| Date: | 06/05/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Division of Administrative Law Appeals |
| Docket Number: | CR-25-0580 |
Petitioner worked in a variety of roles at a non-public school for students with autism, including as a therapist, case manager, and clinical director. She applied to purchase her service under G.L. c. 32, § 4(1)(p). Respondent denied her application because she had not demonstrated that she “taught pupils” or that the Commonwealth paid the tuition of “all” of the students at the school. Respondent’s decision is affirmed.
Petitioner Christina Caruso timely appealed Respondent Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System’s (MTRS) denial of her application to purchase service pursuant to Section 4(1)(p) of Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which allows a purchase of creditable service by a teacher “who was previously engaged in teaching pupils in any non-public school in the commonwealth, if the tuition of all such pupils taught was financed in part or in full by the commonwealth.”
The Division of Administrative Law Appeals issued a Scheduling Order stating that the appeal could be decided based on the Parties’ submissions pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(10)(c). The Order also notified the Parties that if they did not submit additional information, “a decision will be reached based upon the documents that have been submitted.” Neither party objected to having the appeal decided based on their written submissions. I am treating Petitioner’s letter of appeal as her memorandum as she filed no further papers. I now admit into evidence exhibits P1 to P5 and R1 to R3.
Findings of Fact
Based on the evidence in the record and reasonable inferences drawn from it, I make the following findings of fact:
Analysis
The MTRS denied Ms. Caruso’s application to purchase creditable service for her work at NLG, citing Section 4(1)(p) of Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws. Section 4(1)(p) provides that a teacher can purchase up to ten years of creditable service if the teacher was:
previously engaged in teaching pupils in any non-public school in the commonwealth, if the tuition of all such pupils taught was financed in part or in full by the commonwealth . . . . Such member shall furnish the board with such information as it shall require to determine the amount to be paid and the credit to be allowed under this paragraph.
Section 4(1)(p) is “one of few exceptions to the legislative scheme of G.L. c. 32, which otherwise operates under the general rule that retirement rights and benefits to public employees are only provided for their work in the public sector.” Galanti v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., No. 2384CV00186 (Suffolk Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2024) (emphasis in original).
The MTRS argues that Ms. Caruso cannot purchase creditable service for her time at NLG because she was not “teaching pupils” under Section 4(1)(p). A recent decision from the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board explained that the Legislature intended “teaching pupils” to include:
instruction in the academic and vocational subjects that are typically taught for credit in the public schools, generally in the classroom, but not the myriad of other special education services that are provided in alternative day and residential schools, including instruction in life, coping, social, and emotional skills.
Lukasik v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., CR-15-0668 (Contributory Ret. App. Bd. Feb. 21, 2020) (emphasizing “the value of both therapy and instruction in the myriad of life skills that are necessary for children with disabilities to access traditional education”). See also Verbits v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., CR-17-1032 (Div. Admin. Law App. May 2021) (school psychologist who taught social and emotional skills to students not eligible); Burke v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., CR-16-0259 (Div. Admin. Law App. July 24, 2020) (teacher who taught “functional academics” and life skills not eligible); Dibella v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., CR-10-0181 (Div. Admin. Law App. Mar. 4, 2016) (“A therapist, even one who provides services in a classroom to students, is not teaching students academics.”). Thus, a clinician who provides instruction in life, coping, social, and emotional skills but who is not teaching academic or vocational subjects that public schools typically teach for credit is not eligible to purchase creditable service under Section 4(1)(p).
Ms. Caruso has the burden of providing each element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Galanti v. Massachusetts Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys., CR-15-566, 2022 WL 22863705, at *3 (Contributory Ret. App. Bd. Dec. 30, 2022). Ms. Caruso states that she had “direct educational interaction” with individual students for much or all of the time that she worked at NLG. She described her responsibilities as “providing educational guidance, instruction, and support directly to students.” She deferred to the job descriptions to “clearly demonstrate” the type of work that she engaged in with students.
However, the job descriptions do not bolster her case. They describe providing therapy and support to students; collecting and monitoring data; working on ISPs; acting as a job coach; taking students on outings; liaising and collaborating with parents, caregivers, school districts, and other staff; and developing and providing oversight for academic, life skills, and behavioral programming. They do not, however, describe the provision of “instruction in the academic and vocational subjects that are typically taught for credit in the public schools[.]” Lukasik, supra. Rather, they paint a picture of a person working with students on a regular basis to help structure and support their academic endeavors, but not someone who is teaching math, reading, science, or any of the other subjects that public school teachers instruct for credit. Accordingly, I find that Ms. Caruso has not sustained her burden of proving that she had “taught pupils” for purposes of Section 4(1)(p).
The MTRS further asserts in its filing that Commonwealth did not pay the tuition of “all” of the pupils who attended NLG, a non-public school. The MTRS indicated that 1% of the students at NLG came from out-of-state schools that paid their tuition and that another 1% paid their tuition privately. Ms. Caruso did not submit any contrary information about the source of the tuition for the students at NLG and failed to satisfy her burden to show that the Commonwealth paid the tuition of “all” of the pupils at NLG.
Based on the above analysis, I conclude that Ms. Caruso may not purchase her service for the time she worked at NLG. The decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.
