Amicus Announcements from September 2024 to August 2025

From time to time, the Supreme Judicial Court solicits amicus ("friend of the court") briefs or memoranda from parties not directly involved in a case, but that may have an interest or opinion about a case pending before the court.

File an Amicus Brief

Amicus briefs must comply with the requirements of Rules 17, 19, and 20 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. In order to assist the court, amicus briefs should focus on the ramifications of a decision and not solely on the interests of amici.

Interested parties may file their briefs in the Supreme Judicial Court Clerk's Office for the Commonwealth.

June 2025

SJC-1378
David M. Sabatini v. Kristin A. Knouse & others

1. Whether a claim under G. L. c. 214, § 1C, for sexual harassment in the educational context must be brought against the educational institution and not against an individual.

SJC-13779
Impounded Case

1. Whether a police officer acted lawfully under the doctrine of community caretaking by ordering a sixteen-year-old juvenile to exit a vehicle during a motor vehicle stop, on the basis that the officer recognized the juvenile as having been reported missing.
2. Whether the police officer acted lawfully under the doctrine of community caretaking by patfrisking the juvenile before transporting him to the police station for retrieval by a legal guardian; including whether, or under what circumstances, it is permissible for police to patfrisk an individual before transporting him or her for community caretaking purposes.

May 2025

SJC-13777
Matthew Ortins & others vs. Lincoln Apartment Management, LP & others

1. Where Mass. R. Civ. P 23 (e) provides that "where residual funds [in a class action settlement] remain, no judgment may enter or compromise be approved unless the plaintiff has given notice to the Massachusetts IOLTA Committee for the limited purpose of allowing the committee to be heard on whether it ought to be a recipient of any or all residual funds," and where a class action settlement potentially includes residual funds, (a) whether the failure to notify IOLTA violates the rule; (b) whether, if so, what remedy is available to address the violation; and (c) whether IOLTA has standing to appeal from a judgment approving the final distribution of settlement funds. 
2. Whether the proposed settlement agreement in this case, involving violations of the Massachusetts Security Deposit Law, G. L. c. 186, § 15B, was fair, reasonable and adequate.

SJC-13778
Armand Fontaine, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Barbara Ellen Fontaine vs. Philip Morris USA, Inc. & others

1. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial, rather than a remittitur, on the ground that jury’s award of one billion dollars in punitive damages was motivated by passion and prejudice; whether the remitted award, which is seven times the amount of compensatory damages, is constitutionally excessive and should be reduced.
2. Whether a trial judge must impose safeguards to prevent an excessive punitive damages award, namely, (1) a requirement that a punitive damages award must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, as the appellant contends is required in a majority of States outside Massachusetts, and (2) bifurcation of the trial to separate the assessment of the amount of punitive damages from the other issues in the case.
3. Whether the jury should have been instructed that the warnings mandated by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (Labeling Act), are adequate as a matter of law to warn consumers, including the plaintiff’s decedent, about the risks of smoking, where there was evidence that the defendant failed to give warnings beyond those mandated by Congress and used advertising that undermined those warnings; whether such evidence was improperly admitted at trial because the Labeling Act preempts the imposition of liability for failure to include additional or more clearly stated warnings.

April 2025

SJC-13767
Commonwealth vs. Donta L. Lewis

1. Whether the Superior Court judge erred in dismissing so much of the charge of carrying a firearm without a license as alleged more than one previous qualifying conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10G, where the judge concluded that the defendant's three prior convictions -- as to which the offenses were committed (and the prosecutions commenced) separately and sequentially, but as to which the judgments of conviction and accompanying sentences were all imposed subsequent to the latest of the three dates of offense -- did not constitute "separate incidences" under § 10G.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455 (2016).   

SJC-13768
Commonwealth vs. Richard Arnold, Sr.

1. Whether the hearing judge erred -- after a hearing conducted in 2024 pursuant to Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689 (2019) -- in his evaluation of the factors relevant to a determination of whether the imposition of GPS monitoring on the defendant for the duration of a 10-year probationary term imposed as part of the defendant's 2012 sentence comports with art. 14.

SJC-13769
Attorney General vs. Mystic Valley Regional Charter School

1. Whether a “commonwealth charter school,” as defined by G. L. c. 71, § 89 (c), is subject to the provisions of the Massachusetts Public Records Law, G. L. c. 66, § 1, et seq., such that it must respond to public records requests.

March 2025

SJC-13758                  
In Re: Impounded Matter

Where the Department of Children and Families has taken a newborn child into custody outside of Massachusetts on the basis that the department has reasonable cause to believe that the child's health or safety is in immediate danger from abuse or neglect pursuant to G. L. c. 119,     § 51B; and where the department brings the newborn child across State lines and into Massachusetts, whether the Juvenile Court may exercise jurisdiction over the child pursuant to G. L. c. 209B, the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

SJC-13756
Commonwealth vs. Daryen T. Robinson

1. Whether the motion judge erred by denying in part the defendant’s motion to suppress, where defendant contends that police unlawfully extended a routine traffic stop without reasonable suspicion, deviated from the stop’s valid traffic enforcement purpose by asking for consent to search the vehicle, and searched the vehicle without valid consent.
2. Whether the judge erred in permitting the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory strike on a Black juror, purportedly based on his employment as an engineer, only after the prosecutor agreed also to strike a white engineer he had not intended to challenge. 

SJC-13753      
Commonwealth vs. Kenneth Rodriguez

1. Assuming the defendant’s version of events is true, is transferred intent self-defense an available defense in the Commonwealth and, if so, does it present a complete defense or only a partial defense? 
2. If it is a complete or partial defense, what instructions should the trial judge give to the jury regarding the nature of the defense and its limits?

SJC-13754
Thomas Galvin vs. Roxbury Community College et al.

Whether the Superior Court erred in ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether he engaged in whistleblowing as defined in G. L. c. 149, § 185 (b) (3), of the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act, including: (1) whether the requirement under § 185 (b) (3), that an employee “reasonably believe[]” an activity violates the law, is satisfied per se where it is undisputed that the activity in question violated the law; and (2) whether a plaintiff must demonstrate that he acted in good faith to establish that his conduct falls within the definition of whistleblowing set forth in § 185 (b) (3), and if so, whether such a good faith requirement is satisfied per se where it is undisputed that the activity in question violated the law.

SJC-13755      
Mario Nicosia, Trustee of the N&M Trust VII et al. vs. Burn, LLC et al.

1. Whether the motion judge erred in rejecting the defendants' argument that the provision of the lease restricting the pledging or assignment of a license to sell all alcoholic beverages was unenforceable as a matter of public policy; 
2. Whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the defendants violated G. L. c. 93A, § 11, including whether the representation made in the defendants' pledge agreement that the pledge of a license to sell all alcoholic beverages did not violate or constitute a default under the terms of any agreement was an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that provision, where the pledge agreement was submitted to regulators; and
3. Whether the trial judge erred in concluding that a license to sell all alcoholic beverages was the appropriate subject of a claim for conversion.

SJC-13750      
Commonwealth vs. Scott A. McCaffrey

1. Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the defendant’s indictments from alleging violations of G. L. c. 265, § 23A (b), to alleging violations of G. L. c. 265, § 23A (a), where the defendant contends that the amendments were not amendments as to form but impermissible amendments as to substance.
2. Whether as to each of the charges of violating G. L. c. 265, § 23A (a), the trial judge erred by refusing to issue a jury instruction requested by the defendant as to the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, including whether the element differentiating those crimes was sufficiently disputed.

SJC-13749      
Quinteasha Dossantos vs. Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital-Milton, Inc. & others

Whether the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint, including: whether the court erred or abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to impound her medical records, which, the plaintiff contends, inappropriately deprived her of the opportunity to present the records in support of her offer of proof before the medical malpractice tribunal; whether this court should reconsider best practices for impoundment in medical malpractice cases, both at the preliminary stage of the filing of the offer of proof pursuant to Superior Court Rule 73 and at later stages in the litigation, given the widespread transition to electronic medical records and the increased availability of court filings online; and whether, even in the absence of the medical records in this case, the plaintiff’s offer of proof was sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that “the evidence presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry,” G. L. c. 231, § 60B.  See Superior Court Rule 73.

SJC-13747      
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al. 

Whether, under the doctrine of present execution, this interlocutory appeal is properly before the court on the ground that the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (1), provides an immunity from suit and not merely an immunity from liability; and, if the interlocutory appeal is proper, whether the defendants are immune from suit under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c) (1), where the Commonwealth alleges that the defendants violated G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and created a public nuisance by designing and using addictive design features on Instagram to exploit children’s psychological vulnerabilities and that they falsely represented to the public that their features were not addictive and that they prioritized youth health and safety.

February 2025

SJC-13545       
In the Matter of Edward A. Sargent

Whether the sanction of disbarment imposed here is “markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in other cases involving similar circumstances” or whether the decision of the single justice “will result in a substantial injustice,” S.J.C. Rule 2:23; including, where the presumptive sanction for this type of misconduct has been described as “disbarment or indefinite suspension,” e.g., Matter of Schoepfer, 426, Mass. 183, 187 (1997), which factors should guide a determination as to whether disbarment or indefinite suspension is appropriate.

SJC-13735      
Commonwealth vs. Elana Gordon

Whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), clarifying the application of the Confrontation Clause in cases where an expert witness restates an absent drug analyst’s factual assertions to support the expert witness’s own opinion testimony, the testimony of the substitute analyst at the defendant’s trial regarding certain drug evidence, where the analyst who conducted the testing was unavailable, violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.

SJC-13740      
Jean Bennett vs. Jeff Herbst, M.D. & others

Whether the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint against defendant Michael Collins, N.P., and in entering separate and final judgment in favor of defendant Collins, including:  (1) whether the medical malpractice tribunal erred in finding that the plaintiff’s offer of proof failed to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry as to defendant Collins; (2) whether the tribunal inappropriately based its finding on arguments that, the plaintiff contends, were waived by defendant Collins for failure to raise them in his demand pursuant to Superior Court Rule 73; (3) whether the tribunal based its finding on inappropriate considerations of law or other matters outside the authority of the tribunal; (4) whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s emergency motion to reduce the bond required by G. L. c. 231, § 60 (b), based on a conclusory determination that “based on an evaluation of the offer of proof, a reasonable litigant of means would not expend their own funds to pay a bond”; and (5) whether the Superior Court and the tribunal erred in issuing an effectively dispositive finding against the plaintiff without issuing any statement or making any findings on the record as to the alleged deficiencies in the plaintiff's offer of proof, thereby precluding effective appellate review.

SJC-13739      
IMPOUNDED

Whether it is lawful to impose a continuance without a finding, where a juvenile has admitted to sufficient facts to support delinquency charges of carrying a firearm without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and carrying a loaded firearm without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).

SJC-13741      
Phyllis Cardillo vs. Monsanto Company & others

As reported by the single justice of the Appeals Court:  “Where a plaintiff alleges injury caused by the harmful effects of a pesticide, does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., preempt common-law tort claims against the manufacturer based on the manufacturer’s negligent or intentional failure to warn of the product’s harmful effects?”

SJC-13736     
IMPOUNDED

Whether the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) properly considered evidence that the offender committed repeated offenses after having time to reflect under factor 37 of its regulations, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (37) (“any information that [the SORB] deems useful in determining risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness”), where such evidence cannot be considered as “repetitive and compulsive behavior” under factor 2, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2). See Doe No. 6729 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 490 Mass. 759 (2022).

SJC-13738      
Wendell Tang, M.D vs. President and Fellows of Harvard College & others   

Whether the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment to the President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) and two of its administrators on the plaintiff’s negligence claims, where the Superior Court concluded that Harvard owed only a limited, time-bound duty of care to the student upon learning of his suicide attempt, and that this duty was satisfied by Harvard’s actions immediately thereafter, including:  whether the defendants’ duty of care continued beyond the student’s discharge from McLean Hospital, and if so, whether or when such a duty was extinguished; and whether the defendants voluntarily assumed an additional duty of care by entering into a “care contract” with the student that required him to engage in mental health treatment as a condition of continued enrollment.

SJC-13737      
Commonwealth vs. Skipper Carino

Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant violated a provision of an abuse prevention order, obtained under G. L. c. 209A, that required him to “stay away” from the victim’s residence, where the defendant was arrested on the sidewalk in front of a private residence with a backyard abutting the backyard of the victim’s apartment building.

SJC-13701
Commonwealth vs. Cory Alvarez

The Justices are soliciting amicus briefs. Whether the single justice erred or abused his discretion in denying relief from an order of the Superior Court, increasing the defendant's bail from $500 cash to $150,000 cash, primarily on the ground that the defendant faced imminent deportation from the United States. 

SJC-13721
Town of Concord vs. Neil E. Rasmussen & others

Whether the Land Court erred in concluding that the disputed sections of Estabrook Road in Concord were laid out as a public way and became a public way by prescription, and also that the 1932 discontinuance order of the Middlesex county commissioners pursuant to G. L. c. 82, § 32A, inserted by St. 1924, c. 289, ended the town’s obligation to maintain Estabrook Road, but did not end the right of the public to access and use Estabrook Road.

SJC-13731
Commonwealth vs. Jairin Perez

1. Whether and by what procedures resentencing is appropriate where a defendant was sentenced for multiple offenses but where at least one of his sentences was unconstitutional pursuant to Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216 (2024); and
2. Where the defendant, who was an emerging adult at the time he committed the crimes, was originally sentenced to two concurrent life sentences and unconstitutionally denied the possibility of parole, whether it would violate his protections against double jeopardy to resentence him to two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole.

January 2025

SJC-13726 
James M. Ryan vs. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp.

Whether the defendant, an assisted living residence (ALR), violated the security deposit statute, G. L. c. 186, § 15B, by charging new residents an upfront "community fee," in violation of Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612 (2019) (Ryan I), or whether the fees in question were proper because they were used to fund services designed specifically for assisted living residences; whether the trial court properly assessed the fees in question in concluding that the fees violated the security deposit statute and in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

SJC-13727                  
Commonwealth vs. Nathaniel Rodriguez

Where a police officer created a Snapchat account and became “friends” with the defendant; and where video posted to the defendant’s Snapchat account led to certain firearms charges against the defendant, whether the defendant sufficiently raised an inference of selective enforcement, in violation of his equal protection rights and pursuant to Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (2020).

SJC-13720                  
Commonwealth vs. Jorge L. Santana

Whether the motion judge erred in denying without a hearing the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea on the grounds that the judge did not credit the affidavit of the defendant, and further, that he did not credit the affidavit of the defendant's plea counsel in light of the latter's representation during the plea colloquy that he had discussed with the defendant "any immigration consequences . . . pursuant to Commonwealth [v.] Clark[e]," 460 Mass. 30 (2011).

SJC-13722    
Commonwealth vs. Michael J. Wurtzberger

Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant ‘operated’ a motor vehicle ‘while under the influence’ of alcohol, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), where the defendant was found intoxicated, sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked van that he had been living out of for multiple days, with the radio on.

SJC-13725      
IMPOUNDED

Whether a hearing examiner of the Sex Offender Registry Board erred in applying regulatory risk factor three (adult offender with child victim), factor seven (stranger victim), or factor twenty-two (number of victims), set forth in 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33, based on the plaintiff responding to a fake online advertisement for commercial sex with two adult women, where the plaintiff was later told that the subjects of the advertisement were fifteen years old and still made plans to meet them, but where the victims were fictitious.

SJC-13728          
Commonwealth vs. Adonis L. Carvajal

(1) Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth’s motion to compel a DNA sample after evidence obtained from an earlier DNA sample obtained by police was suppressed, including whether the motion judge applied the correct standard in analyzing this issue; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on a definition of serious bodily injury as relevant to the charge of aggravated rape in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a), including whether this issue was preserved.

SJC-13724      
Commonwealth vs. John C. Larace                                           

Whether the Superior Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion, and renewed motion, to dismiss under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, where the defendant contends there were 220 days of unjustified delay in bringing him to trial, even excluding court-imposed COVID-19 tolling periods; and if not, whether the defendant is entitled to relief based on his argument – raised for the first time on appeal – that his Federal and State constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated, including whether and to what extent court-imposed COVID-19 delays factor into the constitutional speedy-trial analysis.

SJC-13706      
Commonwealth v. Gary Mosso

Whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, where, in a prosecution for murder in the first degree, trial counsel failed to pursue plea negotiations with the District Attorney’s Office as the defendant requested.

December 2024

SJC-13705      
Commonwealth vs. Mark Gravito

Where a defendant in a particular criminal case was convicted of at least one charge and acquitted of one or more charges, whether and to what extent his appellate counsel may access court records of the defendant's criminal case sealed automatically pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C, first par., on the ground that the records are associated with the charges of which the defendant was acquitted.

SJC-13709      
Carlos Nunez vs. Syncsort Incorporated & another

Whether, once the plaintiff/employee met all the conditions required to receive a retention bonus pursuant to an agreement with the defendant/employer, that bonus constituted an earned wage for purposes of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148.

SJC-13710      
Tody’s Service, Inc. vs. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing summary judgment for the defendant/insurer, including whether the motion judge erred in concluding: (1) that, pursuant to G. L. c. 159B, § 6B, in a suit alleging breach of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment against a defendant/insurer, arising from a plaintiff/towing company’s storage, at the request of the police during the years-long pendency of a criminal case, of a vehicle insured and later owned by the defendant, the plaintiff’s potential recovery was not limited as a matter of law to the fair market value of the vehicle under Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 195 (1990); (2) but that the summary judgment record in this case contained no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s storage of the vehicle conferred a benefit on the defendant, thus warranting judgment for the defendant/insurer on these claims; and (3) that G. L. c. 159B, § 6B, does not create a private right of action for an aggrieved towing company such as the plaintiff.

SJC-13712       
Jeff Stacy vs. Unitil Corporation & another

Where the Governor’s March 2020 “Order Assuring Continued Operation of Essential Services in the Commonwealth, Closing Certain Workplaces, and Prohibiting Gatherings of More than 10 People,” COVID-19 Order No. 13, designated certain workers to be “essential,” whether the Governor’s subsequent “Order Authorizing the Re-Opening of Phase II Enterprises,” COVID-19 Order No. 37, which became effective in June 2020, rescinded the essential worker designations set forth in Order No. 13; and where, if an employee was an “essential” worker at the time he contracted COVID-19 in the course of his employment in February 2021, and where the employee has been unable to return to work, whether the employee has a “personal injury” for purposes of receiving workers compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 152.

SJC-13711      
Commonwealth vs. Erik A. Ferrara

Whether the failure to instruct the jury as to the Commonwealth’s burden to prove that the defendant lacked a firearms license was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where the defendant was a convicted felon and therefore prohibited from legally possessing a firearm, but where evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions was excluded from evidence at trial.

SJC-13702 
Branda Peebles & another vs. JRK Property Holdings, Inc. & others

1. When a tenant vacates a premises at the end of a lease, whether and under what circumstances, if any, charging the tenant for painting, carpet repair or similar refurbishment constitutes a deduction for “reasonable wear and tear” in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 15B (4).
2. Whether inclusion of a provision in a lease requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease or to bear the costs of later repairs constitutes a violation of G. L. c. 186, § 15B (4)?

SJC-13686
Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund vs. Workers Compensation Trust Fund 

1. Whether under G. L. c. 152, §§ 34B and 65, an insolvent insurer in “run-off,” i.e., administering its workers’ compensation policies but no longer issuing new policies and no longer paying assessments into the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (WCTF), is entitled to reimbursement from WCTF for cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payments made on the insolvent insurer's policies; and
2. if so, whether under G. L. c. 175D, § 5 (1), the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund is permitted to step into the shoes of such an insolvent insurer for the purposes of obtaining those reimbursements.  The case will be paired with No. SJC-13696, Arrowood Indemnity Company vs Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, for oral argument.

SJC-13696       
Arrowood Indemnity Company vs. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund

Whether under G. L. c. 152, §§ 37 and 65, an insolvent insurer in “run-off,” i.e., administering its workers' compensation policies but no longer issuing new policies and no longer paying assessments into the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (WCTF), is entitled to reimbursement from WCTF for second-injury benefit payments made on the insolvent insurer's policies.  The case will be paired with No. SJC-13686, Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund vs. Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund, for oral argument.

SJC-13687      
Bharathan Jeevanandam vs. Vanikala Bharathan; Dept. of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division, third party defendant

Whether the Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division, has the authority to enforce a judge’s order that a parent repay overpayments of child support, where the payor’s child support obligation was terminated nunc pro tunc to an earlier date.

SJC-13697
Susan Miele vs. Foundation Medicine, Inc.

Whether the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, G. L. c. 149, § 24L, applies to a non-solicitation agreement incorporated into a termination agreement, where the termination agreement includes a forfeiture provision in the event that the employee breaches the non-solicitation agreement.

SJC- 13698
Commonwealth vs. William C. Foley

1. Whether the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the criminal complaint on the ground that the Dedham police department violated G. L. c. 90C, § 2, in issuing the citation to the defendant.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 23, third par., where the evidence supported findings that:  the defendant’s license to operate was initially suspended for a term of years for violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24G, which is a predicate offense enumerated in § 23, third par.; the relevant term of years expired prior to the date of the alleged violation of § 23, third par.; but the defendant’s license to operate remained suspended as of the date of the alleged offense due to the imposition of a lifetime suspension pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (c) (4).

SJC- 13699
Commonwealth vs. Boima Collins

1. Whether the trial judge erred by admitting in evidence the certified copy of a docket, as redacted, reflecting a prior felony conviction of the defendant, which evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that the defendant was ineligible to obtain the relevant firearms license.  See Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023).
2. Whether the trial judge erred by failing sufficiently to instruct the jury regarding the burden of proof on the question of whether the defendant was the person convicted of the prior felony offense.
3. Whether the evidence sufficed to establish that the defendant was the person convicted of the prior felony offense.

October 2024

SJC-13688
Anne Weiss & others vs. President & Fellows of Harvard College & others

Whether the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act’s “good faith” immunity provision --G. L. c. 113A, § 18 (a) -- which provides that “[a] person who acts in accordance with this chapter or with the applicable anatomical gift law of another state or who attempts in good faith to do so, shall not be liable for the act in a civil action,” applies to all aspects of an anatomical gift program, including the disposition of donated bodies or remains after they are no longer needed, or whether the provision only applies to the transactional aspects of making the anatomical gift.

SJC-13689
Massachusetts Teachers Association vs. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board 
and
SJC-13690
Massachusetts Teachers Association vs. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board

Where the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board) has found that the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA) induced, encouraged or condoned a public employee strike -- a teachers strike -- in violation of G. L. c. 150E, § 9A (a); where the board ordered the MTA to cease and desist; and where the board then commenced a proceeding in the Superior Court seeking a preliminary injunction and enforcement of the cease and desist order, whether the MTA has a right to certiorari review pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, of the board’s decision, or whether the enforcement proceeding precludes certiorari review because the enforcement proceeding provides a reasonably adequate remedy.

SJC-13665           
IMPOUNDED

Where G. L. c. 209C, § 11, provides that unless a written voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is rescinded within 60 days of the date of signing, “the acknowledgment shall establish paternity as of the date it has been signed by such putative father and mother and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of paternity, subject to challenge within one year only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact,” whether a court may, pursuant to its general equity jurisdiction or otherwise, order an acknowledgment vacated several years after signing where both parties to the agreement wish to have the acknowledgment vacated and where the mother seeks to have the actual biological father adjudicated the father. 

September 2024

SJC-13647      
Commonwealth vs. Sean Tanner

Whether G. L. c. 278A permits postconviction forensic testing where the defendant dies after such testing is ordered but before it is completed.

SJC-13651      
H1 Lincoln, Inc. vs. South Washington Street, LLC & others

Whether the accrual of statutory postjudgment interest terminates when a losing party pays a prevailing party the judgment directly and in full while also reserving a right of appeal.

SJC-13654      
Commonwealth vs. David K. Njuguna

Whether this court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 394 (1981), in which a conviction of negligent motor vehicle homicide was deemed to be duplicative of a conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on the same criminal act, remains good law after Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431-435 (2009); and if so, whether this court should continue to adhere to the holding of Jones.

SJC-13652      
Commonwealth vs. Brendan J. Garofalo (and nine companion cases)

Whether there was probable cause to indict the defendants for trafficking of persons for sexual servitude under G. L. c. 265, § 50, where the defendants allegedly responded to an advertisement and contracted to pay a fee for sexual services.

SJC-13655      
City of Newton vs. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board

Whether, in a case concerning alleged retaliation for engaging in union activity under G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (3), the involuntary transfer of a police officer from the day shift to the night shift constituted an adverse employment action, where the applicable collective bargaining agreement provided that the transfer came with a bargained-for increase in pay.

SJC-13656      
Commonwealth vs. Victor Mercedes

Whether a search authorized by an anticipatory warrant is constitutional where the triggering event described in the affidavit does not occur, but where the affidavit provides probable cause to search.

SJC-13659      
Commonwealth vs. Denny Gannett

Whether an order suppressing a blood sample taken from the defendant and any analysis thereof performed by the State police prohibits the use of the results of serum alcohol testing performed for medical purposes and recorded in the defendant’s medical records to compute a whole blood alcohol concentration level.

Whether G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), requires the defendant’s consent to convert serum alcohol results recorded in the defendant’s medical records to a whole blood alcohol concentration.

SJC-13666      
Jaklin Suzeth Gotay & others vs. Kimberly Malpass & others

Whether social workers employed by the Department of Children and Families are entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims arising from injuries suffered by a child in foster care on the ground that their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Whether a child placed by the Commonwealth in a foster home has a clearly established substantive due process right to a safe living environment due to a special relationship between the Commonwealth and a foster child.

Whether, for purposes of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims, the proper legal standard is whether the social workers acted with deliberate indifference that shocks the conscience, see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), or whether their conduct amounted to an absence of professional judgment, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

SJC-13671      
480 McClellan, LLC vs. Board of Assessors of Boston

Whether the Appellate Tax Board erred in concluding that the appellant was not exempt from the taxation of real property that it leased from the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), including:  (1) whether 1993 H.B. 5379, § 53, a proposed legislative amendment concerning the taxation of Massport property, has the effect of law, where the Legislature voted to override the Governor’s veto of § 53, but where a Senator moved for reconsideration of the Senate override vote, and the Senate never acted upon the motion; and (2) whether G. L. c. 59, § 2B, is applicable to the taxation of real property owned by Massport.

SJC-13667      
Commonwealth vs. McCarthy

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress, where the judge determined that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the defendant’s phone, but concluded that the Lowell detective who seized the phone had no extraterritorial authority to do so in New Hampshire, including:  whether Massachusetts law or New Hampshire law governs the issue of whether the seizure was lawful, and whether the evidence must be suppressed.

SJC-13668      
IMPOUNDED 

Whether the children’s petitions for guardianship, proposing their out-of-State relatives as guardians, were properly denied on the ground that, where the receiving State had previously determined that one of the proposed guardians was ineligible to adopt, placing the children there would subvert the intention of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. 

SJC-13670      
Commonwealth vs. Quentin Smith

Whether testimony from an employee of the Department of Criminal Justice Information Services (DCJIS), who testified that his query of a certain records database returned no firearms licensing information for the defendant, was admissible at trial, and whether it sufficed to establish the absence of the relevant firearms license(s) as required by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and by this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024), including whether and to what extent evidence was required to establish the defendant’s birthdate and the spelling of his name where those criteria were used to run the search.

SJC-13672      
IMPOUNDED

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the joint motion of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Child to proceed with childhood vaccinations and immunizations for the Child, who was in the temporary custody of DCF, over the religious objections of the Child’s Mother and Father, including whether the motion judge applied the proper standard in allowing the motion.

SJC-13669      
William P. O’Donnell vs. John J. Cronin & others

Where G. L. c. 35, § 32, provides that, for sums appropriated to a county, “[t]ransfers within an appropriation between classes and between subclasses within a main group may be made by the authorized official of the organizational unit whenever in his opinion public necessity and convenience so requires,” whether, and if so how and to what extent, the authorized official must justify his or her opinion that “public necessity and convenience” requires such a transfer.

SJC-13664      
Commonwealth vs. Antonio B. Nascimento-Depina

Whether, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. ___ (2024), clarifying the application of the Confrontation Clause in cases where an expert witness restates an absent lab analyst’s factual assertions to support the expert witness’s own opinion testimony, allowing a substitute analyst to testify at the defendant’s trial regarding certain DNA evidence, where the analyst who conducted the testing was unavailable, violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.