On January 9, 2026, the Appellant, Michael A. Cappabianca, Jr. (Appellant), a police sergeant employed by the Worcester Police Department (WPD), who sat for the promotional examination for Worcester Police Lieutenant, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) arguing that he there should be no difference in weight given for education and experience (E&E) credit for time that he served as a Worcester Police Officer and time previously served as a Milford Police Officer.
On March 10, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant and counsel for HRD. I subsequently issued a Procedural Order and received additional requested information from the Appellant and HRD. I have deemed the submissions as cross motions for summary decision.
Facts / Chronology of Events
- The Appellant graduated from the Worcester Police Academy in February 2009, was appointed as a Worcester Police Officer and immediately laid off (without serving any time as a Worcester Police Officer) due to lack of funds and was then placed on the statewide re-employment list for police officers and the reinstatement list for Worcester Police Officer.
- Starting in November 2009, nine months after being laid off by the WPD, the Appellant was appointed as a police officer in the Town of Milford.
- The Appellant served as a Milford Police Officer for approximately 2 years and 7 months, between November 2009 and June 2012.
- In June 2012, the Appellant was reinstated as a Worcester Police Officer.
- The Appellant then served 10 years as a Worcester Police Officer between June 2012 and approximately June 2022. He was then promoted to Worcester Police Sergeant and served 3 years and three months as a Worcester Police Sergeant, between June 2022 and September 2025.
- On September 20, 2025, HRD administered the promotional examination for Worcester Police Lieutenant.
- The examination consisted of various components including E&E.
- The Appellant received an E&E score of 13.6 out of a maximum 20 points.
- Regarding the “experience” portion of the E&E component, experience for service in a current department (i.e. – Worcester) was assigned a comparatively higher point value than experience served in an outside department (i.e. – Milford).
- The decision to give a comparatively higher point value for service in a current department was made by HRD in conjunction with subject matter experts, who felt that experience with a current department was comparatively more valuable than experience outside of a current department for purposes of a promotion within the department in which the promotion would be awarded.
- This point structure goes back to at least 2013 and was most recently affirmed in survey results from 2023 and 2024 that specifically addressed this topic. Both surveys, one to all police officers and one limited to Police Chiefs, showed that more respondents found experience within the current department to be more important when considering promotions within the current department in which the candidate serves.
- There is no dispute that the Appellant was credited with 3 years of service as a Worcester Police Sergeant.
- Regarding experience as a police officer, the Appellant claimed 14 years of service as a Worcester police officer.
- HRD, after reviewing the Employment Verification Forms (EVFs) related to the Appellant, recalculated the E&E score to reflect: 6 months as a Worcester Police Officer for the period immediately after the Appellant was laid off from the WPD and did not serve as a police officer (consistent with its policy regarding approved “leaves of absences”); 3 years as a Milford Police Officer; and 10 years serving as a Worcester Police Officer upon this reinstatement. After rounding up, the Appellant was given credit for 11 years as a Worcester Police Officer and 3 years as a Milford Police Officer, as opposed to the 14 years as a Worcester Police Officer claimed by the Appellant.
- In this appeal to HRD, and now to the Commission, the Appellant seeks E&E credit for 14 years as a Worcester Police Officer.
- If the Appellant were provided with the credit he is seeking, his whole score would increase by one point and could, dependent on a consistent recalculation of other candidates’ scores, possibly improve the Appellant’s ranking on the current eligible list for Worcester Police Lieutenant.
Relevant Civil Service Law
Section 22 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:
Except as otherwise provided by sections sixteen and seventeen, an applicant may request the administrator to conduct one or more of the following reviews relating to an examination: (1) a review of the marking of the applicant's answers to essay and multiple choice questions; (2) a review of the marking of the applicant's training and experience; (3) a review of a finding by the administrator that the applicant did not meet the entrance requirements for the examination; provided, however, that the administrator may deny such request in the case of a competitive examination for original appointment if, at the time such request is made, the administrator is currently accepting applications for a subsequent examination of the same type for the same position.
Such request for review of the marking of the applicant's answers to essay questions, of the marking of the applicant's training and experience, or of a finding that the applicant did not meet the entrance requirements for appointment to the position shall be filed with the administrator no later than seventeen days after the date of mailing by the administrator of the notice to the applicant of his mark on the examination or his failure to meet the entrance requirements for appointment to the position.
…
An applicant may request the administrator to conduct a review of whether an examination taken by such applicant was a fair test of the applicant's fitness actually to perform the primary or dominant duties of the position for which the examination was held, provided that such request shall be filed with the administrator no later than seven days after the date of such examination.
Section 24 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:
An applicant may appeal to the commission from a decision of the administrator made pursuant to section twenty-three relative to (a) the marking of the applicant's answers to essay questions or training and experience sheet; (b) a finding that the applicant did not meet the entrance requirements for appointment to the position; or (c) a finding that the examination taken by such applicant was a fair test of the applicant's fitness to actually perform the primary or dominant duties of the position for which the examination was held. Such appeal shall be filed no later than seventeen days after the date of mailing of the decision of the administrator. The commission shall determine the form of the petition for appeal, provided that the petition shall include a brief statement of the allegations presented to the administrator for review. After acceptance of such an appeal, the commission shall conduct a hearing and, shall forthwith render a decision, and send a copy of such decision to the applicant and the administrator.
Standard for Summary Disposition
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”).
Parties’ Arguments
The Appellant argues that the provisions in Sections 33 and 39 of the civil service law related to seniority and reinstatement require HRD to credit all his time served as a police officer, both in Worcester and Milford, as time served as a Worcester Police Officer for purposes of the E&E component of promotional examination.
Specifically, Section 33, which relates to civil service seniority, states in part that:
Length of service shall be computed from the first date of full-time employment as a permanent employee, including the required probationary period, in the departmental unit, regardless of title, unless such service has been interrupted by an absence from the payroll of more than six months, in which case length of service shall be computed from the date of restoration to the payroll; but upon continuous service following such an absence for a period of twice the length of the absence, length of service shall be computed from the date obtained by adding the period of such absence from the payroll to the date of original employment; provided, however, that the continuity of service of such employee shall be deemed not to have been interrupted if such absence was the result of (1) military service, illness, educational leave, abolition of position or lay-off because of lack of work or money,
Section 39, which pertains to layoffs due to lack of work or money, also stands for the proposition that an employee’s civil service seniority, upon reinstatement, will not be interrupted if the absence was due to a layoff for lack of funds.
HRD effectively argues that these provisions of the civil service law do not apply to what weight is given to candidates for E&E for service performed in the department as opposed to outside the department and that the differentiation is based on the informed advice of subject matter experts.
Analysis
The Appellant has no reasonable expectation of showing that HRD’s decision to give comparatively more weight for time served in the Worcester Police Department over the Milford Police Department was arbitrary or capricious. That longstanding practice was made after consultation with subject matter experts and is inherently logical. Service in the same department naturally makes that candidate more familiar with that Department’s policies and procedures and the community it serves as opposed to service in another community. While both are valuable, it is not arbitrary or capricious for HRD to conclude that a differentiation between the two is appropriate.
I now turn to the Appellant’s argument that, even if HRD’s longstanding policy is not arbitrary or capricious, it cannot apply to a case, as here, when the employee was laid off due to lack of funds; worked in a different department; and was then reinstated years later. While the Appellant is correct that provisions in the civil service law state that civil service seniority is uninterrupted upon reinstatement, that in no way relates to HRD’s ability to differentiate between the two types of experience for the purposes of the E&E component of a promotional examinations administered by HRD under other parts of the civil service law including G.L. c. 31, § 5(e) and §§ 22 – 24. Put another way, HRD’s experience-credit determination is an examination-scoring issue, not a seniority issue. That notwithstanding, HRD’s calculations here did consider that that the Appellant was laid off from the WPD through no fault of his own based on a lack of funds, giving him 6 months’ worth of credit as a WPD police officer for a period in which he served neither in the Worcester or Milford Police Departments. More broadly, HRD is “ … vested with broad authority to determine the requirements for competitive civil service examinations, including the type and weight given as ‘credit for such training and experience as of the time designated by HRD’”. Cataldo v. Human Resources Division, 23 MCSR 617 (2010).
Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Appellant’s appeal docketed under Docket Number B2-25-278 is hereby dismissed.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a 4-1 vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair - Yes; Dooley, Commissioner – Yes; Markey, Commissioner – Yes; McConney, Commissioner – Yes; and Stein, Commissioner - No) on July 9, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)
Notice to:
Michael A. Cappabianca, Jr. (Appellant)
Nicole Boudreau, Esq. (for Respondent)
