| Date: | 06/25/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | D1-25-163 |
The Commission upheld the Boston Housing Authority’s decision to terminate a Special Assignment Laborer because of his failure to respond to a water emergency on April 24, 2025 and after having received progressive discipline for the same or similar violations since 2019.
On July 15, 2025, the Appellant, Jibriyl Abdul-Shafi (Mr. Abdul-Shafi or Appellant), pursuant to G.L. c. 121B, § 29 and G.L. c. 31, § 43, filed this appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the July 1, 2025 decision of the Boston Housing Authority (BHA or Respondent) to terminate his employment. A remote pre-hearing conference was held on August 12, 2025. I conducted an in-person full evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2025 at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston, Massachusetts. The Commission recorded the hearing via the Webex platform.
The parties submitted post hearing briefs on December 19, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.
For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Abdul-Shafi’s appeal is denied.
I admitted 23 exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-23) and 6 exhibits from Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-6). I admitted the Stipulated Facts as a joint exhibit. (J. Exhibits 1) Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the Boston Housing Authority:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
Background
… cooperate with the BHA by carrying an electronic device and promptly responding to calls at any time. Employees shall notify their supervisors when they will be “off duty” (i.e., not carrying their electronic device) for legitimate reasons such as illness, vacation, family emergency, or other personal business. Employees shall not refuse to cooperate with this provision.
(R. Exhibit 19, p. 8; Testimony of Uftring)
April 24, 2025 Incident
Hello Josh sorry to bother you but you’re my last ditch effort for help.
The water has been leaking into my apartment since 6:45 this morning. I have
called maintenance number and they relayed the message I walked over
to the maintenance office and still nobody has come. My stuff is getting
ruined and I need some help I also tried to call the office no answer. So
if you can light a fire up underneath somebody please I would appreciate it.
Thank you J.W..
(R. Exhibit 8; Testimony of Uftring, Testimony of J. W, Testimony of T. W.)
Tenant above [J.W.] disconnected their washing machine, discharge hose, and all the water went downstairs. No plumbing issue. The laborers are cleaning up the water in [J.W.]’s apartment now according to the plumber.
(R. Exhibit 9; Testimony of Boyinton, Testimony of McDonagh, Testimony of Uftring)
Investigation of the April 24, 2025 Incident
Disciplinary History
The Commission’s authority in this matter is drawn from G.L. c. 121B, § 29 which provides, in relevant part, that:
No employee of any housing authority, except an employee occupying the position of executive director, who has held his office or position, including any promotion or reallocation therefrom within the authority for a total period of five years of uninterrupted service, shall be involuntarily separated therefrom except subject to and in accordance with the provisions of sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of said chapter thirty-one to the same extent as if said office or position were classified under said chapter.
(emphasis added)
G.L. c. 31, § 43 provides, in relevant part, that:
If the commission determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was just cause for an action taken against such person, it shall affirm the action of the appointing authority and deny the appeal; provided, however, that if the commission does not so determine, it shall reverse the action and allow the appeal, in whole or in part, and the person concerned may be returned to their position with or without loss of compensation or other benefits and subject to such other orders as the commission may deem appropriate to restore and protect the rights provided to such person under this chapter; provided, further, that if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the action was based upon harmful error in the application of the appointing authority’s procedure, an error of law or upon any factor or conduct on the part of the employee not reasonably related to the fitness of the employee to perform in the position, the commission shall allow the appeal, in whole or in part, and the person concerned may be returned to their position with or without loss of compensation or other benefits. The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority.
An action is “justified” if it is “‘done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.’” Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971) quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). Accord Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).
The Appointing Authority’s burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is satisfied “if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there.” Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33, 35-36 (1956).
Under section 43, the Commission is required “to conduct a de novo hearing for the purpose of finding facts anew,” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006) and cases cited. “The commission’s task, however, is not to be accomplished on a wholly blank slate. After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission . . . does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision’.” Id., 823-24, quoting internally from Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983).
The commission's task, however, is not to be accomplished on a wholly blank slate. After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission must pass judgment on the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, a role to which the statute speaks directly. G. L. c. 43 [sic: 31], § 43 (“The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority”).
Here the commission does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision’." Id., 823-24, quoting internally from Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983)
The BHA has established by a preponderance of the evidence that it had just cause to terminate Mr. Abdul-Shafi’s employment. The Authority has established that the Appellant engaged in substantial misconduct on April 24, 2025 due to his failure to respond to a water emergency that day; that is, for his dereliction of duty, and after having received progressive discipline for the same or similar violations in the preceding six years.
The Appellant’s Testimony Was Not Credible
The BHA presented credible evidence that the Appellant, a SAL at the Hailey Development, was contacted by the BHA’s Emergency Response Services Center operator at 7:08 a.m. on April 24, 2025 to respond to a water emergency at 154 Heath Street.
The Appellant was taking a shower at a friend’s house twenty-five minutes away from the Hailey Development. He called the ERS operator back at 7:18 a.m., but failed to inform the operator that he was off-site and was unable to respond within fifteen (15) minutes as required by BHA policy and procedures. Not only was he unable to respond to the water leak in a timely manner, he was late for the start of his regularly scheduled shift at 8:00 a.m.
I do not find Mr. Abdul-Shafi’s testimony that he appeared at J.W.’s apartment at 7:45 a.m., and encountered Mr. Boyington and Mr. Cortez, to be credible.
The BHA established by credible evidence that when an emergency is called in to the ERS, the SAL is immediately notified. The SAL is expected to respond to most calls within two hours. However, in the case of water emergencies, the SAL should respond within fifteen minutes due to the potential for catastrophic damage to the building and the tenants’ possessions. If the SAL is unavailable to respond promptly, it is their responsibility to inform the ERS operator so that different personnel may be dispatched. I note that SALs receive a rent-free apartment at their assigned housing development to facilitate a quick response in off-hour and weekend emergency situations. The Appellant was aware of this policy and procedure. His failure to let the operator know that he was far away prevented her from sending another person in a timely manner.
The BHA Witnesses Were Credible
The BHA’s witnesses – Joshua Uftring, John McDonagh, Mark Warner, Glenn Boyington, and Declan McGuiness – all presented credible evidence of their response to the water emergency, supported by tangible simultaneous documentary evidence establishing that the Appellant had failed to respond.
J.W. texted Mr. Uftring at 8:28 a.m. on April 24, 2025, advising him that no one had responded to the water emergency first reported at 6:45 a.m., that water was continuing to leak through the ceiling, and that J.W.’s possessions were being ruined.
Within ten minutes, Mr. Uftring reached out Mr. McDonagh and Mr. Warner and asked them whether someone had responded to the emergency call. Mr. McDonagh quickly assigned Mr. Boyington, the BHA plumber, to the problem at 8:41 a.m., then texted Mr. Uftring that the plumber was on his way.
Mr. Boyington arrived at the apartment minutes later and saw water pouring out of the ceiling of J.W.’s unit. On his way to the upstairs apartment to check on the leak, he ran into Mr. Cortez, who advised him that he had stopped the leak by turning off the valve from the washing machine in the upstairs apartment. By 8:51 a.m., Mr. McDonagh texted Mr. Uftring that the water emergency was resolved. At that point, Mr. McGuiness and Mr. Cortez began cleaning up the water in the waterlogged apartments.
At no time did the BHA staff working on the leak see Mr. Abdul-Shafi at 154 Heath Street. The video for that location were also inoperable due to ongoing construction in the two nearby BHA properties.
If Mr. Abdul-Shafi had appeared at J.W’s apartment at 7:45 a.m. as claimed, it is likely that he would have located the source of the leak and water would not have continued to pour off the ceiling for another hour.
Instead, J.W. texted Mr. Uftring at 8:28 a.m. that no one had appeared. Mr. Boyington and Mr. Cortez arrived to stop the leak, and Mr. Warner texted Mr. Uftring at 8:51 a.m. that the water emergency had been resolved. If the Appellant had responded in a timely manner to the emergency call – or, if he had merely shown up to work on time at 8 a.m., still an unacceptable response to this emergency – he would have been ablet to address the water emergency quickly. Rather, the Appellant’s tardiness meant that he was unable to participate in the apartment cleanup.
J.W. ’s Testimony
J.W. testified that he texted Mr. Uftring to indicate that no one had yet responded to the water emergency. Although J.W. could not remember when this happened, the text message was time stamped 8:28 a.m., more than an hour after Mr. Abdul-Shafi had told the ERS operator that he would respond.
J.W. later changed his account, saying that Mr. Abdul-Shafi had appeared at the same time as Mr. Cortez and Mr. Boyington, which, even if true, would still mean that the Appellant responded at 8:40 a.m., more than an hour and twenty minutes after the Appellant’s 7:18 a.m. response to the ERS operator.
I deem credible the documentary evidence – the text that J.W. sent to Mr. Uftring at 8:28 a.m. – and the testimony that J.W. had not seen the Appellant in his apartment by that time, as it is supported by the content and timing of the text message. I do not credit, however, J.W.’s later statements to Mr. Warner and Mr. Uftring that contradicted his initial account. His testimony that he saw the Appellant in his apartment when Mr. Boyington and Mr. Cortez first appeared to address the leak appears to be an attempt to help the Appellant keep his job. His daughter (T.W.)’s testimony that she also saw the Appellant at this time is also not credible. Their testimony is contradicted by the credible testimony of the BHA witnesses and J.W.’s 8:28 a.m. text. Further, it appears that the Appellant visited J.W. and his daughter after the incident to persuade them to change their testimony in his favor.
The Appellant’s Prior Disciplinary Record
Finally, I find that the Appellant’s lengthy disciplinary record of warnings and suspensions of a progressive nature for repeated failures to respond to emergency calls since 2019, as recited in the facts above, substantiates the BHA’s decision to terminate the Appellant.
Accordingly, I find that the testimony and documentary evidence provided by the BHA set forth sufficient grounds to support the Appellant’s termination because of his failure to respond to a water emergency on April 24, 2025, for his dereliction of duty, and after having received progressive discipline for the same or similar violations since 2019.
For all the above reasons, the Appellant’s termination appeal under Docket No. D1-25-163 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners [Dooley – Absent]) on June 25, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Jibriyl Abdul-Shafi (pro se)
Susan M. Whalen, Esq. (for Respondent)
