Settlement  Disposition Agreement in the Matter of Viki Briggs

Date:	12/18/2025
Organization:	State Ethics Commission
Docket Number:	25-0009
Referenced Sources:	G.L. c. 268A, the Conflict of Interest Law, as Amended by c. 248, Acts of 2024

Disposition Agreement

The State Ethics Commission (“Commission”) and Viki Briggs (“Briggs”) enter into this Disposition Agreement pursuant to Section 3 of the Commission’s Enforcement Procedures. This Agreement constitutes a consented-to final order enforceable in the Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(j).

On November 21, 2024, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(a), the Commission initiated a preliminary inquiry into possible violations of the conflict of interest law, G.L. c. 268A, by Briggs. On May 22, 2025, the Commission concluded its inquiry and found reasonable cause to believe that Briggs violated G.L. c. 268A, §§ 4, 7, 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(2)(ii).

The Commission and Briggs now agree to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. Briggs was a Residential Supervisor II for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services (“DDS”) from December 2016 to January 23, 2024. Briggs was assigned to work first shift, from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Sunday through Thursday.
2. On October 7, 2022, DDS sent Briggs a letter via email informing her that she was being placed on paid administrative leave pending the completion of an investigation.
3. The letter stated, “During this time, you are required to remain available to DDS during normal business hours.”
4. “Normal business hours” traditionally and commonly means the hours of 9 a.m. through 5 p.m., Monday through Friday.
5. On October 17, 2022, DDS sent Briggs another letter via email reminding her of her leave requirements, including that she remain available to the Department during normal business hours.
6. While on paid administrative leave, Briggs was paid biweekly for eight hours each day from Monday through Friday.
7. In or about August 2023, Briggs was notified by DDS that it was conducting an additional investigation and that she would remain on paid administrative leave.
8. On November 15, 2023, Briggs was notified by DDS that the review was complete and that, “Conclusions have been made that render the allegations true.”
9. On December 4, 2023, while still on paid administrative leave from her DDS Residential Supervisor II position, Briggs began working as a Residence Director for a private group home in Massachusetts (“Private Group Home”).
10. Briggs was hired by the Private Group Home to regularly work Monday through Friday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
11. The Private Group Home is operated by an organization that receives funding from DDS as an Adult Long-Term Residential services provider pursuant to 101 CMR 420.
12. DDS funding supported Private Group Home staff pay, including that of Briggs.
13. As Residence Director at the Private Group Home, Briggs’s duties included coordinating with DDS staff to ensure adherence to residents’ individual service plans.
14. On December 8, 2023, Briggs was notified by DDS of charges against her and that a hearing would be held “to determine what action, if any, up to and including termination” would be taken as a result.
15. In January 2024, as Residence Director at the Private Group Home, Briggs exchanged multiple emails with DDS staff to coordinate DDS staff meeting with Private Group Home residents.
16. Briggs was terminated from her DDS Residential Supervisor II position on January 23, 2024.
17. Briggs was paid $6,785.94 by the Private Group Home for her work as Residence Director on 35 days between December 4, 2023, and January 23, 2024, while she was on paid administrative leave from her DDS Residential Supervisor II position.
18. The Commonwealth paid Briggs $10,007.71 in administrative leave pay between December 4, 2023, and January 23, 2024.
19. Briggs did not disclose to DDS her employment as Residence Director for the Private Group Home while she was on paid administrative leave.
20. Briggs testified under oath during the Commission’s investigation that she accepted employment with the Private Group Home because she believed that she would be terminated from her DDS position and needed to maintain health insurance but that she did not resign her DDS position because she held out hope that she would not be terminated.

Conclusions of Law

Section 23(b)(2)(ii)

21. Section 23(b)(2)(ii) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a state employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, using or attempting to use her official position to secure for herself unwarranted privileges or exemptions which are of substantial value^[1]and which are not properly available to similarly situated individuals.
22. As a DDS employee, even while on paid administrative leave, Briggs was a state employee as that term is defined in G.L. c. 268A, §§ 1(p)-(q).
23. Briggs’s use of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, normal business hours during her paid administrative leave time to work as Residence Director at the Private Group Home was an unwarranted privilege because she was required to remain available to DDS during normal business hours while on paid administrative leave.
24. The privilege was of substantial value because Briggs earned $6,785.94 for working for the Private Group Home during normal business hours while on paid administrative leave.
25. Similarly situated individuals, including other Commonwealth employees, cannot work during the hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, while on paid administrative leave as they are required to remain available to the Commonwealth during normal business hours.
26. Briggs knew or had reason to know that she was required to remain available to the Commonwealth during the hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, while on paid administrative leave because her leave notice informed her of the requirement to remain available to DDS during normal business hours, and working for the Private Group Home was not consistent with remaining available to the Commonwealth.
27. By working as Residence Director for the Private Group Home during normal business hours while on paid administrative leave from her DDS position, Briggs knowingly, or with reason to know, used her official position to secure for herself a substantially valuable unwarranted privilege which was not properly available to similarly situated individuals. By so doing, Briggs violated G. L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(2)(ii).

Section 23(b)(1)

28. Section 23(b)(1) prohibits a public employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, accepting other employment involving compensation of substantial value, the responsibilities of which are inherently incompatible with the responsibilities of her public office.
29. Briggs’s employment as Residence Director for the Private Group Home involved compensation of substantial value.
30. The responsibilities of Briggs’s employment as Residence Director for the Private Group Home were inherently incompatible with the responsibilities of her public position because she was hired to work for the Private Group Home during the same hours for which she was required to remain available to DDS while on paid administrative leave.
31. Briggs knew or had reason to know that the duties of her position as Residence Director for the Private Group Home were inherently incompatible with the requirement that she remain available to DDS during normal business hours.
32. By working as Residence Director for the Private Group Home during the same hours for which she was required to remain available to DDS while on paid administrative leave, Briggs knowingly, or with reason to know, accepted employment involving compensation of substantial value, the responsibilities of which were inherently incompatible with her public office. By so doing, Briggs violated G. L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(1).

Section 7

33. Section 7 of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a state employee from, knowingly or with reason to know, having a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in a contract made by a state agency in which the Commonwealth or a state agency is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.
34. Briggs had a financial interest in the contract under which DDS provided funding to the Private Group Home for its provision of Adult Long-Term Residential support because such funding included payment for her position as Residence Director.
35. Briggs knew or had reason to know that DDS funded the Private Group Home.
36. By, while a state DDS employee on paid administrative leave, entering into paid employment as Residence Director for the Private Group Home, while the Private Group Home received DDS funding for supports including payment for Briggs’s position as Residence Director, Briggs knowingly or with reason to know had a financial interest in a contract made by a state agency in which the agency was a party and had a direct and substantial interest. By so doing, Briggs violated G.L. c. 268A, § 7.

Section 4(a)

37. Section 4(a) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a state employee from, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duties, directly or indirectly receiving compensation from anyone other than the Commonwealth or a state agency in relation to any particular matter in which the Commonwealth or a state agency is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.
38. Briggs received compensation from the Private Group Home when she received her paycheck for working as Residence Director.
39. Briggs’s compensation as Residence Director for the Private Group Home was in relation to particular matters in which the Commonwealth and DDS had a direct and substantial interest, as DDS provided funding for the Private Group Home’s operation and Briggs’s Residence Director job duties included coordinating meetings with DDS staff regarding residents’ individual service plans.
40. By receiving her pay as Residence Director for the Private Group Home, for duties involving coordination with DDS staff, Briggs directly or indirectly received compensation from someone other than the Commonwealth or a state agency in relation to particular matters in which the Commonwealth and/or a state agency had a direct and substantial interest. By so doing, Briggs violated § 4(a). 

Resolution

In view of the foregoing violations of G.L. c. 268A by Briggs, the Commission has determined that the public interest would be served by the disposition of this matter without further enforcement proceedings, on the basis of the following terms and conditions agreed to by Briggs:

(1)       that Briggs pay to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with such payment to be delivered to the Commission, the sum of $10,007.71 as damages for the administrative leave pay she received for the normal business hours for which she was not available to DDS as required by the terms of her administrative leave;

(2)       that Briggs pay to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with such payment to be delivered to the Commission, the sum of $2,500 as a civil penalty for violating G.L. c. 268A, §§ 4(a), 7, 23(b)(1), and 23(b)(ii); and

(3)       that Briggs waive all rights to contest, in this or any other administrative or judicial proceeding to which the Commission is or may be a party, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.

By signing below, Briggs acknowledges that she has personally read this Disposition Agreement, that it is a public document, and that she agrees to its terms and conditions.

STATE ETHICS COMMISSION

 

^[1] “Substantial value” is $50 or more. 930 CMR 5.05.