Decision  Wood-Young v. Boston Ret. Sys, CR-22-0186

Date:	02/06/2026
Organization:	Division of Administrative Law Appeals
Docket Number:	CR-22-0186

• Petitioner: Camille Wood-Young
• Respondent: Boston Retirement System
• Appearance for Petitioner: Lauren Van Iderstine, Esq.
• Appearance for Respondent: Natacha Thomas, Esq.
• Administrative Magistrate: James P. Rooney

Summary of Decision

Denial of accidental disability retirement application without having the applicant examined by a regional medical panel is reversed. Traffic enforcement officer/special police officer’s duties were not simply ticketing cars. When she became a homicide witness while working, she was expected to assist the prosecution. Her claim that she suffered psychological injury should be evaluated by a medical panel. 

Decision

Camille Wood-Young appeals the July 25, 2019 decision of the Boston Retirement Board denying her application for accidental disability retirement based on its belief that a parking enforcement officer/special police officer who suffered PTSD after confronting three men who had just shot and killed a store employee and who later testified at the grand jury and at trial was not performing her job duties when becoming involved in a homicide prosecution. I held a hearing on November 9, 2023 at the Division of Administrative Law Appeals. I marked the joint prehearing memorandum as Pleading A and admitted thirteen exhibits into evidence. Ms. Wood Young was the only witness. The record closed when the parties filed closing briefs on January 26, 2024.

Findings of Fact

Based on the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing and reasonable inferences from them, I make the following findings of fact:

1. Camille Wood-Young began working for the City of Boston Transportation Department as a Parking Enforcement Officer and Special Police Officer in August 2008. (Wood-Young testimony.)
2. A job posting for Parking Meter Supervisor^[1] from 2015 states that the duties of this position include:

[T]agging illegally parked vehicles in areas assigned; report to immediate supervisor any meter found to be out of order, and any damaged traffic standards (sign post, traffic signals, and missing or loose signs); . . . acts in a courteous and professional manner with the public when explaining parking regulation or providing directions or traffic information; patrols an assigned area or route to observe motor vehicles eligible for impoundment; identifies eligible vehicles and reports to central operation by walkie-talkie or two-way radio, to verify the same; . . . inspects all open-air parking lots to insure compliance with Traffic and Parking rules and regulations; may be required to appear in court regarding findings of traffic and open-air parking regulations. Performs related duties as required.
 

(Ex. 6.)

3. The minimum requirements to obtain this position include “two . . . years full-time or equivalent post-time experience in a customer service/consumer complaint area in which the major duties of such work included accurately collecting and recording information and courteously responding to complaints and informational requests by the general public.” An applicant must also pass a CORI check and “be able to obtain Special Police Officer clearance.” Id.
4. During her training, Ms. Wood-Young was told not only about enforcing parking rules, but also that she was a city ambassador who should help members of the public within reason. Members of the public could recognize she was a city employee because she wore a light blue uniform with a cap. She was sometimes mistaken for a police officer. She carried a radio and was told to call the fire department in case of a fire. If she witnessed an accident or a crime, she was told to call it in, and her supervisors would advise her what to do. (Wood-Young testimony.)
5. Ms. Wood-Young was asked for help by members of the public daily. She gave directions, witnessed car accidents, helped look for a missing person with dementia, and helped secure some streets following the Marathon bombing in 2013. (Wood-Young testimony.)
6. On July 18, 2017, Ms. Wood-Young was working in the Mission Hill neighborhood. While she was ticketing a car, she saw three men run toward her. She asked them if the car she was ticketing was their car. They told her no, then hopped in a grey minivan and sped off. She noted the license plate number. (Wood-Young testimony; Ex. 7.)
7. Shortly thereafter, another man came running and asked her if she had seen three black men running in her direction. He asked for her help because a friend of his had been injured. He led her to a nearby hardware store, where she found store items knocked over and a man named Andres Cruz on the floor. She called her supervisors and was told not to leave and to provide the police with whatever assistance they needed when they arrived. Because she knew cardiopulmonary resuscitation, she performed CPR on Mr. Cruz.^[2] She also told dispatch of the license plate she remembered. The police apprehended the three men shortly thereafter. Ms. Wood-Young identified them as the men she had seen earlier.^[3] (Wood-Young testimony; Ex. 7.)
8. Ms. Wood-Young went next to the police station. Her supervisors were already there in the lobby. So was the man who had led her to the hardware store. He told her that Mr. Cruz had died. She passed out and was taken to Brigham and Women’s emergency department. Her blood pressure was on the high side at 157/79 and she complained of a headache. She was monitored, treated for a tension headache (or possibly a migraine headache), and released. (Wood-Young testimony; Ex. 8.)
9. Ms. Wood-Young testified at the grand jury.^[4] When she was waiting in a hallway,^[5] a man passed by her, stared at her, and began to sing a song with the lyric ‘‘you’re nothing but a snitch. I’ll shoot you dead.” (Wood-Young testimony.)^[6]
10. The murder was reported in local newspapers, including her role as the meter maid who helped solve the crime. Ms. Wood-Young had a panic attack after seeing the article. (Wood-Young testimony.)
11. Two of the men who were arrested pled guilty. One went to trial. Ms. Wood-Young testified at the trial. The defendant was convicted. (Wood-Young testimony.)
12. By July 27, 2017, Ms. Wood-Young was seeking treatment for depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder relating to witnessing on July 18, 2017 what turned out to be the perpetrators of a murder fleeing the scene, and to the difficulties she experienced thereafter related to being a witness. (Ex. 11.)
13. Sometime a year or a year and a half after the murder, she attempted to return to work. She found that no one wanted to be her partner.^[7] She was told by a co-worker that the families of the perpetrators might come after her. Her effort to return to work did not last long because she felt unsafe. (Wood-Young testimony.)
14. On January 2, 2020, Ms. Wood-Young applied for accidental disability retirement based on “PTSD, Agoraphobia, Depression and Stress due to witnessing a crime at work” on July 18, 2017. She described her duties as issuing parking tickets and “Ambassador [for] the City of Boston while issuing tickets that are in parking violation and offer[ing] aide to the public when asked and needed.” She stated that she suffered a work-related injury on July 18, 2017, but did not describe what happened that day or thereafter. (Ex. 3.)
15. Dr. Michael Gill submitted a physician’s statement in support of the application. He diagnosed her with PTSD, major depression, and agoraphobia. He stated that “Ms. Wood-Young witnessed the immediate aftermath of a murder while on the job, was involved in trying to resuscitate the victim and identifying the suspects. She was threatened when she testified [at the] Grand Jury.” He concluded that “[h]er disability appears clearly caused by the job-related event.” (Ex. 4.)
16. On May 5, 2020, the Boston Retirement System denied Ms. Wood-Young’s application without sending her application to a medical panel because “witnessing a crime was not in the ‘actual performance’ of your duties as a BTD parking enforcement officer.” (Ex. 1.) Ms. Wood-Young filed an appeal six days later. (Ex. 2.)

Discussion

No application for accidental or ordinary disability retirement may be approved until the applicant has been examined by a medical panel whose function is to determine medical questions that are beyond the common knowledge and experience of a local retirement board. Malden Ret. Bd. v. Contributory Ret. App. Bd., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 423, 298 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1973). A retirement board, however, need not have an accidental disability retirement applicant examined by a medical panel “if it determines that the member cannot be retired as a matter of law.” 840 CMR 10.09(2).

Ms. Wood-Young’s application is based on the anxiety, depression, and PTSD she developed after witnessing three men who had just committed a murder run past her while she was performing her job ticketing cars and the fear for her personal safety that followed thereafter, including her fear of retaliation and her fear associated with identifying the suspects and testifying before a grand jury and at the trial of one of the men. The Boston Retirement System commends her civic-minded actions in its brief but contends that her involvement in witnessing a crime and participation thereafter in the prosecution were not part of her job. It points to a portion of her job description that she “may be required to appear in court regarding findings of traffic and open-air parking regulations” and argues that her involvement in a homicide prosecution was outside the bounds of her job. 

The Retirement System’s position is based on the portion of the retirement statute requiring that a public employee basing an application for accidental disability retirement on an injury must show that the injury occurred “as a result of, and while in the performance of, [her] duties.” M.G.L. c. 32, § 7(1). The Supreme Judicial Court has held that this “reflects the Legislature’s intention to limit accidental disability retirement benefits to claimants whose injuries result from the actual performance of their job duties.” Richard v. Worcester Ret. Bd., 431 Mass. 163, 164 (2000).

Figuring out whether an applicant was performing a job duty when injured is not necessarily straightforward. In a previous accidental disability retirement decision, I observed:

If an employee is injured during the course of performing duties listed in her job description, that would be a clear instance of an injury “as a result of and while in the performance of her job duties.” Accidental disability retirement benefits are also available, however, to an employee injured while performing a job-related duty that is not listed in her job description. Gale v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., C.A. No. 97-6003-G, Memorandum of Decision (Mass. Super. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000).

• Whether a particular activity is within an employee’s job duties is a factual issue whose resolution is particular to each case. Connolly v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1127, N.E.2d, 902 N.E.2d 433 (2009). The Gale and Connolly decisions illustrate the nature of this factual inquiry. Mr. Connolly, who injured his back while replacing a water cooler bottle at work, was denied accidental disability retirement benefits because his job duties as a building inspector did not include replacing water cooler bottles. Mr. Gale was employed by the Highway Department as a bridge operator, a job that required minimal to moderate physical exertion. He was occasionally assigned to perform manual labor for the Traffic Division and injured his back while performing heavy labor. Judge Thayer Fremont-Smith granted him accidental disability benefits because:

[t]o contend that an employee, who is frequently ordered by his supervisor to do heavy manual labor in another Division of the Highway Department, and who is disabled in the course of such employment, is not entitled to disability because his official job description differs from the actual duties he was required to perform, is contrary to the manifest intent of the statute, which is to provide disability benefits to an employee who has become injured while in the performance his or her actual employment, as was required by their employer.

Gale, Memorandum of Decision at 6.

McDonald v. Boston Ret. Bd., CR-11-623, at *7-8 (Div. Admin. L. App., Feb. 27, 2014).

Laura McDonald’s situation is illustrative. She was a school secretary, and most of her job duties involved work in the school building itself. But she was asked by the school’s principal to take a certificate and drive to a craft store to have it famed for a presentation that was to be made later in that day at a school function. She was seriously injured in a car accident on the way to performing this task. I held that a catch-all provision in her “job description was broad enough to encompass the task she was performing when she was injured. She was also assigned that task by her supervisor. She was therefore performing her job duties when she was injured.” Id. at 8.

Here, Ms. Wood-Young’s job duties involved more than simply ticketing cars or testifying about traffic violations. Her employer recognized that putting a uniformed traffic enforcement officer on the street meant that she would be interacting with members of the public. The Transportation Department thus required that a person applying for the job have two years of experience in some form of customer relations. Her trainers told her that while on the street she would be an ambassador for the city and, accordingly, she should help residents who approached her within reason. Her employer also recognized the possibility that she would see a crime being committed. She was told to call in to her supervisors and follow their instructions. And the job description called for her to perform related duties as required.

On July 18, 2017, Ms. Wood-Young was doing her job ticketing a car when three men ran towards her. Presumably, because she thought they were running to get to her before she ticketed their car, she asked them if the car she was ticketing was their car. They said no and sped off in a minivan. It was this interaction that gave her the opportunity to recognize the men and remember the license plate number of the minivan. So far, her interactions were all within the recognized parameters of her job.

It was when another man ran up to her and asked for her help in a hardware store that it became obvious that a crime was involved. I agree with Retirement System counsel that her job description did not explicitly call for her to perform CPR on the victim of the crime she saw in the hardware store. But she had been told by her trainers to help members of the public in reasonable fashion. Because she was trained in CPR, it was not simply commendable that she performed CPR, but reasonable for her to do it, and therefore was consistent with the job duty of helping members of the public.

As she was instructed when she came across a crime, she called her supervisors. She was told to cooperate with the police and her actions thereafter showed that she followed those instructions. She went to the police station, identified the three men the police had arrested, and testified at the grand jury and at the trial of one of the men. 

While the Retirement System argues that this was outside of the usual requirements of her job to testify in court about parking violations, her supervisors thought the opposite as was shown by their presence at the police station. To say that a special police officer, like Ms. Wood-Young, having become a witness in a homicide prosecution while working could have declined to help the prosecution without suffering employment consequences because that was not her job, beggars belief. Having witnessed the aftermath of a homicide and having interacted with the perpetrators all while she was performing her regular job duties, her supervisors’ behavior shows they expected her to follow through and assist the prosecution.  

Conclusion

Thus, I conclude that Ms. Wood-Young has presented sufficient evidence to show that her witnessing a crime and her cooperation with the prosecution of the crime were job duties, and hence her application for accidental disability retirement should have been sent to a medical panel. I therefore remand this matter to the Boston Retirement System to have Ms. Wood-Young examined by a medical panel.

Before the panel examines her, Ms. Wood-Young should amend her application. She listed July 18, 2017 as the date of her injury, but then did not describe what happened on that day or thereafter. The Retirement System and the medical panelists need to know under what circumstances and when she developed psychiatric injuries because of her being a homicide witness.

Division of Administrative Law Appeals          

James P. Rooney
Administrative Magistrate
Division of Administrative Law Appeals
14 Summer Street, 4th floor
Malden, MA 02148
Tel:  [phone]
www.mass.gov/dala

Dated: February 6, 2026

[1] This was Ms. Wood-Young’s job title. There is no indication in her testimony, however, that she supervised anyone.

[2] Ms. Wood-Young did not say whether she learned CPR in connection with her job, but from the way she described it, I gather she learned other than from an on-the-job training.

[3]. The circumstances in which Ms. Wood-Young made the identification are not clear in the record.

[4].         Ms. Wood-Young could not recall whether she was paid by the City the day she testified at the grand jury. She testified that she was using vacation and sick time until she was granted workers’ compensation. (Wood-Young testimony.) It is therefore likely that she was using vacation or sick leave that day.

[5] I assume this was a hallway in a publicly accessible portion of the courthouse, not in the room for grand jury witnesses.

[6] Ms. Wood-Young testified that she wore some sort of disguise while testifying. She did not describe this disguise, but it could not have been one that interfered with the defendant’s 6^th amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

[7] Ms. Wood-Young was not asked to explain the circumstances in which she worked with a partner.