Blizzard of '78: Thirty Year Anniversary

Much has been written about the Blizzard of ’78.  Many individuals have personal stories and anecdotes about events that occurred during that incredible event.  The following is taken (with some license) from the official After-Action Report of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency.

On the morning of Monday, February 6, 1978, the National Weather Service (NWS) announced that a ‘Snow Watch’ was in effect for southern New England.  Motorists traveling to work were advised to expect an accumulation of 6” of snow and relief from the preceding week’s bitter cold, with temperatures rising to the low 30s.  For coastal communities, the weather indicators were a bit more ominous, as the NWS issued ‘Gale Warnings’. Despite these early warnings, few people anticipated that the region would receive a storm more severe than the record-breaking Nor’easter of January 20-21, 1978.  For New Englanders, ‘Snow Watches’ evinced no unusual alarm or precaution.

Civil Defense officials (the name change to ‘Emergency Management’ did not occur until the 1990s) were aware of the potential for a major storm.  Sunday evening, word had been received of a Low Pressure area forming in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras, NC.  This Low was edging its way northward, feeding off warm Gulf Stream waters, and charting a course similar to the storm of January 20-21.  Simultaneously, a pocket of cold Canadian air was moving southward on a collision path with the Low.  The impact that occurred on the morning of February 6^th produced the most destructive winter storm in the history of the Commonwealth.  The storm was severest in the eastern half of the Commonwealth, where accumulation ranged from over 25” in Boston to as much as 54” in some of our southern communities.  Snow fell at an average of 1” per hour while winds, reaching hurricane force, were not as consistent.  Gusts were savage, officially recording as high as 92 mph at Chatham on Cape Cod and unofficially over 100 mph on Newburyport’s Plum Island.  Highest recorded average winds were 51 mph late Monday evening.  The wind was the critical factor in accounting for the ferocity of the storm.  At this point, most officials felt that state and local resources would be adequate to respond to the enormous snowfall.  When the storm stalled over New England, however, the hurricane-like force of the winds whipped the snow into drifts as high as 15’ and swelled tides from 3’ to 20’ above normal.  These astronomically high tides surged over, across and through sea walls, leaving thousands of coastal homes unprotected against the awesome spectacle of blinding, wind-driven snow followed by icy ocean waters crashing without deference to either coastline or homes.

The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MDCA), charged with the mission of disaster preparedness, continued monitoring the storm activity Monday morning.  Although the first flurries fell at 7:13AM, it was not until almost 3 hours later that significant snowfall actually began.  At 11:00AM, a meeting was held among Civil Defense officials to evaluate the storm’s probable impact.  The need for additional intelligence was cited and the Agency modified its readiness posture, assuring that the State Emergency Operating Center (SEOC) was fully operational and that all Area Civil Defense Offices were on alert.  By Monday afternoon, all Area Civil Defense Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) had been activated and 24-hour rosters were established.  Communications personnel were notified to report to Area EOCs with essential equipment and to establish radio contact with all communities.  Assisting Civil Defense authorities in developing this communications network were members of Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) ham radio operators and Citizens Band (CB) personnel who assisted in short-range transmissions at the local level.

Later in the afternoon, as NWS reports became more alarming. Civil Defense officials placed on alert all agencies and resources of the Commonwealth, including State Police (MSP), the Department of Public Works (DPW), the American Red Cross (ARC), the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), the Department of Public Welfare and the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering.  Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard was notified of the probable need for pumps in coastal communities.  Wareham, a community with an early high tide, due to its location at the head of Buzzards Bay, was monitoring as a possible indicator to the potential severity of flooding on the North and South Shore.

Throughout Monday, MCDA’s survey of communities resulted in very few requests for assistance, as the Agency continued to monitor and analyze the tides and prepare for the eminent coastal flooding.  It was not until early evening that the local communities began to perceive the magnitude of the storm and at that time, the requests for assistance began to filter into the MDCA State and Area Headquarters.  The plight of Point Shirley in Winthrop proved to be representative of the turmoil, which would befall other coastline communities.  Rising water levels on this peninsula community threatened to cut off over 1,000 residents from the mainland.  Rescuers who did succeed in getting through to the storm-battered coastal communities found their efforts hampered by the blinding snow, crashing waves and gusting winds.  Each high tide on Monday and Tuesday was more severe than its predecessor.  In other storms, tidal surge would usually recede after venting the wrath of its waters.  During this storm, however, tidal surge increased.  It was not until Wednesday that the threat of tidal flooding actually decreased.  Accordingly, evacuation efforts along the coast had to continue both Monday and Tuesday.

While flooding quickly emerged as the primary threat for coastal communities, the mounting snow posed as formidable a nemesis for both coastal and inland cities and towns.  As drifts piled as high as 15’, motorists became stranded throughout the Commonwealth.  Thousands of vehicles were abandoned en masse, thus causing roadways to become impassable to any form of transportation, including rescue and snow removal vehicles.  On Route 128 at 138, tractor-trailers had jack-knifed, thus forcing all movement on this critical artery to come to a complete standstill.  By Tuesday morning, over 3,000 cars and 500 trucks were snow-locked along an 8-mile stretch of 128.  There was no means of estimating how many persons had remained inside their stranded vehicles. Clearly a rescue attempt had to be made immediately and the central arteries had to be reopened.

In other developments, the Agency had begun receiving requests for assistance from many of the hundreds of shelters scattered throughout the Commonwealth.  The Agency was also maintaining constant liaison with the Red Cross, which reported thousands of evacuees and motorists flocking to makeshift and inadequately stocked shelters.

Throughout the early morning hours of Tuesday, February 7^th, the emergency situation and emergency outlook worsened.  Rescue operations, although hampered, continued.  Reports from communities that large portions of their snow fighting equipment were out of commission were commonplace.  Morning high tides threatened to be higher than the havoc-wreaking tides of the previous evening.  Countless motorists became trapped in their vehicles on snow-inundated roadways.  Shelters, with no certainty of being stocked with supplies, were swelling with refugees.  An additional somber report was received that Boston was experiencing one of the worst power failures in its history with over 70,000 of the city’s residents without heat or power.

By Tuesday afternoon, the snow still had not stopped as rescue operations continued.  By late evening, more than 17,000 people were reported in shelters.  At State Civil Defense Headquarters in Framingham, all telephone lines were jammed with calls for assistance.  By the end of the week, the Agency had responded to over 100,000 calls for assistance, advice or information. After almost 33 consecutive hours, on Tuesday evening, the snow and wind finally subsided.  Nevertheless, the snow, floodwaters and destruction left in its wake were ubiquitous.  Transportation in the Commonwealth had come to a virtual standstill.  Most roadways were impassable.  Neither supplies nor essential services could be delivered.  Hospitals required blood and medical supplies.  Doctors and nurses had to reach the sick and injured.  Shelters had to be stocked with survival items.  Fire trucks and ambulances had to be assured access to emergencies in snow-locked communities.  Food and fuel supplies were required in nursing homes, housing projects, colleges and private residences.  The Commonwealth, in effect, was paralyzed.  It was up to the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency to mobilize and coordinate the use of local, state and federal government resources augmented by those from the private sector in order to revive the lifelines.

A Profile of a City Receiving Support Coordinated by the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency

One of the communities suffering damage was the North Shore coastal City of Revere.  Actions here were typical of assistance to other communities.  An urgent call was received from the city to help in evacuating its coastal section, in particular, the Beachmont area, abutting Winthrop. State Civil Defense authorized the Metropolitan District Commission to dispatch amphibious vehicles or DUWKS (which incidentally make up the fleet for the present-day Boston Duck Tours) and boats under their command to assist Revere in the coastal evacuation.

The movement of rescue equipment was being hampered by the impassability of the highways.  Both Revere and the MDC, which is responsible for plowing and maintenance of many of Revere’s arteries, requested snow removal assistance.  After reviewing the situation with the Mass. DPW, which had a liaison officer at the SEOC, several pieces of DPW-controlled snow removal equipment were diverted from their usual plowing operation to Revere.  The people, threatened with loss of life, were successfully evacuated and housed in emergency shelters; however, thousands were stranded in flooded and damaged homes without heat or electricity.

The combined forces of Revere, MDC and DPW snow removal equipment available were unable to open the highways leading to the areas of severe need.  A limited amount of equipment was also dispatched from the National Guard, but more help was needed to speed rescue operations.

A request from MCDA was made to the U.S. Army Emergency Operations at Fort Devens for additional help.  A State Police escort was made available through MCDA and the equipment started arriving in Revere before noon on February 7^th, in spite of a 4-truck accident on Route 495 and Route 2 where several pieces of equipment were immobilized. A tracked vehicle known as a “Weasel” owned by the Department of Natural Resources and used to maintain ski and snowmobile trails was dispatched by MCDA to assist in evacuating people unable to be reached by conventional means.

As people were being brought to shelters, assistance from the Red Cross was requested by MCDA for cots, blankets and food for the sheltered.  They were able to supply food, but needed help in transporting it, so MCDA made arrangements for the National Guard to transport it in 4-wheel drive vehicles.  MCDA provided cots and blankets from its 200-bed packaged disaster hospital. Revere also requested National Guard Military Police to prevent looting in the evacuated areas.  This need was made known to the Guard, which dispatched a limited number of troops.

As the storm-related needs were being met, another crisis developed; a leak in a 2,000,000-gallon fuel storage tank located in the city.  MDCA was asked for assistance and located pumping equipment, which together with what was obtained locally and by the oil company started pumping operations to transfer fuel to nearby unfilled tanks.  MCDA also arranged to have National Guard trucks sent to Boston Sand & Gravel Co. to collect loads of clay and sand, which was used to fortify diking operations in the vicinity of the fuel spill.  People had to be evacuated from nearby homes, the area had to be cordoned off by police and a large dike had to be constructed to prevent the fuel from reaching storm sewers, homes and the nearby electrified MBTA tracks.

Simultaneously with the slowdown in Emergency Operations, the Disaster Relief Plan of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency was activated.  MCDA coordinated disaster assistance for both the City and its citizens from the appropriate state and federal agencies at the local Disaster Assistance Center set up in the City of Revere.

BLIZZARD OF ‘78 BY THE NUMBERS