Corp. to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order, In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, Issued by the Office of the Attorney General, No. 16-1888F (June 16, 2016); Emergency Motion of ExxonMobil Corp. to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order, In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, Issued by the Office of the Attorney General, No. 16-1888F (June 16, 2016).
A. Attorney General Healey Objects to Producing Privileged and Protected Investigatory Documents, Because to Do So Would Compromise the Investigation and the Independence of Her Office.

As discussed further below, the Committee’s subpoena is unconstitutional simply because it has no basis in any valid legislative purpose. But the subpoena is particularly egregious for attempting to compel production of documents that are plainly subject to a sovereign state’s attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and deliberative process protection. Indeed, most of the Office’s documents that would be responsive to the subpoena are covered by these or similar protections under Massachusetts law.

In her third letter in response to the Committee’s demands, delivered just prior to issuance of the subpoena, Attorney General Healey advised the Majority that Exxon had filed two lawsuits in an effort to stop the investigation and had not produced any documents in response to the CID. Even if Exxon had produced documents to the Office, or in the future does, the Office is prohibited from making publicly available documents produced by a CID, except in court filings. Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A § 6(6). Consequently, as her letter stated, most of the responsive documents in her possession would be privileged as attorney-client documents or protected as attorney work product.

Moreover, Massachusetts law protects privileged documents in which attorneys within the Office discuss their bases for conducting an investigation into Exxon, as well as work product documents such as Office communications with sources of information about Exxon’s business conduct. And since Massachusetts law protects documents covered by the common interest doctrine, the Committee should not be permitted to see communications between the Office and federal investigators or attorneys general from other states, which are protected by a common interest privilege in the context of a potential multi-state investigation.

Compliance with the subpoena would eviscerate Attorney General Healey’s ability to conduct an ordinary and lawful investigation, shielded by long-established privileges and protections for its internal communications, work product, and strategic discussions with allied state attorneys general. Attorney General Healey therefore declines to produce the documents.

B. The Committee Has No Constitutional Right to Interfere with a Lawful State Investigation into Possible Violations of Massachusetts Law by Exxon.

The Committee has no right to obtain documents from Attorney General Healey—whether or not protected by recognized privileges—for several important reasons. Attorney General Healey’s

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66 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 609, 612, 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Mass. 2007) ("Broadly stated, the common interest doctrine extend[s] the attorney-client privilege to any privileged communication shared with another represented party's counsel in a confidential manner for the purpose of furthering a common legal interest."); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76(1) (2000) ("If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.").
investigation is an ordinary and lawful investigation under Massachusetts law. The Committee’s attempted interference with that investigation is a violation of states’ rights and constitutional principles of federalism. The Majority has not cited any rules of either Congress or the Committee itself that support this attempted intrusion into a sovereign state’s investigation. None of the court decisions cited by the Majority even discusses Congressional subpoenas to state attorneys general, let alone authorizes them.

1. **Attorney General Healey’s investigation arises out of discrepancies in Exxon documents relating to climate change and a concern that Exxon misled Massachusetts investors and consumers with its public representations and omissions about climate change.**

The Committee’s subpoena is a deliberate interference with Attorney General Healey’s ordinary and lawful investigation of Exxon’s possible violation of Massachusetts law. As indicated above, the Office regularly investigates violations of Chapter 93A, which prescribes unfair and deceptive practices toward investors and consumers, among others. Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A. Attorney General Healey is authorized under Chapter 93A to represent the interests of the state and its citizens, as well as to investigate corporate and other wrongdoing, including violations of laws protecting investors and consumers. **See id.** Based on the Office’s review of a number of publicly available Exxon documents and public statements by Exxon, Attorney General Healey determined to investigate whether Exxon made false or misleading statements, in violation of Massachusetts law, to investors and consumers regarding the risks of climate change and the effect of those risks on Exxon’s products and business.\(^\text{67}\)

The recently-published Exxon documents cited above appear to demonstrate that Exxon knew by at least July 1977 from its own scientists that the continued burning of fossil fuels was causing global temperatures to increase, that the impacts could be catastrophic, and that changes in energy strategies would be needed. Nevertheless, it appears that Exxon continued to advise investors that its business model, heavily reliant on continued burning of fossil fuels, was sound, and continued to market its fossil fuel products to consumers without adequately disclosing the climate risks to the public.

The Office is in the preliminary stages of its investigation. Exxon is the first entity or person to receive a CID. Attorney General Healey has made no determinations as to whether the Office will institute litigation against Exxon pursuant to Chapter 93A or other laws. However, given the apparent discrepancies between what Exxon knew from its own internal scientific research about impacts on global warming and what Exxon both affirmatively represented and failed to tell investors and consumers about its research, she is entitled under Massachusetts law to investigate Exxon’s conduct. **Given that the Office’s investigation is in the ordinary course of powers vested in Attorney General Healey by state law, there is no basis whatsoever for the U.S. Congress to interfere in the investigation.**

\(^{67}\text{See Civil Investigative Demand 2016-DPF-36, ExxonMobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469, ECF No. 1 (Apr. 19, 2016).}\)
2. Fundamental constitutional principles preclude a Congressional committee from interfering with a state attorney general’s lawful investigation.

As far as Attorney General Healey is aware, no committee of Congress in the history of the country has issued a subpoena to a sitting state attorney general with respect to his or her exercise of official duties. We have found no such instance in our research. Nor has the Committee brought any such instance to our attention. Indeed, you as Chairman reportedly stated that “[t]his may be the first time any Congressional committee has subpoenaed state attorneys general.”

There is a reason that Congress has refrained: The Constitution precludes such interference. The state of Massachusetts has a sovereign interest in the protection of its residents, including in their capacities as investors and consumers. As the Supreme Court has explained, the “Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers. ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 10. The States thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our constitutional system.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). And the States retain significant sovereign powers—“powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Id. at 461. As already made clear to the Committee by the New York Attorney General, “[i]nvestigations and other law enforcement actions by a state Attorney General for potential violations of state law, as here, involve the exercise of police powers reserved to the States under the 10th Amendment,” and thus “are not the appropriate subject of federal legislation, oversight, or interference.”

Further, while Congress, through committees, has power to investigate in furtherance of its power to legislate, that power may not be used to investigate matters “unrelated to a valid legislative purpose,” Quin v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955), and a broad and general authorization from Congress to a committee must, when necessary, be narrowly construed to avoid transgressing constitutional federal-state boundaries, Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Monitoring or impeding a state attorney general’s investigation or prosecution of a state-law enforcement action is not related to a valid federal legislative purpose. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (Constitution does not “confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”).

The Tobin case well illustrates the limits on a committee’s subpoena power. In Tobin, the D.C. Circuit reversed a Port of New York Authority official’s criminal conviction for contempt of Congress for refusing to comply with a subpoena in a House subcommittee’s investigation into whether Congress should “alter, amend or repeal” its consent to the interstate compact between New York and New Jersey that created the Port Authority. 306 F.2d at 272-76. The subpoena sought a broad range of documents concerning the Port Authority’s internal affairs, including, among other things, “[a]ll communications in [its] files . . . including correspondence, interoffice and other memoranda and reports relating to” a wide array of topics. Id. at 276 n.2. The Port Authority refused to comply with these demands on the two grounds that the request violated the

Tenth Amendment, and that the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution did not actually permit Congress to “alter, amend or repeal” its consent to a compact. \textit{Id.} at 272. Although the court recognized that the committee had “jurisdiction over ‘interstate compacts generally,’ and the power ‘to conduct full and complete investigations and studies relating to . . . the activities and operations of interstate compacts,’” the court also recognized that “when Congress authorizes a committee to conduct an investigation, the courts have adopted the policy of construing such resolutions of authority narrowly, in order to obviate the necessity of passing on serious constitutional questions.” \textit{Id.} at 274-75. And the court found that “the very fact that Congress had never before attempted such an expansive investigation of an interstate compact agency—an investigation, by its very nature, sure to provoke the serious and difficult constitutional questions involved here—leads to the conclusion that if Congress had intended the Judiciary Committee to conduct such a novel investigation it would have spelled out this intention in words more explicit than the[se] general terms[].” \textit{Id.} at 275. Accordingly, the court concluded that the subpoena fell outside the committee’s authority. \textit{Id.} at 276.

Here, the Majority has not identified in its three letters to Attorney General Healey in support of its own “novel” subpoena any explicit Congressional authorization to investigate this Office’s enforcement activities. This lacuna is not surprising: Any such purported authorization would violate the fundamental principles of federalism that are manifest in our Constitution as a whole and are safeguarded by the Tenth Amendment. As the New York Attorney General has aptly stated, “Congress does not have jurisdiction to demand documents and communications from a state law enforcement official regarding the exercise of a State’s sovereign police powers.”\textsuperscript{70}

Thus, as Attorney General Healey already has explained to the Majority in her several prior communications on this matter prior to the unlawful issuance of the subpoena, Massachusetts law empowers her office to conduct an investigation into potential unfair and deceptive business practices on the part of Exxon, and the Committee cannot interfere in the investigation without violating the fundamental federal structure of our Constitution. The subpoena constitutes an unauthorized and unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the state of Massachusetts as a sovereign state.

3. The Committee’s evolving rationales for its subpoena are untenable.

The Majority’s rationales for interfering with Attorney General Healey’s investigation have shifted over time both legally and factually, demonstrating the unstable ground on which this unprecedented subpoena rests.\textsuperscript{71} The bottom line is that the Majority has never provided a valid

\textsuperscript{70} Letter from Leslie B. Dubecck, Counsel, Office of the New York Attorney General to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (May 26, 2016) pg. 2.

\textsuperscript{71} In the Committee’s first letter, on May 18, the Majority alleged that Attorney General Healey was restricting free speech, colluding with extremist groups, and abusing prosecutorial discretion. Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech., to Hon. Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, May 18, 2016. In their second letter, on June 17, the Majority cited their supposedly “broad investigatory power” and charge to protect scientific research and development as justification for their document requests. Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech., to Hon. Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General, June 17, 2016. And their third letter, on July 6, focused on the similarities between the Virgin Islands subpoena and the Massachusetts CID, attempting to use the similar language as evidence of “a deliberate attempt to
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legislative purpose for its action. Nor has the Majority cited a single Congressional rule or judicial decision that remotely suggests that the Committee has authority to interfere with an ongoing state investigation or to subpoena the files of a sitting state attorney general.

a. Congressional and Committee Rules do not provide for investigating purely state matters.

Although the Majority’s letters have cited several Congressional rules in an effort to justify its request for investigatory files from Attorney General Healey, none of these provisions in fact provides any support for the Majority’s effort. Neither the Rules of the House of Representatives72 (“House Rules”), the Science, Space, and Technology Committee’s own rules73 (“Committee Rules”), nor the Committee’s Oversight Plan74 (“Plan”) authorizes the Committee to conduct an investigation of a sovereign state’s exercise of its law enforcement authority in connection with the state’s consumer and investor protection statute.

House Rule X establishes standing committees, whose jurisdiction concerns matters related to federal agencies, application of federal law, implementation of federally-funded programs, and tax and economic implications of federal policies. The standing committees have general oversight responsibilities to assist the House in its evaluation of the application of federal laws; “conditions and circumstances” that “may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation”; formulation of federal law; and whether federal programs are being carried out consistent with Congress’s intent. See House Rule X, Clause 2(a)-(b) (general oversight responsibilities).

Committee Rule VIII (Oversight and Investigations) provides that the Committee “shall review and study . . . the application . . . of those laws . . . the subject matter of which is within its jurisdiction” including “all laws, programs, and Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development” in accordance with House Rule X, and must prepare a plan of its oversight activities. See Committee Rule VIII (emphasis supplied); see also Plan at 1. In light of the capitalized term “Government” and in light of House Rule X, the term “those laws” in Committee Rule VIII refers to federal laws.

Similarly, the Plan prepared by the Committee focuses on oversight of federal agencies, with a key goal of eliminating “waste, fraud, and abuse.” No provision of the Plan discusses a need or plan to investigate any state activities, and no such investigation would aid the Committee in fulfilling its charge pursuant to House Rule X. While the Plan suggests that the Committee will engage in

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oversight efforts in connection with “scientific integrity,” it is limited to oversight of federal agencies. See, e.g., Plan at 9 (the Committee will continue to “collect and examine allegations of intimidation of science specialists in federal agencies, suppression or revisions of scientific findings, and mischaracterizations of scientific findings because of political or other pressures” (emphasis supplied)); see also id. (The Committee will develop and implement “scientific integrity principles within the Executive Branch.” (emphasis supplied)). Read in the context of the overall Plan, it is obvious the Committee’s focus is on and limited to scientific findings made or funded by federal government agencies, not by private corporations, such as Exxon.

The Committee therefore was not delegated “any oversight authority concerning the investigations of state attorneys general regarding violations of state securities, consumer, or business laws” by Congress. The Ranking Member of the Committee has also recognized this lack of authority, stating that “nowhere in our jurisdiction—legislative or oversight—can one find justification for our Committee’s oversight of state police powers.”

b. No judicial decision has sanctioned Congressional subpoenas of state attorneys general.

In addition to the lack of authority under Congressional rules, none of the judicial decisions cited in the Majority’s second and third letters to Attorney General Healey (there were no decisions cited in the first such letter) suggests that the Committee may interfere with her statutory power to investigate possible violations of Massachusetts law by Exxon.

The June 17 Letter referenced several decisions in footnotes, none of which involved a Congressional investigation into enforcement activities of a state attorney general. McGrain v. Daugherty involved a subpoena to a private individual, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), and Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund involved a subpoena to a bank, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). Barenblatt v. United States and Shelton v. United States concerned subpoenas issued by the infamous House Committee on Un-American Activities to a university professor and a Klan member, respectively. 360 U.S. 109 (1959); 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Finally, Hutcheson v. United States concerned a subpoena issued to a union officer, 369 U.S. 599 (1962).

The July 6 Letter is similarly devoid of any court decisions supporting interference by a Congressional committee with a state attorney general’s enforcement activities. In the Matter of the Special April 1977 Grand Jury concerned a federal grand jury subpoena issued to a state attorney general concerning potential criminal law violations by him personally, and specifically did not involve an investigation “into the affairs of the State of Illinois” or the attorney general’s actions in his official capacity. 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978). Freilich concerned a claim that a federal statutory reporting requirement compelled states to implement a federal regulatory program and therefore amounted to unconstitutional “commandeering” under Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Freilich v. Bd. of Directors of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 2d 679, 696 (D. Md. 2001). Michigan Department of Community Health

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76 Letter from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech., to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (June 23, 2016) pg. 7.
involved a federal administrative subpoena issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration to a state agency, where there was a clear nexus between the federal investigation and enforcement of a federal law. See United States v. Michigan Dep't of Cnty. Health, No. 1:10-MC-109, 2011 WL 2412602 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011). Even there, the court denied the DEA’s petition to enforce its subpoena with respect to certain records in the state agency’s possession. Id. at *14.

Put simply, none of the cases which the Committee has cited in any of its letters to Attorney General Healey provides that a Congressional committee can force a state Attorney General to disclose to the committee the substance or results of an official investigation into possible violations of state law by a private company.

c. Attorney General Healey is not infringing on Exxon’s rights of free speech, because the First Amendment does not protect false and misleading statements.

The Majority’s letters to Attorney General Healey and the Chairman’s comments at a press conference announcing the subpoena suggest that the Majority is concerned that this Office’s investigation threatens free speech rights. That concern is misplaced.

As the Chairman and members of this Committee know, the First Amendment does not protect false and misleading statements in the marketplace. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is well settled that the First Amendment does not protect fraud.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“[T]he government may, and does, punish fraud directly.”); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 593 (1980) (“[F]alse and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection.”); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“[R]estrictions on false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech” are “permissible.”); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”); Massachusetts Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, No. CV 14-13706-FDS, 2016 WL 308776 at *18 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 2016) (“[T]he government may place an outright ban on speech that is misleading on its face—that is, speech that is more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”).

Just as the courts rejected claims by the tobacco industry that the First Amendment protected its knowingly false statements that cigarette smoking did not cause lung cancer, Exxon may not use the First Amendment to shield its statements and non-disclosures with respect to the relationship between fossil fuel use and climate change. Businesses are not permitted to make false statements to the public and then claim that the First Amendment protects them from the consequences of state laws prohibiting false statements in business affairs. As the Oregon Attorney General’s Office wrote to you:
Your letter also incorrectly accuses this office of investigating entities based on their speech or beliefs concerning climate change. Please be advised this office will not be dissuaded from considering whether state laws, including consumer protections laws, may provide redress against knowingly false commercial speech concerning global warming. The First Amendment simply does not protect fraudulent speech. Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) ("This government power [to protect people against fraud] has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established.").

Because Exxon appears to have made many statements to the public, including investors and consumers, about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change that appear to contradict its own internal documents, Attorney General Healey is entitled to investigate what Exxon knew and said to others about these issues—in order to determine whether a cause of action exists for violation of Massachusetts law. Attorney General Healey is not seeking to stifle Exxon’s scientific research; to the contrary, the Office is looking into whether Exxon properly represented to the public, in accordance with Massachusetts law, what it knew first-hand from its detailed internal scientific research.

Furthermore, because the Office has not sent CIDs to any entities or individuals other than Exxon, the Majority’s professed concern about chilling third-party research is also misplaced. To the extent that the Office’s CID to Exxon seeks communications between Exxon and other entities or individuals about climate change, those documents are relevant to a determination whether Exxon was telling the public, including investors and consumers, a different story about climate change than it was discussing internally and privately with select third parties. If so, the outside communications would be relevant to potential claims that Exxon violated Chapter 93A by misleading investors and consumers.

4. If the Committee’s action goes unchallenged, it could jeopardize states’ rights and, in particular, the independence of state attorneys general to conduct investigations into violations of state law.

A substantial portion of Attorney General Healey’s work is to conduct investigations into various types of illegal behavior, including unfair and deceptive business practices. As stated above, the Office has issued several hundred CIDs under Chapter 93A since 2013. Some of those investigations result in settlements or assurances of discontinuance, some result in civil enforcement actions or other litigation, and some are closed for lack of sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. Attorney General Healey, like most other state attorneys general, also participates regularly in multi-state investigations in which attorneys general collaborate on strategy, discovery, and sometimes litigation. If the Committee is permitted to obtain the privileged and otherwise protected investigatory files of the Office as well as other offices of state attorneys general, the longstanding independence of states to enforce state laws against businesses will be compromised. The states’

77 Letter from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (June 23, 2016) pg. 3-4 (quoting Letter from Frederick M. Boss, Deputy Attorney General, Ore. Dept.’s Office to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. on Science, Space, & Tech. (June 1, 2016) pg. 2).
The Honorable Lamar Smith  
July 26, 2016  
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prerogative to conduct their own investigations into violations of state law is a bedrock of states’ rights.

As stated above, there has been an unbroken recognition for over 200 years that states are empowered to investigate wrongdoing against their residents, without interference by the federal government and in particular Congress. As a result, state attorneys general succeed in obtaining favorable results for their residents every day of the year, in matters ranging from fraudulent unfair and deceptive mortgage lending practices on the part of large national banks and others, to Volkswagen’s fraudulent schemes with respect to environmental emissions systems. The Committee’s subpoena threatens this entire fabric of independent state investigations.

Exxon has already seized for itself two different opportunities to present legal arguments to two separate courts as to why this Office’s investigation should not proceed. As described above, Exxon has filed lawsuits in both federal court in Texas and state court in Massachusetts in an effort to stop Attorney General Healey’s investigation. Under existing court discovery rules, Exxon would not be entitled in the course of those lawsuits to obtain most of the attorney-client, work product, and deliberative documents that the Committee has subpoenaed. Yet the Committee apparently seeks to provide Exxon with yet another, third venue to challenge the investigation and to obtain materials to which Exxon has no right.

There is simply no legitimate legislative or constitutional basis for the Committee to meddle in a state investigation of state-law violations. Attorney General Healey will not yield to this blatant attempt to chill her investigation into Exxon’s conduct.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, including those contained in the attached letters to the Majority, Attorney General Healey objects to the subpoena and respectfully declines to produce any documents. Attorney General Healey submits that the Majority should withdraw the subpoena and cease its interference with a lawful Massachusetts state investigation. In the event the Majority seeks to pursue the subpoena notwithstanding these objections, Attorney General Healey submits that the subpoena and the objections should be referred to the entire Committee for its review.

Respectfully,

Richard A. Johnston
Chief Legal Counsel

cc:   Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

        Honorable Katherine Clark, Member, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Enclosure
June 2, 2016

The Honorable Lamar Smith
Chairman
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
2321 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Smith:

I write in response to the May 18, 2016, letter (“Letter”) signed by you and several other members of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (“Committee”) seeking certain documents and information in connection with ongoing law enforcement and investigative activities of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (“MA AGO”) regarding potential violations of Massachusetts’s consumer protection and securities laws by ExxonMobil Corporation (“Exxon”).

At the outset, the Committee’s characterization of MA AGO’s investigative activities is inaccurate. The Committee’s assertion that the MA AGO is engaged in a “coordinated attempt to deprive companies, nonprofit organizations, and scientists of their First Amendment rights and ability to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and threats of prosecution,” is absolutely incorrect, and the Committee’s intimation that the MA AGO’s actions “may even amount to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion” is without basis.

The MA AGO is authorized under Massachusetts law to represent the interests of the Commonwealth and its citizens, as well as to investigate corporate and other wrongdoing, including violations of laws protecting investors and consumers. Based on MA AGO’s review of a number of publicly available Exxon documents and public statements by Exxon, MA AGO determined to investigate whether Exxon made false or misleading statements, in violation of Massachusetts law, to investors and consumers regarding the risks of climate change and the effect of those risks on Exxon’s business.

Publicly available Exxon documents establish that at least by July 1977, Exxon’s own scientists informed Exxon management that the release of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels was causing global temperatures to increase, a situation that would, the scientists warned Exxon
management, give rise to "the need for hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies." Publicly available Exxon documents also confirm that Exxon's scientists were, in the early 1980s, predicting significant increases in global temperature as a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, and that a 2 to 3 degree Celsius increase could lead to melting of polar ice, rising sea levels and "redistribution of rainfall," "accelerated growth of pests and weeds," "detrimental health effects," and "population migration." Exxon's scientists counseled Exxon management that it would be possible to "avoid the problem by sharply curtailing the use of fossil fuels." One Exxon scientist warned in no uncertain terms that it was "distinctly possible" that the effects of climate change over time will "indeed be catastrophic (at least for a substantial fraction of the earth's population)." Despite Exxon's early understanding of the science of climate change and the threats posed by climate change to human populations and global ecosystems, other publically available documents suggest that Exxon may have participated in later self-interested efforts to mislead the public, including investors and consumers, with respect to the impacts of climate change in order to defeat governmental policy measures designed to address the threat of climate change.

Exxon's shareholders are taking very seriously concerns about the nature and extent of Exxon's disclosures regarding the impacts of climate change on Exxon's business; just last week, on May 25, Exxon shareholders came close to passing resolutions that would have required Exxon to implement "stress tests" to ascertain more specifically the climate-driven risks to Exxon's business. As The Wall Street Journal reported, the proposals "drew more support than any contested climate-related votes" in Exxon's history, and indicate that "more mainstream shareholders like pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and asset managers are starting to take more seriously" the effects on Exxon of a "global weaning from fossil fuels.”

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3 Id.
5 See, e.g., Draft Global Climate Science Communications Action Plan (est. 1998), available at http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Global%20Climate%20Science%20Communications%20Plan%201998%20.pdf (noting "[v]ictory will be achieved when ... those promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis of extant science appear to be out of touch with reality," and "[u]nless 'climate change' becomes a non-issue, meaning that the Kyoto proposal is defeated and there are no further initiatives to thwart the threat of climate change, there may be no moment when we can declare victory for our efforts.");
7 Id.
As the Chairman and members of this Committee know, the First Amendment does not protect false and misleading statements in the marketplace. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Because Exxon appears to have made many statements to investors and consumers about the impact of fossil fuels on climate change which appear to contradict its own internal documents, the MA AGO is entitled to investigate what Exxon knew and said to others about these issues.

The Commonwealth has a sovereign interest in the protection of its investors and consumers. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the “Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers. ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). The States thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our constitutional system.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 520 U.S. 402, 416 (1997). States, therefore, retain significant sovereign powers—“powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Id. at 2401.

Further, while Congress, through committees, has power to investigate in furtherance of its power to legislate, that power is limited: Congress’s power may not be used to investigate matters “unrelated to a valid legislative purpose,” Quinn v. U.S., 75 S. Ct. 668, 672 (1955), and must be narrowly tailored to avoid transgressing constitutional federal-state boundaries. Tobin v. U.S., 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962). An investigation by a state attorney general, and any related prosecution of a state law enforcement action, is not related to a valid federal legislative purpose. See New York v. U.S. 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (Constitution does not “confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”). The Committee does not identify in its Letter any congressional authorization to undertake an investigation into the enforcement activities of this Office, and any such purported authorization would violate long-standing principles of federalism.

Moreover, most of the materials that the Committee has requested from the MA AGO, which include investigatory and deliberative process materials, attorney work product, and attorney-client and/or common interest privileged materials, would be protected from disclosure under established state and federal law.

For all of these reasons, the MA AGO respectfully declines to provide the requested materials.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Johnston
Chief Legal Counsel
The Honorable Lamar Smith  
Chairman  
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
2321 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515  

Dear Chairman Smith:

We have reviewed your letter of June 17, 2016, also signed by certain other members of the Committee. Your letter does not lead us to alter our conclusion that the Committee lacks authority to interfere with an investigation by the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office into possible violations of Massachusetts law by ExxonMobil Corporation, as set out in detail in our letter of June 2, 2016. Consequently, as indicated in our prior letter, we will not be providing the Committee with the documents requested in your letters to our office.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Johnston  
Chief Legal Counsel
July 13, 2016

The Honorable Lamar Smith  
Chairman  
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
2321 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Smith:

I write in response to your July 6, 2016, letter ("July Letter"), which, like your letters of May 18 and June 17, seeks documents and information in connection with ongoing law enforcement and investigative activities of the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office ("MA AGO") regarding potential violations of Massachusetts law by ExxonMobil Corporation ("Exxon"). This letter supplements our responsive letters to you of June 2 and 24, principally to address new arguments raised in your July Letter.

As you know from our letter of June 2, the focus of MA AGO’s investigation is to determine whether Exxon, in violation of Massachusetts law, misled consumers and/or investors by taking public positions regarding the impact of fossil fuel combustion on climate change and Exxon’s business that contradict Exxon’s own knowledge and understanding, including as documented by Exxon’s own scientific research. For example, in 1981, Exxon understood that “[a]tmospheric CO₂ will double in 100 years if fossil fuels grow at 1.4%/a,” and that such a doubling of CO₂ would result in a “3 [degree Celsius] global average temperature rise and 10 [degree Celsius] at poles” which would cause “major shifts in rainfall/agriculture” and melting of polar ice.¹ Despite Exxon’s knowledge, and its recognition that there may need to be “an orderly transition to non-fossil fuel technologies,”² by 1998, Exxon’s Randy Randol was nonetheless participating as a member of the “Global Climate Science Communications Team” that was engaged in a concerted effort to challenge the “scientific underpinning of the global climate change theory” in the media, and taking the position that “[i]n fact, it [sic] not known for sure

² Id.
whether (a) climate change actually is occurring, or (b) if it is, whether humans really have any influence on it.”

MA AGO is entitled to investigate what Exxon knew and communicated to others about these issues, since those facts are highly relevant to our prospective determination of whether Exxon violated Massachusetts law and misled consumers and/or investors. It appears, from documents such as the above-cited Draft Global Climate Science Communications Plan, that Exxon may have communicated with many entities to misrepresent facts about the impacts of climate change and climate-driven risks to its business; the fact that some of those entities may have conducted research or employed scientists does not diminish the relevance of Exxon’s communications to them, nor give this Committee authority to probe into or interfere with MA AGO’s investigation of potential violations by Exxon of Massachusetts law.

Neither the Rules of the House of Representatives4 (“House Rules”), the Science, Space and Technology Committee’s own rules5 (“Committee Rules”), nor the Committee’s Oversight Plan6 (“Plan”) authorize the Committee to conduct an investigation of a sovereign state’s exercise of its law enforcement authority in connection with the state’s consumer and investor protection statute. House Rule X establishes standing committees. Standing committee jurisdiction concerns matters related to federal agencies, application of federal law, implementation of federally-funded programs, and tax and economic implications of federal policies. The standing committees have general oversight responsibilities to assist the House in its evaluation of the application of federal laws: “conditions and circumstances” that “may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation”; formulation of federal law; and whether federal programs are being carried out consistent with Congress’s intent. See House Rule X, Clause 2(a)-(b) (general oversight responsibilities).

Committee Rule VIII (Oversight and Investigations) provides that the Committee “shall review and study . . . the application . . . of those laws, . . . the subject matter of which is within its jurisdiction” including “all laws, programs, and Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development” in accordance with House Rule X, and must prepare a plan of its oversight activities. See Committee Rule VIII (emphasis supplied); see also Plan at 1. In light of the capitalized term “Government” and in light of House Rule X, the term “those laws” in Committee Rule VIII refers to federal laws.

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Similarly, the Plan prepared by the Committee focuses on oversight of federal agencies, with a key goal of eliminating “waste, fraud, and abuse.” No provision of the Plan discusses a need or plan to investigate any state activities, and no such investigation would aid the Committee in fulfilling its charge pursuant to House Rule X. While the Plan suggests that the Committee will engage in oversight efforts in connection with “scientific integrity,” it is limited to oversight of federal agencies. See, e.g., Plan at 9 (the Committee will continue to “collect and examine allegations of intimidation of science specialists in federal agencies, suppression or revisions of scientific findings, and mischaracterizations of scientific findings because of political or other pressures”) and id., (the Committee will develop and implement “scientific integrity principles within the Executive Branch.”) Read in the context of the overall Plan, it is obvious the Committee’s focus is on and limited to scientific findings made or funded by federal government agencies, not by private corporations, such as Exxon.

As we previously conveyed in our letter of June 2, Congress’s power may not be used to investigate matters “unrelated to a valid legislative purpose.” Quinn v. U.S., 75 S. Ct. 668, 672 (1955). The MA AGO investigation is unrelated to a valid federal legislative purpose. See New York v. U.S. 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (Constitution does not “confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”) and therefore, may not be the subject of the exercise of Congress’s power.

None of the cases cited in your July Letter suggests a different result with respect to MA AGO’s right under Massachusetts law to investigate possible violations of a state statute protecting consumers and investors without Congressional interference. In the Matter of the Special April 1977 Grand Jury concerned a federal grand jury subpoena issued to a state attorney general concerning potential criminal law violations by him personally, and specifically did not involve an investigation “into the affairs of the State of Illinois.” 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978). Freilich concerned a claim that a federal statutory reporting requirement compelled states to implement a federal regulatory program and therefore amounted to unconstitutional “commandeering” under Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See Freilich v. Bd. of Directors of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 2d 679, 696-97 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Hodel, at 288). Michigan Department of Community Health involved a federal administrative subpoena issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration to a state agency where there was a clear nexus between the federal investigation and enforcement of a federal law. See U.S. v. Freilich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, No. 1:10-mc-109, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59445 (W.D. Mich. June 3, 2011). Even there, the court denied the DEA’s petition to enforce its subpoena with respect to certain records in the state agency’s possession. Id. at *41. Put simply, none of the cases which you have cited provides that a Congressional committee can force a state Attorney General to disclose the substance or results of an official investigation into possible violations of state law by a private company.

We note that on June 23, 2016, Ranking Committee Member Eddie Bernice Johnson wrote you that your requests for information about state AGO investigations into Exxon “are an illegitimate exercise of Congressional oversight power,” and she provided a detailed legal explanation as to why. In addition to the arguments which we have made and the authorities which we have cited in our responsive letters to you as grounds for our declination to provide documents about our investigation, we refer you again to Rep. Johnson’s letter attached hereto.
Furthermore, as you know, Exxon has challenged, in Massachusetts state court and Texas federal district court, the civil investigative demand MA AGO served upon the company, and Exxon has not yet produced any documents to MA AGO. Thus the vast majority of existing documents sought by the Committee and in MA AGO's possession constitutes core attorney work product, attorney-client communications, deliberative process documents and other privileged materials that are protected from disclosure.

In response to your various letters, MA AGO continues respectfully to decline to provide the requested materials to the Committee. As we indicated in a call with your staff today, we are willing to confer by telephone with you or your staff, provided that Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member of the Committee, and/or her staff, are invited and permitted to participate in any discussions between our offices.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Johnston
Chief Legal Counsel

Cc: Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Science, Space and Technology Committee
The Honorable Lamar Smith  
Chairman  
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology  
2321 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Smith,

On May 18, 2016, you wrote to 17 state and territorial attorneys general and 8 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) demanding documents related to possible investigations into fossil fuel industry fraud regarding climate change. On June 17, 2016, after receiving what were presumably unsatisfactory responses from these attorneys general and NGOs, you sent a second round of demands to these same groups. These demands are an illegitimate exercise of Congressional oversight power, and I urge you to immediately cease this abuse of authority.

In a Congress in which the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology’s oversight powers have been repeatedly abused, this latest action stands apart. In addition to mischaracterizing innumerable facts, laws, and legal precedents surrounding this situation, the May 18 and June 17 letters have now led the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology to the precipice of a Constitutional crisis. Never in the history of this formerly esteemed Committee has oversight been carried out with such open disregard for truth, fairness, and the rule of law.

The state and territorial attorneys general, representatives for the targeted NGOs, and 43 Democratic Members of Congress have already written to you to patiently explain the

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illegitimacy of your “investigation.” Since you have apparently rejected their responses, I will endeavor to highlight once more the factual and legal shortcomings of your demand letters.

The Majority’s Letters Mischaracterize State Attorney General Actions

Both your May 18 and June 17 letters refer to a “coordinated attempt to attack First Amendment rights of American citizens and their ability to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and threats of prosecution…” In laying out your factual case, you state:

This sequence of events – from the 2012 workshop to develop strategies to enlist the help of attorneys general to secure documents, to the 2016 subpoenas issued by you and other members of the Green 20 – raises serious questions about the impartiality and independence of current investigations by the attorneys general. Your office – funded with taxpayer dollars – is using legal actions and investigative tactics taken in close coordination with certain special interest groups and trial attorneys may rise to the level of an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Further, such actions call into question the integrity of your office. Ignoring for a moment the grossly inappropriate and unsubstantiated innuendo contained in these statements, I would like to highlight the factual deficiencies in your claims.

First of all, it is important to accurately report on the actions of the state and territorial attorneys general. As the New York Attorney General’s Office noted in their response to your May 18 letter, they are investigating “whether ExxonMobil Corporation violated New York’s securities, business and consumer fraud laws by making false or misleading statements to investors and consumers relating to climate change driven risks and their impact on Exxon’s business.” In other words, these state attorneys general are investigating potential fraud under state law.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General laid out the factual basis for these fraud investigations in some detail in its June 2, 2016, response letter, stating:

Publicly available Exxon documents establish that at least by July 1977, Exxon’s own scientists informed Exxon management that the release of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels was causing global temperatures to increase, a situation that would, the scientists warned Exxon management, give rise to “the need for hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies.” Publicly available Exxon

Id.
documents also confirm that Exxon’s scientists were, in the early 1980s, predicting significant increases in global temperature as a result of the combustion of fossil fuels, and that a 2 to 3 degree Celsius increase could lead to melting of polar ice, rising sea levels and “redistribution of rainfall,” “accelerated growth of pests and weeds,” “detrimental health effects,” and “population migration.” Exxon’s scientists counseled Exxon management that it would be possible to “avoid the problem by sharply curtailing the use of fossil fuels.” One Exxon scientist warned in no uncertain terms that it was “distinctly possible” that the effects of climate change over time will “indeed be catastrophic (at least for a substantial fraction of the earth’s population).” Despite Exxon’s early understanding of the science of climate change and the threats posed by climate change to human populations and global ecosystems, other publically available documents suggest that Exxon may have participated in later self-interested efforts to mislead the public, including investors and consumers, with respect to the impacts of climate change in order to defeat governmental policy measures designed to address the threat of climate change.6

These accusations were widely reported in the press in 2015.7 Moreover, these accusations should have come as no surprise to you or your staff as they formed the same factual basis that compelled 20 scientists to write to the U.S. Attorney General to suggest that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) investigations might be warranted against fossil fuels companies that potentially knowingly defrauded the American public. You previously instigated an investigation against one of these scientists for exercising his constitutionally protected First Amendment right to petition the government.8 This is the first of many instances where the irony of your current accusations becomes evident.

Multiple state attorneys general also pointed out the legal fallacy of your accusations of First Amendment violations. For instance, the Oregon Attorney General’s Office pointed out that:

[y]our letter also incorrectly accuses this office of investigating entities based on their speech or beliefs concerning climate change. Please be advised this office

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will not be dissuaded from considering whether state Jaws, including consumer protections laws, may provide redress against knowingly false commercial speech concerning global warming. The First Amendment simply does not protect fraudulent speech, *Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.*, 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003); *Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.*, 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) ("This government power [to protect people against fraud] has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established.").

The notion that fraudulent speech is not protected by the U.S. Constitution would seem to be beyond dispute. Nonetheless, despite the state attorneys generals pointing very specifically to the factual and legal deficiencies of your accusations, your June 17, 2016, letters persist in leveling these baseless accusations against the attorneys general, stating:

This statement suggests that your office, as an arm of state government, will decide what science is valid and what science is invalid. In essence, you are saying that if your office disagrees with whether fossil fuel companies' scientists were conducting and using the "best science," the corporation could be held liable for fraud. Not only does the possibility exist that such action could have a chilling effect on scientists performing federally funded research, but it also could infringe on the civil rights of scientists who become targets of these inquiries. Your actions violate the scientists' First Amendment rights. Congress has a duty to investigate your efforts to criminalize scientific dissent.

Nothing in that assertion bears any relationship to the statements of the various state attorneys general. These state investigations have nothing to do with deciding "what science is valid and what science is invalid." The investigations, as multiple attorneys general pointed out, are concerned with whether certain fossil fuel companies believed or knew one set of facts, and yet publically disseminated another in order to enrich themselves at others expense. These allegations constitute textbook fraud.

These investigations have a well-known precedent. In the 1990s, various state attorneys general sued tobacco companies for the state-borne healthcare costs associated with tobacco use. One of the bases for the claims was that the tobacco industry engaged in a conspiracy to conceal and misrepresent "the addictive and harmful nature of tobacco/nicotine." These suits resulted in the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, where the four largest tobacco companies settled all pending state claims related to the healthcare costs related to tobacco. The Federal Government soon followed suit. In

9 Letter from Frederick M. Boss, Deputy Attorney General, Oregon Department of Justice letter to Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. On Science, Space, & Tech., June 1, 2016, pg. 2.
11 Black's Law Dictionary defines fraud as: "A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment." Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999).
1999 the U.S. Department of Justice brought RICO Act actions against the largest tobacco companies.\textsuperscript{14} The parallels of that case with the current state attorneys general investigations cannot be overstated. In \textit{U.S. v. Philip Morris}, the government alleged that the tobacco industry internally knew of the health risks of their products for decades, yet engaged in a well-financed conspiracy to deceive the American public about the health effects of tobacco. This included financing scientific studies questioning the links between tobacco and health problems and the creation of front organizations to hide links to the tobacco financing. The U.S. government won the case, and the decision was upheld on appeal.\textsuperscript{15}

I have repeatedly criticized your tendency to rely upon former tobacco industry-funded scientists, consultants, and public relations firms in past Committee investigations and hearings.\textsuperscript{16} Given your past reliance on such “experts”, it’s perhaps unsurprising that you are now questioning these legitimate state attorneys general investigations of potential fraudulent actions against the American people.

\textbf{The Majority’s Investigation of State Attorneys General is Unconstitutional}

A Congressional document demand to a state attorney general is exceptionally unusual. Such a demand from the Science Committee is unheard of.

State attorney generals are elected officials of sovereign state governments. They are not employees of the Federal Government, nor are they subject to federal oversight or control, including by the United States Congress.

You note in your June 17 letter that Congress’s oversight powers are well established and broad, citing such authorities as the “U.S. Constitution, Art. 1; \textit{McGrain v. Daugherty}, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (Congress was investigating the U.S. Dep’t of Justice’s handling of the Teapot Dome scandal); \textit{Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund}, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)(U.S. Senate committee investigating the activities of U.S. Servicemen’s Fund and their effect on the morale of members of the Armed Services).”\textsuperscript{17} The existence of Congress’s oversight powers goes without saying, and is a well-established principle of law. You go on to make an important point about the source of Congressional oversight power, stating:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} U.S. Department of Justice, \textit{Litigation Against Tobacco Companies Home}, https://www.justice.gov/civil/case-4
  \item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.}, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. On Science, Space, & Tech. to Hon. Eric Schneiderman, Attorney General, June 17, 2016, pg. 1 (note).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Hand in hand with Congress' legislative power is its power to investigate. Indeed, in 1975, when commenting on Congress' investigative power, the Supreme Court stated that the "scope of its power of inquiry... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution."

This analysis is particularly relevant to the "investigation" at hand. Congress's broad oversight powers are directly tied to our power to legislate. Thus, by the authority you have relied upon in your own letters, Congress has no legal oversight authority over issues or actions that fall outside Congress's legislative authority.

As nearly every state attorney general who responded to your May 18 letters indicated, state government law enforcement officials acting in their official capacities are not within Congress's legislative control. For instance, in its May 27, 2016, response to your demand letter, the California Attorney General's Office noted:

[we do not believe it is within the jurisdiction of Congress to demand documents from a state law enforcement official such as the California Attorney General. Although Congress' investigative jurisdiction is broad, that is because it tracks Congress' power to legislate and appropriate concerning federal matters. But the power to investigate does not extend beyond those matters. (See, e.g. Barenblatt v. U.S. (1959) 360 U.S. 109, 111 ["Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate"]).) Investigations and prosecutions of state law enforcement actions by state attorneys general are not federal matters. To the contrary, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, such activities partake of police powers reserved to the states, and are not subject to federal interference. (See, e.g., New York v. U.S. (1992) 505 U.S. 144, 162 ["the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions"]).]

As a reminder, the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads as follows:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Implicit in the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment are state police powers. In case after case, the courts have struck down Congressional attempts to regulate state government activities, including exercise of their police powers. It is clear that Congress has no legislative authority to dictate the actions of state attorneys general.

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18 Id. at 1, citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n. 15 (1975) (quoting Barenblatt v. United States 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)).
20 U.S. Const. amend. X.
Even if Congress did have some inroad into regulation of state police powers, such a legislative authority would not rest with the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Our oversight jurisdiction (which is broader than our actual legislative jurisdiction) encompasses “laws, programs, and Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and development.” Note that the capitalization of the word “Government” gives the word the meaning “Federal Government.” Nowhere in our jurisdiction - legislative or oversight - can one find justification for our Committee’s oversight of state police powers. The elected officials that serve as state attorney generals are answerable to their respective constituents and the courts, but not to the U.S. Congress. As my colleagues from Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland pointed out:

States’ rights long being a central pillar of conservative philosophy, the Letter’s effort to meddle directly in the self-governance and prosecutorial discretion of 17 U.S. state and territories is not lacking for irony.  

The Majority’s Investigation of NGOs’ Exercise of Free Speech is Unconstitutional

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in whole:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

While the First Amendment prohibits government interference with the free speech rights of individuals, that prohibition is not absolute. One relevant example is that fraudulent speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the First amendment does not provide an absolute shield against legitimate Congressional oversight. In that regard, you state in your June 17 letter to the various NGOs:

In Barenblatt v. United States, the Supreme Court stated “where the First Amendment rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.” Moreover, when balancing the interests of the parties in Watkins v. United States, the Court held “the critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosure from an unwilling witness.” These cases are important precisely because they provide examples of congressional investigations – sustained by the Supreme Court – involving

22 House Rule X(3)(k).
24 U.S. Const. amend. I.
organizations similar to yours. The parties being investigated in the cases noted above are no different than the recipients of the Science Committee’s May 18 letter.\(^\text{26}\)

Since this is the only real legal authority you cite as justification for investigating Americans’ constitutionally protected speech, I think it is worth scrutinizing.

First, I would like to point out the context of these cases. Both of these cases involved the notorious House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), and investigations that committee conducted into the private lives of American citizens. If ever there was an example of a “witch hunt” in the history of the United States Congress, the HUAC investigations best fit the bill. For that reason, it is more than a little disconcerting that you think these cases’ fact patterns so closely resemble your own investigation.

I would also like to point to an error in your statement. You state that both of these cases are important because “they provide examples of congressional investigations – sustained by the Supreme Court – involving organizations similar to yours.”\(^\text{27}\) This statement is false. In Watkins v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction under 2 U.S.C. 192 against an individual who refused to provide certain testimony to HUAC.\(^\text{28}\) The Watkins Court held that the conviction was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Rather than supporting the legal grounds of your investigation, the Watkins decision is actually an indictment against it. The Watkins court noted that:

> The Court recognized the restraints of the Bill of Rights upon congressional investigations in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41... It was concluded that, when First Amendment rights are threatened, the delegation of power to the committee must be clearly revealed in its charter.\(^\text{29}\)

The Watkins Court went on to state:

> Kilbourn v. Thompson teaches that such an investigation into individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any legislative purpose. That is beyond the powers conferred upon the Congress in the Constitution. United States v. Rumely makes it plain that the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights.\(^\text{30}\)

As I noted earlier, it is clear that our Committee doesn’t even have a semblance of a legislative purpose that would justify this investigation. It is inconceivable that our

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\(^{26}\) Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. On Science, Space, & Tech. to Richard Heede, Climate Accountability Institute, June 17, 2016, pg. 4 (citations omitted).

\(^{27}\) Id. emphasis added.


\(^{29}\) Id. at 198.

\(^{30}\) Id.
Committee, based on our House Rule X jurisdiction, could legislate on any topic related to state law enforcement, private speech, private citizens exercising their First Amendment right to petition their government, or fraud. In fact, the only plausible legislative action that Congress as a whole could take in this instance would be in altering Federal fraud and RICO Act statutes to inappropriately help big oil avoid potential liability. However, even in that instance, such a bill would not come anywhere near the jurisdiction of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.

Your June 17 letter claims legislative jurisdiction over this “investigation” because we oversee $31.8 billion in annual federal government research expenditures. Somehow you link the Committee’s specific jurisdiction to fund federal scientific research to being the science police for the United States. Even if we had such expansive jurisdiction (and we do not), it would still fall far short of having jurisdiction over state police powers or fraud laws, which are the true subject matters of this “investigation.” Thus, based on the legal authorities you yourself have cited, this “investigation” violates the Constitution.

This “Investigation” is Illegitimate

In the foregoing, I have pointed out the many factual and legal shortcomings and mischaracterizations contained in your May 18 and June 17 letters. Sadly, despite having these shortcomings previously noted to you, this misguided effort is continuing. In reality, this overreach is simply the culmination of three years of “oversight” run amuck. When you assumed the Chairmanship of this Committee, Members were promised an ambitious and bipartisan legislative agenda. That did not materialize. What has taken its place is a series of increasingly disturbing “fishing expeditions” masquerading as oversight.

I noted your May and June letters contain a great deal of unintentional irony. I'll note one more example. In your June 17 letter, as a justification for your current investigation you say:

[C]ongress has a responsibility to investigate whether such investigations are having a chilling effect on the free flow of scientific inquiry and debate regarding climate change.

Here, you could just as well be referring to your own misguided investigation into eminent NOAA climate scientists last year. In that “investigation” you actually subpoenaed NOAA Administrator, former astronaut, and authentic American hero Dr. Kathy Sullivan in an attempt to obtain the email communications of world renowned NOAA climate scientists. What was the purpose of this investigation? It was simply a fishing expedition against scientists who reached a scientific conclusion with which you

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31 Letter from Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm. On Science, Space, & Tech. to Richard Heede, Climate Accountability Institute, June 17, 2016, pg. 3.
32 Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by Hon. Lamar Smith, Chairman, to Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, 114th Cong., October 13, 2015.
personally disagreed. In the end, your investigation, like so many recent Science Committee investigations, found nothing.

I have served on the Committee on Science for more than two decades, and during that time this Committee has accomplished great things. We’ve overseen the completion of the International Space Station and the sequencing of the human genome, and we’ve undertaken serious investigations, ranging from the Space Shuttle Challenger accident to the environmental crimes at the Rocky Flats nuclear site. However, lately the Committee on Science has seemed more like a Committee on Harassment. The Committee’s prolific, aimless, and jurisdictionally questionable oversight activities have grown increasingly mean-spirited and meaningless. They frequently appear to be designed primarily to generate press releases. However, none of these recent investigations has rushed headlong into a serious Constitutional crisis like we are about to face. We are moving into dangerous and uncharted territory.

At the beginning of this Congress I swore an oath to uphold the Constitution. I take that oath seriously. As evidenced by the letters you have received from Democratic Members from New York, California, Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, the Democratic Members of the Committee also take this oath seriously. We will not sit idly by while the powers of the Committee are used to trample on the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. I implore you to cease your current actions before they do lasting institutional damage to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the Congress as a whole.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON
Ranking Member
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Cc: Members of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Attachment 2

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Eric Tradd Schneiderman and Maura Tracy Healey,
No. 4:16-cv-469 (N.D. Tex.)
Orders dated December 12, 2016, and December 15, 2016
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC TRADD SCHNEIDERMAN,
Attorney General of New York, in his
official capacity, and MAURA TRACY
HEALEY, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-469-K

ORDER

The Court hereby cancels the deposition of Attorney General Healey that is set
for Tuesday, December 13, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.

SO ORDERED.

Signed December 12th, 2016.

ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC TRADD SCHNEIDERMANN,
Attorney General of New York, in his
official capacity,
MAURA TRACY
HEALEY, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, in her official capacity,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-469-K

ORDER

The Court ORDERS all parties to submit a brief to the Court regarding whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Attorney General Healey and/or Attorney General Schneiderman totaling twenty-five (25) pages. All briefing on this issue of personal jurisdiction must be filed on or before January 4, 2017. No extensions of this deadline will be considered absent exigent circumstances.

SO ORDERED.

Signed December 12th, 2016.

ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, §
Plaintiff, §
v. §
§
ERIC TRADD SCHNEIDERMAN, §
Attorney General of New York, in his §
official capacity, MAURA TRACY §
HEALEY, Attorney General of §
Massachusetts, in her official capacity, §
Defendants. §

Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-469-K

ORDER

The Court hereby stays all discovery pending further order from this Court.

SO ORDERED.


[Signature]
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Attachment 3

In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, No. 2016-1888-F
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 2016-1888-F

IN RE CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND NO. 2016-EPD-36,
ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ORDER ON EMERGENCY MOTION OF EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION
TO SET ASIDE OR MODIFY THE CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE
DEMAND OR ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND THE COMMONWEALTH'S
CROSS-MOTION TO COMPEL EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION TO COMPLY WITH
CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND NO. 2016-EPD-36

On April 19, 2016, the Massachusetts Attorney General issued a Civil Investigative
Demand ("CID") to ExxonMobil Corporation ("Exxon") pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 6. The CID
stated that it was issued as:

[P]art of a pending investigation concerning potential violations of M.G.L. c. 91A, § 2,
and the regulations promulgated thereunder arising both from (1) the marketing and/or
sale of energy and other fossil fuel derived products to consumers in the Commonwealth
... and (2) the marketing and/or sale of securities, as defined in M.G.L. c. 110A, §401(k),
to investors in the Commonwealth, including, without limitation, fixed- and floating rate-
notes, bonds, and common stock, sold or offered to be sold in the Commonwealth.

Appendix in Support of Petition and Emergency Motion of Exxon Mobil Corporation to Set
Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order. Exhibit B. The CID
requests documents generally related to Exxon's study of CO\text{2} emissions and the effects of these
emissions on the climate from January 1, 1976 through the date of production.

On June 16, 2016, Exxon commenced the instant action to set aside the CID. The
Attorney General has cross-moved pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 7 to compel Exxon to comply with
the CID. After a hearing and careful review of the parties' submissions, and for the reasons that
follow. Exxon's motion to set aside the CID is DENIED and the Commonwealth's motion to
compel is ALLOWED, subject to this Order.

DISCUSSION

General Laws c. 93A, § 6 authorizes the Attorney General to obtain and examine documents "whenever he believes a person has engaged in or is engaging in any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by this chapter." Among the things declared to be unlawful by chapter 93A are unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. G. L. c. 93A, § 2(a). General Laws c. 93A, § 6 "should be construed liberally in favor of the government," see Matter of Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 353, 364 (1977), and the party moving to set aside a CID “bears a heavy burden to show good cause why it should not be compelled to respond,” see CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 539, 544 (1980). There is no requirement that the Attorney General have probable cause to believe that a violation of G. L. c. 93A has occurred; she need only have a belief that a person has engaged in or is engaging in conduct declared to be unlawful by G. L. c. 93A. Id. at 542 n.5. While the Attorney General must not act arbitrarily or in excess of her statutory authority, she need not be confident of the probable result of her investigation. Id. (citations omitted).

I. Exxon’s Motion to Set Aside the CID

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Exxon contends that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over it in connection with any violation of law contemplated by the Attorney General’s investigation. Memorandum of Exxon Mobil Corporation in Support of its Emergency Motion to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order, page 2. Exxon is incorporated in New
Jersey and headquartered in Texas. All of its central operations are in Texas.

Determining whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a familiar two-pronged inquiry: (1) is the assertion of jurisdiction authorized by the longarm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and (2) if authorized, is the exercise of jurisdiction under State law consistent with basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Constitution? Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1979). Jurisdiction is permissible only when both questions draw affirmative responses. Id. As the party claiming that the court has the power to grant relief, the Commonwealth has the burden of persuasion on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612 n.28 (1979).

The Commonwealth invokes jurisdiction under G. L. c. 223A, § 3(a), which permits the court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant “either directly or through an agent transacted any business in the Commonwealth, and if the alleged cause of action arose from such transaction of business.” Good Hope Indus., Inc., 378 Mass. at 6. The “transacting any business” language is to be construed broadly. See Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994). “Although an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and successful solicitation of business from residents of the Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to satisfy this requirement.” Id.

Whether the alleged injury “arose from” a defendant’s transaction of business in Massachusetts is determined by a “but for” test. Id. at 771-772 (jurisdiction only proper if, but for defendant’s solicitation of business in Massachusetts, plaintiff would not have been injured).

The CID says that the Attorney General is investigating potential violations arising from
Exxon’s marketing and/or sale of energy and other fossil fuel derived products to Commonwealth consumers. The Commonwealth argues that Exxon’s distribution of fossil fuel to Massachusetts consumers “through more than 300 Exxon-branded retail service stations that sell Exxon gasoline and other fuel products” satisfies the transaction of business requirement. Exxon objects because it contends that for the past five years, it has neither (1) sold fossil fuel derived products to consumers in Massachusetts, nor (2) owned or operated a retail store or gas station in Massachusetts. According to the affidavit of Geoffrey Grant Doescher (“Doescher”), the U.S. Branded Wholesale Manager, ExxonMobil Fuels, Lubricants and Specialities Marketing Company at Exxon, any service station or wholesaler in Massachusetts selling fossil fuel derived products under an “Exxon” or “Mobil” banner is independently owned and operated pursuant to a Brand Fee Agreement (“BFA”). Doescher says that branded service stations purchase gasoline from wholesalers who create ExxonMobil-branded gasoline by combining unbranded gasoline with ExxonMobil-approved additives obtained from a third-party supplier. The BFA also provides that Exxon agrees to allow motor fuel sold from these outlets to be branded as Exxon or Mobil-branded motor fuel.

Exxon provided to the court and the Commonwealth a sample BFA. By letter dated December 19, 2016, the Commonwealth argued that many provisions of the BFA properly give rise to this court’s jurisdiction. The Commonwealth contends that the BFA provides many instances in which Exxon retains the right to control both the BFA Holder and the BFA Holder’s franchisees.\(^1\) For example, Section 15(a) of the BFA states:

\(^1\) The BFA mandates that all BFA Holders require their outlets to meet minimum facility, product, and service requirements, Section 13, and provide a certain level of customer service, Section 16. Moreover, Exxon requires that the BFA Holder enter into written agreements with
BFA Holder agrees to diligently promote and cause its Franchise Dealers to diligently promote the sales of Products, including through advertisements, all in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. BFA Holder hereby acknowledges and agrees that, notwithstanding anything set forth herein to the contrary, to insure the integrity of ExxonMobil trademarks, products and reputation, ExxonMobil shall have the authority to review and approve, in its sole discretion, all forms of advertising and sales promotions that will use media vehicles for the promotion and sale of any product, merchandise or services, in each case that (i) uses or incorporates and Proprietary Mark or (ii) relates to any Business operated at a BFA Holder Branded outlet. ... BFA Holder shall expressly require all Franchise Dealers to (a) agree to such review and control by ExxonMobil. ...

By letter dated December 27, 2016, Exxon disputes that any of the BFA’s provisions establish the level of control necessary to attribute the conduct of a BFA Holder to Exxon. See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 617 (2013) (citation omitted) (“[T]he marketing, quality, and operational standards commonly found in franchise agreements are insufficient to establish the close supervisory control or right of control necessary to demonstrate the existence of a master/servant relationship for all purposes or as a general matter.”); Lind v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 650, 654-655 (2015) (“The mere fact that franchisors set baseline standards and regulations that franchisees must follow in an effort to protect the franchisor’s trademarks and comply with Federal law, does not mean that franchisors have undertaken an agency relationship with the franchisee such that vicarious liability should apply.”); Theos & Sons, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 1999 Mass. App. Div. 14, 17 (1999)

each of its Franchise Dealers and in the agreement, the Franchise Dealer must commit to Exxon’s “Core Values.” Section 19. “Core Values” is defined on page one of the BFA:

BFA Holder acknowledges that ExxonMobil has established the following core values (“Core Values”) to build and maintain a lasting relationship with its customers, the motoring public:

(1) To deliver quality products that consumers can trust.
(2) To employ friendly, helpful people.
(3) To provide speedy, reliable service.
(4) To provide clean and attractive retail facilities.
(5) To be a responsible, environmentally-conscious neighbor.
(obligations to render prompt and efficient service in accordance with licensor’s policies and standards and to satisfy other warranty related service requirements did not constitute evidence of agency relationship because they were unrelated to licensee’s day-to-day operations and specific manner in which they were conducted).

Here, though, Section 15 of the BFA evidences a retention of more control than necessary simply to protect the integrity of the Exxon brand. By Section 15, Exxon directly controls the very conduct at issue in this investigation – the marketing of Exxon products to consumers. See Depianti, 465 Mass. at 617 (“right to control test” should be applied to franchisor-franchisee relationship in such a way as to ensure that liability will be imposed only where conduct at issue properly may be imputed to franchisor). This is especially true because the Attorney General’s investigation focuses on Exxon’s marketing and/or sale of energy and other fossil fuel derived products to Massachusetts consumers. Section 15(a) makes it evident to the court that Exxon has retained the right to control the “specific policy or practice” allegedly resulting in harm to Massachusetts consumers. See id. (franchisor vicariously liable for conduct of franchisee only where franchisor controls or has right to control specific policy or practice resulting in harm to plaintiff). The quantum of control Exxon retains over its BFA Holders and the BFA Holders’ franchisees as to marketing means that Exxon retains sufficient control over the entities actually marketing and selling fossil fuel derived products to consumers in the Commonwealth such that the court may assert personal jurisdiction over Exxon under G. L. c. 223A. § 3(a).

To determine whether such an exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies – or does not satisfy – due process, “the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
The plaintiff must demonstrate (1) purposeful availment of commercial activity in the forum State by the defendant; (2) the relation of the claim to the defendant's forum contacts; and (3) the compliance of the exercise of jurisdiction with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 210, 217 (2010) (citations omitted). Due process requires that a nonresident defendant may be subjected to suit in Massachusetts only where "there was some minimum contact with the Commonwealth which resulted from an affirmative, intentional act of the defendant, such that it is fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the State to defend the action." Good Hope Indus., Inc., 378 Mass. at 7 (citation omitted). "In practical terms, this means that an assertion of jurisdiction must be tested for its reasonableness, taking into account such factors as the burden on the defendant of litigating in the plaintiff's chosen forum, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." Tatro, 416 Mass. at 773.

The court concludes that in the context of this CID, Exxon's due process rights are not offended by requiring it to comply in Massachusetts. If the court does not assert its jurisdiction in this situation, then G. L. c. 93A would be "de-fanged," and consequently, a statute enacted to protect Massachusetts consumers would be reduced to providing hollow protection against non-resident defendants. Compare Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership, 457 Mass. at 218 (Massachusetts has strong interest in adjudicating violations of Massachusetts securities law; although there may be some inconvenience to non-resident plaintiffs in litigating in Massachusetts, such inconvenience does not outweigh Commonwealth's interest in enforcing its laws in Massachusetts forum). Also, insofar as Exxon delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in all states, including Massachusetts, it is not overly burdened by being called into court in Massachusetts. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980) (forum State does not exceed its powers under Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over corporation that delivers its products into stream of commerce with expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in forum State).

For all of these reasons, the court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Exxon with respect to this CID.

B. Arbitrary and Capricious

Exxon next contends that the CID is not supported by the Attorney General’s “reasonable belief” of wrongdoing. General Laws c. 93A, § 6 gives the Attorney General broad investigatory powers to conduct investigations whenever she believes a person has engaged in or is engaging in any conduct in violation of the statute. Attorney Gen. v. Bodimetric Profiles, 404 Mass. 152, 157 (1989); see Harmon Law Offices P.C. v. Attorney Gen., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 830, 834 (2013). General Laws c. 93A does not contain a “reasonable” standard, but the Attorney General “must not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority.” See CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 380 Mass. at 542 n.5 (probable cause not required; Attorney General “need only have a belief that a person has engaged in or is engaging in conduct declared to be unlawful by G. L. c. 93A”).

Here, Exxon has not met its burden of persuading the court that the Attorney General acted arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the CID. See Bodimetric Profiles, 404 Mass. at 157 (challenger of CID has burden to show that Attorney General acted arbitrarily or capriciously). If Exxon presented to consumers “potentially misleading information about the risks of climate
change, the viability of alternative energy sources, and the environmental attributes of its
products and services,’ see CID Demand Nos. 9, 10, and 11. the Attorney General may conclude
that there was a 93A violation. See Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 395 (2004)
(advertising is deceptive in context of G. L. c. 93A if it consists of “a half truth, or even may be
true as a literal matter, but still create an over-all misleading impression through failure to
93A is legislative attempt to “regulate business activities with the view to providing proper
disclosure of information and a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers to
persons conducting business activities”). The Attorney General is authorized to investigate such
potential violations of G. L. c. 93A.

Exxon also argues that the CID is politically motivated, that Exxon is the victim of
viewpoint discrimination, and that it is being punished for its views on global warming. As
discussed above, however, the court finds that the Attorney General has assayed sufficient
grounds – her concerns about Exxon’s possible misrepresentations to Massachusetts consumers –
on which to issue the CID. In light of these concerns, the court concludes that Exxon has not
met its burden of showing that the Attorney General is acting arbitrarily or capriciously toward
it.2

2 The court does not address Exxon’s arguments regarding free speech at this time
because misleading or deceptive advertising is not protected by the First Amendment. In re
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979). The Attorney General is investigating whether Exxon’s
statements to consumers, or lack thereof, were misleading or deceptive. If the Attorney
General’s investigation reveals that Exxon’s statements were misleading or deceptive, Exxon is
not entitled to any free speech protection.
C. Unreasonable Burden and Unspecific

A CID complies with G. L. c. 93A, §§ 6(4)(c) & 6(5) if it “describes with reasonable particularity the material required, if the material required is not plainly irrelevant to the authorized investigation, and if the quantum of material required does not exceed reasonable limits.” Matter of a Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. at 360-361; see G. L. c. 93A, § 6(4)(c) (requiring that CID describe documentary material to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity, so as fairly to indicate material demanded); G. L. c. 93A, § 6(5) (CID shall not ‘‘contain any requirement which would be unreasonable or improper if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the commonwealth; or require the disclosure of any documentary material which would be privileged, or which for any other reason would not be required by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the commonwealth’’).

Exxon argues that the CID lacks the required specificity and furthermore imposes an unreasonable burden on it. With respect to specificity, Exxon takes issue with the CID’s request for “essentially all documents related to climate change,” and with the vagueness of some of the demands. Memorandum of Exxon Mobil Corporation in Support of its Emergency Motion to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order. page 18. In particular, Exxon objects to producing documents that relate to its “awareness,” “internal considerations.” and “decision making” on climate change issues and its “information exchange” with other companies.

The court has reviewed the CID and disagrees that it lacks the requisite specificity. The CID seeks information related to what (and when) Exxon knew about the impacts of burning
fossil fuels on climate change and what Exxon told consumers about climate change over the years. Some of the words used to further describe that information—awareness and internal considerations—simply modify the “what” and “when” nature of the requests.

With respect to the CID being unreasonably burdensome, an effective investigation requires broad access to sources of information. See Matter of a Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. at 364. Documentary demands exceed reasonable limits only when they “seriously interfere with the functioning of the investigated party by placing excessive burdens on manpower or requiring removal of critical records.” Id. at 361 n.8. That is not the case here. At the hearing, both parties indicated that Exxon has already complied with its obligations regarding a similar demand for documents from the New York Attorney General. In fact, as of December 5, 2016, Exxon had produced 1.4 million pages of documents responsive to the New York Attorney General’s request. It would not be overly burdensome for Exxon to produce these documents to the Massachusetts Attorney General.

Whether there should be reasonable limitations on the documents requested for other reasons, such as based upon confidentiality or other privileges, should be discussed by the parties in a conference guided by Superior Court Rule 9C. After such a meeting, counsel should submit to the court a joint status report outlining disagreements, if any, for the court to resolve.

II. Disqualification of Attorney General

Exxon requests the court to disqualify the Attorney General and appoint an independent investigator because her “public remarks demonstrate that she has predetermined the outcome of the investigation and is biased against ExxonMobil.” Memorandum of Exxon Mobil Corporation in Support of its Emergency Motion to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative
Demand or Issue a Protective Order, page 8. In making this request, Exxon relies on a speech made by the Attorney General on March 29, 2016, during an “AGs United for Clean Power” press conference with other Attorneys Generals. The relevant portion of Attorney General Healey’s comments were:

Part of the problem has been one of public perception, and it appears, certainly, that certain companies, certain industries, may not have told the whole story, leading many to doubt whether climate change is real and to misunderstand and misapprehend the catastrophic nature of its impacts. Fossil fuel companies that deceived investors and consumers about the dangers of climate change should be, must be, held accountable. That’s why I, too, have joined in investigating the practices of Exxon Mobil. We can all see today the troubling disconnect between what Exxon knew, what industry folks knew, and what the company and industry chose to share with investors and with the American public.

General Laws c. 93A, § 6 gives the Attorney General power to conduct investigations whenever she believes a person has engaged in or is engaging in any conduct in violation G. L. c. 93A. Bodimetric Profiles, 404 Mass. at 157. In the Attorney General’s comments at the press conference, she identified the basis for her belief that Exxon may have violated G. L. c. 93A. In particular, she expressed concern that Exxon failed to disclose relevant information to its Massachusetts consumers. These remarks do not evidence any actionable bias on the part of the Attorney General; instead it seems logical that the Attorney General inform her constituents about the basis for her investigations. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 278 (1993) (“Statements to the press may be an integral part of a prosecutor’s job ... and they may serve a vital public function.”); Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Not only do public officials have free speech rights, but they also have an obligation to speak out about matters of public concern.”); see also Commonwealth v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 372 (1999) (due process provisions require that prosecutor be disinterested in sense that prosecutor must not be – nor
appear to be— influenced in exercise of discretion by personal interests). It is the Attorney
General’s duty to investigate Exxon if she believes it has violated G. L. c. 93A, § 6. See also G.
L. c. 12, § 11D (attorney general shall have authority to prevent or remedy damage to the
environment caused by any person or corporation). Nothing in the Attorney General’s comments
at the press conference indicates to the court that she is doing anything more than explaining
reasons for her investigation to the Massachusetts consumers she represents. See generally Ellis.
429 Mass. at 378 (“That in the performance of their duties [the Attorney General has] zealously
pursued the defendants, as is [his or her] duty within ethical limits, does not make [his or her]
involvement improper, in fact or in appearance.”).

III. Stay

On June 15, 2016, Exxon filed a complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging that the CID violates its
federal constitutional rights. Exxon Mobil requests this court to stay its adjudication of the
instant motion pending resolution of the Texas federal action. See G. L. c. 223A, § 5 (“When the
court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum,
the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.”);
decision whether to stay action involves discretion of motion judge and depends greatly on
specific facts of proceeding before court). The court determines that the interests of substantial
justice dictate that the matter be heard in Massachusetts.

This matter involves the Massachusetts consumer protection statute and Massachusetts
case law arising under it, about which the Massachusetts Superior Court is certainly more
familiar than would be a federal court in Texas. See *New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Estes*, 353 Mass. 90, 95-96 (1967) (factors to consider include administrative burdens caused by litigation that has its origins elsewhere and desirability of trial in forum that is at home with governing law). Further, the plain language of the statute itself directs a party seeking relief from the Attorney General’s demand to the courts of the commonwealth. See G. L. c. 93A, § 6(7) (motion to set aside “may be filed in the superior court of the county in which the person served resides or has his usual place of business, or in Suffolk county”); see also G. L. c. 93A, § 7 (“A person upon whom notice is served pursuant to the provisions of section six shall comply with the terms thereof unless otherwise provided by the order of a court of the commonwealth.”). The court declines to stay this proceeding.

**ORDER**

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the Emergency Motion of ExxonMobil Corporation to Set Aside or Modify the Civil Investigative Demand or Issue a Protective Order is **DENIED** and the Commonwealth’s Cross-Motion to Compel ExxonMobil Corporation to Comply with Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36 is **ALLOWED** consistent with the terms of this Order. The parties are **ORDERED** to submit a joint status report to the court no later than February 15, 2017, outlining the results of a Rule 9C Conference.

Heidi E. Brieger
Associate Justice of the Superior Court

Dated at Lowell, Massachusetts, this 11th day of January, 2017.
Attachment 4

Response of the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office to the Schedule Attached to the Subpoena dated February 16, 2017, Issued to Attorney General Maura Healey by the Science, Space, and Technology Committee
Response of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office to the Schedule Attached to the Subpoena dated February 16, 2017, Issued to Attorney General Maura Healey by the Science, Space, and Technology Committee

This response ("Response") contains a more particularized response to the Schedule attached to the 2017 Subpoena. The Response is in addition to the general objections raised in the Letter. The Response is based on a preliminary review and reflects information gathered by the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (MA AGO) as of March 1, 2017. The MA AGO’s review is ongoing. The MA AGO reserves the right to update this Response and to raise any applicable privileges or protections.

Request Number 1

All documents and communications between any officer or employee of the MA AGO and the following individuals: Peter Frumhoff, Matthew Pawa, Lee Wasserman, May Boeve, Kenneth Kimmell, Ken Berlin, Dan Stiles, Richard Heede, Sharon Eubanks, Erin Suhr, Tom Steyer, and former Vice President Al Gore; referring or relating to climate change and environmental research, and/or the Clean Power Plan.

Response Number 1

Based on a preliminary review, the MA AGO has potentially responsive documents or communications between an officer or employee of the MA AGO and a very small number of the individuals listed in Request No. 1.

Any potentially responsive documents or communications in the MA AGO’s possession, custody, or control are:

1. Records developed or obtained as part of Attorney General Healey’s ongoing investigation pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A into apparent inconsistencies between what scientists at Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon") told Exxon management about the expected impact of fossil fuels on climate and what Exxon told, or failed to tell, investors and consumers; and/or

2. Records related to active litigation, including but not limited to:
   a. In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, Issued by the Office of the Attorney General, Civil Action No. 2016-1888-F;
   b. Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Eric Tradd Schneiderman and Maura Tracy Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469 (N.D. Tex.); and/or
As a result, most, if not all, responsive records are protected from disclosure by one or more of the following privileges: work product,\(^1\) attorney-client,\(^2\) deliberative process,\(^3\) and law enforcement investigatory materials.\(^4\) Some documents may also be explicitly exempted from disclosure by statute.\(^5\)

The MA AGO’s review is ongoing. The MA AGO reserves the right to update this Response and to raise any relevant objections and privileges if additional responsive documents are identified.

**Request Number 2**

All documents and communications between any officer or employee of the MA AGO and the following individuals: Wendy Morgan, Peter Washburn, Scot Kline, Lemuel Srolovic, Michael Meade, Matthew Levine, Elizabeth Wilkins, James Gignac, Jerry Reid, Paul Garahan, Greg Schultz, Claude Earl Walker, Daniel Rhodes, Laura Watson, Eric Soufer, Damien LaVera, Daniel Lavoie, Natalia Salgado, Brian Mahanna, Joan Smith, and Tasha L. Bartlett; referring or relating to climate change and environmental research, and/or the Clean Power Plan.

**Response Number 2**

The listed individuals that the MA AGO has been able to identify serve in legal positions in the offices of various state attorneys general, including Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, and Washington. The Attorneys General in these jurisdictions have entered into common interest agreements and/or joint defense agreements with the MA AGO that cover, among other things,


\(^3\) Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2001); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22, (1941); See Lederman v. New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 731 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2013); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 884 (1st Cir. 1995); Skelton v. U.S. Postal Service, 678 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Dep’t of the Navy, 558 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1977); J.H. Rutteman v. N.L.R.B., 473 F.2d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d 600, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1966).

\(^4\) Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 62-64 (1st Cir. 2007); In re U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 459 F.3d 565, 569-70 (5th Cir. 2006); Couglin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Dep’t of Investigation of City of New York, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988); Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Frankel v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). These records are also exempt from disclosure under the Massachusetts Public Records Law, as they are investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the public view, the disclosure of which would so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.

\(^5\) For example, Massachusetts General Law c. 93A § 6(6) specifically or by necessary implication exempts certain materials in an investigation under that law from disclosure.
the cases brought by Exxon Mobil Corporation against the MA AGO and the New York Attorney General’s Office, the Clean Power Plan, or litigation related to climate change. Therefore, based on a preliminary review, any potentially responsive documents and/or communications in the MA AGO’s possession, custody, or control are:

1. Records subject to joint defense and/or common interest agreements that limit disclosure;

2. Records developed or obtained as part of Attorney General Healey’s ongoing investigation pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A into apparent inconsistencies between what Exxon scientists told Exxon management about the expected impact of fossil fuels on climate and what Exxon told, or failed to tell, investors and consumers; and/or

3. Records related to active litigation, including but not limited to:
   a. In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, Issued by the Office of the Attorney General, Civil Action No. 2016-1888-F;
   b. Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Eric Tradd Schneiderman and Maura Tracy Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469 (N.D. Tex.); and/or

Most, if not all, responsive records are protected from disclosure by one or more of the following privileges: work product, attorney-client, deliberative process, and law enforcement investigatory materials. Some documents may also be explicitly exempted from disclosure by statute.

The MA AGO’s review is ongoing. The MA AGO reserves the right to update this Response and to raise any relevant objections and privileges if responsive documents are identified.

**Request Number 3**

All documents and communications between any officer or employee of the MA AGO and any official or employee of the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, or the Executive Office of the U.S. President; referring or relating to the MA AGO’s investigation or potential prosecution of companies, nonprofit organizations, scientists, or other individuals related to the issue of climate change.

**Response Number 3**

Based on a preliminary review, the MA AGO is not aware of any potentially responsive documents or communications. This review is ongoing and the MA AGO reserves the right to

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6 See footnote 2, supra.
7 See footnote 3, supra.
8 See footnote 4, supra.
9 See footnote 5, supra.
10 See footnote 6, supra.
update this Response and to raise any relevant objections and privileges if responsive documents are identified.

**Request Number 4**

All documents and communications referring or relating to the following subjects:
- a) the Attorneys General Climate Change Coalition;
- b) the AGs United for Clean Power;
- c) the happy hour scheduled for March 28, 2016, with participants from the New York Attorney General’s Environmental Protection Bureau and visiting assistant attorneys general as discussed in an email message dated March 17, 2016, from Michael Meade to Scot Kline and Wendy Morgan, among others; and
- d) the March 29, 2016, Climate Change Coalition meeting and press event as well as any associated meetings and discussions.

**Response Number 4**

Based on a preliminary review, potentially responsive records to Request Number 4(a), 4(b), and 4(d) that are in the MA AGO’s possession, custody, and control are:

1. Records subject to joint defense and/or common interest agreements that prohibit disclosure;

2. Records developed or obtained as part of Attorney General Healey’s ongoing investigation pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93 into apparent inconsistencies between what Exxon scientists told Exxon management about the expected impact of fossil fuels on climate and what Exxon told, or failed to tell, investors and consumers;

3. Records related to active litigation, including but not limited to:
   - In re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-EPD-36, Issued by the Office of the Attorney General, Civil Action No. 2016-1888-F;
   - Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Eric Tradd Schneiderman and Maura Tracy Healey, No. 4:16-cv-469 (N.D. Tex.);

As a result, most, if not all, responsive records are protected from disclosure by one or more of the following privileges: work product, attorney-client, deliberative process, and law enforcement investigatory materials. Some documents may also be explicitly exempted from disclosure by statute.

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11 See footnote 2, supra.
12 See footnote 3, supra.
13 See footnote 4, supra.
14 See footnote 5, supra.
15 See footnote 6, supra.
With respect to Request Number 4(c), the request is irrelevant to any purported purpose of the Committee's investigation. To the best of our knowledge, no one from the MA AGO attended "the happy hour scheduled for March 28, 2016."

This review is ongoing and the MA AGO reserves the right to update this Response and to raise any relevant objections and privileges if responsive documents are identified.