Amicus Announcements from September 2025 to August 2026

From time to time, the Supreme Judicial Court solicits amicus ("friend of the court") briefs or memoranda from parties not directly involved in a case, but that may have an interest or opinion about a case pending before the court.

File an Amicus Brief

Amicus briefs must comply with the requirements of Rules 17, 19, and 20 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. In order to assist the court, amicus briefs should focus on the ramifications of a decision and not solely on the interests of amici.

Interested parties may file their briefs in the Supreme Judicial Court Clerk's Office for the Commonwealth.

November 2025

SJC-13855
Commonwealth vs. Shu Feng Hsu

1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter based on theories of battery and wanton or reckless conduct.
2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting expert testimony that the infant’s injuries were “consistent” with “abusive head trauma,” as well as expert testimony that the injuries were not consistent with a short fall.

SJC-13852                  
Commonwealth vs. Jose M. Shaw

Whether the trial judge erred in admitting in evidence a purportedly certified Massachusetts court record, which document was embossed on all pages with the seal of the court and signed by the clerk-magistrate on the first five of its nine pages, where the defendant contends that the document was not attested, including whether, if the admission was erroneous, it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

SJC-13854                  
IMPOUNDED           

Whether the Juvenile Court judge erred in revoking upon reconsideration his order expunging a harassment prevention order, issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, as to a defendant who was then nine years old, where the judge had since found that the allegations on which the harassment prevention order was based were unsupported by the evidence, and where his reconsideration and revocation of the expungement order was based on his finding that the harassment prevention order nevertheless was not obtained through a fraud on the court, including whether the judge was authorized to expunge the harassment prevention order issued against the child even if it was not obtained through a fraud on the court.

SJC-13856                  
Commonwealth vs. Mikai P. Thomson

Where G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), prohibits an individual under the age of twenty-one from obtaining a license to carry a firearm, whether that provision is unconstitutional; and, where the defendant, who is under the age of twenty-one, did not apply for a firearms license, whether he is entitled to raise an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.

SJC-13857 
Mahabub Khoda vs. Bangladesh Association of New England, Inc. et al.

Where a plaintiff in a successful civil contempt proceeding is entitled to an award of attorney's fees; where the party held in contempt is a charitable organization; and where G. L. c. 231, § 85K, provides that "liability [in certain actions involving a charitable organization] shall not exceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars," whether the twenty thousand dollar cap on damages applies to the award of attorney's fees.

SJC-13840         
Town of Marshfield et al. vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al.

Whether the MBTA Communities Act, G. L. c. 40A, § 3A, and regulations promulgated thereunder constitute an unfunded mandate, see G. L. c. 29, § 27C, on the cities and towns required to comply with it.

SJC-13841         
Crown Communities, LLC vs. Pocasset Park Association, Inc. et al.

Where the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A - 32S, provides, in § 32R (c), that resident owners in the manufactured housing community shall have a right of first refusal before the manufactured housing community may be sold, what constitutes a valid offer to purchase including what constitutes (1) "reasonable evidence" that the requisite percentage of residents have approved the purchase, as required by the act; and (2) a proposed purchase and sale on "substantially equivalent terms and conditions" to that of the third party bona fide offer.

SJC-13842         
Commonwealth vs. Scott M. Grimaldi 

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant's motion to suppress police body-worn camera (bodycam) footage from a sobriety checkpoint, on the basis that it constituted a secret recording in violation of the wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99: including, whether the motion judge erred in finding that police failed to comply with their department's bodycam policies, and if not, what relevance, if any, an officer's non-compliance with departmental policy has in determining whether bodycam footage should be suppressed under G. L. c. 272, § 99 P.

SJC-13843         
Watermark LLC vs. RH Benea Cranberry Co. Inc. et al.

Whether the Superior Court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on claims concerning the town's right of first refusal under G. L. c. 61A, § 14, where the town received notice of an intent to sell agricultural land (Notice) stating that the plaintiff-buyer "seek[s] to subdivide" a small portion of the land and maintain the rest for agricultural use, and where the buyer and seller later sent a joint withdrawal of the Notice in which they asserted that the plaintiff-buyer "does not intend on currently seeking a change in" the existing agricultural use; including: (a) whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the town's right to be notified of the sale under G. L. c. 61A, § 14 was triggered; (b) whether the Notice was ambiguous as to whether the sale was intended for a non-agricultural use, and if so, what effect, if any, such ambiguity has on the town's right of first refusal; and (c) whether, insofar as the town's right of first refusal remains valid, it may purchase only that portion of the land intended for non-agricultural use, rather than the entire parcel, see Town of Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 296 n.11, 302 n.19 (2003).

SJC-13844         
Town of Nahant vs. Northeastern University et al.

1. Whether the motion judge erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and thereby dismissing the plaintiff-town's petition for authorization to take land by eminent domain under G. L. c. 80A, based upon the judge's conclusion that the taking was pretextual and bad faith under Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Burlington, 399 Mass. 771, 774-780 (1987).
2. Whether G. L. c. 80A, § 13, authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees and expert fees.

SJC-13845         
Helen Banevicius et al. vs. Town of Barnstable et al.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims for declaratory relief and relief in the nature of mandamus arising from the sale of property classified and taxed as agricultural or horticultural under G. L. c. 61A without compliance with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 61A, § 14, where the plaintiffs are abutters to the property and a nonprofit corporation organized for the preservation, protection, and maintenance of the property.
2. Whether abutters to property subject to G. L. c. 61A are presumed to have standing to challenge a sale or conversion to a non-agricultural or non-horticultural use.

SJC-13846
IMPOUNDED

Where the Department of Children and Families has placed children in its care in a foster home and subsequently removes the children from that placement to a different foster home; where the first foster parent seeks a Fair Hearing with the department, pursuant to 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10; where the Fair Hearing officer reverses the department's decision to remove the children from the first foster home; and where the first foster parent seeks to enforce the Fair Hearing decision in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, whether the Superior Court may enforce the Fair Hearing decision by ordering the department to return the children to the first foster parent's care where, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26B, matters related to the care and protection of children, including placement and custody, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.

SJC-13847         
IMPOUNDED

Whether the Superior Court judge erred in affirming Doe's classification as a level two sex offender, including: (1) whether the Board committed an error of law or violated Doe's rights to due process by applying catch-all Factor 37, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (37) ("any information that [the SORB] deems useful in determining risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness"), to Doe's repetitive offending behavior, where that behavior occurred prior to his first apprehension, in the absence of substantial evidence that such repetitive behavior increases an offender's dangerousness, and (2) whether the hearing examiner violated Doe's rights to due process by relying on information not in evidence to make findings about Doe's sexual deviancy, ant

October 2025

SJC-13835
Commonwealth vs. Michael A. Diaz, Jr.

Where the police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to an arrest, and where there is a lengthy delay (here,123 days) between the date that the police seize the phone and the date that the police apply for, and receive, a search warrant to search the phone, (1) whether the delay is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether, or how, the facts that the Commonwealth will retain possession of the phone until trial because the phone itself may have independent evidentiary value or that the defendant has not asked for the phone to be returned are relevant to the consideration whether the delay is unreasonable and a violation of the defendant's rights (Note that this case will be argued with SJC-13823, Commonwealth vs. Jose N. Solis).

September 2025

SJC-13827
Commonwealth vs. Domingo Agostini

Whether the orders committing the defendant for dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, should be vacated, including whether the defendant, who was charged with armed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17, and making a bomb or hijack threat, in violation of   G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), was charged with a crime that qualified as a predicate offense under§ 58A.
 

SJC-13820    
Commissioner of Correction vs. M.B. 

What standard of proof applies when, pursuant to Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255 (1979), the Department of Correction petitions for an order authorizing the use of involuntary medical treatment, including force-feeding, because it claims that such treatment is reasonably necessary to save an incarcerated person's life.

SJC-13823
Commonwealth vs. Jose N. Solis

Where the police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to an arrest, and where there is a lengthy delay (here, 110 days) between the date that the police seize the phone and the date that the police apply for, and receive, a search warrant to search the phone, (1) whether the delay is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether, or how, the facts that the Commonwealth will retain possession of the phone until trial because the phone itself may have independent evidentiary value or that the defendant has not asked for the phone to be returned are relevant to the consideration whether the delay is unreasonable and a violation of the defendant's rights.

SJC-13822
David Pratt, Chief of the Holyoke Police Department, as Licensing Authority vs. Randy Westbrook

Whether the district court judge erred in concluding that the defendant's rights pursuant to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by statutory language, contained in the then-applicable version of G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), prohibiting the issuance of a license to carry firearms to an applicant determined "unsuitable . . . based on reliable, articulable and credible information that the applicant . . . has exhibited or engaged in behavior that suggests that, if issued a license, the applicant . . . may create a risk to public safety or a risk of danger to self or others."

SJC-13819
J.C. Cannistraro, LLC vs. Columbia Construction Co. et. al

In an arbitration proceeding deciding a dispute regarding a construction contract governed by the prompt pay act, G. L. c. 149, § 29E, whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in allowing the respondent to bring a counterclaim for recoupment, where the respondent had not paid the amount demanded at the time it raised its affirmative defenses, but later paid that amount when ordered to do so by the arbitrator, and thereafter sought recoupment; including, whether allowing the respondent to bring the later recoupment claim was contrary to the holding of Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Constr. Co., 494 Mass. 216, 225-228 (2024).

SJC-13816
Commonwealth vs. Jose Arias

1. Whether a judge in the Superior Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a traffic stop, where the traffic infraction used to justify the stop occurred one day prior to the stop, including:  (a) whether the delay in initiating the traffic stop rendered the stop unreasonable, see Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 353-354 (2022); (b) whether the pretextual nature of the stop violated art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (c) whether police lacked probable cause to believe the defendant failed to stop for police, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 25; (d) whether G. L. c. 90, § 25, is void for vagueness; (e) whether the defendant’s arrest was unreasonable under art. 14; and (f) whether the defendant’s arrest was pretextual, and if so, whether the pretextual nature of the arrest violated art. 14.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s request for a voir dire of a juror who submitted a post-verdict letter concerning jury deliberations.

(Note that this case will be argued with SJC-13835, Commonwealth vs. Michael A. Diaz, Jr.).

SJC-13825    
Kevin C. Robinson vs. Town of Marshfield et. al

1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of liability on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s award of $1.1 million in punitive damages on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151B.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, where the parties agree that the jury were erroneously instructed under both the “mixed motive” framework articulated in Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 666-670 (2000), as well as the traditional pretext framework, including:  whether the jury should have been instructed on the mixed motive framework at the request of the employer, even though the evidence of retaliatory animus was circumstantial in nature.  Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-101 (2003).
4. Whether it was error to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.

SJC-13821
William E. O’Connor vs. MAG Mutual Insurance Co.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that disciplinary proceedings initiated against a plaintiff-doctor were not covered by his professional insurance policy because the underlying allegations did not arise out of the doctor’s professional services, see Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 48-54 (1992), where it was alleged, among other things, that the doctor repeatedly prescribed an addictive medication to a patient, with whom he was in a romantic relationship, as leverage to make the patient dependent on him and to discourage her from leaving the relationship.
 

SJC-13824    
Committee for Public Counsel Services vs. Middlesex and Suffolk County District Courts and another

In light of the scope of the present shortage of available defense counsel in the District Courts of Middlesex and Suffolk County and in the Boston Municipal Court, whether and under what circumstances the Supreme Judicial Court, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, or any justice of any trial court department is authorized to order increased compensation rates beyond those provided in G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (a), for attorneys accepting representation of indigent criminal defendants.
 

SJC- 13817
Commonwealth vs. Sambath Chhieng

Whether the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his 2015 admission to sufficient facts; including, whether the plea judge’s immigration warnings during the 2015 plea colloquy were sufficient to comply with G. L. c. 278, s. 29D, see Commonwealth v. Petit-Homme, 482 Mass. 775 (2019); and whether the defendant satisfied his burden to show “more than a hypothetical risk” of the relevant immigration consequence occurring, by showing “either that the Federal government has taken some step toward deporting him or that its express written policy calls for the initiation of deportation proceedings against him.”  Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 134-136 (2010).