| Date: | 12/04/2025 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | E-25-181 |
The Commission dismissed the appeal of a Natick firefighter as he was unable to show that he was aggrieved by the Town’s decision not to make any promotions from an eligible list for fire lieutenant upon which he was ranked first prior to its expiration.
Procedural Background
On August 2, 2025, the Appellant, John C. Georges (Appellant), a firefighter for the Town of Natick (Town)’s Fire Department, filed a non-bypass equity appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission). On September 9, 2025, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, co-counsel for the Town and the Town’s Fire Chief. Pursuant to a Procedural Order issued on September 10th, the Town submitted a motion for summary decision and the Appellant submitted an opposition.
Parties’ Positions
Both parties agree that the Appellant was ranked first on an eligible list for Natick Fire Lieutenant which expired on August 1, 2025. When a new list was established (from a new examination) on August 1st, the Appellant was ranked 11th, well outside the statutory 2N+1 formula to be considered for promotional appointment.
The Appellant does not allege any wrongdoing by the Fire Chief, who is the civil service appointing authority. Rather, the Appellant alleges that a fire lieutenant position in Natick would have become vacant before August 1st, and he would have received consideration for such vacancy, but for the allegedly unlawful actions of the Director of the Natick Retirement Board in delaying a decision on when an incumbent Natick Fire Lieutenant (the Lieutenant) would attain twenty years of creditable service toward retirement, thus allegedly delaying the Lieutenant’s decision to resign from the Natick Fire Department until on or after August 1st.
The Town argues that the Appellant is unable to show that he is an aggrieved person as: the alleged inaction involves the Natick Retirement Board, an autonomous third-party that does not serve as the civil service appointing authority; and because the Appellant cannot prove that any vacancy would have arisen even if the Retirement Board had acted as desired by the Appellant.
Summary Disposition Standard
A motion to dispose of an appeal, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be allowed by the Commission pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h) when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56; namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
Applicable Civil Service Law
The fundamental mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” described in Chapter 31, which command, among other things, “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills including open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. The most important mechanism for ensuring adherence to basic merit principles in hiring and promotion is the process of conducting regular competitive qualifying examinations, open to all qualified applicants, and establishing current eligible lists of successful applicants from which civil service appointments are to be made based on the requisition by an appointing authority of a “certification” which ranks the candidates according to their scores on the qualifying examination, along with certain statutory credits and preferences. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27. In general, each position must be filled by selecting one of the top three most highly ranked candidates who indicate they are willing to accept the appointment, which is known as the “2n+1” formula. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.09.
Section 2(b) of Chapter 31 provides:
No person shall be deemed to be aggrieved . . . unless such person has made specific allegations in writing that a decision, action, or failure to act on the part of the administrator [HRD] was in violation of this chapter, the rules or basic merit principles promulgated thereunder and said allegations shall show that such person's rights were abridged, denied, or prejudiced in such a manner as to cause actual harm to the person's employment status.
Section 2(b) Bypass Appeals
To deviate from the rank order of preferred hiring and appoint a person “other than the qualified person whose name appears highest”, an appointing authority must provide written reasons – positive or negative, or both – consistent with basic merit principles, to affirmatively justify bypassing a lower ranked candidate in favor of a more highly ranked one. G.L. c. 31, §§ 1, 27; PAR.08. A person who is bypassed may appeal that decision under G.L. c. 31, § 2(b) for a de novo review by the Commission to determine whether the bypass decision was based on a “reasonably thorough review” of the background and qualifications of the candidates’ fitness to perform the duties of the position and was “reasonably justified”. Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688 (2012), citing Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); Brackett v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 233, 543 (2006) and cases cited; Beverly v. Civil Service Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).
Section 2(b) Non-Bypass Equity Appeals
Individuals may also file a "non-bypass equity appeal" with the Civil Service Commission under Section 2(b) to contest an action or inaction (not involving a bypass) by the state's Human Resources Division (HRD), or, in certain cases by appointing authorities to whom HRD has delegated its authority, and which actions or inactions have abridged their rights under the civil service law.
Analysis
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Appellant, as I am required to do at this stage, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the Appellant has no reasonable expectation of showing that he is an aggrieved person.
The Appellant was not bypassed for promotional appointment as no candidate ranked below him on a certification was promoted to lieutenant. In fact, no certification was even created from the now-expired fire lieutenant eligible list as no vacancy existed while the Appellant was ranked first on the eligible list. Thus, no bypass could occur and the Appellant’s assertion that a “functional” bypass occurred has no basis in civil service law or prior Commission decisions.
The Appellant’s other argument to show that he is an aggrieved person rests on a series of highly speculative assertions and[RQ1] novel interpretations of the civil service law and rules. To fully appreciate the speculative nature of the Appellant’s argument, it is helpful to put matters into context.
A Natick fire lieutenant who was out on paid leave due to an injury intended to resign from the Natick Fire Department after attaining twenty years of creditable service. Given his current age, he will not actually file for retirement for many years thereafter. Understandably, the lieutenant, out of an abundance of caution, wanted to memorialize, in writing, the official date upon which he would attain twenty years of creditable service, to avoid any problems in the future when he filed for retirement.
In an affidavit completed by the lieutenant as part of a related judicial proceeding, the lieutenant stated that he received conflicting dates from the Natick Retirement Board including: July 11, 2025; July 12, 2025; August 18, 2025; and September 1, 2025, after which he was directed to contact the Public Employee Retirement Administration (PERAC) for clarification. In his August 26, 2025 affidavit, the lieutenant wrote in part: “PERAC provided me with a definitive date of August 12, 2025 upon which I would receive twenty years of creditable service. They explained that the previous retirement system which I belonged to ..[] … began my creditable service thirty (30) days after my start date.” The lieutenant remained employed by the Natick Fire Department until September 21, 2025, upon which date he resigned his employment.
To support that he is an aggrieved person, the Appellant asserts that:
Any one of these assertions is highly speculative. For all of them to be true it is beyond reason and common sense. Further, there is nothing in the civil service law or rules that would require the Natick Fire Department to create a certification and fill the purported lieutenant vacancy in the lightning speed envisioned by the Appellant.[1]
Further, the Appellant’s extraordinary efforts, in his role as the local union president, to expedite the lieutenant’s resignation date, appear more geared toward his own interests as opposed to ensuring the fair and impartial treatment due to all candidates, including those who scored higher than him on a subsequent examination and thus are ranked above him on the fire lieutenant eligible list established on August 1, 2025. Finally, to the extent that the Appellant alleges that he was subject of discrimination and/or that the Town’s actions violated provisions of the CBA, the Appellant has exercised his right to file petitions with other relevant agencies.
Conclusion
As the Appellant has no reasonable expectation of showing that he is an aggrieved person, the Town’s Motion for Summary Decision is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number E-25-181 is hereby dismissed.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein Commissioners) on December 4, 2025.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
John C. Georges (Appellant)
James Donnelly, Esq. (for Respondent)
Karis North, Esq. (for Respondent)
[1] Moreover, the Appellant’s bare assertion that “[a] ‘bypass’ exists not only where a lower ranked candidate is selected, but also where administrative obstruction, miscalculation of service, or irregular conduct prevents a vacancy from being recognized during the life of the list” finds no discernable support in Commission or appellate case law. Rather, see, e.g., Callanan v. Pers. Adm'r for Com., 400 Mass. 597, 601 (1987) (“The over-all pattern of the statute [G.L. c. 31, § 25] does not justify expectations that certain positions will become available during the period of a single list. Moreover, individuals do not have a vested right in their particular positions on the eligibility list once it is established.”)
