You are a former member of a Board of Selectmen (Board). While a Selectman, you were designated a special municipal employee.1/ The Board is currently seeking applicants for the position of Alternate Building Inspector. The Alternate Building Inspector works under the supervision of the Board. You would like to apply for the job.
Are you eligible for appointment to the position of Alternate Building Inspector?
Yes, provided you have waited thirty days from the date you completed your services as Selectman.
Your question requires us to reconcile two seemingly contradictory aspects of the conflict law: the requirements of §21A and §20(g)¶2. On the one hand, §21A requires a municipal board member to wait thirty days from the date he terminates his board membership before he is eligible for appointment to a position under the supervision of his board. Alternatively, §20(g)¶2 requires a selectman to wait six months after he terminates his selectman's services before he is eligible for appointment to an additional municipal position. In essence, your question is whether a "special municipal employee" selectman must follow the six month "cooling off ' period required under §20(g)¶2 or the less restrictive thirty day period under §21A.
We conclude that the provisions of §20(g)¶2, including the six month "cooling off” period, only apply to regular selectman.2/ Consequently, as a "special selectman" you are subject to the provisions of §21A of the conflict law, and are required to wait thirty days from the date of your resignation as a Selectman before you are eligible for appointment as Alternate Building Inspector.5/
This conclusion reaffirms a 1982 Commission opinion. In EC-COI-82-106 we analyzed the then recent 1982 amendment to the conflict of interest law (St 1982, c. 107; G.L. c. 268A, §20(g),2)4/ which set forth rules for town employees who also wanted to be selectmen. We were specifically asked to rule on whether a town school teacher who was elected to the position of selectman and designated a "special" could continue to receive the compensation from both jobs in light of the 1982 amendment. The amendment provided, in part, that town employees could be elected as selectmen if, among other things, they received only one salary. We concluded that the 1982 amendment (G.L. c. 268A, §20(g)¶2 did not repeal the earlier provisions for "special municipal employees" but rather, was intended to apply only to those selectmen who were previously prohibited from receiving compensation for a second municipal office or position and not to selectmen who had been classified as special municipal employees under § l(n). EC-COI-82-106.
The Commission's present finding that all the provisions of that 1982 amendment (including the requirement that a selectman wait six months from his termination as selectman before he may obtain additional town appointments) do not apply to "special" selectmen is consistent with and relies on our previous opinion. This conclusion is further based on sound rules of statutory construction and supported by the Commission's obligation to give the conflict law a workable meaning. See, Graham v. McGrail, 370 Mass. 133, 140 (1976).
The 1982 amendment for selectmen "cannot be read in isolation but must be considered in connection with . . . the main object to be accomplished. "Robertson v. McCarte, 13 Mass. App. 441, 442 (1982) quoting Board of Education v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975). The goal of the 1982 amendment was to allow selectmen to hold two town positions. 5/ This made no sense as applied to "special" selectmen who already could hold two town jobs and be paid for both.6/ EC-•COI-82-106.
The language of the amendment itself supports this reading. The amendment provides that nothing in §20 should be construed to prohibit a town employee from also being a selectman provided that "such selectman shall not . . . receive compensation for more than one position . . ." G.L. c. 268A, §20(g)¶2. The words "such selectman" can reasonably be read to place a limitation on the application of §20 to only those selectmen who otherwise were unable to hold two positions, i.e., regular selectmen. "It is not to be assumed that words in a statute have no force or effect." Gilliam v. Board of Health of Saugus, 327 Mass. 621, 623 (1951).
In construing the provisions of §21A (thirty day waiting period) and §20(g)¶2 (six month waiting period) we must attempt "to give reasonable effect to both . . . and create [ ] a consistent body of law. "Boston v. Board of Education, 392 Mass. 788, 792 (1984). Reasonable effect is given to both if §20(g)¶2 applies only to regular selectmen. To conclude otherwise would have special selectmen follow only some of the provisions of §20(g)¶2 only some of the time.7/ The construction of §20(g)¶2 outlined herein is one "in harmony with prior enactments . . . [and] give[s] rise to a consistent body of law.” Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 (1977).