Decision  Clarke, Roxanne v. MassDOT 5/28/26

Date:	05/28/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	C-25-190

• Appearance for Appellant: Roxanne Clarke
• Appearance for Respondent: James Norton, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Shawn C. Dooley

The Commission denied the classification appeal of an employee of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT) seeking to be reclassified as a Program Coordinator III because she was unable to demonstrate that she performed the distinguishing duties of that title more than 50% of the time. 

Decision

On August 12, 2025, Roxanne Clarke (the Appellant), filed a timely appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 49 with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Human Resources Division (HRD) to affirm the Department of Transportation (MassDOT)’s denial of her request for reclassification from Program Coordinator II (PC II) to Program Coordinator III (PC III.)  The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on October 7, 2025.  On January 28, 2026, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts. I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform and forwarded a link to this recording to both parties. The respondent filed a proposed decision. For the reasons set forth below, the Appellant’s appeal is denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Appellant entered 14 exhibits (App. Exhibits 1-14) into evidence and MassDOT entered seven exhibits into evidence (Res. Exhibits 1-7).  Based on the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by the MassDOT:

• Pamela Deal, Human Resources Specialist - Classification & Compensation Unit, MassDOT

Called by the Appellant:

• Debra Eaton, Assistant Director of Operations, MassDOT Merit Rating Board
• Roxanne Clarke, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all papers filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies and drawing from reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

1. The Appellant began working for MassDOT as a Program Coordinator II (PC II) in 2016. (Stipulated Fact)
2. She holds the title of PC II within the Merit Rating Board in the RMV Division of MassDOT. (App. Exhibit 8; Testimony of Eaton, Testimony of Appellant)
3. The Appellant directly supervises nine individuals in the Quality Control Unit of the Merit Rating Board.  All of these employees hold the classification designation of Customer Service Representative III. (App. Exhibit 6; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Eaton)
4. Over the course of her time as a PC II, the Appellant’s duties have expanded as she has taken on additional responsibilities.  In 2018, she began working on a project known as “Duplicate Person Merge” when MassDOT began using a program called “ATLAS.” (Res. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Appellant)
5. On July 10, 2024, the Appellant filed a request for reclassification from Program Coordinator II (PC II) to Program Coordinator III (PC III). (Stipulated Fact)
6. Amy Lynch, the Manager of MassDOT’s Classification and Compensation unit, assigned Pamela Deal, a Human Resources Specialist with the Classification and Compensation unit, to review the Appellant’s application. (Testimony of Deal)
7. For this reclassification appeal, Ms. Deal collected the Appellant’s Form 30 (the official job description), her Employee Performance Review Form (EPRS), a Manager Questionnaire as well as the employe’s questionnaire responses, and other relevant data.  She then invited the employee to submit any additional information to supplement this material. (Testimony of Deal)
8. In addition, Ms. Deal created a Job Analysis Comparison Chart to compare the duties the employee performs and is documented with her Form 30 and her answers from the questionnaire with the Classification Specifications for the position. (Res. Exhibit 7; Testimony of Deal)
9. The Classification Specification for the Program Coordinator series has not been updated since 1987. (App. Exhibit 7)
10. All levels of the PC series share six common duties. They all coordinate and monitor program activities for effectiveness and compliance. They all review data concerning programs to determine effectiveness and make recommendations for achieving program objectives. They all provide technical assistance and advice to exchange information, problem solve, and ensure compliance with established standards. They all respond to inquiries regarding their programs. They all maintain communications with various agencies to exchange information and problem solve. Finally, they all perform miscellaneous related duties, such as attending relevant meetings, keeping records, and preparing reports. (App. Exhibit 7)
11. The PC II position has three level distinguishing duties set forth in the classification specification. These are: 

• Provide on-the-job training and orientation for employees.
• Develop and implement procedures and guidelines to accomplish assigned agency program objectives and goals.
• Review reports, memoranda, etc. for completeness, accuracy, and content.
• Confer with management staff and other agency personnel in order to determine program requirements and availability of resources and to develop the criteria and standards for program evaluation.

• Evaluate program activities in order to determine progress and effectiveness and to make recommendations concerning changes as needed.

  (App. Exhibit 7)

12. The PC III position has three level distinguishing duties set forth in the classification specification. These are: 

• Develop and implement standards to be used in program monitoring and/or evaluation. 
• Oversee and monitor activities of the assigned unit. 

• Confer with management staff and others in order to provide information concerning program implementation, evaluation, and monitoring, and to define the purpose and scope of proposed programs. 

  (App. Exhibit 7)

13. The Appellant completed a questionnaire to initiate her appeal. This questionnaire was then provided to an analyst in HRD who compared it against her Form 30 and EPRS.  (Res. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Deal)
14. After HR Specialist Pamela Deal finished analyzing the material she compiled, she drafted a recommended decision and forwarded that to Class & Comp Manager Amy Lynch for approval. Pamela Deal concluded from her analysis that the Appellant’s duties were commensurate with those of a PC II. (Res. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Deal)
15. On March 10, 2025, Ms. Lynch informed the Appellant that her request for reclassification was denied because she found that the Appellant spent the majority of her time reviewing reports, developing and implementing procedures and guidelines to accomplish program objectives, and evaluating program activities for progress and effectiveness. (App. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Deal)
16. In addition, Ms. Deal found that the Appellant did not confer with management staff in order to provide information concerning implementation, evaluation, and monitoring of proposed programs to define their purpose and scope.  She also did not develop and implement standards for program monitoring and/or evaluation. (App. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Deal)
17. On May 13, 2025, the Appellant appealed this decision to HRD, stating that she does in fact confer with management and others, and that she does in fact develop and implement standards for program monitoring and evaluation. (App. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Deal)
18. On July 15, 2025, HRD upheld MassDOT’s decision to deny her reclassification appeal. (App. Exhibit 2) 
19. The Appellant’s case at her CSC hearing centered around her assertion that he Form 30, EPRS, and questionnaire did not fully reflect her involvement in the MERGE program, her work on SQR’s, or her involvement in a pilot program designed to facilitate interdepartmental communication. (App. Exhibits 12-14; Testimony of Appellant)
20. Debra Eaton supervises six PC II workers, including the Appellant.  All the PC II’s under her supervision also directly supervise other individuals within the unit. (App. Exhibit 6; Testimony of Eaton)
21. Ms. Eaton stated that while the Appellant does confer with management and others, as well as develop and implement standards for program monitoring and evaluation on a regular basis, she does not perform them daily or consistently enough to give an accurate time assessment.  Ms. Eaton further said that she was unsure if these tasks were already reflected in the Appellant’s Form 30, and she could not state that she spends at least 50% of her time performing them. (App. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Eaton)
22. The Appellant did not produce any documentation describing how frequently she performed certain tasks that she described; nor did she provide documentation showing the percentage of her time that should be allocated to PC III distinguishing duties. (Testimony of Appellant)

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator . . . . Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it. If said commission finds that the office or position of the person appealing warrants a different position reallocation . . . it shall be effective as of the date of appeal . . . .”

Generally speaking, “the bar for proving that one's position is misclassified is set very high.” Shields v. Dep’t of Revenue, 21 MCSR 263, 266 (2008).  To obtain a reclassification, as a general rule, an employee must establish that they are performing duties encompassed within the higher-level position a majority (i.e., at least 50% or more) of the time. See Thompson v. Division of Insurance and HRD, 29 MCSR 565 (2016) (an appellant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence); Pellegrino v. Dep’t of State Police, 18 MCSR 261 (2005) (at least 51%); Gaffey v. Dept. of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011) (more than 50%); Morawski v. Dep’t of Revenue, 14 MCSR 188 (2001) (more than 50%); Madison v. Dep’t of Public Health, 12 MCSR 49 (1999) (at least 50%); Kennedy v. Holyoke Cmty. Coll., 11 MCSR 302 (1998) (at least 50%). More specifically, the Appellant must demonstrate that the majority of the time they are performing their duties, they perform activities that are “level distinguishing duties”.  Duties which fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties”.  “Where duties are equally applicable to both the lower and higher titles, although they may be described slightly differently for each title, those types of overlapping duties are not distinguishing duties of the higher title.” Saunders v. Dep’t of Lab. Standards, 32 MSCR 413, 415 (2019).

However, particularly where the assigned job title is not a good fit, the Commission is not bound to apply the classification specifications literally in every case.  Blodgett v. Massachusetts Highway Dept., 24 MCSR 588 (2011); Lefebvre v. Department of Early Education, 22 MCSR 149 (2009).  When analyzing a reclassification appeal, it is within the Commission’s discretion to weigh all of the facts and to make a determination based on the evidence presented.  Past reported Commission reclassification decisions have established that the Commission is not bound to interpret the classification specifications in an overly literal fashion when adjudicating a case.  Blodgett, 24 MCSR 590 (2011); Lefebvre, 22 MCSR 149 (2009).  The Commission also possesses discretion to take into account all the facts and evidence admitted when making a decision in reclassification appeals in cases where the specifications against which current job responsibilities are being measured are outdated.  When accounting for outdated specifications, the Commission has previously considered major shifts in the occupation’s field in cases where the description is highly rigid to determine the reasonability of the description.  These factors include the role’s adaptation of new technology and the evolution or material broadening of the title’s scope of duties. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 199 (2024). 

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, once again the Commission is hampered by the fact that the Program Coordinator Series job specifications have not been updated in almost four decades.  While duties and responsibilities associated with this position may not change markedly over the years, relying on job specifications that have not been reviewed, updated, or even refreshed in 40 years to make a reclassification decision is increasingly indefensible.  While resources are always limited, ongoing efforts to update, or at least refresh, job specifications, need to be expedited, so that reclassification decisions such as this can be based on current and accurate descriptions of what is expected of incumbents in each classification. 

In making my decision, I have relied on all the relevant evidence submitted, including the job specifications, the Form 30, the interview guide completed by the Appellant, and the testimony of the witnesses.

While the Appellant is an exemplary employee who goes above and beyond what is required of her, the standard for reclassification is primarily tied to the determination as to whether she performs the level distinguishing duties of the job title in question more than 50% of the time.  While she has shown that there are certain aspects of her job that may be susceptible of being classified at the next higher title, the Appellant was unable to show that she performed these tasks a majority of the time on a consistent basis and thus she was unable to meet the 51% hurdle.  Since the primary classification specifications for the Program Coordinator Series are somewhat all-encompassing and vague, it is difficult to determine that many of the duties the Appellant described could not also be categorized as a duty common to all Program Coordinator levels.

Unfortunately, it remains unclear as to whether the Appellant performs any of the level-distinguishing duties of a PC III.  Even if one were to view her work through the most favorable lens possible and determine that some of her workload could qualify as that of a PC III, this work isn’t predictable or consistent and therefore it is infeasible at present to determine what percentage of time should be assigned to this work. Given that such work is inconsistent and coupled with the volume of other tasks that fall under general duties within the Program Coordinator series or are considered to be PC II duties, it is impossible to make the determination that she spends greater than 50% of her time solely on PC III level duties. 

One of the distinguishing duties of a PC III is that they develop and implement standards to monitor and evaluate programs. There was no evidence that the Appellant developed the standards to be used in program monitoring and evaluation.  While there was a great deal of evidence that she developed procedures for accomplishing programs,  no evidence entered the record that she spent time developing the standards by which those programs could be evaluated.  While the tasks she described in her May 13, 2025 email may be deemed accurately conveyed, there is no evidence that they were not already reflected in her Form 30 as tasks involving the development of procedures. 

Another distinguishing duty is that PC IIIs oversee and monitor activities of their assigned unit.  While all three levels in the Program Coordinator series are categorized as supervisory positions, there is not a significant amount of detail differentiating each level in this regard.  To further complicate matters, when referencing the specifications for PC III, it is entirely unclear what the term “unit” refers to.  Given the fact that all five of the other PC IIs who report to Ms. Eaton oversee individuals within their small teams, it seems likely that the term “unit” in this context refers to a higher order of magnitude than the nine employees whom the Appellant supervises. 

Finally, PC IIIs confer with management and others in order to provide information concerning program implementation, evaluation, and monitoring, and to define the purpose and scope of proposed programs.  While the Appellant provided a great deal of evidence that she confers with management and others, this is not a duty specific to PC III. The important language in the PC III specific duty, which is not included in the others, is “and to define the purpose and scope of proposed programs.”  The Appellant has not provided any evidence that she engages in communications with the intention of defining the purpose or the scope of proposed programs, and the fact that the duty contains the word “and” rather than “or” plainly conveys that PC III’s must engage in communication with management towards all five of the ends stated; that is, providing information on 1) implementation, 2) evaluation, and 3) monitoring, and defining 4) the purpose and 5) the scope of proposed programs.  She has not proven that she defines the purpose of potential programs, or that she defines the extent of their scope, as part of her current role.

Most importantly, the Appellant has not demonstrated that she performs the duties purportedly specific to a PC III more than 50% of her worktime.  Even if one accepted the Appellant’s position that many of her tasks should be viewed as PC III duties, she was unable to assign a quantifiable percentage of time in which she spent performing them.  Therefore, she was unable to demonstrate that at least half of her working day or week was spent performing duties specific to the PC III classification.  Her own supervisor, testifying on the Appellant’s behalf, could not state under oath that the Appellant spent at least 50% of her time performing the duties which she believed were specific to the PC III role.  While there is a clear need to improve the clarity of the outdated Program Coordinator Classification Specification, the fact remains that the Appellant was unable to meet the standard for which a reclassification should be granted, showing that a majority of their workload is specific to that higher classification. 

Conclusion 

The Appellant failed to meet the burden of proving that she performs the specific job duties of a Program Coordinator III a majority of the time.  Therefore, the Appellant’s reclassification appeal is denied.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 /s/ Shawn C. Dooley

Shawn C. Dooley 

Commissioner 

By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on May 28, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 

Notice to:
Roxanne Clarke (for Appellant)
James F. Norton, Esq. (for Respondent)
Lynne-Marie Reveliotis (for Respondent)

1. The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence 
2. Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording. 
3.  The Appellant informed the Commission that she did not intend to submit a proposed decision.