00:01:12.000 --> 00:01:20.000
Will drop the handout link in the chat if you were unable to download it through the email. Alright, thank you.
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Here's Ken.
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Thank you, Natasha. And thank you to everyone who's attending today. We appreciate it.
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As Natasha said, we're presenting on recent cases of interest. These are cases that, it's a mixture.
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We've chosen them. Some are Pretty basic, but they're cases that you run across, similar fact patterns.
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And then we also have a few cases that you'll never run across, but we hope you find it interesting.
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As Natasha also said, we will be taking questions. I just asked that because we're presenting on particular fact patterns of these cases, you not hit us with any hypotheticals because we're not really prepared to answer those.
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We're prepared to talk about these cases. Also, one case. Oh, and if you have specific specific questions or you do have a hypothetical situation, feel free to email either I or Felicia and we'll get back to you with the best answer we can.
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Also. There was a recent case decided by the appeals court, the, the Worcester retirement board and crab case.
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We will not be presenting on that today. The reason being that Perrick is actually working on a memo to go out to all the boards regarding the implementation of that case.
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So that That will be coming in the forecoming weeks. Oh, finally before I begin, is both Felicia and I are going to be using the words Dala and crab frequently. And for those who don't know, those are the administrative agencies where appeals are heard.
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Dala and crab is the contributor retirement appeal board. So I just wanted to throw that out there before we just start throwing out those acronyms.
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Okay, and onto my first case. The 2 Minelli be the Somerville retirement board case.
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In this matter, Mr. Trumanelli, was a member of the Lin retirement system and he injured his leg very badly.
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He had to have multiple surgeries. Eventually he left that job and took a job working for Somerville and became a member of the Somerville retirement system.
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Unfortunately, soon into his tenure in Somerville, his leg issues returned and he had to have multiple surgeries again.
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He was never really able to work long in Somerville, maybe about 3 months. And after about a year, the pain became too bad and he had to resign.
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And he became an inactive member of the Summerville retirement system. Soon after resigning. This is in about 2,013.
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So a long time ago. He applied for accidental disability retirement from the Lin retirement system because that was the system where he sustained his injury.
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The Lin Retirement Board denied his application because and they argued that he was not permanently disabled on his last day of work.
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With their system. Mr. Tuminelli appealed that decision to dollar. In 2020.
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Dollar reversed the board's decision and granted him ADR. But then in an unusual. Situation, dollar then reconsideridered.
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And to that he should have filed the application with the Summerville retirement system. He appealed that decision to crab where it is still, it remains pending at this time.
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While it's pending a crab, he filed an application for accidental disability with the Somerville retirement system.
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The board denied his application. They essentially found that he wasn't injured while working for Somerville.
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And the fact that the pertinent statute, which is section 7 5. States that if he was injured while a member of a different system, he must file in the system where he was, quote, presently employed.
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The Summerville retirement system argued that he was not presently employed by Summerville because he was inactive.
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He, he, when he filed this application, he was inactive.
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Cool, Mr. Trumanelli had to appeal that decision to, and this is the recent decision.
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Dollar phone that Well, they found that if Summerville's argument was to be accepted, Mr. Tuminelli is in, as they put it, no man's land.
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They noted when there's only one system involved, section 7 one does not require that the applicant be presently employed in the system.
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You can file when inactive. There was no evidence that presently employed should be required when there are 2 or more systems.
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They essentially ruled that the phrase presently employed means the most recent system you were a member of. Okay.
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This has been appealed to Kreb. From Dala, where it is, it is pending.
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So, poor Mr. Toominelli has 2 matters pending at crab. Just to get is you know accidental disability which doesn't seem to be in dispute that he is you know
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It doesn't seem to be in dispute that he is permanently disabled. So I wish him the best of luck.
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And that we get some law out of this to give us all some direction. But that is the situation now.
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The next case I will present on. Is I don't know if I'm pronouncing it right, but I would say Crichton be the state board of retirement and Perak.
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Okay. This is a situation that you might run into. Okay. When a public safety person, person applies for ADR when I say ADR, I mean accidental disability retirement.
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When they apply for ADR under the heart presumption The statute requires the inclusion of a pre-employment physical.
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And this pre-employment physical must show no evidence of a heart condition or hypertension at the time of hiring.
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In this situation here, Mr. Crichton was a corrections officer. His pre employment physical showed evidence of hypertension.
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The board found him ineligible for the Hartwa presumption. He appealed to dollar and he argued that His disabling condition right now.
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Is not hypertension. It is aortic dissection. Which was not present prior to his hiring or in his preemployment fiscal.
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So we argued, yes, there was hypertension in my pre-employment physical, but I'm not going out for hypertension.
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I'm going out for aortic dissection. Dollar ruled that the presence of the hypertension, however, at the time of his hiring.
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Makes the presumption automatically inoperable. Regardless of what the disabling condition is. They also noted that he could have applied for a section 7 accidental disability retirement, but the fact that he chose not to do so was indicative, that there was no workplace injury that caused the aortic dissection.
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And, mister. Creighton has appealed to that decision to crab where it is pending.
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Okay, this is a case that it's a Wakefield retirement board versus the mass teachers retirement board.
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Section 3 8 C. Okay, permits a retirement system to seek proportional reimbursement from any previous retirement system a member may have belonged.
00:09:06.000 --> 00:09:21.000
Okay, you have to request the board has to request it. So 3 A/C says if you were, you know, you retired from our system, but you had many years in a different system, so they owe a proportion of the liability.
00:09:21.000 --> 00:09:29.000
Here, there were 2 former members of the Wakefield retirement system who later became members of the, mass teachers retirement system.
00:09:29.000 --> 00:09:51.000
And they're retired from the teachers retirement system. About 20 years after their retirements. Mas teachers invoiced the Wakefield retirement system for its proportionate shares for the members pursuant to 3 8 c and Wakefield your time system paid those invoices in full.
00:09:51.000 --> 00:10:04.000
Now, in Massachusetts, There are statutes and limitations for certain actions. Okay. There is a statute of limitations for maintaining an action in contract and that is 6 years.
00:10:04.000 --> 00:10:11.000
Okay, so if it's a contractual argument, you need to make it within 6 years. You only get 6 years basically.
00:10:11.000 --> 00:10:22.000
Wakefield realized this and argued that MTRS was only entitled to 6 years worth of payments, not the 20 that they saw it and received.
00:10:22.000 --> 00:10:28.000
Well, MTRS declined to issue a refund. And the Wakefield retirement system appealed to Dalla.
00:10:28.000 --> 00:10:37.000
Dala determined that the 6 year. Of limitations is applicable. But it can be relinquished or forfeited.
00:10:37.000 --> 00:10:45.000
And that is what the wake for retirement system did here. By paying it, they forfeited their right to make the statute of limitations argument.
00:10:45.000 --> 00:10:54.000
Della found that the mass teachers was rightfully owed the entire amounts. So there was nothing legally wrong in their collecting it.
00:10:54.000 --> 00:11:04.000
It was a valid and enforceable debt. Notwithstanding the statute of limitations. And there was no error here in there requesting it or being paid.
00:11:04.000 --> 00:11:08.000
So the 6 year statute limitations is applicable. But because it wasn't utilized here, they forited.
00:11:08.000 --> 00:11:25.000
The use of it. And this is a final decision.
00:11:25.000 --> 00:11:32.000
As some of you may be aware, I give a presentation at the most recent. Macros convention in Springfield.
00:11:32.000 --> 00:11:44.000
And part of my presentation had to do with making sure that people updated their beneficiary forms. This case illustrates why it's so important to do so.
00:11:44.000 --> 00:11:55.000
This member was in a long standing relationship. When he entered service with the state in 2,005, he named his partner, Mr. Robbins, as his sole option B beneficiary.
00:11:55.000 --> 00:12:03.000
It was properly witnessed and accepted by the board. It did not, however, include any proportionate share.
00:12:03.000 --> 00:12:10.000
That was to go to Mr. Robbins. It just, he was the only beneficiary named, but it did not say what proportionate share he should be getting.
00:12:10.000 --> 00:12:15.000
But again, it was accepted and witnessed by the board.
00:12:15.000 --> 00:12:23.000
In 2,019 the couple broke off their relationship. They sold their home and they went their separate ways.
00:12:23.000 --> 00:12:28.000
And unfortunately the member died about a year later.
00:12:28.000 --> 00:12:33.000
He never updated his beneficiary form, however.
00:12:33.000 --> 00:12:41.000
After his death, his sisters argued that their brother would never have wanted Mr. Robbins to be his beneficiary at that time.
00:12:41.000 --> 00:12:51.000
They provided, you know, to this effect. And they, noted that he had removed Mr. Robbins from a life insurance policy he was on.
00:12:51.000 --> 00:13:01.000
And the board determined that the form itself that he filled out was invalid. Because he did not complete the proportionate benefit section of the form.
00:13:01.000 --> 00:13:07.000
And as a result, the board was going to make the final payment to the funds of his estate.
00:13:07.000 --> 00:13:13.000
Mr. Robbins appealed that decision to Dala. Dala noted in its decision.
00:13:13.000 --> 00:13:22.000
That if a beneficiary form is missing a witness signature, it is a fatal omission that nullifies the form.
00:13:22.000 --> 00:13:30.000
But it should be given. It's full effect if it's as they put it substantially complies.
00:13:30.000 --> 00:13:42.000
With the board's rules and the intent is unambiguous. Here, Dollophone, the form substantially complied and was unambiguous.
00:13:42.000 --> 00:13:50.000
In, in validating it as the board did. Because there was no proportionate allocation was in duly harsh.
00:13:50.000 --> 00:13:53.000
He identified Mr. Robbins as his sole beneficiary. So there was no need to designate proportions.
00:13:53.000 --> 00:14:02.000
There's only one there. They would get 100%. It basically dollar said that's common sense.
00:14:02.000 --> 00:14:12.000
And they noted that the relevant inquiry goes to the members intent. When he filed the form. Not upon his death.
00:14:12.000 --> 00:14:19.000
And it was obvious that his intent was for Mr. Robbins to get this benefit at the time he filed his file to form.
00:14:19.000 --> 00:14:26.000
He could have changed that benefit. Prior to his death, but he did not do so. So the intent was obvious.
00:14:26.000 --> 00:14:38.000
And this is a final decision.
00:14:38.000 --> 00:14:44.000
The next case is Roy versus the State Board of Retirement. This is a fairly common case.
00:14:44.000 --> 00:14:56.000
This is the kind of case that, can be referred to as sticker shock. In in a nutshell, the member left service and got a refund of a total deductions.
00:14:56.000 --> 00:15:07.000
I was in March of 2,004. She was notified that she would not get credit for such service unless she paid back the withdrawn funds with regular interest.
00:15:07.000 --> 00:15:14.000
And that refund amount was about $6,400.
00:15:14.000 --> 00:15:22.000
Will she return to service in July of 2,004? Just 4 months after taking the refund.
00:15:22.000 --> 00:15:33.000
She worked, she worked, she worked. In 2,011. The legislature amended the statute. So that any service purchase not completed by April, 2,013.
00:15:33.000 --> 00:15:41.000
Would be subject to quote unquote actuarial assumed interest. Interest, which is higher than regular interest.
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Much higher, significantly higher.
00:15:45.000 --> 00:15:51.000
Well in 2,019 in anticipation of her retirement she sought to buy back her prior service. And was told that the actuarial assumed interest would need to be applied.
00:15:51.000 --> 00:16:09.000
She was given that rate, well, Given that rate of the actuarial assumed interest and the passage of 15 years, She was told that the buyback amount would be $24,000.
00:16:09.000 --> 00:16:15.000
Which is about 4 times what she withdrew. Okay. That's when the sticker shock hit.
00:16:15.000 --> 00:16:29.000
She appealed and basically argued that, you know, she was told regular interest rates should apply. And dollar phone that unfortunately the statute is unambiguous.
00:16:29.000 --> 00:16:37.000
That actuarial assumed interest. Should apply for anything, buy back not completed after that date in 2,013.
00:16:37.000 --> 00:16:42.000
And they felt sorry for her. They understood the sticker shock. But the statutes unambiguous and dollar does not have the ability to create an equitable remedy.
00:16:42.000 --> 00:16:56.000
So unfortunately either she paid the $24,000 or she does not get credit for that time she worked.
00:16:56.000 --> 00:17:06.000
In this it was not appealed and it is a final decision.
00:17:06.000 --> 00:17:11.000
The next case is Robinson via the State Board of Retirement. This is a fairly common type case.
00:17:11.000 --> 00:17:22.000
So it involves a state police dispatcher, which I always find There's a crazy percentage of cases out there that involve dispatchers.
00:17:22.000 --> 00:17:28.000
I don't know why, but, back to it.
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To be basic for a moment, when a member retires from public service, they retirement allowance is based on their age.
00:17:35.000 --> 00:17:45.000
Their years of credible service, their salary and a group classification. And depending on your group class classification, you can retire at different times.
00:17:45.000 --> 00:17:57.000
Essentially the higher your group class. Classification. The earlier you can retire. Section 3, to G, provides the criteria for determining your group class.
00:17:57.000 --> 00:18:04.000
Most of us are group one. That's the catch all. Provision. And That leads us to Mrs. Robinson.
00:18:04.000 --> 00:18:13.000
As I said, she was a state police dispatcher. Dispatchers are not listed. As having group 2 status.
00:18:13.000 --> 00:18:22.000
In section 3 2 G. But. That statue does list what are called police signal operators.
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And signal maintenance repair.
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Now, there's a long line of cases. Reposo being the, key one.
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A long line of cases that have held that dispatches do not qualify as those jobs. Because the duties and hazards of those jobs that I mentioned in 3 2 G.
00:18:43.000 --> 00:18:59.000
Involve certain dangers that a dispatcher does not incur. You know, being out in traffic, electrical problems, the weather All these dangers that regular dispatches are working in office don't, don't have incur.
00:18:59.000 --> 00:19:03.000
Mrs. Robinson, however, took it a step further. She acknowledged that, but she took it a step further.
00:19:03.000 --> 00:19:25.000
She argued that her duties as a state police dispatcher were different than your typical municipal dispatcher, because she was, you know, Sometimes she was exposed to dangers, including occasionally having to be at unseen command posts and occasionally being near prisoners in cell blocks.
00:19:25.000 --> 00:19:40.000
Dala was not swayed, however. They, the dangers that she cited, seem to be very infrequent, and that her typical duties were similar to a municipal dispatcher working in an office.
00:19:40.000 --> 00:19:43.000
And more over the dangers that she cited were not any of the dangers that are, listed in the bullet point, bullet point 4.
00:19:43.000 --> 00:20:01.000
So she was denied group 2 status and this is a final decision.
00:20:01.000 --> 00:20:07.000
This is a sad case. This is, Mr. McDonald via the Norfolk County Retirement Board.
00:20:07.000 --> 00:20:16.000
Mr. Mcdonnell was a police officer. 2,014 he injured his need while on duty.
00:20:16.000 --> 00:20:25.000
He was able to return to work several months later, however. In 2,019 5 years later.
00:20:25.000 --> 00:20:33.000
His knee or knees. Buckled under him. Which caused him to fall and he hid his head.
00:20:33.000 --> 00:20:42.000
He was taken to the hospital and he was initially diagnosed with intracranial hemorrhages and then he was diagnosed with brain cancer.
00:20:42.000 --> 00:20:54.000
And he died less than a month later. The death certificate, listed the immediate cause as intercranial hypertension due to brain metastasis.
00:20:54.000 --> 00:21:03.000
Okay. Several months later, his Widowed wife, Mrs. Mcdonnell. Applied for death benefits pursuant to section 9.
00:21:03.000 --> 00:21:17.000
With her application, she included then IME, an independent medical examination from a neurosurgeon saying that the knee injury may have caused him to fall and possibly accelerated his death.
00:21:17.000 --> 00:21:23.000
The board asks, to retain a neural, a neurologist to connect a different IME.
00:21:23.000 --> 00:21:30.000
That doctor concluded that his lack of stability was caused by the intercranial pressure and not by the knee injury.
00:21:30.000 --> 00:21:38.000
And that the evidence was that there were multiple falls in the days leading up to his death and that they involve both knees buckling.
00:21:38.000 --> 00:21:46.000
Not just the need he injured. The board denied her application. She appealed to Dalla.
00:21:46.000 --> 00:22:04.000
She argued that the board should have requested a full medical panel of 3 doctors. Dala dismissed that argument because section 6 and 7 for ordinary and accidental disability they mandate that you need a medical panel of the 3 doctors, but section 9 does not require a medical panel.
00:22:04.000 --> 00:22:13.000
Dollar further found that in comparing the 2 IMEs that were submitted it was clear that the IME by the parac doctor was stronger.
00:22:13.000 --> 00:22:27.000
It was it contained far more conviction and diagnoses. That the knee injury was not a part of. The reason why, Thomas McDonald fell.
00:22:27.000 --> 00:22:30.000
And dollar found that the application was properly denied because the board did not receive proper proof under section 9.
00:22:30.000 --> 00:22:42.000
And the knee injury was not the proximate cause of his death. It was unfortunately the brain cancer was the proximate cause.
00:22:42.000 --> 00:22:54.000
And this was not appealed and is a final decision.
00:22:54.000 --> 00:23:01.000
Again, going back to the, Macros conference in Springfield. I touched on this case.
00:23:01.000 --> 00:23:24.000
Lightly during my presentation. It's about the interplay between. Eleventh section 11 C and a section 12 2D that's what I presented on but In a nutshell, prior to retirement, you can name a beneficiary under section 11 to receive a return of your accumulated deductions.
00:23:24.000 --> 00:23:34.000
You can also name a section 12 2D beneficiary who If certain circumstances, I can receive a lifetime benefit.
00:23:34.000 --> 00:23:42.000
Only one of those benefits gets paid, however. And it's section 12 2D Trump's a section 11 beneficiary.
00:23:42.000 --> 00:23:53.000
However, If you're married and meet certain criteria, a spouse can trump a name section 12 to be beneficial.
00:23:53.000 --> 00:24:01.000
Those conditions are. You need to have been married for over one year. And you need to be living together on the date of death.
00:24:01.000 --> 00:24:07.000
If not, you were living apart for justifiable cause.
00:24:07.000 --> 00:24:11.000
Now that brings us to this case.
00:24:11.000 --> 00:24:20.000
Here, Mr. Differentis named his wife as a section 11 beneficiary. But he did not name anyone as his option date.
00:24:20.000 --> 00:24:29.000
Marital issues. Happened and, Mrs. Different moved out of the matter, marital home.
00:24:29.000 --> 00:24:32.000
They never technically divorced, however.
00:24:32.000 --> 00:24:42.000
Unfortunately, he died while in service. Mrs. Tephritis attempted to elect the option D benefit as his spouse.
00:24:42.000 --> 00:24:52.000
The board denied it because they were living apart. The issue before dollar was whether they were living apart for justifiable cause.
00:24:52.000 --> 00:25:05.000
Usually justifiable cause. Is when one of the spouses is unfortunately has to live in a nursing home or something like that or military deployment overseas.
00:25:05.000 --> 00:25:22.000
Those are the typical justifiable cause reasons. Here dollar found there was no justifiable cause that they were living apart because of as they put it mutual consent so she was not eligible for the spousal election.
00:25:22.000 --> 00:25:31.000
To make matters worse. She was not even eligible for the section E. 11. Because Mr. Differitis had a son from a prior marriage.
00:25:31.000 --> 00:25:43.000
And section 12 B provides that in this type of situation the option D benefit shall be paid to the surviving children until they reach age 18 or 22 if a full time student.
00:25:43.000 --> 00:25:48.000
So, Mrs. T. Faritis did not get anything. In this situation, unfortunately for her.
00:25:48.000 --> 00:26:03.000
And this is a final decision. It was not a field.
00:26:03.000 --> 00:26:11.000
The next case is Bryley B. Parag. This is a very, very sad situation.
00:26:11.000 --> 00:26:24.000
Office of Bryley attended a training session on defensive tactics. Okay, it was a combination of classroom setting and also, you know, hand to hand, you know.
00:26:24.000 --> 00:26:27.000
Learning new techniques and whatnot where you know one partner would act as the aggressor and the other partner would work.
00:26:27.000 --> 00:26:44.000
Their partner would work as they basically the police officer in diffusing the aggressor. Well, he attended that class and a few hours later he reported for his overnight shift.
00:26:44.000 --> 00:26:45.000
Very unfortunately he was found dead in his police cruiser in the parking lot of the police station.
00:26:45.000 --> 00:26:58.000
Several hours later. An autopsy was performed and he was found to have died from cardiovascular disease.
00:26:58.000 --> 00:27:10.000
His widow applied for and was awarded death benefits pursuant to section 9. She also applied for benefits under section 100.
00:27:10.000 --> 00:27:17.000
Section 100 is an enhanced benefit. For, public safety killed in the line of duty.
00:27:17.000 --> 00:27:26.000
Wow, now at the time. Of his death section 100 provided the benefit for police officers killed in the line of duty.
00:27:26.000 --> 00:27:33.000
And as the result of an assault on his person or as a result of an accident involving a police department vehicle.
00:27:33.000 --> 00:27:42.000
So that is the criteria at that time. At the request of the board, Hirak retained a doctor to examine the records.
00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:52.000
And he opined that Mr. Bryley likely died of preexisting heart disease. And that there was no evidence of an assault.
00:27:52.000 --> 00:28:01.000
Despite this the board voted despite this the board voted to approve the application for the section 100 Parak, unfortunately had to remand.
00:28:01.000 --> 00:28:16.000
That decision and it was appealed to D. Dala ruled that the requirements, what that the word assault is unambiguous and it is not synonymous with incident as argued by the board.
00:28:16.000 --> 00:28:23.000
There was no evidence he was assaulted while at the training. It was consensual, class that he attended.
00:28:23.000 --> 00:28:38.000
And There was no assaulter. Okay, that could have committed that assault. And noted that the training class was just a simulation and they denied the section 100 application.
00:28:38.000 --> 00:29:03.000
The, the statue, although it would not have helped, Mrs. Bradley in this situation, section 100 has been amended, following, the, very, very unfortunate, death and, Worcester of officer many familiar where he tried to rescue a child who was drowning and he unfortunately drowned himself under the language that section 100 had, he would not
00:29:03.000 --> 00:29:11.000
have been eligible for the 100 either. So it was recently expanded to include the phrase or at the scene of an emergency.
00:29:11.000 --> 00:29:17.000
So. Officer familiar was able to get it. But again, this would not have helped. Mrs. Bryly, because he was not at the scene of an emergency.
00:29:17.000 --> 00:29:32.000
But unfortunately that's the situation here and it is a final decision.
00:29:32.000 --> 00:29:41.000
The next case I will. Present on his Pereira, be the state board of retirement and the Fall River retirement system.
00:29:41.000 --> 00:29:51.000
Before getting into that. As virtually all of you know, in 2,009 and 2,011, significant changes were made to the pension laws.
00:29:51.000 --> 00:30:00.000
It's part of pension reform. Well, many of those changes. We're kind of open to interpretation.
00:30:00.000 --> 00:30:02.000
And it wasn't any case law to look on. Well, now we're starting to get some case law that can provide us all with some guidance.
00:30:02.000 --> 00:30:17.000
And this is one of those cases. So one of those legislative changes involved the dual member provision of section 5 2 E.
00:30:17.000 --> 00:30:23.000
Requiring that if you were a member of 2 systems, you had to retire separately from each system.
00:30:23.000 --> 00:30:39.000
Another one concerned the so called year for a day provision, which was revoked before it was revoked, you used to get credit for a full year service, even though you only possibly worked one day in that year.
00:30:39.000 --> 00:30:42.000
Bring us to our situation here.
00:30:42.000 --> 00:30:52.000
Miss Peru was a member. Of 2 retirement systems prior to pension reform legislation.
00:30:52.000 --> 00:31:08.000
She argued that Pursuant to section 25 5. She had a contractual expectation. That the law as it was written upon her entry into service would apply when she sought retirement.
00:31:08.000 --> 00:31:22.000
Okay. And the pension reform changes, she argued. Broke that contract. She wanted the dual member provision to not apply to her and the year for a day provision to apply for her.
00:31:22.000 --> 00:31:23.000
She argued that had the change not happened. She could have retired earlier and at a higher benefit.
00:31:23.000 --> 00:31:30.000
Like she expected when she became a member. Crab, okay, cause this was appealed from dollar to crab.
00:31:30.000 --> 00:31:49.000
Grab, a detailed analysis. Of the justification and reasons for the legislative changes. No, they know it was primarily due to the economy and the fiscal viability of the pension systems.
00:31:49.000 --> 00:31:55.000
And determine that the legislative reasons bore a reasonable and material relationship. To the successful operation of the pension systems.
00:31:55.000 --> 00:32:06.000
And that saved. And they're in saved, we're saved by the legislative legislatures reserved police powers.
00:32:06.000 --> 00:32:22.000
So in my opinion, Mrs. Peru came up with a very good argument. However, Crab had a very detailed and appropriate decision in this matter.
00:32:22.000 --> 00:32:27.000
I recommend that everyone take a look at that, that decision as well, which is a final decision.
00:32:27.000 --> 00:32:34.000
It was not appealed any further.
00:32:34.000 --> 00:32:49.000
The next case is Stanton the state board of retirement. This is another decision. That, you know, has to do with the anti-spiking and it is related to the Pereira case in terms of its argument.
00:32:49.000 --> 00:33:01.000
But by way of background, Mr. Stanton worked for you, Mass. He stopped working in 2,008 and he deferred his retirement until 2,018.
00:33:01.000 --> 00:33:15.000
His highest 3 years were 2,006 through 2,008. Pursuant to changes to the pension law, the board applied what called the anti spiking provisions.
00:33:15.000 --> 00:33:20.000
That were added to the law in 2,011. And he was found to trip those provisions.
00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:27.000
Resulting in a lowering of his pension. Basically his compensation in one of those years exceeded the average.
00:33:27.000 --> 00:33:43.000
And, compensation in the 2 preceding years by more than 10%. This change was intended to prevent a big raise at the end of your career, which would artificially inflate your pension.
00:33:43.000 --> 00:33:48.000
Excuse me.
00:33:48.000 --> 00:34:03.000
Similar to, okay, excuse me. He argued the same as Mrs. Pereira. He argued that under section 25 5, he had a contractual expectation that the law is at applied when he became a member would be applied to him.
00:34:03.000 --> 00:34:08.000
And that this legislative change broke that contract.
00:34:08.000 --> 00:34:22.000
Similar to the Pereira case. Crab found that the anti spiking provisions, did not change that original contract because they were permitted.
00:34:22.000 --> 00:34:32.000
Via the police powers of the legislature and they had a valuable viable reason for doing so. This matter has been appealed.
00:34:32.000 --> 00:34:41.000
Or to the superior court. I wouldn't be surprised if it eventually goes to the appeals court and then we would have, incredible precedent going forward.
00:34:41.000 --> 00:34:54.000
I mean, if Mr. Stanton were to win in this case. At the appeals court level, I mean, it's possible that the anti-spiking and all the other changes made in 2,009 in 2,011.
00:34:54.000 --> 00:35:03.000
Maybe they wouldn't be applicable to anyone who was a member before that. But getting ahead of ourselves.
00:35:03.000 --> 00:35:11.000
As I said, this is appeal to the spirit court. And it may end there and who knows what they'll determine.
00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:18.000
But might wanna keep an eye on it.
00:35:18.000 --> 00:35:23.000
And the final case that I'll, present on is actually it's their companion cases.
00:35:23.000 --> 00:35:30.000
This is a littleette in Houston versus Somerville, Somerville Retirement Board in Perak.
00:35:30.000 --> 00:35:47.000
Once again, this involves pension reform. These are anti spiking cases as well. In this situation, the city of Summerville conducted a review of employee compensation to determine whether employees were being paid their proper salaries.
00:35:47.000 --> 00:36:03.000
That's a good thing. It resulted in raises for these 2 employees. They both put in their retirement paper soon after and however they tripped the anti spiking provisions of section 5 2 F
00:36:03.000 --> 00:36:14.000
They argued, however, that they met one of the exceptions to 5 2 F because their salaries were specified by law.
00:36:14.000 --> 00:36:21.000
Indeed, as a result of the salary survey, the City Council did pass ordinances. Approving the increases.
00:36:21.000 --> 00:36:30.000
Okay. Pericket argued that an ordinance is not specified by law as intended by the statute. That was appealed.
00:36:30.000 --> 00:36:35.000
It was appealed to dollar and then it was appealed to crab and we got the decision here.
00:36:35.000 --> 00:36:46.000
And crab ruled that the ordinances satisfied the requirement of being specified by law. Parrot did not appeal this. Neither did some of the retirement board.
00:36:46.000 --> 00:36:59.000
It's a final decision. The survey on at the salary survey and an increase on its own likely would not have been sufficient to satisfy the exception of specified by law.
00:36:59.000 --> 00:37:08.000
But the fact that they put the increases into the ordinance is what saved it here and allowed them. Mr. Well, I'm not sure if it's a man or woman.
00:37:08.000 --> 00:37:16.000
It allowed the parties to. Argue that the exception applied and so anti-spiking was not applicable to them.
00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:25.000
And as I said, it's a final decision. So that is are the case that is the conclusion of the cases I'm going to present on.
00:37:25.000 --> 00:37:29.000
But let's see if we have any questions.
00:37:29.000 --> 00:37:54.000
I can, yes, we have a few questions. So the first question that I received is how can One physical indicate quote hypertension when I understand the medical hypertension diagnosis requires 3 consecutive readings of 140 over 90 on 3 separate occasions during a two-week period according to the American Heart Association source.
00:37:54.000 --> 00:38:03.000
I am not familiar. With that source, that is quoted. I am only familiar with, the statute.
00:38:03.000 --> 00:38:12.000
And the statute says any evidence of hypertension. And if you're pre employment physical says hypertension.
00:38:12.000 --> 00:38:19.000
Then you cannot, Yeah, the Part law presumption is inoperable. And that's what we go by.
00:38:19.000 --> 00:38:25.000
We don't go by, you know, the American Red Cross. Sorry.
00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:35.000
Yeah, and Ken I can also add that for this case. Specifically, the member did have a diagnosis of hypertension and he was on hypertensive medication.
00:38:35.000 --> 00:38:40.000
That's what we looked at for this specific person.
00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:41.000
Thank you.
00:38:41.000 --> 00:38:53.000
Okay. Thank you. So the next question I have is does the 6 year statute of Limit statute of limitations apply to modifications as well?
00:38:53.000 --> 00:38:59.000
I'm not sure if they need modifications pursuant to 91 A.
00:38:59.000 --> 00:39:01.000
I'm not sure what they any contractual.
00:39:01.000 --> 00:39:07.000
I didn't specify about this name early in the presentation, so probably one of the earlier cases.
00:39:07.000 --> 00:39:19.000
Whoever Ask that question. If you could just email me, with a little bit more background, I'm happy to, try to respond to it.
00:39:19.000 --> 00:39:27.000
The 6 are statutory limitations. It's applied to any contractual. And a person's, you know, relationship when they start working in Massachusetts and become part of a public system.
00:39:27.000 --> 00:39:35.000
Is primarily contractual. So 6 here, could apply. But I, I can't speak on the specific situation.
00:39:35.000 --> 00:39:43.000
So please email me.
00:39:43.000 --> 00:40:00.000
Okay, next question. In Robbins versus SRB, when you say a board accepted the beneficiary form should the board actually be voting to accept a beneficiary change or is the fact that the office took this in and date stamped the form adequate?
00:40:00.000 --> 00:40:01.000
Okay.
00:40:01.000 --> 00:40:04.000
The latter. Yeah, they they don't need to vote on any beneficiary phones that come in.
00:40:04.000 --> 00:40:10.000
Just the board, you know, accepting it and stamping it is acceptance.
00:40:10.000 --> 00:40:19.000
Thank you. On the buy back interest, is a member allowed to purchase the service back at half interest for one year after rehire.
00:40:19.000 --> 00:40:23.000
I believe that is the rule.
00:40:23.000 --> 00:40:34.000
Next question. I've had retirees that were impacted by anti-spiking due to salary increases from a salary compensation study done by the town.
00:40:34.000 --> 00:40:37.000
Do I need to recalculate them?
00:40:37.000 --> 00:40:46.000
If the study was done by the town. And it was not then. Made into an ordinance of some sort.
00:40:46.000 --> 00:40:49.000
Then no you don't need to. But if it was put into a bylaw or an ordinance that this is what the salary will be.
00:40:49.000 --> 00:41:02.000
Then that is, you know, that meets the exception of being approved by law. And you would need to recalculate.
00:41:02.000 --> 00:41:10.000
But a study on its own. Is not approved by law. I figure exactly what the term is, but you would not need to.
00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:15.000
But if it's a bylaw or an ordinance, you wouldn't need to.
00:41:15.000 --> 00:41:25.000
And this is in response to that earlier question is, the attendee said no modification of a 3 8 C.
00:41:25.000 --> 00:41:30.000
The question about the. Statute of limitations.
00:41:30.000 --> 00:41:35.000
Oh. It would apply. To something like that. A modification of a 3 8 C.
00:41:35.000 --> 00:41:51.000
Okay. Were the members in the last anti-spiking case were let in Houston versus Somerville and Perick members of a bark of a bargaining unit and if so was that at all a factor in crabs decision.
00:41:51.000 --> 00:41:54.000
I'm not sure. Felicia, are you aware whether they were part of a
00:41:54.000 --> 00:41:58.000
I don't believe they were part of the bargaining unit. Crabs decision just focused on the fact that it was officially done in an ordinance.
00:41:58.000 --> 00:42:04.000
Like Ken mentioned that it wasn't just a salary study was done, so they use the salary and everybody just did general increases.
00:42:04.000 --> 00:42:16.000
It was because the town then officially took a position and made an ordinance requiring that it be done.
00:42:16.000 --> 00:42:25.000
Next question. 3 8 C cases are still pending, correct? Regarding the 6 years statute of limitations.
00:42:25.000 --> 00:42:26.000
Yes.
00:42:26.000 --> 00:42:36.000
Okay. And is there a difference between killed in the line of duty? And died while on duty.
00:42:36.000 --> 00:42:42.000
Yes. You know, killed them on line of duty is actually section 100 a. And section 100.
00:42:42.000 --> 00:42:49.000
And. If you add section 9 into that, all 3 of them have different criteria for whether you are eligible to receive those benefits.
00:42:49.000 --> 00:43:00.000
So you need to look at the specific language of those statutes. I think section 100 and a, says incident.
00:43:00.000 --> 00:43:08.000
It doesn't say assault. And I believe Mrs. Bryly, was awarded the 100 a.
00:43:08.000 --> 00:43:16.000
So you do need to look at, and she was awarded this section 9, but because section 100 is so specific with that assault.
00:43:16.000 --> 00:43:19.000
Yeah, you know.
00:43:19.000 --> 00:43:23.000
Unfortunately, Mr. Bradley, you know, was not assaulted. So she was not eligible to receive that benefit.
00:43:23.000 --> 00:43:28.000
But you need to look at specific language of those statutes.
00:43:28.000 --> 00:43:39.000
And that was the final question for you, Ken. I had one comment from an attendee that, says that this presentation shows the diversity of cases.
00:43:39.000 --> 00:43:41.000
That come up during the course of a year and the challenge to retirement boards to decide at the local level what decision is appropriate.
00:43:41.000 --> 00:43:47.000
So thank you for that comments.
00:43:47.000 --> 00:43:50.000
All right, completely great.
00:43:50.000 --> 00:43:55.000
And with that, I will turn it over to Felicia.
00:43:55.000 --> 00:44:09.000
Great. So the first case that I will be discussing deals with definition of the veteran, the Hollenbach, the state board of retirement, which was a dollar decision issued in January of 2023.
00:44:09.000 --> 00:44:17.000
So the member appealed a state retirement board's determination that rescinded an earlier approval of this application to buy back military service time.
00:44:17.000 --> 00:44:30.000
The state board determined that Mr. Hollabock was actually ineligible to purchase military service because his discharge was quote unquote other than honorable and therefore he did not meet the state definition of a veteran.
00:44:30.000 --> 00:44:38.000
So Dollar issued a show cause for why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
00:44:38.000 --> 00:44:51.000
So dollar wrote that Chapter 32 section 4 one H allows public employees who served in the military to purchase that service if they are a veteran as defined in section one of the retirement statute.
00:44:51.000 --> 00:45:11.000
So section one of chapter 32 actually relies on the definition of a veteran found in chapter 4. So chapter 4, section 7, paragraph 43 says that a veteran is any person whose last discharge or release from his wartime service as defined here and was under honorable conditions.
00:45:11.000 --> 00:45:20.000
So if a member was discharged under conditions other than honorable, they do not meet the state definition of a veteran and are not eligible to purchase military service.
00:45:20.000 --> 00:45:32.000
So in the response to the show cause, Mr. Hollenbach had explained that he was discharges other than honorable because he had gone to an officer's party ate some chocolate and he didn't know that it was laced with marijuana.
00:45:32.000 --> 00:45:39.000
So we told the ship doctor who requested a year in sample and confirmed that he had marijuana and his system.
00:45:39.000 --> 00:45:47.000
So he that's why he received his other than honorable discharge. He asked Dala to remove this event of 35 years ago from his record.
00:45:47.000 --> 00:46:07.000
So, DAIL ultimately dismissed the case, found that it did not have the authority to revise the type of discharge a serviceman receives from the military because his DD 2 14 specifically said other than honorable he was not a veteran and that if he wanted to try to fight and get it changed to honorable, he should contact the VA to make the changes.
00:46:07.000 --> 00:46:13.000
The dismissal was not appealed. So this is a final determination of crab.
00:46:13.000 --> 00:46:20.000
All right, the second case, a MQV state board of retirement is also a dollar decision from May of 2023.
00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:28.000
So Mr. Mchugh was a assistant DA from 1,984 until his retirement in July of 2,022.
00:46:28.000 --> 00:46:32.000
So for the past 12 years he had been assigned to the major felony unit as a senior prosecutor for homicide cases.
00:46:32.000 --> 00:46:51.000
He was on call to report to crime scenes late at night and on the weekends. The legislature appropriated money to the Massachusetts District Attorney's Association for the purpose of distributing funds to increase salaries of assistant DAs for 2,019 and 2020 fiscal years.
00:46:51.000 --> 00:47:18.000
The legislature left the distribution, however, of the funds in the hands of the DA Association. So the state board had determined that Mr. Mcchugh's regular compensation in fiscal years, 2019 to 2,020 and 2020 2021 must be reduced as it violated the anti spiking provision of section 5 to f because he exceeded the average prior 2 years by more than 10 in section 5 UF, however
00:47:18.000 --> 00:47:33.000
there are 3 exceptions to anti-speaking role. One is if you have an increase in compensation due to an increase of in hours of employment, a bona fide change in position, or an increase in salary for a member whose salary is specified by law.
00:47:33.000 --> 00:47:40.000
Mr. Mchugh, our you argued that he met all 3 exceptions. DD. Determined that he did not qualify for any of the exceptions.
00:47:40.000 --> 00:47:50.000
He did not qualify for the hours of employment exception because he did not have fixed hours of employment. His position was expected to have long and late work hours as he was on call.
00:47:50.000 --> 00:47:54.000
He also did not have a bona fide change in position because even if he took on those additional duties, duties were the same type that one would expect in that position and that were expected of the position.
00:47:54.000 --> 00:48:23.000
And finally, he did not qualify for the exception of an increase in salary specified by law, even though the legislature had passed these salary increases because the funds were used by the DA to give him raises and they were distributed with the DA's discretion, they were not specifically allocated to Mr. Mchugh, so they did not find that it was actually specified by law salary increase.
00:48:23.000 --> 00:48:32.000
So Mr. Mchugh has filed an appeal of the dis of the dollar decision with crab.
00:48:32.000 --> 00:48:41.000
The next case is the Christopher C the Boston retirement board. So these are 2 consolidated cases from dollar issued on May fifth.
00:48:41.000 --> 00:48:49.000
So you're gonna notice Dala has now started, especially with a lot of disability cases offering the.
00:48:49.000 --> 00:48:57.000
Petitioners the ability to use pseudo names so this is I just recently received several that have it.
00:48:57.000 --> 00:49:03.000
Marked and even sometimes they don't even ask they've just been replacing individuals names with pseudonyms.
00:49:03.000 --> 00:49:12.000
So in this case, it's also really interesting as we're going to see that it deals with an ADR for a heart condition being awarded to a non police or fire member.
00:49:12.000 --> 00:49:26.000
So this is just going to be a regular worker. It's actually a teacher. So the petition has worked for the Boston School system started there in 995 and his classes combined students with and without special needs.
00:49:26.000 --> 00:49:35.000
So in August, 2,015, testing indicated that he had some significant heart related conditions and he was placed on several heart related medications.
00:49:35.000 --> 00:49:47.000
On October nineteenth of 2,015 the petitioners principal forwarded him an email from a parent claiming that her son had been watching pornography in his in the petitioners classroom.
00:49:47.000 --> 00:49:56.000
The petition experiences this as very stressful because he felt that any allegations of a sexual nature could destroy his career and reputation.
00:49:56.000 --> 00:50:02.000
He immediately began to feel, he testified that he immediately began to feel dizzy, have palpitations, and chest pain.
00:50:02.000 --> 00:50:07.000
He was taken to the ER that day and admitted for evaluations and it was discovered that he may have had a heart attack at some point.
00:50:07.000 --> 00:50:17.000
They weren't sure if it was that day. Or at some point in his life, he had suffered hard sexes or damage to his heart.
00:50:17.000 --> 00:50:22.000
He was off of work and returned on in January, 2016. On January fourteenth of 2,016 he intervened in an altercation between several students.
00:50:22.000 --> 00:50:36.000
He was really afraid of being attacked himself because a teacher in the school had recently been attacked and and injured by several students.
00:50:36.000 --> 00:50:45.000
He saw accommodations and the school administrator responded that there was no reasonable accommodations that could shelter him from aggressive student behavior.
00:50:45.000 --> 00:50:51.000
On the way home that day, he again experienced palpitations, chest pain, and shortness of breath.
00:50:51.000 --> 00:51:03.000
He was taken to hospital and admitted and had not as not returned teaching since that day. In September, 2,016, he applied for ADR based on heart disease, arithmetic, and PTSD.
00:51:03.000 --> 00:51:11.000
Though a Boston retirement board had asked him to supplement his application several times and he did so in February. 2017 and November, 2,017.
00:51:11.000 --> 00:51:19.000
He underwent medical panel examinations in June, the twentieth, 17 for his cardiac conditions and then June, 2018 for his mental health conditions.
00:51:19.000 --> 00:51:28.000
Both panels unanimously concluded that he was incapacitated. It was permanent and it was a result of his asserted workplace injuries in 2,015 and 2,016.
00:51:28.000 --> 00:51:38.000
The board held hearing and the hearing officer actually did recommend the board grant his ADR based on his cardiac conditions, but not his psychotic conditions.
00:51:38.000 --> 00:51:50.000
The board attorney reviewed and disagreed with the hearing officer and noted that the cardiac application did not meet the statutory notice requirements and he was not in the performance of his duties at the time or the purported injury.
00:51:50.000 --> 00:51:58.000
The member appealed and Dala actually determined the 2 medical panel determinations were decisive because they were neutrally construed panels.
00:51:58.000 --> 00:52:07.000
The retirement board had relied heavily in their argument on examinations performed for workers compensation. Proceedings. But, did not find that they were neutral.
00:52:07.000 --> 00:52:19.000
They got also determined that the petition here had 2 specific injuries on October, the nineteenth, 2,015 and January, the fourteenth, 2,016 that relied on for his cardiac and psychiatric applications.
00:52:19.000 --> 00:52:25.000
Especially for the cardiac condition, dollar had stressed that just because he suffered the palpitations.
00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:37.000
On the way home for the last one for the January, 2,016 incident did not mean it didn't stem from the incident that happened earlier when he was breaking up a student fight and his fear of being assaulted.
00:52:37.000 --> 00:52:46.000
So they determine that the medical panel confirmed the causation analysis that his cardiac conditions were brought to the point of disability because of the 2 alleged workplace events.
00:52:46.000 --> 00:52:54.000
The Boston Retirement Board has filed an appeal of this decision with Crab.
00:52:54.000 --> 00:53:02.000
Great. The next case are 2. Consolidated cases, Cohen and Vaccar, EV state board of retirement issued by DALA on July fourteenth.
00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:16.000
Now these are really interesting regular compensation cases. So the petition is or state troopers who each receive stipends of $75 a week per their collective bargaining agreement for having to commute longer than 75 miles.
00:53:16.000 --> 00:53:23.000
Now some employees were able to commute in a department motor vehicle and others use their personal vehicles. It was.
00:53:23.000 --> 00:53:29.000
Confirm that Mr. Cohen commuted in a police cruiser and it's believed that Mr. Vaccari had driven a police cruiser as well.
00:53:29.000 --> 00:53:34.000
It does not appear that it was confirmed, but the Dollar Mage Street made it a finding effect.
00:53:34.000 --> 00:53:45.000
The department motor vehicle policy lists that members of cruisers who are traveling to and from home shall undertake all necessary activities ordinarily performed during Motor Patrol.
00:53:45.000 --> 00:53:50.000
Additionally, the members are to be attired in the required duty uniform while commuting in the cruiser.
00:53:50.000 --> 00:53:59.000
If they come upon an accident, they must notify the relevant jurors, assisted the scene, or investigate the accident if the state police control is not available.
00:53:59.000 --> 00:54:10.000
Both petitioners retired in 2,019 and in March, 2,021 the board notified them that their retirement allowance would be adjusted as a set $75 an hour stipend was not regular compensation.
00:54:10.000 --> 00:54:21.000
The state retirement board argued that the definition of wages specifically excluded travel. They also found that the regular compensation payments must be recurrent, regular and ordinary, and must be for services performed.
00:54:21.000 --> 00:54:29.000
They said that no services are performed here other than commuting to and from work. Now, DALLA found that the payments were regularly recurrent and ordinary as they were received bi-weekly by both Mr. Cohen and Mr. Picari.
00:54:29.000 --> 00:54:41.000
Dialer determined that because they commuted in a state vehicle, department policy mandated that the carry out their regular duties while commuting.
00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:49.000
So as wearing a uniform and investigating accidents if they came upon any. They were found to be on duty from the moment they left their driveway.
00:54:49.000 --> 00:54:53.000
Additionally, dollar also found that the $75 an hour payments were not created to reimburse them for commuter related expenses which is prohibited from regular compensation.
00:54:53.000 --> 00:55:08.000
Because here the gas and maintenance of the department vehicle was covered by the department. So the member was not spending any money on gas or maintenance of the vehicle.
00:55:08.000 --> 00:55:17.000
Since they performed a service for the department during their commute dollar upheld, dollar determined that the $75 an hour they received is regular compensation.
00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:24.000
So this is interesting in the decision in that dollar did not address what would if these payments would have been regular comp if the members had been commuting in their personal vehicle they only stuck to whether or not it was regular compensation.
00:55:24.000 --> 00:55:40.000
If they commuted in a department vehicle. So the state board has filed an appeal with crab regarding the Cohen case.
00:55:40.000 --> 00:55:48.000
All right, the next one is Bonnegut v Mass to choose his teachers retirement board. It's a crab decision issued in September.
00:55:48.000 --> 00:56:03.000
So Miss Vonnegut appealed a dollar decision that had a firm to the decision of the teachers retirement board to exclude stipends related to her work as the administrator of the Brooklyn Public Schools early education extension summer program from her regular compensation.
00:56:03.000 --> 00:56:13.000
So Miss Vonnegut worked as an early childhood program coordinator at the Brooklyn Public School, Replying Public Schools from 1,988 until her retirement in June, 2,014.
00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:23.000
So she started working as the administrator of the early education extension summer program in 2,001. As the coordinator of the early childhood program she supervised employees observed classrooms and monitored student progress.
00:56:23.000 --> 00:56:34.000
As the administrator of the summer program, whose duties were the same, except she did not form teacher evaluations or conduct IEP meetings.
00:56:34.000 --> 00:56:40.000
Ms. Vonnegut's employment CBA provided a stipend for the administrator of the summer of the summer program.
00:56:40.000 --> 00:56:44.000
Now, Dowell found that administering the summer program was not a core duty of Miss Vonnegut's position as the coordinator, but was an additional service.
00:56:44.000 --> 00:57:05.000
And then looking at the additional service, it failed to satisfy any requirements under the teachers regulations as it was not a public day school, the additional service was not performed during the school year and her CBA did not require her to work a 11 to 12 months per year.
00:57:05.000 --> 00:57:14.000
Have reversed the dollar termination and held that Miss Vonnegut's work as the administrator of the summer program was a core duty of her position as the coordinator.
00:57:14.000 --> 00:57:23.000
Crap found that the summer program was subject to the Department of Early Education and Care regulations that required a full-time school age administrator to run the program.
00:57:23.000 --> 00:57:31.000
She never, Miss Bonnie, it never applied for the position, but was expected to take on these duties in her capacity as the early education.
00:57:31.000 --> 00:57:40.000
Early childhood extension coordinator. Crowd also found that her job description specifically reflected the task of planning and supervising the summer program.
00:57:40.000 --> 00:57:50.000
So it was determined that the stipend payments were recurrent payments for her services as she was expected to and did run this over program from 2,001 until her retirement.
00:57:50.000 --> 00:57:58.000
The siphons were not bonuses over time or ad hoc payments. They were paid for additional duties as it was part of her regular job.
00:57:58.000 --> 00:58:05.000
So crab determined that her base compensation was the salary received as well as a stipend for administering the summer program.
00:58:05.000 --> 00:58:17.000
We were able to confirm with Cab that they have not received notice that this was appealed. However, the last day to notify crab would be January 2620 24.
00:58:17.000 --> 00:58:24.000
So we're not entirely sure if this has been appealed or not.
00:58:24.000 --> 00:58:30.000
The second case is superior court case issued in July, Habib and Stoff, the crab and the state board of retirement.
00:58:30.000 --> 00:58:41.000
Now this case also deals with regular compensation payments. So the plaintiffs are 7 physicians, all of whom are former members of the clinical faculty and group practice at the Umass Medical School.
00:58:41.000 --> 00:58:49.000
They appealed the crowd decision which upheld the state retirement board determination that certain supplemental pay received by them was not regular compensation.
00:58:49.000 --> 00:59:02.000
So, 1,962, the legislature created the new mathematical school. In 1,974 it was recognized that the compensation was too low and that they needed it increased in order to obtain better physicians and clinical staff.
00:59:02.000 --> 00:59:16.000
In response to the legislature enacted chapter 733 which established a group practice plan as well as a fee generated trust fund from which the members of the group practice plan as well as a fee generated trust fund from which the members of the group practice would be paid in addition to their base salary.
00:59:16.000 --> 00:59:34.000
Section 6 of chapter 733 specifically stated that in computing state retirement benefits for those who receive both an annual salary and compensation from the trust fund, consideration would only be given to set employees annual base salary and not the payments from the trust fund.
00:59:34.000 --> 00:59:45.000
In 1,900, and 91, the legislature passed chapter 142, section 20, which amended the language and allowed the trustees to create a salary schedule without reference to any state salary schedule.
00:59:45.000 --> 00:59:58.000
The legislation made no changes to the language of chapter 33 and it was still considered to be applicable. 1,997, the legislature again made changes and privatized the provision of clinical service by EMAS medical.
00:59:58.000 --> 01:00:14.000
And it became a new entity called U Mass Memorial Healthcare Incorporated. Now, certain clinical faculty members were allowed to remain new mass medical employees and remain in state service and it was determined that in 2,008 it was set that the trust fund would be officially dissolved.
01:00:14.000 --> 01:00:20.000
Well, there was a lot of setbacks and the trust one was not officially dissolved until September, 2,011.
01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:31.000
Once it was dissolved and actually prior to it being dissolved, the state board had aligned that sense that once a trust one was officially dissolved, there would no longer be a cap on pensionable compensation.
01:00:31.000 --> 01:00:44.000
As the restrictions of chapter 733 would no longer apply. The state board determined that individuals would now need to pay retroactive contributions since what was previously deemed nonpenchable was now pensionable.
01:00:44.000 --> 01:00:54.000
Here, though, at the time the trust fund was resolved was dissolved in 2,011 all of the plaintiffs had retired at different times between 2,008 and 2,011.
01:00:54.000 --> 01:01:05.000
So the retroactive contribution. Requirement was never applied to them. As such the state of time and board had issued rulings that excluded the point of trust fund compensation from the calculation of the retirement benefits.
01:01:05.000 --> 01:01:24.000
The plaintiffs appealed and dollar firm's date for parliament board's determination. Crab further affirms the dollar decision by holding that the supplemental pay was not regular compensation because chapter 733 the governing legislation of the trust one specifically prohibited the payments from being included in the calculation of the retirement benefits.
01:01:24.000 --> 01:01:36.000
In his decision, the Superior Court agreed with both Crab and dollar and found that chapter 7 33 was applicable to the plaintiffs because they are employees of the UMAS medical and had received compensation from the trust fund pursuant to chapter 7.
01:01:36.000 --> 01:01:49.000
133. The Superior Court also found that the legislative changes in 1991 and 1,997 did not supersede chapter 7 33 and so it was still a valid law that governed the trust funds.
01:01:49.000 --> 01:01:58.000
The court also determined that it was undisputed that the trust fund continued to be an active use until 2,011 and to continue to fund part of the plaintiffs compensation.
01:01:58.000 --> 01:01:59.000
Now the plaintiffs would argue that it was really not fair that they were considered as a second class of citizen.
01:01:59.000 --> 01:02:12.000
As second class of people since they retired and would not receive the benefit of the additional compensation in their retirement contributions that other individuals might be receiving now.
01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:23.000
However, the court found that they chose that the plaintiffs chose to retire or resigned voluntarily before the ability to get the trust fund payments counted as regular compensation.
01:02:23.000 --> 01:02:37.000
They were on notice that they would be eligible. To count those payments as regular compensation after the last merger required transfer transaction, which was AKA the trust one being dissolved.
01:02:37.000 --> 01:02:43.000
Easily established prior to 2,008 and at or in 2,008 that the trust one was set to be dissolved at some point.
01:02:43.000 --> 01:02:56.000
And it was then later determined that it would be in 2,011. So all the plaintiffs were on notice that if they waited until the trust run dissolved in 2,011 they would be able to count that as regular compensation, but they refuse to wait.
01:02:56.000 --> 01:03:02.000
They'd also raised a due process violation, but the court determined that there was no due process violation.
01:03:02.000 --> 01:03:14.000
As the plaintiffs because of chapter 733 never possessed the right for their trust run compensation to be considered regular compensation and never established a right to the increased p pensions that they now seek.
01:03:14.000 --> 01:03:20.000
Several plaintiffs have appealed this decision to the appeals court, so it'll be interesting to follow this.
01:03:20.000 --> 01:03:27.000
Probably having a presentation whenever we get a decision from the deals for.
01:03:27.000 --> 01:03:29.000
All right, the next case is the reviewer time of board V Parak, which is dollar decisions issued on November third.
01:03:29.000 --> 01:03:46.000
So in For these cases, we're going to be looking at dual member for vision. So in February, 2,016, Mr. Millazano joined the reviewer retirement system while he was a member of the low retirement system.
01:03:46.000 --> 01:04:00.000
Prior to his retirement, he selected option A from Revere and option B from Lowell. In December, 2,019, he applied for superannuation retirement and in May of 2,020 we parak approved the revere's calculation of mr.
01:04:00.000 --> 01:04:23.000
Miller's retirement under option A. After we approved it, we realized that we needed to withdraw the approval and in and we informed a revere that since Mr. Milo had select an option B in Lowell when he was going to retire, he had to retire to the same option with Revere.
01:04:23.000 --> 01:04:34.000
The reviewer time and system had requested further guidance and we provided them with an opinion letter focusing on the language of section 5, to E, which is the dual member provision in chapter 32.
01:04:34.000 --> 01:04:42.000
So under section 5 2 E, we determine that a dual member will receive A, superannuation retiring allowance.
01:04:42.000 --> 01:04:48.000
So that this meant that only one retirement allowance is paid that is equal to the sum of the benefits from both systems.
01:04:48.000 --> 01:04:54.000
Well, section 5 to E does state that the member will be treated as if they were retiring solely from each system.
01:04:54.000 --> 01:05:06.000
They are still only retiring once and receiving one retirement benefit. So the dual member must have the same effect of data retirement and is not eligible to receive 2 different types of a time allowed to me system.
01:05:06.000 --> 01:05:14.000
Therefore this also meant that since it's treated as one benefit, a dual member must choose the same option selection from each system and list the same beneficiary.
01:05:14.000 --> 01:05:22.000
We determined that this interpretation provided uniformity across chapter 32 as it was consistent with how every other member is retired.
01:05:22.000 --> 01:05:38.000
In this decision, dollar rejected Parax interpretation and concluded that a dual member who retires under chapter 32 section 5 to E can choose different retirement options from each system as there is no prohibition by statute, regulation, or parent policy.
01:05:38.000 --> 01:05:55.000
That, Gallo found that while section 5 to E does indicate that a member will receive a superannuation retirement allowance, it must be read in conjunction with the remaining language that indicates that the allowance is calculated as though the member will retiring solely from each system.
01:05:55.000 --> 01:06:03.000
And that each system shall pay the superannuation retirement allowance attributable to membership in that system to the member.
01:06:03.000 --> 01:06:22.000
So because of that language, dollar determined that there was no proven increased financial burden to either system if a dual member chose a different retirement option in either system and that the legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 5 to be supported its conclusion that a dual member can choose different retirement options from each system.
01:06:22.000 --> 01:06:30.000
Eric has not appealed this decision. So now this is a final determination of crap.
01:06:30.000 --> 01:06:40.000
Okay. So next case is Janet Walsh and Parac of either writing retirement board. This is a dollar case that was issued in July.
01:06:40.000 --> 01:06:44.000
So any member who has retired from a chapter 32 retirement system under sections 5 or 10 can be reinstated to service under the requirements.
01:06:44.000 --> 01:07:14.000
Of chapter 32 section 105. So in 2,010, Ms. Walsh retired from the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority and then on September third, 2,019 she submitted to MWR a signed application for reinstatement to service as she has just recently hired by the Reddy Municipal Light Department with a start date of September, the 20 sixth, 2,019.
01:07:14.000 --> 01:07:32.000
September, the thirtieth, 2,019, she submitted a letter reaffirming the acknowledgement of the buyback procedure and requested it to either occur via installment payments for a period of less than 5 years or a lump sum payment depending upon a decision from PARAC of whether she could use a rollover.
01:07:32.000 --> 01:07:46.000
After starting her employment, the light department initially withheld retirement deductions. However, that was stopped when they were instructed by the renting retirement board not to take any deductions from until her reinstatement had been confirmed.
01:07:46.000 --> 01:07:55.000
On November fifteenth, 2,019 para conformed the MWRA that a rollover was permissible for a lumps on payment under section 105.
01:07:55.000 --> 01:08:03.000
In December of December, the twentieth of 2,019, Miss Walsh was placed on the town of running employee payroll.
01:08:03.000 --> 01:08:11.000
Again as the retirement as the wedding or time award determined that her installment plan became official on December tenth.
01:08:11.000 --> 01:08:20.000
On January 20 s. 2020, Miss Walsh made her final wall over payment to the MWRA of her previously received time and allowance.
01:08:20.000 --> 01:08:27.000
In June and October, 2020, Perick was contacted by both. At the MWRA, Miss Walsh and the Reading Retirement Board, and we issued 2 opinion letters on this matter.
01:08:27.000 --> 01:08:42.000
We opined that Miss Walsh's date of reinstatement should be September third, 2,019 as that was when she entered into assigned and binding repayment agreement and waver seat of retirement allowance.
01:08:42.000 --> 01:08:53.000
In March of 2,021 there. Writing retirement board inform is Walsh that they were keeping her in statement data as December, the twentieth, 2,019 and she filed an appeal.
01:08:53.000 --> 01:09:05.000
So Reading argued that Miss Walsh's reinstatement date should either be on December, the twentieth, 20,000, and 19 when they determined that the Einstein plan was official or on January, the 20 s, 2,020 when she fully repaid her previously received her time and allowance.
01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:19.000
The writing board further argued that they were not provided with sufficient information by the NWRA to establish that in agreement to repay the retirement allowance had been established.
01:09:19.000 --> 01:09:25.000
On September third, 2,019 because signing the application for marine statement service was not a valid contract.
01:09:25.000 --> 01:09:31.000
So in its decision, dollar found that Dollar agree with Ms. Walsh and Parax determination.
01:09:31.000 --> 01:09:40.000
They found that the application for reinstatement to service specifically indicates that the member signature means that the date signed is the reinstatement date.
01:09:40.000 --> 01:09:52.000
Additionally, there was ample evidence that Ms. Walsh had agreed to repay her retirement allowance in either installment payments or lump sum pending a decision from Perek concerning the use of a rollover.
01:09:52.000 --> 01:10:05.000
Dala concluded that to do as the reviewer, as though sorry, as the reading retirement board suggested and delay or reinstatement date until the details of the repayment plan were established or until the repayment plan was completed.
01:10:05.000 --> 01:10:13.000
Would be inconsistent with the legislative intent and could require that an unretired member work beyond the 5 years noted in statue.
01:10:13.000 --> 01:10:26.000
Dala also agreed with Peric and Miss Walsh's interpretation of section 105 that the statute requires only the part that the parties reach an agreement to reinstate not that the agreement has to meet all the formalities of a contract.
01:10:26.000 --> 01:10:38.000
Dollar concluded that Miss Walsh's state of reentry and disservice and herine statement date was September third, 2,019 when she officially waved her retirement allowance and completed the application for reinstatement to service.
01:10:38.000 --> 01:10:59.000
Now, the, Reading or Time Award did originally file an appeal of the decision with the contributor retirement appeal board as well as filing a motion for reconsideration clarification of the dollar decision on the grounds that the reinstatement date should be September, the 20 sixth, 2,019 when Ms. Walsh officially started working for the light department.
01:10:59.000 --> 01:11:16.000
In July. Dala denied the review, writing retirement boards motion for reconsideration or clarification, but it did confirm that Miss Walsh's date to start accruing reinstatement service was a September, the 20 sixth, 2,019 when she which was her first day of work.
01:11:16.000 --> 01:11:30.000
As a result of that, confirmation the Reading Retirement Board with roots of actions to the dollar decision and so the case is now considered a final determination of crap.
01:11:30.000 --> 01:11:35.000
All right, our next case we'll be looking at is 91 Ak. So this is Parek B, Daniel Parker and Barnesville County retirement forward.
01:11:35.000 --> 01:11:46.000
To consolidate decisions issued by craft. So Mr. Parker started his career as a police officer in 1987.
01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:58.000
While a police officer, he was specifically trained in accident reconstruction. And so in 1,990, he created a business named Barnstable Reconstruction doing private accident reconstruction cases.
01:11:58.000 --> 01:12:06.000
During that time, his wife started working for the Barnstable Reconstruction business a few hours a week while also working full-time for a gas company.
01:12:06.000 --> 01:12:19.000
In 2,004, Mr. Parker retired under accidental disability. And around the same time his wife incorporated their old business barnstable reconstruction into parking collision consultants or PCC.
01:12:19.000 --> 01:12:32.000
And this business specialized in accident reconstruction and special investigation unit work. So the both Mr. And Mrs. Parker have worked and continue to work for PCC since 2,004.
01:12:32.000 --> 01:12:48.000
Now, under para policy, 1902, Parek attributed 50% of PC's business earnings to Mr. Parker as it was determined that he generated profit for the business through his labor that was not appropriately represented in his W 2 wages.
01:12:48.000 --> 01:12:56.000
So we instructed the board to recover access earnings for calendar years, 2,011 to 2,015 and then 2,018 to 2,019.
01:12:56.000 --> 01:13:16.000
The board found an appeal and Mr. Parker joined the appeals. Now the issues in these cases were whether Mr. Parker's labor management or supervision at PCC produce profits which earned him income in access of the allowable earnings under section 91 A for calendar years, 2,011, 2,015 and 2,018 2,018.
01:13:16.000 --> 01:13:25.000
In its 2 decisions, Dollar had determined that Mr. Parker's contributions to PCC was limited and he was not the individual responsible for the ongoing success of the business.
01:13:25.000 --> 01:13:35.000
It concluded that Mr. Parker did not generate any income for PCC through labor, management, or supervision, and therefore he did not have any access earnings under section 91.
01:13:35.000 --> 01:13:46.000
His decision, Crab did agree with Dollar's determination and found that Mr. Parker's actual annual W 2 wage compensation was consistent with the value of his confident of his contributions to the business.
01:13:46.000 --> 01:14:06.000
And so he should not be attributed any ordinary business income from PCC. Crab further affirmed dollars credibility determination and held that the testimony for Mr. And Mrs. Parker established that his Mrs. Parker made the business decisions assigned her husband his work and oversaw the business development managing their subcontractors.
01:14:06.000 --> 01:14:12.000
Importantly in the decision though, crab did affirm Perick's 50 50 split policy policy.
01:14:12.000 --> 01:14:20.000
19 dash 0 2. A critical and permissible means to elicit cooperation, information, and documentation from retirees.
01:14:20.000 --> 01:14:27.000
Crab determined that we did appropriately apply the policy here in the present case, but that it was just regretted by evidence from the parkas.
01:14:27.000 --> 01:14:37.000
A parent has not appealed these decisions. And so their final determinations of crab.
01:14:37.000 --> 01:14:44.000
Alright, in the last case I'll be discussing I actually presented on this last year with the dollar decision and now we have the crowd decision.
01:14:44.000 --> 01:14:49.000
So this is Mystic Valley Regional Trader School, the state retirement board and Perak.
01:14:49.000 --> 01:14:58.000
This has to do with non teaching members of a charter school. So Mr. Kravitz work at the Mystic Valley Regional Charter School as a non-teaching employee.
01:14:58.000 --> 01:15:04.000
In January, the TWENTIETH, 20, he applied for membership with the state board, which was 9.
01:15:04.000 --> 01:15:23.000
Because he was a non-teaching employee and ineligible for membership. Now, Dala concluded that Mr. Kravitz was ineligible for membership in the state board because he was a non-teaching employee of a charter school and that case law clearly supported Parax position that non-teaching employees at charter schools are not eligible for membership in a retirement system.
01:15:23.000 --> 01:15:33.000
DAILA also concluded that if the legislature had intended to allow non-teaching employees to join a retirement system, they would have done so during the several amendments made to chapter 71.
01:15:33.000 --> 01:15:47.000
DAILA found that star decisis prevented Mr. Kravitz and Mystic Valley Regional from prevailing as parrots binding the Miranda that we had issued on this as well as the prior dollar decisions were persuasive authority entitled to full deference.
01:15:47.000 --> 01:15:51.000
Now in its decision, Crowd also found that non-teaching employees of a charter school do not qualify for membership in a chapter 32 retirement system.
01:15:51.000 --> 01:16:08.000
Because general law chapter 71 section 89 y makes clear that only teachers in charter schools are eligible for membership in a chapter 32 system, ie that Massachusetts teachers retirement systems.
01:16:08.000 --> 01:16:15.000
Crab agreed with Dallas reasoning that had the legislature intended to allow non-teaching employees to join a retirement system.
01:16:15.000 --> 01:16:28.000
They would have revised chapter 71 section 89 why to either expand or contract the class of employees eligible for membership in a retirement system during the many times that section 89 had been amended throughout the last 3 decades.
01:16:28.000 --> 01:16:41.000
Crab also affirmed its decision in Whipple the Mass teachers retirement system from 2,014 that had held that chapter 71 section 89 why emphasis is that teachers may both join and receive credible service for their work in a charter school.
01:16:41.000 --> 01:16:51.000
Not that the purchase of credible service can be done outside the requirements of section 3 5 by non-teachers.
01:16:51.000 --> 01:17:03.000
There have been some recent dollar decisions in inferring that the non-teaching members could potentially use section 3 5 to purchase credible service and here crab is.
01:17:03.000 --> 01:17:13.000
Firmly striking that down saying in Wipple we meant that only teachers can join and receive creditable service not that non-teachers are able to purchase the credible service.
01:17:13.000 --> 01:17:30.000
Cab also held that charter schools cannot utilize section 2028 4 to establish their own retirement system under chapter 32 so while employees of a charter school are considered public employees for purposes of collective bargaining, port liability and confidence of interest laws.
01:17:30.000 --> 01:17:39.000
The charter schools were created to have other powers available to a business corporation form under chapter 156 B.
01:17:39.000 --> 01:17:50.000
Additionally, charter schools are eligible to create their own pension plans rather than petition to establish a retirement system under a retirement system in chapter 32, section 28 4.
01:17:50.000 --> 01:18:18.000
Crap included that because charter schools are often managed by private companies and its management can vary considerably, the charter schools may not accept the provisions of chapter 32 sections one to 28 inclusive as required by section 28 4 Crab also recognized that there might be possible federal tax qualification implications for the private sector plan should charter schools be allowed to join a chapter 32 retirement system that those issues would be best addressed by the legislature.
01:18:18.000 --> 01:18:29.000
Now, when Mystic Valley Regional originally filed their appeal to crab, they had also filed an action for declaratory judgment with the superior court in February of 2,023.
01:18:29.000 --> 01:18:37.000
So the superior court case was originally stayed pending this decision from crab. Mystic Valley has officially appealed this decision.
01:18:37.000 --> 01:18:49.000
To superior court and it's now expected that the cases will be consolidated and that this will join the other action for declaratory judgment.
01:18:49.000 --> 01:18:58.000
Thank you, Felicia. So I do have a few questions for you. The first question I have, I think was actually, for Ken.
01:18:58.000 --> 01:19:07.000
Cause it's referring referencing an earlier case says if he had to increase his hours to get the cases closed.
01:19:07.000 --> 01:19:16.000
Wouldn't that qualify for increase in hours given his employer knew he worked increased hours on the weekend?
01:19:16.000 --> 01:19:17.000
Okay.
01:19:17.000 --> 01:19:23.000
I think that's actually for mine. So no, it was expected of the position in the, in the members.
01:19:23.000 --> 01:19:34.000
Job description as the I think he was a senior prosecutor. It was expected of him to be on call and report to crime scenes late at night and on the weekends.
01:19:34.000 --> 01:19:40.000
That was part of his official job duties. It wasn't any extra hours. And plus, he was not an hourly employee.
01:19:40.000 --> 01:19:44.000
He was salaried. So that's also what they focused on.
01:19:44.000 --> 01:19:53.000
Okay, thank you. Next question, how can you determine the date she waved her benefit is the date of reinstatement when she wasn't even offered the job yet.
01:19:53.000 --> 01:20:08.000
She was offered the job. She had an official job offer. It was just not starting until September 20 sixth of 2,019 but when as she was offered the job and she accepted it she immediately contacted MWRA.
01:20:08.000 --> 01:20:17.000
If the other board does not provide the proper documentation for you, for you to determine that member is an agreement as the board.
01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:28.000
Hold on, let me reread this. If the other boards does not provide the proper documentation for you to determine that member is in agreement as the board only received a blank signed form.
01:20:28.000 --> 01:20:37.000
Yes, so it is not the determination of another board to determine whether another board has entered into an agreement with a member.
01:20:37.000 --> 01:20:47.000
The MWR, the MWRA established that they received a sign form from Miss Walsh to enter into the reinstatement agreement.
01:20:47.000 --> 01:20:57.000
The NWIA determined that it was a valid Signature and a valid agreement. It was not up to the Reading Retirement Board to evaluate the terms of the agreement.
01:20:57.000 --> 01:21:03.000
That was not their purpose. They have no control over what the MWRA decided.
01:21:03.000 --> 01:21:19.000
Okay. In all section 105 reinstatement situations is the reinstatement to service date the date the reinstatement application is signed or agreement reached and not the date of returning to work.
01:21:19.000 --> 01:21:26.000
So the way the dollar case was written, the reinstatement of service date is the date that the application is signed and submitted to the board.
01:21:26.000 --> 01:21:32.000
However, the date that you're going to start recruiting reinstatement to service is going to be the day that the member starts.
01:21:32.000 --> 01:21:40.000
So in this instance, the date that her 5 years began was September, the 20 sixth, 2,019 when she was which was her first day of work.
01:21:40.000 --> 01:21:44.000
That's what Dala had clarified in the decision.
01:21:44.000 --> 01:21:51.000
Okay, and that was the final question.
01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:52.000
Absolutely.
01:21:52.000 --> 01:21:58.000
Natasha, if I could jump in. Going back to, the case I talked about about the salary increases being specified by law.
01:21:58.000 --> 01:22:15.000
Our colleague Patrick Charles texted me a reminder that the pay equity law that went into effect a few years ago that called for the increasing salaries of certain female employees to match their male counterpart salaries, which is a very good thing.
01:22:15.000 --> 01:22:25.000
You should be paid the same. But unfortunately, an unfortunate result of that is that many female employees then tripped the anti-spiking provision.
01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:37.000
So we are in the process. We've actually tried to have any, you know, increase that was that that happened because of the pay equity law should be an exception to the anti-spiking law.
01:22:37.000 --> 01:22:40.000
We're pursuing legislation on that, but as of yet, it has not passed, but we will continue to try to pursue.
01:22:40.000 --> 01:22:51.000
And speaking of, our colleague Patrick Charles. So look at what you made me. Okay. Look at this.
01:22:51.000 --> 01:22:52.000
Yeah.
01:22:52.000 --> 01:22:53.000
Okay. All right. Beautiful. Okay.
01:22:53.000 --> 01:23:03.000
Back up, can't see it. It's blurry.
01:23:03.000 --> 01:23:04.000
Okay.
01:23:04.000 --> 01:23:07.000
This, this is coming out of Christmas time. Meanwhile, I get them like a 6 pack every year, you know, like he's considered right and I'm just an inconsiderate loser.
01:23:07.000 --> 01:23:08.000
I don't get on Patrick's list.
01:23:08.000 --> 01:23:15.000
But anyway. Patrick is very talented, very talented. But anyway, sorry.
01:23:15.000 --> 01:23:16.000
Thanks. Thanks for that, Ken.
01:23:16.000 --> 01:23:17.000
You're making his head even bigger than it already is.
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Okay. Yeah.
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Okay. Alright, well thank you everyone for joining us this morning as I stated earlier any board members who have joined us live.
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I will send you the attendee list to Rose and she will update your account in prosper. Thank you, Rose.
01:23:29.000 --> 01:23:46.000
Excuse me. Thank you, Ken and Felicia, for very informative presentations. All of your the attendees we you will receive a survey in your browser when we close this window.
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We would appreciate you taking 5 min to provide us with some feedback because we're constantly looking at ways to improve these webinars for you.
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So we would appreciate you doing that now. And if you don't have time to do it now, you can do it when you receive our thank you email tomorrow.
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So again, have a great rest of your day and thanks for joining us today. Take care.
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Thank you, everyone.
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Thank you.