On January 15, 2026, the Appellant, Corey Clark (Appellant), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, contesting the decision of the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) to suspend him from his employment. A remote pre-hearing conference was held on February 17, 2026, that was attended by the Appellant and counsel for both parties. The BHA filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which the Appellant opposed. With the motion to dismiss pending, a hearing on the merits was held on April 8, 2026. For the reasons stated below, the BHA’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Undisputed Facts
The relevant facts related to jurisdiction are undisputed. The Appellant has been employed by the BHA since 1999 when he was appointed as an electrician. He was promoted to journeyman electrician in 2017. On January 7, 2026, the BHA upheld a 1-day suspension against the Appellant for alleged misconduct and the Appellant filed a timely appeal with the Commission. The issue here is whether the Commission has jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s appeal.
Background
The Commission majority recognizes that several prior Commission decisions have construed G.L. c. 121B, § 29 as limiting the Commission's jurisdiction over housing authority employees to appeals involving permanent separation from employment or position, thereby excluding appeals from suspensions. See, e.g., Jerauld v. Waltham Hous. Auth., 21 MCSR 573 (2008); Johnson v. Worcester Hous. Auth., 23 MCSR 555 (2010); Santiago v. Worcester Hous. Auth., 28 MCSR 323 (2015); Prokop v. Boston Hous. Auth., 29 MCSR 40 (2016).
However, in Martin v. Dracut Hous. Auth., 30 MCSR 282 (2017), where the Commission took jurisdiction after ruling that a demotion was a permanent separation from an employee’s position, the Commission expressly noted that the issue regarding jurisdiction over suspensions remained unsettled and stated that the Commission “may opt to revisit, and potentially reverse, its position” regarding whether suspended housing authority employees may appeal to the Commission.
Upon reconsideration of the statutory language, the definitions incorporated from G.L. c. 31, and the relevant legislative history, a majority of the Commission now concludes that this earlier interpretation was unduly restrictive. To the extent these prior decisions hold that a qualifying housing authority employee may not appeal a suspension under G.L. c. 121B, § 29, they are no longer followed. A majority of the Commission concludes that the statutory protection against involuntary separation for housing authority employees encompasses temporary involuntary separations, i.e. – suspensions, as well as permanent involuntary separations from employment or position, e.g. – discharges and demotions, subject to the applicable provisions of G.L. c. 31, §§ 41–45.
Relevant Law
Section 29 of G.L. c. 121B states, in relevant part:
No employee of any housing authority, except an employee occupying the position of executive director, who has held his office or position, including any promotion or reallocation therefrom within the authority for a total period of five years of uninterrupted service, shall be involuntarily separated therefrom except subject to and in accordance with the provisions of sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of said chapter thirty-one to the same extent as if said office or position were classified under said chapter.
Section 1 of G.L. c. 31 states, in relevant part:
“Discharge”, the permanent, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment by his appointing authority.
“Suspension”, a temporary, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment by the appointing authority.
Majority Opinion (Commissioners Bowman, Dooley, Markey and Stein)
The starting point is the language of G.L. c. 121B, § 29, itself. The statute provides that qualifying housing authority employees may not be “involuntarily separated” except in accordance with the procedures set forth in G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-45. Although Section 29 does not define the term “involuntarily separated,” neither is it expressly limited to permanent separations.
As referenced above, Chapter 31 itself does supply the relevant guidance, however. G.L. c. 31, § 1, defines “suspension” as “a temporary, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment by the appointing authority.” (emphasis added). Similarly, “discharge” is defined as “the permanent, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment by his appointing authority.” As such, Chapter 31 specifically recognizes that there are two kinds of “involuntary separations” from employment or a position. There are: (1) “permanent” ones (discharges/layoffs/demotions) and (2) “temporary” ones (suspensions).
The Commission's prior interpretation of G.L. c. 121B, § 29 effectively construed the statutory phrase “involuntarily separated” to mean only “permanently involuntarily separated,” thereby excluding temporary suspensions from its protection. The statute, however, contains no such qualification. The Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly cautioned that courts may not “add words to a statute that the Legislature did not put there, either by inadvertent omission or by design.” Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 294 (2002). See also Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Ct. Dep’t, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006); Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 672 (2014); Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537 (2015).
The Legislature expressly incorporated G.L. c. 31, §§ 41–45, into the protections afforded qualifying housing authority employees under G.L. c. 121B, § 29. Chapter 31 recognizes that a suspension constitutes a temporary involuntary separation, while a discharge constitutes a permanent involuntary separation. Had the Legislature intended to confine § 29 to permanent separations, it could have expressly imposed that limitation. The Commission should not supply language that the Legislature omitted. Accordingly, the statutory text supports the conclusion that § 29 encompasses temporary suspensions as well as permanent discharges. See also Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 694–95 (2022) (statutory “term[s] should be given a consistent meaning throughout”); cf. Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 486 Mass. 487, 493-94 (2020) (according to Supreme Judicial Court, suspended employees are “temporarily separated from their employment” and citing G.L. c. 31, § 1) (emphasis added).
The legislative history further supports this conclusion. In March 1969, the Legislature amended G.L. c. 31, § 1, to define “suspension” as “the temporary, involuntary separation from service for just cause, made in accordance with the provisions of section forty-three.” See St. 1969, c. 45, § 1; Board of Selectmen of Framingham v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 366 Mass. 547, 552 (1974). Just a few months later, the Legislature enacted the current language of G.L. c. 121B, § 29, which protects housing authority employees with five years’ service from being “involuntarily separated" from their position “to the same extent as if said office or position were classified under [c. 31].” See St. 1969, c. 751. Given the Legislature’s virtually contemporaneous use of the phrases “involuntary separation” and “involuntarily separated” in the two statutes, the majority concludes that the Legislature intended the nearly identical phrases to carry the same meaning in both contexts.
The majority recognizes that G.L. c. 121B, § 29 refers to an employee being involuntarily separated from an “office or position,” whereas G.L. c. 31, § 1 defines a suspension in terms of temporary separation from employment. That difference in wording does not, in the majority's view, establish that the Legislature intended to exclude suspensions from the protection afforded by § 29. A suspension temporarily prevents an employee from performing the duties of the office or position, even though the employee retains the position and ordinarily returns to active service upon completion of the suspension. The continued existence of the employment relationship does not necessarily mean that no temporary involuntary separation has occurred.
Moreover, § 29 expressly incorporates the protections and procedures of G.L. c. 31, §§ 41–45, which address suspensions as well as permanent disciplinary separations. Reading § 29 to exclude suspensions altogether would substantially limit the operation of that incorporation. Considering the statutory language and the incorporated civil service provisions together, the majority concludes that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the phrase “involuntarily separated” solely to permanent separations.
Finally, as discussed in Martin, the majority recognizes that G.L. c. 121B, § 52, governing redevelopment authority employees, expressly identifies suspensions among the personnel actions subject to civil service protections, whereas § 29 does not separately enumerate suspensions. Upon further reflection, this distinction does not compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude suspensions from § 29. Section 52 employs an enumeration of specific personnel actions, while § 29 uses the broader phrase “involuntarily separated,” expressly incorporating the protections of G.L. c. 31, §§ 41–45. As discussed above, Chapter 31 recognizes that an involuntary separation may be temporary or permanent. The express reference to suspensions in § 52 therefore does not necessarily establish that the Legislature intended the broader language of § 29 to exclude them.
Moreover, the provisions governing redevelopment authority employees originated in earlier legislation and were carried forward when the Legislature recodified the housing and redevelopment laws in 1969. See St. 1969, c. 751. The different formulations may therefore reflect, at least in part, distinct statutory histories rather than necessarily a deliberate legislative choice in 1969 to provide fewer protections to housing authority employees. The majority therefore does not consider the wording of § 52 sufficient to overcome the language of § 29, particularly its express incorporation of the civil service provisions governing suspensions.
Minority Opinion (Commissioner McConney)
I respectfully dissent.
Once again, the Commission is presented with the question of whether a housing authority employee may appeal a suspension under the provisions of G.L. c. 121B, § 29.
Upon review of the parties’ submissions and argument, the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be allowed because the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to hear the matter. Jerauld v. Waltham Hous. Auth., 21 MCSR 573 (2008). See Finklea v. Boston Hous. Auth., 38 MCSR 263 (2025) (termination appeal of housing authority employee dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as employee had not been employed for at least five continuous years at the time of his termination). Contrast Abdul-Shafi v. Boston Hous. Auth., 39 MCSR 183 (2026) (termination of tenured housing authority employee upheld); Hand v. Tyngsborough Hous. Auth., 37 MCSR 259 (2024) (termination of tenured housing authority employee upheld).
Section 29 of G.L. c. 121B provides in relevant part:
No employee of any housing authority, except an employee occupying the position of executive director, who has held his office or position, including any promotion or reallocation therefrom within the authority for a total period of five years of uninterrupted service, shall be involuntarily separated therefrom except subject to and in accordance with the provisions of sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of said chapter thirty-one to the same extent as if said office or position were classified under said chapter.
It is undisputed that Mr. Clark has served continuously in his position for five years.
Commission Precedent
Notwithstanding the limitations of G.L. c. 121B, § 29, the Commission has adjudicated non-termination disciplinary matters from housing authorities in the past. In Bosse, the Commission accepted a BHA employee’s one-day suspension appeal under §§ 41 and 43, conducted a full hearing, and affirmed the suspension. Bosse v. Boston Hous. Auth., 12 MCSR 171 (1999). See also Dottin v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 21 MCSR 86 (2008) (five-day suspension upheld) and Randazza v. Gloucester Hous. Auth., 10 MCSR 69 (1997) (five-day suspension upheld). In none of these cases did the respective appointing authorities raise the issue of jurisdiction; none of these decisions even cited G.L. c. 121B, § 29.
In subsequent matters, the Commission declined jurisdiction to hear housing authority non-termination disciplinary appeals. The Commission declined a Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) administrative magistrate’s findings of fact and recommendation affirming the five-day suspension of a tenured BHA employee, citing lack of jurisdiction:
Housing Authority employees derive rights under c. 121 s. 29; these rights are limited when compared to those of other civil service employees. See Courchesne v. Dennis Housing Authority, 40 MCSR 11 (1998); Jones v. Boston Housing Authority, 6 MCSR 83. Chapter 31 applies to Housing Authority employees only in the area of termination … See McGilvray v. Boston Housing Authority, 6 MCSR 117 (1993); Randazza v. Gloucester Housing Authority, 13 MCSR 3 (2000); Mahoney v. Boston Housing Authority, 6 MCSR 249 (1999).
Jerauld v. Waltham Hous. Auth., 21 MCSR 573 (2008).
G.L. c. 121B, § 29 does not define the specific actions which would constitute an “involuntary separat[ion] therefrom”, but the Commission has consistently ruled that a suspension does not constitute an “involuntarily separation” from the housing authority or the housing authority employee’s position. Prokop v. Boston Hous. Auth., 29 MCSR 40 (2016); Santiago v. Worcester Hous. Auth., 28 MCSR 323 (2015); Jerauld, 21 MCSR 573 (2008), citing Courchesne v. Dennis Hous. Auth., 11 MCSR 40 (1998). However, the Commission has also observed that the term “involuntary separation” is not clear and unambiguous, and has acknowledged that actions such as demotions, although not clearly discussed in statutes using that same term, are included in the definition of “involuntary separation”. Martin v. Dracut Hous. Auth., 30 MCSR 282, 284 (2017).
Mr. Clark argues that the Commission should reverse its previously held position that it lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals related to the suspension of housing authority employees, citing G.L. c. 31, § 1, and the legislative history underlying the enactment of civil service protections for certain housing authority employees. Mr. Clark notes that Chapter 31 defines a discharge as “a permanent, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment” and a suspension as “a temporary, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment”. G.L. c. 31, § 1 (emphasis added).
The definition utilized in Chapter 31 for “suspension” was added on March 3, 1969. On August 21, 1969, the legislature enacted the current iteration of G.L. c. 121B, § 29, which prohibits involuntary separations for tenured housing authority employees, subject to the provisions of sections 41-45 of Chapter 31. On this basis, Mr. Clark argues that the term “involuntary separation” as used in c. 121B, § 29 encompasses suspensions defined by c. 31, § 1.
Mr. Clark acknowledges that the legislature addressed the civil service rights of the employees of redevelopment authorities in the same 1969 statute that adopted the current protections for housing authority employees.[FN1] The relevant section provides:
No person permanently employed by a redevelopment authority. . . shall, . . . be discharged, removed, suspended, laid off, transferred from the latest office or employment held by him without his consent, lowered in rank or compensation, nor shall his office or position be abolished, except for just cause and in the manner provided by sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of chapter thirty-one.
G.L. c. 121B, § 52 (emphasis added).
Mr. Clark argues that the enumeration of specific prohibited actions in this section was a product of the legislature “cutting and pasting language” that had been originally enacted as part of the redevelopment authority statute in 1958 and should not be read to imply that housing authority employees possess fewer appeal rights than employees of redevelopment authorities.
For the reasons stated below, I believe that Mr. Clark’s argument must fail.
In resolving questions of statutory interpretation, the words used in a statute should be given their “usual and accepted meaning”, consistent with the statute’s purpose. Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 693 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Morasse, 446 Mass. 113, 116 (2006). The usual and accepted meaning of the statute’s words is derived from sources such as “use in other legal contexts”. Id. at 694. In attempting to discern the meaning of the words used, courts “look to the language of the entire statute, not just a single sentence” and attempt to interpret all terms “harmoniously”. Id.
The reasoning of the Commission in Martin is instructive and provides guidance for determining the purpose of § 29, as well as determining the meaning of “involuntarily separated” as the phrase is used in § 29. Martin, 30 MCSR 282 (2017). In Martin, the Commission observed that the contrasting language of §§ 29 and 52 provides evidence of legislative intent to provide fewer rights for housing authority employees than redevelopment authority employees. Martin at 283 (2017). Past decisions by the Commission also make clear that reference to §§ 41-45 of Chapter 31 within § 29 does not confer additional substantive rights on housing authority employees. Courchesne, 11 MCSR 40, 42 (1998) (“The protection [of G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-45] is not extended, as evidenced by its limiting language, to confer any additional rights on housing authority employees”). Indeed, as Courchesne makes clear, housing authority employees do not even have a right to notice prior to the abolition of their positions. Id. Therefore, it is very likely to have been the intent of the legislature to limit the rights of housing authority employees early in their service and to limit the substantive appeal rights that vest after the required five years.
Although the rights of housing authority employees are limited, this does not necessarily mean that review of suspensions is precluded by the language of § 29. Here, Martin again provides helpful reasoning. Viewing the redevelopment authority statute as a whole, the Commission in Martin observed that the very same language prohibiting involuntary separation appears in the redevelopment authority statute in the paragraph preceding the enumerated list of actions:
A veteran, . . . who holds an office or position in the service of a redevelopment authority not classified under said chapter thirty-one . . . shall not be involuntarily separated from such office or position except subject to and in accordance with the provisions of sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive of said chapter thirty-one to the same extent as if said office or position were classified under said chapter.
G.L. c. 121B, § 52 (emphasis added).
The use of the phrase “involuntarily separated” one paragraph prior to the paragraph containing the enumerated list in § 52 suggests that the phrase should not be interpreted as encompassing all of the actions in the enumerated list. Even if I were to accept Mr. Clark’s argument that the enumerated list in the next paragraph of § 52, which prohibits suspensions explicitly, was simply a cut-and-paste from an older version of the redevelopment authority statute, Mr. Clark offers no explanation for why the legislature would have used the same narrow language in both §§ 29 (relating to all housing authority employees with five years’ tenure) and 52 (relating to redevelopment authority employees who are veterans), but suddenly decided to copy-and-paste-in more expansive language when discussing the employment rights of all redevelopment authority employees. More to the point, such an inadvertent action would not have been as likely in 1969, when the current version of the redevelopment authority statute was adopted, as the framers of the statute did not have access to technology/computer programs capable of cutting and pasting the relevant language. Rather, the drafters of the 1969 statute would have relied on legislative committees and staff experienced in legislative drafting, conference committees and counsel from the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is unlikely that, through these steps, there would have been a deliberate decision to recycle language in one paragraph after deliberately choosing not to recycle the same language in the previous paragraph. This inconsistency suggests that the legislature did not intend for the words “involuntarily separated” to encompass all the actions included in the enumerated list in § 52, which are also included in G.L. c. 31, § 41.
I agree with Mr. Clark that the legislature likely intended the phrase “involuntary separation” to have a consistent meaning, and I am obligated to give this term a consistent meaning throughout the statutes in which it appears. Williams, 490 Mass. 684, 694–95 (2022) (statutory “term[s] should be given a consistent meaning throughout”).Were the definition of “suspension” provided in Chapter 31 limited to merely “temporary, involuntary separation” alone, perhaps Mr. Clark’s argument would be more persuasive. Yet the question is not whether a suspension is an involuntary separation, but what the employee is being separated from. Here, reference to a preceding paragraph in the statute is not necessary, but merely the rest of the sentence in Chapter 31, § 1. A “suspension”, in G.L. c. 31 § 1, is defined as “a temporary, involuntary separation of a person from his civil service employment” (emphasis added). [FN2}
The deliberate choice to define a suspension as separation from employment is not trivial. As the Commission observed in Martin, statutes using similar language to § 29, such as G.L. c. 30, §9A, apply to separations “from an office or position, not from employment.” Martin at 284 (2017) (citing Greaney v. Colonel, Dep’t of State Police, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 789, 792 n.5 (2001) (emphasis added)). As the Commission in Martin observed, the use of the word “therefrom” in § 29 refers specifically to a separation from an “office or position”, not from “any housing authority”. Id. The distinction is important, as courts have frequently treated employment as being distinct from one’s position when interpreting other sections of Chapter 31. See Provencal v. Police Dep’t of Worcester, 423 Mass. 626, 630 (1996) (“We conclude that . . . for the purposes of G.L. c. 31 . . . ‘retained in employment’ does not mean or include retention in a specific position.”). As even the cases the Appellant cites acknowledge, a suspended employee continues to “hold[] the office from which he was suspended”. Serrazina v. Springfield Pub. Schs., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 622–23, aff’d, 464 Mass. 1011 (2013); see also Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 486 Mass. 487, 493-94 (2020) (according to Supreme Judicial Court, suspended employees are “temporarily separated from their employment”) (emphasis added). By contrast, separation from one’s position is necessarily permanent.
A demotion is such a separation as an employee no longer possesses their title or position, and discharge or layoffs also constitute such a separation, as a discharged or laid off employee no longer retains their title or any claim to their office. While a suspended employee is separated from the benefits of employment, such as their pay, they cannot be said to be separated from their position, as they still retain their title and may return to their office once the suspension has concluded. As such, a suspension does not fall within tenured housing authority employees’ protections against involuntary separation as that term is used in G.L. c. 121B, § 29.
Accordingly, in my opinion, Mr. Clark’s appeal is jurisdictionally defective: the Commission may not adjudicate suspension appeals from employees of housing authorities pursuant to G.L. c. 121B, § 29.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in the majority opinion above, a majority of the Commission concludes that the Commission does have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, the Boston Housing Authority’s motion to dismiss the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction is denied.
Under separate cover, a decision is being issued this same day by the Presiding Hearing Officer regarding whether there was just cause for the 1-day suspension.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a 4-1 vote of the Commission (Bowman, Chair – Yes; Stein, Commissioner – Yes; Markey, Commissioner – Yes; Dooley, Commissioner – Yes; McConney, Commissioner – No).
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his/her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
James A. W. Shaw, Esq. (for Appellant)
Susan M. Whalen, Esq. (for Respondent)
On March 6, 1969 (notably, the same date as the enactment of Chapter 31's definition of a “suspension”), then-Acting Governor Sargent filed SB 1226 An Act Recodifying the Housing and Urban Renewal Laws of the Commonwealth (1969), proposing a new chapter, Chapter 121B. Housing and Urban Renewal.
In the letter accompanying the bill, Gov. Sargent made clear that the proposed reforms were necessary to resolve confusion from the existing “hodge-podge” of housing statutes. It is clear from the governor’s letter that the recodification built on earlier work by an advisory committee from the governor's office and that the proposed bill is an update of that work. Further, the governor specifically noted that “[c]hanges involving matters of substance and policy have been kept to a minimum”.
SB 1226’s index referenced the original source of the provisions as well as the nature of the changes, if any. Section 29 is blank as to both. On Section 52 (redevelopment authorities) the only noted change is that the state auditor can examine redevelopment authorities as they do housing authorities.
After SB 1226 was referred to the Committee on Urban Affairs, it was released as SB 1394 An Act Recodifying the Housing and Urban Renewal Laws of the Commonwealth (1969). After amendments to Section 1 on August 11, 1969, SB 1394 passed and was sent to the governor on August 14, 1969.
Less than 6 months before the enactment of G.L. c. 121B, § 29, the Legislature introduced into Chapter 31 (Section 1) the following definition: —
"Suspension", the temporary, involuntary separation from service for just cause, made in accordance with the provisions of section forty-three.
Chapter 45 of the Acts of 1969.
