Decision  Cote, Holly v. City of Chicopee 10/29/26

Date:	10/29/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	D-26-037

• Appearance for Appellant: Holly Cote
• Appearance for Respondent: Lauren F. Olanoff, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Robert L. Quinan, Jr.

The Commission dismissed the appeal of a now-retired Chicopee Police Captain as the Commission lacks jurisdiction over verbal reprimands. 

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Edward Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision

Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the undersigned Chair of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) assigned the above-captioned disciplinary appeal to the Commission’s General Counsel, Robert L. Quinan, Jr., to serve as Presiding Officer for initial adjudication on behalf of the Commission.

Pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(11)(c), Presiding Officer Quinan issued the attached Tentative Decision to the Commission on August 27, 2026. The parties were afforded thirty days to provide written objections to the Commission. No objections specific to the Tentative Decision were received in a timely fashion.  The Commission acknowledges recent receipt of materials associated with Ms. Cote’s parallel petition for investigation.

After careful review and consideration, the Commission voted to affirm and adopt the Tentative Decision of the Presiding Officer, thus making this the Final Decision of the Commission.

Accordingly, summary decision enters for the City of Chicopee in this case, and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket No. D-26-037 is dismissed without the need to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on October 29, 2026.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Christopher C. Bowman

Christopher C. Bowman
Chair

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the Superior Court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Holly Cote (Appellant)
Lauren Olanoff, Esq. (for Respondent)

Tentative Decision

                On January 21, 2026, the Appellant, Holly Cote (Appellant), then a Captain with the Chicopee Police Department (Department), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) relating to a verbal warning that was memorialized following a three-step grievance process.  The Appellant asks the Commission to review that action, which she contends was not an isolated corrective measure but part of a broader pattern of retaliation, favoritism, gender-based differential treatment, and deviation from civil service merit principles.  She has independently requested that the Commission consider exercising its investigatory authority under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a).

                On March 17, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference (via WebEx), attended by the Appellant, counsel for the Respondent City of Chicopee (City), the local grievance hearing officer, and an observer affiliated with Respondent counsel’s firm.  The City thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, contending that a verbal warning is not appealable under G.L. c. 31, § 41.  The Appellant opposed the motion and argued that the Commission should consider the surrounding circumstances, including her alleged reassignment, reduced responsibilities, diminished access to command-level opportunities, and alleged retaliation for reporting her operational, fiscal, and safety concerns.

Unless otherwise noted, and for purposes of ruling on the City’s dispositive motion only, I have considered the following putative facts in the light most favorable to the Appellant:

1. The Appellant was first appointed as a police officer in Chicopee in April 1997. 
2. After rising through the ranks, the Appellant was promoted to the position of Captain in June of 2022. 
3. The Appellant had not previously been the subject of formal discipline during her nearly twenty-nine-year policing career. 
4. In February 2025, the Appellant requested a formal meeting with City and Department officials.  The record identifies attendees as including the Appellant, Chicopee Mayor John Vieau, the Mayor’s Chief of Staff, and now-retired Police Chief Patrick Major. 
5. At that meeting, the Appellant raised concerns regarding alleged misuse or abuse of overtime.  She contends that she had been directed to reduce overtime in her unit, that she did so, but that male captains did not reduce their units’ overtime to anywhere near the same extent during the same period. 
6. The Appellant also raised concerns about alleged conflicts of interest, use of City resources for training and certification opportunities, staffing shortages, patrol coverage, operational safety, favoritism, and gender-based differential treatment within the Department. 
7. On March 7, 2025, the Appellant received a letter from Mayor Vieau informing her that the concerns she raised had been determined to be without merit and that no outside review or further investigation was necessary. 
8. The Appellant asserts that, around the same time, she was removed from Chief Major’s calendar and no longer served as his regular backup for meetings or command-level matters. 
9. On August 25, 2025, the Appellant and Captain Doug Lambert received an email from the Executive Director of the Boys & Girls Club of Chicopee concerning potential use of Shannon Community Safety Initiative grant funds. 
10. The Appellant responded by suggesting that the parties meet to discuss potential programming. 
11. The City contends that the subject of the inquiry fell within Captain Lambert’s area of responsibility.  A later Step 3 grievance decision found that the Appellant had contacted a citizen regarding topics that were, at least in part, under Captain Lambert’s responsibility.  The Appellant contends that both captains had responsibilities connected to the Shannon Grant program. (FN2]
12. The Appellant had previously been advised by superiors to avoid encroaching on other supervisors’ assigned areas of responsibility. 
13. Following a dispute between the Appellant and Captain Lambert over the August 25, 2025 email exchange, the two captains met with Chief Major and Deputy Chief/HR Officer Colin Larbi on August 29, 2025.  The Appellant states that the meeting ended with both captains shaking hands and that she understood the matter to have been resolved through informal mediation. 
14. The Appellant asserts that, after these events, she was reassigned from her position as Operations Captain overseeing the Patrol Division to a role overseeing the Traffic unit and the Bureau of Services. 
15. The Appellant asserts that this reassignment reduced the number of sworn personnel under her supervision from approximately ninety-two to approximately sixteen, reduced her command responsibilities and professional visibility, and diminished her opportunities to serve in an Officer-in-Charge or out-of-rank capacity. 
16. On or about October 3, 2025, Chief Major issued a verbal warning to the Appellant regarding alleged interference with Captain Lambert’s area of responsibility and directed her to engage in coaching. 
17. The Appellant pursued the grievance process.  A Step 3 grievance hearing was held on December 19, 2025, before hearing officer Russell J. Dupere, Esq. 
18. In a January 8, 2026 “Step 3” decision, Attorney Dupere found just cause for the verbal warning and denied the grievance in that respect.  He also confirmed that certain coaching offered to the Appellant was not discipline and directed that any documents related to coaching or the Employee Assistance Program be removed from the Appellant’s personnel file.  Attorney Dupere further found that there was no differential treatment involved, as Captain Lambert had not received previous warnings. 
19. The Appellant filed an appeal with the Commission on January 21, 2026. 
20. On March 17, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference regarding the Appellant’s appeal of the verbal warning. 
21. On April 14, 2026, the City filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the basis that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to review a verbal warning or any form of reprimand. 
22. On April 16, 2026, the Appellant filed a petition asking the Commission to exercise its investigatory authority under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a), and subsequently she separately opposed the City’s motion to dismiss. 
23. On May 2, 2026, while the City’s motion was still pending, the Appellant retired from the Chicopee Police Department. 

The Appellant’s Contentions

The Appellant acknowledges that reprimands are not routinely reviewed by the Commission, but she argues that this matter should not be treated as a routine verbal warning.  She contends that the warning was memorialized in writing, remained in her personnel file, and was imposed after she reported concerns about overtime, conflicts of interest, use of training resources, public-safety staffing issues, favoritism, and gender-based differential treatment.  She further contends that the warning was followed by a substantial reassignment that reduced her command responsibilities, authority, visibility, and opportunities for out-of-rank compensation.

The Appellant also argues that the circumstances surrounding the warning and reassignment raise broader merit-principles concerns.  She points to leadership changes within the Department, the anticipated process for selecting a permanent Police Chief, and other pending bypass appeals involving allegations of favoritism.  She asks that the Commission deny the City’s motion to dismiss, review the discipline in context, and consider whether further inquiry under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a) is warranted.

The Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

The City contends that the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the appealed action was a verbal warning, not a discharge, removal, suspension, layoff, transfer, reduction in rank or compensation, or abolition of position. The City further contends that written warnings and reprimands are not appealable under G.L. c. 31, § 41, and that a verbal warning cannot confer greater appeal rights than a written warning. To the extent the Commission considers the Appellant’s broader allegations, the City denies that it retaliated against her or treated her differently because of gender or any protected activity.

Applicable Legal Standard

The Presiding Officer may at any time, on his or her own motion or that of a party, dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction to decide the matter, for failure of the petitioner to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or because of the pendency of a prior, related action in any tribunal that should first be decided. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3).

When there is no genuine issue of fact relating to all or part of a claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, a party may move for summary disposition on the claim or defense pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h).  See Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”).

The Commission decides a dispositive motion by viewing the undisputed material facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and determining whether the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one essential element of the case.  See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 18 MCSR 216 (2005).

Analysis

Appeals to the Commission from disciplinary actions are governed by G.L. c. 31, §§ 41 to 43.  Section 41 provides, in relevant part:

Except for just cause . . . , a tenured employee shall not be discharged, removed, suspended . . . , laid off, transferred from his position without his written consent . . . , lowered in rank or compensation without his written consent, nor his position be abolished.

 I have carefully scrutinized the contentions the Appellant presented at the pre-hearing conference and the arguments she outlines in her written submissions.  For the reasons elaborated upon below, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear this disciplinary appeal.

1.   A verbal warning, even if later memorialized, is not appealable discipline under G.L. c. 31, § 41.

The threshold issue in this case is not whether the Appellant’s allegations are serious; it is whether the disciplinary action appealed to the Commission falls within the statutory categories made appealable by G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-43.  The Supreme Judicial Court has emphasized that the Commission’s disciplinary jurisdiction extends only to the serious personnel actions enumerated in § 41. See Doherty v. Civil Service Commission, 486 Mass. 487, 492-493 (2020) (noting that loss of accrued leave time is not included in G.L. c. 31, § 41 as an appealable form of discipline). 

Reprimands and warnings, whether verbal or written, are not included in the statutory list of appealable matters.

The appealed discipline here started as a verbal warning.  The January 8, 2026 Step 3 decision did not transform that verbal warning into an appealable suspension, removal, transfer, reduction in rank or compensation, or abolition of position.  Nor did it transform the warning into a written reprimand independently subject to review.  Even if the Step 3 letter were characterized as a written reprimand or written warning, which I need not determine, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to review written warnings.  See Kevin Larkin v. Town of Milton, 38 MCSR 5, 6 (2025).  See also New Bedford Airport Comm’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 n.4 (2016) (noting that written warnings are not appealable under G.L. c. 31, § 41); accord Savage v. Springfield Fire Department, 32 MCSR 24, 26 (2019); Bretta v. Department of State Police, 21 MCSR 384, 396 (2008).  The Commission has also previously recognized that it is at least unclear whether an oral reprimand constitutes discipline at all.  Jolly v. City of Attleboro, 35 MCSR 113, 118 (2022).

The conclusion I reach here does not rest solely on the City’s label.  I have considered the substance of the Appellant’s allegations and the surrounding circumstances she identifies.  Still, the discipline appealed from remains a verbal warning, and the Commission may not create jurisdiction where the Legislature has not conferred it via statutory enactment.

2.  The alleged reassignment and loss of supplemental opportunities do not create § 41 jurisdiction in this disciplinary appeal.

The Appellant contends that the verbal warning cannot be viewed in isolation because it was accompanied or followed by reassignment, loss of command responsibilities, reduced professional visibility, reduced access to Officer-in-Charge (OIC) or out-of-rank assignments, and diminished supplemental compensation opportunities.  I have assumed those allegations to be true for purposes of acting upon the City’s motion. Even so, they do not establish that the Commission has jurisdiction over this disciplinary appeal.

The Appellant does not allege that she was discharged, removed, suspended for more than five days, laid off, reduced in civil service rank, reduced in base compensation, or that her position was abolished.  Nor does the record show a statutory involuntary transfer within the meaning of G.L. c. 31, §§ 35 or 41.  A reassignment of duties within the same title, without a change in civil service title, appointing authority, base pay, or tenure-protected position, does not become an appealable disciplinary action merely because the employee considers the reassignment professionally harmful or unfair.  Cf. Underwood v. City of Lowell, 35 MCSR 94 (2022) (Commission dismissed challenge to discontinuation of Acting Captain assignment where dispute concerned loss of acting/out-of-grade assignment rather than protected permanent civil-service rank).

The Appellant’s allegations concerning lost overtime, details, OIC, or out-of-rank opportunities also do not establish a reduction in compensation for purposes of § 41. The Appeals Court has distinguished protected base compensation from speculative or supplemental earnings such as overtime and paid details. See Boston Police Dep’t v. Jones, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 766 (2020), citing White v. Boston, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 356, 360 (2003).  The Commission has similarly declined to exercise jurisdiction where the challenged action ended a specialty assignment or associated stipend but did not alter the employee’s civil service title or base compensation.  See Nichols v. Town of Norwell, 20 MCSR 293 (2007); Johnston v. Worcester Public Schools, 26 MCSR 497 (2013) (Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal of a junior building custodian whose functional assignment as “groundskeeper” and associated pay differential was ended after seven years).

Nor does the alleged change in duties, by itself, establish a transfer appealable under §§ 35 or 41.  Previous Commission decisions have distinguished a reassignment of duties within an employee’s title from a statutory transfer.  See Sullivan v. Department of Transitional Assistance, 11 MCSR 80, 81 (1998); Keady v. Boston Fire Department, 39 MCSR 111, 112 (2026), citing Sands v. City of Salem, 21 MCSR 502, 504 (2008), and Anderson v. Saugus Public Schools, 23 MCSR 45 (2010).

My recommended conclusion is limited in nature.  I do not purport to determine whether the reassignment was wise, fair, retaliatory, discriminatory, or contractually permissible. I conclude only that the Appellant’s allegations, even taken as entirely true, do not supply the jurisdictional predicate necessary for a disciplinary appeal under G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-43.

3.  The Appellant’s whistleblower and discrimination allegations do not independently confer disciplinary appeal jurisdiction.

The Appellant characterizes the discipline and reassignment as retaliation for reporting what she viewed as misuse of overtime, conflicts of interest, safety concerns, and gender-based differential treatment.  As Presiding Officer, I do not minimize the seriousness of those allegations.  The issue here is one of proper forum and jurisdiction.

A claim under the public employee whistleblower statute, G.L. c. 149, § 185, does not convert a verbal warning into an appealable disciplinary action under G.L. c. 31, § 41. The Whistleblower Act states its own cause-of-action prerequisites; it has its own remedial structure and authorizes an aggrieved employee to pursue relief in Superior Court.  Similarly, discrimination and retaliation claims may be asserted according to procedures and in forums specified elsewhere in the General Laws.  The Commission may consider evidence of retaliation or discrimination when it has an independent jurisdictional basis to review an appealable civil service action. But absent such a basis here, the Commission cannot adjudicate a stand-alone Whistleblower Act or discrimination claim within this disciplinary appeal.

This distinction is consistent with Commission decisions that have addressed whistleblower-related allegations only where the Commission otherwise had jurisdiction over a discrete appealable action, such as a suspension.  See, e.g., Leeper v. Department of Correction, 38 MCSR 449, 453 (2025); Caporelli v. City of Worcester, 21 MCSR 107 (2008).  Because the only remaining appealed discipline is a verbal warning, there is no independent jurisdictional foundation on which to adjudicate the Appellant’s whistleblower or discrimination allegations in this appeal. An experienced employment attorney may be able to advise the Appellant whether she has a viable cause of action under G.L. c. 149, § 185, G.L. c. 151B, a collective bargaining agreement, or another statute.  Those potential claims are not properly before the Commission in this disciplinary appeal.

4.  The Appellant’s retirement provides an additional basis for dismissal.

Even if the Appellant had identified an appealable action under § 41, her retirement provides an additional reason that this disciplinary appeal should be dismissed. Litigation is ordinarily moot when the party who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in the outcome. See Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976); Attorney General v. Commissioner of Insurance, 403 Mass. 370, 380 (1988).  The Commission has dismissed civil service appeals on mootness grounds where no effective relief remained available.  See Gillan v. Quincy Police Department, 17 MCSR 35 (2004).

Chapter 31 defines a person aggrieved as one whose rights were abridged, denied, or prejudiced in such a manner as to cause actual harm to the person’s employment status. G.L. c. 31, § 2.  The Appellant is no longer employed by the City.  In light of her retirement, and in the absence of an appealable action under § 41, there is no effective relief the Commission could grant in this disciplinary appeal.

5.  The separate § 2(a) investigation request is not resolved by this tentative decision.

Several months ago, the Appellant also filed a petition asking the Commission to exercise its discretionary investigatory authority under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a).  This tentative decision does not address that petition.  The Respondent in that matter, although directed to do so, has not responded to the petition and thus a show cause conference will be convened shortly.  The dismissal of the disciplinary appeal means only that the Commission lacks jurisdiction under G.L. c. 31, §§ 41-43, to hear the Appellant’s appeal from the reprimand she received.  Whether the Commission should exercise its separate investigatory authority is a distinct question that will be addressed in the context of CSC docket number I-26-087 once the Respondent has weighed in on whether such exercise of § 2(a) or § 72 authority would be appropriate.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the Commission allow the City of Chicopee’s Motion to Dismiss under 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g) and (h) and dismiss the Appellant’s disciplinary appeal docketed under CSC case number D-26-037.  This recommended dismissal is without prejudice to the Commission’s separate consideration of the Appellant’s request for an investigation under G.L. c. 31, § 2(a), and without prejudice to whatever rights or remedies the Appellant may have in another forum.

/s/ Robert L. Quinan, Jr.
Robert L. Quinan, Jr.
Commission General Counsel

Date issued: August 27, 2026

Notice to:
Holly Cote (Appellant)
Lauren F. Olan

2.  It is not necessary to resolve any such factual dispute to decide the City’s jurisdictional motion.