On July 6, 2026, the Appellant, Scott T. Brooks, a Police Sergeant with the Dartmouth Police Department (DPD), appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), after the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) denied his request to be allowed to register for the Statewide Police Lieutenant Exam after the deadline for registration had expired. I held a remote pre-hearing conference on July 27, 2026. Pursuant to Procedural Order dated July 28, 2026, HRD was substituted as the party respondent and the parties’ Pre-Hearing Memoranda were deemed to be Cross-Motions for Summary Decision; the Appellant filed a supplement to his Pre-Hearing Memorandum on July 28, 2026, to which HRD filed a response on August 4, 2026. After careful review of the submissions of the parties, HRD’s Cross-Motion is allowed, the Appellant’s Cross Motion is denied, and the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
Undisputed Facts
Based on the submissions of the parties and the documents attached thereto the following material facts are not disputed:
- The Appellant, Scott T. Brooks, is a tenured Police Sergeant with the DPD. (Claim of Appeal)
- On or about March 23, 2026, HRD posted a Job Bulletin announcing the Statewide Departmental Promotional Examination for Police Lieutenant to be administered by HRD on September 14, 2026. The notice stated that June 1, 2026 was the date on which applications for the examination would be accepted on-line beginning on June 1, 2026 and that the last date to register for the examination was July 7, 2026. The notice stated:
If you currently have a Civil Service Online Account DO NOT create a new account to apply for this exam.
Utilize the Government Jobs Help & Support to access your account. [Hyperlink omitted]
Test takers with two accounts may cause delays with properly recording your application and notifications from civil service such as notices to appear, or job opportunities. If you have questions, please email civilservice@mass.gov.
(HRD Pre-hearing Memo, Exh.1 and hyperlink cited therein]
- On July 10, 2026, the Appellant sent an email to civilservice@mass.gov in which he stated:
My name is Scott T. Brooks II I am currently a Sergeant with the Dartmouth Police Department and seeking to take the upcoming Lieutenants exam (2026 Police Lieutenant 1YP-442).
I attempted multiple times to sign in to complete the process however due [to] my department changing email names approximately 4 times in the last 5 years I was unable to.
When I attempted to use the retrieve function I was unable to get an email sent to me to rectify the problem which pushed me past the July 7th date.
I would appreciate consideration in this matter and will complete any and all application today if you would gracefully understand my issue.
(HRD Pre-Hearing Memo, Exh.2; App.Pre-Hearing Memo; DPD Pre-Hearing Memo)
- Following a series of subsequent emails and phone calls between the Appellant and HRD, HRD informed the Appellant that it would not accept a late-filed registration for the 2026 Statewide Police Lieutenant Examination. (HRD Pre-Hearing Memo, Exhs.3 through 7)
- This Appeal duly ensued. (Claim of Appeal)
- At the Pre-Hearing Conference, the Appellant explained that he had missed the application deadline because he had not accessed his civil service online account for some time, his email address had changed several times during the interim, and the DPD converted to an new email account effective June 30, 2026. Thus, the Appellant was uncertain what email would be associated with his active civil service account. He tried several different emails to “retrieve” his username and password but never got a response. (Colloquy at Pre-Hearing Conference; DPD Pre-Hearing Memo; DPD Pre-Hearing Memo)
- The Appellant also contends that HRD had allowed late filings by other DPD officers in the past. In his July 28, 2026 supplemental submission, the Appellant identified three DPD Sergeants whose names appear on the current DPD Lieutenant eligible list that he asserted were granted such late-filing waivers by HRD concerning the deadlines for submission of Education and Experience (E&E) claims on the prior Statewide Lieutenant’s exam. (Appellant’s 7/28/26 Supplement)
- The three DPD officers to whom the Appellant referred had taken the 2024 Statewide Lieutenant Examination for which there was a September 28, 2024 deadline for filing the on-line form required to claim credit for the E&E component of that examination. In actuality, all three officers timely filed an E&E claim form within the deadline and, upon receiving their E&E score notices, duly filed an appeal with HRD for review of those scores within the 17-day window to take such appeals, and filed additional documents with HRD in support of those appeals. (HRD 8/4/26 Response to Appellant’s Supplement & Attachment A)
Applicable Legal Standard
A motion to dispose of an appeal, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be allowed by the Commission pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h) when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56; namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
Analysis
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant, establish that this appeal must be dismissed.
First, the Commission repeatedly has held that consistency and equal treatment are fundamental as important hallmarks of the basic merit principles under civil service law. DiGiando v. HRD, 37 MCSR 252 (2024). The Commission generally has deferred to HRD’s expertise and discretion to establish reasonable requirements, consistent with basic merit principles, for crafting, administering, and scoring examinations. In particular, in deciding prior appeals, the Commission has concluded that, as a general rule, HRD’s insistence on compliance with its established examination requirements was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. See Helms v. HRD, 38 MSCR 147 (2025); Bell v. HRD, 38 MSCR 44 (2025); Donovan v. HRD, 38 MCSR 60 (2025); Weaver v. HRD, 37 MCSR 313 (2024); Medeiros v. HRD, 37 MCSR 56 (2024); Dunn v. HRD, 37 MCSR (2024); Kiley v. HRD, 36 MCSR 442 (2024); Evans v. HRD, 35 MCSR 108 (2022); Turner v. HRD, 34 MCSR 249 (2022); Amato v. HRD, 34 MCSR 177 (2021); Wetherbee v. HRD, 34 MCSR 173 (2021); Russo v. HRD, 34 MCSR 156 (2021); Villavizar v. HRD, 34 MCSR 64 (2021); Holska v. HRD, 33 MCSR 282 (2020); Flynn v. HRD, 33 MCSR 237 (2020); Whoriskey v. HRD, 33 MCSR 158 (2020); Bucella v. HRD, 32 MCSR 226 (2019); Dupont v. HRD, 31 MCSR 184 (2018); Pavone v. HRD, 28 MCSR 611 (2015); and Carroll v. HRD, 27 MCSR 157 (2014).
Second, the Commission has the authority to hear and decide appeals by individuals “aggrieved by any decision, action, or failure to act by the administrator…”; however, “[n]o person shall be deemed to be aggrieved … unless such person has made specific allegations in writing that a decision, action, or failure to act on the part of the administrator was in violation of this chapter, the rules or basic merit principles promulgated thereunder and said allegations shall show that such person’s rights were abridged, denied, or prejudiced in such a manner as to cause actual harm to the person’s employment status.” G. L. c. 31, § 2(b). See c. 310 of the Acts of 1993 (“If the rights of any person acquired under the provisions of chapter thirty-one of the General Laws or any rule made thereunder have been prejudiced through no fault of his own, the civil service commission may take such action as will restore or protect such rights, notwithstanding the failure . . . to comply with [civil service laws and rules]”). See generally Pavone v. Human Resources Division, 28 MCSR 611, 616 (2015) (denying relief to appellant who had entered information on E&E claim but failed to “submit” it to HRD, finding that the candidate had failed to follow HRD’s express instructions); Flynn v. Human Resources Division, B2-20-039 (June 18, 2020) (finding that appellant could not show that he had been harmed through no fault of his own where he could not show that he had followed HRD’s instructions regarding submission of E&E component).
Thus, for the Commission to grant relief to the Appellant, it must determine that he is an “aggrieved person,” harmed through no fault of his own, and that granting him relief is consistent with the principles of equal treatment under basic merit principles of civil service law. The Appellant has not made that showing here. I fully understand the frustration that the Appellant must have experienced and the glitch that caused him to miss the registration deadline. However, HRD provided more than three months’ advance notice of the deadline and provided clear instructions to candidates on how to contact HRD through its email portal for assistance with any technical difficulties. It is undisputed that the Appellant did not reach out to HRD prior to expiration of the recent exam registration deadline. Under these circumstances, I cannot find that the Commission is warranted in exercising the conditional authority it possesses to overrule HRD’s reasonably established requirement, to which all other candidates for the September 2026 examination are held.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, HRD’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number B2-26-147 is dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/Paul M. Stein
Paul M. Stein
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein Commissioners) on August 6, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Scott T. Brooks (Appellant)
Victoria Giuliano, Esq. (for Respondent)
Daniel Brunelli, Esq. (for Respondent)
