| Date: | 01/22/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-25-060 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Police Department to bypass a candidate for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer based on his poor driving history, judgment and conduct.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Aaron Aviles, appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the January 13, 2025 decision of the Boston Police Department (Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of police officer in the Department. The Department based its decision on Mr. Aviles’s judgment, conduct, and poor driving record, including four National Safety Council (NSC) courses.[1]
The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on April 8, 2025 via remote videoconference. On June 18, 2025, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston.[2] I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform.[3] The parties filed post hearing briefs on August 7, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.
The Respondent entered eleven exhibits (R. Exhibits 1 – 11) into evidence. I also admitted the Appellant’s three exhibits (A. Exhibit 1 – 3). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:
and taking administrative notice of all matters filed in the case, pertinent law, and reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
Civil Service Process
After attending the Boston Police Recruit Interview on July 27, 2024, you received two warnings for motor vehicle infractions. The first incident occurred on 09/06/2024, and a warning was issued for Electronic Device use while operating a motor vehicle. The second occurred on 10/11/2024, and a warning was issued for Number Plate Missing. … The rest of your driving history is of concern to the Department as well. You have taken two NSC courses and have a lengthy driving history which includes numerous speeding incidents that occurred even after the NSC courses.
(R. Exhibit 1)
On 07/31/2024, your ex-girlfriend sought and was granted a temporary Restraining Order against you in Dorchester District Court. … On 08/14/2024, after a full hearing, the order was terminated. There are two Boston Police Incident Reports related to this incident … The first is for a possible violation of the order on 08/02/2024, and the second is Boston Police’s response to confiscate your firearms in relation to the other.
(R. Exhibit 1)
You served in the United States Marine Corps on 08/01/2009 and were separated on 02/02/2012. You received an “Other than Honorable” Discharge. The basis for the discharge is “Misconduct.” On 08/08/2011, the United States Marine Corps initiated formal separation procedures against you with an official Notification of Separation. This notification cited two prior non-judicial punishments and two Court Martials as the basis for separation procedures. On 09/20/2011, while separation proceedings were ongoing, you received a third non-judicial punishment for operating a motor vehicle with a revoked registration on the base. On 10/11/11, again with proceedings still ongoing, you violated a liberty leave pass that had a limit of 350 miles by traveling to Boston, MA. On 10/14/11, you were the subject of a Court Martial for the third time and received another guilty finding. You were sentenced to 30-day confinement and a fine of $904.00. You had previously received a reduction in rank from Lance Corporal to Private and additional fines after an earlier Court Martial.
(R. Exhibits 1 and 4)
On March 4, 2025, Mr. Aviles filed a timely appeal with the Commission. (Stipulated Facts)
Background Investigation
On November 3, 2024, Det. Flynn spoke to Mr. Aviles’s current partner who had no issues with or complaints about Mr. Aviles and believed Mr. Aviles would do a good job as a police officer. (R. Exhibit 2)
Military Record
Driving History
The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996). See also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law). The role of the Civil Service Commission in a bypass appeal is to determine whether “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997). See Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003).
Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification,” whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the civil service “eligible list,” using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 – 11; 16 – 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09. An appointing authority must provide specific written reasons, consistent with basic merit principles, when choosing to bypass a higher ranked candidate in favor of a lower ranked one. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.08(4).
In its review of bypass decisions, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass, after conducting an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971). Cambridge further states: “In the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304.
The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 824-26 (2006). The issue for the Commission is “not whether it would have acted as the appointing authority had acted, but whether, on the facts found by the Commission, there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the Commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.” Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 334. See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 86 (1975) and Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 727-28. The Commission owes substantial deference to the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in determining whether there was “reasonable justification” shown. Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188. That “deference is especially appropriate with respect to the hiring of police officers.” Id.
Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and therefore must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004), citing Cambridge, supra, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 303-305; Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).
The Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had reasonable justification to bypass Mr. Aviles for appointment due to his poor driving history, judgment, and conduct.
Bypass Reason 1: Driving History
Explaining its concern regarding his driving history, the Department stated in the bypass letter:
[T]he ability to safely operate a vehicle is an essential duty of a Boston Police Officer, and officers are often called upon to issue citations for motor vehicle infractions. Your motor vehicle history reflects negatively on your ability to complete this essential task and deems you unsuitable for employment as a Boston Police Officer.
Mr. Aviles’ RMV record shows several lapses in judgment where he did not follow the law including: a surchargeable accident, speeding violations, operating an unregistered motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle without a valid inspection sticker, operating a motor vehicle with a missing license plate, and attendance at two NSC courses. Mr. Aviles’ driver’s license was also suspended for failure to pay fines and costs. In addition, the courts issued two warrants against him.
Police departments are rightfully concerned with liability should an officer injure a member of the public or cause property damage by driving unsafely. However, the analysis of a candidate’s driving history should be based on the totality of their record, not singular events. See White v. Boston Police Dep’t, 38 MCSR XX (2025). For these reasons, the Commission has found that an exceptionally poor driving record is a reasonable justification for a bypass of a candidate. See Cheam v. Boston Police Dep’t, 38 MCSR XX (2025); Serebour v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 293 (2023); Gilmore v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 212 (2023); McGrath v. Lowell, 22 MCSR 560 (2009); Torres v. Lowell, 22 MCSR 558 (2009); Campbell v. Boston Fire Dep’t, 22 MCSR 489 (2009); Jones v. Boston Police Dep’t, 22 MCSR (2008).
There is no denying the appropriateness of diligently investigating a candidate’s driving record, as police officers are often called upon to operate a police cruiser, sometimes at high speeds in stressful situations. Moore v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 146 (2024), aff’d Moore v. Boston Police Dep’t, et al., No. 2484CV02253 (Suff. Sup. Ct., Sept. 19, 2025). As the Commission has previously found, however, an appointing authority must conduct a reasonably thorough review of the candidate’s driving record and consider the applicant’s 
“An appointing authority, as part of a reasonably thorough review, should at least afford the applicant with the opportunity to address the underlying issues, either with the background investigator or an interview panel.” Wine v. City of Holyoke, 31 MCSR 19, 24 (2018). By affording a candidate the opportunity to address driving infractions head-on, an appointing authority will have an adequate basis on which to decide whether the infractions have any bearing on the candidate’s fitness to perform the responsibilities of the position.
To evaluate driving histories in the proper context, the Commission has ruled that appointing authorities must consider such factors as:
Whether any of the violations such as nonpayment of fines for inspection stickers may be attributable to socioeconomic factors, and, accordingly, may have no bearing on whether an appellant can effectively serve in a public safety position.
See, e.g., Stylien v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 209, 210 (2018); Stylien v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 154 (2018); Gibbons v. Woburn, 32 MCSR 14 (2019); Kodhimaj v. Department of Correction, 32 MCSR 377 (2019); Dorn v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 375, 376 (2018).
More broadly, when the bypass, as here, involves a person of color, appointing authorities must consider public policy concerns related to the racial disparity in traffic stops. See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 670 (1999) (Ireland, J., concurring) (“The widespread public concerns about police profiling, commonly referred to as ‘DWB—driving while black,’ has been the subject of much discussion and debate both across the country and within the Commonwealth”).
The Department conducted a reasonably thorough review of Mr. Aviles’ driving record. The Department reviewed information lawfully available to them through the RMV and the CJIS related to his driving record; including the two recent 2024 warnings that occurred after the Recruit Investigative Interview. Mr. Aviles failed to apprise the detective about them, and only disclosed them when Det. Flynn inquired about them. Det. Flynn then provided Mr. Aviles with an opportunity to address each of the entries on the report.
In the meeting with the detective, Mr. Aviles did not disclose that he was required to drive more frequently due to his occupation or that he had to drive in a high traffic area. He also did not disclose financial hardship as a reason for his license suspension for failure to pay court costs and fines (on two occasions).
It is undisputed that Mr. Aviles had to take two NSC courses in order to maintain his license. It is possible that an operator has to take an NSC course for every three driving offenses occurring within a two-year window, or take an additional NSC course when two of his previous violations fall within a three-year window.[5] G.L. c. 175, § 113B. Thus, an operator may fall into a “trap” of repeating NSC courses. Nonetheless, it is entirely within the candidate’s power to drive safely and obey the rules of the road.
Police officers are expected to carefully and swiftly maneuver through traffic when dispatched to address emergencies. Mr. Aviles’ driving history indicates that he may not be able to effectively fulfill this aspect of an officer’s essential job duties.
Therefore, the Department’s conclusion that Mr. Aviles lacked a good driving history required for appointment is supported by credible evidence and provides an independent and reasonable basis for bypass.
Bypass Reason 2: Conduct
In addition to (and, in my view, even more salient than) his poor driving history, Mr. Aviles’s previous conduct also concerned the Department. Mr. Aviles served in the United States Marine Corps from August 1, 2009 to February 2, 2012, and received an “Other than Honorable Discharge” for misconduct. The Marine Corps cited two prior non-judicial punishments and two court martials as the reasons for initiating formal separation procedures against Mr. Aviles. Subsequent discipline resulted in a 30-day confinement, a fine of $904.00, and reduction in rank from lance corporal to private. Even after facing several penalties in the Marine Corps, Mr. Aviles failed to cure his behavior.
Although these events occurred within the Marine Corps, police officers - as are Marines - are held to high standards of conduct and are expected to follow the regulations and guidelines of their department. As the Department’s bypass letter states, “police officers must behave in a manner consistent with the law that they are sworn to enforce in order to gain and preserve public trust, maintain public confidence, and avoid abuse of power by law enforcement officials.” Police officers must be aware of and abide by the law to perform their duties effectively and to protect the public.
Mr. Aviles’ previous conduct within the military does not bode well for potential employment in a paramilitary organization such as the Boston Police Department. Police officers’ misconduct not only reflects poorly on themselves, but to the Department and affects the public’s perception of other officers. One officer’s misconduct within the police force can spread and impact officers as a whole, even if other officers demonstrate stellar conduct. Thus, the Department is justified in bypassing a candidate with a history of serious misconduct.
Therefore, the Department’s conclusion that Mr. Aviles lacked the good conduct required for appointment is supported by credible evidence and provides an independent and reasonable basis for bypass.
Bypass Reason 3: Judgment
The Department’s decision to bypass Mr. Aviles for issues related to poor judgment is also reasonably justified. The instances of poor judgment are particularly glaring in the examination of the three separate ex-partners. Except for his current partner, Ms. Aviles presents a tumultuous partner history, requiring intervention from law enforcement on more than one occasion. One ex-partner alleged assault and battery, and another alleged violation of a July 2024 restraining order – requiring the surrendering of his firearms and ammunition in August 2024. These incidents may indicate Mr. Aviles’ failure to assess potentially contentious circumstances and de-escalate the situation.
When law enforcement intervention becomes imperative, police officers rarely encounter individuals who are in a calm and rational state because it is in the nature of the officers’ job often to respond to emergencies and dire situations. This requires that they not only have good judgment but possess the ability to make potentially life-altering decisions in a swift manner. Mr. Aviles’s interactions with his ex-partners demonstrate that he does not yet have this skill. If partners fail to de-escalate a conflict, then police officers can get involved. If a police officer fails to de-escalate a conflict, then the outcome of that conflict could be disastrous due to the officer being the only one who is both armed and authorized to use lethal force.
The Department’s negative determination upon examination Mr. Aviles’s exercise of judgment in stressful situations, a conclusion I cannot disturb based on this record, also underpins the consideration of his driving history and prior conduct reflected in police reports. The Department will view a candidate who commits several traffic violations as someone who is not able to properly assess traffic patterns or believes that it is acceptable to disregard traffic laws. A candidate with a history of serial misconduct often can reasonably be perceived to be irresponsible and lacking the proper judgment to either improve their conduct on their own or seek support from those who have the knowledge and expertise to assist them. Most of the reasons the Department provides for bypassing Mr. Aviles fundamentally reduce to issues of judgment, and this Appellant’s demonstrated lack of proper judgment is sufficient to sustain this bypass.
Therefore, the Department’s conclusion that Mr. Aviles lacked the proper judgement required for appointment is supported by credible evidence and provides an independent and reasonable basis for bypass.
Accordingly, the Boston Police Department had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had reasonable justification to bypass Aaron Aviles for the position of permanent full-time police officer. The appeal docketed under G1-25-060 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein), Commissioners on January 22, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Aaron Aviles (Appellant)
Robert S. Arcangeli, Esq. (for Respondent)
[1] The Commission acknowledges the assistance of Law Clerk Chanel Palmer and Student Intern Cayla Kwok in the drafting of this decision.
[3] The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. §§ 1.01 et seq. (Formal Rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
[4] Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.
[5]The operator has 90 days from the issuance of the suspension notice to complete a mandatory NSC course or Massachusetts Driver Retraining Program before the suspension or revocation becomes active. If the operator completes the course before the date listed on the suspension notice, the RMV will not take any additional actions to suspend or revoke one’s permit, license, or right to operate. If the operator fails to complete the course before the date on the notice, the RMV will suspend or revoke the operator’s permit, license, or right to operate until he/she has successfully completed the course. G.L. c. 175, § 113B.
[6] From Mr. Aviles’s RMV record, it appears that he took the second NSC course after his 2014 surchargeable accident.
