Amicus Announcements from September 2025 to August 2026

From time to time, the Supreme Judicial Court solicits amicus ("friend of the court") briefs or memoranda from parties not directly involved in a case, but that may have an interest or opinion about a case pending before the court.

File an Amicus Brief

Amicus briefs must comply with the requirements of Rules 17, 19, and 20 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. In order to assist the court, amicus briefs should focus on the ramifications of a decision and not solely on the interests of amici.

Interested parties may file their briefs in the Supreme Judicial Court Clerk's Office for the Commonwealth.

March 2026

SJC-13921      
Diana DiZoglio, State Auditor vs. Ronald Mariano, Speaker of the House, & others; Attorney General, Intervener

Whether this court should allow the motion of the Attorney General to strike the complaint filed by the State Auditor without the authorization of the Attorney General pursuant to G. L. c. 12, § 3; including, whether the Attorney General has acted within her authority under G. L. c. 12, § 3, where she has yet to render a decision on the State Auditor’s request for the appointment of counsel to represent her in litigation to enforce document requests made on the State Legislature in connection with an audit under G. L. c. 11, § 12, or whether the Attorney General has exceeded her authority by acting arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, or scandalously. See Secretary for Administration & Finance v. Attorney General, 367 Mass. 154, 159 n.4, 165 (1975).

SJC-13908      
Request for Advisory Opinion

The Justices invite interested persons and organizations to submit briefs addressing the request for an advisory opinion that was transmitted by the Massachusetts Senate. Specifically, the Senate has asked the Justices:

1. Does Initiative Petition 25-14, “An Initiative Petition for a Law to Improve Access to Public Records” (petition), which proposes statutory changes relating to the retention of and access to records of the General Court, propose a rule relating to internal legislative procedures, not a law, and is, therefore, not properly introduced and pending before the General Court under Article XLVIII, The Initiative, Part II, Section 3 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth?
2. Does the petition relate “to the powers . . . of courts,” insofar as it grants the judicial branch new and unprecedented authority to review, decide and order relief in challenges to records determinations made by the General Court, and is thus excluded from the initiative process under Article XLVIII, The Initiative, Part II, Section 2 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth?
3. If the petition is properly introduced and pending, does the petition, by amending the public records law to include the General Court within its ambit, violate or intrude upon the Senate’s authority to “determine its own rules of proceedings” for its records under Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth?
4. If the petition is properly introduced and pending, does the petition’s grant of authority over the records of the General Court — and to supersede legislative rules and proceedings related to those records — to the judicial branch and to executive branch officers, including the Secretary of the Commonwealth and Attorney General, violate Part I, Article XXX of the Constitution of the Commonwealth?
5. If the petition is properly introduced and pending, does the petition violate or intrude upon rights granted to members and staff of the General Court pursuant to Part I, Article XXI of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, namely freedom of deliberation, speech and debate?

Briefs may be filed on or before April 3, 2026.

SJC-13909      
Request for Advisory Opinion

The Justices invite interested persons and organizations to submit briefs addressing the request for an advisory opinion that was transmitted by the Massachusetts Senate. Specifically, the Senate has asked the Justices:

1. Does Initiative Petition 25-37, “Initiative Petition for an Act to Reform and Regulate Legislative Stipends” (petition) — which has been filed and certified in accordance with Article XL VIII, The Initiative, Part II, Section 3 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth (“art. 48”), seeking passage of legislation entitled “An Act to reform and regulate legislative stipends,” and which is pending before the General Court — violate art. 48 by making changes to internal legislative procedures that are within the constitutional unicameral powers of the Senate, thus failing to propose a law, where:
   1. The petition reshapes and codifies existing legislative rules on how and when bills are heard and reported out of legislative committees, setting specific procedures for bill hearings and reporting;
   2. The petition assigns additional duties to the Clerks of the House of Representatives and Senate, who are officers of those bodies and whose duties are set by internal rule by the respective bodies;       
   3. The petition makes the rate of pay for Senators dependent, in part, on “compliance” by the House of Representatives with the petition’s procedural requirements, thus interfering with the independence of both bodies; or where
   4. The petition supplants and codifies existing legislative rules on compensation, ensuring that members of the House of Representatives and members of the Senate are compensated differently?
2. If the answer to question 1 and all its subparts is in the negative, does the petition, if enacted, intrude on the Senate’s ability to set its own rules of proceedings in violation of Part II, Chapter 1, Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, where:
   1. The petition reshapes and codifies existing legislative rules on how and when bills are heard and reported out of legislative committees, setting specific procedures for bill hearings and reporting;
   2. The petition assigns additional duties to the Clerks of the House of Representatives and Senate, who are officers of those bodies and whose duties are set by internal rule by the respective bodies;
   3. The petition makes the rate of pay for Senators dependent, in part, on “compliance” by the House of Representatives with the petition’s procedural requirements, thus interfering with the independence of both bodies; or where
   4. The petition supplants and codifies existing legislative rules on compensation, ensuring that members of the House of Representatives and members of the Senate are compensated differently?

Briefs may be filed on or before April 3, 2026.

SJC-13913      
Grant Headley vs. Commonwealth

Whether a defendant who has completed his sentence for a conviction of possession of a large capacity firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m), may be retried on a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), relating to the same weapon, where his conviction of the latter was vacated pursuant to Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023).

SJC- 13910     
In the Matter of the Richard E. Howard Trust

1. Whether a trust providing that, after the donor’s death, a sum of money was to be advanced to a named charitable entity for the purpose of constructing a room to be used for the display of the donor’s paintings and other materials qualifies as a public charitable trust.
2. Whether a second nonprofit entity has standing, as a party with a special interest in the trust, as a successor in interest to the original beneficiary, or otherwise, to bring an action to reform the trust pursuant to the cy pres doctrine to substitute itself as the beneficiary and otherwise to enforce the trust.

SJC- 13911     
Morse Brothers, Inc. vs. Town of Halifax & another

Where G. L. c. 40, § 21 (17), provides that a municipality “may . . . make such ordinances and by-laws [] not repugnant to law” that relate to “prohibiting or regulating the removal of soil, loam, sand or gravel from land not in public use;” where G. L. c. 40A, § 3, provides that “[n]o zoning ordinance or by-shall shall prohibit, unreasonably regulate, or require a special permit for the use of land for the primary purpose of commercial agriculture;” and where a municipality promulgates a local bylaw pursuant c. 40, § 21 (17), whether (1) the bylaw conflicts with c. 40A, § 3, and is therefore invalid; (2) requiring a company engaged in commercial-agriculture-related earth removal to secure a permit is arbitrary and capricious; and (3) the permit that the municipality required the company to secure was a “special permit.”

SJC-13912      
Commonwealth vs. Luis Morales

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress, including, whether the motion judge erred in evaluating the reliability of the 911 caller, and, more generally, whether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

SJC-13915      
Friends of Bassing Beach, Inc, et al vs. Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General

 Where a municipality adopts a bylaw and submits it to the Attorney General for approval pursuant to G. L. c. 40, § 32, and where the Attorney General disapproves the bylaw, whether the proponents of the petition that proposed the bylaw have standing to challenge the Attorney General’s disapproval of the bylaw.

SJC-13916      
Commonwealth vs. J.M.

Whether a verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity” is subject to automatic sealing pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C, first par.

SJC-13917      
Anaplan Parent, LP & another vs. Timothy Brennan

Whether, under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act (MNAA), G. L. c. 149, § 24L, a noncompetition agreement signed by the employer’s corporate parent, rather than the employer itself, is unenforceable; whether the corporate parent is an “employer” within the meaning of the MNAA.

SJC-13918      
State Retirement Board vs. John Giulino, et al.

Whether the forfeiture of the appellant’s public pension, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 15, constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, including whether, or to what extent, a court may consider whether the forfeiture will deprive the pensioner of his or her livelihood in making this determination.  See Raftery v. State Bd. of Retirement, 496 Mass. 402, 416 n.14 (2025).

SJC- 13919      
Boston Retirement System vs. Marilyn Golisano, et al.

Whether the forfeiture of the appellee’s public pension, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 15, constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, including:  (a) whether a court may take judicial notice of actuarial life tables published by the Social Security Administration, as the Superior Court did here, to calculate the present value of the pension; (b) whether, or to what extent, a court may consider the actual criminal sentence imposed on a pensioner, or the Federal guidelines sentencing range for a pensioner who was convicted of Federal offenses, in assessing the gravity of the offense; and (c) whether, or to what extent, a court may consider whether the forfeiture will deprive the pensioner of his or her livelihood in assessing whether the forfeiture is unconstitutionally excessive, see Raftery v. State Bd. of Retirement, 496 Mass. 402, 416 n.14 (2025).

SJC-13920      
Commonwealth vs. Martell - LeBron

Whether the trial judge erred in allowing the defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice after the defendant was detained outside of the courthouse by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents during the pendency of his trial, including:  (a) whether the judge’s finding that ICE would not return the defendant for trial was clearly erroneous; (b) whether the judge erred in ordering dismissal with prejudice, rather than declaring a mistrial; (c) whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion to continue the evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss; (d) whether the judge erred in ruling on the motion to dismiss without permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine the final witness or to call additional witnesses at the evidentiary hearing; (e) whether the prosecution team has an ethical obligation to inform the court of an impending ICE action to detain a defendant; and (f) whether the judge erred in considering two State troopers and an ICE agent, who were summonsed by the Commonwealth to testify at trial, to be part of the prosecution team for purposes of assessing whether the prosecution engaged in misconduct unrelated to pretrial discovery.

SJC-13893
Arcangelo Cella & others vs. Andrea Joy Campbell, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth & another

Whether the Attorney General properly certified Initiative Petition No. 25-21, "An Initiative Petition to Protect Tenants by Limiting Rent Increases," and whether her summary thereof complied with the requirements of article 48.

SJC-13904      
Martina Jackson & another vs. Andrea Joy Campbell, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth & another

Whether the Attorney General properly certified Initiative Petition No. 25-12, "An Initiative Petition for a Law to Implement All-Party State Primaries.”

SJC-13906
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. KalshiEX LLC

Whether the Superior Court erred in allowing the Commonwealth's motion for a preliminary injunction, including whether the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., preempts Massachusetts laws regulating sports wagering, G. L. c. 23N, as applied to the sports-related contracts offered on the defendant's platform.

SJC-13897
Commonwealth vs. Jesse Colon

Whether, under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, this court should continue to review the denial of an untimely, midtrial request for self-representation for an abuse of discretion, or whether, as the defendant contends, a more stringent standard of review is necessary to protect the right to self-representation; whether the defendant is entitled to relief under the applicable legal standard; and whether claimed errors related to the admission of hearsay, the admission of lay opinion evidence, and alleged impermissible statements in the prosecutor's closing argument cumulatively created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

SJC-13898
Commonwealth vs. Joseph K. McLaughlin

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that a Massachusetts State Police trooper violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in opening the door of a vehicle parked on the side of an interstate highway, where the motion judge found that the operator was sleeping and what looked like a prescription pill bottle was visible on the passenger's seat, and where the motion judge further found that the trooper did not wait for the operator to respond after the trooper knocked on the vehicle's window.

SJC-13899
Commonwealth vs. Walter Esteras

Whether the visible shackling of the defendant during jury selection and trial on a petition to civilly commit the defendant as a sexually dangerous person, over the defendant's objection, violated Federal and State due process protections; and whether the trial court's refusal, over the defendant's objection, to instruct the jury on whether merely looking at video constituted "re-offense" when considering the defendant's "likelihood of re-offending," despite a juror's repeated request for specific instruction and clarification, violated the defendant's Federal and State rights to due process

SJC-13900
John T. Martin et al. vs. Amherst College

Whether the retroactive application of Section 113 of Chapter 9 of the Acts of 2025 to claims pending prior to its enactment, which seek statutory penalties, comply with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; whether Section 113 is a selective exemption to Massachusetts standing laws in violation of art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and whether the dismissal of pending claims brought under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148, pursuant to Section 113 violates the remedies clause of art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

February 2026

SJC-13863
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mega Life & Health Insurance Co. & others

1. Whether the Superior Court erred in calculating restitution, including whether the court erred in applying a framework of “assumed reliance” in calculating restitution pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 4.
2. Whether the Superior Court erred by awarding monetary remedies for conduct not encompassed by the liability findings made on summary judgment.
3. Whether the Superior Court erred in finding liability for certain claims on summary judgment despite the existence of genuine disputes of material fact.
4. Whether the Superior Court erred in applying the discovery rule to permit recovery on claims asserted to be time-barred.

SJC-13885
Lewis Finfer & others vs.  Andrea Joy Campbell, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the Commonwealth & another

Whether the summary prepared by the Attorney General for Initiative Petition 25-18, “Initiative Petition for a Law Relative to Reducing the State Personal Income Tax,” complies with the requirements of Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.

SJC-13889
Commonwealth vs. Neil E. Tom, Jr.

Whether the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress; including, whether the Commonwealth met its burden under Commonwealth v. Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 16 (2023), and Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711, 726 (2020), to rebut the reasonable inference of racial discrimination raised by the statistical and other evidence brought forward by the defendant in support of his motion to suppress.

SJC-13890
Katherine Dant et al. vs. City of Chicopee Mobile Home Rent Control Board

Whether the Housing Court erred in affirming the decision of the Mobile Home Rent Control Board of Chicopee to approve a rent increase, including certain sewer-upgrade related costs as ‘reasonable operating expenses’ pursuant to its enabling statute, St. 1977, c. 596, § 3 (a), which permits the board to adjust the rent at manufactured housing parks to assure that rent is set ‘at levels which yield to owners a fair net operating income,’ where the Attorney General has promulgated certain regulations, pursuant to the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A-32S, and where those regulations provide, in 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.03 (2) (m), that ‘[i]t shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of M.G.L. c. 93A for an operator [of a manufactured housing community] . . . to seek to recover costs or expenses resulting from any legal obligation of the operator to upgrade or repair sewer . . . systems to meet minimum standards required by law.’

SJC-13882      
Commonwealth vs. Freslet Noralus

1. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his request for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the denial of his motion to dismiss without prejudice, or the denial of his objection to the issuance of a default warrant, on the basis that he has no adequate alternative remedy and/or that his petition raises claims that are capable of repetition but evading review.
2. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred in declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus to secure the defendant’s presence at trial where the defendant was being detained out of state in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
3. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred in issuing a default warrant because the defendant’s failure to appear was a result of his out-of-state detention in ICE custody.
4. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss without prejudice, on the basis that his State and Federal rights to a speedy trial were violated, where the defendant was being detained out of state in ICE custody.

SJC-13875      
Commonwealth vs. Jamie Loredo

1. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of his motion to dismiss and his objection to the issuance of a default warrant, on the basis that he has no adequate alternative remedy and/or that his petition raises claims of systemic abuses affecting the proper administration of justice.
2. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel his presence or, in the alternative, to dismiss, on the basis that the Commonwealth failed to secure his appearance at trial, resulting in a violation of the defendant’s rights to due process, counsel, and a speedy trial, where the defendant was being detained out of state in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and was ultimately deported prior to trial.
3. Whether the defendant is entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erred in issuing a default warrant at a hearing where the defendant’s presence had been waived, but where the defendant was deported by Federal immigration officials prior to the hearing.

January 2026

SJC-13877
Claire Fitzmaurice & others vs. City of Quincy & another

Whether (1) the installation of two statues of Catholic saints outside of the city of Quincy's public safety building violates art. 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether the court should evaluate that question pursuant to the framework set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), or whether a different framework should apply.

SJC-13880
Commonwealth vs. Clerence Henrique Goncalves

Where an indoor home security camera captures a photograph of a nude person, whether the photograph is willfully and secretly taken in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b); and, where the photograph is sent only to the subject of the photograph, whether the photograph has been disseminated in violation of, G. L. c. 272, § 105 (c). 

SJC-13881
Daikin Applied Americas, Inc. vs. Joseph Russo & others

Where a party claims misappropriation of trade secrets; where the party seeks a preliminary injunction; and where the party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits related to that claim, whether the loss of trade secrets creates a presumption of irreparable harm for purposes of the preliminary injunction; and whether, in this case, the plaintiff has, for purposes of a preliminary injunction, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the defendants misappropriated trade secrets.

SJC-13878
Luis Contento Suquilanda vs. Skyway Roofing, Inc.

Where an employee of a subcontractor is injured in the course of his employment, whether the employee may assert a negligent hiring and supervision claim against the general contractor, i.e., whether a subcontractor's employee may assert a claim that the general contractor negligently hired and supervised the employee's own employer; and whether, in this case, the general contractor exercised meaningful control over the subcontractor and over the project site such that the general contractor owes a duty of care to the injured employee of the subcontractor.

SJC-13879
Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited vs. YIHE Forbes, LLC

Whether the Superior Court judge abused his discretion in approving the sale of the property under receivership to the Massachusetts Audubon Society, over the objection of the property owner, where the City of Chelsea sought the appointment of the receiver to manage public health and safety issues on the property, and where the owner asserts that the terms of the proposed sale are commercially unreasonable and that the receiver breached her fiduciary duties by failing to undertake reasonable efforts to sell the property at a fair price.

December 2025

SJC-13680    
Sunpin Energy Services, LLC 7 another vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of Petersham

Under the provision of the Dover Amendment pertaining to solar energy systems, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth par., whether and under what circumstances a town zoning board of appeals may deny a special permit for the installation of a solar energy system.

SJC-13865
Emerald Necklace Conservancy, Inc. et al. vs. City of Boston et al.

Whether the trial court erred in: (1) dismissing on standing grounds two claims brought by the plaintiffs to enforce the terms of the George Robert White Fund, a public charitable trust; (2) concluding the evidence insufficient to show that the parcel of land at issue, which includes White Stadium and the surrounding area in Boston's Franklin Park, was protected by Article 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution and G. L. c. 3, § 5A; (3) concluding that the defendants did not violate G. L. c. 45, § 7; (4) concluding that the plaintiffs' claim under G. L. c. 40, § 53, was barred by laches and that even if it was not so barred, the plaintiffs did not establish that the expenditures at issue were unauthorized; (5) declining to address whether legislative approval was required pursuant to art. 97 for any effect on other sections of Franklin Park; and (6) excluding certain pieces of evidence from trial, including certain of Boston's traffic rules and regulations, certain rules of Boston's Parks and Recreation Department, and evidence of a past petition.
 

SJC-13861
James Barros & another vs. Select Board of Nantucket & others

Whether the Superior Court erred in concluding, based on the summary judgment record, that:  (1) no reasonable jury could find that the defendants infringed on the plaintiffs’ free speech rights under art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) no reasonable jury could find that the defendants interfered (or attempt to interfere) with the plaintiffs’ free speech rights through the use of threats, intimidation, or coercion, see G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I.

SJC-13864
MD Zafar vs. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission

1. Where G. L. c. 10, § 27, provides that the director of the Massachusetts State Lottery Commission "may refuse to issue a [lottery sales agent] license to any person who has been convicted of a felony by a court of competent jurisdiction in the commonwealth or of any other state or of the United States and who, in the opinion of said director, is not of good moral character to act as a licensed agent to sell lottery tickets," whether the director may refuse to issue a license to an individual who has been acquitted of a felony but who is, in the director's opinion, not of "good moral character," or whether the director may only refuse to issue a license to an individual who has been convicted of a felony and is also not of "good moral character."                
2. Where a party aggrieved by a decision of the commission denying an application for a sales agent license may seek judicial review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and where, on judicial review, the court considers whether the commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence, what constitutes substantial evidence, e.g., whether the commission's reliance on a trial transcript from the applicant's underlying criminal trial for purposes of deciding whether the applicant is not of "good moral character" for purposes of G. L. c. 10, § 27, is sufficient, or whether live testimony from a percipient witness, in connection with the criminal trial, is required.

November 2025

SJC-13855
Commonwealth vs. Shu Feng Hsu

1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter based on theories of battery and wanton or reckless conduct.
2. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting expert testimony that the infant’s injuries were “consistent” with “abusive head trauma,” as well as expert testimony that the injuries were not consistent with a short fall.

SJC-13852                  
Commonwealth vs. Jose M. Shaw

Whether the trial judge erred in admitting in evidence a purportedly certified Massachusetts court record, which document was embossed on all pages with the seal of the court and signed by the clerk-magistrate on the first five of its nine pages, where the defendant contends that the document was not attested, including whether, if the admission was erroneous, it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

SJC-13854                  
IMPOUNDED           

Whether the Juvenile Court judge erred in revoking upon reconsideration his order expunging a harassment prevention order, issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, as to a defendant who was then nine years old, where the judge had since found that the allegations on which the harassment prevention order was based were unsupported by the evidence, and where his reconsideration and revocation of the expungement order was based on his finding that the harassment prevention order nevertheless was not obtained through a fraud on the court, including whether the judge was authorized to expunge the harassment prevention order issued against the child even if it was not obtained through a fraud on the court.

SJC-13856                  
Commonwealth vs. Mikai P. Thomson

Where G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (iv), prohibits an individual under the age of twenty-one from obtaining a license to carry a firearm, whether that provision is unconstitutional; and, where the defendant, who is under the age of twenty-one, did not apply for a firearms license, whether he is entitled to raise an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.

SJC-13857 
Mahabub Khoda vs. Bangladesh Association of New England, Inc. et al.

Where a plaintiff in a successful civil contempt proceeding is entitled to an award of attorney's fees; where the party held in contempt is a charitable organization; and where G. L. c. 231, § 85K, provides that "liability [in certain actions involving a charitable organization] shall not exceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars," whether the twenty thousand dollar cap on damages applies to the award of attorney's fees.

SJC-13840         
Town of Marshfield et al. vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al.

Whether the MBTA Communities Act, G. L. c. 40A, § 3A, and regulations promulgated thereunder constitute an unfunded mandate, see G. L. c. 29, § 27C, on the cities and towns required to comply with it.

SJC-13841         
Crown Communities, LLC vs. Pocasset Park Association, Inc. et al.

Where the Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A - 32S, provides, in § 32R (c), that resident owners in the manufactured housing community shall have a right of first refusal before the manufactured housing community may be sold, what constitutes a valid offer to purchase including what constitutes (1) "reasonable evidence" that the requisite percentage of residents have approved the purchase, as required by the act; and (2) a proposed purchase and sale on "substantially equivalent terms and conditions" to that of the third party bona fide offer.

SJC-13842         
Commonwealth vs. Scott M. Grimaldi 

Whether the motion judge erred in allowing the defendant's motion to suppress police body-worn camera (bodycam) footage from a sobriety checkpoint, on the basis that it constituted a secret recording in violation of the wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99: including, whether the motion judge erred in finding that police failed to comply with their department's bodycam policies, and if not, what relevance, if any, an officer's non-compliance with departmental policy has in determining whether bodycam footage should be suppressed under G. L. c. 272, § 99 P.

SJC-13843         
Watermark LLC vs. RH Benea Cranberry Co. Inc. et al.

Whether the Superior Court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on claims concerning the town's right of first refusal under G. L. c. 61A, § 14, where the town received notice of an intent to sell agricultural land (Notice) stating that the plaintiff-buyer "seek[s] to subdivide" a small portion of the land and maintain the rest for agricultural use, and where the buyer and seller later sent a joint withdrawal of the Notice in which they asserted that the plaintiff-buyer "does not intend on currently seeking a change in" the existing agricultural use; including: (a) whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the town's right to be notified of the sale under G. L. c. 61A, § 14 was triggered; (b) whether the Notice was ambiguous as to whether the sale was intended for a non-agricultural use, and if so, what effect, if any, such ambiguity has on the town's right of first refusal; and (c) whether, insofar as the town's right of first refusal remains valid, it may purchase only that portion of the land intended for non-agricultural use, rather than the entire parcel, see Town of Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 296 n.11, 302 n.19 (2003).

SJC-13844         
Town of Nahant vs. Northeastern University et al.

1. Whether the motion judge erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and thereby dismissing the plaintiff-town's petition for authorization to take land by eminent domain under G. L. c. 80A, based upon the judge's conclusion that the taking was pretextual and bad faith under Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Burlington, 399 Mass. 771, 774-780 (1987).
2. Whether G. L. c. 80A, § 13, authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees and expert fees.

SJC-13845         
Helen Banevicius et al. vs. Town of Barnstable et al.

1. Whether the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims for declaratory relief and relief in the nature of mandamus arising from the sale of property classified and taxed as agricultural or horticultural under G. L. c. 61A without compliance with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 61A, § 14, where the plaintiffs are abutters to the property and a nonprofit corporation organized for the preservation, protection, and maintenance of the property.
2. Whether abutters to property subject to G. L. c. 61A are presumed to have standing to challenge a sale or conversion to a non-agricultural or non-horticultural use.

SJC-13846
IMPOUNDED

Where the Department of Children and Families has placed children in its care in a foster home and subsequently removes the children from that placement to a different foster home; where the first foster parent seeks a Fair Hearing with the department, pursuant to 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10; where the Fair Hearing officer reverses the department's decision to remove the children from the first foster home; and where the first foster parent seeks to enforce the Fair Hearing decision in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, whether the Superior Court may enforce the Fair Hearing decision by ordering the department to return the children to the first foster parent's care where, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, §§ 24-26B, matters related to the care and protection of children, including placement and custody, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.

SJC-13847         
IMPOUNDED

Whether the Superior Court judge erred in affirming Doe's classification as a level two sex offender, including: (1) whether the Board committed an error of law or violated Doe's rights to due process by applying catch-all Factor 37, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (37) ("any information that [the SORB] deems useful in determining risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness"), to Doe's repetitive offending behavior, where that behavior occurred prior to his first apprehension, in the absence of substantial evidence that such repetitive behavior increases an offender's dangerousness, and (2) whether the hearing examiner violated Doe's rights to due process by relying on information not in evidence to make findings about Doe's sexual deviancy, ant

October 2025

SJC-13835
Commonwealth vs. Michael A. Diaz, Jr.

Where the police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to an arrest, and where there is a lengthy delay (here,123 days) between the date that the police seize the phone and the date that the police apply for, and receive, a search warrant to search the phone, (1) whether the delay is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether, or how, the facts that the Commonwealth will retain possession of the phone until trial because the phone itself may have independent evidentiary value or that the defendant has not asked for the phone to be returned are relevant to the consideration whether the delay is unreasonable and a violation of the defendant's rights (Note that this case will be argued with SJC-13823, Commonwealth vs. Jose N. Solis).

September 2025

SJC-13827
Commonwealth vs. Domingo Agostini

Whether the orders committing the defendant for dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, should be vacated, including whether the defendant, who was charged with armed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17, and making a bomb or hijack threat, in violation of   G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b), was charged with a crime that qualified as a predicate offense under§ 58A.
 

SJC-13820    
Commissioner of Correction vs. M.B. 

What standard of proof applies when, pursuant to Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255 (1979), the Department of Correction petitions for an order authorizing the use of involuntary medical treatment, including force-feeding, because it claims that such treatment is reasonably necessary to save an incarcerated person's life.

SJC-13823
Commonwealth vs. Jose N. Solis

Where the police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to an arrest, and where there is a lengthy delay (here, 110 days) between the date that the police seize the phone and the date that the police apply for, and receive, a search warrant to search the phone, (1) whether the delay is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) whether, or how, the facts that the Commonwealth will retain possession of the phone until trial because the phone itself may have independent evidentiary value or that the defendant has not asked for the phone to be returned are relevant to the consideration whether the delay is unreasonable and a violation of the defendant's rights.

(Note that this case will be argued with SJC-13835, Commonwealth vs. Michael A. Diaz, Jr.).

SJC-13822
David Pratt, Chief of the Holyoke Police Department, as Licensing Authority vs. Randy Westbrook

Whether the district court judge erred in concluding that the defendant's rights pursuant to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by statutory language, contained in the then-applicable version of G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d), prohibiting the issuance of a license to carry firearms to an applicant determined "unsuitable . . . based on reliable, articulable and credible information that the applicant . . . has exhibited or engaged in behavior that suggests that, if issued a license, the applicant . . . may create a risk to public safety or a risk of danger to self or others."

SJC-13819
J.C. Cannistraro, LLC vs. Columbia Construction Co. et. al

In an arbitration proceeding deciding a dispute regarding a construction contract governed by the prompt pay act, G. L. c. 149, § 29E, whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in allowing the respondent to bring a counterclaim for recoupment, where the respondent had not paid the amount demanded at the time it raised its affirmative defenses, but later paid that amount when ordered to do so by the arbitrator, and thereafter sought recoupment; including, whether allowing the respondent to bring the later recoupment claim was contrary to the holding of Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Constr. Co., 494 Mass. 216, 225-228 (2024).

SJC-13816
Commonwealth vs. Jose Arias

1. Whether a judge in the Superior Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a traffic stop, where the traffic infraction used to justify the stop occurred one day prior to the stop, including:  (a) whether the delay in initiating the traffic stop rendered the stop unreasonable, see Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 353-354 (2022); (b) whether the pretextual nature of the stop violated art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; (c) whether police lacked probable cause to believe the defendant failed to stop for police, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 25; (d) whether G. L. c. 90, § 25, is void for vagueness; (e) whether the defendant’s arrest was unreasonable under art. 14; and (f) whether the defendant’s arrest was pretextual, and if so, whether the pretextual nature of the arrest violated art. 14.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s request for a voir dire of a juror who submitted a post-verdict letter concerning jury deliberations.

SJC-13825    
Kevin C. Robinson vs. Town of Marshfield et. al

1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of liability on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s award of $1.1 million in punitive damages on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151B.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, where the parties agree that the jury were erroneously instructed under both the “mixed motive” framework articulated in Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 666-670 (2000), as well as the traditional pretext framework, including:  whether the jury should have been instructed on the mixed motive framework at the request of the employer, even though the evidence of retaliatory animus was circumstantial in nature.  Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-101 (2003).
4. Whether it was error to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.

SJC-13821
William E. O’Connor vs. MAG Mutual Insurance Co.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that disciplinary proceedings initiated against a plaintiff-doctor were not covered by his professional insurance policy because the underlying allegations did not arise out of the doctor’s professional services, see Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 48-54 (1992), where it was alleged, among other things, that the doctor repeatedly prescribed an addictive medication to a patient, with whom he was in a romantic relationship, as leverage to make the patient dependent on him and to discourage her from leaving the relationship.
 

SJC-13824    
Committee for Public Counsel Services vs. Middlesex and Suffolk County District Courts and another

In light of the scope of the present shortage of available defense counsel in the District Courts of Middlesex and Suffolk County and in the Boston Municipal Court, whether and under what circumstances the Supreme Judicial Court, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, or any justice of any trial court department is authorized to order increased compensation rates beyond those provided in G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (a), for attorneys accepting representation of indigent criminal defendants.
 

SJC- 13817
Commonwealth vs. Sambath Chhieng

Whether the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his 2015 admission to sufficient facts; including, whether the plea judge’s immigration warnings during the 2015 plea colloquy were sufficient to comply with G. L. c. 278, s. 29D, see Commonwealth v. Petit-Homme, 482 Mass. 775 (2019); and whether the defendant satisfied his burden to show “more than a hypothetical risk” of the relevant immigration consequence occurring, by showing “either that the Federal government has taken some step toward deporting him or that its express written policy calls for the initiation of deportation proceedings against him.”  Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 134-136 (2010).