Decision  Brien, Shane v. City of Worcester 9/17/26

Date:	09/17/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	G1-25R-072

• Appearance for Appellant: Shane L. Brien
• Appearance for Respondent: Ian C. Keefe, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Christopher C. Bowman

The Commission affirmed the decision of the City of Worcester to bypass a candidate for original appointment to the position of police officer because of sustained discipline by his current employer and concerns regarding his previous employment history.  

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Edward Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision. 

On March 17, 2025, the Appellant, Shane L. Brien (Appellant), filed an appeal challenging the City of Worcester (City)’s decision to not appoint him to the position of permanent, full-time police officer. Although one candidate who ranked below the Appellant initially received a conditional offer, that offer was rescinded, and no candidate ranked below the Appellant was appointed. Following an April 22, 2025 pre-hearing conference, the Commission issued an order of dismissal nisi on May 1, 2025, based on the parties’ agreement that the Appellant would be reconsidered in a subsequent hiring cycle. The order provided that, if the City did not appoint the Appellant in the next hiring cycle, the Commission would accept a motion to revoke the dismissal. The effective date of the dismissal was subsequently extended to February 13, 2026.

On January 16, 2026, the City notified the Appellant that he was being bypassed for appointment. The January 16, 2026 bypass letter incorporated the reasons stated in the City’s January 27, 2025 letter and cited additional information obtained after that letter issued. The Appellant requested that the Commission revoke the dismissal, and the Commission reopened the appeal. Following a status conference on May 19, 2026, a full hearing was held on June 17, 2026, at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston. [FN2] The hearing was recorded via Webex and copies were provided to the parties. [FN3] The parties filed proposed decisions on August 31, 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed. For the reasons stated below, Mr. Brien’s appeal is denied. 

Findings of Fact

                I admitted 19 exhibits from the Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-9, 11-13, 15-21) and 21 exhibits from the City (R. Exhibits 1-21). One document was marked for identification. Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by the City:

• Nancy O’Loughlin, Deputy Chief of Police, UMass Chan Medical School Police Department
• Shanelle Burbo, Officer and Background Investigator, Worcester Police Department
• Paul B. Saucier, Chief of Police, Worcester Police Department

Called by the Appellant:

• Judy Lam, Sergeant, UMass Chan Medical School Police Department
• Shane L. Brien, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

Appellant’s Background 

1. The Appellant was 30 years old at the time of the hearing and resides in Dudley, Massachusetts where he has lived for approximately five years.  (R. Exhibit 6; Testimony of Appellant)
2. The Appellant is a high school graduate and obtained college credit through his service in the Air Force Reserves but has not obtained a college degree. He hopes to obtain a bachelor’s degree in the future. (R. Exhibit 15; Testimony of the Appellant)
3. The Appellant has served in the United States Air Force Reserve for approximately 12 years and holds the rank of E-6. His military duties involve civil engineering, pavement work, and equipment operation. He has no history of discipline in the military. (Testimony of Appellant; R. Exhibit 6)
4. The Appellant was activated in 2019 and deployed to the United Kingdom in support of a reconnaissance mission at Royal Air Force Fairford. In 2020, he deployed to Kuwait for approximately six months, where he supported runway operations and other civil-engineering projects. He also participated in a presidential ceremony in Normandy commemorating the eightieth anniversary of D-Day. (Testimony of Appellant)
5. The Appellant has been employed as a police officer by the UMass Chan Medical School Police Department (UMass) since November 2023. He is currently serving as a field training officer (FTO) and is being trained to conduct background investigations. (Testimony of Appellant)
6. The Appellant previously worked as a correction officer for the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office from March 2020 to November 2023; for a private security company from August 2018 to March 2020, installing and repairing security-screening equipment; and as a Department of Youth Services (DYS) Group Worker from November 2017 to June 2018. Prior to 2017, he held other security-related positions. He is certified as a Massachusetts police officer and holds a license to carry a firearm. (Testimony of Appellant; R. Exhibits 4, 6, and 7)

DYS Employment

7. The Appellant began working for the Department of Youth Services (DYS) as a Group Worker I on November 26, 2017. (R. Exhibit 7, R0202)
8. Sometime prior to April 2018, the Appellant participated in the intake of two juvenile detainees at a secure DYS facility. Also present during this intake was another DYS official, the Appellant’s supervisor. (Testimony of the Appellant) 
9. Following this intake, one of the juveniles reported to DYS officials that the Appellant had disclosed his location to others outside the facility and threatened to send gangs after him. (Testimony of the Appellant)
10. By letter dated April 23, 2018, the Appellant was placed on paid administrative leave, pending the results of an investigation into his alleged conduct in connection with the incident. (R. Exhibit 7, R0151 and R0154; Testimony of the Appellant)
11. By letter dated April 30, 2018, the Appellant was notified that he had been found to have violated DYS policies regarding the conduct of employees and confidentiality of client records, and that he was being terminated effective immediately.  The April 30^th letter stated in part that: “… you disclosed confidential information you acquired during a conversation with JG during the youth’s intake …”. (R. Exhibit 7, R0151)
12. On September 5, 2018, in response to the Appellant’s attempt to appeal his termination from DYS, he received notice of a hearing to appear before an arbitrator on May 1, 2019. (R. Exhibit 6, R0142)
13. On May 1, 2019, the Appellant attended a hearing in Boston regarding his termination from DYS. Present at this hearing were several DYS officials. (R. Exhibit 6, R0142; Testimony of Appellant)
14.  At or before the start of the May 1, 2019 hearing, the Appellant was informed that his termination could not proceed through the arbitration process, because he had been terminated during his probationary period. (Testimony of Appellant; R. Exhibit 7, R0145)
15. A “Personnel Exit / Leave Transaction” (PET) Form from DYS dated October 24, 2019 lists the reason for the Appellant’s exit from DYS as “Resignation” with an effective date of April 22, 2018. (R. Exhibit 7, R0132) 
16. Approximately five years later, in a letter dated August 19, 2024, DYS notified the Appellant that:  “I am in receipt of your email dated October 14, 2019, wherein you resigned from your … position with the Department of Youth Services.  The Department accepts your resignation from your position effective April 22, 2018.” (A. Exhibit 8, A0065)

UMass Employment 

17. As referenced above, the Appellant has been employed by UMass as a police officer since 2023. (Testimony of Appellant) 
18. In 2024, a UMass hospital employee filed a written complaint against the Appellant alleging that he made inappropriate comments concerning the employee’s family, her brother’s incarceration, and alleged gang affiliations; made comments suggesting that she might be arrested or should not drive through Auburn, where he was applying to be a police officer; criticized the caliber of employees hired by UMass and the thoroughness of background investigations; and acted discourteously when she requested assistance with a patient. (Testimony of Deputy Chief O’Loughlin and Officer Burbo; R. Exhibit 11).
19. UMass retained an outside investigator and UMass Deputy Chief Nancy O’Loughlin (Deputy Chief O’Loughlin) assisted with the investigation. The investigation included interviews of the complainant and the Appellant and consideration of their respective accounts. (Testimony of Deputy Chief O’Loughlin).
20. UMass sustained allegations of discourtesy and conduct unbecoming against the Appellant and issued him a written warning on February 12, 2025. The sustained allegations and resulting discipline were reported to the Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“POST”). (Testimony of Deputy Chief O’Loughlin and Officer Burbo; R. Exhibits 11 and 12).
21. The Appellant has since grieved the written warning, and the matter will be arbitrated in October of 2026. (R. Exhibit 11, R0227; Testimony of the Appellant)

Applications to other Police Departments 

22. On January 4, 2023, the State Police notified the Appellant that his application for employment as a Trooper was rejected citing three reasons for his non-selection. (R. Exhibit 9, R0221)  The Appellant appealed the decision to the State Police Background Review Board and his appeal was denied. (Testimony of Appellant) 
23. On September 13, 2024, the Auburn Police Department notified the Appellant that his application for employment was rejected citing two reasons for his non-selection. (R. Exhibit 10, R0223)

Worcester Police Department’s background investigation of the Appellant

24. As referenced in the introduction, the Appellant has been considered for appointment as a Worcester Police Officer twice.  The first non-selection did not constitute a bypass and the resulting appeal was dismissed with a future effective date tied to a decision being made on his new application in a subsequent hiring round. The most recent non-selection, which is the subject of this appeal, did constitute a bypass. (Stipulated Facts) 
25. In 2024, Officer Shanelle Burbo of the Worcester Police Department was assigned to conduct a background investigation into the Appellant’s application to be a Worcester police officer. (Testimony of Shanelle Burbo)
26. On October 15, 2024, Officer Burbo attempted to contact the Appellant’s reference from his time at DYS, the same supervisor who had conducted the intake that was the subject of the investigation against him. She was unable to contact him, and attempted to reach him again on October 21, 2024, and was unsuccessful a second time. (R. Exhibit 6, R0123)
27. Officer Burbo reviewed the background materials that the Appellant had submitted when he applied to work at UMass. (Testimony of Shanelle Burbo) [FN4]
28. On September 25, 2025, Officer Burbo spoke with a Facility Administrator at DYS. Neither this administrator nor any other DYS employees he spoke with could recall the Appellant having worked there. (R. Exhibit 6, R0123)
29. On September 26, 2025, Officer Burbo contacted the DYS Human Resources division by email and received the Appellant’s complete personnel file and reviewed the documents referenced above. (R. Exhibit 6, R0123; R. Exhibit 7)
30. On October 6, 2025, Officer Burbo spoke with Deputy Chief O’Loughlin and a Lieutenant at UMass who had conducted the Appellant’s background investigation when he applied for employment at UMass. Deputy Chief O’Loughlin informed Officer Burbo of the results of the investigation referenced above and explained that the Complainant was found credible because she had recounted information that could only be known had she spoken with the Appellant. (Testimony of Shanelle Burbo; R. Exhibit 6, R0120)
31. Deputy Chief O’Loughlin also stated, however, that the Appellant’s work performance at community events is “fantastic”, but both she and the Lieutenant stated that the Appellant battles with authority figures and does not respond positively to constructive criticism. (R. Exhibit 6, R0120; Testimony of Nancy O’Loughlin)
32. On October 7, 2025, the Appellant sat for an interview with Officer Burbo and other officials of the Worcester Police Department. (R. Exhibit 15)
33. When asked about the written warning he had received from UMass, the Appellant stated that he did not agree with the decision to discipline him and stated that the conversation between himself and the Complainant was an instance of rapport-building. He went on to acknowledge that he could have been “more tactful” in how he handled the conversation with the Complainant. (R. Exhibit 15) 
34. Officer Burbo submitted the final report from her background investigation to Chief of Police Paul B. Saucier. (R. Exhibit 6, R0114)
35. On October 16, 2025, Chief Saucier submitted this report to the City Manager, noting that he viewed the Appellant as unacceptable for hire. (R. Exhibit 6, R0114)
36. In a letter dated November 5, 2025, Chief Saucier informed the City Manager that the primary reason for his recommendation to bypass the Appellant was the sustained discipline at UMass. (R. Exhibit 13, R0231)  He was also concerned that the Appellant was not accepting responsibility for the underlying alleged misconduct at UMass. (Testimony of Paul Saucier)
37. In a letter dated January 16, 2026, the City notified the Appellant that he was being bypassed for appointment, citing the alleged misconduct at DYS, his sustained misconduct at UMass, the partly-poor references received by two officials at UMass, his inability to accept responsibility for actions, and his non-selection by the State Police and the Auburn Police Department. (R. Exhibit 14, R0232 -R0235)
38. The Police Chief does not consider the current bypass reasons to be a permanent bar to the Appellant’s ability to seek employment with the Worcester Police Department in the future. (Testimony of Paul Saucier)

Applicable Legal Standard

The core mission of Massachusetts’ civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996); see also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law).  The role of the Civil Service Commission in a bypass appeal is to determine whether “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  See Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 473 (1995); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003).  

Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification”, whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the applicable civil service “eligible list”, using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09.

In its review of bypass decisions, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass, after conducting an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 727-28.  An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971). Cambridge further states: “In the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304.

The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 824-26 (2006). The issue for the Commission is “not whether it would have acted as the appointing authority had acted, but whether, on the facts found by the Commission, there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the Commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.” Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 334. See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 86 (1975) and Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 727-28. The Commission owes substantial deference to the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in determining whether there was “reasonable justification” shown. Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188. That “deference is especially appropriate with respect to the hiring of police officers.” Id.Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004) (citing Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-305, rev. den., 428 Mass. 1102 (1997)); Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).

Analysis

                The Appellant has many strong attributes, including his years of service in the military, his police officer certification, his demonstrated commitment to the community, positive statements from a direct supervisor whom he called to testify, as well as strong verbal and organizational skills that were on full display as he represented himself before the Commission.

                The City, however, has shown that, after conducting a reasonably thorough review, which included reaching out to the Appellant’s current and former employers and interviewing the Appellant, it had valid reasons to bypass the Appellant for police officer at this time.

                While issues surrounding the Appellant’s DYS employment, standing alone, may not justify the City’s decision to bypass the Appellant for appointment, they do provide one piece of a larger picture that the City was justified in considering.   Shortly after beginning his employment at DYS, the Appellant was put on leave, investigated, and then terminated by DYS for disclosing confidential information with a DYS youth during an intake interview.   While I did consider that the Appellant was unable to have this termination reviewed due to his probationary status and that DYS apparently agreed to convert the termination to a resignation, that does not change the undisputed fact that the contemporaneous DYS record establishes that DYS had issued a termination notice following its investigation.

                Then, years later, shortly after beginning his current employment at UMass, the Appellant was again investigated, this time for an alleged verbal interaction with another employee.  Although the circumstances differ, both incidents, i.e., the DYS incident and the UMass incident, reasonably raised concerns for the City regarding the Appellant's judgment and discretion in workplace communications involving sensitive information. Ultimately, UMass sustained part of the charges against the Appellant and issued him a written warning.  While the Appellant has appealed that warning, that appeal does not prevent the City from considering sustained discipline that existed at the time of bypass.  That is particularly true when, as here, the City did not accept the charges at face value, but, rather, reached out to those involved in the investigation as part of its review.  That is exactly the type of “reasonably thorough review” expected prior to deciding whether to bypass the Appellant for appointment.  Further, the Appellant himself verified at several points that he jokingly referenced the Complainant’s family ties to gang activity.  Moreover, the Appellant’s written questionnaire responses confirm that he did reference the caliber of employees hired by the hospital in the presence of the Complainant.  These remarks were also referenced in the written reprimand as part of the investigator’s findings.

               The City’s reliance on the decision of other police agencies not to select the Appellant for appointment stands on less solid ground, as the City did not independently investigate most of the underlying reasons for non-selection by those other police agencies.  Specifically, I do not rely on the reasons identified in the State Police non-selection letter.  However, even the Appellant acknowledges that, when applying to the Auburn Police Department, he failed to disclose on the application that he had previously applied for employment in the Towns of Holden and Warren.  That is problematic -- and the City was justified in considering those prior omissions when evaluating his candidacy to be a Worcester Police Officer.

                Since the above reasons alone justify the decision to bypass the Appellant for appointment, I need not decide the inherently subjective question of whether the Appellant has accepted responsibility for any lapses in judgment. He claims he has; the Police Chief claims he hasn’t.  The bypass is justified regardless of who has the most supportable argument on that front.

                I also considered the Appellant’s argument that other candidates with blemishes on their record were appointed from the same certification.  A review of the record supports that argument, but it does not show that those candidates had the same number or level of concerns that arose with the Appellant.   Further, nothing in the record establishes that the City applied materially different standards to similarly situated candidates; nor does anything in the record suggest any improper motive by the City in deciding to bypass the Appellant for appointment. 

                In summary, this is not a case in which the City relied principally upon stale misconduct having little demonstrated nexus to present fitness. The principal concern arose from recent conduct while the Appellant was serving as a sworn police officer—the same type of position for which he sought appointment in Worcester.   The Auburn omissions provide additional corroboration of the City's overall concerns.

                However, as noted in the findings, the City’s Police Chief does not consider the stated reasons for bypass to be a permanent disqualification to serving as a Worcester police officer.  Learning from past mistakes and exercising the type of discretion expected of police officers will only add to the Appellant’s already impressive credentials and make him a stronger candidate for police officer in the future.

Conclusion

                The City’s decision to bypass the Appellant for appointment as a police officer is affirmed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number G1-25R-072 is hereby denied.  

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Christopher C. Bowman

Christopher C. Bowman
Chair

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on September 17, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 

Notice to:
Shane L. Brien (Appellant)
Ian Keefe, Esq. (for Respondent)

[FN2].  The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR §§1.00, et seq., apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter             31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.

[FN3]   A link to the audio/video recording was provided to the parties.  If there is a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would               be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the sub                 stantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If such an appeal is filed, the recording provided to the parties should be                     used to transcribe the hearing. 

[FN4]   The Appellant cross examined Officer Burbo and asked her if she had reviewed his background packet from his UMass application. During this                   questioning, he claimed that a letter from his DYS supervisor was included in that packet explaining the details of the DYS intake and the investi                 gation that resulted. The letter itself was not introduced into evidence, and I find no other documentary evidence corroborating its existence.