| Date: | 04/16/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | C-25-265 |
The Commission dismissed the reclassification appeal of a UMass Amherst employee as he had no reasonable expectation of showing that he performed the duties of the requested classification of Technical Assistant III (TA III) a majority of the time.
On November 19, 2025, the Appellant, Thomas Burns (Appellant), currently employed in the title of Technical Assistant II (TA II) at UMass Amherst (UMass), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) to affirm UMass’s decision to deny the Appellant’s request to be reclassified to the title of Technical Assistant III (TA III).
On January 6, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, his union representative and a representative of UMass. UMass subsequently filed a motion for summary decision and the Appellant filed an opposition.
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion to resolve an appeal before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be disposed of, however, on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides:
Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification of his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator and shall be entitled to a hearing upon such appeal . . . . Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it.
The Appellant has the burden of proving that he is improperly classified as a TA II and should be classified as a TA III. To do so, he must show that he performs the duties of the TA III more than 50% of the time, on a regular basis. E.g., Gaffey v. Dep’t of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011); Bhandari v. Exec. Office of Admin. and Finance, 28 MCSR 9 (2015) (finding that “in order to justify a reclassification, an employee must establish that they are performing the duties encompassed within the higher-level position a majority of the time . . .”). In making this calculation, duties which fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties.” See Lannigan v. Dep’t of Developmental Services, 30 MCSR 494 (2017).
Once again, the Commission is faced with a reclassification appeal where the underlying job specifications were adopted almost four decades ago. In this case, the job specifications bear almost no resemblance to the job duties performed by the Appellant. Despite having never worked in a laboratory, he has been assigned a title almost entirely tied to performing laboratory-related work. While resources are always limited, this is a striking example of why ongoing efforts to update, or at least refresh, job specifications, need to be expedited, so that reclassification decisions such as this can be based on current and accurate descriptions of what is expected of incumbents in each classification.
Here, however, the record is clear that the only meaningful distinction in the existing job specifications between a TA II and TA III, the position to which the Appellant seeks to be reclassified, is the exercise of direct and indirect supervision. Based on the information provided, the Appellant does not exercise any bona fide supervision duties, either directly or indirectly.
At the pre-hearing conference, the Appellant pointed to TA IIIs in his Department who do not exercise direct and indirect supervisory experience. UMass suggested that those incumbents likely did exercise those supervisory duties at some point and were “red-circled” or “grandfathered” in the TA III title consistent with provisions in the respective collective bargaining agreement (CBA). At my request, UMass subsequently submitted the Form 30s pertinent to when these employees were initially hired into their TA III roles. Those Form 30s confirm that, upon initial appointment, the comparator employees identified by the Appellant were assigned supervisory duties. See Belding v. Department of Revenue, CSC Case No. C-25-125 (2026) (A Tax Examiner III, the position being sought by the Appellant in Belding, held that title in a different unit and maintained the title when transferred to the fraud unit, a practice commonly referred to as “red-circling”, which does not justify the reclassification of others in the same unit. )
While the TA II title may not accurately capture the duties and responsibilities performed by the Appellant, he has no reasonable expectation of showing that he performs the level-distinguishing supervisory duties of a TA III. For that reason, the Appellant’s appeal must be dismissed.
The dismissal of this appeal is not meant to diminish the consequential role that the Appellant and others play at UMass, including managing the turf of NCAA fields. Given the importance of those fields to the University, it would behoove them to work with HRD to establish job specifications that are aligned with the actual job duties of those who perform this function, and I encourage both entities to work expeditiously toward achieving that outcome.
The motion for summary decision submitted by UMass is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number C-25-265 is hereby dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on April 16, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Thomas Burns (Appellant)
Rachel Siano (for Respondent)
Michele Heffernan, Esq. (HRD)
