Decision  Clark, Corey v. Boston Housing Authority (Just Cause) 10/15/26

Date:	10/15/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	D-26-032

• Appearance for Appellant: James A.W. Shaw, Esq.
• Appearance for Respondent: Susan M. Whalen, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Angela C. McConney

The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Housing Authority to suspend an electrician for one day for taking leave without authorization and failing to report his whereabouts. 

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Edward Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision.

Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-43 and G.L. c. 121B, § 29, the Appellant, Corey Clark (Appellant or Mr. Clark), appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the September 9, 2025 decision of the Boston Housing Authority (BHA, Housing Authority or Respondent) to suspend him for one day from his employment as an electrician. [FN2] The Housing Authority based its decision on Mr. Clark’s conduct on August 19, 2025:  that he had taken leave without authorization and that he had provided false information to his supervisor (when she inquired about said unauthorized leave).  The one-day suspension was served on Wednesday, September 10, 2025, with Mr. Clark returning to work on Thursday, September 11, 2025. 

                The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on February 17, 2026, and I conducted a remote evidentiary hearing on April 8, 2026.  The parties filed proposed decisions on the jurisdictional issue [FN3] and the merits of the appeal in May 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed. 

Findings of Fact 

                I admitted nine exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-9) and six exhibits from the Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-6). Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by the Respondent:

• Christine Erardi, Program Maintenance Supervisor, Boston Housing Authority 

Called by the Appellant:

• Corey Clark, the Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

1. Mr. Clark has been an electrician since 1999.  (Testimony of Appellant)
2. Since 2017, Mr. Clark has been employed by the Boston Housing Authority as a journeyman electrician.  (Testimony of Appellant)
3. Mr. Clark is a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 103 union. His employment is negotiated by a contract between the BHA and the IBEW 103.  (R. Exhibit 4)
4. Mr. Clark had no previous record of discipline.  (Stipulated Facts; Testimony of Appellant)
5. A typical workday for electricians at a BHA development begins at 8:00 a.m., with a 15 minute break from 10:00 a.m. to 10:15 a.m., a lunch break from 12:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m., a 15 minute break from 2:00 p.m. to 2:15 p.m., with the work day ending at 4:30 p.m. These times fluctuate based on circumstances such as employees working through their usual lunch period to complete a job. (Testimony of Erardi; Testimony of Appellant) 
6. The BHA has a “zero tolerance” policy for drinking on the job.  (Testimony of Erardi; Testimony of Appellant)
7. BHA staff are expected to report unexpected absences or request time off in advance. The BHA’s vacation policy mandates a 24-hour notice. The BHA sick time policy requires employees to provide notice to supervisors before the expiration of the first hour of said leave, or as soon as practicable.  (R. Exhibit 7) 
8. Christine Erardi, a Program Maintenance Supervisor, supervises all the trades and laborers in the BHA’s Asset Management Division. She is responsible for the oversight of five (5) different BHA buildings.  (Testimony of Erardi)
9. Ms. Erardi has supervised Mr. Clark since 2024. She assigned him to different BHA developments depending on the work required at each location.  (Testimony of Erardi)
10. On August 19, 2025, Ms. Erardi assigned Mr. Clark to perform electrical work at the Patricia White Development (Patricia White) in Brighton, MA.  Another BHA employee whose initials are M.R. was working in the same unit as Mr. Clark that day.  (Testimony of Erardi, Testimony of Appellant)
11. At 12:14 p.m., an employee called Ms. Erardi to let her know that plumbing work had been completed at Patricia White. During this call, Ms. Erardi overheard background conversation from other employees, including M.R.  (R. Exhibit 5; Testimony of Erardi)
12. From her experience supervising M.R., Ms. Erardi found that his voice on the phone call was louder than usual and he appeared less shy. Because this was not his usual deportment, Ms. Erardi suspected that M.R. was intoxicated.  (Testimony of Erardi)
13. At 12:44 p.m., Ms. Erardi called the employee who initiated the earlier phone call and asked if M.R. was acting like his usual self. The employee confirmed that M.R. was not behaving in his usual manner.  (R. Exhibit 5) 
14. Around 12:45 p.m., Ms. Erardi decided to go to the Patricia White Development to check on M.R.’s situation. En route, she called other workers at Patricia White and asked that they print out the BHA “reasonable suspicion” form used by supervisors for determining whether an employee was intoxicated on the job.  (Testimony of Erardi)
15. Intoxication among BHA employees is a serious matter.  (Testimony of Erardi)
16. M.R. was working in the same unit where Mr. Clark was performing his electrical work. Mr. Clark worked through his usually scheduled lunch period to complete this job.  (Testimony of Appellant)
17. When Mr. Clark’s work was done, he asked M.R. to join him for lunch because M.R. did not have access to a vehicle that day.  (Testimony of Appellant)
18. M.R. agreed to join Mr. Clark for lunch, and they left Patricia White around 1:00 p.m.  (Testimony of Appellant)
19. M.R. suggested a restaurant a 20-minute drive away.  (Testimony of Appellant)
20. M.R. and Mr. Clark ate for 10 minutes outside the restaurant. Mr. Clark observed that M.R. was “not himself,” and suspected that he was intoxicated. (Testimony of Appellant)
21. Ms. Erardi arrived at Patricia White shortly after 1:30 p.m. and retrieved a copy of the reasonable suspicion form. She telephoned M.R. but got no answer.  (Testimony of Erardi; R. Exhibit 5)
22. When Ms. Erardi asked the BHA employees on site about M.R.’s whereabouts, she learned that M.R. had left with Mr. Clark for lunch. (R. Exhibit 5)
23. When Ms. Erardi called Mr. Clark at 1:50 p.m., he was getting back into his car. He told her that he and M.R. were at lunch, and would be heading back to Patricia White soon.  (Testimony of Erardi; Testimony of Appellant)
24. At 1:53 p.m., M.R. called Ms. Erardi and informed her that he and Mr. Clark would return to Patricia White when they had finished lunch.  (Testimony of Erardi)
25. Shortly after M.R.’s call with Ms. Erardi, his girlfriend called and asked that he put Mr. Clark on the phone. M.R.’s girlfriend asked Mr. Clark if M.R. was “okay,” and Mr. Clark said, “I don’t think so.”  (Testimony of Appellant)
26. M.R.’s girlfriend asked Mr. Clark to drive M.R. home, approximately 30 minutes away from Patricia White. Mr. Clark agreed.  (Testimony of Appellant)
27. At 2:10 p.m., Mr. Clark called Ms. Erardi and told her that he was taking M.R. home because he was “sick”, and that he would return to work afterwards. Ms. Erardi responded “okay” without further discussion.  (Testimony of Erardi, Testimony of Appellant)
28. M.R. later denied being ill, and admitted that he was in the car with the Appellant when Mr. Clark told Ms. Erardi that he would be returning to work.   (R. Exhibit 4)
29. When Mr. Clark and M.R. arrived at M.R.’s home, he waited for M.R.’s girlfriend and his mother to arrive. They arrived between 2:30 p.m. and 2:45 p.m.  (Testimony of Appellant)
30. An argument then ensued among M.R., his girlfriend and his mother. Mr. Clark did not leave the family home until approximately 3:00 p.m.  (Testimony of Appellant)
31. Instead of returning to work at Patricia White, Mr. Clark went home. Although he was scheduled to work until 4:30 p.m., he did not inform Ms. Erardi that he would not be returning to the worksite.  (Testimony of Appellant)
32. Ms. Erardi waited until 4:00 p.m. for Mr. Clark to return to Patricia White.  (Testimony of Erardi)
33. The next day, August 20, 2025, Ms. Erardi informed Mr. Clark that his name would be put in a report of the events of the previous day.  (Testimony of Erardi)
34. Ms. Erardi modified Mr. Clark’s timesheet to reflect 3.5 hours of unpaid leave for the time that he had spent away from Patricia White on August 19, 2025. (R. Exhibit 6)

BHA Discipline

35. On September 9, 2025, the BHA Assistant Director of Labor Relations issued Mr. Clark a Notice of 1-Day Suspension. The Assistant Director wrote:

… Your unreported and unauthorized absence from the site during critical work hours, especially in conjunction with your intentional misstatement to your supervisor, does not meet the standards of professionalism and accountability expected of all employees and undermines the integrity and safety of the workplace. The BHA cannot tolerate this misconduct. 

… Any future instances of unauthorized absence, providing false information to a supervisor, or involvement in a conduct that comprises workplace standards will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. 

(R. Exhibit 4)

36. The BHA suspended M.R. for five days for his August 19, 2025 conduct.  (A. Exhibit 3)
37. The BHA has imposed discipline against employees found to be absent without leave with actions ranging from a written warning to a five-day suspension.  (R. Exhibit 9) 
38. The Appellant appealed the suspension. In a December 5, 2025 Notice of Hearing, the BHA scheduled a hearing for December 10, 2025. At the hearing, Mr. Clark was represented by counsel. Union representatives, including the president, the business agent and the steward attended.  (R. Exhibit 4)
39. In a January 7, 2026 decision, the hearing officer upheld the suspension and made three findings of fact:
40. On August 19, 2025, Clark withheld relevant information from [Ms.] Erardi and intentionally misrepresented other information regarding the events of that day.
41. On August 19, 2025, Clark left his assigned worksite at approximately 1:30 p.m. [sic], failed to return despite saying he would do so, and failed to report his continuing absence to his supervisor.
42. Clark’s actions on August 19, 2025 after he left the worksite did not constitute “work” and his absence was without authorization. 

(R. Exhibit 3)

40. The BHA adopted the Hearing Officer’s decision on January 7, 2026.  (R. Exhibit 4)
41. On January 15, 2026, the Appellant filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission.  (Stipulated Facts)

Applicable Legal Standard

Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 provides:

If the commission by a preponderance of the evidence determines that there was just cause for an action taken against such person it shall affirm the action of the appointing authority, otherwise it shall reverse such action and the person concerned shall be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other rights; provided, however, if the employee by a preponderance of evidence, establishes that said action was based upon harmful error in the application of the appointing authority’s procedure, an error of law, or upon any factor or conduct on the part of the employee not reasonably related to the fitness of the employee to perform in his position, said action shall not be sustained, and the person shall be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other rights. The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority. 

The Commission determines justification for discipline by inquiring “whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service.” Murray v. Second Dist. Ct. of E. Middlesex, 389 Mass. 508, 514 (1983); School Committee of Brockton v. Civil Service Commission, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488 (1997). An action is “justified” if it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind; guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971); Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). 

The Appointing Authority’s burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is satisfied “if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there.” Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33, 35-36 (1956). 

Under section 43, the Commission is required “to conduct a de novo hearing for the purpose of finding the facts anew,” Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006) and cases cited. However, “[t]he commission’s task is not to be accomplished on a wholly blank slate. After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision’.” Id. at 823-24, quoting internally from Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983) and cases cited. 

Analysis

The Boston Housing Authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had just cause to suspend Mr. Clark for one day due to the events of August 19, 2025. 

The hearing officer made three findings of fact in her January 7, 2026 decision upholding the one-day suspension. First, she found that Mr. Clark withheld information from Ms. Erardi and intentionally misrepresented information regarding the events of August 19, 2025. Second, she found that Mr. Clark failed to return to the Patricia White worksite after his lunch, despite informing Ms. Erardi that he would do so, and failed to update her on his continuing absence. Third, the hearing officer found that Mr. Clark’s actions after he left the Patricia White for lunch did not constitute work and amounted to an unauthorized absence. 

Mr. Clark had already exceeded the thirty (30) minutes allotted to him for his lunch break when Ms. Erardi first spoke to him on the phone at 1:50 p.m. Ms. Erardi’s statement “okay” when Mr. Clark informed her that he was taking M.R. to his Dorchester home was an acknowledgement of his statement, and was neither an authorization of his absence nor a legitimization of his behavior up until that point. 

Equally serious as Mr. Clark’s August 19, 2025 decision to leave work and fail to return to work without authorization was his misrepresentation to Ms. Erardi about M.R.’s condition. Mr. Clark acknowledged that he took M.R. home because he suspected that he was intoxicated. Because he had made the determination about M.R.’s condition before speaking with Ms. Erardi, his later statement to her was at the least a misrepresentation, and at most concealment and a misrepresentation of behavior that constituted a violation of BHA policies. Deliberate misrepresentation of material facts to one’s supervisors constitutes substantial misconduct for which discipline is warranted. See Connolly v. Quincy, 25 MCSR 338, 345 (2012).

As BHA employees, both Mr. Clark and M.R. were subject to its zero-tolerance policy on alcohol intoxication or consumption during working hours. Mr. Clark testified that he first became suspicious that M.R. was intoxicated while they were eating lunch. Moreover, he possessed a layman’s knowledge to determine whether an individual is intoxicated. Ms. Erardi determined that M.R. was intoxicated simply from overhearing his speech in the background of a phone call whereas Mr. Clark and M.R. had been working together in the same unit before going to eat lunch. 

Even if I accept Mr. Clark’s assertion that he was unaware of M.R.’s condition when they left Patricia White for lunch and only learned of M.R.’s condition during lunch, Mr. Clark was aware that M.R. was intoxicated when he told Ms. Erardi that M.R. was ill. Thus, he communicated misinformation to Ms. Erardi. 

It is likely that the plumber and the other people in the background of Ms. Erardi’s phone call also knew that M.R. was intoxicated. Thus, Mr. Clark’s actions undermined Ms. Erardi’s authority and prevented her from performing her supervisory duty to conduct an investigation of M.R.’s intoxication in real time – in an environment where intoxication is a problem among the BHA employees. 

Mr. Clark also acknowledged that he told Ms. Erardi that he would return to work when he had already decided to go home. Without Ms. Erardi’s approval, Mr. Clark’s early departure amounted to an unauthorized absence. “[U]nauthorized absences from work” is an example of “misconduct that impair[s] the efficiency of public service.” Pano v. Boston Hous. Auth., 22 MCSR 222, 224-25 (2009). 

Mr. Clark admitted that his decisions were mistakes, and that he would do things differently if he were faced with the same circumstances again. Mr. Clark’s belated acknowledgment does not change the fact that his actions constituted misconduct and warrant discipline. 

The Appellant was no doubt faced with a difficult situation when M.R.’s girlfriend asked him to take M.R. home rather than return his coworker to Patricia White. However, Mr. Clark had an obligation to be at the work site unless his absence was excused. He was obliged to report to Ms. Erardi when she called him and asked for his location. Mr. Clark had an obligation not to conceal the misconduct of his coworker from Ms. Erardi, even inadvertently. Good intentions do not erase these obligations.  

Mr. Clark decided to protect M.R. to his own detriment and in violation of BHA policies. While Mr. Clark may have been swayed by compassion for his coworker, the BHA expects individual employees to be present at their job sites and not absent due to the poor decision-making of others. Mr. Clark did not exercise good judgment when he agreed to take M.R. home, without informing his supervisor, although he knew that he was already outside the allotted time for lunch. I do believe that Mr. Clark originally intended to return to work, albeit late, after dropping M.R. off. However, he waded into a family argument which led to an extended drop off time. Without seeking Ms. Erardi’s counsel or permission, Mr. Clark decided to go home due to the lateness of the hour. 

The changing circumstances as a result of M.R.’s intoxication do not excuse Mr. Clark’s lapse of judgment that resulted in the attempt to conceal M.R.’s intoxication. Indeed, Mr. Clark testified that he made a serious error in judgment when he decided to go home after leaving M.R’s residence, rather than returning to work as he had informed Ms. Erardi that he would do. Even if Ms. Erardi had authorized Mr. Clark to take M.R. home at 2:10 p.m., that authorization did not extend to Mr. Clark’s absence from work between 3:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. 

Mr. Clark’s one-day suspension was less severe than M.R.’s five-day suspension, and thus is not disproportionate. The administrative record also suggests that a one-day suspension is consistent with an employee being absent without leave, and that in certain cases such an offense has resulted in even more severe discipline. Mr. Clark’s discipline here was based on both his absence and his misrepresentation to Ms. Erardi. Considering Mr. Clark’s unblemished disciplinary record prior to the August 19 incident, the seriousness of the misconduct, and the prevalence of intoxication among BHA employees, a one-day suspension was appropriate. 

Based on the foregoing, I find that by a preponderance of the evidence, the BHA had just cause to discipline Mr. Clark.

Conclusion

                The Commission finds that the Boston Housing Authority had just cause to discipline the Appellant, and affirms its decision to suspend Mr. Clark for one day. 

                The appeal filed under docket number D-26-032 is hereby denied.

Civil Service Commission

Angela C. McConney 

Angela C. McConney
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on October 15, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
James A.W. Shaw, Esq. (for Appellant)
Susan M. Whalen, Esq. (for Respondent)

2.  The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR §§ 1.01, et seq., apply to adjudication before the Commission with G.L. c. 31, or any Commission rules, taking precedence.

3.  The Commission has issued its decision on the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on this same day, in which a majority of commissioners concluded that the Commission does have jurisdiction to hear a tenured housing authority employee’s suspension appeal.