Edward F. Hennessey

Chief Justice memorial

451 Mass. 1403

A special sitting of the Supreme Judicial Court was held at Boston on April 15, 2008, at which a Memorial to the late Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey was presented.

Present: Chief Justice Marshall; Justices Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Cordy, and Botsford; retired Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins; and retired Justices Ruth I. Abrams, Joseph R. Nolan, and Neil L. Lynch.

Martha Coakley, Attorney General, addressed the court as follows:

May it please the court: As the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, it is my honor to present, on behalf of the bar of this Commonwealth, a memorial and tribute to the late Edward F. Hennessey. Justice Hennessey served this court with great distinction from 1971 until his retirement on April 19, 1989, first as an Associate Justice and then for more than thirteen years as Chief Justice. He also served for almost five years as a judge of the Superior Court.

Chief Justice Hennessey was "not simply a great legal scholar, teacher and jurist: He was above all, a man of great personal integrity, honesty, and fairness."1 The son of Irish immigrants, he was born in South Boston. After receiving his bachelor's degree from Northeastern in 1941, he enlisted in the Army where he saw combat in the Mediterranean, earned the Bronze Star, among other service medals, and rose to the rank of captain. While in the Army, Justice Hennessey was "[a]ttached to a battalion that had no trained lawyers [and he] often found himself under orders to defend enlisted men charged with serious crimes."2 He also witnessed the execution of prisoners. These experiences with "rough "justice"3 led him to his career in law and his intense distaste for the death penalty.

After his discharge at the end of World War II, he married Elizabeth, his wife of over sixty years. He attended Boston University School of Law, graduating in 1949. He became an assistant district attorney in Middlesex County. He later entered private practice with the firm known today as Martin, Magnuson, McCarthy and Kenney. During his many years as a trial lawyer, he was a leader in the Massachusetts bar. He was elected to three terms on the Massachusetts Bar Association's (MBA's) Board of Delegates and served two consecutive terms as the MBA's Vice President. In addition to his busy practice and bar activities, he found time to write a two-volume treatise on torts and trial practice and to lecture on constitutional and criminal law. In 1961, combining his scholarly pursuits and his bar activity, he became the editor-in-chief of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly.

In 1966, Governor John Volpe appointed then Attorney Hennessey to the Superior Court where he served for five years. During his tenure as a judge of the Superior Court, he confronted the inadequacy of some of the Commonwealth's court facilities. In McIntyre v. County Commissioners of Bristol County, twenty inhabitants of Bristol County, all attorneys, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the county commissioners "to provide adequate and suitable facilities and accommodations" for the Superior and Probate Courts in Bristol County. As a judge of the Superior Court, he ordered the county commissioners to take all available steps to provide "suitable courthouse facilities" which he defined as "those which provide the minimum necessities for speedy . . . and efficient disposition of court business. . . ; and to maintain public respect for the dignity and stature of the Superior and Probate Courts."4 His concern that the judiciary have adequate facilities and competent management continued throughout his tenure on the Supreme Judicial Court.

On July 26, 1971, Governor Francis Sargent appointed him an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Justice Hennessey first sat with the court on September 13, 1971. On January 21, 1976, Governor Michael Dukakis appointed Justice Hennessey Chief Justice, a position he held until his retirement at age 70 on April 19, 1989.

One of his early initiatives as Chief Justice reflected his appreciation of the history of the Commonwealth and the preservation of its treasures. To preserve centuries of "priceless" court records which were in danger of "loss and deterioration,"5 Chief Justice Hennessey created the Judicial Records Committee.

While Chief Justice, Justice Hennessey also strove to improve court facilities and management by actively engaging with the Legislature and rallying the support of the bar. He also strove to improve the quality of justice by ensuring that the judiciary had an adequate number of judges, and endeavored to make the judicial process move more efficiently and effectively for judges, lawyers, litigants, including indigent parties, and jurors. His myriad efforts to improve the quality of justice included such initiatives as the establishment of the Committee on Judicial Responsibility, the precursor of the Judicial Conduct Commission, judicial education and training, and the expansion of the availability of competent appointed counsel for indigent parties. He also sought to lessen the disparity in the sentencing of criminal defendants through his advocacy for presumptive sentencing, rejecting mandatory sentences because he believed that the elimination of judicial discretion might result in sentences "inappropriate to the facts of certain offenses and the circumstances of certain offenders."6

During his time on the court, he wrote more than seven hundred majority opinions and more than sixty concurring and dissenting opinions that span volumes 360 through 404 of the Massachusetts Reports. Justice Greaney has described Chief Justice Hennessey's opinions as "absolutely first rate" and has also observed that Chief Justice Hennessey had "the courage to break precedent where changing societal values and conditions call[ed] for a new rule of law. [Chief Justice Hennessey] adhered to the philosophy that stability in the law was important but should never supplant the need for judges to exercise their 'creative' powers to fashion, whenever necessary, thoughtful answers to difficult human problems."7

Three of those thoughtful answers illustrate Chief Justice Hennessey's humanity and abiding respect for the rights of all.

In ruling that the death penalty, which he found was "inflicted . . . by chance and caprice," violated art. 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution, Chief Justice Hennessey wrote for the Court: 8

"In its finality, the death penalty may cruelly frustrate justice. Death is the one punishment from which there can be no relief in the light of later developments in the law or the evidence . . . . While this court has the power to correct constitutional or other errors retroactively by ordering new trials for capital defendants whose appeals are pending or who have been fortunate enough to obtain stays of execution or commutations, it cannot, of course, raise the dead.

"There is an impetus to respond in kind in punishing the person who has been convicted of murder, but the death penalty brutalizes the State which condemns and kills its prisoners." 9

And quoting Thomas Jefferson, Chief Justice Hennessey concluded:

"I shall ask for the abolition of the punishment of death until I have the infallibility of human judgment demonstrated to me."10

In another opinion dealing with the administration of anti-psychotic drugs which were capable of "undermining the foundation of personality," Chief Justice Hennessey wrote:

"The question presented by the ward's refusal of anti-psychotic drugs is only incidentally a medical question. Absent an overwhelming State interest, a competent individual has the right to refuse such treatment. To deny this right to persons who are incapable of exercising it personally is to degrade those whose disabilities make them wholly reliant on other, more fortunate individuals.11

Egregious police misconduct which interfered with a defendant's right to counsel, evoked this response from Chief Justice Hennessey:

"Prophylactic considerations assume paramount importance in fashioning a remedy for deliberate and intentional violations of constitutional rights. Such undermining of constitutional rights must not be countenanced. The specific misconduct present in this case is particularly troublesome because only when the importunings of government agents are successful will the matter come to the attention of the courts, and there is, in turn a grave danger that the courts themselves may become the instrumentality through which government agents may effectuate threats to defendants regarding the consequences of asserting constitutional rights."12

Chief Justice Hennessey retired from the court on April 19, 1989. He did not, however, retire from public service. He continued to serve the public and the legal profession for many more years. He taught at Boston University School of Law, served as the chairman of the State Ethics Commission and then took on the role of settlement counsel for the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.

Chief Justice Paul Liacos aptly described his predecessor when Chief Justice Hennessey was honored by the Massachusetts Law Review in 1989. He was "a man who [was] the model of what a judge should be:

"a cultured man, a self-effacing man, a legal scholar, a skillful negotiator and advocate. He [was] a dedicated, hard-working public man, a creative, open-minded thinker, responding wisely to the challenges of the changing world; in short, he [was] a man of justice."13

On behalf of the Commonwealth, I respectfully move that this Memorial be spread on the records of the Supreme Judicial Court.

Raymond J. Kenney, Jr., Esquire, addressed the court as follows:

May it please the court: I am greatly honored to speak of a friend of fifty (50) years who has held such a significant position in my personal and professional life and in the life of my family.

At the time of his passing Chief Justice Hennessey was referred to as a hero. Webster's dictionary defines a hero as any person admired for their qualities or achievements and regarded as an ideal or model. How fitting a description of Chief Justice Hennessey. He truly was a modern man for all seasons. Many of us were privileged to have been able to share in various ways our lives with him. In touching so many lives as a modest man of unfailing goodwill he not only was well respected but, in a word, was well liked.

The highlight of Chief Justice Hennessey's career, after seventeen (17) years as a highly successful trial lawyer was, of course, his judicial service, first as a trial judge from 1967 to 1971 and then serving on this court as Associate Justice from 1971 to 1976 and as Chief Justice from 1976 to 1989.

I fear that my words in attempting to portray Edward Hennessey as a judge would offer little more than a pale reflection of his attributes. It is more fitting, I believe, in that regard to take his own words from "The Hennessey Papers" as he defined judicial temperament:

"Perfection, if the judge seeks it, requires the knowledge of the law and faithful application of the law; diligence and efficiency; unfailing courtesy without sacrifice of firmness and decisiveness; evenhandedness, while retaining a jealous regard for the individuality of every person; restraint, eternal restraint, particularly as to both the quality and quantity of speech; courage and strength in the face of criticism. Above all, integrity in all of its nuances."

Far too modest and humble to apply those words to himself, Chief Justice Hennessey spoke them at a memorial service for a former Associate Justice of this court. How aptly, however, they describe Chief Justice Hennessey's judicial temperament.

As an able administrator, Judge Hennessey led the court during the implementation of State-wide court reorganization, as well as during revision of the civil and criminal rules of procedure and the establishment of bar and judicial discipline. When circumstances required, Judge Hennessey did not hesitate to visit the halls of the legislature where he was well received as he sought support for court improvements.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whom Judge Hennessey was fond of quoting, once observed in speaking of this court, here only slightly paraphrased, that "no person of any loftiness of soul could be long a Justice on this Court without rising to his or her full height." Truly, Judge Hennessey stood as a giant among giants.

Edward Hennessey, however, was far more than a judge, however magnificently he fulfilled that role.

He was an extraordinary teacher, both in his more formal presentations as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Boston University Law School, his alma mater from which he graduated with honors, as well as in his extensive writings and in his numerous lectures at continuing legal education programs.

On a more personal level, he was an incredible mentor for younger lawyers. I was extraordinarily privileged to have come under his mentorship at the outset of my legal career. Moreover, his counsel and wisdom continued for me and my colleagues through the time of his return, following retirement from the court, to the law firm which he co-founded in 1957. His door was always open. He thoroughly enjoyed discussing legal issues or simply chatting about current events when not busy writing or preparing for arbitrations. I have no doubt that the many brilliant young lawyers who served from time to time as his law clerks have equally fond memories of his guidance and encouragement.

Among so many of Chief Justice Hennessey's virtues, which surely include great patience and humility, he possessed limitless loyalty. As a lawyer he was loyal to his partners and colleagues, as well as to his fellow attorneys by serving them through various bar association capacities and in contributing to the development of Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. As a judge, he was loyal to his judicial peers, ultimately as their leader, including his participation in the establishment of the Flaschner Judicial Institute. Above all, he remained unswervingly loyal to the moral principles which formed the foundation of all aspects of his personal and professional life.

Certainly, his wife, Betty, his life companion for over sixty-one (61) years, his daughter Beth and her husband Mick, his beloved grandsons, John and Ethan, and his devoted secretary and friend, Rose Krikorian, miss him deeply, as do I and my family and all who had the privileged of knowing him. I suspect, however, that this special sitting of the court had been convened not so much to mourn his loss as to celebrate the life of a great man and a great jurist. His wisdom and counsel will continue to live through his many writings and in the hundreds of opinions which he authored, as well as in the hearts and minds of all of us who have been touched by him. How very fortunate are we to have shared that wisdom and guidance. Well done, good and faithful servant.

Thank you.

Frederick J. Martone, United States District Judge, addressed the court as follows:

Madam Chief Justice, members of the court, members of the Hennessey family and friends. I am Frederick Martone and I clerked for Justice Hennessey during the 1972-1973 term. You will forgive me if I refer to him as Justice Hennessey, or, more affectionately, as Judge Hennessey, but he was not yet Chief Justice when I clerked for him.

I am grateful to Tom Maffei for nominating me to speak on behalf of all of the Hennessey clerks. No one can really speak on behalf of some thirty former law clerks, but I hope, that in these very personal remarks, each clerk will find something that resonates with his or her own experience. Judge Hennessey held us together over the years and through him we have found common ground.

Judge Hennessey interviewed me in the fall of 1971. He was brand new to the court and neither one of us could have imagined that some thirty-six years later I would be standing in his courtroom speaking to his court at his memorial. Nor could I have imagined then the influence he would have on my life.

He had the look and physique of a boxer. Yet when he spoke, he had the voice of a saint. He was deliberate. His words were measured. He asked me about my newly published law review note on the law relating to automobile searches. He was reserved and often stared out of the window while he spoke. He was the first judge I had ever met, but even at that, I sensed that I was in the presence of someone very special. He asked if, after four years in the Air Force, I would be happy researching and writing. He said that, unlike the trial court, the appellate court could be somewhat lonely. He was fresh from the Superior Court and I sensed his heart was still there. I could not know at the time, that in a court of last resort, a judge might work only with his law clerks or judicial assistant for long stretches at a time.

I accepted with pride the offer that would come, and in September 1972, took the train from Winchester to North Station for my first day at the court. Judge Hennessey greeted me warmly and invited me to occupy the office sandwiched between him and Justice Braucher. This gave me a front row seat from which to observe the rhythm of the court.

These were exciting times for the country and the court. Like 2008, 1972 was a presidential election year. One noon hour we walked down to Post Office Square to see Senator George McGovern campaign for President. Vietnam was on the front burner and Watergate was yet to come.

Change was afoot at the court. The Massachusetts Appeals Court had just been created and the Supreme Judicial Court was learning how to transition from a court of error to a court of last resort. Massachusetts still had archaic rules of procedure. I was introduced to demurrers, pleas in abatement, and bills of exceptions. The new rules, modeled after the Federal rules, were still on the horizon. With so many new members of the court, there was a generational shift as well. A Dickensian formality was still in the air but Judge Hennessey put everyone at ease. The clerks of court, the reporter of decisions, the court officers, the editors, and secretaries admired him. I always thought Hélèn Currier, Emily Paradise, and the other fine editors gave our drafts curb service because of their affection for him. Chief Justice Tauro was a frequent visitor, and the two shared an experience-based interest in the administration of justice.

His human qualities made him a great judge: integrity, courage, courtesy, humility and generosity of spirit. He was wonderfully modest in an environment that still bore the weight of the pretensions of a prior age. The local paper once thought it noteworthy that Judge Hennessey was found eating lunch at the counter at the Steaming Kettle.

He loved his family and beamed with pride when his daughter, to whom he referred as "My Bethy," or "My Bessy," was admitted to Brown that year. He smiled from ear to ear when my wife Jane and I rolled our first born into his chambers. This had to be a first at the Supreme Judicial Court.

He was a great teacher. We would sit down and discuss the cases. He did much of his own writing, so much so, that in the first few months, I wondered whether I was of any use to him at all. In discussing legal issues, he showed an enormous respect for the law, lawyers, and, especially, judges. It distressed him greatly when lawyers or judges failed to meet or exceed professional standards.

During my last week at the court, we finished and filed In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973). Judge Hennessey was profoundly troubled by Judge Troy's extreme judicial misbehavior. Although per curiam, the language is vintage Hennessey. Even as the court disbarred and enjoined Judge Troy from exercising judicial power, Judge Hennessey took pains to put a good word in for the vast majority of judges who work their hearts out.

The court said:

"So it is that there is a tendency to judge the courts, not on the dedicated and selfless service of the vast majority of judges but on the publicized misconduct of the few who fail to live up to the high standards long characteristic of the Massachusetts Judiciary.

. . ."Unquestionably a judge is entitled to lead his own private life free from unwarranted intrusion. But even there, subjected as he is to constant public scrutiny in his community and beyond, he must adhere to standards of probity and propriety higher than those deemed acceptable for others. More is expected of him and, since he is a judge, rightfully so."

364 Mass. at 71, 306 N.E.2d at 234-235.

Judge Hennessey was not an ideologue. In our discussions, it was plain that his decisions were not driven by some grand, overriding legal theory, but, instead, by a good faith effort at reason and common sense. Experience counted for much.

My year went quickly. He was magnificent. I jumped at the chance when he offered me an opportunity to spend another year to assist the newly created hearing list committee and Dan Johnedis in transitioning to the court's new role as a certiorari court. His generosity was boundless.

Over the years he and Mrs. Hennessey hosted the law clerks at their place at the Cape where I was to meet later generations of clerks. In our family, Mrs. Hennessey's ham and cheese sandwiches became famously known as "Betty Hennessey Sandwiches."

Judge Hennessey continued to give throughout his life. He was always encouraging. I had a very fine law practice with a very fine firm, but nothing matched the pleasure of working with him. So I did what he did, albeit in Arizona. I served as a Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County for seven years. I then served ten years as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Arizona. I think this pleased Judge Hennessey greatly. Serving on a multi-member State court of last resort is no easy task, which I suspect each member of this court well understands. The interpersonal dynamic of collective decision making is itself an art form. This is especially the case for one who had become accustomed to singular decision making as a trial judge. It pleased him, too, when I accepted an appointment as a United States District Judge.

Before he published his booklet, Excellent Judges, he called and expressed doubts about releasing it -- he was concerned that it was too "banal," to use his word. I encouraged him to go forward because those involved in the selection of judges needed to know what good judging was all about. I had the members of the Arizona appellate and trial court judicial nominating commissions supplied with copies. In this, and in so many other ways, his keen interest in the administration of justice extended beyond his term and beyond Massachusetts.

His counterparts around the country treasured him. Back in 1987, I attended the annual meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices in Rapid City, South Dakota. Judge Hennessey was there as the immediate past president. I was there to lecture on State civil jurisdiction in Indian country. He squired me around the room, introducing me to his colleagues from the fifty States. So many of them buttonholed me later to tell me what a grand man he was.

Just this year, at the meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction in New Orleans, I had the chance to bask vicariously in his glow when some of the participants came up to me, and with great enthusiasm, told me how wonderful it was that I had clerked for Chief Justice Hennessey.

I owe my twenty-three year judicial career to the early and continuing influence of Judge Hennessey. While I know how fortunate I have been to have served in so many judicial roles, and while Article III status will allow me to continue to judge for as many years as I have left, it is the case, however, that serving as Judge Hennessey's law clerk has been and continues to be the best year of my professional life. And while I have not polled them, I suspect that every other former Hennessey clerk here today feels much the same way. Rose Krikorian, his faithful, long-time secretary and assistant, was the luckiest of all -- she had thirteen such years with him.

I last saw Judge Hennessey lying flat on his back in a nursing home in Needham. Tom Maffei and I stole our way into his room unannounced. He smiled from ear to ear and said, "hello Tom and Fred." With memory intact, and showing his generous interest in others, he asked about Jane. When I told him she was down in the lobby, he said, "well, have her come up," and she did.

The visit evoked powerful emotions. When Tom and Jane left the room, I lingered for a bit. I told him how grateful I was to him, and how he had been the guiding hand in my life as a judge. He sensed the deep affection, his eyes welled up in tears, and I knew it was time to leave.

One of the few downsides of longevity is that, upon death, there are fewer people left to mourn. So it was at Judge Hennessey's funeral. Gone were many of the governors, colleagues, and public officials he knew over the course of a lengthy career. But we clerks were there and Tom Maffei, his first, gave a touching eulogy. The law clerk-judge relationship is special and lasts for as long as the clerk lives. We have a shared experience, and are indelibly marked as Hennessey clerks. We loved him.

While sitting on the Supreme Court of Arizona, one of my colleagues often reminded us that we were not writing in concrete, but instead, on a chalkboard. It is easy to lose sight of that in the midst of an active judicial career. Our best and uncertain hope, Madam Chief Justice and members of the court, is, that when our day of memorial comes, a former law clerk might rise and be able to tell the gathering how much we were loved.

Thank you, Madam Chief Justice and members of the court, for this rare chance to declare so publicly our deep affection for Chief Justice Hennessey.

Retired Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins, speaking for the court, responded as follows:

Chief Justice Marshall and members of the court, Judge Martone, Attorney General Coakley, Mr. Kenney, members of the bar, the Hennessey family, and guests.

I was privileged to serve with Chief Justice Hennessey from 1972 until his retirement in 1989. These were challenging and exciting times. The substantive law underwent major alteration, and there were many administrative and procedural changes. Associate Justice, and then Chief Justice, Hennessey had a major role in these events. No one had a greater one.

Among the many significant innovations Chief Justice Hennessey promoted during his time as Chief Justice, were the formation of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, the court records preservation project, the recall of retired judges, cameras in the courtroom, judicial education through the Flaschner Judicial Institute, and the early steps toward judicial evaluation programs. He also took practical steps to ensure good will within the court. For example, he changed the process of assigning cases for opinion writing, deciding (with necessary exceptions) to assign cases in rotation, abandoning the wide discretion exercised by his predecessors in assigning cases and thus avoiding any appearance of favoritism.

He was involved deeply in the modernization of the personal injury law of the Commonwealth. The court that he joined in 1971 had long held the view that common law tort rules, although established by the court, should be revised by legislative action. See Colby v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 528 (1969). That view, although perhaps of some theoretical merit, was impractical, as the court repeatedly concluded during the balance of the 1970's. For example, Chief Justice Hennessey led the charge against the discredited doctrine of governmental immunity.

In his scholarly opinion in Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612 (1973), then Justice Hennessey explained in detail the advisability of abolishing governmental immunity for the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. He urged the Legislature to take a comprehensive approach in formulating exceptions and limits in abolishing governmental immunity. When, however, by 1977 the legislature had failed to act on the issue, now Chief Justice Hennessey wrote in Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1977), that unless the Legislature acted on this issue during its 1978 session, the court would do so. His opinion set forth thoroughly the details of the court's intended approach in establishing a rule of limited governmental immunity, principles that the Legislature largely followed in finally adopting a new Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. St. 1978, c. 512.

The success of the court both internally and externally was largely attributable to Ed's affable personality. He had a fine sense of humor, was not easily aroused, and was imbued with good will. Several circumstances come to mind: his wry analysis, recounted at the start of consultation, of some Red Sox misfortune of the night before; the report of an amusing or instructive conversation about the law or the court that he overheard as he commuted by public transportation to and from the courthouse; a word of praise (with a hint of pride) about his wife's golf game or his daughter's academic achievements; a kind word for the position of a colleague before announcing his decision to vote the other way; a joke, best forgotten, recounted with pleasure for a second or third time; his admonition to me that I should count my fingers after shaking hands with a particular politician.

Ed was not beyond telling a story on himself. He had an elderly aunt who lived alone whom he would visit from time to time. One day she decided to have a party and to invite some of her old friends. Although she thought few, if any, of them would drink an alcoholic beverage, as a precaution she bought a bottle of whiskey. When the party was over, the bottle had been opened, but hardly any of the whiskey had been consumed. She put the bottle in the back of a cupboard. Several weeks later Ed came to visit her. In the course of the visit, his aunt said to Ed, "Edward, I have had this opened bottle of whiskey in the back of the cupboard for several weeks now. Don't you think it has gone bad and that I should pour it down the drain?" "Oh no, Auntie," said Ed, "I'll take care of it for you."

Ed's patient, non-confrontational approach to his colleagues, the bar, the judiciary, and other branches of government did much to advance the administration of justice in Massachusetts. Improvement in the administration of justice is a long-term process, but Ed had the staying power and the patience to make it work Madam Chief Justice, I join in support of the Attorney General's motion.

The court allows the motion that the Memorial be spread upon the records of the court.


1 Foreword, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. xi (1990).

2 G. Dargo, A Tribute to Chief Justice Hennessey, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. xiii (1990).

3 Id.

4 McIntyre v. County Commissioners of Bristol County, 356 Mass. 520, 524 (1969).

5 22 Boston Bar J. 5 (1978).

6 E. Hennessey, The State of the Judiciary Seventh Annual Report of the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 68 Mass. L. Rev. 3, 8 (1983).

7 J. Greaney, Dedication to Honorable Edward F. Hennessey, 24 New Eng. L. Rev. xxv (1990).

8 District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 662-663 (1980).

9 Id. at 671.

10 Id.

11 Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 434, 437 (1981).

12 Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 444 (1977).

13 P.J. Liacos, Edward F. Hennessey -- A Man of Justice, 74 Mass. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1989).

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