Amicus Announcements from September 2025 to August 2026

From time to time, the Supreme Judicial Court solicits amicus ("friend of the court") briefs or memoranda from parties not directly involved in a case, but that may have an interest or opinion about a case pending before the court.

File an Amicus Brief

Amicus briefs must comply with the requirements of Rules 17, 19, and 20 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. In order to assist the court, amicus briefs should focus on the ramifications of a decision and not solely on the interests of amici.

Interested parties may file their briefs in the Supreme Judicial Court Clerk's Office for the Commonwealth.

September 2025

SJC-13827
Commonwealth vs. Domingo Agostini

Whether the orders committing the defendant for dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, should be vacated, including whether the defendant, who was charged with armed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17, and making a bomb or hijack threat, in violation of   G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), was charged with a crime that qualified as a predicate offense under§ 58A.
 

SJC-13820    
Commissioner of Correction vs. M.B. 

What standard of proof applies when, pursuant to Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255 (1979), the Department of Correction petitions for an order authorizing the use of involuntary medical treatment, including force-feeding, because it claims that such treatment is reasonably necessary to save an incarcerated person's life.

SJC-13823
Commonwealth vs. Jose N. Solis

Where the police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to an arrest, and where there is a lengthy delay (here, 110 days) between the date that the police seize the phone and the date that the police apply for, and receive, a search warrant to search the phone, (1) whether the delay is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether, or how, the facts that the Commonwealth will retain possession of the phone until trial because the phone itself may have independent evidentiary value or that the defendant has not asked for the phone to be returned are relevant to the consideration whether the delay is unreasonable and a violation of the defendant's rights.

SJC-13822
David Pratt, Chief of the Holyoke Police Department, as Licensing Authority vs. Randy Westbrook

Whether the district court judge erred in concluding that the defendant's rights pursuant to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by statutory language, contained in the then-applicable version of G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), prohibiting the issuance of a license to carry firearms to an applicant determined "unsuitable . . . based on reliable, articulable and credible information that the applicant . . . has exhibited or engaged in behavior that suggests that, if issued a license, the applicant . . . may create a risk to public safety or a risk of danger to self or others."

SJC-13819
J.C. Cannistraro, LLC vs. Columbia Construction Co. et. al

In an arbitration proceeding deciding a dispute regarding a construction contract governed by the prompt pay act, G. L. c. 149, § 29E, whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in allowing the respondent to bring a counterclaim for recoupment, where the respondent had not paid the amount demanded at the time it raised its affirmative defenses, but later paid that amount when ordered to do so by the arbitrator, and thereafter sought recoupment; including, whether allowing the respondent to bring the later recoupment claim was contrary to the holding of Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Constr. Co., 494 Mass. 216, 225-228 (2024).

SJC-13816
Commonwealth vs. Jose Arias

1. Whether a judge in the Superior Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a traffic stop, where the traffic infraction used to justify the stop occurred one day prior to the stop, including:  (a) whether the delay in initiating the traffic stop rendered the stop unreasonable, see Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 353-354 (2022); (b) whether the pretextual nature of the stop violated art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (c) whether police lacked probable cause to believe the defendant failed to stop for police, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 25; (d) whether G. L. c. 90, § 25, is void for vagueness; (e) whether the defendant’s arrest was unreasonable under art. 14; and (f) whether the defendant’s arrest was pretextual, and if so, whether the pretextual nature of the arrest violated art. 14.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s request for a voir dire of a juror who submitted a post-verdict letter concerning jury deliberations.

SJC-13825    
Kevin C. Robinson vs. Town of Marshfield et. al

1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of liability on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s award of $1.1 million in punitive damages on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151B.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, where the parties agree that the jury were erroneously instructed under both the “mixed motive” framework articulated in Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 666-670 (2000), as well as the traditional pretext framework, including:  whether the jury should have been instructed on the mixed motive framework at the request of the employer, even though the evidence of retaliatory animus was circumstantial in nature.  Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-101 (2003).
4. Whether it was error to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.

SJC-13821
William E. O’Connor vs. MAG Mutual Insurance Co.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that disciplinary proceedings initiated against a plaintiff-doctor were not covered by his professional insurance policy because the underlying allegations did not arise out of the doctor’s professional services, see Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 48-54 (1992), where it was alleged, among other things, that the doctor repeatedly prescribed an addictive medication to a patient, with whom he was in a romantic relationship, as leverage to make the patient dependent on him and to discourage her from leaving the relationship.
 

SJC-13824    
Committee for Public Counsel Services vs. Middlesex and Suffolk County District Courts and another

In light of the scope of the present shortage of available defense counsel in the District Courts of Middlesex and Suffolk County and in the Boston Municipal Court, whether and under what circumstances the Supreme Judicial Court, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, or any justice of any trial court department is authorized to order increased compensation rates beyond those provided in G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (a), for attorneys accepting representation of indigent criminal defendants.
 

SJC- 13817
Commonwealth vs. Sambath Chhieng

Whether the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his 2015 admission to sufficient facts; including, whether the plea judge’s immigration warnings during the 2015 plea colloquy were sufficient to comply with G. L. c. 278, s. 29D, see Commonwealth v. Petit-Homme, 482 Mass. 775 (2019); and whether the defendant satisfied his burden to show “more than a hypothetical risk” of the relevant immigration consequence occurring, by showing “either that the Federal government has taken some step toward deporting him or that its express written policy calls for the initiation of deportation proceedings against him.”  Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 134-136 (2010).