| Date: | 07/23/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-26-106 |
The Commission dismissed the bypass appeal of a candidate for Boston police officer as the Commission recently upheld a prior bypass by the Boston Police Department based on the same reasons.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Aaron Aviles (Appellant), filed a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Boston Police Department (Respondent or Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer. The Department based its decision on the Appellant’s driving history, judgment, and conduct. The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on June 30, 2026 via videoconference. Prior to the pre-hearing conference, the Department submitted a motion to dismiss, and the Appellant filed an opposition. As part of the pre-hearing conference, I heard oral argument from both parties. For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is dismissed.
Prior Bypass Appeal
Current Bypass Appeal
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 5 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion to resolve an appeal before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be disposed of, however, on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . that there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant, establish that this appeal must be dismissed.
Here, the bypass reasons for this most recent hiring cycle are essentially the same as those contained in the prior hiring cycle where the Department bypassed the Appellant. Given that the Commission recently affirmed the Appellant’s bypass for the same reasons in the prior hiring cycle, there are no factual disputes which would warrant a new evidentiary hearing. Put another way, there is no additional information that could be presented by the Appellant that would change the Commission’s decision regarding the validity of the bypass reasons, reached by the Commission in a recent decision less than six months ago. SeeLima v. City of New Bedford, 33 MCSR 285 (2020) (Commission dismissed that appellant’s second bypass appeal as it had upheld same reasons in prior bypass decided by Commission months earlier); Reynolds v. City of Brockton, 37 MCSR 37 (2024).
The Appellant, in opposition to the Department’s motion to dismiss, argues that the Commission was not presented with certain facts in his prior appeal as he chose to represent himself, as opposed to obtaining counsel which he has done in the instant appeal.
Commission protocols, including a Guide for Self Represented Individuals, ensure that self-represented individuals operate on a level-playing field when appearing before the Commission. Here, the record shows that, in his prior appeal, the Appellant had a full and fair opportunity to present his case; that he called three witnesses, including himself; that he submitted multiple exhibits and was given an opportunity to cross-examine Department witnesses.
Further, the record in the prior appeal, which was reviewed in its entirety, did include a detailed overview of the Appellant’s background, including his personal, employment and military background. All of this was considered by the Commission when determining whether the Department had valid reasons to bypass the Appellant. Regarding the most serious reason supporting the Appellant’s bypass, a record of alleged domestic abuse, the hearing officer heard testimony from the Appellant and the Appellant’s current partner to support the Appellant’s contention that some of the abuse allegations were unsupported. Ultimately, however, after reviewing the entire record, including statements or affidavits provided to the Department from three of the Appellant’s former partners, the hearing officer concluded that those allegations were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and provided reasonable justification for bypassing the Appellant.
Similarly, after a review of the entire record, including the Appellant’s own testimony, and considering potential staleness or other factors, the Commission concluded that the Appellant’s disciplinary history in the military was another valid reason to bypass him for appointment.
After reviewing the record of the prior appeal and the Appellant’s submissions in the instant appeal, he has no reasonable expectation of showing that the Commission would reach a result different than the decision issued only several months ago.
For the reasons stated above, the Department’s Motion to Dismiss is allowed, and the Appellant’s appeal filed under G1-26-106 is hereby dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on July 23, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
James W. Gilden, Esq. (for Appellant)
Robert S. Arcangeli, Esq. (for Respondent)
