Settlement  Disposition Agreement in the Matter of Steven Madelle

Date:	03/29/2023
Organization:	State Ethics Commission
Docket Number:	23-0005
Referenced Sources:	G.L. c. 268A, the Conflict of Interest Law, as Amended by c. 194, Acts of 2011

Disposition Agreement

The State Ethics Commission (“Commission”) and Steven Madelle (“Madelle”) enter into this Disposition Agreement pursuant to Section 3 of the Commission’s Enforcement Procedures. This Agreement constitutes a consented-to final order enforceable in the Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(j). 

On March 17, 2022, the Commission initiated a preliminary inquiry, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(a), into possible violations of the conflict of interest law, G.L. c. 268A, by Madelle. On December 15, 2022, the Commission concluded its inquiry and found reasonable cause to believe that Madelle violated G.L. c. 268A, §§ 23(b)(2)(i) and 23(b)(2)(ii).

The Commission and Madelle now agree to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. Madelle has worked for the Charlton Police Department (“Police Department”) since 2006. He was promoted to sergeant in 2019.
2. On June 12, 2021, while off-duty, Madelle called the Police Department’s non-emergency business number and spoke with a dispatcher. Madelle told the dispatcher, “I need you to ping a phone for me.” After Madelle provided the cell phone number and the name of the carrier, the dispatcher stated “Okay, I’ll get on that.”  
3. A “ping” of a cell phone is a remote activation of the cell phone’s GPS capabilities that causes the phone to transmit its real-time location coordinates to the cell phone carrier.
4. In Massachusetts, a cell phone ping may be initiated by search warrant, or, absent a search warrant, only after a request by law enforcement under exigent circumstances.
5. Exigent circumstances include assisting persons who are seriously injured or who are facing the threat of imminent injury.
6. A cell phone carrier will not under any circumstances ping a phone for a private citizen, including the private citizen’s own phone.
7. During the relevant time, the Police Department did not generally initiate a phone ping without specific facts indicating a person may be in danger or a danger to others, such as their having made threats to harm themselves or others.
8. When a person is reported missing, the Police Department’s general practice is to first conduct follow-up investigation. It does not immediately initiate a phone ping in cases where persons are reported missing without facts indicating they may be in danger. When a person reported missing is not a Charlton resident, the proper procedure is to refer the matter to the police department in the jurisdiction in which the person lives.
9. On the recorded line on which Madelle spoke to the dispatcher, he did not identify the owner of the cell phone number, his relationship to the owner of the cell phone, or the reason for his ping request.
10. The cell phone number belonged to a person (“the Person”) with whom Madelle had a private relationship. The Person was not a resident of Charlton at the relevant time.
11. At the time Madelle requested the ping, he was unable to locate the Person, however, the circumstances were not objectively exigent.
12. The police dispatcher, who is subordinate to Madelle as a Charlton police sergeant, did as Madelle requested and immediately contacted the cell phone carrier to initiate the ping. When asked by the carrier, the dispatcher communicated that the request related to an emergency involving the danger of death or serious physical injury.
13. The carrier provided the dispatcher with the location coordinates of the pinged cell phone. The dispatcher then provided Madelle the location coordinates and a map of the cell phone’s location according to the Police Department’s 911 mapping system.
14. The police department in the jurisdiction where the Person lived would not have immediately initiated a ping of the Person’s cell phone based on the facts Madelle reported.
15. Had Madelle, while on duty as a police sergeant, received a request to have a cell phone pinged based on facts similar to those he reported in requesting the ping of the Person’s cell phone, he would not have immediately initiated the ping.
16. Several hours after requesting the cell phone ping, Madelle again called the Police Department’s non-emergency business number and asked a subordinate Charlton patrol officer to “look up” the “vehicle” of the Person “to see the last time somebody ran [the Person’s vehicle’s license plate].”
17. “Running” a vehicle license plate generally means searching the vehicle’s license plate in various databases accessible to police departments. Running a vehicle license plate to see if any other police officers have run the plate can potentially provide information on the location of the vehicle.
18. Madelle gave the patrol officer the name of the Person and the spelling of the Person’s name. 
19. The patrol officer understood Madelle to be asking him to search Registry of Motor Vehicles (“RMV”) and Department of Criminal Justice Information Services (“DCJIS”) databases to access information to determine the last time the Person’s vehicle’s license plate was queried by any law enforcement officer. 
20. RMV and DCJIS information may be accessed only for authorized purposes.
21. The patrol officer ran the search as requested and informed Madelle that there had been no recent queries.

Conclusions of Law

Section 23(b)(2)(i)

22. Section 23(b)(2)(i) prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, soliciting or receiving anything of substantial value[1] which is not otherwise authorized by statute or regulation, for or because of his official position.
23. As a Charlton police sergeant, Madelle is a municipal employee as defined by G.L. c. 268A, § 1(g).
24. Madelle solicited and received the location of the Person’s cell phone via a “ping” and information as to whether other officers had recently “run” the Person’s license plate.
25. Madelle was provided with the results of the “ping” by the Charlton police dispatcher and the information as to whether other law enforcement officers had “run” the license plate by the Charlton patrol officer for or because of Madelle’s position as a Charlton police sergeant.
26. When Madelle solicited and received the results of the cell phone ping and the information as to whether other officers had “run” the license plate, he knew or had reason to know he was being given this information for or because of his position as a Charlton police sergeant. The use of investigatory tools available only to law enforcement for official purposes and the information which Madelle solicited and received from the police dispatcher and the patrol officer were of substantial value.
27. Madelle’s solicitation and receipt of the location of the Person’s cell phone via a “ping” and information as to whether other officers had recently “run” the Person’s license plate for his private purposes were not otherwise authorized by statute or regulation.
28. Therefore, by, for his private purposes, requesting that subordinate Police Department employees use police investigatory tools, including a cell phone “ping” and “running” a license plate, that are only available to the police for official police purposes, and by receiving from them the results of their use of those police tools, Madelle knowingly solicited and received something of substantial value which was not otherwise authorized by statute or regulation, for or because of his official position. In so doing, Madelle violated § 23(b)(2)(i). 

Section 23(b)(2)(ii)

29. Section 23(b)(2)(ii) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, using or attempting to use his official position to secure for himself or others unwarranted privileges or exemptions of substantial value that are not properly available to similarly situated individuals.
30. Madelle knowingly or with reason to know used his position as a Charlton police sergeant to request that subordinate Police Department employees use law enforcement investigatory tools for his personal purposes.
31. The use of investigatory tools available only to law enforcement and the information which Madelle solicited and received from the police dispatcher and the patrol officer were privileges of substantial value.
32. Madelle’s use through his Police Department subordinates of law enforcement investigatory tools, including a cell phone ping and “running” a license plate, was unwarranted because use of those tools for any personal or private purpose is not authorized and, thus, not properly available to any other similarly situated individual seeking for personal purposes to locate a person with whom they have a private relationship.
33. Therefore, by requesting that subordinate Police Department employees use police search tools, including a cell phone “ping” and “running” a license plate, for his personal purposes, and in the absence of objectively exigent circumstances, Madelle knowingly or with reason to know used his official position as a Charlton police sergeant to secure for himself unwarranted privileges of substantial value that were not properly available to similarly situated individuals.  In so doing, Madelle violated § 23(b)(2)(ii). 

Disposition

In view of the foregoing violations of G.L. c. 268A by Madelle, the Commission has determined that the public interest would be served by the disposition of this matter without further enforcement proceedings, on the following terms and conditions agreed to by Madelle:

(1)        that Madelle pay to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with such payment to be delivered to the Commission, the sum of $10,000 as a civil penalty for violating G.L. c. 268A, §§ 23(b)(2)(i) and 23(b)(2)(ii); and

(2)        that Madelle waive all rights to contest, in this or any other administrative or judicial proceeding to which the Commission is or may be a party, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.

By signing below, Madelle acknowledges that he has personally read this Disposition Agreement, that it is a public document, and that he agrees to its terms and conditions.

STATE ETHICS COMMISSION

[1] Substantial value is $50 or more. 930 CMR 5.05.