| Date: | 12/04/2025 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | D-25-100 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Department of State Police to suspend a Trooper for 50 days for acting unprofessionally toward a member of the public and unnecessarily escalating a call for service.
The Commission acknowledges the assistance of Law Clerk Chanel Palmer in drafting this decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 43 and G.L. c. 22C, § 13, as amended by Chapter 43 of the Acts of 2002, the Appellant, Evan MacLean, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) on April 10, 2025, contesting the decision of the Department of State Police (Department or Appointing Authority) to suspend him without pay for 50 days.
On May 20, 2025, the Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference. I conducted a full evidentiary hearing on July 30, 2025, at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts.[1]
The hearing was recorded via Webex and a link provided to the parties.[2] The parties submitted post-hearing briefs on September 26, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.
For the reasons stated herein, the appeal is denied.
I admitted 34 joint exhibits (J. Exhibits 1-34) into evidence. I admitted the Appellant’s appeal form as Joint Exhibit 35 (J. Exhibit 35). Based on the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses
Called by the Department:
Called by the Appellant:
Evan MacLean, Trooper, Department of State Police, Appellant
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
(J. Exhibit 21)
Unsatisfactory Performance
Unsatisfactory performance may be demonstrated by a lack of knowledge of the application of laws to be enforced; an unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks; the failure to conform to work standards established for he member’s rank, title, or position; the failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserving State Police attention; or by an absent without leave.
Class B
1. First Offense: Suspension of not less than five (5) days nor more than thirty (30) days.
2. Second Offense: Suspension of not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days.
3.Third Offense: Suspension of not less than thirty (30) days up to and including termination.
(J. Exhibit 3)
Charge I
Violation of Article 5.8.2 of the Rules and Regulations for the governance of the Department of State Police, to wit: Unsatisfactory Performance.
Specification I
In that Trooper Evan MacLean, #[ ], Massachusetts State Police, Division of Field Services, State Police – Charlton (C10), on August 18, 2021, in the town of Charlton, demonstrated by a lack of knowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced, an unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks; the failure to conform to work standards in the member’s rank, title or position; and/or the failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserving State Police attention. This occurred when Trooper MacLean made an improper arrest of a subject. This action is in direct violation of Article 5.8.2. This is a third offense Class “B” violation. (B)
Specification II
In that Trooper Evan MacLean, #[ ], Massachusetts State Police, Division of Field Services, State Police – Charlton (C10), on August 18, 2021, in the town of Charlton, demonstrated by a lack of knowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced, an unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks; the failure to conform to work standards in the member’s rank, title or position; and/or the failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserving State Police attention. This occurred when Trooper MacLean acted unprofessionally toward a member of the public and escalated a call for service, unnecessarily increasing the intensity of the situation. This action is in direct violation of Article 5.8.2. This is a third offense Class “B” violation. (B)
(J. Exhibit 4)
A tenured civil service employee may be disciplined or discharged for “just cause” after due notice and hearing upon written decision “which shall state fully and specifically the reasons therefor.” G.L. c. 31, § 41. An employee aggrieved by the decision may appeal to the Commission. G.L. c. 31, § 43. Under section 43, the appointing authority carries the burden to prove to the Commission by a “preponderance of the evidence” that there was “just cause” for the action taken. Id. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411, rev. den., 726 N.E.2d 417 (2000). In performing its function:
… the commission does not view a snapshot of what was before the appointing authority…the commission hears evidence and finds facts anew…[after] a hearing de novo upon all material evidence and…not merely for a review of the previous hearing held before the appointing officer. There is no limitation of the evidence to that which was before the appointing officer… For the commission, the question is . . . “whether, on the facts found by the commission, there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.”
Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003) (quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983) (emphasis added)). See also Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. at 823; Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-05, rev. den., 428 Mass. 1102 (1997).
An action is “justified” if it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind; guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971); Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304, rev. den., 426 Mass. 1102 (1997); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). The Commission must take account of all credible evidence in the entire administrative record, including whatever would fairly detract from the weight of any particular supporting evidence. See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264-65 (2001). It is the purview of the hearing officer to determine credibility of testimony presented to the Commission. “[T]he assessing of the credibility of witnesses is a preserve of the [commission] upon which a court conducting judicial review treads with great reluctance.” Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 729. See Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 401 Mass. 526, 529 (1988); Doherty v. Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 141 (1997).
The Commission has consistently held police officers to a high standard of conduct even in the absence of indictable conduct or a criminal conviction. For example, in Zorzi v. Norwood, 29 MCSR 189 (2016), the Commission noted:
“An officer of the law carries the burden of being expected to comport himself or herself in an exemplary fashion.” McIsaac v. Civil Service Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 475 (1995) (negligent off-duty handling of firearm). When it comes to police officers, the law teaches that there is a special ‘trust reposed in [a police officer] by reason of his employment …. Police officers must comport themselves in accordance with the laws that they are sworn to enforce and behave in a manner that brings honor and respect for rather than public distrust of law enforcement personnel. They are required to do more than refrain from indictable conduct. Police officers are not drafted into public service; rather they compete for their positions. In accepting employment by the public, they implicitly agree that they will not engage in conduct which calls into question their ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities.’ Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den., 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).
Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 also vests the Commission with the authority to affirm, vacate or modify a penalty imposed by the appointing authority. The Commission is delegated “considerable discretion” in this regard, albeit “not without bounds” so long as the Commission provides a rational explanation for how it has arrived at its decision to do so. See, e.g., Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996) and cases cited; Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 800 (2004); Faria v. Third Bristol Div., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 985, 987 (1982) (remanded for findings to support modification). However, the Supreme Judicial Court has added that, in the absence of “political considerations, favoritism, or bias,” the same penalty is warranted “unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the town or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way.” Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. at 824.
The Department, by a preponderance of the evidence, has proven that it had just cause to discipline Mr. MacLean.
Det. Lt. McDonald conducted an investigation and issued his findings in a September 23, 2024 report. Det. Lt. McDonald sustained two of the four charges, to wit: that (1) Mr. MacLean had improperly arrested Ms. A; and that (2) he had acted unprofessionally toward her and unnecessarily escalated the situation.
The Department scheduled a hearing before the Trial Board for the dates of March 24 and 25, 2025 and issued a charge sheet with one charge for violation of Article 5.8.2 of the Rules and Regulations for the governance of the Department of State Police, to wit: Unsatisfactory Performance. Under the charge of Unsatisfactory Performance, the Trial Board tried Mr. MacLean for two specifications and found him not guiltyof unsatisfactory performance based on improper arrest (Specification I)[9]; and guilty of unnecessarily increasing the intensity of the situation (Specification II).
Specification II
The Department issued Specification II:
In that Trooper Evan MacLean, #[ ], Massachusetts State Police, Division of Field Services, State Police – Charlton (C10), on August 18, 2021, in the town of Charlton, demonstrated by a lack of knowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced, an unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks; the failure to conform to work standards established for the member’s rank, title or position; and/or the failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserving of State Police attention. This occurred when Trooper MacLean acted unprofessionally toward a member of the public and escalated a call for service, unnecessarily increasing the intensity of the situation. This action is in direct violation of Article 5.8.2. This is a third offense Class “B” violation. (B)
It is undisputed that Sgt. Boland dispatched Mr. MacLean to the service plaza on a wellbeing check after receiving a call for someone slumped over the steering wheel. Further, Sgt. Boland informed Mr. MacLean that AAA had reported to the scene to assist that same operator for a disabled motor vehicle earlier that day.
When Mr. MacLean first arrived at the service plaza, he parked behind Ms. A’s motor vehicle. He observed that she appeared to be asleep in the driver’s seat. However, Mr. MacLean failed to inquire about Ms. A’s wellbeing during their encounter.
Before he arrived at the service plaza, Mr. MacLean had investigated Ms. A based on her registration information. Thus, he knew that she was on probation when he arrived. He testified that he believed that drugs were involved in her situation on August 18, 2021, and noted the scars purportedly from intravenous drug use on her arms.
Based on the track marks and her probationary status, Mr. MacLean prejudged Ms. A. He harangued Ms. A about her probation status and asked for the name of her probation officer. The Trial Board noted in its Finding and Recommendations:
Solicitating information about a member of the public’s probation status and contact information for the[ir] probation officer; while not necessarily improper, was unnecessary for a trooper responding to a well-being check …
(J. Exhibit 28)
Ms. A was understandably frustrated because her car would not start and because AAA had delayed her service by going to the wrong service plaza. After she waited for the requisite half hour for her battery to charge before safely turning off her motor vehicle, she encountered Mr. MacLean as she exited her car to make her way to the service plaza restroom.
After Ms. A identified herself, Mr. MacLean questioned her at length about her probationary status and the length of time she had remained in the service plaza parking lot. When Mr. MacLean prevented her from going to the restroom, Ms. A had been in the parking lot more than seven hours. In addition to his lack of empathy for her situation, Mr. MacLean’s demanding tone and vulgarity served to further agitate Ms. A. He got annoyed when she talked back to him, and he arrested her in a swift manner that was unprofessional. He then placed her in the cruiser, in the August heat, without any air conditioning.
The job duties of officers of the Commonwealth equate community caretaking with law enforcement. However, Mr. MacLean’s actions on August 18, 2021 were devoid of any element of caretaking for Ms. A.
Progressive Discipline
Mr. MacLean’s two previous disciplines for violation of Article 5.8.2 resulted in penalties of Class B, first offense with the forfeiture of ten days; and Class B, second offense with the forfeiture of twelve days. (Findings of Fact 5-9) These prior incidents are significant because they document Mr. MacLean’s history of dismissive and rash behavior.
Now we are presented with Mr. MacLean’s third violation of Article 5.8.2. Under the principle of progressive discipline, a fifty-day suspension may be imposed for misconduct under Class B, third offense, which may be punishable up to and including termination. Even accounting for his prior misconduct, the Department chose not to terminate Mr. MacLean.
Mr. MacLean has argued that the punishment for his actions on August 18, 2021 is too severe. He stated that since the October 3, 2021 and December 14, 2021 incidents occurred after his encounter with Ms. A on August 18, 2021, a third offense level punishment for his actions toward Ms. A would not be appropriate.
While it is true that his encounter with Ms. A predates the other two offenses, this point does not detract from the fact that Mr. MacLean committed three serious offenses within the span of five months. It is also important to note that his punishments have been related to the conclusions of the three separate investigations, not necessarily the chronology of the incidents. These three separate investigations resulted in three personnel orders issued on September 22, 2022; July 23, 2023; and April 8, 2025, respectively.
Even if the Department were to rearrange the order of the charges to align with the dates of the offenses, it is indisputable that Mr. MacLean has been charged based on his misconduct three times. Since Mr. MacLean has committed two previous instances of misconduct warranting investigations, and this is his third instance of misconduct, I find that the Department appropriately charged him with a third offense Class “B” violation.
I have carefully reviewed and considered the arguments of both parties. Intervention by the Commission in the form of a modified penalty is not warranted here.
I find no allegations here of political considerations, favoritism, or bias. Moreover, the underlying material facts found by the Department’s hearing officer are backed by the testimony and documentary evidence I have reviewed. Thus, even if the Commission were inclined to modify Mr. MacLean’s suspension, it would lack a rational justification for doing so.
Based on the preponderance of credible evidence presented at the hearing, I conclude that the Department of State Police had just cause to discipline Evan MacLean.
Accordingly, the appeal docketed at D-25-100 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on December 4, 2025.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his/her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Vincent DeMore, Esq. (for Appellant)
Keith Paquette, Esq. (for Respondent)
Rachel Audley, Esq. (for Respondent)
[1] The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
[2] Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal is obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.
[3] Consistent with its privacy protocols, the Commission refers to the private citizen as “Ms. A” in order to protect her privacy.
[4] “… No person may loiter in or about a way for the purpose of ‘hitchhiking’ or for any other purpose.”
[5] Section 120: Entry upon private property after being forbidden as trespass; prima facie evidence; penalties; arrest; tenants or occupants excepted
Section 120. Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon … improved or enclosed land, … after having been forbidden so to do by the person who has lawful control of said premises, whether directly or by notice posted thereon, … shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both such fine and imprisonment. … A person who is found committing such trespass may be arrested by a … police officer and kept in custody in a convenient place, not more than twenty-four hours, Sunday excepted, until a complaint can be made against him for the offence, and he be taken upon a warrant issued upon such complaint. …
[6] The footage was date/time stamped 08/18/21 12:54:15 hours, and is 42 minutes and 39 seconds in length. (J. Exhibit 7)
[7] The footage was date/time stamped 08/18/21 12:54:15 hours, and is 1 hour 34 minutes and 15 seconds in length. (J. Exhibit 6)
[8] In his Post-Trial Board Objections memo, Mr. MacLean argued that the Trial Board’s pre-trial denial of his motion for a Bill of Particulars was improper, the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain a conviction, the Department’s argument in support of its Disciplinary Recommendation was improper, and the use of progressive discipline was improper. (J. Exhibit 29)
[9] Since the Trial Board found Mr. MacLean not guilty of improper arrest, I do not examine whether he demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the application of laws required (trespassing in a service plaza) to be enforced.
