Upon retirement, teachers may receive a superannuation retirement allowance that is based in part on their “regular compensation” during certain years. Regular compensation for the relevant period is defined as the “full salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form, lawfully determined for the individual service of the employee by the employing authority.” Id. § 1. “Wages” are defined in turn as “base salary or other base compensation of an employee paid to that employee for employment by an employer,” not including overtime, bonuses, and other additional ad hoc forms of payment. Id. This definition describes “recurrent or repeated amounts of compensation not inflated by extraordinary ad hoc payments.” Boston Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs & Sup’rs v. Boston Ret. Bd., 383 Mass. 336, 341 (1981).
However, there is an exception to this definition for teachers, whose “salary payable under the terms of an annual contract for additional services” is considered regular compensation. G.L. c. 32, § 1. An MTRS regulation requires that both the “additional services” and the “remuneration” for them must be “set forth in the annual contract.” 807 CMR 6.02(1)(a), (c). Another MTRS regulation defines “annual contract” as the applicable CBA. 807 CMR 6.01.
The dispute here is over whether Ms. Johnson’s services as a SET I and SET II Instructor, and the compensation for those services, were “set forth” in Shrewsbury’s CBA. The purpose of these requirements is to “provide clear records of approved stipends so as to avoid confusion and uncertainty . . . when retirement boards are called upon to calculate pension benefits.” Kozloski v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 783, 787 (2004). The Appeals Court has been concerned that boards not have to “sift through a multiplicity of alleged oral or side agreements about which memories might well be hazy.” Id.
Taking these goals into consideration, DALA magistrates, the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, and the Superior Court have concluded that CBAs are not required to describe additional services with “exacting specificity.” Marshall v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-19-460, at *8 (Div. Admin. L. App. Jan. 27, 2023). A CBA may instead account for additional services “by way of an open-ended category.” Florio v. Massachusetts Teachers' Ret. Sys., CR-18-509, at *3 (Div. Admin. L. App. May 7, 2021). See Fazio v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., No. 17-664-D, at *10 (Suffolk Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2018). “In essence, the statute and regulations are satisfied if the pages of the CBA—without supplementation—reassure a reasonable reader that the teacher’s additional services were compensable under the CBA in the amount that the teacher received.” Hoppensteadt v. Massachusetts Teachers' Ret. Sys., CR-22-0582, at *2 (Div. Admin. L. App. Oct. 27, 2023), aff’d (Contributory Ret. App. Bd. Mar. 26, 2025) (citations omitted).
Some examples help illustrate these principles. In Fazio, the member’s supervision of a jazz choir counted as regular compensation under a CBA that authorized pay for “5 clubs selected by [the] principal.” Fazio, supra, at *10. In Florio, the member’s work with an EMT club was covered by CBA language concerning “extracurricular . . . clubs.” Florio, supra, at *3. In Beford, the member taught a cooking club, which was sufficiently addressed by certain CBA provisions about “extracurricular activities and intramural programs.” Beford v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-18-493, at *4-6 (Div. Admin. L. App. Oct. 15, 2021). And in Marshall, the member’s work on curriculum development came within the scope of a CBA provision about “mentors or curriculum task force members.” Marshall, supra, at *8-10.
It is easy to understand MTRS’s confusion with Ms. Johnson’s CBA. Typically, additional duties, like football coach and chess club moderator, are listed in an appendix to the CBA; in Ms. Johnson’s CBA, that was Appendix D. However, there is an additional appendix, E, that covered certain additional duties that were a part of the New Employee/Mentoring program. Appendix E provided compensation for “mentors” and “facilitators/presenters,” but not course instructors. The compensation for those services did not square with what Ms. Johnson received, so MTRS concluded that neither Ms. Johnson’s SET I and SET II instructor services nor the compensation for them were “set forth” in the CBA.
But, this is not the end of the analysis. Ms. Johnson credibly explained that her instructor duties and compensation were not covered in the appendices, but rather in the body of the CBA in Article IV, Section E, which covered in-district “professional improvement” courses. Section E provided compensation of $900 per credit for in-district professional development course instructors, like Ms. Johnson. The SET programs together were a total of 3 credits, so Section E entitled her to compensation of $2,700 for her services.
The “open-ended category” of professional improvement course instructor is at least as specific as the categories in Fazio, Florio, Beford, and Marshall, supra. It is not required that the specific position or course be listed in the CBA. Fazio, supra. Nothing in Kozloski or any other case concerned with “confusion” and “uncertainty” says piecing this information together must be effortless. The fact that Ms. Johnson had to explain where the CBA listed the compensation for her additional services is not unexpected. Fazio, supra. Only the service and its stipend must be set forth in the CBA; other records are usually required to prove that the member performed the duty and was paid for it. Id. See also Wood v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Syst., CR-15-439, CR-15-491, at *6 (Div. Admin. L. App. Feb. 11, 2022) (theorizing there may be situations in which contracts contain “terms of art” that administrators, teachers, and union negotiators understand). There will always be some extrinsic evidence, outside of the CBA, needed to prove the services were rendered. Florio, supra at *5 (unreasonable to assume MTRS needs only to look at the CBA to determine the existence and actual performance of an additional duty).
That is not the only confusion in this appeal. As mentioned above, Ms. Johnson’s stipend amount is set forth in Article IV, Section E of the CBA. She was entitled to $2,700 for teaching 3 credits at $900 per credit. Each year, she received a total of $2,700 for her service, but for some reason the school system paid her in two unequal payments of $1,200 and $1,500. This made locating the remuneration for Ms. Johnson’s services more confusing. But, again, there is nothing in the statute, regulations, or interpretive adjudication of them that prevents MTRS from recognizing as regular compensation additional services compensation that is paid in two or more installments. See, e.g., Fazio, supra, at *2, 10 (stipend not precluded from treatment as regular compensation if paid in more than one installment).
Finally, in its closing argument and for the first time, MTRS now contends that Ms. Johnson’s services were not “educational in nature.” 807 CMR 6.02 (1)(b). That phrase is not defined in the statute or regulations. “Not every activity that happens in or [is] related to a school is educational in nature.” Wood and Peitavino v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-15-439, CR-15-491, at *6 (Div. Admin. Law App. Feb. 11, 2022). “[I]t is the Legislature’s intention that only compensation paid for services that affect the educational experiences of students enrolled in regular public school programs is to be included in the retirement benefit calculation.” Varella v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 390 (2002). Though it is not a requirement, duties deemed educational in nature often include some “instructional” component. Walker and Jacobson v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-09-393, CR-10-847, CR-10-466, at *11 (Div. Admin. L. App. Mar. 28, 2014). DALA decisions have concluded that classroom teaching, tutoring, classroom preparation, and professional development, for instance, qualify as “educational in nature.” Samsel v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-24-0717, at *3 (Div. Admin. L. App. June 20, 2025), citing Ketchum v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-19-0614, at *5 (Div. Admin. L. App. Aug. 30, 2024). On the other hand, purely administrative duties, such as performing staff evaluations, are not considered “educational in nature.” Fonseca v. Massachusetts Teachers’ Ret. Sys., CR-12-164, at *6 (Contributory Ret. App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2024). See also, e.g., Samsel, supra (coordinating a Title I program); Hurley v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., CR-02-552 (Contributory Ret. App. Bd. Nov. 6, 2003) (running concession stand at school sporting events).
Ms. Johnson’s duties as a professional development instructor were educational in nature. Professional development programs, including the teacher initiation that Ms. Johnson performed, are required by the Department of Elementary & Secondary Education. See 603 CMR 7.12. Instructing new teachers in a state-mandated professional development program, at its core, is about improving the quality of education. Ms. Johnson was not merely filling out evaluation forms, as in Fonseca, supra. She was instructing them in order to increase their chances of success at teaching.
For the above-stated reasons, I conclude that the additional services performed by Ms. Johnson and their remuneration were “set forth” in the CBA and that those services were educational in nature. MTRS’s decision is therefore REVERSED. The stipends shall be included as regular compensation in Ms. Johnson’s retirement allowance calculation.
SO ORDERED.
Division of Administrative Law Appeals
/s/ Kenneth J. Forton
____________________________________________
Kenneth J. Forton
Administrative Magistrate
DATED: October 17, 2025