Decision  Belding, Jesse v. Department of Revenue 3/5/26

Date:	03/05/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	C-25-165

• Appearance for Appellant: Jesse Belding
• Appearance for Respondent: Amanda L. Rigal, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Shawn C. Dooley

The Commission denied the reclassification appeal of a DOR employee seeking to be reclassified as a Tax Examiner III as he was unable to show that he performed the level-distinguishing duties of that title more than 50% of the time.

Decision

Cayla Kwok, a Civil Service Commission intern, assisted in the drafting of this decision.

On July 18, 2025, the Appellant, Jesse Belding (Appellant) pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 49, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Human Resources Division (HRD) to affirm the Department of Revenue’s (DOR) denial of his request for reclassification from Tax Examiner II to Tax Examiner III. The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on September 16, 2025.  On December 2, 2025, I conducted a remote full evidentiary hearing. The hearing was recorded via Webex.[1]Both parties filed proposed decisions.  For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Belding’s appeal is denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I entered 29 exhibits into evidence: 15 exhibits from DOR (Res. Ex. 1-15) and 14 exhibits from the Appellant (App. Ex. 1-14). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by DOR:

• Murielle Campbell, Personnel Analyst III, Human Resources Bureau, DOR
• Patrick Shirley, Chief, Personal Income Tax, Tax Administration, DOR
• Samantha Perella, Tax Examiner VII, Income Tax Desk-Examination, Tax Administration, DOR

Called by the Appellant:

• Karen Shay, Supervisor, Tax Examiner V, Tax Administration, DOR
• Jesse Belding, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all papers filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies and drawing from reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

1. The Appellant works at the Department of Revenue (DOR) in the income tax refund fraud unit as a Tax Examiner II. (Res. Ex. 1)
2. The Appellant has been employed by DOR since 2015 when he was appointed as a seasonal employee. In February 2021, DOR appointed the Appellant to his current position as a full-time Tax Examiner II. (Res. Ex. 1)
3. The Appellant is assigned to DOR’s fraud unit. This unit currently includes five Tax Examiners with three Tax Examiner IIs and two Tax Examiner IIIs. The members of this unit report to their supervisor who holds a Tax Examiner V title. One of the unit’s Tax Examiner IIIs was promoted over 10 years ago when the unit introduced a new technology program. The other Tax Examiner III held that title in a different unit and maintained the title when transferred to the fraud unit, a practice commonly referred to as “red-circling”. The Appellant is one of the fraud unit’s three Tax Examiner IIs. (Testimony of Shirley)
4. The Appellant’s duties include:  (i) being assigned specific lines of a person’s tax return to investigate whether or not that line item could be considered fraudulent and (ii) testing, special projects or work queues. In addition, he offers support to his team members through answering questions about projects and providing “cheat sheet” references to employees. He completes one-line audits often requiring intensive research to determine if the deduction is fraudulent. His supervisor, Karen Shay, frequently will advise the unit employees to seek support from the Appellant if they have a question or need advice on a more complex matter.  Ms. Shay typically assigns the more complex single line fraud cases to the Appellant and often reassigns cases from other members of the unit to him if a particular case ends up being more complicated than the other examiner could handle. (Testimony of Appellant and Shay)
5. Human Resources Bureau (HRB) Personnel Classification Analyst Murielle Campbell (Ms. Campbell), who has worked at DOR for four years, reviewed the Appellant’s reclassification appeal. (Testimony of Campbell)
6. Ms. Campbell reviewed the Appellant’s “Interview Guide” and documentation describing the Appellant’s duties. HRB’s reclassification is based on Series Classification documents created by the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD). The threshold for reclassification requires the applicant to perform the duties of the proposed title for the majority or over 50% of the time. (Testimony of Campbell)
7. The Appellant began the process of requesting reclassification from Tax Examiner II to Tax Examiner III to HRB through the designated channels over two years ago.  The Appellant submitted the requested forms and Interview Guide on August 30, 2023, in an email to Ms. Campbell. (Res. Ex. 1 and 11)
8. Gera Page held Ms. Campbell’s position at HRB prior to Ms. Campbell being promoted to this position and was responsible for training her as to reclassification appeals during the time of the Appellant’s appeal. (Testimony of Ms. Campbell)
9. Ms. Campbell and Ms. Page conducted an hour-long interview with the Appellant on September 11, 2024. During the interview, the Appellant explained his duties and why he appealed for reclassification. (App. Ex. 5)
10. As part of the appeal,the Appellant completed the Interview Guide, and in it he stated his work duties (and the percentage of time he did each task) as follows:
11. Fraud work items: 60%
12. Testing: 25%
13. Special projects/work queues: 15%

(Res. Ex. 1)

11. HRB considered HRD’s Classification Specification document to address his appeal. The document includes nine distinguishing duties of a Tax Examiner III:

1. Review audit activities including audit reports for content, accuracy, and completeness.

2. Back-up Supervisor with functional supervision of other employees or personnel during a specific task or review and/or approval of the work of other Tax Examiners.

3. Specialized and unique duties, leader of field team assigned to trade shows, and "uncollectible at this time" cases.

4. Examiner in charge of conducting Small Business Workshops.

5. Develops and provides outreach sessions, lectures and written materials to educate taxpayers, practitioners and community organizations.

6. Works with DOR staff and vendors to test and implement Web and IVR applications and interactive worksheets.

7. Reviews the accuracy of scripts and forms, making recommendations and for change as needed.

8. Completes more complex, large dollar amount problem and review sets.

9. Conducts specialized, complex desk audits that involve multiple audit issues.

(Res. Ex. 5)

12. A TE III may exercise direct supervision over other employees.  This is the first level supervisory position in this series.  The Appellant does not directly supervise any employees. (Testimony of Appellant, Res. Ex. 5)
13. HRB issued a preliminary denial to the Appellant via email on November 6, 2024, and cited the distinguishing Tax Examiner III duties included in HRD’s Series Classification document as justification for the decision. The email invited the Appellant to submit any rebuttals to Ms. Campbell. (Res. Ex. 2)
14. The Appellant rebutted the denial and noted that the nine justifications do not align with the Form-30’s “Detailed Statement of Duties and Responsibilities” for Tax Examiner III. He addressed the justifications through clarifying duties that do not apply to the fraud unit and how his work fulfills those duties. (App. Ex. 3)
15. HRB denied the Appellant’s reconsideration of his appeal and referred him, if he wished to appeal the agency’s decision, to HRD. (App. Ex. 4)
16. HRD denied the Appellant’s appeal on July 16, 2025, concurring with HRB’s decision to deny the reclassification appeal because he did not prove that over 50% of his work time is focused on the specific duties of a Tax Examiner III. The letter informed the Appellant that he could appeal this reclassification decision to the Civil Service Commission. (App. Ex. 6)
17. The Appellant repeatedly requested from various supervisors within DOR a copy of HRD’s classification guidelines for the Tax Examiner series (including the level distinguishing duties) but was never provided with this information until the guidelines were submitted as an exhibit by DOR in response to this appeal. (Testimony of Appellant)

Legal Standard

Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator . . . . Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it. If said commission finds that the office or position of the person appealing warrants a different position reallocation . . . it shall be effective as of the date of appeal . . . .”

In order to obtain a reclassification, as a general rule, an employee must establish that she is performing duties encompassed within the higher-level position the majority (i.e., at least 50% or more) of the time. See Thompson v. Division of Insurance and HRD, 29 MCSR 565 (2016) (an appellant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence); Pellegrino v. Dep’t of State Police, 18 MCSR 261 (2005) (at least 51%); Gaffey v. Dept. of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011) (more than 50%); Morawski v. Dep’t of Revenue, 14 MCSR 188 (2001) (more than 50%); Madison v. Dep’t of Public Health, 12 MCSR 49 (1999) (at least 50%); Kennedy v. Holyoke Cmty. Coll., 11 MCSR 302 (1998) (at least 50%). More specifically, the Appellant must demonstrate that the majority of the time she performs her duties, she performs activities that are “level distinguishing duties”. Duties which fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties”.

However, particularly where the assigned job title is not a good fit, the Commission is not bound to apply the classification specifications literally in every case.  Blodgett v. Massachusetts Highway Dept., 24 MCSR 588 (2011); Lefebvre v. Department of Early Education, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). When analyzing a reclassification appeal, it is within the Commission’s discretion to weigh all of the facts and to make a determination based on the evidence presented.  Past reported Commission reclassification decisions have established that the Commission is not bound to interpret the classification specifications in an overly literal fashion when adjudicating a case.  Blodgett, 24 MCSR 590 (2011); Lefebvre, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). The Commission also possesses discretion to take into account all the facts and evidence admitted when making a decision in reclassification appeals in cases where the specifications against which current job responsibilities are being measured are outdated. When accounting for outdated specifications, the Commission has previously considered major shifts in the occupation’s field in cases where the description is highly rigid to determine the reasonability of the description. These factors include the role’s adaptation of new technology and the evolution or material broadening of the title’s scope of duties. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 199 (2024). While these specifications are not fully current and were originally written in 1987, they were updated in 2017.

Analysis

Although the Appellant is a superior employee who demonstrates an exceptionally high commitment to the Commonwealth and goes above and beyond by assisting fellow employees, the Appellant has not shown that he performs the level- distinguishing duties of a TE III a majority of the time.

While the Appellant appears to complete more tasks and has greater responsibilities than other members of his unit, the standard for reclassification is based solely on whether he can demonstrate that he performs the level-distinguishing duties of Tax Examiner III.  The Commission has established that a comparison with the duties of other employees is insufficient to warrant reclassification if the Appellant fails to establish that they perform the duties of the requested position more than 50% of the time. Skinner v. Department of Revenue, 21 MCSR 379 (2008). Further, a tax examiner can be denied reclassification to a Tax Examiner III if they do not function as a back-up supervisor, approve the work of other examiners, or perform specialized functions. Steinberg v. Department of Revenue, 18 MCSR 196 (2005).  The Commission has denied reclassification appeals where the appellant has performed additional duties outside of their job description. E.g., Guimond v. Department of Correction, 27 MCSR 327 (2014). The Appellant’s work in creating cheat sheet references for new employees or taking on projects before other employees does not fulfill the distinguishing duties of a Tax Examiner III and therefore is not sufficient for reclassification.

Furthermore, even if an individual completes duties specific to the requested title, that is not necessarily sufficient to achieve reclassification. An appellant may perform more complex work than described in their current classification which instead fits within the desired classification. However, the Commission has held that if these duties are sporadic and not the main focus of the individual’s responsibilities, they are insufficient to justify reclassification. Saunders v. Department of Labor Standards, 32 MCSR (2019). Even if the Appellant performs some of the distinguishing job duties of a Tax Examiner III, he failed to show that he performed those job duties more than 50% of the time. Even if I were to agree that some of the Appellant’s current workload could be categorized under Tax Examiner III’s distinguishing duties (namely: one, seven and eight), he still fails to get over the threshold for reclassification because these duties are sporadic or one-time tasks. If one were to take even the most liberal interpretation of how all of the Appellant’s working hours should be allocated (some to completing these tasks but most still devoted to TE II duties), he still falls far short of proving these tasks take up a majority of his time spent doing his job as a Tax Examiner.

The Appellant’s lack of formal supervisory duties associated with the requested higher-level title, independent of his failure to devote more than 50% of time to level distinguishing duties, also proves sufficient for reclassification denial. Sutliff v. Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development, 32 MCSR 26 (2019). While he answers questions and provides guidance for employees in the unit, he does not evaluate peers or seasonal employees and lacks a formal supervisory role as a back-up supervisor. The Commission has held that this lack of a specific supervisory role, as defined in the Tax Examiner III duties listing of the pertinent classification specification, is sufficient to deny a reclassification appeal.

It is unfortunate that I do not have the ability to reclassify the Appellant with some sort of mid-tier classification in between TE II and TE III as it is apparent that he is doing work at a higher and more complex level than his peers. The fact that he is relied upon by his supervisor to be the lead TE II, serving as the de facto right-hand aide to said supervisor, and possesses expertise that makes him an invaluable resource should be taken into consideration by the agency when reviewing how the department is organized.  It is my hope that DOR will address this obvious shortfall within their organizational structure, and the Appellant will have an opportunity to apply for a more senior position commensurate with his expertise and experience.

Further, the lack of information provided to the Appellant regarding the standards for reclassification and the withholding of the governing document created by HRD is regrettable as a timelier production of these documents would have eliminated a great deal of unnecessary confusion and stress for the Appellant. DOR’s Human Resources Bureau should ensure that this lack of communication is corrected, and these documents are provided to any employee initiating a classification appeal in the future. This is imperative since being able to prove that a majority of one’s time is allocated to the level-distinguishing duties set forth by HRD is the standard for reclassification. In this instance, as the Appellant was unable to quantify his hours in this manner, the Commission must deny the Appellant’s reclassification appeal based on the evidence provided.

Conclusion

The Appellant has failed to meet the burden of proving that he performs the specific job duties of a Tax Examiner III during the majority of his working hours. Therefore, Mr. Belding’s reclassification appeal is denied.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

/s/ Shawn C. Dooley

Shawn C. Dooley

Commissioner 

By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein – Commissioners) on March 5, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 

Notice to:

Jesse Belding (Appellant)

Amanda L. Rigal, Esq. (for Respondent) 

[1]The Commission sent the parties a copy of the recording. If there is a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to use the recording to supply the court with a written transcript of the hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.