| Date: | 06/11/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | D-26-055 |
The Commission allowed the procedural appeal of a Gardner firefighter and ordered his suspension overturned as the City failed to provide him with a local hearing after the firefighter filed a timely request for such with the City to contest the suspension.
On February 18, 2026, the Appellant, Jeffrey Chartier (Appellant), a firefighter employed by the City of Gardner (City), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting whether the City violated the procedural requirements of the civil service law by failing to conduct a local hearing that he had requested regarding a suspension of less than five days.
On March 31, 2026, I conducted a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, his counsel, and counsel for the City. The Appellant submitted a motion for summary decision and the City opted not to file an opposition.
The following is undisputed:
Standard for Summary Disposition
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”).
Section 41 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:
A civil service employee may be suspended for just cause for a period of five days or less without a hearing prior to such suspension. Such suspension may be imposed only by the appointing authority or by a subordinate to whom the appointing authority has delegated authority to impose such suspensions, or by a chief of police or officer performing similar duties regardless of title, or by a subordinate to whom such chief or officer has delegated such authority. Within twenty-four hours after imposing a suspension under this paragraph, the person authorized to impose the suspension shall provide the person suspended with a copy of sections forty-one through forty-five and with a written notice stating the specific reason or reasons for the suspension and informing him that he may, within forty-eight hours after the receipt of such notice, file a written request for a hearing before the appointing authority on the question of whether there was just cause for the suspension. If such request is filed, he shall be given a hearing before the appointing authority or a hearing officer designated by the appointing authority within five days after receipt by the appointing authority of such request.
Section 42 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:
Any person who alleges that an appointing authority has failed to follow the requirements of section forty-one in taking action which has affected his employment or compensation may file a complaint with the commission. Such complaint must be filed within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after said action has been taken, or after such person first knew or had reason to know of said action, and shall set forth specifically in what manner the appointing authority has failed to follow such requirements. If the commission finds that the appointing authority has failed to follow said requirements and that the rights of said person have been prejudiced thereby, the commission shall order the appointing authority to restore said person to his employment immediately without loss of compensation or other rights.
The City violated the civil service law when it failed to provide the Appellant with a local hearing that he timely requested after being notified of his suspension. The statutory language of Section 41 is unequivocal: upon a timely written request, the employee “shall be given a hearing”. The use of the word “shall” imposes a mandatory obligation on the City to provide an employee with a hearing on their alleged misconduct. (See Garza v. Abington Police Department, 37 MSCR 84 (2024)).
In fact, civil service employees who are suspended for five days or less cannot opt to skip the local appointing authority hearing and unilaterally decide to have a just cause hearing before the Commission. Rather, the suspended employee, prior to filing an appeal with the Commission, must first request a local hearing.
There is, however, another avenue for the parties to forego a local hearing laid out in Section 41A of the civil service law which states in part that:
Upon the request of the appointing authority and a tenured employee, who is entitled to a hearing pursuant to the first paragraph of section forty-one, a hearing before a disinterested hearing officer, designated by the chairman of the commission, may be held in lieu of a hearing before the appointing authority. Such hearing officer shall make findings of facts and may make recommendations for decision to the commission.
No such request was made by the parties to the Commission.
For all the above reasons, the Appellant’s appeal is allowed; his suspension is rescinded, and he shall be restored to his employment related to those tours of duty for which he was suspended immediately without loss of compensation or other rights.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher C. Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on June 11, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Rose Mann, Esq. (for Appellant)
Christopher Batinsey, Esq. (for Respondent
