• This page, Disposition Agreement in the Matter of Lawrence Army Jr., is   offered by
  • State Ethics Commission
Settlement

Settlement  Disposition Agreement in the Matter of Lawrence Army Jr.

Date: 09/23/2025
Organization: State Ethics Commission
Docket Number: 25-0006
Location: Boston, MA
Referenced Sources: G.L. c. 268A, the Conflict of Interest Law, as Amended by c. 248, Acts of 2024

Disposition Agreement

The State Ethics Commission (“Commission”) and Lawrence Army Jr. (“Army”) enter into this Disposition Agreement pursuant to Section 3 of the Commission’s Enforcement Procedures. This Agreement constitutes a consented-to final order enforceable in the Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(j).

On December 21, 2023, the Commission initiated a preliminary inquiry, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(a), into possible violations of the conflict of interest law, G.L. c. 268A, by Army. On March 20, 2025, the Commission concluded its inquiry and found reasonable cause to believe that Army violated G.L. c. 268A, §§ 6 and 23(b)(2).

The Commission and Army now agree to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

  1. On September 14, 2022, the Governor’s Council confirmed Governor Baker’s nomination of Army to serve as an Associate Justice in the Worcester Probate and Family Court.
  2. Army, however, began his judicial service in the Essex Probate and Family Court, acting as a ‘fill-in’ judge for the sitting judges in that court from October 2, 2022 through December 29, 2022.
  3. On December 29, 2022, Army presided over Associate Justice Mary Black’s courtroom in Salem.
  4. One of the matters Army presided over was a divorce proceeding.
  5. Judge Black had previously issued an order in the divorce proceeding that the marital home, located in Georgetown, be sold, and that, if the parties could not agree to the terms of the listing and sale, the court might appoint a Special Master.
  6. At the December 29 hearing, the parties reported they had not agreed to the terms of the sale and one party requested the appointment of a Special Master to sell the house because the parties were in “dire straits” financially.
  7. Army stated during the December 29 hearing that he was “either going to appoint a Special Master or a Commissioner to sell the marital home.”
  8. Following the December 29 hearing, Army asked a Sessions Clerk what the process was to appoint a Special Master or Commissioner.
  9. The Sessions Clerk Army asked was a recent hire and did not know the process for appointing a Special Master or Commissioner. The Clerk told Army that there was no list from which appointments needed to be made.
  10. After the conversation with the Sessions Clerk, Army drafted, signed, and dated a handwritten order appointing his father, Lawrence Army Sr., as a Special Master for sale of the parties’ home.
  11. The Sessions Clerk subsequently produced a typed order, dated December 29, 2022, which Army signed, appointing Army’s father, as a Special Master, and setting the Special Master fee at “his customary rate” of $450/hour, which was to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home.
  12. Army’s father’s office is located in Worcester, approximately 65 miles from the property to be sold.
  13. Special Master is a “fee-generating” court appointment.
  14. SJC Rule 1:07(3) provides that fee-generating court appointments are made from a list of eligible persons maintained by the court. Appointments from the list are made successively. If an appointment is not successive, or not made pursuant to the list, the judge must provide a brief written statement of reasons for not following the order of the list.
  15. The Essex Probate and Family Court maintained such appointment lists. Army’s father did not appear on any of the Court’s appointment lists.
  16. In his appointment of his father as a Special Master, Army did not provide a reason for not appointing a person from the court appointment list.
  17. Army’s action was brought to the attention of First Justice Frances Giordano by a court employee and on January 18, 2023, First Justice Frances Giordano vacated Army’s order appointing his father as a Special Master. On this date, Judge Giordano also appointed a different Special Master to sell the marital home.
  18. Army’s father did not receive any fees as a result of Army’s appointment of him as a Special Master in the divorce proceeding.

    Conclusions of Law

    Section 6

  19. Section 6 of General Laws chapter 268A prohibits a state employee from participating as such an employee in a particular matter in which, to their knowledge, they or an immediate family member has a financial interest.
  20. As a Probate and Family Court Associate Justice, Army was, at all relevant times, a state employee as defined in G.L. c. 268A, § 1(q).
  21. Army’s father is a member of his immediate family, as defined by G.L. c. 268A, § 1(e).
  22. The December 29, 2022 appointment of him as a Special Master was a particular matter in which Army’s father had a financial interest as he was to be paid $450 per hour for his services as a Special Master.
  23. When Army participated as a Probate and Family Court Associate Justice in his father’s appointment as a Special Master by personally making the appointment, he knew of his father’s financial interest in the appointment.
  24. Therefore, by, as a Probate and Family Court Associate Justice, appointing his father as Special Master in the divorce proceeding on December 29, 2022, Army violated § 6.
     

    Section 23(b)(2)(ii)

  25. Section 23(b)(2)(ii) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, using or attempting to use his official position to secure for himself or others unwarranted privileges or exemptions of substantial value that are not properly available to similarly situated individuals.
  26. Appointment as a Special Master in a court proceeding is a privilege.
  27. The appointment of Army’s father as a Special Master in an Essex Probate and Family Court divorce proceeding was an unwarranted privilege because Army’s father was not on the court-maintained list of persons eligible for fee-generating appointments and Army had no legitimate reason or justification for not making the appointment of the Special Master in the divorce proceeding from the court’s list.
  28. The unwarranted privilege of the Special Master appointment was of substantial value because, pursuant to the appointment, Army’s father was to be paid $450 per hour for his services as Special Master.
  29. The unwarranted privilege of a Special Master appointment was not properly available to similarly situated individuals, that is other attorneys who like Army’s father did not appear next on the Court’s list of available persons for fee-generating appointments.
  30. Army used or attempted to use his position as a Probate and Family Court Associate Justice to provide this unwarranted privilege to his father by drafting an order appointing his father as a Special Master and by signing the order making that appointment.
  31. Although the Sessions Clerk told Army that there was no list from which Special Master appointments are to be made, Army, as a Probate and Family Court Judge, had reason to know when he appointed his father as a Special Master that the appointment was a fee-generating appointment subject to SJC Rule 1.07.
  32. Therefore, by so acting, Army knowingly, or with reason to know, used his official position as a Probate and Family Court Associate Justice to secure for his father an unwarranted privilege of substantial value that was not properly available to similarly situated individuals.  In so doing, Army violated § 23(b)(2)(ii).

    Disposition

In view of the foregoing violations of G.L. c. 268A by Army, the Commission has determined that the public interest would be served by the disposition of this matter without further enforcement proceedings, on the following terms and conditions agreed to by Army:

(1)        that Army pay to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with such payment to be delivered to the Commission, the sum of $4,000 as a civil penalty for violating G.L. c. 268A, § 6 and § 23(b)(2)(ii); and

(2)        that Army waive all rights to contest, in this or any other administrative or judicial proceeding to which the Commission is or may be a party, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.

By signing below, Army acknowledges that he has personally read this Disposition Agreement, that it is a public document, and that he agrees to its terms and conditions.

Help Us Improve Mass.gov  with your feedback

Please do not include personal or contact information.
Feedback