| Date: | 09/17/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | D1-25-078 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the City of Lawrence to terminate a police officer for serious on-duty misconduct involving a minor and for subsequent untruthfulness during the Police Department’s internal affairs investigation.
CSC Law Clerk Jack Moses assisted with the drafting of this decision.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, §§ 42 and 43, the Appellant, Mikel Beltran (Appellant or Mr. Beltran), appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the March 18, 2025, decision of the City of Lawrence (City) to terminate his employment from the position of permanent full-time police officer with the Lawrence Police Department (LPD or the Department). The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on April 29, 2025.
On February 18, 2026, [FN2] I held a remote motion hearing after the parties filed motions regarding the admissibility of video exhibits (R. Exhibits 36 and 38). The Appellant moved to exclude videos recovered from his cell phone, arguing that they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. I denied the motion without adjudicating the constitutional validity of the search. In any event, as discussed below, I have concluded that Mr. Beltran's juvenile-related misconduct and subsequent untruthfulness independently establish just cause for termination and I do not rely upon the firearm incident as an independent basis for sustaining the termination penalty.
On May 19 and June 23, 2026, I held remote status conferences to review stipulations of Spanish translations into English (R. Exhibits 5 - 7, 16A -16C [FN3]); the parties’ objections to exhibits, subpoenas, and the scheduling of a second day of hearing.
On June 25, 2026, I conducted Day 1 of the evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston, Massachusetts. [FN4] Days 2 and 3 were conducted remotely on July 7and 9, 2026, to capture the testimony of Mayor Brian A. DePeña [FN5]. First Assistant City Attorney Tim Houten and Chief of Staff Johanna Guillermo were present.
I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform. [FN6] The parties submitted proposed decisions on August 31, 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed.
For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is denied.
I admitted 54 exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-54) into evidence. [FN7] The Appellant objected to R. Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 52, 53, and 54. I overruled the objections and admitted the exhibits into evidence. I admitted the Stipulated Facts as a joint exhibit. (J. Exhibit 1)
Based on these exhibits and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the Respondent:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
The Appellant’s Background
Events of August 11 - 21, 2024
First Internal Affairs Investigation – Interaction with Minor
Hello, I am [redacted], my daughter is [redacted] and I had a problem with her behavior. I went to the police, and they told me they would send an officer to the house. Then the officer has been sending me messages, and I am not responding. He showed up at my house saying that he was going to get my daughter a job, gave her a phone without my knowledge, and told her to hide it. I am worried because the girl is disrespectful, and he is not helping me; even the girl says she doesn’t want to talk to him.
(R. Exhibits 5 and 42)
Beltran Disciplinary Action
Beltran IAD Interview
Officers shall not commit any specific act or acts of immoral, improper, unlawful, disorderly, or intemperate conduct whether on or off duty, which reflects discredit or reflects unfavorably upon the officer him/herself, upon his/her fellow officers or upon the Police Department.
(R. Exhibit 40)
Members shall not engage in the commission of any felony or misdemeanor criminal acts, or the violation of the criminal laws or statutes of the United States, the Commonwealth, or other foreign or domestic jurisdictions.
(R. Exhibit 40)
Any conduct or omission which is not in accordance with established and ordinary duties or procedures as to such employee or which constitutes use of unreasonable judgment in the exercise of discretion granted an employee constitutes neglect of duty.
(R. Exhibit 40)
Members shall be civil, orderly and moral in their conduct, character and habits, both official and private.
(R. Exhibit 40)
A member shall truthfully state the facts in all reports as well as when he/she appears before any judicial, Department or other official investigation, hearing, trial or proceeding.
(R. Exhibit 40)
Search of Mr. Beltran’s Cell Phone
Second Internal Affairs Investigation – Firearm Discharge Incident
Section 41 Hearing and Termination
… Your conduct falls far below the standard of conduct expected of a Lawrence Police Officer and constitutes just cause for termination. Whether on duty or off duty, Lawrence Police Officers have a sworn duty to conduct themselves in a manner consistent to ensure the public trust. You have violated your oath and the Rules and Regulations of the Lawrence Police Department. …
(R. Exhibit 4)
A tenured civil service employee may be disciplined or discharged for “just cause” after due notice and hearing upon written decision “which shall state fully and specifically the reasons therefor.” G.L. c. 31, § 41. An employee aggrieved by the decision may appeal to the Commission. G.L. c. 31, § 43. Under Section 43, the appointing authority carries the burden to prove “just cause” for the action taken by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Id. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411, rev. den., 726 N.E.2d 417 (2000). In performing its review, the Commission hears evidence and finds facts anew. Examining an earlier but substantially similar version of the same statute, the Appeals Court wrote:
We interpret this as providing for a hearing de novo upon all material evidence and a decision by the commission upon that evidence and not merely for a review of the previous hearing held before the appointing officer. There is no limitation of the evidence to that which was before the appointing officer.
Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).
The Commission determines just cause for discipline and discharge by inquiring “whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service.” School Comm. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488, rev. den., 426 Mass. 1104 (1997). See also Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 486 Mass. 487, 493 (2020). It is also a basic tenet of merit principles, which are the core protections of civil service law, that discipline must be remedial, not punitive, designed to “correct inadequate performance” and “[only] separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected.” G.L. c. 31, § 1.
The Commission must take account of all credible evidence in the entire administrative record, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law, including whatever would fairly detract from the weight of any particular supporting evidence. See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971), citing Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264-65 (2001).
It is the purview of the hearing officer to determine credibility of testimony presented to the Commission. “[T]he assessing of the credibility of witnesses is a preserve of the [Commission] upon which a court conducting judicial review treads with great reluctance.” Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 729.
Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 also vests the Commission with authority to affirm, vacate or modify discipline but that discretion is “not without bounds” and requires sound explanation for doing so. See, e.g., Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996) (“The power accorded to the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio . . . accorded the appointing authority”). See also Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006), quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983). However, the Supreme Judicial Court has added that, in the absence of “political considerations, favoritism, or bias,” the same penalty is warranted “unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the town or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way.” Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824.
Section 42 Procedural Appeal
The Appellant argues that the City violated various procedural requirements contained in Section 41 of the civil service law in carrying out his termination; that the violations prejudiced his rights and, therefore, that he should be restored to his position without loss of compensation or other rights.
Section 41 states in relevant part that, prior to a permanent, tenured employee being terminated:
… they shall be given a written notice by the appointing authority, which shall include the action contemplated, the specific reason or reasons for such action and a copy of sections forty-one through forty-five, and shall be given a full hearing concerning such reason or reasons before the appointing authority or a hearing officer designated by the appointing authority.
Further, the appointing authority shall provide such employee a written notice of the time and place of such hearing at least three days prior to the holding thereof …
and
… if such hearing is conducted by a hearing officer, [their] findings shall be reported forthwith to the appointing authority for action. Within seven days after the filing of the report of the hearing officer, or within two days after the completion of the hearing if the appointing authority presided, the appointing authority shall give to such employee a written notice of his decision, which shall state fully and specifically the reasons therefor …
The most salient aspect of Mr. Beltran’s Section 42 appeal is two-fold. First, he argues that his local hearing was conducted by a hearing officer who was not designated by the Mayor, who is the appointing authority. Rather, he argues that the hearing officer was designated by a member of the Police Department. Second, Mr. Beltran argues that the hearing officer’s report to the Mayor was not in writing, and, more substantively, that she reported erroneous information to the Mayor which he relied upon in the decision to terminate Mr. Beltran.
I find that Ms. Garcia was designated by the Office of the Mayor to serve in that capacity. Even assuming, however, that the Mayor did not designate Ms. Garcia as the hearing officer, Mr. Beltran has not demonstrated that this procedural violation, standing alone, prejudiced his rights. He received written notice of the contemplated action and the reasons for it, was provided the hearing required by Section 41, was represented by counsel, and was afforded an opportunity to respond to the charges before the City made its decision. See Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545–46 (1985).
The more problematic part of the local hearing process involves the second prong of Mr. Beltran’s procedural appeal: the manner in which the local hearing officer reported her findings to the Mayor and, more significantly, what she reported to the Mayor. The City acknowledges that the hearing officer did not issue a written report of her findings to the Mayor, but they argue that such written findings are not required by the statute and can, as occurred here, be reported verbally.
Although §41 does not expressly require that the local hearing be recorded or that a hearing officer's report be reduced to writing, the circumstances here demonstrate the substantial risks associated with an entirely oral process. Because neither the hearing nor Ms. Garcia's findings and report were memorialized, the Commission must resolve conflicting testimony concerning what information was conveyed to the appointing authority. The Commission therefore again strongly recommends that appointing authorities record §41 hearings and require hearing officers to memorialize their findings and reports in writing, particularly where termination is contemplated.
In this matter, the Commission is presented with another layer: the hearing officer and the Mayor disagree about the oral report of her findings. After further review, I credit the Mayor’s testimony over that of the hearing officer.
Ms. Garcia testified before the Commission that she told the Mayor that Mr. Beltran had touched Daughter’s stomach and placed the cell phone in Daughter’s “panty line.” (Day 1, Hearing Recording at 2:51:58) All other references to hiding the phone, including the October 31 and December 4, 2024 IAD investigative reports and the February 4, 2025 Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment, document that Mr. Beltran told Daughterto hide the phone in her “underwear.” (R. Exhibit 2) Immediately upon hearing this portion of Ms. Garcia’s report, the Mayor said, “Terminate.”
Mr. Beltran argues that had there not been a defect in Ms. Garcia’s reporting of the proceedings, i.e. reporting that Mr. Beltran had placed the phone in daughter’s panty line, instead of reporting that Mr. Beltran had told Daughter to hide the phone in her underwear – thereby placing the phone in the underwear herself – the Mayor might not have decided to terminate. Ms. Garcia testified that the phrases “in her underwear” and “in her panty line” were the same. That, obviously, is not the point. I draw the important distinction that she said that Mr. Beltran placed the phone in the minor’s underwear himself, while the IAD investigative reports and the intent to terminate notices state that Mr. Beltran advised Daughter to place the phone in the underwear herself.
I recognize that, if Ms. Garcia inaccurately reported to the Mayor that Mr. Beltran himself placed the cell phone in Daughter's ‘panty line,’ rather than that he instructed Daughter to place the phone in her underwear, and if that inaccurate information materially influenced the Mayor's decision to terminate, such an error could constitute prejudice within the meaning of Section 42. The question, therefore, is whether Mr. Beltran has established that the alleged discrepancy materially affected the Mayor's decision to terminate him.
The Mayor testified before the Commission that he understood that Mr. Beltran had had inappropriate communications/interactions with a minor, had given the minor a cell phone, and had asked her to hide it from her mother in her underwear. The Mayor did not recall Ms. Garcia informing him that there had been a sexual assault.
The Mayor further testified that he and City Attorney Kevin Foley drafted the Notice of Termination. That March 18, 2025 Notice of Termination correctly described Mr. Beltran’s alleged conduct as charged by the IAD investigation and that formed the basis of the Section 41 hearing.
Thus Ms. Garcia and the Mayor’s recollection of the reporting of her findings after the Section 41 hearing differ. Ms. Garcia was sincere, but she incorrectly reported the allegations to the Mayor. It appears that she also misread the underlying IAD October 31, 2024 report of Mr. Beltran’s interaction with the minor. (She appears to believe that the IAD report stated that Mr. Beltran placed the cell phone in the minor’s panty line.) As of the date of the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Garcia had not corrected her mistake.
Ultimately, I conclude that the Mayor relied on the proper charges resulting from the IAD investigation and Mr. Beltran’s violation of them when he drafted the termination letter. The Mayor understood that Beltran gave Daughter a cell phone and instructed her to conceal it from Mother, including by hiding it in her underwear. After Ms. Garcia’s oral report, the Mayor prepared the termination letter with a member of his staff, reviewed it and signed it. This sequence supports the inference that the Mayor’s understanding was based upon the correct version of events, even if the hearing officer herself misunderstood it.
In this matter, I credit the Mayor’s testimony over that of Ms. Garcia. The decision of the appointing authority to terminate was not based on Ms. Garcia’s misstatements. The Commission does not find that the Mayor made his final termination decision based upon a belief that Beltran personally inserted the phone into Daughter's clothing.
Finally, the Commission has independently reviewed the evidence presented in this appeal. Based upon its de novo findings, the Commission concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that the on-duty misconduct independently supplied just cause for termination.
Section 43 (Just Cause) Appeal
As a preliminary matter, I considered that Mother and Daughter did not testify at the Commission or local hearing. Accordingly, substantial portions of the evidence concerning Mr. Beltran’s interactions with Daughter constitute hearsay. Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings and may constitute substantial evidence when it bears sufficient indicia of reliability and probative value. Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 401 Mass. 526, 529–31 (1988). See also DeFarias v. Gloucester, 36 MCSR 7, 8–10 (2023), aff'd, DeFarias v. Civil Serv. Comm’n et al. (Suff. Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 2024), aff’d DeFarias v. Civil Serv. Comm’n et al., No. 24-P-1460 (Mass. App. Ct., May 26, 2026).
The relevant inquiry is therefore not simply whether evidence is hearsay, but whether the hearsay is sufficiently reliable, when considered together with the other evidence in the administrative record, to satisfy the applicable burden of proof. The Commission has historically considered both the quality of hearsay evidence and the extent to which reliable hearsay is corroborated by other evidence.
I find that Mother and Daughter's statements bear substantial indicia of reliability here. First, I had the opportunity to review the recorded October 3, 2024 interviews themselves, rather than relying exclusively upon an investigator's summary of those interviews. Further, as referenced in more detail below, Mother and Daughter provided materially consistent accounts on separate occasions; significant portions of their accounts were corroborated by contemporaneous documentary evidence; Mr. Beltran admitted to certain actions which constitute misconduct; and other evidence corroborates Daughter's knowledge of the Appellant's Lawrence residence and imminent deployment to Japan. Finally, the record provides no persuasive evidence that Mother or Daughter had a motive to fabricate the allegations; neither sought criminal prosecution of the Appellant.
I also heard and evaluated the testimony of the Internal Affairs investigators, who were subject to cross-examination concerning the manner in which the interviews were conducted, the statements made, and the course of the investigation. Although this did not afford Mr. Beltran an opportunity to cross-examine Mother or Daughter themselves, it permitted meaningful examination of the circumstances bearing upon the reliability of their statements.
After weighing all of the evidence presented, I have concluded that the City has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had just cause to terminate Mr. Beltran. The March 18, 2025 Notice of Termination cited two bases for termination: the August 2024 conduct with the 16-year-old female and the July 2024 firearm discharge from a moving motor vehicle in New Hampshire. These two incidents occurred in violation of Department rules and regulations governing criminal conduct, conduct unbecoming an officer, untruthfulness, failure to maintain conduct and deportment, and neglect of duty.
The termination comports with basic merit principles and “[separated an] employee[] whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. Mr. Beltran’s actions also amounted to a serious breach of the public trust.
August 2024 Misconduct
In the August 2024 incident, Mr. Beltran engaged in behavior in violation of Rule 7.2 Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, Rule 7.3 Criminal Conduct, Rule 7.11 Neglect of Duty, Rule 8.7 Conduct and Deportment, Oath of Office and Rule 8.27 Truthfulness. I examine each charge in turn.
Rule 7.2 Conduct Unbecoming an Officer provides:
Officers shall not commit any specific act or acts of immoral, improper, unlawful, disorderly, or intemperate conduct whether on or off duty, which reflects discredit or reflects unfavorably upon the officer him/herself, upon his/her fellow officers or upon the Police Department.
Police officers must behave in a manner that brings honor and respect for law enforcement personnel rather than public distrust. In accepting employment by the public, police officers implicitly agree that they will not engage in conduct which calls into question their ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities. Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den., 398 Mass. 1103 (1986). Police officers are required to conduct themselves in a manner that reflects favorably on the Department and its members. Mr. Beltran’s conduct fell far short of this standard.
Mr. Beltran was dispatched to the family’s residence on August 11, 2024 after Mother went to the police station in crisis; her daughter was threatening to run away from home. Mother turned to the Department because she trusted that its sworn officers were upstanding members of the community. Mr. Beltran violated this trust, engaging in highly inappropriate conduct toward Mother’s 16-year-old daughter, and attempting to manipulate Mother in the process.
Mr. Beltran violated the sanctity of the home. He spoke to Daughter alone in her room, asking whether she was a virgin, and making inappropriate comments that she was cute, sexy, and his type. Mr. Beltran then gave Daughter his cell phone number and asked Mother for Daughter’s phone back. Mr. Beltran then represented to Mother that there was a job opportunity for Daughter and sought to use that purported opportunity to obtain further access to Daughter without arousing Mother's suspicion.
Mr. Beltran returned to the family home on August 15, 2024, and sought out Daughter so he could surreptitiously provide her with a cell phone. Mr. Beltran escorted Daughter to his cruiser outside her mother’s view, and gave her a cell phone in the course of his inappropriate efforts to establish a personal relationship with Daughter. Mr. Beltran provided Daughter with his home address and asked her to visit while her mother was at work. Mr. Beltran grabbed and pinched Daughter’s stomach, and gave her a hug.
Daughter was uncomfortable because Mr. Beltran was an adult man, a police officer, making sexually charged comments to her. She said that she never wanted to see him again.
It is immoral and improper for a Police Officer to make sexual advances on a vulnerable 16-year-old threatening to run away. It is immoral and improper for a Police Officer responding to an official call to provide his personal phone number to a 16-year-old girl for personal conversations. It is immoral and improper for a Police Officer to provide a cell phone to a teenage girl, without her mother’s permission, and tell her to keep it a secret. It is immoral, improper and unlawful for a Police Officer to commit an indecent assault and battery by inappropriately touching a teenage girl.
Mr. Beltran’s interactions with Daughter presented a substantial power imbalance arising from his age and his position as a police officer. This will impact her ability to trust police officers in the future.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above-referenced conduct was in violation of Rule 7.2. Mr. Beltran’s lack of professionalism impacted Daughter, Mother and Brother. He behaved in a manner that was immoral and improper, creating serious questions about his character and judgment; furthermore, his conduct reflected unfavorably on himself, his fellow officers, and the LPD.
Mr. Beltran’s August 11 and 15, 2024 conduct with the minor, on its own, is reason enough for termination.[FN20]
Rule 7.3 Criminal Conduct provides in relevant part:
Members shall not engage in the commission of any felony or misdemeanor criminal acts, or the violation of the criminal laws or statutes of the United States, the Commonwealth, or other foreign or domestic jurisdictions.
Section 13H of G.L. c. 265, Indecent Assault and Battery on a person 14 and older, provides a three-part test for indecent assault and battery: (1) the defendant intentionally touched another person without legal justification or excuse; (2) the touching was indecent; and (3) the alleged victim did not consent to the alleged indecent touching.
Although Mr. Beltran was not criminally charged, his conduct falls short of the high standard of conduct expected of a police officer. The Commission has repeatedly ruled that a conviction is not necessary for it to consider the underlying conduct in disciplinary matters. L.G. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR 16, 20 (2026); Ramirez-Martinez v. Salem, 37 MCSR 396, 398 (2024).
The IAD interviewed Mother and Daughter together on August 27, 2024, and separately on October 3, 2024. Their statements remained consistent on the two interview dates, were corroborated by contemporaneous accounts (statements to clinician and Ms. Perez), and on important points were consistent with Mr. Beltran’s own admissions. There was no evidence that Mother and Daughter had a motive to fabricate. In fact, they did not want Mr. Beltran to come to any harm as a result of his conduct.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the touching was indecent and without Daughter’s consent because it occurred in the context of Mr. Beltran's repeated sexually suggestive comments to a 16-year-old, his inquiries concerning her sexual history, his statement that she was his ‘type,’ his invitation that she come to his home while her mother was at work, and his statement that he wanted to ‘flip her around.’ Viewed in that context, his grabbing and pinching of Daughter's stomach and subsequent hug constituted touching with sexual overtones rather than innocuous or incidental physical contact.
The record further supports this finding in that Daughter stated that she never wanted to see Mr. Beltran again.
Accordingly, I find that his conduct satisfied the elements of indecent assault and battery under G.L. c. 265, § 13H and violated LPD Rule 7.3.
This misconduct, on its own, is reason enough for termination.
Additionally, Rule 7.11 Neglect of Duty provides in relevant part:
Any conduct or omission which is not in accordance with established and ordinary duties or procedures as to such employee or which constitutes use of unreasonable judgment in the exercise of discretion granted an employee constitutes neglect of duty.
When Mr. Beltran was dispatched to the family home, he had been a police officer for almost two years. He had responded to over 100 service calls for service and submitted over 100 incident reports. Mr. Beltran was familiar with the established and ordinary duties and procedures of his position, having acknowledged his practice of following up on investigations, notifying dispatch and updating the CAD system notes.
However, after leaving the family residence on August 15, 2024, Mr. Beltran failed to follow procedure and submit an incident report or update the CAD system. While this failure is not a terminable offense, taking this step was not subject to Mr. Beltran’s discretion and is a serious breach of Department policy. It is likely that Mr. Beltran failed to document his activity so that he could hide his conduct.
In further violation of Rule 7.11, Mr. Beltran’s conduct of providing his personal phone number to both Mother and Daughter, texting Mother while off-duty, and attempting to meet them at home while off-duty constituted acts of unreasonable judgment.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above-referenced conduct was in violation of Rule 7.11. The above-referenced conduct was an exercise in the failure of discretion and unreasonable judgment equaling neglect of duty.
This misconduct, in conjunction with the other reasons, is reason for termination.
Rule 8.7 Conduct and Deportment provides in relevant part:
Members shall be civil, orderly and moral in their conduct, character and habits, both official and private.
Mr. Beltran failed to be civil, orderly and moral in his conduct, character and habits when he made suggestive comments and committed the elements of the offense of indecent assault and battery on Daughter. Mr. Beltran was dispatched to the family residence in an official capacity. He was wearing his uniform and carried all the accoutrements of his position, including operating a police cruiser. But at the scene, Mr. Beltran failed to comport himself in a professional manner.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above-referenced conduct was in violation of Rule 8.7. Mr. Beltran’s conduct as described above did not meet the standards for conduct and deportment incumbent upon Lawrence police officers.
This misconduct, in conjunction with the other reasons, is reason for termination.
Rule 8.27 Untruthfulness
Finally, I address the charge of untruthfulness. Rule 8.27 Truthfulness provides in relevant part:
A member shall truthfully state the facts in all reports as well as when he/she appears before any judicial, Department or other official investigation, hearing, trial or proceeding.
The Commission has consistently upheld discharges of police officers based on dishonesty alone. Diaz v. Somerville, 32 MCSR 156 (2019).
Throughout the IAD investigation, Mr. Beltran offered inconsistent statements in order to disguise his conduct. Both Mother and Daughter confirmed that Mother had taken Daughter’s cell phone away and that is why Daughter wanted to leave home. Mother’s taking of the cell phone was also reflected in the CAD that dispatched Mr. Beltran to the family residence. Mr. Beltran asserts that he did not know, or discover at any point, that Mother had taken Daughter’s cell phone away.
Mr. Beltran asserts that when he asked Mother if Daughter had a phone, he was told that Daughter did not have a phone because of their straitened circumstances. This directly contradicts the information Mother and Daughter provided to Lt. Rossi. Mother and Daughter, in their recorded interviews, both separately confirmed that the dispute on August 11, 2024, was because Mother had taken Daughter’s phone away. Mother told Lt. Rossi that Mr. Beltran asked her to give him Daughter’s phone because the police could use it to track her if she went missing. Daughter also told Mr. Beltran that her mother had taken her phone.
Mr. Beltran said that he had established a “rapport” with Daughter when he spent an hour at the family home on August 11, 2024. Mr. Beltran admits that he spoke to Daughter about her career ambitions, about her difficult relationship with her mother, including that Mother filed a restraining order on her boyfriend, and about where she went to school. He also asserts he investigated why Daughter intended to leave the house. I find it unlikely that Mr. Beltran, after speaking with Mother about Daughter's phone, did not learn that Mother had taken Daughter's phone away that night. It appears that Mr. Beltran used the excuse of the family’s poverty to explain why he gave Daughter a cell phone on August 15, 2024.
It is more likely that the City’s assertion is true: Daughter told Mr. Beltran that Mother had taken her phone away after he gave her his personal cell phone number. Mr. Beltran then told Daughter he would get her phone back. Mr. Beltran then told Mother that if Daughter had her phone back, the police could use it to track her if she went missing.
Mr. Beltran also denied asking Brother to leave the shared bedroom so that he could talk to his sister alone. This is not credible. Both Daughter and Mother said that Mr. Beltran asked Brother to leave the room before speaking to Daughter.
Mr. Beltran asserts he provided his phone number to Mother first, and then to Daughter. Again, I do not find Mr. Beltran credible. Mr. Beltran explained that he had to leave abruptly on August 11, 2024, to respond to a shooting while he was talking to Mother. In this context, it makes little sense that Mr. Beltran gave his number to Mother, then went into Daughter’s room and repeated the process of writing down his name and number when he was aware that he needed to respond urgently to a shooting. It is more likely that Mr. Beltran gave Daughter his number when he first responded to the call and learned Daughter did not have a phone. Mr. Beltran then provided Mother with his phone number at the end of the night.
Mr. Beltran’s explanation for texting Mother while off-duty is similarly unpersuasive. [FN21] Mr. Beltran told Lt. Rossi he was referring to Mother when he texted Mother the following message on August 12, 2024, at 10:40 p.m: “If she is there in the morning, I can go.” If Mr. Beltran was referring to Mother he would have texted: “If you are there in the morning, I can go.” Mr. Beltran later walked back his statement, asserting he likely meant to write “if you guys are there in the morning, I can go.” This language demonstrates that Mr. Beltran was evasive about texting Mother in order to gain access to Daughter.
It is far more likely that on August 12, 2024, Mr. Beltran was attempting to speak with Daughter that morning so that he could give her the cell phone. Mr. Beltran told Daughter on August 11, 2024, that he would give her a phone. He then followed up with a text to find out when she and her mother would be available.
Mr. Beltran asserts he initiated a follow-up investigation on August 15, 2024, because he had not finished providing Mother with the resources available to her. He has never described these resources. Mr. Beltran stated that when he starts something, he wants to see it through to the end. I do not find Mr. Beltran’s explanation credible.
Mr. Beltran sent Mother four text messages without receiving a response on August 12 and August 13, 2024. Most of his text messages were about attempts at arranging meetings to speak with Daughter.
One may infer that Mr. Beltran did not want Mother to know that he had given Daughter a cell phone. Mr. Beltran asserts he arrived at the residence on August 15, 2024, and spoke to Mother first, talking about multiple topics including a job for Daughter, and resources for the family. Throughout this conversation and in all text messages, Mr. Beltran failed to tell Mother he intended to give Daughter a phone.
Mr. Beltran also asserted that he initiated the follow-up investigation on August 15, 2024, to ask Daughter about her interest in a potential job. However, he acknowledged in the IAD interview that there was no actual job for Daughter; he was there to gauge her interest in a restaurant position. Despite the lack of a position, on August 15, 2024, he told Mother that he had been trying to get Daughter a job. In his testimony, Mr. Beltran asserted that he had spoken to several people, including a female restaurant owner who promised to give Daughter a job.
When Lt. Rossi asked for the female restaurant owner’s contact information for verification, Mr. Beltran was extremely hesitant. He said that they had fallen out, and no longer spoke. Lt. Rossi explained that it was for verification purposes only. Mr. Beltran delayed, then left the room to speak to his attorney. When Mr. Beltran provided the information 17 minutes later, the number was no longer in service.
I infer that the purported employment opportunity was created as a means of obtaining further access to Daughter without arousing Mother's suspicion. Mr. Beltran did not bring any information with him about the job for Daughter, such as a job application or contact information for someone at the restaurant. While Mr. Beltran asserted he was present on August 15, 2024, to get more information from Daughter for his restaurant contact, he texted Mother on August 16, 2024, “… Yesterday I gave your daughter a paper and talked to her about the job, and she told me that she did want it. Is [Daughter] available in a little while to I can take down all her information and send it to the lady from the restaurant??” [FN22]
On August 15, 2024, Mr. Beltran asserts he talked to Daughter about going on a ride-along and enrollment in the JPA. Mr. Beltran asserts he brought Daughter to his cruiser because he believed he had an application for the JPA in his cruiser bag. Mr. Beltran stated that, when he discovered that he did not have an application, he told Daughter that if she was still interested she could get an application from the station. He also told Daughter that if she ever needed anything, she could call him at the station for help.
In Mr. Beltran’s own words, when he starts something, he finishes it. Yet, he started a discussion about the JPA, but failed to contact anyone in the program in order to assist Daughter’s enrollment. He then advised Daughter to get a JPA application from the station. In his own words, he failed to enlist a teenager in the official JPA program but purported to assist with employment in a private business.
Instead, it is far more likely that Mr. Beltran provided the Use of Force paper to Daughter in case Mother asked her what she was doing with him outside. This piece of paper had no nexus to a potential job, and thus I conclude that Mr. Beltran created a false explanation for giving Daughter the paper.
During his IAD interview, Mr. Beltran learned that Daughter was attempting to locate the paper he gave her. He then needed to create a credible excuse for giving Daughter a paper pertaining to LPD Policy, and so he created the story that Daughter was interested in the JPA. Neither Mother nor Daughter ever mentioned the JPA to Lt. Rossi. Mr. Beltran was inconsistent about his behavior on August 15, 2024. He contradicted himself, stating at some points he had a job for Daughter, before ultimately walking back his statements and stating he told Mother he was only there to ask about Daughter’s interest in a potential job. The conclusion is the same. Daughter had to go to the station for a JPA application if she had been interested in the program.
Mr. Beltran could not explain how Daughter knew about his imminent deployment to Japan. Daughter also asserted that Mr. Beltran showed her where he lived using Google Maps. Mr. Beltran could not explain to Lt. Rossi how Daughter knew where he lived when the Department did not have that information. Mr. Beltran speculated that she used publicly available information. Mr. Beltran’s listed address with LPD and the Registry of Motor Vehicles was a Methuen, MA address. Public information would have indicated that Mr. Beltran lived in Methuen. It is a fair inference that Daughter knew Mr. Beltran was going to Japan because Mr. Beltran told her he wanted to see her before he left for Japan.
Mr. Beltran conceded that Mother and Daughter have nothing to gain from their complaint. In fact, Mother and Daughter did not want any harm to attach to Mr. Beltran. However, Mr. Beltran had many reasons to be deceitful about his conduct.
Accordingly, I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Beltran violated Rule 8.27, Truthfulness, which requires LPD officers to truthfully state the facts during official investigations. Specifically, Mr. Beltran was untruthful about his August 2024 interaction with Daughter during the IAD interview.
In addition to being truthful in official investigations, police officers are expected to be truthful in investigations and in gathering evidence. Being truthful is an essential job duty and affects the administration of justice, particularly when an officer is required to testify in court. Untruthfulness diminishes an officer's credibility within the Department, affects the ability of other officers to work with and trust them, and damages the Department's reputation in the community.
Mr. Beltran’s untruthfulness, on its own, is reason enough for termination.
Firearm Discharge Incident
Regarding the incident of the firearm discharge from a moving vehicle, I conclude that Mr. Beltran engaged in a pattern of troubling behavior that constituted conduct unbecoming an officer and criminal conduct.
Conduct unbecoming an officer includes off-duty conduct where there is a nexus between the act committed by the officer and the adverse effect the conduct may have on the reputation of the Department.
Mr. Beltran’s behavior in Conway, NH places his ability and fitness to perform his official responsibilities as a police officer into question. See Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n at 371 (1986). As police officers, Mr. Beltran and the other two men in the motor vehicle were trained in firearm safety and should have known that it was dangerous to discharge a firearm from a moving motor vehicle while driving on a public way. At one point, the officer seated directly behind Mr. Beltran pointed his firearm at Mr. Beltran in violation of firearm safety protocols. The video recording also captures a motor vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.
Once again, Mr. Beltran’s behavior did not reflect favorably on the Department and its members.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above-referenced conduct was in violation of Rule 7.2. Mr. Beltran behaved in a manner that was immoral and improper, creating serious questions about his character and judgment; furthermore, his conduct reflected unfavorably on himself, his fellow officers, and the LPD.
Mr. Beltran engaged in a violation of New Hampshire criminal law when he fired a gun out of a moving motor vehicle on a public way without legal justification or excuse. Mr. Beltran knew or should have known that his actions were unlawful.
Although Mr. Beltran was not criminally charged, his conduct is violative of all norms of firearm safety and physical safety to the general public. It fell far short of the high standard of conduct expected of a police officer.
I find that the City has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the above-referenced conduct was in violation of Rule 7.3. Mr. Beltran’s conduct was a criminal act in violation of New Hampshire law. The Commission has repeatedly ruled that a conviction is not necessary for it to consider the underlying conduct in disciplinary matters.
With respect to the firearm incident, neither violation of these Department rules is sufficient for termination. In fact, the other two officers in the motor vehicle with Mr. Beltran received suspensions.
Modification of the Penalty is not Warranted
The Commission has consistently reaffirmed the standard set forth in Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983), that its role is not to decide what penalty it would have imposed in the first instance. Rather, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority’s action was “reasonably justified” considering the facts and circumstances as found by the Commission at the time the decision was made.
As the Appeals Court has clarified, “the power accorded to the Commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio, which is a power accorded to the appointing authority.” Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 800 (2004), quoting Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996). When the Commission reviews the discipline imposed, it is not free to disregard the appointing authority’s judgment; rather, it must give due weight to the original decision. Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 823.
In Carey, the Commission upheld the termination of a long-serving lieutenant for a pattern of misconduct that included repeated sexually inappropriate behavior toward a female civilian employee, misuse of a department-issued phone, insubordination, inaccurate reporting, and evidence-handling violations. Carey v. Holden Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 311 (2018), aff'd, Carey v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, (Worc. Sup. Ct., Apr. 16, 2020). The court specifically noted that the Commission had considered whether lesser discipline was warranted and reasonably concluded that the number and seriousness of the offenses justified termination even in the absence of previous discipline. The court also approved the Commission's reliance on the principle that police officers voluntarily undertake a higher standard of conduct than ordinary citizens. In this case, we are presented with police interaction with a minor, rather than an adult civilian employee.
The City has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Beltran committed multiple violations of Department rules and procedures from his contact with the minor female beginning on August 11, 2024. Daughter already had challenges: a tough relationship with her mother, threatening to leave home, and attending a school for troubled youth – when Mr. Beltran chose to violate her trust, that of her mother, brother, grandmother and the community.
That is a harm that is unlikely to be repaired.
Mr. Beltran’s later misconduct in firing a firearm out of a moving motor vehicle in Conway, NH amounted to a further violation of the rules and regulations of the Department. Mr. Beltran was in a motor vehicle on the public way and failed to conduct himself in the manner of a person trained in the use of firearms, firearm safety protocols and operating a motor vehicle with the responsibilities incumbent upon a licensed driver. An operator in another motor vehicle, a bystander, the passengers of the motor vehicle—or Mr. Beltran himself—could have been injured. In fact, the first video depicts a passing motor vehicle.
Having independently determined the circumstances warranting discipline that existed, the Commission must determine whether there was reasonable justification for the penalty selected by the appointing authority. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 823–25 (2006). Where the Commission's material findings do not differ substantially from those upon which the appointing authority acted, the Commission may not substitute its judgment concerning the appropriate penalty merely because it might have selected a different sanction. See Tejeda v. Brockton, 38 MCSR 251, 259 (2025).
Even if, as the Appellant argues, I should discount the New Hampshire misconduct because it came to light via a cell phone search that, he contends, exceeded the scope of the seizure warrant, I could not recommend modification of his disciplinary penalty in light of the unrelated findings and analysis regarding his misconduct with a minor as set forth above.
In any event, the City has argued that Mr. Beltran’s termination was based solely on his conduct from August 2024 when he interacted with the minor and her family. In this matter, the minor was particularly vulnerable, Mr. Beltran’s contact arose through the exercise of his official duties, his conduct was repeated rather than isolated, he used access obtained through his official position, aspects of his conduct were concealed or inadequately documented, and his subsequent explanations were materially inconsistent. Finally, honesty, judgment, and public trust are essential job duties for a police officer.
The following three violations related to the juvenile-related misconduct — (1) Mr. Beltran’s untruthfulness throughout the IAD investigation, (2) his conduct unbecoming with the minor and (3) his criminal conduct—independently constituted just cause for termination.
Thus, the Commission does not rely upon the firearm incident as independent justification for the termination penalty.
Given the seriousness and nature of the juvenile-related misconduct, including Mr. Beltran’s misuse of the access and trust afforded to him as a police officer and his subsequent untruthfulness during the Internal Affairs investigation, I conclude that there was just cause for termination -- and modification of the penalty is not warranted.
Accordingly, I find that the testimony and documentary evidence provided by the City of Lawrence set forth sufficient grounds to support Mikel Beltran’s termination.
For all the above reasons, the appeal under Docket No. D1-25-078 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on September 17, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Walter H. Jacobs, Esq. (for Appellant)
Robert D. Hillman, Esq. (for Respondent)
Thomas Costello, Esq. (for Respondent)
FN2. The Commission granted continuances after counsel represented that Mr. Beltran was deployed overseas.
FN3. Those translations were admitted as R. Exhibits 42-51.
FN4. The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
FN5. The Commission utilized the services of a Spanish language interpreter. During the Mayor’s testimony, Appellant counsel claimed that the profes sional interpreter was translating Spanish incorrectly. I questioned the interpreter, and concluded that it was an issue of correct titles for City em ployees: Ms. Garcia, the Human Resources Director and Hearing Officer; and William Castro, the Mayor’s Chief of Staff.
FN6. The Commission forwarded a link to the parties. Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal is obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by substantial evidence, arbi trary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.
FN7. Mother and Daughter’s names and their home addresses shall be stricken from any transcript made from this proceeding.
FN8. The texts were exchanged in Spanish. On August 12, 2024 at 12:43 p.m., the parties wrote:
Mr. Beltran: How did the inspection go?
Mother: Hello, the inspection went well.
Mr. Beltran: Very good. How did the girl behave after I left?
Mother: She behaved well.
Mr. Beltran: Good. It seems the conversation with her helped. I told her later tonight I would stop by to talk more with her and with you.
Mother: Oh yes, that’s fine.
(R. Exhibits 16A and 44)
On August 12, 2024 at 2:50 p.m., the parties wrote:
Mr. Beltran: When I get back from Boston, I’ll stop by at night. Is that okay?, or do you go to sleep early?
Mother: Text me first, just in case I’m asleep.
Mr. Beltran: Well, in that case, I’ll call you when I’m around her. I’ll call you.
Mother: Okay.
(R. Exhibits 16B and 45)
On August 12, 2024 at 10:40 p.m., the parties wrote:
Mr. Beltran: I’m still in Boston. Did you go to sleep already???
Mother: Yes, I’m going to sleep now. I have to wake up early.
Mr. Beltran: Okay, that’s fine. If she is there in the morning I can go.
(R. Exhibits 16C and 46)
FN9. The Lawrence Junior Police Academy is further described online: https://tinyurl.com/2bn8a8kp
FN10. Mr. Beltran texted Mother on August 16, 2024:
Good evening, sorry to bother you. Yesterday I gave your daughter a paper and talked to her about the job, and she told me that she did want it.
Is she available in a little while so I can take down all her information and send it to the lady from the restaurant?
(R. Exhibits 16C and 46)
FN11. Mr. Beltran and D texted on August 19, 2024:
Mr. Beltran: What’s up, bro? How’s everything going?
D: Everything is good. And how are you?
Mr. Beltran: Everything is good. I wanted to ask you if you need someone for a few hours over there in T*******, in the morning or afternoon, for a few days? We’re trying to find a job for a 17-year-old girl to help her.
(R. Exhibits 33 and 47)
Mr. Beltran and D texted on August 20, 2024:
D: Okay, let me see. I’ll call you tomorrow.
Mr. Beltran: Thank you very much.
(R. Exhibits 33 and 47)
FN12. For the Commission hearing, the City employed a professional translation service to translate all the exhibits originally in Spanish (texts, videos and IAD recordings) into English. (R. Exhibits 42-51)
FN13. While on administrative leave, Mr. Beltran was ordered to comply with the following conditions:
You must return all City owned property to Lawrence Police Internal Affairs;
You may not act on behalf of the City in any capacity;
You are not to enter any City owned property without prior approval from Internal Affairs, Chief, or the Personnel Director;
You are not to communicate or engage with any City employees or member of the Police Department unless it is at the request of Internal Affairs for the purposes of an investigation, or unless you are in need of Police services as a private citizen such as in the case of an emergency or to report a crime;
You are not to communicate with any potential witnesses to this investigation; …(R. Exhibit 23) (Emphasis added)
FN14. G.L. c. 265, §13H provides a three-pronged test for indecent assault and battery: (1) the defendant intentionally touched another person without legal justification or excuse; (2) the touching was indecent; and (3) the alleged victim did not consent to the alleged indecent touching.
FN15. The Department confirmed that the female in the thumbnail was not Daughter, but a 20-year-old woman.
FN16. A press check on a pistol is a technique used to verify whether a firearm is loaded. It involves retracting the slide slightly to visually inspect the chamber and determine if a bullet is chambered.
FN17. I credit Ms. Garcia's testimony concerning her designation by Mayor DePeña and therefore find that the requirement of G.L. c. 31, § 41 that the hearing officer be designated by the appointing authority was satisfied.
FN18. It appears that Mr. Jacobs recorded the Section 41 hearing. (Day 1, Hearing Recording at 3:00:53; Testimony of Garcia)
FN19. The Mayor did not cite Ms. Garcia’s erroneous oral finding that Mr. Beltran placed the cell phone himself in Daughter’s “panty line.” (Testimony of Garcia, Testimony of DePeña)
FN20. Indeed, any combination of two of the four discrete misdeeds I have identified in this section would suffice, in my estimation, to justify severe discipline, up to and including termination.
FN21. See footnotes 8 and 10.
FN22. Mr. Beltran asserts that he what he was referring to was a Use of Force paper that he gave to Daughter in connection with her interest in the JPA; it was completely unrelated to the job. (See Finding of Fact 49)
